Daniel Feakes
Practical Steps for Accelerating BWC Universality
After 30 years, the membership of the BWC stands at 155, a clear majority of the countries of
the world, but it is beginning to seriously lag behind its closest counterpart, the CWC. The fact
that membership of the BWC has not even doubled since the original call for universality at
the 1st review conference suggests that the time is ripe for the 6th review conference to
consider new approaches to achieving universality. The issue of universality of all WMD
treaties has increased in salience in recent years and other treaties have adopted new
approaches and reaped the benefits. The BWC, lacking any mechanism to conduct a
sustained universality campaign has consequently lagged. The 6th BWC review conference
presents an opportunity for BWC states parties to supplement the traditional laid-back and
sporadic approach with new mechanisms which can provide increased pressure on a
sustained basis. Other treaties such as the CWC and CTBT can provide useful experience.
The current situation
Achieving the universality of the BWC has been a long-stated aim of states parties to the
Convention. The Convention entered into force on 26 March 1975 and by the end of 1975 it
had 64 member states. Thirty years later, BWC membership has grown to 155 (see annexed
status list). Universality has been a concern of BWC review conferences since the first in
1980 when the Final Declaration included the following: “The Conference notes with
satisfaction that 81 States have ratified the Convention, 6 States have acceded to the
Convention and a further 37 States have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention. The
Conference calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so
without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States
Parties thereto in the efforts to eliminate the risk of biological warfare.”1 Similar exhortations to
signatory and non-signatory states were included in all subsequent final declarations.
CWC & BWC Membership 1997-2005
States Parties
200
150
CWC
100
BWC
50
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
While 155 member states is a clear majority of the 191 UN member states2, it is not a figure
with which states parties to the BWC should be satisfied. The fact that membership of the
BWC has not even doubled since the original call for universality at the 1st review conference
suggests that the time is ripe for the 6th review conference to consider new approaches to
achieving universality. The potential of new approaches is also suggested by experience from
other, more recent multilateral treaties. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention
1
BWC, First Review Conference, BWC/CONF.1/10, “Final Declaration of the First Review Conference”.
An additional three states (Cook Islands, Holy See and Niue) are recognized as capable of taking treaty actions in
relation to treaties for which the UN is the depositary. Indeed, each of them are states parties to some of the treaties
discussed in this paper.
2
entered into force on 29 April 1997 with 87 states parties, which had grown to 105 by the end
of 1997 and which now stands at 175 (see annexed status list); a doubling of membership in
the space of eight years. Although different as it has not yet entered into force, the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty has experienced a similarly rapid growth since it
was opened for signature on 24 September 1996. During the subsequent nine years, the
CTBT has amassed 125 ratifications (but not by all of the 44 states required for it to enter into
force). Compared with the treaty to which it is most closely related, the CWC, the BWC now
lags behind by 20 member states.
The table on page 1 shows how, since 1997, the CWC has caught up with and overtaken the
BWC in terms of ratifications, while the BWC has meanwhile stagnated around the 150-mark.
Of course, both the CWC and CTBT benefit from something which the BWC lacks, namely
mechanisms (in both cases permanent secretariats) which can run intensive universality
campaigns. The opportunity to establish a similar organization for the BWC has passed and is
unlikely to return in the foreseeable future. The CWC and CTBT also benefit from having the
UN Secretary-General as
2003 with the adoption by the Executive Council (on recommendation from the 1st review
conference) of an “Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention”.10
The table on page 1 would appear to indicate that the action plan has had the desired effect
with the number of states which had neither signed nor ratified the CWC falling from 40 when
the action plan was adopted in October 2003 to 19 now.
