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H U IVI AIN U I IVl I I:IUIN
Human and Habitat Needs in Disaster Relief
for Pacific Northwest Salmon Fisheries
By Courtland L. Smith and Jennifer Gilden
Abstract
Since 1994, federal disaster relief programs have been implemented for New England, Pacific
Coast, and Gulf Coast fisheries. The Pacific Northwest coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) fishery
serves as a case study for results of a disaster relief program. To help salmon fishers, the U.S. government declared an ecological disaster and provided $37 million in relief over 3 years. Relief
efforts included an emergency program that provided limited, one-year assistance to an estimated
two-thirds of the salmon gillnetters and trollers in Oregon, Washington, and California. A multiyear Northwest Emergency Assistance Program (NEAP) sought to reverse harmful habitat and
capacity conditions and helped a quarter of the salmon gillnetters and trollers. NEAP was an
important catalyst for programs to restore habitat, one of the primary causes of salmon stock
decline. Interview, survey, and documentary data suggest that disaster relief helped commercial
fishers continue fishing but did not adequately meet many human needs for assistance.
I
n May 1994, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
announced an emergency assistance package
for salmon fishers in Oregon, Washington,
and California. Disaster relief was a new concept in fisheries. Two months earlier, the secretary of
commerce had announced an emergency assistance
package for the New England groundfish fishery. A year
later, Gulf of Mexico fishery disaster assistance was
necessitated by "the immediate and secondary effects of
hurricanes and floods which have occurred since August
22, 1992" (NOAA 1998). These experiences, combined
with the Pacific Northwest disaster, led to Section 312 (a)
of the 1996 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (M-SFCMA, 16 U.S.C. 1861a), which
authorizes the secretary of commerce to establish disaster relief programs. Subsequently, policy makers and
fishers discussed disaster relief for Pacific Northwest
groundfish and Alaska salmon, crab, and pollock.
When the Pacific Fishery Management Council
(PFMC) announced closure of the ocean coho salmon
(Oncorhynchus kisutch) fishery and restricted the chinook salmon (O. tshawytscha) fishery to reduce its
impacts on coho salmon stocks, fishing industry members and political leaders called for help. Fishers, as
independent businesses, are not eligible for the state
and federal assistance programs available to employees
of firms. To provide assistance, federal officials used an
approach more commonly used in agriculture-they
declared a natural disaster, which allowed federal
funds to be used for relief.
CourtlandL. Smith is a Professor at the Departments of
Anthropology and Fisheriesand Wildlife, Oregon State University, 238 Waldo Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331, [email protected]
and Jennifer Gilden is a Research Assistant of the Oregon Sea
Grant Program, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331.
6 * Fisheries
Many studies have explored the reasons behind the
decline of coho and chinook salmon stocks (Nehlsen et
al. 1991; Huntington et al. 1996; Governor Kitzhaber's
Natural Resource Office 1997). All studies point to habitat problems and fishing overcapacity as major causes of
salmon decline. The secretary of commerce's disaster
declaration cited the following environmental causes:
"(1) An extended drought in California; (2) less than normal snowpack throughout the western United States;
(3) drought followed by extensive flooding in the State of
Washington; and (4) an extreme El Nifio ocean warming
event during 1992-93, which is believed to have been
responsible for poor salmon survival" (59 FR 28839).
The disaster contributed to the already considerable
problems facing salmon fishers. Since passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976,
salmon fishers have faced increasingly numerous, complex, and restrictive fishing regulations (PFMC 1999),
which have meant less fishing time and smaller catches.
These restrictions have decreased the income of commercial salmon fishers as well as the enjoyment of recreational
salmon fishers. In addition to the lower numbers of fish
landed, competition from farmed salmon, record-setting
salmon catches in Alaska through 1996, and imported
salmon have reduced fish prices. Combined, these factors
have forced most Pacific Northwest commercial salmon
fishers to make significant economic and lifestyle changes.
Harvest data show that 1988 was the peak salmon
fishing year since 1981 (Figure 1). In 1988 Oregon had
2,597 troll permits; of these, 79% reported salmon landings. Since 1988, Northwest revenues from recreational
and commercial salmon catches have decreased by
more than 90% (PFMC 1999). As a result, the number of
Oregon troll permit holders declined by 40% from 1988
to 1994. In 1994 only 24% of the remaining permit holders reported salmon landings.
