UTC/DelDOT Infrastructure Security and
Emergency Preparedness
By Sue McNeil, Rachel Davidson, Earl Lee, Joseph Trainor,
Tricia Wachtendorf, Laura Black, Sarah Dalton, Charles
Mitchell, and Gabriela Wasileski
A report submitted to the University of Delaware University
Transportation Center (UD-UTC)
August 7, 2009
DISCLAIMER:
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who
are responsible for the facts and the accuracy of the information
presented herein. This document is disseminated under the
sponsorship of the Department of Transportation University
Transportation Centers Program, in the interest of information
exchange. The U.S. Government assumes no liability for the
contents or use thereof.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 1
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 3
2.
Evacuation Literature Review ................................................................................... 5
3.
Social Science Literature ......................................................................................... 16
4.
Background on Hurricane Evacuation & Nuclear Evacuation in Delaware ............ 20
5.
Considering Emergent Groups in Emergency Management .................................. 27
6.
Geographic Information Systems in Emergency Management .............................. 30
7.
Identifying Vulnerable Populations in Delaware .................................................... 33
8.
Vulnerability of Bridge Infrastructure ..................................................................... 36
9.
Rail and Ferry Security ............................................................................................ 42
10.
Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 47
11.
Acknowledgments................................................................................................... 48
12.
References .............................................................................................................. 49
UDUTC Final Report
Page 2
1. Introduction
a. Problem Statement
Transportation Infrastructure security and emergency preparedness presents an enormous challenge for
both the State of Delaware and for the major transportation corridors that run through the state. DelDOT
and its extensive network of partner organizations have a strong coalition in place to plan, train, and run
exercises related to regional evacuation issues. Most notably the state’s Transportation Management
Team is charged with jointly making decisions on how an incident or an event that impacts the
transportation system will be handled. Given the complexity of this task and the many intersecting areas
of interest, it is vital that relevant engineering and social sciences be brought to bear on the planning
processes already underway.
The Disaster Research Center at University of Delaware has an extensive body of applied social science
research experience that will be of great use for planners and emergency management personnel who
deal with mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery from natural disasters and terrorist events.
For over forty years DRC has worked on related projects and in just the last five years has produced many
state of the art scientific insights related to transportation and evacuation issues including projects that
address: community based emergency planning and management, supply chain management,
characteristics of warning systems, household evacuation decision-making, multi-organization networks,
and a host of other issues.
b. Objective
The objective of this project is to review the current state of practice for Delaware, review external
research and apply insights from state of the art social science and engineering, and develop a plan for
integrating research insights into practice.
c. Background
The Department of Homeland Security considers the protection of our national infrastructure systems to
be one of its main missions as set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), Critical
Infrastructural Identification, Prioritization, and Protection. The primary goal of the National
Infrastructural Protection Plan (DHS 2006: 3)—which defines the specific federal responsibilities and
strategies for implementing HSPD-7—is to build a safer, more resilient America by enhancing the nation’s
civil infrastructural systems from terrorist attacks and natural or technological disasters through
strengthening preparedness, improving response capabilities, and developing rapid recovery strategies.
Of special relevance to this proposal is the joint responsibility of the Department of Transportation and
DHS to collaborate on all matters pertaining to transportation security and transportation infrastructural
protection1.
This research also begins to address needs identified by DelDOT and FHWA including the need to 1)
assess the vulnerability and risk of Delaware’s critical infrastructure (including bridges and tunnels); 2)
develop possible countermeasures to detect and deter terrorist threats to such assets; 3) estimate the
capital and operating costs of such countermeasures, and 4) improve security operational planning for
better protection against terrorism. While not addressing these issues directly, this research provides
background and context including the common area between infrastructure security and emergency
preparedness for natural hazards.
1
DHS 2006.National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington, DC:DHS.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 3
This project recognizes the diversity of organizational structures that are involved – FHWA, DelDOT,
DEMA, county and local government, volunteer organizations, social service organizations and
emergency responders. Furthermore, emergency plans must recognize the needs and issues of freight
and passenger transportation, the many modes involved, and the variety of events that can disrupt the
transportation systems.
d. Purpose and Outline of this Report
This report is intended to document the relevant literature, understand the needs in Delaware and
explore gaps. The following section summarizes the relevant evacuation literature, and the next section
reviews the social science literature. The fourth section reviews existing evacuation plans for Delaware
focusing on hurricane evacuation and nuclear incident evacuation.
The next section explores the literature on emergent groups and the role of GIS in understanding risk and
vulnerability. The next section reviews information on bridge vulnerability and then rail and ferry
security. A concluding section summarizes observations and conclusions.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 4
2. Evacuation Literature Review
To better understand the relevant literature, we organized the bibliography around the
following topics:




I.
Variables predicting evacuation due to natural hazards.
Need for coordinated interdisciplinary approach that incorporates qualitative and quantitative
methods.
Hurricane hazard modeling for evacuation planning.
Mathematical modeling.
Variables predicting evacuation during natural hazard
A) The effect of family structure on household response to natural hazard warning.
The residents’ decision to evacuate differs depending on structural characteristics of the
household. Studies showed that the complete nuclear family appears to respond to evacuation
based on its own perception and interpretation of warning information. On the other hand,
single person and families without children rely on their prior perception of risk and their social
contacts.
Van Willigen et al. (2002) found that households with physically disabled members were less
likely to evacuate than others. Reasons for not evacuating were directly attributable to a lack of
or perceived lack of access to services and assistance. Households with a disabled member were
more likely to have experienced damages to their homes in both seasons and to see their homes
condemned after Floyd. Damage costs represented a greater proportion of the incomes of
households with a disabled member. These data underscore the need for attention by
emergency management personnel to three issues: communication and coordination of
services, evacuation planning and assistance, and the provision of accessible shelter.
Carter, M. T., Kendall, S. and Clark, J. P. (1983). “Household response to warnings.” Int. J. Mass
Emergencies and Disasters, 1(1), 95–104.
Gladwin, H. and Peacock, W. G. (1997). “Warning and evacuation: A night for hard houses.” In
Hurricane
Andrew: Gender, ethnicity and the sociology of disasters, eds., B. H. Morrow and H.
Gladwin, Routledge, New York, 52–74.
Baker, E.J. (1979). “Predicting response to hurricane warnings: A reanalysis of data from
four studies.” Mass Emergencies, 4(1), 9–24.
Van Willigen, M., Edwards, T., Edwards, B. and Hessee, S. (2002). “Riding out the storm:
Experiences of
the physically disabled during Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd.” Natural Hazards
Review, 3(3), 98-106. .
UDUTC Final Report
Page 5
B) Shelters and evacuation: As an option to evacuation, people take protective shelter to prevent
harm during natural disasters. Most people evacuate to relatives, friends, or hotels. Using
shelters as an alternative appears to be higher when the evacuating population is of low income
and older and lower when the population is more affluent and young (Mileti et al. 1992). Among
transient populations the homeless and migrants are much more likely to use public shelters
during an evacuation than more affluent transients such as business travelers or vacationers
(Drabek, 1996).
Whitehead et al. (2000) examine the social, economic, and risk factors that affect the decisions
to evacuate and whether to go to a shelter or motel/hotel relative to other destinations. When
making the evacuation decision households are more likely to go someplace safer during a
hurricane when given evacuation orders. Objective and subjective risk factors also play an
important role when making evacuation decisions. Social and economic factors are the primary
determinants of the destination decision.
Drabek, T. (1996). Disaster evacuation behavior—Tourists and other transients. Institute of
Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.
Quarantelli, E. (1982). “General and particular observations on sheltering and housing after
American disasters.” Disasters, 6, 277-281.
Morrow, B. (1997). “Stretching the bonds: The families of hurricane Andrew.” In Hurricane
Andrew: Ethnicity, gender, and the sociology of disasters, eds., W. Peacock, B. Morrow, and
H. Gladwin. Routledge, New York, 141-170.
Tierney, K.J., Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. (2001). Facing the unexpected: Disaster preparedness
and response in the United States. Joseph Henry Press, Washington, D.C.
Mileti, D.S., Sorensen J.H. and O’Brien, P.W. (1992). “Toward an explanation of mass care shelter use in
evacuations.” Int. J. Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 10(1), 25-42.
Whitehead, J.C., Edwards, B., Van Willigen, M., Maiolo, J.R., Wilson, K. and Smith, K.T. (2000).
“Heading for higher ground: Factors affecting real and hypothetical hurricane evacuation
behavior.” Environmental Hazards, 2(4), 133–142.
Lindell, R. and Perry, R. (1992). Behavioral foundations of community emergency management.
Hemisphere Publishing Corp., Washington, DC.
Ruch, C., Miller, H., Haflich, M., Farber, N., Berke, P. and Stubbs, N. (1991). “The Feasibility of
Vertical Evacuation.” Monograph #52, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of
Colorado, Boulder, CO.
C) Socioeconomic status and low income families vulnerability to disasters:
Studies show that pre-existing socio-economic conditions play a significant role in the ability for
particular economic classes to respond immediately to the disaster and to cope with the
disaster’s consequences.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 6
Drabek, T. and Boggs, K. (1968). “Families in disaster: Reactions and relatives.” J. Marriage
Fam., 30(3), 443–451.
Drabek, T. and Key, W. (1984). Conquering disaster: Family recovery and long-term
consequences. Irvington, New York.
Bolin, R. (1986). “The 1986 California floods.” Quick Response Research Rep. No. 02, Univ. of
Colorado, Institute for Behavioral Research, Boulder, Colorado.
Schaffer, R. and Cook, E. (1972). Human response to hurricane Celia. Environmental Quality
Program, Texas A&M Univ., College Station, Tex.
Sorensen, J.H., Vogt, B.M. and Mileti, D.S. (1987). “Evacuation: An assessment of planning and
research.” ORNL-6376, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
D) Factors that affect evacuation decisions after people hear hurricane forecasts involve warning
and risk perception.
Communication of forecast information and more accurate geographically focused prediction of
evacuation rates would give emergency managers a better idea of where evacuation orders
would be followed.
Dash, N. and Gladwin, H. (2007). “Evacuation decision making and behavioral responses:
individual
and household.” Natural Hazards Rev., 8(3), 69-77.
Tierney, K.J., Lindell, M.K. and Perry, R.W. (2001). Facing the unexpected: Disaster preparedness
and response in the United States. Joseph Henry Press, Washington, D.C.
Sorensen, J.H. and Vogt-Sorenson, B. (2006). “Community processes; warning and evacuation.”
In Handbook of disaster research, eds., H. Rodriguez, E.L. Quarantelli, and R.R. Dynes,
Springer, New York, 183–199.
E) The presence of pets and previous experience with disaster:
Most disaster relief shelters do not allow people to bring in pets or other animals. FEMA,
however, recommends people evacuate with pets. Growing number of studies address issues
whether people evacuate without their pets or other animals such as livestock or risk their lives
by deciding to stay with their animals.
Hutton, J. (1976). “The differential distribution of death in disaster: A test of theoretical
propositions.”
Mass Emergences, 1(4), 261–266.
Baker, E.J. (1979). “Predicting response to hurricane warnings: A reanalysis of data from
four studies.” Mass Emergencies, 4(1), 9–24.
F) Geographical location (proximity to evacuation routes):
UDUTC Final Report
Page 7
Simpson, R.H. and Riehl, H. (1981). The hurricane and its impact, LSU Press, Baton Rouge, La.
