Partisanship Renewal.
Evidence of the rise in partisanship of the electorate
1) The Crossover vote for the Presidency
These are self-declared Democrats or Republicans who vote for the other candidate
at an election. The lower the cross-over vote the higher the degree of partisan
loyalty. However this is a weak measure of partisanship since in a presidential race a
single man’s character and issues can easily affect the cross-over vote
Republican vote for
Democrat vote for
1988 D - Dukakis
8%
82%
R – Bush
91%
17%
1992 D - Clinton
10%
77%*
R – Bush
73%*
10%
1996 D - Clinton
13%
84%
R – Dole
80%
10%
2000 D - Gore
8%
86%
R – Bush
91%
11% (ouch!)
2004 D – Kerry
6%
89%
R – Bush
93%
11%
2008 D - Obama
9%
89%
R - McCain
90%
10%
*The presence of Ross Perot significantly skews the 1992 figures
These figures seem to show the solidity of the Republican vote behind Bush since
2000 which stayed true with McCain in 2008, or perhaps the increased levels of
partisanship. The Democrat vote generally seems less firm and the coalition may be
more difficult to hold together than the Republican one. However note that in each
of the presidential elections 1988- 2004 (excluding the 1992 third party effect) the
Democrat vote for the Democrat candidate also rose and it stayed at this high level
of correlation with party identification in 2008. EV These are only figures from those
who voted, it is possible that many Republicans expressed their dissatisfaction with
McCain by not voting.
The thesis of partisan decline is a little undermined by the fact that in 80% of the
elections since 1952 the party that got the highest percentage support from its own
party identifiers won the election. 2008 is thus a rare case when the Republicans
showed greater cohesion (albeit by only one percentage point) than the Democrats
but still lost. This emphasises once again the colossal importance of the effective
campaign organisation of Obama in the field offices who ensured that the Democrat
vote mobilised in much greater numbers than the Republicans did.
22 | P a g e
2) The decline in split-ticket voting from 1996 onwards. This went from 25% of
districts in 1996 to just 14% of districts in 2004, although it has risen again by 24 split
districts in 2008 (see CQ here). This would seem to indicate the growing partisanship
of voters who had been increasingly voting a straight ticket up until 2008. Split ticket
voting fell by 56% between 1984 and 2008 (although it rose 41% between 2004 and
2008!)
3) The increasingly partisan gap in the Obama job approval ratings figures (which may
be a product of the ideological battle over health care and the role of the state). This
partisan gap is at a record for a first term president.
Job approval rating for
Total % Rep % Dem % Ind % Rep - Dem Gap
first year presidents
Obama, March 9-12, 2009
59
27
88
57
-61
Bush, April 18-22, 2001
55
87
36
56
+51
Clinton, April 1-4, 1993
49
26
71
47
-45
Bush, May 4-7, 1989
56
79
41
48
+38
Reagan, March 13-16, 1981
60
87
41
61
+46
Carter, March 25- 28, 1977
72
56
81
70
-25
Nixon, March 16-18, 1969
65
84
55
65
+29
Sources: Combination of Pew and Gallup poll data.
4) From 2006 onwards the evidence seems to point to a growing partisan attachment
to the Democrats among voters. Although the lack of party registration makes this
difficult to see across all states there has been a marked rise in Democratic
registration from 2006 onwards. This accelerated throughout the presidential
primaries (USA Today article here) and continued into the presidential campaign period
itself (Washington Post article here is excellent). Among the 29 states with registration
data, the percentage of those who have signed on with Democrats has risen in 15
states since 2004, and the percentage for Republicans has risen in six, according to
state data. The number of registered Democrats fell in 11 states, compared with 20
states where Republican registration numbers fell. (NY Times Graphic) Is this just an
Obama factor, particularly as a product of the close primary battle which raised
Democrat party registration? The fact that it seems to have begun before the 2006
midterms would argue against this explanation. A further counter-argument to the
“Obama” effect argument would be to point to state and local elections, 23 state
legislatures were controlled by the Democrats and 14 by Republicans, with 12 states
with divided chambers (Nebraska has a nonpartisan legislature) in August 2008.