Vol. 25, No. 1
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
Figure 1
The 1981-1998 change in the ex-vessel value (1998 USS) ) of Pacific
Northwest non-Indian troll and gillnet chinook and coho salmon
landings by state and gear shows significant decline in th e value of
commercial salmon fisheries. Columbia River gillnet (CR gillnet)
landings decline to a few hundred thousand dollars as deo Washington troll (WA troll). Data come from Pacific Fishery Management
Council (1999:1V-2 to 4) and WDFW and ODFW (1998:Ta ble 15
and ODFW personal communication).
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) took
the lead in designing disaster relief programs in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), and Small Business Administration (SBA). The
approach used federal emergency provisions, existing
fisheries legislation, ecological disaster programs, and
small business loan programs. The agencies started
with $24 million appropriated in FY1995 and had to
quickly design programs to meet industry and state
government goals, but this quick action still required
public participation and comment processes. NMFS
scheduled meetings that drew 700 people and provided
37 hours of testimony (59 FR 46225). Federal Register
review solicited additional suggestions.
Because of the complexity of the salmon fishery, the
diversity of the affected communities, and the varying
interests of states, decision makers heard a wide variety of suggestions. Government leaders from the state
of Washington promoted a vessel license buyout while
those from Oregon and California wanted to focus on habitat problems.
The disaster relief package focused on
helping commercial salmon fishers: gillnetters (who fish the Columbia River and
bays of the Washington coast); trollers
(who fish in the ocean off Oregon, Washington, and California); charter boat operators; and small businesses associated
with the salmon industry. Two major
groups were not directly involved in any
of the disaster relief programs-treaty
tribes and anglers. A review of the
Columbia River Treaty Tribes' response
to the salmon crisis is reported by Smith
and Berg (1998). Because of concerns
about maintaining treaty rights, tribes
did not take disaster relief funds. Recreational fishers were not directly included
in the salmon disaster relief programs,
but they would benefit from improved
salmon stocks.
The primary goals of disaster relief were
to alleviate human suffering, reduce fishing
capacity, and improve fish habitat that
would ultimately improve fish stock survival. The disaster relief package funded in
FY1995 was composed of 5 programs:
(1) An unemployment insurance program for salmon
trollers and gillnetters. Unemployment insurance
came through FEMA, which was authorized to
spend 58% of the first phase allocation (59 FR
51419). Actual expenditures were $2 million for
Oregon, $5.8 million for Washington, and $1.3 million for California (Table 1).
(2) An SBA disaster relief loan program. An allocation
of $3 million was designed to help businesses that
were indirectly dependent on the salmon fishery,
such as suppliers, service providers, and fishingoriented tourist businesses.
(3) Habitat restoration programs in Oregon, Washington, and California. These programs, which sought
to restore watershed health and create healthy coho
and chinook salmon stocks, accounted for $6 million
of the initial allocation of disaster relief funds. They
were planned and administered by NMFS in cooperation with local soil and water conservation districts.
The programs had two important requirements:
4
Table 1. Distribution of unemployment assistance expenditures in California, Oregon, and Washington for the 1994 salmon
season. Washington fishers received the largest total amount and average.
State
California
Oregon
Washington
Coastwide
January 2000
Number of applicants
674
951
1,737
3,362
Number of recipients
477
648
1,695
2,790
Total paid ()
1,327,105
2,035,881
5,824,343
9,187,329
Total payment ($ average)
2,782
3,142
3,436
3,293
Fisheries * 7
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
restoration projects had to be undertaken on private
land, and 80% of the funds were allocated for hiring
fishers to work on the restoration projects.
(4) A Washington Salmon License Buyout administered
by the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife
(WDFW). This $4 million program retired Washington
salmon troll, Columbia River gillnet, and Washington
charter licenses. The buyout sought to reduce fishing
effort to better match fleet size with the future coho
and chinook salmon fishery.
(5) A data collection jobs program ("at-sea research" or
"test fishing") administered by the Pacific States
Marine Fisheries Commission (PSMFC). This $2 million program hired fishers to collect biological data on
which managers could base their plans and create
fishing options.
The habitat, buyout, and data collection programs were
funded under the Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act [section
308 (d)], for which NMFS was responsible. Agreed to by
federal and state officials, these programs were collectively known as the Northwest Emergency Assistance Program (NEAP) (61 FR 17879). NEAP was funded a second
time in FY1996 for $12.7 million. Some NEAP funds continued to be available for projects into 1999.