G) Evacuation of subpopulation such as tourists:
Drabek, T. (1995). “Disaster responses within the tourist industry.” Int. J. Mass Emergencies and
Disasters, 13(1), 7-23.
Drabek, T. (1996). Disaster evacuation behavior—Tourists and other transients. Institute of
Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.
H) Age as a predictor for evacuation:
Research on people decision why not to evacuate claim that elderly population is less likely to
evacuate as a result of lack of access to resources, limited social network and risk perception of
a disaster.
Mileti, D. S., Drabek, T. E. and Haas, E. (1975). “Human systems in extreme environments: A
sociological perspective.” Program on Technology, Environment and Man, Monograph No.
21, Institute of Behavioral Science, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.
Gruntfest, E., Downing, T. and White, G. F. (1978). “Big Thompson Flood.” Working Paper No.
32, Institute of Behavioral Science, Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.
Perry, R.W. (1979). “Evacuation decision making in natural disasters.” Mass Emergencies, 4(1),
25–38.
I)
Need for developing community-based evacuation planning. Urgent evacuations can result in
significant traffic congestion and a sharp increase in mean vehicle travel times, particularly if
there are a lot of people at home during the evacuation and household vehicle use is relatively
high.
Study of Cova and Johnson (2003) presents a method for using microscopic traffic simulation to
develop and test neighborhood evacuation plans in the urban wild-land interface. GIS was used
to map the spatial effects of a proposed second access road on household evacuation times.
Results indicate that the second road will reduce some household travel times much more than
others, but all evacuation travel times will become more consistent.
Dow and Cutter (2002) survey of coastal South Carolina residents addressed the role of
household decisions in amplifying demand on transportation infrastructure during 1999’s
Hurricane Floyd evacuation. Three major findings reveal that traffic problems are becoming a
major consideration in whether people evacuate. How they evacuate is emerging as an issue for
evacuation traffic planning. First, about 25% of households took two or more cars. Nearly 50% of
evacuees left in one 6-h period. Second, while the majority of respondents carried road maps,
only 51% of that group used them to determine their route. Many decided to stay on the
Interstate despite the congestion. Finally, the majority of South Carolinian residents traveled
distances greater than necessary for safe sheltering and more than in past hurricanes.
Transportation issues will become more important in coastal evacuations as traffic problems
impinge on peoples’ ability to get out of harm’s way and ultimately influence their decisions to
evacuate.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 8
Cova, T.J. and Johnson, J.P. (2003). “A network flow model for lane-based evacuation
routing.” Transportation Research, 37A(7), 579-604.
Dow, K. and Cutter, S. L. (2002). “Emerging hurricane evacuation issues: Hurricane Floyd
and south Carolina.” Natural Hazards Review, 3(1), 12–18.
J)
Race and Perception of natural hazard risk. Some researchers argue that membership in a
minority group t isolates a person from information as a result of cultural or language barriers,
and decreases the probability of responding to a disaster warnings. In addition, racial and ethnic
communities in the U.S. face housing problems in disasters such as living in unsafe buildings.
Therefore, these studies suggest for necessity of multilingual dissemination of warning
information. Need for involvement of all members of community to be involved in the disasterreduction process and cooperation with neighborhood associations, churches and other
community groups. Need for addressing the issue of housing. Other studies demonstrate that
ethnicity has no significant effect on evacuation.
Fothergill, A. (1996). “Gender, risk and disaster.” Int. J. Mass Emergencies and Disasters,
14(1), 33–56.
Perry, R.W. and Greene, M.R. (1982). “The role of ethnicity in the emergency decision
making process.” Sociological Inquiry, 52(4), 306–334.
Drabek, T. and Boggs, K. (1968). “Families in disaster: Reactions and relatives.” J. Marriage
Fam., 30(3), 443–451.
K) Gender and evacuation:
Studies of evacuation during natural disaster have often noted that women are more likely than
men to evacuate. For example, Bateman and Edwards (2002) study indicates that women are
more likely to evacuate than men because of socially constructed gender differences in caregiving roles, access to evacuation incentives, exposure to risk, and perceived risk. The authors
found that women are most likely to evacuate because, compared to men, they live at greater
exposure to risk and have a heightened perception of risk.
Bolin, R., Jackson, M. and Crist, A. (1996). “Gender inequality, vulnerability, and disasters:
Theoretical and empirical considerations.” In The gendered terrain of disasters, eds., E.
Enarson and B. H. Morrow, Praeger, Westport, Conn.
Fothergill, A. (1996). “Gender, risk and disaster.” Int. J. Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 14(1),
33–56.
Bateman, J.M. and Edwards, B. (2002). “Gender and evacuation: A closer look at why women
are more likely to evacuate for hurricanes.” Natural Hazards Review, 3(3), 107–117.
L) Technical modeling of evacuation performance
UDUTC Final Report
Page 9
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires that all electric utilities develop and update
evacuation plans for the areas surrounding their nuclear power plants. The evacuation of people
around these plants has certain peculiar transportation-related characteristics, such as the
location of the incident is fixed, the evacuation area is predetermined by NRC, and all the
inhabitants must be evacuated from the affected area. Hobeika et al. have developed a mass
evacuation computer program (MASSVAC 3.0) that models the evacuation process and utilizes
the traffic assignment of all-ornothing and Dial’s algorithm to simulate the traffic movements
during evacuation.
An evacuation management decision support system (EMDSS) is being used in experiments to
assess different information about (1) hurricane behavior (e.g., track, FMS, intensity, size, and
stability), (2) community characteristics (e.g., population size and distribution, ERS link capacity
and geometry), (3) information displays (e.g., historical and forecast data on FMS and intensity,
evacuation costs, survival probabilities), and (4) decision team characteristics (e.g., number and
characteristics of team members) in order to identify the variables determining effective
evacuation decision making. In addition, it will be used in training and actual hurricane
operations.
The computation of evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for communities threatened by hurricanes
requires analysts to develop sophisticated models of evacuation flows and significant progress
has been made in this area over the past 25 years. However, ETEs also require accurate
assumptions about the behavior of the risk area population. Article of Lindell and Prater (2007b)
lists the principal behavioral variables affecting hurricane ETEs such as size and distribution of
the resident population, number of persons per household, size and distribution of the transit
dependent resident population, number of evacuating vehicles per household, number of
evacuating trailers per household, evacuation ultimate destination, destination/ route choices.
Lindell (2008) describes a simple, rapid method for calculating evacuation time estimates (ETEs)
that is compatible with research findings about evacuees’ behavior in hurricanes. The author
study provides an example using EMDSS to calculate ETEs for San Patricio County Texas and
discusses directions for further improvements of the model.
Hobeika, A.G., Kim, S. and Beckwith, R.E. (1994). “A decision support system for developing
evacuation plans around nuclear power stations.” Interfaces, 24(5), 22-35.
Lindell, M.K. and Prater C.S. (2007a). “A hurricane evacuation management decision support
system (EMDSS).” Natural Hazards, 40(3), 627-634.
Lindell, M.K. and Prater, C.S. (2007b). “Critical behavioral assumptions in evacuation time
estimate analysis for private vehicles: Examples from hurricane research and planning”, J.
Urban Planning and Development, 133(1), 18-29.
Lindell, M. K. (2008). “EMBLEM2: An empirically based large scale evacuation time estimate
model.” Transportation Research Part A, 42 (1), 140–154.
II.
Need for a coordinated interdisciplinary approach that incorporates qualitative and
quantitative methods
UDUTC Final Report
Page 10
Gladwin, H., Lazo, J., Morrow, B., Peacock, W. and Willoughby, H. (2007). “Social science
research
needs for the hurricane forecast and warning system.” Natural Hazards Review, 8(3), 8795.
III.
Hurricane hazard modeling for evacuation planning
Modeling of hurricane storm surge effects is usually executed using a combination of models. In
most models, wind fields are prescribed as a surface boundary condition. However, in order to
capture the full extend of flooding, variety of other components need to be include into
modeling such as astronomical tides, wave setup, wave run-up, and wind driven surge (Graber
et al., 2006).
Graber, H.C., Cardone, V.J., Jensen, R.E., Slinn, D.N., Hagen, S.C., Cox, A.T., Powell, M.D. and
Grassl,
C. (2006). “Coastal forecasts and storm surge predictions for tropical cyclones: A timely
partnership program.” Oceanography, 19(1), 130-141.
A) Storm surge and inundation maps:
Jarvinen, B.R. and Lawrence, M.B. (1985). “An evaluation of the SLOSH storm surge model.”
Bull.
American Meteorological Society, 66, 1408–1411.
Jelesnianski, C. P., Chen, J. and Shaffer, W.A. (1992). “SLOSH: Sea, lake, and overland surges
from
hurricanes.” NOAA Tech. Report NWS-48, p.71.
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (1999). NOAA state-of-thecoast
website. [Online] Available http://state-ofcoast.noaa.gov/bulletins/html/rtt_06/intro.html, November.
B) Surge hazard modeling including physical models of the hurricane wind, coupled storm surge
and wave fields:
Luettich, R.A., Jr., Westerink, J.J. and Scheffner, N.W. (1992). “ADCIRC: an advanced threedimensional
circulation model for shelves coasts and estuaries, report 1: theory and methodology of
ADCIRC-2DDI and ADCIRC-3DL.” Dredging Research Program Technical Report DRP-92-6,
U.S. Army Engineers Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS, p.137.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 11
Booij, N., Ris, R.C. and Holthuijsen, L.H. (1999). “A third-generation wave model for coastal
regions, Part I, Model description and validation”, J. Geophysical Research, C4, 104, 76497666.
Holland, G.J. (1980). “An analytic model of the wind and pressure profiles in hurricanes.”
Monthly Weather Review, 108(8), 1212-1218.
Vickery, P, Skerlj, P., Steckley, A. and Twisdale, L. (2000). “Hurricane wind field model for use in
hurricane simulations.” J. Structural Engineering, 126(10), 1203-1221.
C) Developing long-term hazard maps using variety of methods such as peaks over threshold,
empirical stimulation technique, Joint Probability Method, empirical track method, sample
return period event method, and maximum likelihood estimation method :
Resio, D.T. (2006). “White paper on estimating hurricane inundation probabilities.” Version
January 29, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Vicksburg, MS.
Scheffner, N., Borgman, L. and Mark, D. (1996). “Empirical simulation technique based storm
surge frequency analysis.” J. Waterway, Port, Coastal, and Ocean Engineering, 93-101.
Scheffner, N.W., Clausner, J.E., Militello, A., Borgman, L.E. and Edge, B.L. (1999). “Use and
application of the empirical simulation technique: User’s guide.” U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) Technical Report ERDC/CHL-99-10.
Ho, F.P and Myers, V.A. (1975). “Joint probability method of tide frequency analysis applied to
Apalachicola Bay and St. George Sound, Florida.” NOAA Tech. Rep. NWS-18, p.43.
Vickery, P., Skerlj, P. and Twisdale, L. (2000). “Simulation of hurricane risk in the U.S. using
empirical track model.” J. Structural Engineering, 126(10), 1222-1237.
Watson, Jr., C. and Johnson, M. (2004). “Hurricane loss estimation models: Opportunities for
improving the state of the art.” Bull. American Meteorological Society, 1713–1726.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2003). “HAZUS-MH multi-hazard loss
estimation methodology: hurricane model. User manual.” FEMA, Washington, D.C.