In terms of concrete steps, the action plan called for the designation of “points of contact”
on universality, the selection of a TS official as the focal point for implementation and
coordination within the TS (the Director of the External Relations Division Mr Liu Zhixian)
and the preparation of an annual comprehensive document on planned activities. There
is also a facilitator on the plan within the Executive Council who convenes regular informal
consultations. In addition, the action plan highlighted the importance of outreach to regional
and sub-regional groupings. This approach seems to have been particularly successful with
the TS’s report on universality to the 10th CSP stressing the “excellent cooperation” with such
organizations, including the European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American
States, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the League of Arab States and the
Pacific Islands Forum.11 Cooperation with the EU led to the adoption in November 2004 of an
EU Joint Action under which the OPCW received €200,000 to organise universality-related
events in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East, Africa and Asia.12 The
OPCW has also received voluntary financial contributions towards its universality-related
activities from states parties. The TS submitted reports to the 8th and 9th sessions of the CSP
and this year’s 10th session reviewed implementation of the action plan and took further
decisions aimed at accelerating universality. In addition to continuing with the action plan and
related activities, the CSP adopted universality targets – to increase CWC membership to
180 by the end of 2006 and to achieve full universality by 2007, the tenth anniversary of the
CWC’s entry into force. A related measure was the decision to establish 29 April as a day of
remembrance for all victims of chemical warfare which should help to increase awareness of
the Convention.
Like the CWC, the CTBT benefits from having a permanent secretariat which can undertake a
sustained universality campaign. It must be made clear however, that since not all “Annex 2”
states (those 44 states which formally participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on
Disarmament, and possess either nuclear power or research reactors) have ratified the
CTBT, the treaty has not yet entered into force. However, activities undertaken by CTBT
states signatories and the PTS to encourage entry into force are similar to those carried out
by the OPCW. Of particular interest is the mechanism under Article XIV of the CTBT to
accelerate its entry into force. Under this provision, the ratifying states have so far requested
the UN Secretary-General to convene four conferences (in 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005) to
“decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to
accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.”
The BWC lacks a similar provision and such a conference is not required as the BWC has
already been in force for 30 years. However, some of the “measures to promote the entry into
force” of the CTBT adopted by the conferences might be of relevance to the BWC.13
Each Article XIV conference has decided to select one particular country as coordinator to
“promote cooperation to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, through informal
consultations with all interested countries”. To date these coordinators have been Japan
(1999), Mexico (2001) and Finland (2003) and this year Australia was selected. Alongside
these, from 2003 the conferences have also appointed “regional coordinators” who have
enabled the question of CTBT ratification to be kept on the agenda of various regional
10
The action plan is reproduced as Annex II in: Scott Spence, “Achieving Effective Action on Universality and
National Implementation: The CWC Experience”, Graham Pearson and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Strengthening the
Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conference Paper No. 13 (April 2005).
11
OPCW, “Note by the Director-General: Further Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Universality
of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, EC-42/DG.7 C-10/DG.3, 2 September 2005.
12
European Union, “Council Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP of 22 November 2004 on support for OPCW activities in the
framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Official
Journal of the European Union, L349/63, 25 November 2005.
13
For the most recent Article XIV conference Final Declaration see: Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, “Report of the Conference”, CTBT-Art.XIV/2005/6, 26 September
2005, on the internet at <http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2005/CTBT-Art-XIV-2005-6-E.pdf>
3
summits.14 From its 2003 session, the conference also decided to appoint a special
representative to “assist the coordinating State.” Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the
Netherlands was selected as special representative in 2003 and reselected in 2005. His role
is to “provide states signatories and non-signatories with information on the significance of the
treaty in the wider context of nuclear arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, with a
view to promoting the early entry into force of the CTBT.”15 Ambassador Ramaker reported to
the 2005 conference that he had visited China, Pakistan and Vietnam to encourage them to
ratify the CTBT. In addition, the conferences have requested the PTS to act as “a ‘focal
point’ where information about activities undertaken by ratifiers and signatories is collected.”
In fulfilment of this provision, the PTS submitted to the 2005 conference a report containing a
detailed listing of all activities by signatory and ratifying states including demarches, meetings
between officials, sponsorship of resolutions, workshops, ministerial statements and so on.16
After disagreement at its 2003 session, the 2005 Article XIV conference decided to consider
the establishment of a trust fund, financed through voluntary contributions, to support an
outreach programme.