In total, approximately $37 million was spent to alleviate
human and habitat problems in the Pacific Northwest
salmon fishery (Table 2): $9.1 million for the unemployment
program, $24.7 million for NEAP, $3 million for loans, and
$300,000 for administrative expenses. For comparison purposes, the 1976-1996 total annual personal income average
for the commercial and recreational salmon fishery in Oregon, Washington, and California was $78 million (adjusted
for inflation) (PFMC 1999). The $37 million spent on disaster
relief programs amounted to approximately half of one
year's total personal income impact from salmon fishing.
Table 2. Expenditures reported by Northwest Emergency
Assistance Program and unemployment insurance providers.
Program
Unemployment Insurance
Habitat Restoration
Buyout (1)
Data Collection
Total
Washington Oregon California
$ millions $ millions $ millions
5.8
2.0
1.3
3.0
9.2
1.4
4.9
0.0
2.8
2.8
0.0
0.6
19.4
9.7
4.0
Source: Nancy Caputo, NMFS Consultant, Washington, personal communication.
Evaluation Methods
Our approach to evaluating the disaster relief programs
involved surveying, observing meetings, conducting
unstructured in-person and phone interviews, and reviewing records. We began interviewing in June 1995 and continued data gathering through August 1999. Significant data
came from surveys to the two groups receiving disaster
8 * Fisheries
relief and we conducted additional in-person and phone
interviews with fishers, project managers, and people
knowledgeable about the disaster relief programs.
In October 1995, we sent a survey to all 666 Columbia
River, Willapa Bay, and Gray's Harbor gillnetters who
held permits in Oregon and Washington for 1994 (364 in
Washington and 302 in Oregon). After three mailings the
overall response rate was 53% (n=355).
In March 1996 a sample for a survey of trollers was
drawn from those who had been or remained eligible for
Oregon troll permits in 1994 (n=1,821). We selected 25% of
these permit owners and removed duplicates and unusable addresses (determined from a pre-survey postcard),
leaving a survey population of 390. From that group, we
received 225 responses (57%) after three mailings.
The gillnetter and troller surveys were similar in that
they asked about fishing activities, lifestyle changes, the
effectiveness of disaster relief programs, ways to help the
salmon resource, and general background information.
We changed the wording of some questions to accommodate differences in the gillnet and troll fisheries.
On both questionnaires we encouraged respondents to
write additional comments. We received comments on
88% of the returned surveys, with an average of more
than 2 comments per survey.
We sent the surveys 16-21 months after the May 1994
closure declaration. In interviews, fishers reported not
receiving unemployment insurance payments until the
spring of 1995. The habitat and data collection jobs began
in the mid-summer of 1995.
Evaluation of Programs
The sections below report the findings of the surveys,
which reflect the fishers' evaluation of the programs. We
also include supplementary material from interviews with
fishers, managers, and watershed council coordinators.
We begin with the fishers' views of their economic condition. Next we discuss their perspective on the causes of
the salmon decline. Then we review the components of
the NEAP programs-disaster unemployment insurance,
habitat, buyout, and data collection.
Economic Conditions
When asked if their economic situation was better or
worse than 5 years ago, 71% of gillnetters and 40% of
trollers said it was worse. Queried about their overall situation, including finances, family, and health, 65% of gillnetters and 37% of trollers responded "worse." In a typical year before 1994, 46% of gillnetters reported receiving
more than 50% of their income from salmon fishing. This
dropped to 6% of gillnetters in 1994 and 1995. For trollers,
36% reported earning 50% or more of their income from
salmon fishing in a typical year before 1994. This dropped
to 12% of trollers in 1994 and 1995. As might be expected,
there was a significant correlation between income and
perception of economic situation (Kendall's tau = 0.38, p <
0.001). Fishers who reported that they did not need assistance had higher incomes (Kendall's tau = 0.29, p < 0.001).
Vol. 25, No. 1
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
Of those who received unemployment assistance, 82% of
gillnetters and 64% of trollers responded that they used the
money to meet family living expenses. Thirty-nine percent of
trollers and five percent of gillnetters purchased Coast Guardrequired equipment with the money; 17% of trollers and 14%
of gillnetters used the money to buy salmon fishing gear.
T
I
t.