D) Summaries of available long-term hazard methods:
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2005). “Storm meteorology: FEMA coastal
flood hazard analysis and mapping guidelines.” Focused Study Report.
Nelson, M. (2007). “Optimizing the selection of hazard-consistent probabilistic scenarios for long-term
regional hurricane loss estimation'', M.S. Thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
E) A new variation of the Joint Probability Method and the JPM-Optimal Sampling:
UDUTC Final Report
Page 12
Niedoroda, A., Resio, D., Toro, G., Divoky, D., Das, H. and Reed, C. (2007). “Evaluation of the
storm surge hazard in coastal Mississippi.” Proc. 10th International Workshop on Wave
Hindcasting and Forecasting and Coastal Hazards.
Toro, G., Niedoroda, A. and Reed, C. (2007). “Approaches for the efficient probabilistic
calculation of surge hazard.” Proc. 10th Int. Workshop on Wave Hindcasting and Forecasting
and Coastal Hazards.
IV.
Mathematical Modeling:
A) Simulation models for evacuation
Pidd, M., de Silva, F., and Eglese, R. (1996). “A simulation model for emergency evacuation.”
European J. Operational Research, 90(3), 413-419.
Bower, J.C., Millard, W.D. and Matsumoto, S.W. (1990). “Integrated Emergency Management
System (IEMS) User’s Manual.” Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, WA.
de Silva, F.N. and Eglese, R.W. (2000). “Integrating simulation modeling and GIS: spatial decision
support systems for evacuation planning.” J. Operational Research Society, 51(4), 423-430.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (1984). “Application of the I-DYNEV system to
compute estimates of evacuation travel times at nuclear power stations.” FEMA Report 8,
Washington, DC.
Han, A.F. (1990). “TEVACS: Decision support system for evacuation planning in Taiwan.”
J.Transportation Engineering, 116(6), 821-830.
Hobeika, A.G. and Jamei, B. (1985). “MASSVAC: a model for calculating evacuation times under
natural disasters.” Proc. Conference on Computer Simulation in Emergency Planning, La
Jolla, CA, 15(1), 23-28.
Hobeika, A.G., Kim, S. and Beckwith, R.E. (1994). “A decision support system for developing
evacuation plans around nuclear power stations.” Interfaces, 24(5), 22-35.
Lim, E. and Wolshon, B. (2005). “Modeling and performance assessment of contraflow
evacuation termination points.” Transportation Research Record-1922, 118-128.
Pidd, M., de Silva, F., and Eglese, R. (1996). “A simulation model for emergency evacuation.”
European J. Operational Research, 90(3), 413-419.
Pidd, M., Eglese, R.W. and de Silva, F.N. (1997). “CEMPS: A prototype spatial decision support
system to aid in planning emergency evacuations.” Transactions in GIS, 1(4), 321-334.
Rathi, A.K. and Solanki, R.S. (1993). “Simulation of traffic flow during emergency evacuations: a
microcomputer based modeling system.” Proc. 1993 Winter Simulation Conference, Los
Angeles, CA, 1250-1258.
Sheffi, Y., Mahmassani, H. and Powell, W.B. (1981). “Evacuation studies for nuclear power plant
sites: a new challenge for transportation engineers.” ITE Journal, 51(6), 25-28.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 13
Stern, E. and Sinuany-Stern, Z. (1989). “A behavioral-based simulation model for urban
evacuation.” Papers of the Regional Science Association, 66(1), 87-103.
Sheffi, Y., Mahmassani, H. and Powell, W.B. (1982). “A transportation network evacuation
model.”Transportation Research, 16A(3), 209-218.
Sinuany-Stern, Z. and Stern, E. (1993). “Simulating the evacuation of a small city: the effects of
traffic factors.” Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 27(2), 97-108.
Theodoulou, G. and Wolshon, B. (2004). “Alternative methods to increase the effectiveness of
freeway contraflow evacuation.” Transportation Research Record-1865, 48-56.
Williams, B.M., Tagliaferri, A., Meinhold, S., Hummer, J. and Rouphail, N. (2007). “Simulation
and analysis of freeway lane reversal for costal hurricane evacuation.” J. Urban Planning
and Development, 133(1), 61-72.
B) Optimization models for evacuation:
Tufekci, S. and Kisko, T.M. (1991). “Regional evacuation modeling system (REMS): a decision
support
system for emergency area evacuation.” Computers and Industrial Engineering, 21(1), 8993.
Dunn, C.E. and Newton, D. (1992). “Optimal routes in GIS and emergency planning
applications.” Area,
24(3), 259-267.
Cova, T.J. and Johnson, J.P. (2003). “A network flow model for lane-based evacuation routing.”
Transportation Research, 37A(7), 579-604.
Meng, Q. and Khoo, H.L. (2007). “Model and algorithm for the optimal contraflow scheduling
problem.” Transportation Research Board 86th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.
Tuydes, H. and Ziliaskopoulos, A. (2004). “Network re-design to optimize evacuation
contraflow.” Presented at the 83rd Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting,
Washington, D.C.
Tuydes, H. and Ziliaskopoulos (2006). “Tabu-based heuristic for optimization of network
evacuation contraflow.” Transportation Research Record-1964, 157-168.
C) Shelter models:
Sherali, H.D., Carter, T.B. and Hobeika, A.G. (1991). “A location-allocation model and algorithm
for
evacuation planning under hurricane/flood conditions.” Transportation Research, 25B(6),
439-452.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 14
Yamada, T. (1996). “A network flow approach to a city emergency evacuation planning.” Int. J.
Systems Science, 27(10), 931-936.
D) Modeling for industrial capacity expansion, energy system design, aircfraft scheduling, health
care services:
Paraskevopoulos, D., Karakitsos, E. and Rustem, B. (1991). “Robust capacity planning under
uncertainty.” Management Science, 37(7), 787-800.
Malcolm, S.A. and Zenios, S.A. (1994). “Robust optimization for power systems capacity
expansion
under uncertainty”, J. Operational Research Society, 45(9), 1040-1049.
Mulvey, J., Vanderbei, R.J. and Zenios, S.A. (1995). “Robust optimization of large-scale systems”,
Operations Research, 43(2), 254-281.
Soteriou, A.C. and Chase, R.B. (2000). “A robust optimization approach for improving service
quality”, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2(3), 264-286.
Xu, N., Davidson, R., Nozick, L. and Dodo, A. (2007). “The risk-return tradeoff in optimizing
regional earthquake mitigation investment.” J. Structure and Infrastructure Engineering,
3(2), 133-146.
Dodo, A., Davidson, R., Xu, N., and Nozick, L. (2007). “Application of regional earthquake
mitigation investment.” Computers in Operations Research, 34(8), 2478-2494.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 15
3. Social Science Literature
In examining social science literature, a few topics surfaced as being directly relevant to infrastructure
security and emergency preparedness. These topics include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Receiving Warning Message: Does the warning reach the receiver in some way?
Understanding Warning: Is the warning message understood by the receiver?
Message Credibility: Does the receiver believe the message is credible?
Community Characteristics: What are community characteristics that affect the above how the
message is received, understood, and trusted?
Sources elaborating on these issues are presented below.
1. Receiving Warning Message
A prominent topic in social science literature regarding emergency management is in exploring factors
that affect how emergency messages are received by the community. These factors include the presence
of formal and informal social networks, established credibility, specifics about escape routes,
communication modes, etcetera.
Sutton, Palen & Shklovski, 2008. Backchannels on the Front Lines: Emergent Uses of Social Media in
the 2007 Southern California Wildfires
Details dynamics of social networks in disaster response. Also background on historical views about social
networks as a credible means to address emergency management topics. Addresses the view of social
networks causing panic within a community and spreading incorrect information.
M.K. Lindell, C. Prater & R.W. Perry (2007). ‘Introduction to Emergency Management’
Noteworthy discussions about building credibility through performance in public hearings or meetings
with neighborhood associations or civic organizations. Sources also claims that panics are not very
common and occur when there are limited escape routes, closing escape routes, and lack of clear
communication.
Laysia Palen & Sophia Liu (2006) “Citizen Communications as a Form of Public Participation in
Disaster”.
Kirschenbaum, A. (1992). Warning and Evacuation during a Mass Disaster: A Multivariate Decision
Making Model. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 10: 91-114
Rogers and Nehnevajsa (1987). Crisis Conditions. Pittsburgh, PA: Center for Social and
Urban research, University of Pittsburgh.
Perry and Greene (1982) The role of ethnicity in the emergency decision-making process. Sociological
Inquiry, 52(4), pp. 306-334
Sorenson and Gercmehl (1980). Volcanic Hazard Warning System: Persistence and
Transferability. Environmental Management 4, pp. 125-136
Turner, R.H., Nigg, J.M., Paz, D.H. & Young, B.S. (1979). Earthquake Threat: The Human
Response in Southern California. Los Angeles, CA: Institute for Social Science research,
University of California, Los Angeles.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 16
Perry, Lindell and Greene (1981) Threat perception and public response to volcano hazard Journal
Soc. Psych, 116(2), 199-204
Pfister, N. (2002). Community Response to Flood Warnings: The Case of an Evacuation
from Grafton, March 2001. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 17, pp. 1929.
Lindell and Perry (1987) Communicating Environmental Risk in Multiethnic Communities. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Authors talk about the role of information communication technology including cellular phones, internet,
etcetera in improving warning and response activities. Arguments were made about first respondents
and the need to address informal peer-to-peer communication. Communication activity addressed
included provision of response and rescue data, relief assistance, emotive and evaluative expression.
2. Understanding warning
An additional topic in social science research is in how the recipient understands the warning message.
Some characteristics which social science literature investigates includes the source of the warning, the
language used, inclusion of assistance information, prior understanding, and the effects of multiple
warning sources.
M.K. Lindell, C. Prater & R.W. Perry (2007). ‘Introduction to Emergency Management’
Ketteridge and Fordham (1998) Flood Evacuation in two communities in Scotland: lessons from
European Research. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 16: 119-143
Perry and Lindell (1986). Twentieth-Century Volcanicity at Mt. St. Helens: The Routinization of Life
Near an Active Volcano. Tempe. AZ.: School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University.
Haas, Cochrene and Eddy (1977) Consequences of a cyclone on a small city. Ekistics 44:45-50
Blanchard-Boehm (1998) Understanding Public Response to Increased Risk from Natural hazard:
Appluication of the Hazard Risk Communication Framework. International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters 16: 247-278
Quarantelli , E.L. (1980). Some Research Emphases for Studies on Mass Communication
Systems and Disasters. In 239-299 in Proceedings of the Committee on Disaster and the
Mass media Workshop. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
Tierney, K. (1987). Chemical Emergencies, Offsite Exposures and Organizational
Response. Quick Response Report No 21, Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
Lachman, Tatsuoka and Bonk (1961). Human Behavior during the Tsunami of 1960. Science 133:
1405-1409
Mileti and Darlington (1995). Societal Response to Revised Earthquake Probabilities in the San
Francisco Bay Area. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 13: 119-145
Aguirre (1988) The lack of Warning before the Saragosa Tornado. International Journ al of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters 6:65-74
Perry (1987). Disaster Preparedness and Response among Minority Citizens pp. 135-151 in Sociology
of Disasters, Edited by Dynes, DeMarchi and Pelamda, Milan Italy: Frnaco Angeli Libri.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 17
Mitchem J.D. (2003). An Analysis of the September 20, 2002, Indianapolis Tornado: Public response
to a Tornado Warning and Damage Assessment Difficulties. Natural Hazard Research and Application
Information Center. University of Colorado.