After the 2000 election, 16 state legislatures were dominated by Democrats, and 17
by Republicans, with 16 divided. In 2009 there are 28 Democratic Governors and 22
Republican ones but in 2000 there were only 19 Democrats and 31 Republicans. The
Democrats appear to be on the ascendancy from the grassroots upwards!
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This increase in registration could also be seen in a rise in party identification with
the Democrats if you take the “leaning Democrats” into account as well as the solid
Democrat voters.
The Democratic partisan advantage opens up?
55
50
45
Democrat or lean
Democrat %
40
Republican or lean
Republican %
35
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
30
This point would argue that 2008 may well prove to be a re-aligning or “critical” election to
use the phrase of V.O. Key. (see realignment section later)
5) There is some evidence of an emerging policy based divide in 2009 over the extent of
the government’s role in the economy. Some of the anti-government sentiment has
spread out into the Tea Party (Tax Enough Already) protest movement which is, at
least nominally meant to be non-partisan, although in practice there is likely to be a
degree of sympathy of Tea Partiers with the economically conservative positions of
the Republicans or the Blue Dogs. This has particularly emerged over the healthcare
debate. In the February 2010 Pew Research Survey there was a considerable divide
between the Democrat and Republican voters who were concerned about the
government becoming too involved in healthcare. 68% of Republican voters agreed
that they were concerned that the government was looking to play too large a role in
healthcare as opposed to just 29% of Democrats (a 39% point split which is an
uncommon degree of partisan alignment in the electorate over a single policy issue).
There has also been a considerable widening of attitudes over social security
provision in recent years. (see Pew p. 99)
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Causes of Partisan Renewal?
1) The great sorting out of the electorate to cement the link between ideology and
partisanship: 1940- present day. This itself can be seen as a product of the civil rights
revolution, feminism, gays rights, questions about America’s place in the world and
on the conservative side the growing popularity of evangelical churches from the
1960s onwards.
2) Changes in party discipline arrangements employed by liberals in wake of WWII
such as the reforms to seniority rules.
3) The rise of primaries which tie the candidate to a more radical wing of the party as
the membership of the party has become more polarised. Growth of right wing
pressure groups enforcing discipline such as Club for Growth and their funding of
ideological purists in closed primaries
4) Reagan.
He wooed conservative Democrats away and made the Republican party more
ideological, driven by monetarist goals of rolling back the state. He was ideological
where previous incumbents, Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford had been centrists and
compromisers.
5) End of the Cold War. Split the foreign policy consensus since then. Unilateralist
Republican neo-conservatives have increasingly faced hostility from multilateralist
liberal Democrats in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine. This
internationalism has also emerged in environmental and international criminal court
debates. 9/11 reopened the foreign policy cleavage in US politics that had been
dormant since the end of the Cold War and became a clear delineator on party lines.
(By 2003 Republican voters favoured a more aggressive foreign policy over
Democrats by more than 25% points).
6) Clinton. Reopened the divisive moral issues sex, the role of women and the nature of
authority while the Christian right was growing in strength simultaneously.
7) Bush and his officials rejected the idea of controlling the centre of politics to control
the electorate in 2000 and 2004 and instead championed a 51% solution relying on
turning out the Republican base to ensure victory.
8) The Rise of the Christian Right
Republicans seeking to reverse decades of liberal government reforms from the
1980s onwards and in particular since the Republican Revolution in 1994 have
ensured that their troops towed a much tighter line on policy by having a much more
centrally directed party line.
2000- 2008 elections became more ideological with certainly a relatively right wing
Republican campaigning against more liberal Democrats. The most important issue
in 2004 was “moral values”. There has been an increase in the number of people
calling themselves “liberal” or “conservative” since 1990.
25 | P a g e
9) The Rise in Democrat Party Registration since 2004 and Identification since 2002.