Causes of Disaster
Being in a position to receive assistance was frustrating
to gillnetters and trollers who value their occupation
because of its independence, freedom to control schedules
and activities, and relative absence of bureaucratic details.
Comments written on the surveys consistently reflected
irritation at having to ask for government assistance to
weather a crisis that gillnetters and trollers believed was
not their fault. Many gillnetters and trollers were particularly irritated when people blamed them for the salmon
decline. Fishers made such comments as: "Society chose to
destroy the fishing industry; there should be just compensation," and "Failing on my own is one thing; failing
because someone is destroying your business is different."
These statements reflected fishers' views that society's
economic priorities were responsible for taking too many
trees out of watersheds, eliminating riparian corridors,
blocking salmon streams, building dams, and polluting
waters that destroyed the habitats needed by salmon.
While ecological disaster was the justification for assisting salmon fishers, gillnetters and trollers believed that the
disaster was not a natural one but rather one of wrong
public priorities and ineffective fishery management. Gillnetters and trollers were more concerned about habitat
modifications associated with economic and urban development than about overfishing (Table 3). Gillnetters, who
mainly fish the lower Columbia, blamed Columbia River
dams for the lack of salmon. Many gillnetters and trollers
(14% and 17%, respectively) wrote about the causes of
Table 3. Average rankings by trollers and gillnetters of what is
important to improve conditions for salmon. Rankings are on
a scale of 1 to 5, in which 5 is very important, 3 neither
important nor unimportant, and 1 is not important at all.
Item prioritized
Restore damaged habitat
Modify dams
Reduce seal and sea lions
Increase hatchery production
Emphasize fishers' views
Protect endangered salmon
Develop terminal fisheries
Maintain genetic diversity
Remove dams
Prevent mixed stock fishing
Establish ownership rights
na = not asked
January 2000
Gillnetters
Trollers
4.8
4.8
4.7
4.6
na
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.7
3.0
na
4.7
4.5
4.5
4.7
4.5
3.6
na
3.6
3.4
na
3.0
Fishers plant willows in habitat restoration efforts at Neskowin
Creek, Oregon, 1997.
salmon decline in their survey comments. The modal comment was one that said the salmon crisis was caused by
managers failing to do their jobs effectively. The next highest cluster of comments was about society's lack of respect
for the needs of salmon and the value of salmon fishing.
In interviews, fishery managers and scientists said they
thought gillnetters and trollers failed to recognize their own
role in the salmon decline. Most gillnetters and trollers
viewed managers and scientists as equally unable to accept
their roles in the decline. The most common comment was
that managers were not enforcing rules to protect habitat.
Fishers also pointed to errors for the sampling design for
stream counts. These errors resulted in 20 years of overestimating coho salmon escapements and the failure to correctly estimate the stock-recruitment curve for coho.
DisasterRelief Unemployment Program
In 1994, the only year unemployment assistance was
available, 68% of trollers and 76% of gillnetters who
applied received some kind of assistance. However, 72%
of trollers and 75% of gillnetters who received assistance
said they did not receive the help they needed.
Gillnetters and trollers criticized the unemployment
insurance program for not giving large enough payments,
for being too late, and for not helping the right people.
We also received comments from people who chose not to
Fisheries
9
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
participate in the programs. Typical comments of this
kind included "The idea of accepting welfare is appalling
to me," "I feel this would have been simply taking government welfare to recoup my dumb investments...," and
"I did not need this additional income-felt funds needed
by other fishing families more."
Many gillnetters and trollers believed the allocation of
unemployment insurance was unfair. They expressed concem that people fishing as crew members, fishing on boats
owned by others, or otherwise informally involved in the
fishery did not qualify for unemployment insurance. Further, gillnetters and trollers saw people who they thought
should not be eligible getting payments, and respondents
pointed to commercial fishers who they thought were
doing well in other fisheries receiving assistance. They also
noted that some part-time and retired fishers with other
jobs or sources of income received unemployment benefits.
What were the characteristics of fishers who benefitted
from unemployment insurance? Identifying oneself as a
"commercial fisherman" appeared to be the most important characteristic of gillnetters and trollers participating
in the program. This might not seem surprising because
the programs were directed at people fishing commercially, but 48% of trollers and 39% of gillnetters did not select
commercial fishing when asked, "What best describes
your occupation?" Those giving their occupation as commercial fishing applied for disaster relief programs at a
ratio four times greater than those who gave other occupations (chi-square = 32.0, p < 0.001).