Turner, R.H., Nigg, J.M., Paz, D.H. & Young, B.S. (1979). Earthquake Threat: The Human
Response in Southern California. Los Angeles, CA: Institute for Social Science research,
University of California, Los Angeles.
Berry (1999) Cyclone Rona: Evacuation of Caravonica and Lake Placid report. James Cook University,
Centre for Disasters Studies, Australia.
Fundamental ideas in emergency management say that people must receive the information, they must
pay attention to the information, and they must comprehend the information. Source highlights that
fear, not panic, affects people’s reaction and how they understand the warning.
Aquirre et al. 1987, “An Evaluation of the Warning System”
Access to various information channels is unevenly spread among citizens in a community and the
combination of channels like brochures, radio, TV, newspaper, etcetera is very important. Additionally,
viewer preference of information channel has an impact on warning message dissemination. Language
barriers also need to be addressed when considering the supply of information channels available in a
given community.
3. Message Credibility
Even when an emergency message is received by an individual and fully understood by the individual,
there is potential that the recipient may not respond to the message because the individual does not
believe the message. The issue of establishing credibility was touched on during the stage of receiving
the message but it become important once the message has been understood as well. Characteristics
such as legitimacy of sender, the race and age characteristics of the receiver, and the efficacy of local
warning system shape belief in warning information.
Atwood (1998) Exploring the “Cry Wolf’ Hypothesis International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
Disasters 16:279-302
Cola (1996) Responses of Pampanga Households to Lahar Warnings: Lessons from two villages in the
Pasig-Potrero River Watershed pp. 141-149 in Fire and Mud: Eruption and Lahars of Mount Pinatubo,
Philippines, edited by C.G. Newhall and R.S. Punongbayan. Seattle, WA.
4. Community Characteristics
Broad community characteristics such as an aging population or strongly tied ethnic groups can have
effects on strategies needed for emergency preparedness messages. Sources suggest that the propensity
to comply with evacuation warnings is lower in elderly populations putting this already vulnerable
population group in dangerous situations. In another example of a community characteristic affecting
planning, ethnic groups have different tendencies when it comes to warning confirmation behavior.
Whites tend to confirm via mass media, whereas African Americans are more likely to confirm through a
social network (M.K. Lindell, C. Prater & R.W. Perry (2007). ‘Emergency Planning’).
Studies have showed that hazard adjustment and hazard awareness are higher for:
1. People with higher educational and higher income (Farley et. al., 1993. “Earthquake hysteria
before and after: A survey and follow-up on public response to the Browning forecast.”
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 11, pp. 305-322.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 18
2. Those of female gender (Mileti & O’Brien, 1992. “Warnings during disasters.” Social Problems 39,
pp. 40-57.; Zhang, 1994. “Environmental hazards in the Chinese public eye.” Risk Analysis 14, pp.
163-167)
3. Those of white ethnicity (Edwards, 1993. “Social location and self-protective behavior.”
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 11, pp. 293-304)
4. Those with high levels of social network contacts (Turner, Nigg & Heller-Paz, 1986. “Waiting for
disaster.” Los Angeles: University of California Press.; see also Aguirre et al, 1998, “A test of the
Emergent Norm Theory of Collective Behavior”)
5. Those in close proximity to hazard zones (Farley, 1998. “Earthquake fears, predictions and
preparations in mid-America.” Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press)
UDUTC Final Report
Page 19
4. Background on Hurricane Evacuation & Nuclear Evacuation
in Delaware
During the summer of 2008, Charles Mitchell and Sarah Dalton reviewed existing published
evacuation plans for Delaware. Their research focused on hurricane evacuation and nuclear evacuation. This
section begins with a brief summary of the plans reviewed and then presents a summary of hurricane
evacuation and nuclear incident evacuation in Delaware. The complete reports are available at:
Dalton, Sarah, Hurricane Evacuation in Delaware, Report, Summer Research Experience, Science and
Engineering Scholars, University Transportation Center and Disaster Research Center, University of
Delaware, August 2008
http://www.ce.udel.edu/UTC/Dalton_Summer08.pdf
Mitchell, Charles W.W III, Delaware Emergency Evacuation for the Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Power
Generators, Report, Summer Research Experience, University Transportation Center and Disaster
Research Center, University of Delaware, August 2008
http://www.ce.udel.edu/UTC/Mitchell_Summer08.pdf
a. Demographics and Geography
Delaware ranks 49th in the nation with a total area of 1,982 square miles. New Castle County is 438 square
miles. Kent County is 594 square miles. Sussex County is 950 square miles. Delaware is 96 miles long and
varies from 9 to 35 miles in width. The maximum elevation is 448 ft.
Population is 873,092 (2008 Estimate), 45th among the states. Density is 401 persons per square mile.
Products are:




Agriculture -- broilers, soybeans, corn, milk.
Fishing Industry -- crabs, clams
Manufacturing -- chemicals, food products, paper products, rubber and plastics products,
primary metals, printed materials.
Mining -- sand and gravel, magnesium compounds.
b. Hazards
Potential hazards are:
I—Natural Hazards
A Atmospheric Hazards
1 Tropical Cyclones
2 Thunderstorms and Lightning
3 Tornadoes
4 Windstorms
5 Hailstorms
6 Snow Avalanches
UDUTC Final Report
Page 20
7 Severe Winterstorms
8 Extreme Summer Weather
B Geologic Hazards
9 Landslides
10 Land Subsidence
11 Expansive Soils
C Hydrologic Hazards
12 Floods
13 Storm Surges
14 Coastal Erosion
15 Droughts D Seismic Hazards
16 Earthquakes
17 Tsunami Events
E Other Natural Hazards
18 Volcanic Hazards
19 Wildfire Hazards
II—Technological Hazards
20 Dam Failures
21 Fires
22 Hazardous Materials Events
23 Nuclear Accidents
Over 95% of the state has an elevation less than 150 feet. Perhaps more importantly, the economic base is
dependent on tourism. For example, Dewey Beach, has a population of 350 in the winter, and 30,000 on
summer weekends, and 17% of all of Delaware’s non-hotel or motel housing could be impacted by some
kind of tidal inundation from a category 4 hurricane
c. Evacuation Plans for Delaware
Delaware is vulnerable to many natural hazards. Sussex County, the southernmost county in Delaware, is at
risk for seventeen of the twenty-one hazards defined by the federal government, the most threatening of
these being floods and hurricanes. Elaborate evacuation plans exist, but with limited experience we do not
know how effective or efficient these plans are.
The plans also pay little attention to the “special” populations in Delaware. These include tourists in the
beach communities, the growing elderly population in southern Delaware, the Amish community and the
Hispanic community. Local knowledge, access to information, mobility and places to go vary and to provide
effective warning and information for evacuation, it is important to understand these “special” populations.
This project will explore the demographics of these populations through census and other data. Geographic
Information Systems tools will be used to convey the distribution and location of these populations groups.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 21
For one specific population group, we will then explore and build on relevant literature and experience to
help develop an appropriate communication/ warning strategy to address the needs of that population
group.
Key documents are:
 Edwards and Kelcey (2004). “Transportation Incident & Management Plan”. State of Delaware Depat
ment of Transportation. August 2004.
 Edwards and Kelcey. (2006). “All Hazards Evacuation Annex: Transportation Incident and Event
Management Plan, Sussex County, Delaware.”
 Edwards and Kelcey. (2007a). “All Hazards Evacuation Annex: Transportation Incident and Event
Management Plan, Kent County, Delaware.”
 Edwards and Kelcey. (2007b). “All Hazards Evacuation Annex: Transportation Incident and Event
Management Plan, New Castle County, Delaware.”
 Jacobs Edwards and Kelcey (2007). Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Stations Emergency Ev
acuation Traffic Operations Manual [DEMA Plan]. October 2007.
 JB/A, Inc. (1994). “Evacuation Time Estimates for Delaware Within The Plume Exposure Pathway Eme
rgency Planning Zone For the Artificial Island Nuclear Generating Station.” Delaware Emergency Man
agement Agency and Public Service Electric & Gas Company. January 1994.
 KLD Associates (2004). “Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Stations Evacuation Time Estimates
Within the Plume Exposure Pathway.” Delaware Emergency Management Agency and PSEG Nuclear,
LLC. February, 2004.
 State of Delaware (2008). Radiological Emergency Plan. Issued January 2008.
d. Delaware Emergency Evacuation for the Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Power Plant
In reviewing the research and current practices related to evacuation planning in Delaware, several
recommendations have become apparent. Evacuation plans need to be a process rather than a list of
actions. In the existing plans there is a very detailed inclusion of where to put cones and personnel,
but it would be beneficial to turn this list of actions into a process. This process would include
formulating warning messages so that the vast majority of the population understands the situation,
personalizes it, and knows how to take protective measures, and would also include a process in
order to facilitate the evacuation and limit entrance into the emergency planning zones. Evacuation
planning should plan, as best as possible, to facilitate this process. Additionally there is a need for
consistency in both primary Delaware plans. In many cases the plans are very consistent with the
access control points which describe plans for reception centers and the locations of barriers.
However there are several areas in which improvements could be made. One clear area that could
use improvement is the bus plan. The Radiological Emergency Plan states that busses should be
used to evacuate only those without any other means of transportation, however in the Traffic
Management Plan it is not as clear. It
may also be worthy to note that, as seen from other evacuations, bus drivers and other personnel
who may be directly affected by the radiological emergency may be unable or refuse to show up for
work. In spite of that the busses could be beneficial to evacuate special needs populations who do
not have transportation but are able to ambulate on their own.
There is still the other portion of the population who will not be able to move themselves to busses.
The plan mentions the use of ambulances and wheelchair vans to evacuate this portion of the
UDUTC Final Report
Page 22
population. However, there are limited numbers of ambulances to begin with, for example Delaware
City only has two, and all these resources cannot simply be redirected in an emergency. This aspect
of the emergency plan, along with the use of busses with the assistance from the National Guard
should have the feasibility reviewed and perhaps have a contingency plan put in place, such as
mutual aid from neighboring states.
Part of the review of the Delaware plans should be a look at the time estimates. KLD Associates
did a very good job at extensively researching the population that would have to be evacuated in a
radiological emergency. They have very good data on who, how many, and where people will be
located. However, there are certain aspects they did not take into account. Research shows that
weather can play an important factor in the amount of time required for evacuation. The current
time estimates only allow an additional 30 minutes for snow and no additional time for rain or heavy
wind. They make the statement that weather will not have an effect on an evacuation and the
additional 30 minutes is for people to clear the snow from their driveways (KLD Associates, 2006:
p36). In reality weather can reduce road capacities by as much as 30% for snow and 10-20% for rain
during an evacuation. This aspect of the plan and evacuation should be reviewed. KLD associates
have many scenarios and magnitudes of emergencies, however, the report becomes almost too
cumbersome with so many different possibilities. A streamlining of a few representative scenarios
(Good Weather,Bad Weather, Summer, Winter, etc.) would be useful to emergency management in
creating a processfor evacuation.