Possible options for the 6th BWC review conference
If BWC states parties are to give real meaning to their consistent calls for universal adherence
to the Convention then new approaches are required to accelerate BWC universality. Given
that the measures described above seem to have had some success for the CWC and CTBT,
perhaps similar measures, suitably adapted, could be adopted by the 6th BWC review
conference. Below are some suggestions:
o
o
Universality action plan – it has already been suggested elsewhere that the review
conference adopt an action plan similar to that adopted by the OPCW.17 Such an
approach would have the benefit of being relatively uncontroversial if it was primarily an
exhortation to states parties and those not party, and would therefore probably be fairly
easy for the review conference to reach consensus. However, such a plan would not
represent much progress on the current situation. More effective would be a plan linked to
arrangements which could provide sustained effort, continued analysis and proper followup and which could employ a combination of diplomatic tools. Some possible options
follow.
Universality targets/deadlines – at its 10th session, the OPCW CSP took the action plan
concept a stage further by fixing set deadlines for universality targets to be achieved.18
Deadlines are something with which CWC states parties are familiar, but it is clear that
setting targets can concentrate minds and increase pressure. At their simplest, they
provide a timeframe within which a certain action is to be completed. There is no real
reason why most states that have joined the CWC could not also join the BWC besides a
lack of awareness and urgency. Deadlines would at least inject a sense of urgency into
the process. Perhaps the review conference could adopt a target of BWC universality by
the time of the 7th review conference. Or perhaps incremental goals such as five new
states parties every year. The setting of such goals should not be controversial and the
review conference would hopefully be able to find consensus.
14
In 2003, the following regional coordinators were appointed: For Africa - South Africa; For Eastern Europe –
Ukraine; For Latin America - Chile and Venezuela; For North America and Western Europe - Austria, Canada and
Spain; For South East Asia and Pacific - Japan, Korea and Philippines.
15
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, “Activities
Undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States Under Measure (k) of the Final Declaration of the 2003 Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in the Period September 2003 – September 2005”, CTBT –
Art.XIV/2005/4, 16 September 2005, p. 18, on the internet at <http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2005/CTBTArt-XIV-2005-4.pdf>
16
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, “Activities
Undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States Under Measure (k) of the Final Declaration of the 2003 Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in the Period September 2003 – September 2005”, CTBT –
Art.XIV/2005/4, 16 September 2005, on the internet at <http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2005/CTBT-ArtXIV-2005-4.pdf>
17
Scott Spence, “Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC Experience”,
Graham Pearson and Malcolm Dando (eds.), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, Review Conference
Paper No. 13 (April 2005), Canada, [undated], “Canadian Non-Paper: Looking Forward to the 2006 BTWC Review
Conference”.
18
OPCW, “Decision: Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Implementation of the Universality
Action Plan”, C-10/DEC.11, 10 November 2005.
4
o
o
o
Coordinator, regional coordinators and special representative – this concept might
be too specific to the CTBT Article XIV process to be replicated in the BWC. Also the
three BWC depositary governments might not appreciate the implicit assumption that they
have not been sufficiently active. However, the appointment of a state with specific
responsibility for increasing BWC universality, particularly if combined with regional
coordinators and a special representative as in the CTBT, could be an effective
mechanism for sustaining pressure on non-states parties at a high level and increasing
awareness of the BWC at a regional and sub-regional level. It would also not be
particularly costly. Such an approach would increase the visibility of the BWC on the
international scene and the special representative could act as the ‘face’ of the
Convention for non-states parties. Personal diplomacy on an informal basis by a number
of ambassadors can often be more effective than formally urging states to join a treaty in
a set-piece speech. However, Ambassador Ramaker recently warned that “the
appointment of a Special Representative to promote the ratification process is no magic
formula. After all I cannot act as a substitute for a genuine political commitment at the
political, if not the highest political, level to further the ratification process.”19
Joint missions/workshops – while activities undertaken solely within the BWC will be
an improvement on the current situation, more effective might be joint missions with other