This could be attributable to:
• Bush disapproval and an unpopular war (short term factor)
• Disenchantment with the whole idea of free-market capitalism left to its own
devices without government regulation and intervention in the wake of the
economic collapse which could totally undermine the ideological basis of
Republican monetarist economics. (Greenspan – my paradigm model was
flawed). This would be a devastating and realigning long term blow to the
Republicans were this to be true.
• Support for Keynesian/ New Deal interventionism at a time of economic
collapse i.e. will the New Deal coalition reform now that the circumstances
support it and the liberal agenda of the Democrats is playing towards this
(Blue Dog fiscal conservatism might halt this in its tracks)
• Demographic factors – such as the rise in the number of younger voters and
the increasing spread of urbanisation into the suburbs as the urban
population grows.
10) Technology. Increasingly media is chosen rather than being forced upon consumers.
Now people “tune in” to like-minded news channels, talk radio stations, weblogs etc.
which endorse and affirm opinions rather than questioning them. Figures from
October 2008 on the partisanship profile of different news organisations and media
made interesting reading:
Rep %
Dem%
Ind %
Fox News
52
17
30
MSNBC
11
50
36
CNN
13
45
38
Internet
24
34
38
Newspapers
22
41
34
Radio
31
31
34
General Public
25
35
35
Source: Pew Research Centre
Perhaps these figures also lend weight to the Karl Rove and Bruce Keith thesis about
the mythical “independent” voter. Are 30% of the Fox News audience really
“independent” or are they more likely to be silent Republicans?
11) It never really declined?
In 1992 Bruce Keith et al wrote The Myth of the Independent Voter which challenged how
“independent” those who proclaimed to be so in opinion polls really were. They believed
that these “independents” retained a leaning for one party and that the number of true
independents has in fact remained relatively constant over time. This is the thesis favoured
26 | P a g e
by Karl Rove for the Republicans and certainly between 2000 and 2008 he built an expert
winning coalition of support behind Bush.
Positive aspects of increasing partisanship of parties:
1) Voters are offered distinct choices. In 1980 less than 50% of voters told polls that
they saw a clear difference between the policies of the parties. In 2008 75% of voters
say they see a marked difference between the parties. This could be a cause of the
increased levels of participation in elections (129 million in 2008 – 63%), nearly 26
million more than in 2000. The American Political Science Association published a
report in 1950 calling for a more responsible 2 party system which would allow
parties to pass “coherent programmes” and James Macgregor Burns wrote of “The
deadlock of democracy” compelled to govern “by consensus and coalition” in 1963.
2) More people volunteering for campaigns and donating money than ever before.
Between 2000 and 2008 the number of small donors has increased more than sixfold
in the presidential campaign.
3) More cohesive congressional parties may make political accountability at elections
easier to ascribe. It may also make legislating an easier process. (although 2009does not seem to suggest this is the case)
Negative consequences of the “hyper-partisanship” of parties – term invented by Ken
Mehlmann Chair of RNC 2005-07 and Campaign Manager Bush 04:
1) Disaffected middle ground could result in low participation and turnout.
2) Big switches in policy direction should the party in power change suddenly.
3) Toxic environment which empowers the most flagrant activist and encourages
adversarial politics regardless of the sense spoken by the other side.
4) Can create divided government and gridlock (Clinton 94-96, Bush 06-08)
5) Produce a failure to address the most important questions because they cause too
much internal division within the party in power – such as Welfare reform/ Social
Security reform and the ageing population impact on pensions/ the lack of
sustainable funding for Medicare/ the size of the national debt.
6) It means that neither mainstream party can really claim to speak for the whole
nation.
(See conservative Democrat Senator Evan Bayh’s resignation announcement here on his
dislike of the partisan nature of the congressional system on 15th February 2010.)
27 | P a g e
The Red–Blue Nation and 50/50 nation debates
The Red State/ Blue State phenomenon refers to the conventional Republican RED shading
of states on electoral college maps and the Democratic BLUE shading (some maps are
reversed so be careful), but it also has come to be used since 2000 to refer to an increasing
divide in US Politics. This is the increasingly conservative/ liberal and geographical divides in
the support for the parties.