In the KLD Associates report (2004) they mention that traffic should be facilitated and entry into the
emergency planning zones should be discouraged (KLD Associates, 2004: p61). However, in the early
stages of evacuation, people will want to enter the evacuated areas to gather belongings and meet
up with family members. It will be important for the police to aid in the control of entry into the
emergency planning zones. This could remedied in part by viewing the evacuation as a process
rather than a list of definitive steps. Additionally, accommodation for evacuation traffic from
shadow evacuations needs to occur. The current plans do not take into account that more people
will be evacuating than requested to. DelDot and State Police will need to be able to accommodate
this additional and unplanned traffic.
Also, it may be worthwhile to mention the possibility of adding a Radiological Emergency signage
plan. There are several evacuation routes with signs through the state of Delaware, however, none
of them are specific to a nuclear emergency. If an evacuation is ordered people may not always
follow instructions given by emergency management so it is important to make the evacuation as
clear as possible. If there was a different sign for a radiological emergency that people could be told
to follow, perhaps a different shape and color, people might be more inclined to follow the signs. If
they follow the current evacuation signs there could be significant confusion amongst the evacuees
because these signs really are not intended for a radiological evacuation. At the present time the
plan calls for the use of sounding of sirens to alert the public so they can then tune into 93.7 FM and
listen for further instructions. There are signs along some routes that explain this notion. However,
many of the fire departments in Delaware have fire sirens that go off to call volunteers. Unless
residents know the different pitches or sounds of the sirens, many might simply ignore the siren for a
radiological hazard because they thought it was for the fire departments. Additionally some
research (Mileti and Peek, 2000) states that sirens may not be a reliable method to notify the public,
especially if they are indoors or near noisy equipment.
As a final note on warning information, there is also a growing Hispanic population in Delaware and
multi-language warnings should be issued so people who have trouble understanding the English
language can still receive the warning. The signs and brochures currently available on the State of
UDUTC Final Report
Page 23
Delaware’s website are only in English. There is no specific direction for broadcasting warning
messages in English and Spanish during an evacuation. This issue should be addressed to prevent
having a portion of the population not hearing the warning information.
e. Hurricane Evacuation for Delaware
By reviewing the sociological literature and other state’s plans, some clear strengths and
weaknesses have developed in Delaware’s evacuation plans. The fact that Delaware is a
small state in this instance can actually be a strength. In the event of a hurricane, all of
Delaware’s Counties will be affected. This means it is a state problem and not just
individual counties like in most other hurricane prone states. Plans are then developed
for each county, but compiled by the same people. This leads to a standard through
each county’s plans. There is no need to worry if a county left out a certain part of the
plan, because they are all set up exactly the same. Delaware is actually very up to date
dealing with Intelligent Transportation Systems. DelDOT owns and operates their own
radio station to keep evacuees up to date on traffic conditions. This also feeds into the
idea of how being a small state helps. This one radio station can broadcast over the
whole state rather than just one city or county. DelDOT also has cameras set up at
intersections and main stretches of roadway feeding constant and near-real time
information back to DelDOT. There is also a great deal of coordination among the
various agencies and organizations that are likely to respond to an evacuation. They all
know their tasks, and for the most part, in a prioritized fashion. Lastly, Delaware has all
of its plans, studies, and maps posted on the DelDOT website for all of the public to
access. This is a useful tool that all Delawareans should know about and be able to
access.
This leads me to the weaknesses. The fact that Delaware is a small state can also be a
weakness. A hurricane would affect the whole state, and leave no area where resources
could be pulled to help the devastated area recover. Since Delaware is so small, the
only person who can order an evacuation is the governor. In all the other states I found
this information for, local governments could order the evacuation. They have a better
idea of when something is not right than the governor and could start an evacuation
faster.
Delaware’s biggest potential weakness that I can tell is its lack of communication with
the public. They have plans on the website, but does the public know they are there
and easily understand them. Most other states I have read about have hurricane
awareness weeks, hand out hurricane guides every year, or have public safety
announcements on TV. Delaware only has pamphlets on coastal storm preparedness
and a brochure on the Delaware Emergency Notification System posted on the DEMA
website. The state emergency management web pages for Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Florida, all have links on Hurricane preparedness on the
UDUTC Final Report
Page 24
homepage. DEMA only had a link for natural hazards, and even there the only hurricane
related information was the coastal storms brochure and tips for pets and livestock in a
hurricane. The internet is a great tool, but not every Delaware resident or especially
tourists, have a computer hooked up to the internet in their home. Delaware should
not rely solely on the internet as their way to disseminate information.
The assumptions used for the models that created the evacuation time estimates are
also a little broad. Free flow was one assumption that would probably not occur during
an evacuation, but was assumed when running the model. Large amounts of vehicles
will be entering the evacuation network which will increase the density and decrease
the flow rate. There will be large queues and congestion not vehicles going the speed
limit. Also, the idea that there will be constant traffic demand all day is basically ruled
out by research done by social scientists. A large number of people will leave in the
morning and then the evacuation rate will diminish as the day progresses. It is also not
written in the plans if evacuation delay is incorporated into the 24 hours it is said would
take to evacuate the vulnerable area. People do not drop everything and get right into
their car. They pick up family, protect their house, drive home from work, among
various other tasks. This also adds to the evacuation time estimates. Also, DelDOT used
a behavioral study conducted for the Army Corps of Engineers to determine an estimate
of the number of evacuating vehicles on the roadways. This is good, but some bias was
possibly developed. They conducted phone interviews with a little less than 700
residents throughout the Delmarva Peninsula in November and December. This might
not be an adequate sampling of those who would inhabit the beach in the summer,
which is hurricane season. Finally, I wonder if those evacuating from elsewhere on the
peninsula- Maryland and Virginia or shadow evacuees where considered. These two
factors will greatly increase the total number of evacuating motorists.
I also question how much interaction Delaware has with other states if an evacuation
was ordered. It seems like they made a plan to get the evacuees to state borders and
then developed no other plans with bordering states. Nothing was written in the
Hazards Annex stating cooperation with Pennsylvania or New Jersey. The only part of
Maryland mentioned was Ocean City.
One of the recent innovations dealing with evacuation, contraflow, was not written into
Delaware’s plans at all. The benefits of this practice were seen with the model DelDOT
developed, but no written plans have been found. Contraflow has its downfalls, but as a
last case scenario to get people out quickly, it can be a great tool. There should at least
be a plan, even if it is never put into practice.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 25
Another area in which Delaware’s plans are somewhat lacking is in the evacuation of
special needs populations. It is said that it needs to be done, but there are no concrete
plans as to how the evacuation will be executed, using which resources. Delaware can
use Texas as an example. This state plans to use contracted school buses, public transit,
and even railways to evacuate those without personal vehicles and those who can not
evacuate themselves. They set up evacuation hubs where these people can meet.
Delaware can also improve plans to make the evacuation as smooth as possible for
motorists. Comfort stations could be available like seen in Texas and Virginia where
predetermined exits provide a place for evacuees to get off the highway and rest. A
plan to monitor fuel could also be useful so motorists are not stranded on the roadway,
blocking traffic flow. Lastly, some sort of sheltering plan should be included in the
hazards annex. Shelters are tied to evacuation. They are possible destinations and
should be incorporated into both the plans and the evacuation routes. Plans for pet
owners who wish to go to shelters should also be considered. Red Cross shelters do not
accept those who come with pets, and therefore, cause some in danger to stay home in
order to be with their pet.
Delaware has a strong background in planning for an evacuation, but somewhat lacks in
keeping up with current practices. It should take the lessons learned by other states
that have more experience with the natural hazard, and put them into practice in its
plans.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 26
5. Considering Emergent Groups in Emergency Management
In
the
1960’s
and
1970’s
considerable amounts of research
was performed in the area of
organizational theory in disasters and
specifically the tasks and structures
of these tasks that organizations,
both formal and informal, were
undertaking after a disaster. The “DRC typology” that came out of Ohio State
University’s Disaster Research Center under Quarantelli and Dynes included four types
of organizations during disasters. The now popular diagram included to follow is based
on the illustration presented in Organizational Behavior in Disaster (Dynes) which
includes the categorization of the emergent group. Over thirty years later, many
specifics about this group remain unclear but its strong presence and impact following a
disaster make it a group that should be paid special attention by emergency
management practitioners.
This document will provide a basic outline on what is known about this group and then
highlight why considering this group and their behaviors are important in emergency
management. It will also go into the broader aspect of including the community aspect
into emergency management as the emergent group is a subset of this concept. This
document will not go into great depth about the reasoning behind why the emergent
group exists but will focus on the practical implications of this group.
a. Defining the Group
Emergent organizations are newly formed groups which were not formalized prior to
the disaster. They are most often informal and loosely organized and the group is most
frequently comprised of residents of the disaster area. They rarely have experience in
disaster recovery but sometimes bring expertise from their personal or professional life
into their recovery work (Tierney, Lindell and Perry). For example, medical professionals
may aid in providing emergency services to injured neighbors or carpentry professionals
may aid in removing large debris from surrounding areas all while being under no
municipal or governmental organization’s direction.
Emergent groups should not be confused with extending groups which are organized
prior to the disaster but in another role. These groups, such as religious organizations or
community leagues, retain their structure during disaster recovery but take on tasks in
which they may have little experience. They may have performed no preparedness
activities for the disaster but they are extending their resources to aid in recovery. In
many instances they are also involved in preparedness work but this is not a
requirement. Emergent organizations, on the other hand, performed no prior
preparation for the disaster as a group but may have done so individually.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 27
b. Relevance & Importance of the Emergent Group
Members of emergent groups are often the residents being impacted by the disaster.
They are immediately on site and have extensive knowledge of the events that directly
impacted them. They also will likely have more knowledge about the surrounding
community and infrastructure than outside emergency professionals if the disaster is of
a scale that requires outside support.
They can be the first respondents in search and rescue and if they are not able to able to
provide physical support in this, when emergency rescue professionals arrive, they can
aid in locating victims as they have knowledge that the professionals do not about
neighbors, friends, or family members. There have been many instances where all
victims after a disaster have been recovered by relatives, neighbors, and others at the
site when the disaster happened prior to the arrival of any professional emergency
response teams (Aguirre, Wenger and Glass). Had these emergent response groups not
formed, it can be inferred that the injuries and casualties could have been worse.
Additional activities might include responding to rising flood waters or growing fires but
also simpler things like directing traffic and providing direction to masses. Their
involvement is not limited to response activities but they have the potential to play a
strong role in recovery as well. Their motivation and enthusiasm is unmatched because
it is often their own, their relative’s, or their friend’s home or neighborhood. Emergent
groups sometimes form after disasters in disadvantaged populations when they do not
receive the amount of support from organized relief as other socioeconomic groups do
(Gillespie, Mileti and Perry).
Most importantly, these groups are a large resource of general knowledge, labor, and
compassion that are going to form and work towards their individual goals regardless of
institutional intervention or embracement. However, with a bit of forethought the
effectiveness, efficiency, and overall community benefit of these emergent groups can
be improved.
c. Integrating the Emergent Group
The basic idea behind including emergent groups in emergency management
procedures is in enabling these groups to do more by providing some amount of
organization and integration into formalized emergency management plans. This can be
done at numerous stages of the emergency management process and starts by
improving community involvement and considering individual community needs in the
planning and preparedness steps.
