North Korea

SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
Background
The total active manpower of the North Korean military is approximately
1,190,000 (Army 900,000; Navy 60,000; Air Force 110,000; Airborne Forces
18,000; Amphibious Forces 7,000; Special Operations Forces 21,000; and
Command and Support forces 74,000). In addition, there are approximately
600,000 organized reservists – most of less readiness for operational
employment. There are a further approximately 189,000 personnel in active
Paramilitary units (e.g., Border Guard, Public Security), and approximately 5.7
million paramilitary reservists in province/village organized units trained with
small arms and some crew served weapons and infantry indirect fire systems.
North Korea’s conventional military capabilities generally are qualitatively
inferior to South Korea’s modern forces. Many, if not most, of North Korea’s
tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft and vessels are 35-50 years old. This is
offset somewhat by the relatively high quantity of artillery – approx. 8,500
cannon systems, 5,100 multiple rocket systems, 7,500 mortars and nearly 11,000
anti-aircraft gun systems – that can provide support their ground forces.
Moreover, in terms of missiles and small numbers of selected capabilities
North Korea has managed to make some significant advances between 2013 2017. These include fielding the accurate 220km range KN02 SRBM (capable of
precision targeting of more than half the territory of South Korea) and a 134km
range sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile, as well as taking the first deliveries of
small numbers of domestically produced modern small surface combatants and
new submarines.
[continued next page]
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only
SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
The ‘total force’ columns represent the maximum military ground/air/maritime capability resourced by the nation.
The ‘max equiv potentially available expeditionary’ columns reflect the portion of the total force which reasonably
could be employed outside of the national territory within the next year (taking into consideration reserve mobilization
and training times, supportability with available combat service support structure and national logistics,
interoperability, commitments to home defense, etc.).
NATION
Democratic
People’s
Republic of
Korea (North
Korea)
ACTIVE
RESERVE
Ground
Ground
Total Force
Max Equiv
Potentially
Avail
Expeditionary
43 BDE
5 SSMB
2 ASMB
80 ASFC
27 BDE
1 SSMB
26 BDE
11 BDE
40 ASFC
BDE = ground combat brigade
FS = fighter squadron (approx 20 planes)
AWAC = Airborne Warning & Control Package
SSG = diesel pwrd atk submarine group (2 boats)
SAG= surface action and/or anti-sub group
ARG = amphib lift group (incl escorts)
UAVS(R) = Unmanned air vehicle squadron (recon)
NSFT = Naval Special Forces Tm (approx. 20 pers)
SSMB = Surface-to-surface missile Bde (12 launchers)1
Air
Air
Total Force
Max Equiv
Potentially
Avail
Expeditionary
8 BS (H-5)
1 FS (M-29)
8 FS (M-21)
3 FS (M-23)
10 FS (J-5/6)
2 FS (S-25)
1 FS (S-7)
1 UAVS(R)
Sea
Sea
Total Force
Max Equiv
Potentially
Avail
Expeditionary
24 SSG
1 SAG
5 MCMG
1 ARG, 1 MEB
18 NSFT
8 SSG
1 SAG
3 MCMG
1 ARG, 1 MEB
8 NSFT
2 BS (H-5)
2 FS (M-21)
2 FS (J-5/6)
1 FS (S-25)
1 UAVS(R)
BS = bomber squadron (approx 10-12 planes)
ALS = airlift squadron [C-5/C-17 equiv]
CSG = Carrier Strike Group (incl escorts & aircraft)
SSNG= nuclear pwrd atk submarine group (2 boats)
MCMG = mine counter mine group
MEB = Marine/Naval Inf Amphib Brigade
UAVS(A) = Unmanned air vehicle squadron (attack)
ASFC = Army Special Forces Com (approx. 80 pers)
ASMB = Anti-ship missile Bde (16 launchers)
[continued next page]
1
Approx 8 reloads per launcher. Short/medium range ballistic missiles; see strategic attack chart for long range
systems.
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only
SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
DPRK Missile Defense and Strategic Attack in 2017
The following chart depicts national military capabilities for defense against missile threat and for
conducting long range/strategic attacks, available in 2017.
NATION
Democratic
People’s Republic
of Korea (North
Korea)
Missile
Defense
none
Space
Systems
Strategic Attack
2 BS (H-5)
100 Nodong IRBM
5 Taepodong-1 ICBM
15 Musudan ICBM
2 Taepodong-2 ICBM
15-25 nuclear (5-7 kt) warheads
1-2 EMP Sat w launch system
1 ComSat
1 Ground Station
BMD = Ballistic Missile Defense suitable vs. ICBMs
IRBM = Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
SSBN = Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSGN = Nuclear Guided Missile Submarine
ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (fixed site)
MICBM = Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
BS = Bomber Squadron (approx 10-12 planes) capable of delivering nuclear weapons
All systems except EMP satellite are dual-capable (i.e., conventional or WMD
warhead delivery)
See next two pages for additional information on launch sites and range fans of
the DPRK BM systems
[continued next page]
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only
SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
Potential North Korean “Strategic” Missile Lunch Facilities
[continued next page]
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only
SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
North Korean “Strategic” IRBM and ICBM Range Fans
[continued next page]
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only
SIMULEX 2015
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea Military Forces in 2017
Cyber and the DPRK Military2
Since the 1970s the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea military (the
Korean People’s Army – KPA) has maintained a modest electronic warfare (EW)
capability.
As a result of strategic reviews following Operation Desert Storm, the KPA
established an information-warfare (IW) capability under the concept of
‘electronic intelligence warfare’ (EIW). Complementing these EIW developments,
the KPA is believed to have expanded its EW capabilities with the introduction of
more modern ELINT equipment, jammers and radars.
In 1998, Unit 121 was reportedly established within the Reconnaissance
Bureau of the General Staff Department to undertake offensive cyber operations.
Staff are trained in North Korea but some also receive training in Russia and
China.
In early 2012, activity attributed to Pyongyang included jamming the global
positioning systems of aircraft using Seoul’s main international airports, as well as
those of vessels in nearby waters for two weeks. North Korea has also continued
to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks on South Korean institutions and
pursue cyber infiltration against military and other government agencies.
2
Cyber information is largely from the 2015 Military Balance, Chapter 6, p 263.
For SIMULEX 2015 Educational Purposes Only