Two other characteristics were common to gillnetters
and trollers participating in disaster relief programs:
(1) They received a higher percentage of their income
from salmon fishing, which meant they could show higher losses in qualifying for unemployment programs, and
(2) those receiving assistance planned to continue fishing.
Specifically, gillnetters expressed a desire to fish elsewhere, while trollers had hopes for a better year in 1996.
With only 61% of gillnetters and 52% of trollers describing themselves as "commercial fishermen," a question
arose about the occupational composition of the gillnet
and troll fisheries. Interviews with fishers and people
knowledgeable about these fisheries suggested three major
occupational groupings: professionals, retirees, and parttimers. Professional salmon fishers identified themselves
as "commercial fishermen" but had to participate in other
fisheries or activities to make a living. They most commonly fished Dungeness crab (Cancer magister) and albacore
(Thunnus alalunga), and were more likely to fish chinook
salmon in deeper waters, although many other fishery and
nonfishery combinations existed. Retired people trolled for
salmon as a way to supplement their income and keep
active. Usually, they fished coho salmon closer to shore.
Retirees comprised 5% of gillnetters and 12% of trollers.
The third group, part-timers, encompassed people with
other jobs in farming, forestry, construction, teaching, or
who were self-employed, but who fished for salmon on
their days off or seasonally. Thirty-four percent of gillnetters and thirty-six percent of trollers were part-timers.
10 * Fisheries
The survey showed that professional gillnetters and
trollers were most likely to receive unemployment compensation. Eighty-one percent of those receiving unemployment compensation described themselves as "commercial fishermen." Ninety-two percent of respondents
who identified themselves as "retired" and 86% of the
part-timers did not receive unemployment compensation
(chi-square 32.2, p < 0.0001). Most of the people leaving
the salmon fishery were retirees and part-timers.
A critical question is whether the disaster unemployment
compensation program, which reached the most people of
the various disaster relief programs, reached the majority of
those needing assistance. The number of gillnet and troll
licenses and permits in Oregon, Washington (excluding
Puget Sound), and California for 1994 totaled 5,548 (PFMC
1999; WDFW and ODFW 1998). No precise calculations
exist that adjust for duplicate licenses and permits within
and among states. For our survey of trollers, 73% reported
Oregon as their residence. Three-fourths of gillnetters lived
in southwest Washington or northwest Oregon. If we
assume that one-quarter of those with licenses also have a
license in one of the other states, and if we adjust for the
many gillnetters and trollers who have multiple licenses
within their own state, we estimate that a total of 4,200
(-0.75*5548) individuals is the maximum population to be
served by the disaster relief programs. Unemployment
insurance payments went to 2,970 (Table 1). This is two
thirds of the estimated total. Thus, one third received nothing. A second shortfall was the small size of the average
benefit-$3,293 (Table 1).
Habitat Restoration
The habitat restoration program had both human and
habitat objectives. While the unemployment insurance program lasted only one year, the habitat restoration program
ran for three years and became a catalyst for other habitat
work and funding. The habitat restoration program served
fewer fishers and usually provided only part-time work.
The NOAA Office of Sustainable Development and
Intergovernmental Affairs (1998) reported, "The Habitat
Restoration Program is estimated to provide approximately 538 jobs to impacted fishers..." from 1995-1997 in Washington, Oregon, and California, which was 13% of the
potential number of gillnetters and trollers (538/4,200).
Our survey showed 11% of trollers were involved with
habitat restoration programs. The comments written on
the gillnet and troll surveys most commonly reported that
there were not enough habitat jobs to go around.
The objectives of the restoration programs were to
reduce capacity in the fishery, create job alternatives, and
address habitat problems contributing to the salmon
decline. To assess the results of the restoration programs,
we used in-person and phone interviews with those associated with the habitat programs. Our gillnet and troll surveys were done in fall 1995 and spring 1996, and they
were less helpful in assessing the restoration programs.
In-person interviews with trollers revealed a favorable
attitude toward the habitat restoration programs. Trollers
Vol. 25, No. 1
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
considered the programs successful in their goal to create
new jobs for people who prefer to work outdoors. All
respondents liked the habitat work, saying that the jobs
gave them dignity and that they were proud of the work
they did. However, trollers also yearned to return to fishing and did so when the opportunity arose. The habitat
jobs did little to reduce fishing capacity.