This article from the National Post is one of the best summaries of the standard red state/ blue state
argument BUT note that these are both COUNTIES within the state of North Carolina one of the most
symbolic swing states that voted for Obama in 2008.
Arguments for the 50/50 nation – polarised and (equally) divided?:
1) Popular Voting Figures and other institutions.
The Fifty-Fifty Nation in 2000:
In 1996 Clinton won 49.2%, the House vote was 48.9% Democrat in 1996 and 1998.
In 2000 both major candidates got 49% of the popular vote, separated by only 539,947
votes out of 103 million. The Electoral College was even 271- 267. The House was 221 – 2122 a majority of just 7. The Senate was 50 -50. Even the Supreme Court only voted to stop the
recounts in Florida by 5 -4 !
The House vote was 48.3% Republican and only 52.9% in 2002.
Even in 2004 the presidential vote was 50.7% R 48% D and only 286-252. Only New Mexico,
New Hampshire and Iowa changed hands and 419 of the congressional districts voted for
the same party for president as they had in 2000.
(EV: Although the House went 232- 202- 1 Republican, and the Senate was 55- 45
Republican so the 50/50 was already disappearing at congressional level – BUT the House
vote was still 50.4% Republican)
The Senate went 49 – 49 -2 in 2006 and the House simply reversed to 232-202-1 Democrat.
28 | P a g e
2) In 2002 the party identification figures were 31% Democrat, 30% Republican
and 30% independent. In 2009 they have again moved back towards closer PI
between the parties when you include leaning party identifiers.
Party identification tightens in 2009
% Democrat or lean Democrat
51.7
38.7
% Republican or lean Republican
48.8
39.6
48.2
47.2
42.4
42.2
3) RED America is white or Hispanic (Cuban), male, rural or surburban, older,
wealthy, Protestant or sometimes Catholic until 2008 and conservative. It goes to
church once a week or more and lives in the South and the Midwest.
As can be seen in the above Pew Research survey findings in October 2008, the notion that
these states were “red” was possibly true in the 1990s but the figures for party
identification became much tighter in 2004 and again in 2008.
(FUN: It is perhaps not quite so bad as the caricatures of the Red State update though!)
BLUE America is a rainbow coalition of white, black, Asian and Hispanic. It is
more female than male. It is younger, poorer, urban and liberal and churchgoing
is not that important to many of them. They live in the West and the Northeast.
The notion that these were blue states did seem borne out by the same Pew
Research in October 2008 though.
st
See Gallup article here from February 1 2010 arguing for the continued Red State/ Blue state
divide.
4) Partisanship has increased in Congress
(also see History of Partisanship notes)
This argument fits in here if partisanship in Congress mirrors the partisanship in the country.
This thesis is fiercely contested by some commentators such as Morris Fiorina.
See this fascinating map/ study of roll-call voting in the 111th Congress looking at the party
unity and presidential support ratings of all of the members of Congress to show how broad
29 | P a g e
the 2009 coalitions of the parties are from Congressional Quarterly but also how PARTISAN
the 111th Congress appears to have been already. Remember that in US Politics the party
label tends to be far less important than in the UK and perhaps nowhere is this seen more
than in the voting records of Congressmen and Senators. Although this has become
increasingly partisan in recent years as shown by the roll call votes above it is still very true
that there is a geographical divide within the parties with Northern Republicans tending to
vote in a more moderate fashion (they would NEVER allow the term liberal to be used) and
particularly Southern Democrats tending to vote in a much more conservative fashion than
their party label. In other words the party whip is not strong and the different demands of
different electorates place strains on the broad ideological coalitions that are present within
both parties (but in particular the Democrats in Congress). Congressmen owe primary
allegiance to their constituents as patronage powers of the president are weak to nonexistent given the separation of powers and candidates run and fund their own campaigns
in a far more individual manner, less tied to the party than in virtually any other democracy
due to the huge importance of primaries and the restrictions on campaign finance. This is
certainly being stretched under Obama over healthcare with the strength of the Blue Dog
caucus on the rise. See National Journal article: will healthcare provoke a Republican Revolution as in 1994
Congressional partisanship in 2008
The following fantastic extensive interactive resource from the National Journal magazine
analyses how liberal and conservative House and Senate members are compared to their
peers on the Economy, Social and Foreign policy roll call votes in the 2008 session. It gives
scores for how liberal or conservative the members voting record has been over 2008 and
can rank the chamber on any of the data:
House roll call votes 2008
The 10 most conservative
Democrats in the House
2008
Senate roll call votes 2008
The 10 most
conservative
Democrats in the
Senate 2008
The 10 most
moderate
Republicans in the
House 2008
Jim Marshall (Ga8)
Ben Nelson (Neb)
Chris Smith (NJ4)
Susan Collins (Maine)
Dan Boren (Okla2)
Mary Landrieu (La)
Chris Shays (Conn4)
Gordon Smith (Ore)
Brad Ellsworth (Ind8)
Claire McCaskill (Mo)
Michael Castle (Del AL)
Arlen Specter (Penn)
Lisa Murkowski (Alaska)
Ted Stevens (Alaska)
Chuck Hagel (Neb.)