There is a large amount of literature about how to involve the community in emergency
planning and preparedness however there seems to be a common weakness. It is
difficult for emergency management professionals to motivate communities to get
involved in the process when there is no eminent emergency and when no community
interest is shown, the procedures often fall back to standard bureaucratic forms. It
seems that one aspect should be to establish transparency of the process and trust in
UDUTC Final Report
Page 28
the community so that when these emerging groups do form, there is existing
knowledge on the citizen’s part about emergency management.
Utilizing internet databases and information technology to enhance community-based
disaster preparedness has shown to have some promise but like many resources offered
by emergency management, it typically only accessed after the disaster is eminent or
after it has occurred (Troy, Carson and Vanderbeek). Collaboration between the
community and emergency management agencies can provide a wealth of information
about local area details, culture, and challenges that may not have been apparent to
anyone outside of a specific neighborhood (Schafer, Carroll and Haynes) (Kapucu,
Collaborative emergency management: better community organizing, better public
preparednes and response). Emphasis on community involvement and community
awareness during the planning stages is becoming a more commonly considered aspect
of planning and with enough effort, may increase the abilities of emergent groups.
Once a disaster has occurred and emergent organizations have formed, the
acknowledgement of their existence by emergency management agencies and
government officials is important in sustaining their activity. Additionally, these
institutions can provide direction to the groups and integrate their activities into the
overall response and recovery plan. It is a difficult task because while their efforts may
be very real, there is the question of if they can be relied upon or if they are just a
transient and unreliable service. Regardless of which it is, recognizing their efforts,
providing them needed resources, and helping with their organization into the larger
plan will benefit the community and the response and recovery efforts.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 29
6. Geographic
Information
Management
Systems
in
Emergency
A large part of emergency management focuses on the acquisition, management, and
distribution of large sets of data. These databases might include property information,
distribution sites, vulnerable populations, critical infrastructure, or evacuation zones but
regardless of their nature, having this data immediately available and in an easy to
access and understandable form is a crucial part of a successful disaster response and
recovery. One tool which has become increasingly popular among state and local
planners is geographic information software.
It has the power to succinctly organize large
sets of data, analyze this data as the
information is needed, and in some instances
simultaneously broadcast and update this
information with the addition of network
wide databases or internet based
applications.
While this tool has the potential to be
extremely powerful and helpful during a
disaster, there must be a certain amount of
forethought to obtain the data necessary for
many applications.
Included in this
document will be a series of GIS applications
which may be useful for state and municipal
agencies to consider. They are loosely
divided into five broad emergency management phases and a few specific studies are
mentioned throughout. The table to the right is a summarization of a more detailed
table from “The Role of Geographic Information Systems/Remote Sensing in Disasters
Management” and provides a succinct idea of the topics to be discussed below (Thomas,
Ertugay and Kemec). This document is meant as an overview to possibly spark further
interest which will require deeper research into one of the specific activities.
a. Planning
Planning in emergency management includes accessing the need for mitigation, gauging
possible risks, and analyzing potential impacts on people, infrastructure, the
environment, etcetera. A data rich GIS application can aid in locating areas of
vulnerability or potential problem. Geospatial layouts of critical infrastructure lines like
water, sewer, and electric as well as distribution facilities for each of these items
become useful as they are combined with databases including households, buildings,
emergency response sites, sheltering locations, etcetera. This information can be
mapped along with potential hazard information about hurricanes, flooding, high winds,
UDUTC Final Report
Page 30
hazardous material sites, landslides, earthquakes, and even highly vulnerable sites for
terrorism.
GIS is frequently used to analyze vulnerability of transportation systems in response to
an emergency. Studies have been used to reveal specific regions of transportation
systems which are more prone to failure during evacuations (Shulman) but more
commonly, areas in a municipality with high densities of vulnerable populations which
may require specific transportation needs (Cova and Church).
Some researchers
suggest that vulnerable populations such as elderly, single parent households, the poor,
and even new residents to the area be highlighted with the use of GIS to receive more
specialized care throughout the emergency management process. In locating these
individuals and communities, they may even be able to be incorporated into the
planning process and received individualized education so that in the event that a
disaster does occur, they are less likely to need additional attention (Morrow). One
challenge with this is in locating the needy individuals but recent ideas in voluntary
registries have provided some solution (Wait, Cromley and Garb). Work has been done
in combining the information obtained through disaster simulation modeling with GIS
and creating a “spatial decision-support system” for preparing for evacuations (de Silva)
but GIS itself can even be used to simulate potential disaster situations and examine the
areas affected. GIS has also been used in preparedness exercises during the actual test
and then afterwards in examining how to improve the system. Areas of weakness can
be plotted and other scenarios for evacuation or response can be evaluated (ArcNews).
b. Preparedness
With an adequate database of information about a community and potential events, GIS
can be used to quite effectively to estimate and appropriate resources. It can aid in
determining where to place fire and emergency services based on level of accessibility,
locations for police barricades for lane closures, estimating the number of evacuation
vehicles needed, and also where to place them for most efficient use. In knowing the
population information and the designated evacuation facility, the specific amount of
food, water, bedding, etcetera needed at each facility can be calculated with just a few
clicks. While GIS is very often just considered a static mapping tool, it can become a
powerful analysis tool when there is constantly updating input information. Quickly
changing a few numbers related to wind speeds, flood levels, or plume sizes can
simultaneously update an entire database of evacuation routes, evacuation service
needs, and sheltering information.
c. Response
Recognizing that GIS can be used as a dynamic database is important in its use in
emergency response. When paired with vehicle locating technologies or global
positioning, it can be useful in routing and ultimately improve efficiency during an
emergency. A detailed database can provide information about potential threats and
difficulties at the site before the response vehicle arrives. The database can include
information about the size and use of the structure or region and in the case of some
UDUTC Final Report
Page 31
hazards, it can aid in determining the size and location of the evacuation. In cities
where the populations fluctuates drastically depending on the hour, GIS databases can
respond to this and provide an estimate on the appropriate number of emergency
personnel needed (Wait, Cromley and Garb).
Public health emergencies also can benefit from GIS by assessing vulnerability, hazards,
and risks but more commonly in response. It can aid in outbreak investigations and
disease distribution patterns and can be used in distributing information to the public.
Maps showing exposure can provide direction for professionals to research and also to
look for patients needing treatment (Spiegel, Gerber and Henderson).
d. Recovery
An application that spans both response and recovery is in estimating damage and
prioritizing utility response. GIS can be used to keep a database of damages, estimated
monetary loss, and areas of high priority. Handheld devices can be used by field
respondents to record the damage data and it can be fed back into the master database.
From there, policy makers and emergency management personnel can makes decisions
about resources allotment and areas needing special attention (Aziz, Pena-Mora and
Chen). Additionally, formulas can be used to calculate damages using GIS immediately
following an event. These numbers may not be the most accurate but they provide a
baseline estimate (Bockarjova, Steenge and van der Veen).
e. Other Uses
In addition to using GIS to aid in agency and governmental planning, organization,
preparedness, response, and recovery, GIS can be used as a tool to disseminate
information to the public. Some research shows that clear maps, charts, and graphics
can aid in promoting a message be it an evacuation warning or a public health
announcement but it is important to gear the map to the literacy level of the population
at hand (Zarcadoolas, Krishnaswami and Boyer).
The underlying requirement for any of these GIS technologies to be effective is in having
a solid foundation of data. It would be extremely difficult to nearly impossible to use
some of these activities if the data was not on hand many months prior to the
emergency. There is certainly some amount of investment required to create a strong
GIS database but many municipalities have found it worthwhile and agencies like FEMA
are embracing the technology as well (FEMA). There are a seemingly infinite number of
potential uses for GIS technology in emergency management and its ability to be
combined with other technologies makes it a powerful and versatile tool.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 32
7. Identifying Vulnerable Populations in Delaware
a. Non-English Speaking Farm Workers
Agriculture and poultry processing plants have always played an important role in the
economy of Delaware and Delmarva Peninsula (Miller, Martin & Kee, 1997). In 2007,
there were 2,546 farms in Delaware with 510,253 acres of farmland, and average of 200
acres per farm (Delaware State Agriculture Overview, 2007).
According Miller et al. (1997,) the agricultural labor force on Delaware’s farms have
changed significantly in the past century. While in the 1920’s the most seasonal work
was performed by white women, currently the majority of seasonal workers in Delaware
are Hispanic (50-60%), African-American (30-40%) and workers with Guatemalan,
Jamaican and Haitian background (Miller, at al. 1997). However, work on farms is social
stratified and unequal within race of migrant workers. Certain ethnic groups are
prevalent in some crops but not others. In addition, the agricultural workers are paid
just a little bit over minimum wage (Miler, et al., 1997). The number of migrant workers
who are undocumented and unauthorized alien employment in seasonal agricultural
work has probably increased in recent years (Miller et al, 1997). Growing problems with
undocumented workers are mirrored in the apparent increase in INS and USDOL
enforcement activity. For example, an INS audit done in late 1995 early 1996 of four
poultry plants found that from 3,000 employees 460 did not have proper authorization
to work in the US (Rural Migration News, 1996).
As a result of their undocumented situation, illegal immigrants are more prone to live in
insecure situations and, as a result, they are more vulnerable to human rights violations.
Because of their illicit status, undocumented workers are left without formal work
contracts, welfare services except of emergency and child medical treatment. Basok's
(2002) research on Mexican workers in Canada, describes the migrant population as a
workers without a social life as a result of the isolation of the work environment and
housing arrangements. Furthermore, Basok's research records cases of racism and social
exclusion among Mexican seasonal workers in Canada’s farms.
In summary, besides class, race, gender and age another significant factors for
vulnerability is immigration status, special needs population and occupation (Bolin and
Stanford 1999; Morrow 1999; Cutter, Boruff and Shirley 2003). These factors might
influence vulnerability of individuals and groups to natural hazards. In addition, migrant
workers in agriculture field of Delaware regardless of their legal status are vulnerable to
negative consequences of natural disasters as a result of language barrier, in many cases
UDUTC Final Report
Page 33
of their high levels of illiteracy (Caldwell, 2006), and social and physical isolation from
other population.
b. Amish Community
Another group that might be highly vulnerable to disaster hazards because of different
culture is Amish population in state of Delaware. The size of Amish population in
Delaware is estimated of 1,215 people (Amish Studies, 2008). Even though some
research of Amish communities suggests that gradual social change is occurring in their
community (Savells, Jerry 1985), the Amish population is still organized around the
extended family and the church. In addition, they try to avoid dependence on modern
life and their social life lies in the local district without interaction with outside world.