The requirement that habitat work be done on private
land created contact and dialogues among fishers, farmers, ranchers, and forest operators. Watershed council
coordinators said that the local control and neighbor-toneighbor communication of the habitat programs broke
down barriers and encouraged landowners to improve
conditions for salmonids. Watershed council coordinators
stated gillnetters and trollers who stayed with the habitat
crews learned habitat evaluation and restoration techniques, and coordinators described fishers doing habitat
jobs as hardworking, innovative, and dedicated workers.
They brought their problem-solving skills, love of nature,
and independence to their habitat jobs.
The habitat restoration programs were meant to
improve the fishery in the long term and provide job
alternatives. An estimated two-thirds of gillnetters and
trollers received unemployment insurance, but only about
1 in 10 gained habitat jobs and many jobs were part-time,
summer jobs, designed to replace lost fishing income.
Fishers wanted full-time habitat restoration opportunities.
During the three years of the disaster relief programs,
Oregon trollers and gillnetters received 122 of the habitat
jobs (NOAA 1998). During the summer of 1997, interviews
with watershed coordinators found half this number
working on habitat projects.
Apart from the positive experience with habitat jobs,
gillnetters and trollers said that qualifying for the habitat
jobs was unnecessarily difficult. The unemployment, habitat jobs, and other programs each had different eligibility
requirements, and although some applicants received
assistance from more than one program, more often people
did not meet the requirements or they received less assistance than they expected.
Fishers complained about the different eligibility requirements for the various programs, as well as the amount of
paperwork, and records required to complete the forms.
Fishers had to produce considerable data to meet the initial
NEAP requirements (Table 4). Part of this complexity came
at the request of the fishing industry when it argued that
catches and earnings during the 1990s were not representative of the incomes they had lost; the rules enabled fishers to
go back to financially stronger years to calculate their losses.
In response to industry concerns, some bureaucratic requirements were subsequently modified (61 FR 40197).
Unlike the unemployment program, which tried to help
fishers through the initial closure, managers designed the
habitat program to be a catalyst for watershed restoration.
The $9.7 million for habitat jobs was important core funding that encouraged more action in watershed restoration
(Hudson and Heikkila 1997; Oregon Sea Grant 1994-1998).
The program came at a time when the watershed was
becoming the focus of forest and fishery restoration in the
Pacific Northwest (NRC 1996). California trollers had taxed
themselves since 1979 in the Salmon Stamp Program (Bingham and Yoon n.d.), which uses revenues from fishing to
improve habitat and fish stocks. In 1993 Oregon created a
Watershed Health Program (ORS 541). That same year the
state of Washington created the Jobs for the Environment
Program, and a year later, the Washington Watershed
Restoration Partnership Program received funding. After
NEAP, the California, Washington, and Oregon Legislatures
appropriated multi-year and multimillion dollar programs
for watershed restoration.
Buyout
The state of Washington's approach emphasized reducing effort in the commercial salmon fishery through a buyout. Washington fishery managers spent nearly $3.9 million
in 1995 and $5.1 million in 1996 retiring 438 Washington
troll, gillnet, and charter licenses (WDFW 1997).
Two different buyout concepts were used. In 1995,
licenses were bought for the lowest bid. The program was
criticized for not retiring enough fishing capacity. In 1996,
Table 4. Initial (October 1994) eligibility criteria required for obtaining Northwest Emergency Assistance Program (NEAP) habitat and
data collection jobs.
NEAP Eligibility Criteria
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The applicant must show an uninsured loss.
In the base year (1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, or 1990) used by the applicant in determining loss, the applicant must have earned at
least 50 percent of gross income from commercial fishing.
The applicant must have earned commercial fishery income in 1991, 1992, 1993, or 1994.
The applicant's 1992, 1993, or 1994 commercial fishery income, whichever is greater, must have declined by at least 50 percent
from the applicant's commercial fishery income from the base year selected...
If single, the applicant's 1993 gross income must have been less than $25,000. If married, the applicant's gross combined income of
the applicant and his/her spouse must have been less than $50,000. No person may receive financial assistance under NEAP that
exceeds 75 percent of any uninsured and otherwise uncompensated commercial fishery loss resulting from fishery resource disaster,
and no person may receive more than $100,000 of Federal funds in the aggregate from all losses resulting from the disaster.