international organizations. Experience from the OPCW could be instructive here. In its
background paper to the first CWC review conference, the TS stated that efforts towards
universality could benefit from “cooperation with other international organisations and
agencies, in particular the UN, and the synchronisation of activities of common interest in
order to create a synergy of purpose.”20 While it has previously been argued that
international organizations guard their turf jealously, perhaps recent cross-WMD
initiatives such as UNSCR 1540 and the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD
are breaking down such attitudes. As an example, in August 2004 the OPCW conducted
a bilateral visit to Myanmar in conjunction with DDA, IAEA and the CTBTO. Perhaps
BWC coordinators or the special representative could take part in future joint missions
involving states not party to the BWC. The attached status list illustrates just how many
signatory and non-signatory states are shared between the Geneva Protocol, the BWC,
the CWC and the CTBT. The concept might also be worth broadening beyond
coordinating bilateral visits; for example many of the participants in an OPCW workshop
might also be responsible for the BWC within their own countries. Why not take
advantage of their all being in the same place and also discuss the BWC?21 Obviously not
under the OPCW name and not paid for by the OPCW but perhaps as an extra day
organized and paid for by the host country, or the EU, or the UN. Such an approach could
be extended further to include the Geneva Protocol which lags even the BWC in terms of
membership. Many states have implicitly accepted the Geneva Protocol by joining the
BWC and CWC, but they should be encouraged to make their commitment explicit, while
existing states parties need to be encouraged to withdraw their reservations. In many
countries, the same officials are responsible for all ‘WMD’ treaties so a joined-up
approach would be both logical and cost-effective.
Trust fund – any initiatives beyond the merely rhetorical are likely to cost money. The
travel costs associated with coordinators, regional coordinators and special
representatives and perhaps even workshops might be picked up by those states parties
involved. However, the model of a trust fund financed by voluntary contributions as
adopted by the 2005 CTBT Article XIV conference has a lot to recommend it. It avoids the
problems and administrative burden that could arise if all states parties were required to
contribute and does not depend on the finite resources of the UN. It is clear from the
OPCW that states are willing to contribute financially to universality activities, particularly
in their own regions. The EU is about to adopt a Joint Action on the BWC which will
apparently provide funding for universality activities. While welcome, such funding might
19
Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, “Presentation by Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the
Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”, VERTIC seminar “Facilitating the Early Entry into Force of the
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Overcoming Political and Technological Challenges”, 22 September
2005, on the internet at <http://www.vertic.org/assets/VERTIC%20Seminar%20CTBT%2022%2009%2005.pdf>
20
OPCW, “Technical Secretariat: Background Paper on Universal Adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention”,
RC-1/S/5, 25 April 2003, on the internet at <http://www.opcw.org/docs/rc1s05.pdf>
21
For example, at the recent OPCW workshop in Addis Ababa, six of the countries attending were signatories or nonsignatories of the BWC. It is likely that the officials attending would be those responsible for BWC as well as CWC
ratification.
5
o
be better paid into a common pot open to others and overseen by staff who could then
allocate it on the basis of priorities.
Collaboration with civil society – not a subject for review conference decision but
perhaps for individual states parties or regional organizations. While ‘top-down’
interventions from other states such as demarches frequently produce results they can
also be sporadic and rapidly forgotten. In contrast, if local civil society can be ‘recruited’ to
campaign for BWC membership through their media, parliament etc they can not only
conduct a more sustained campaign, their ‘bottom-up’ approach might be better received
by officials and ministers than an approach from abroad. In addition, local groups often
have better contacts within governments and understand more about the national political
and legal processes. Ideally, a combined approach would be adopted in which ‘top-down’
and ‘bottom-up’ interventions were coordinated. However, it can be problematic for states
to be seen to be ‘stirring up’ NGOs in other states, so a discreet approach will be
required. Such an approach could be made by the coordinators or special representative
or alternatively the EU might be able to coordinate along the lines of its 2004 action plan
on the International Criminal Court.22 This action plan states that the EU has been
involved in funding awareness-raising campaigns led by NGOs, calls for the development
of country or region-specific strategies and establishes an EU focal point on the ICC.