1
2
3
4
5
Nick Lampson (Tex22)
Evan Bayh (Ind)
Wayne Gilchrest (Md1)
John Barrow (Ga12)
Tim Johnson (SD)
6
7
8
9
10
Joe Donnelly (Ind2)
Mark Pryor (Ark)
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(Fla18)
Jim Ramstad (Minn3)
Don Cazayoux (La6)
Joe Lieberman (ID Conn)
Jon Porter (Nev3)
The 10 most
moderate
Republicans in the
Senate 2008
Olympia Snowe (Maine)
Jim Matheson (Utah2)
Thomas Carper (Del)
Mark Kirk (Ill10)
John Warner (Va)
Melissa Bean (Ill8)
Jon Tester (Mont)
Jim Gerlach (Penn6)
Elizabeth Dole (NC)
Jason Altmire (Penn4)
Jim Webb (Va)
Lincoln Diaz-Balart
(Fla21)
Norm Coleman (Minn)
Defeated or did not run!
30 | P a g e
Analysis of the House figures
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
There were 219 Democrats ranked with a more liberal voting record than the
most moderate Republican Wayne Gilchrest of Maryland, who was especially
liberal in his foreign policy voting record.
There was no Democrat ranked less liberal than Jon Porter (the 7th most
moderate Republican) indicating a VERY partisan House.
There were 191 Republicans ranked with a more conservative voting record
than the most conservative Democrat Nick Lampson of Texas.
Wayne Gilchrest (R Md) ranked as less conservative than 11 House
Democrats.
Note the geographic split that would be expected, 5 of the most conservative
Democrats are Southern Congressmen (the others will be due to the
composition of specific districts). The top 4 most moderate Republicans are
all from the Northeast and 3 more are from the Upper Midwest, a region
trending more Democrat.
8 of the 10 conservative Democrat Congressmen are current members of the
“Blue Dog” coalition and the other two Cazayoux (was a special election
member) and Lampson (also a Blue Dog) were both defeated in 2008.
2 of the 4 House incumbents defeated in primaries in Maryland in the 2008
congressional elections were removed for not toeing the party line enough.
(Wayne Gilchrest for not being conservative enough, he had supported a
timetable for a phased withdrawal from Iraq).
House Roll Call Votes throughout the Bush presidency: (click to interact)
Analysis of the Senate figures:
•
•
•
•
There were 44 Democrats and the 2 Independents ranked with a more liberal
voting record than Olympia Snowe the most moderate Republican Senator.
No Democrat was ranked as being less liberal than Gordon Smith of Oregon,
again indicating a VERY partisan Senate.
There were 46 Republicans ranked with a more conservative voting record
than the most conservative Democrat Evan Bayh of Indiana.
The moderate voting record of the Coleman, Dole, Smith and Stevens did not
save them from incumbency defeat in 2008, Hagel (led the blocking of the
Kyoto Protocol signing in the Senate) and Warner (once married to Elizabeth
Taylor) both retired and Arlen Specter switched to the Democrats. Thus the
moderate Republican Senate was decimated in the 2008 Democratic surge in
the Senate, probably making the institution even more partisan in 2009.