Source: 59 FR51423
January 2000
Fisheries * 11
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
half the 1995 number of licenses were retired at triple the
average 1995 price (Table 5). In the 1996 program, bidding
was changed based on industry and other input from the
lowest offer to the lowest offer as a ratio of the salmon disaster impact (SDI), which effectively is the lowest price to
remove the most fishing capacity (61 FR 56217). Administrative costs for the buyout program were less than budgeted, and administrative savings were used to retire additional licenses.
Sixteen percent of gillnetters who responded to the survey participated in the 1995 WDFW license buyout, out of
the 56% who said they applied. The two buyouts retired
26% of the eligible Washington gillnet licenses. A new disaster declaration for Washington using the provision of
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act came in August 1998. The Washington Legislature matched the $3.5 million in federal funds to provide
$4.67 million for a third buyout program for Puget Sound
and coastal Washington.
Fishers' comments on the surveys and unstructured
interviews revealed that gillnetters more strongly supported buyouts than trollers. In addition to the surveys, we
worked with leaders of Salmon for All, a salmon industry
group located in Astoria, Oregon, near the mouth of the
Columbia River, to develop acceptable recommendations.
Their recommendations include:
* Implement fair, voluntary buyout/buyback programs
in Oregon and Washington that compensate fishermen for
their boats, gear, nets, and permits or licenses.
* Implement leaseback programs for people who do
not want to quit fishing.
* Expand habitat restoration programs so that more
people are eligible. (Gilden and Smith 1996)
Data Collection and Loans
Our surveys found very little impact from the data collection and loan programs. The Data Collection Jobs Program "...is estimated to provide 312 jobs for impacted fishers" (NOAA 1998) in Oregon, Washington, and California.
This is 7% (312/4,200) of the total population of gillnetters
and trollers. Mostly due to the timing of our survey, which
was after receipt of disaster unemployment compensation
but at the beginning of NEAP, we found that less than 1%
of gillnetters and 5% of trollers had participated in the program. Several survey respondents mentioned that they
were waiting to learn about their application.
2
E.
=
O
ID
Ro
Fishers installing offsite watering device in Coquille watershed,
Oregon, 1997.
One of the intangible benefits of involving gillnetters
and trollers in data collection is that they learn about scientific questions and methods. The data collection program
increased communication between fishers and scientists.
One comment frequently heard from fishers was that scientists had never observed the operation of their fishery and
did not know enough about it to make effective decisions.
Loans could go to fishers or to businesses supporting
the salmon industry. Fishers complained about the small
size of the approved loans and the amount of paperwork
required to apply. The paperwork for the loan program
also could be expensive. One troller reported paying
$1,000 to prepare a loan application for a fishing-related
business and being offered only a $15,000 loan. Others
were frustrated when they were rejected because they
were told they did not have the projected income required
to make the repayments.
Table 5. The numbers of eligible licenses, licenses making bids, and awards in the Washington License Buyout Program show the
effect of the changed offering rules between 1995 and 1996.
Licenses
Year
Salmon Troll
Salmon gillnet
Salmon charter
Total
Eligible
Bids
Retired
Avg cost
1995
1995
1995
1995
668
252
190
9,136
506
160
83
21,998
260
47
23
13,896
1,434
459
296
13,112
Eligible
Bids
Retired
Avg cost
1996
1996
1996
1996
478
117
72
31,740
423
193
52
45,145
237
47
18
24,619
1,138
357
142
35,746
Source: WDFW 1997.
12 * Fisheries
Vol. 25, No.
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
Program Managers' Perspectives
Managers for many of the disaster relief programs were
interviewed by phone and in person. They uniformly
cited and documented their efforts to increase the amount
of resources reaching people in the salmon fishery. In
every case, program managers reported saving administrative costs and using these savings to provide more program dollars. They also thought fishers and the public did
not understand the difficulty involved in developing the
programs, writing new rules, and applying legislative
mandates in new areas.
Disaster relief efforts took place in an atmosphere of
congressional budget-balancing and increasing accountability of public expenditures. By working together, efficiently marshaling their resources, and creating new initiatives, program managers kept administrative costs low
and increased benefits for fishers while contending with
diverse industry and congressional constraints.
Conclusions
Evaluating the disaster relief programs is like viewing
art: the quality of the disaster relief is in the eye of the
beholder. Fishers, fishery and program managers had different perceptions. We found that, in part due to the complexity of the salmon fishery, the human dimensions of
disaster relief were not well-understood. Although many
people were helped, the assistance fell short of the fishers
expectations in three-fourths of the survey respondents.
