Multilateral regimes under
pressure from advances in
science and technology:
The examples of the CWC
and the BWC
Ralf Trapp
Disarmament Consultant
Chessenaz (France)
Overview
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Why should we worry?
GPC versus control lists
What to do about the GPC
How?
Why should we worry?
“The pace of scientific and technological
developments is now so rapid that the
implications of new scientific and
technological developments need to be
reviewed more frequently than allowed
by the five year cycle of BTWC Review
Conferences.”
(RS-IAP-ICSU international workshop on science and technology
developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, London, September 2006)
Examples
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BWC:
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Synthetic biology
Postgenomic technologies
Immunological research
Drug discovery and delivery
Agricultural and environmental biotechnology
Diagnosis and surveillance of infectious diseases
CWC:
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Most of the above, and as one consequence:
Non-lethal agents for law enforcement purposes
Combinatorial synthesis and screening
Changing production technologies
What it might lead to:
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Artificial creation of new or modified organisms with
“BW profile”
Vastly increased capacity to synthesis and screen
new chemical compounds might lead to new
candidate CW agents
Enhanced capabilities to identify potential drug
targets might have the same result
Exploitation of ethnic polymorphisms for weapons
purposes (“ethic weapons”)
Agents that may evade detection, defeat treatment
or resist decontamination
But:
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Move from discovery of new agents to
weaponisation involves a series of
steps (such as testing, formulation,
production, stability in storage,
effective dissemination, detection/
protection/decon)
These take time and effort (in fact:
they take an active programme)
CWC: SAB to RC-1
“ … while the time required for the early stages of
agent development may have shrunk considerably
as a result of these developments, the subsequent
stages in the development of such a new toxic
chemical into an effective CW (in the traditional
meaning of the term, …) are much less affected by
these developments in science and technology
… Notwithstanding these scientific developments and
the SAB’s conclusion that they do not significantly
change the situation with respect to CW, it must
also be noted that experience has shown that there
is a possibility that less sophisticated CW may be
opted for, with little regard to agent stability and
shelf life (i.e. weapons filled for immediate use).”
What has changed
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Security environment, and consequently
Notion of “militarily significant quantities”
If one includes terrorism into the threat
assessment, many of the steps required in
military programs may not be relevant; in
any case, the required quantities will be far
smaller (TICs: tens of tonnes; classical and
“make-shift” agents: kilograms; toxins:
grams; organisms: ???)
Again: why should we
worry?
The tremendous advances in biology,
biotechnology, genomics, proteomics, synthetic
biology and bioinformatics in recent years are
almost certain to lead to improved health and
well being …. Unfortunately, the possibility that
such advances will be deliberately misused to
do harm on an unprecedented scale cannot be
ignored, nor can the chance of a major
outbreak due to a laboratory accident. In short,
the knowledge and technologies that result
from life science research can be used for good
or harm, accidentally or intentionally.
(Draft Summary report from the WHO scientific working group meeting on life science
research and global health security, Geneva October 2006)
Risk assessment
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Natural outbreaks of diseases (old and
“new”), other natural incidents (poisoning –
e.g. red tides)
Accidents (spills, laboratory releases,
releases caused by fire, transportation
incidents, …)
Intentional releases (or preparations
thereof)
– States
– Non-state actors
A First Conclusion
States Parties need to assess the impact of
advances in science and technology from
the perspective of the treaty’s scope and
mandate (“object and purpose”)
But
„ They need to develop responses within a
wider context, as part of a broad and
balanced risk management strategy, if they
are to attract the support of all States
Parties
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GPC versus control lists
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Control lists can be implemented in a straightforward manner (list plus regulations, quantitative
thresholds, permits, licensing etc.)
Lists provide transparency through regulatory
processes, identify (some) potential
facilities/activities of concern, help prevent (some)
abuse
But: lists are no good in dealing with new
discoveries
GPC is the answer, but it requires an evaluation
process (what and how much is justified for
purposes not prohibited, what is not?) as well as
adoption of the GPC in national legislation
A Second Conclusion
Implementing the General
Purpose Criterion is key to
dealing with advances in Science
and Technology
But how does one implement a
criterion….
GPC in the BCW
Each State Party to this Convention
undertakes never under any circumstances
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise
acquire:
(a) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes;
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes,
take any necessary measures to prohibit
and prevent …
GPC in the CWC
Chemical weapons means the following,
together or separately:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except
when intended for purposes not prohibited
under this Convention, as long as types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes
Each State Party shall adopt the necessary
measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and
their precursors are only developed,
produced, otherwise acquired, retained,
transferred or used … for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention
What to do about the
GPC?
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Apprehensions leading to the desire
for reaffirmations that the treaty
covers all new developments?
Desire to be specific as well as
comprehensive with these
reaffirmations?
More frequent reviews of science and
technology?
BWC Review Conference
2006:
… declares that the Convention is comprehensive in
its scope and that all naturally or artificially created
or altered microbial and other biological agents and
toxins, as well as their components, regardless of
their origin and method of production and whether
they affect humans, animals or plants, of types and
in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,
are unequivocally covered by Article I.
… reaffirms that Article I applies to all scientific and
technological developments in the life sciences and
in other fields of science relevant to the
Convention.
CWC Review Conference
2003:
… The definitions contained in Article II …
were found to adequately cover these
developments and to provide for the
application of the Convention’s prohibitions
to any toxic chemical, except where …
intended for purposes not prohibited … .
… noted, however, that science is rapidly
advancing. New chemicals may have to be
assessed in relation to their relevance to
the Schedules of Chemicals ….
… requested the Council to consider the
developments in relation to additional
chemicals that may be relevant to the
Convention, and assess, inter alia, whether
these compounds should be considered in
the context of the Schedules of Chemicals.
A Third Conclusion
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Applying the GPC is essentially a process of
risk assessment / consistency evaluation
It works at the scientific/technical as well as
policy levels
It requires dialogue between these two
worlds
It requires dialogue between the States
Parties
It requires national implementation…
What should be done?
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Awareness raising at the State level of implications
of S&T advances
Awareness raising within the scientific community
of legal restrictions applicable to CBW
Strengthening of legal barriers against CB weapons
- implementation of the GPC plus universality
Development of a culture of compliance –
governance and ethical norms
… and what about verification?
Final Conclusion
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To manage the impact of science and
technology on treaty regimes, the scientific
community needs to understand and
support the treaty objectives, and the States
Parties need to understand the potential
impact of new discoveries on the regimes
The GPC is central to dealing with new
scientific discoveries and knowledge, but it
is not necessarily “self-enforcing” – there is
a need for ongoing dialogue and improved
implementation
Thank you!
Comments are welcome!