Senate Roll Call Votes throughout Bush presidency: (click to interact)
31 | P a g e
Another useful site measuring ideological affiliation of members of Congress is the ratings
provided by the very influential American Conservative Union (ACU).
It seems true that the parties are more polarised in Congress and perhaps the party
activists are more polarised but this does NOT mean that the American public as a whole
are more polarised. (This is Morris Fiorina’s - Myth of the Culture War contention that
individuals are not any more partisan but that as groups America has become so – i.e.
stance of most people on abortion is similar from both parties and fairly centrist).
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Arguments against the 50/50 Nation:
1) Popular Voting Figures and other institutions.
America has become more partisan since 2000 but is also leaning more towards the
Democrats. The key facts in favour of the 50/50 nation are now blown out of the water by
2008 results:
Presidency:
Obama took 53% to McCain’s 46% a clear margin that is no longer 50/50. (EV: the MALE
vote is now 49% D 48% R in 2008)
Obama won the electoral college by 365- 173, no longer a close win as in 2000 and 2004.
Congress:
The House is now overwhelmingly Democrat after 2006 and 2008 combined they have a
majority of 79 (257- 178) rather than the majority of 7 in 2001-03. (EV: The popular vote
was closer but still a 53% D – 45% R split in 2008 rather than 47.3% R – 47% D).
The Senate is now overwhelmingly Democrat, in 2009 they have 58 (and the support of
the two independents) and a SUPER MAJORITY for the first time since 1977 rather than
the 50 – 50 split that exemplified the 50/50 nation in 2000. (EV: The popular vote is much
closer but still a 51% D – 45% R split in 2008 rather than 48.3% D- 47.7% R in 2000).
State level:
The Democrats now lead the Republicans in Governorships by 28- 22 in 2009.
2) The era of equal party identification is over? Since 2002 the gap between the
Democrats and Republicans widened with firm Democrats in 2009 at 35%,
Republicans 23% and independents 36%. (see Pew research figures in party
identification notes) When leaners are taken into account as well this trend is
magnified, see chart below.
55
50
45
Democrat or lean
Democrat %
40
Republican or lean
Republican %
35
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
30
This increasing trend towards “leaning” one way or the other is a key factor in the argument
against the idea that the US has become increasingly polarised. In 1960 only 6% of
33 | P a g e
independents were identified as leaning Democrat and 7% as leaning Republican. In 2009
these were 17% and 12% respectively. Thus the strong affiliation with the party may have
gone but there is still a weak affiliation – hardly polarised sentiment. If anything this argues
for more centrist tendencies and not a RED/BLUE divide at all.
However in 2009 the move towards the Democrats began to slip away and reverse in the
light of the recession, unpopular wars and Obama’s interventionist state agenda
(healthcare/stimulus/cap and trade) and this saw the growth in the Tea Party movement
and the rise in independents again (see argument 2 in pro-50/50 case).
So perhaps we are moving back towards more even party identification again?
See this 2010 Gallup evidence on PI here on a state by state basis.
Critique of this Gallup analysis of PI as partisanship from Rothenburg report here
3) The 50/50 hypothesis is and was only really valid in suburban areas.
The nation as a whole is red/blue in rural and urban areas
District
Urban
Rural
Suburban
Mixed
2008 Republican %
28
53
50
39
2008 Democrat %
70
45
48
59
District
Urban (90)
Rural (61)
Suburban (220)
Mixed (64)
2004 Republican %
38
54
51
57
2004 Democrat %
61
43
48
42
District
Urban
Rural
Suburban
Mixed
2000 Republican %
26
59
49
40
2000 Democrat %
71
37
47
57
EV: these were more than half of the districts 220/435 in 2004 and 49% of them in the 2008
figures! Even in the year meant to be the “height” of the split 50/50 nation in 2000 only the
suburbs had 49% R – 47% D.
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