The salmon disaster relief programs represented an
attempt to address both human needs and habitat requirements. The programs were short-lived, and from the perspective of most but not all gillnetters and trollers, the
assistance was and continues to be inadequate. The key
inadequacies fishers reported were that there was too little
money, it was too late in the disaster (which had been
developing for a generation), and the programs were for
too short a time. However, disaster relief program managers viewed the programs as successful in distributing
the maximum amount of federal funds appropriated to
beneficiaries, beginning to address salmon habitat problems, and reducing capacity in the salmon fishery.
What path will disaster relief take to address the key
complaints? One possibility is for NMFS to expand its disaster relief activities through the M-SFCMA. Mechanisms
could be created to fund this provision, and NMFS could
respond to fisheries crises as they develop. However,
because NMFS is a fisheries agency and is already burdened with evaluating and listing endangered species,
there are few incentives for it to develop its disaster relief
mission. Endangered species issues focus attention on
habitat, and that has been NMFS s primary focus.
A second option is to use the community sustainability
provisions in the M-SFCMA [Sec. 301 (8)] to encourage
fishing communities to develop their own disaster relief
programs as part of a community development quota or
through the regional fishery management councils. However, community development quotas and fishing comJanuary 2000
munity sustainability are new, untried approaches in the
United States that demand new management styles. Further, fishery management councils, like NMFS, are fully
occupied with day-to-day management issues, and do not
have the opportunity to look ahead.
The third option is to neglect the disaster relief provision. Developing disaster relief programs requires a great
deal of agency energy, and funding them is difficult under
congressional budget rules. With the exception of the
added buyout monies for the state of Washington, attention has shifted from human dimensions to habitat protection and restoration.
Of all the disaster relief programs, the habitat programs
gained the most support and enthusiasm. The nature of
the work is agreeable to fishers, and they see it as a positive step toward restoring their livelihoods and the environment. Restoring habitat ranked at the top of the list of
concerns for gillnetters and trollers (Table 4). However,
effects on fish productivity and production are long-term,
and do not immediately lead to fishery improvement. In
the short term, the habitat jobs serve human needs more
than the biological needs of salmon stocks.
In 1998 and 1999 substantial funds were becoming
available for habitat improvement in the Pacific Northwest. These monies may lead to more full-time, family
wage, habitat restoration jobs. In addition to over $100
million in state commitments, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program
(CREP) was slated to spend $370 million over 15 years.
Another $100 million is promised in President Clinton s
FY2000 budget. Private timber interests are improving
riparian habitats and upgrading and decommissioning
roads. County governments are looking more closely at
their culverts and land use planning.
Habitat restoration programs have the potential for hiring more fishers. Creating jobs for ecosystem workers
jobs that ideally pay reasonable wages and contribute to
scientifically sound and effective restoration work is one
way to address both the natural and human dimensions
of the salmon crisis. Since the effects of habitat restoration
are long-term, programs must produce interim results to
sustain public and political support.
The disaster relief programs were an effort to meet
both human and habitat needs for the salmon fishery.
Despite fishers criticisms, the programs were a precedent
for future disaster relief efforts. Approaches that combine
social and biological perspectives, as habitat restoration
and at-sea research do, offer fresh approchaes to future
fisheries problems.
Acknowledgments
This research is funded by grant no. NA36RG0451 (project number R/FDF-2) from NOAA to the Oregon State University Sea Grant College Program and by appropriations
made by the Oregon State Legislature. We appreciate the
comments and help of Stan Allen, Jim Bergeron, Dave Bitts,
Linda Brown, Ralph Brown, Nancy Caputo, Christopher
Carter, Frances Clark, Joe Cone, Bob Eaton, Kevin Ford,
Fisheries * 13
HUMAN DIMENSIONS
Stephen Freese, Ginny Goblirsch, Herb Goblirsch, Carolyn
Griswold, Madeleine Hall-Arber, Susan Hanna, Dyan Hartill, Connie Kennedy, Pat Kight, Jack Marincovich, Irene
Martin, Hans Radtke, Jay Rasmussen, Jim Seger, Tom Shafer,
Lance Simmens, Jimmy Smith, and anonymous reviewers.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of NOAA or any of its subagencies, or other agencies, organizations, or individuals
who cooperated with this research.
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