Even without coordination with states, it should be possible for civil society itself to adopt
more innovative approaches to encouraging BWC universality. For example, the Coalition
for an International Criminal Court runs a universal ratification campaign in which it
focuses on one state not party to the Rome Statute every month. The CICC’s website
gives information on the particular country, provides addresses of the leaders, foreign
ministers and justice ministers and gives a form letter for individuals to send. Perhaps the
BioWeapons Prevention Project could run a similar campaign, ideally funded by some
states parties or the EU. Of BWPP’s current network members, one is in a BWC signatory
state (Malawi) and another is in a BWC non-signatory state (Zambia).
Conclusion
A combination of some or all of the options listed above would go a long way towards
accelerating BWC universality. Also worth considering is the idea of combining efforts to
achieve universality with those to improve national implementation, as Sergey Batsanov
recommends in his paper for this workshop.23 Membership of the BWC is an obvious
prerequisite of national implementation, and the Convention is strengthened not just by
bringing in new member states but by bringing in member states able to implement the BWC
effectively. National implementation is currently a high-salience issue within the BWC as one
of the five topics selected for discussion during the inter-sessional process and with the
requirements of UNSCR 1540. It might therefore be useful for the 6th review conference to link
the two issues when it considers them next year.
For the past 30 years, the BWC has lacked a constant champion able to devote sustained
and high-level energy to encouraging universality. The depositaries have done their bit, but
the way in which the treaty has been overhauled, particularly by the CWC, illustrates that
much more needs to be done. An action plan and deadlines would create the legitimacy and
urgency for a campaign on BWC universality. Global and regional coordinators and a special
representative would increase the visibility of the Convention and could act as the ‘foot
soldiers’ spreading the message. Their effectiveness (and cost-effectiveness) would be
increased if such outreach could be undertaken in synergy with other organizations such as
the UN, the OPCW, the IAEA and the CTBTO. Finally, it should be stressed that the
Convention does not just belong to its states parties and that civil society must therefore
actively support efforts to accelerate and achieve BWC universality.
22
EU, “Action Plan to Follow-Up on the Common Position on the International Criminal Court”, 4 February 2004, on
the internet at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf>
23
rd
Sergey Batsanov, “OPCW – What Next?”, paper prepared for the 23 workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on
the Implementation of the CBW Conventions, Achieving a Successful Outcome of the Sixth Review Conference, 3-4
December 2005, Geneva.
6
Annex
Status of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 1972 BWC, 1993 CWC
and 1996 CTBT
(as of 27 November 2005)
X = state party to treaty
Light grey = signatory state
Dark grey = non-signatory state
1925 GP
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo Republic of the
Cook Islands*
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1972
BWC
X
X
X
1993
CWC
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
1996
CTBT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
7
46. Czech Republic
47. Democratic People's Republic of
Korea
48. Democratic Republic of the Congo
49. Denmark
50. Djibouti
51. Dominica
52. Dominican Republic
53. Ecuador
54. Egypt
55. El Salvador
56. Equatorial Guinea
57. Eritrea
58. Estonia
59. Ethiopia
60. Fiji
61. Finland
62. France
63. Gabon
64. Gambia
65. Georgia
66. Germany
67. Ghana
68. Greece
69. Grenada
70. Guatemala
71. Guinea
72. Guinea-Bissau
73. Guyana
74. Haiti
75. Holy See*
76. Honduras
77. Hungary
78. Iceland
79. India
80. Indonesia
81. Iran Islamic Republic of
82. Iraq
83. Ireland
84. Israel
85. Italy
86. Jamaica
87. Japan
88. Jordan
89. Kazakhstan
90. Kenya
91. Kiribati
92. Kuwait
93. Kyrgyzstan
94. Lao People's Democratic Republic
95. Latvia
96. Lebanon
97. Lesotho
98. Liberia
99. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
100. Liechtenstein
101. Lithuania
102. Luxembourg
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
8
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia Federated States of
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Niue*
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
9
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Thailand
The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela Bolivarian Republic of
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
* The UN recognizes 194 states as being capable of taking treaty actions in relation to treaties for which the UN is the
depositary. These are the 191 member states of the UN, plus the observer state the Holy See and two non-members,
the Cook Islands and Niue. Cook Islands is a state party to the CWC and CTBT, the Holy See is a state party to the
GP, BWC, CWC and CTBT and Niue is a state party to the CWC.
10