It needs to be taken into account that the rules of the church are observed by every
member. These rules cover most aspects of life, so in order to prepare this population
for natural hazards the communication needs to be taken through the church leader. In
addition, Amish communities as a result of their specific characteristics of life have
limited access to phones, transportation and even electricity.
c. Horse Farms
Research on natural disaster and pets show that people are more likely to stay with
their pets especially if they lack options for their pet’s transportation. Animal evacuation
should be one part of disasters planning. Consequently, it is necessary to prevent people
from risking their lives and health on order to protect and save their pets. State of
Delaware is known for a large number of stable companies and horse farms. Even
though there is scare research in live stocks and disaster response, we can assume that
owners of horse farms would not evacuate without their horses. As Allen & Linda
Anderson (2006) point out, Katrina disaster revealed that ‘pets are part of people lives’
and it is was very common that people stayed with their pets, smuggled them into buses
and experienced psychological disorders as result of loosing their pets. People even
might risk their own lives to save their pets. In addition, animal rescuers trained in the
concept of animals rescue needs to be implemented into preparedness and planning for
disasters (Anderson, 2006; see also Irvine, 2006). Consequently, there is need to accept
the premise that animals need to be moved with people especially if those animals are
part of business and source of income. Some states such as Florida. Hawaii, Louisiana,
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont had passed legislation in 2006 on
animal disaster planning and response. As response to need for shelters suitable for
accommodating horses in time of disasters ‘Days end Farm Horse Rescue’ has
established two first-responding rescue teams in states of Maryland, Virginia, and
Delaware.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 34
d. Elderly
As has been mentioned numerous times prior in this report, another factor which
influences social vulnerability to disasters is age. Scholars point out that elderly
populations usually lack the access to resources (information, knowledge) and access to
political power and representation that might increase their vulnerability to disaster
(Morrow, 1999). Elderly may have mobility constrains and lack of resilience (Cutter,
Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; see also Ngo, 2001). Similarly, M.K. Lindell, C. Prater & R.W.
Perry (2007) in their ‘Emergency Planning’ argue that the propensity to comply with an
evacuation warning decreases as age increases. This leaves more elderly in vulnerable
areas. Probable reason for this is that as age increases, levels of social activity decrease.
More social isolation produces fewer chances of receiving a warning.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 35
8. Vulnerability of Bridge Infrastructure
a. Background on Bridge Security
Incidents that affect the security of our bridges are becoming increasingly important
since September 11, 2001. Bridges present a unique threat because they are essential to
our economic activity and pose serious risk for human casualties. However,
transportation networks require unique protection, especially bridges, because they are
design to be easily accessible and there are a limited number of alternate routes due to
geographic conditions at the bridge site (Federal Highway Administration, 2003: p1).
There are already many locations in the U.S. and Delaware where the transportation
system is stressed to its maximum on a regular basis and a disaster or terrorist attack at
one of these locations can have widespread consequences. Small and routine
transportation incidents have caused major delays on vital routes (Roper, 2005).
A Blue Ribbon Panel on Bridge and Tunnel Security formed by the Federal Highway
Administration believes a loss of a major bridge or tunnel could result in a cost of
approximately $10 Billion (FHWA, 2003: p2). Much of the preparedness on bridges will
require federal assistance on funds which the Federal Highway Administration has
begun to recommended methods for the distribution of funds based upon the need for
a structure. One of the primary methods recommended to plan for loss is a risk based
strategy to establish the critical nodes in the transportation infrastructure (Roper,
2005). These critical nodes are analyzed for how much of an impact destruction would
cause on the transportation network.
b. Federal Approach to Bridge Security
The Federal Highway Administration and The American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) requested that a “Blue Ribbon Panel” of
engineering experts establish recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel security. They
issued a report titled “Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security” in September
2003. This panel had several recommendations to reduce the threat to our bridge and
tunnel infrastructure. Their recommendations fall into three areas: institutional, fiscal,
and technical (FHWA, 2003: p4). Within the three areas there should be uniformity
among states, especially if federal funds are to be awarded to aid with security
upgrades.
At present time there are very little codes written for prevention of damage to bridges
from terrorist events. There is some assistance available from the Department of
Defense, however there are not specific codes related to many of the technologies
becoming available (FHWA, 2003 p12). The BRP suggests more academic research to
better understand response and fill in existing gaps. The recommendation is to take
information provided by the department of defense and other security standards and
develop appropriate codes for uniform construction.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 36
The suggested method for uniformity begins with identifying “critical” bridges and
specific threats to those structures. The development of a risk based strategy for
security assessment allows prioritization of countermeasures and geospatial
management of information to develop scenarios that can be used for planning and
analysis (Roper, 2006: p4). This information should be communicated to larger security
databases to facilitate communication between security agencies for assessment and
decision making purposes (Roper, 2006: p6).
Additionally countermeasures to each of these threats should be considered and
priority assigned to the structure based upon importance, threat level and likelihood a
terrorist attack will occur. These countermeasures can be divided into several
categories: “technology to deter attack, deny access, detect presence, defend the
facility or design structural hardening to minimize consequences to an acceptable level”
(FHWA, 2003: p11). Some of the solutions are easy to implement and have minimal cost
while others are long term solutions that will require significant financial assistance. For
example, placing concrete jersey walls to keep people from driving up to the structure
vs. adding protective shielding to a suspension bridge’s cables for blast protection.
Prioritization of Structures
Prioritization is required because funds are not unlimited for any jurisdiction,
although some funding may be available from the federal government for security
upgrades. This makes it necessary to prioritize structures to make the largest impact on
the transportation network. AASHTO has developed a recommended procedure for this
process. The AASHTO method uses critical factors so assess vulnerability based upon
several categories. These include “target attractiveness, accessibility and expected
damage” (FHWA, 2003: p19). This information can be then used for risk assessment to
determine where funding will be most effective.
In addition to the AASHTO method the FHWA Blue Ribbon Panel recommends
following similar procedures to the Texas Department of Transportation by ranking
bridges based upon a very specific criteria, much of which is available from the National
Bridge inventory (FHWA, 2003: p20).
Some of these criteria include (From FHWA, 2003:p20):











Potential for mass causality based on Average Daily traffic (ADT) and peak capacities
Criticality to emergency response and emergency evacuation
Military or defense mobilization
Alternate routes with available capacity
Symbolic Value
Mixed Use Bridge
Potential for Collateral damage (land, marine, rail)
Maximum Single Span Length
Commercial Vehicle vs. Passenger Vehicle Mix
Bridge Dimensions
Significance of Revenue (From Toll Collection)
UDUTC Final Report
Page 37

Bridges at international border crossings
It is also recommended that a risk factor be determined for structure based upon three
factors:
Figure 1 – FHWA, 2003 p. 21
Applicable Research
The FHWA Blue Ribbon Panel recognizes that one of the primary concerns when
mitigating against attack is blast loading on bridges. More research is needed to
understand how bridges can be protected through retrofit and structural design. The
panel considered key components of the bridge found in table 1. The recommendation
is to develop research and methods to militate against threats to these structural
components.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 38
Table 1: FHWA, 2003:p23
Design for threat prevention should be based upon the importance factor of the
bridge (the R factor found by using figure 1) and the level of the threat to the bridge.
Large Scale threats, such as a precision attack would cause catastrophic failure and
should be prevented. The FHWA determined other threats and their magnitudes
thought to be likely for design considerations. These values are shown in Table 2. Based
upon these threats the owner of the structure must determine if they are acceptable
and if not how they can be prevented. Mitigation can be either in the form of mitigating
against the threat or mitigating against the consequences.
Table 2: FHWA, 2003: p26
Examples for Mitigation against threats (FHWA, 2003: p27):




Establish Secure Perimeters
Inspection, Surveillance, detection and enforcement, CCTV
Visible Security Presence
Minimize Time on Target
UDUTC Final Report
Page 39
Examples for Mitigation against Consequences (FHWA, 2003: p27):




Create Standoff Distances
Add a design Redundancy
Hardening/Strengthening the elements of the Structure
Develop an Accelerated Response and Recovery Plan
c.
Applications for the State of Delaware
State Departments of Transportation have much of the responsibility for bridges and their
safety. The loss of a state’s bridge could be detrimental to the State’s economy and cause
significant shifts of loads on a state’s (and neighboring state’s) transportation Networks.
Planning for bridge security would likely be a cooperation with DelDOT, the Army Corps of
Engineers and other agencies such as the Delaware River and Bay Authority who operate
bridges within Delaware.
Details of Bridges in Delaware
At present time no policies concerning bridge security in Delaware have been found for this
report. A press release by the Delaware River Bay Authority details some of their Traffic
Management System put into place in 2002 for the Delaware Memorial Bridge. The security
features of this plan include 26 High resolution cameras on the towers and 11 towers below the
road surface. These cameras are monitored 24/7 by the Delaware River Bay Authority Police
Operations Center (DRBA, 2002).
A recommended method for application of bridge security is that practicing bridge engineers,
owners and government officials make recommendations for the specific structures in the area
of risk. This process can integrate Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) and other solutions
and plan for specific times or situations where there is an increased vulnerability. Based upon
recommendations the DOT, or other owner can begin specific security protection and
monitoring of threats, generally starting with specific sites of high threat or impact (Roper,
2006: p5). It’s important to recognize that security for each type of structure will vary and the
risk based assessment information can be used to recognize which structures should take
priority. In each case the strengths and weaknesses of each application scenario should be
considered (Roper, 2006: p5).
Possible Security Opportunities for Delaware (Roper, 2006)









Fixed /Pan/Tilt/Zoom Cameras
Contact Sensors on doors and gates
Motion Detectors
Seismic Sensors
Digital Video Recorders
Fiber Optic Sensors
Electronic Key Access
Weather Monitoring
Low Tech Devices: Lighting, Speakers, Microphones, Physical Barriers
UDUTC Final Report
Page 40
d. Conclusion
In any application there should be a multi-tiered approach with overlapping security systems.
For higher risk structures there will be a larger need for monitoring and active protection. In
low risk situations low tech deterrents may be deemed “enough” protection, such as lighting
and physical barriers. New Bridges and retrofits should be designed with a level of resiliency so
that if a portion of the structure fails due to a natural disaster or a terrorist, the entire
superstructure will not fail: this applies not only to the structure itself but the security and
protection measures applied. Often infrastructure management systems are installed for
monitoring of slow deterioration; however the probability of failure is increased for extreme
events, such as a terrorist attack. This requires a new type of monitoring and protection not
previously installed with most structures (Transportation Research Board, 2008: p354). If a
bridge was damaged in Delaware the cost of repair and of impact on society could be
substantial. Delaware would be able to benefit from the addition of security to many bridges
that would have a high impact to society and mitigate against threats to the state’s
transportation infrastructure.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 41
9. Rail and Ferry Security
a. Rail Security Assessment
Securing passenger and cargo rail lines presents a unique challenge due to the number of
access points and numbers of riders. After the London bombings on July 7th, 2005 there has
been a new, nationwide emphasis on improving rail security (Petterman, 2005: p1). Surface
transportation presents a unique problem because it is so expansive it is hard to obtain the
level of security of air travel.
“There is a general consensus among security experts that passenger rail systems are inherently
vulnerable and thus virtually impossible to defend against attack, due to the very nature of
their design and operations” (Petterman, 2005: p3). “Passenger rail systems are open, have
multiple access points, are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some cases have no barriers”
(Rabkin, 2007: p5). The aviation industry has been able to have a very closed system with a
minimal number of access points making it less difficult to secure. The TSA is ultimately
responsible for securing all modes of transportation and state and local governments will have
to coordinate protection measures with the TSA (Rabkin, 2007:p 7). The decision of what to
secure and how to secure it will be made using risk based assessment looking at where the
largest impact on the system can be made. With this taken into account transit experts focus on
minimizing the effects of a terror attack and reducing the damage caused by natural disasters.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 9/11 commission recommends the use of
threat based risk management (Petterman, 2005: p5). This has been transformed into a
numerical equation to categorize risk: Vulnerability + Threat + Criticality = Risk. Passenger rail is
by its design hard to secure.
The worldwide average of 30 rail attacks per year leave the likelihood for attack low, however
the effects of an attack in lives and confidence of protection could be significant. There is much
debate about where the funding for improvements should come from and if it should be
federally funded or sate and locally funded. Much of the threat reduction is managed through
vulnerability assessments, emergency response training and drills. This type or preparedness
leads to analysis of potential threats and needs for equipment and further training. The details
of physical security upgrades for rail transport have not been made public, however reports
show increased security measures such as surveillance, increased police presence and random
inspections (Petterman, 2005). The TSA has been working with rail and transit agencies to
update threat assessments in an effort to allocate funding. Any methods to secure rail lines
must find the right balance between a desired level of security and efficient operation.
Specifically in Delaware there are three types of rail transit in use. Delaware has heavy rail for
cargo transport of cargo throughout the state, passenger rail with Amtrak lines and stations in
UDUTC Final Report
Page 42
New Castle County, and commuter rail into Pennsylvania and Maryland. These lines have
security in place and a police presence. The lines passing through New Castle County are
essential to the overall rail system in the northeast corridor and important to the State of
Delaware.
b. Ferry Security Assessment
Although ferries do not have status as a symbolic target, an attack on a ferry would attract
significant media attention resulting in death and economic damage (Greenberg, 2006). Some
scenarios threatening ferries are much more likely than others and would only require basic
skills. Attacks for ferries range from relatively high for an onboard explosion to low threat os a
USS Cole type of attack where the vessel is rammed with an IED. Ferries operate on a
predictable schedule and have large numbers of people coming and going freely. Additionally
ferries are not designed as robustly as cruise ships against attack (Greenberg, 2007). The
facilities are designed with commerce in mind requiring minimal requirements for entry. The
RAND Corporation (Greenberg, 2006) recommends the use of threat based risk assessment for
maritime terrorism incidents and has developed their own assessment for use.
Additionally in Maritime Homeland Security, the Unites States Coast Guard had has made an
effort deter and mitigate against terrorist attacks. The Coast Guard recommends that maritime
operators evaluate and document the security measures they have in place. In order to do the
evaluation the Coast Guard has developed a risk based security assessment. “Risk-based
decision-making is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a security
breach will endanger an asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the
vulnerability and mitigate the consequences of a security breach” (USCG, 2004: p1). During the
security assessment weaknesses in the existing security policies and protection systems should
be identified. Additionally measures to prevent security breaches due to the weaknesses should
be recommended. To do this the U.S. Coast Guard recommends a 5 step process (USCG, 2004).
Step 1: Potential Threats
The initial step in the threat assessment process is to consider scenarios which are realistic for
the type and location of the vessel. The example used is a boat with explosives ramming a
tanker would be a credible threat meanwhile a handheld missile sinking a tanker is not as likely.
It is suggested that as a minimum the scenarios in Table 1 be considered. It is not necessary to
evaluate variations on a theme and scenarios that have now consequences (USGS, 2004).
UDUTC Final Report
Page 43
Table 3 - U.S. Coast Guard, 2004
Step 2: Consequences
The consequences of a potential attack should be assessed for death, injury, economic and
environmental impact. Each consequence should be given a rating, based upon the component
of the consequence that yields the highest rating. If a likely threat has a moderate (rating of 1)
impact in death, injury and economic but a significant environmental impact (rating of 2) then
the overall consequences would be rated as significant (rating of 2). Additionally events that are
considered catastrophic receive a rating of 3. Descriptions of the rating levels can be found in
Table 2.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 44
Table 4 – Consequence Score (Source: U.S. Coast Guard, 2004)
Step 3: Vulnerability
A vessel’s vulnerability to attack should be included in the assessment. The U.S. Coast Guard
recommends giving a numerical score to the vulnerability of the vessel based upon accessibility and
“organic security.” Accessibility is described as the physical barriers that deter attacks from
occurring. Organic Security is the use of security personnel and systems to detect and prevent
threats from occurring. The vulnerability rating is a similar rating to consequences on a one to three
scale found in table 3.
Table 5 - U.S. Coast Guard, 2004
Step 4: Mitigation
Once the threat assessment has been conducted it is important for the owner to determine which
scenarios require protection to be implemented. The owner should be aware of other scenarios but
may find in the assessment that the current security measures provide an acceptable level of
UDUTC Final Report
Page 45
protection. The U.S. Coast Guard uses table 4 to determine what actions should be taken based upon
the resulting score of each scenario.
Mitigate is defines as: “mitigation strategies, such as security protective measures and/or
procedures, may be developed to reduce risk for that scenario” (USCG, 2004).
Consider is defined as: “the scenario should be considered and mitigation strategies should
be developed on a case by case basis” (USCG, 2004).
Document is defines as “the scenario may not need a mitigation measure at this time and
therefore only needs to be documented” (USCG, 2004).
Step 5: Implementation
Once the assessment has been completed and the operator of the vessel determines the best
steps for mitigation that will reduce risk they must be implemented. Its suggested that reducing
the vulnerabilities is easier than reducing consequences or threats. Implementation of
mitigation strategies should be evaluated based upon effectiveness and feasibility. If the
strategy lowers the vulnerability score itself or in combination with other strategies it may be
beneficial. It is likely to be feasible if it can be implemented without significantly affecting
impact and within the budget. If a strategy is cost prohibitive or prevents operations it may not
be feasible. Security measures put in place should be re evaluated periodically to ensure they
have the desired affect because threats and vulnerabilities change over time.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 46
10.
Conclusions
Although Delaware is small infrastructure security and emergency preparedness are important
in Delaware. First, the I-95 corridor and the Northeast rail corridor are key elements of the
transportation system in the Northeast. Second, the geographical configuration of the
Delmarva Peninsula means that evacuation requires some careful planning. Finally, there are
many different agencies involved. While there appears to be many opportunities to explore
security and emergency preparedness, transportation agencies indicate that they are confident
that there current plans are effective.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 47
11.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank University Transportation Center for sponsoring this research.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 48
12.
References
Aguirre, B., D. Wenger, T.A. Glass, M. Diaz-Murillo, and G Vigo. "The social organization of search and
rescue: Evidence from the Guadalajara gasolene explosion." International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters 13 (1995): 93-106.
ArcNews. Disaster Preparedness Exercise Uses GIS. ESRI, 2006.
Aziz, Zeeshan, Feniosky Pena-Mora, Albert Chen, and Timothy Lantz. "Supporting urban emergency
response and recovery using RFID-based building assessment." Disaster Prevention and
Management, 2009: 35-48.
Bockarjova, Marija, Albert E Steenge, and Anne van der Veen. "On direct estimation of initial dmamage
in the case of a major catastrophe." Disaster Prevention and Management, 2004: 330-336.
Cova, Thomas J, and Richard L Church. "Modelling community evacuation vulnerability using GIS."
International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 1997: 763-784.
de Silva, F. Nisha. "Providing spatial decision support for evacuation planning: a challenge in integrating
technologies." Disaster Prevention and Management, 2001: 11-20.
Delaware River Bay Authority (DRBA). “Delaware Memorial Bridge’s Traffic Management System
Featured at International Bridge Tunnel Turnpike Association Meeting.” Delaware River Bay
Authority News Release. 13 May 2002.
Drabek, Thomas E., and David A. McEntire. "Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster:
lessons, trends, and opportunities from the research literature." Disaster Prevention and
Management 12, no. 2 (2003): 97-112.
Dynes, R. Organized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1970.
FEMA. FEMA Mapping and Analysis Center. 2004. http://www.gismaps.fema.gov/gis04.shtm.
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). “Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security.”
September 2003.
Greenberg, Michael D, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko and David S. Ortiz. “Maritime Terrorism
Rick and Liability.” Rand Corporation, 2006.
Gillespie, D.F., D.S. Mileti, and R. Perry. Organizational Response to Changing Community Systems. Kent,
OH: Kent State University Press, 1976.
Kapucu, Naim. Collaborative emergency management: better community organizing, better public
preparednes and response. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 49
Kapucu, Naim. "Culture of preparedness: household disaster preparedness." Disaster Prevention and
Management 17, no. 4 (2008): 526-535.
Majchrzak, Ann, Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, and Andrea B. Hollingshead. "Coordinating Expertise Amount
Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters." Organization Science 18, no. 1 (2007): 147-161.
Morrow, Betty Hearn. "Identifying and Mapping Community Vulnerability." Disasters, 1999: 1-18.
Newport, Jeyanth K, and Godfrey G. P. Jawahar. "Community participation and public awareness in
disaster mitigation." Disaster Prevention and Management 12 (2003): 33-36.
Paton, Douglas. "Preparing for natural hazards: role of community trust." Disaster Prevention and
Management 16, no. 3 (2007): 370-379.
Paton, Douglas, and David Johnson. "Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience and
preparedness." Disaster Prevention and Management 10, no. 4 (2001): 270-277.
Peterman, Randall. “Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues.” CRS Report for Congress. 29 July 2005.
Rabkin, Norman J. “Passenger Rail Security”. Testimony before congressional subcommittees. GOA-07583T. 7 March 2007.
Roper, William. “Strategies and Technology Choices for Bridge and Tunnel Monitoring, assessment and
Protection.” 2006 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting. TRB Paper 06-2948. 1 August
2005.
Schafer, Wendy A., John M. Carroll, Steven R. Haynes, and Stephen Abrams. "Emergency Management
Planning as Collaborative Community Work." Homeland Security and Emergency Management
5, no. 1 (2008).
Shulman, Holly Miriam-Lea. "Estimating Evacuation Vulnerability of Urban Transportation Systems Using
GIS." 2008.
Spiegel, Paul B, Michael L Gerber, Alden K Henderson, and Reinhard Kaiser. "The Application of
Geographic Information Systems and Global Positioning Systems in Humanitarian Emergencies:
Lessons Learned, Programme Implications and Future Research." Disasters, 2003: 127-140.
Thomas, Deborah S.K., Kivanc Ertugay, and Serkan Kemec. "The Role of Geographic Information
Systems/Remote Sensing in Disaster Management." In Handbook of Disaster Research, by
Havidan Rodriguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, 83-96. New York: Springer, 2007.
Tierney, Kathleen J., Michael K. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry. Facing the Unexpected: Disaster
Preparedness and Response in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press, 2001.
Transportation Research Board. “International Bridge and Structure Management.” Transportation
Research Circular, Number E-C128. October 2008.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 50
Trim, Peter R.J. "An integrative approach to disaster management and planning." Disaster Prevention
and Management 13, no. 3 (2004): 218-225.
Troy, Douglas A., Anne Carson, Jean Vanderbeek, and Anne Hutton. Enhancing community-based
disaster preparedness with information technology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
United States Coast Guard (USCG, 2004). “Navigation and vessel inspection circular No. 10-02, Change
1”. 6 August 2004.
Wait, Richard B, Robert G Cromley, and Jane L Garb. "Estimating Populations at Risk for Disaster
Preparedness and Response." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2007.
Zarcadoolas, Christina, Arthi Krishnaswami, Jennefer Boyer, and Andrea Rothenberg. "GIS Maps to
Communicate Emergency Preparedness: How Usable Are They for Inner City Residents?" Journal
of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2007.
UDUTC Final Report
Page 51