Bart
Hesseling*
May 2010
the prospects for security
cooperation in the persian gulf
Today, an armed
conflict in the Gulf
with the Islamic
Republic of Iran as
one of the protagonists is a distinct
possibility. The Arab
Gulf monarchies,
members of the
Gulf
Cooperation
Council (GCC)1, find
themselves at the
centre of a volatile
region with antagonists Israel and Iran
and their respective
allies in close geographical proximity.
© Gustavo Ferrari/AP/SIPA
The Persian Gulf has been rife with tension and
inter-state war for the past thirty years. The Islamic
Revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait and the 2003 US-led invasion of
Iraq were dramatic conflicts set against a backdrop
of sectarian and religious violence, border disputes
and coup d’états.
The GCC states share features that would normally
dictate
intense
political and security cooperation,
especially in such
an unstable region. They are all
absolute monarchies facing similar political and
socio-economic
challenges and, to
varying degrees,
endowed
with
abundant energy
resources which
are vital to the gloGCC leaders at the meeting of the Supreme Council in Kuwait on 14 December, 2009. From left to right: Kuwait’s Crown Prince
Nawaf Al Ahmad Al Sabah; the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani; the representative of Sultan Qaboos of Oman, Fahad
bal economy.
bin Mahmoud Al Saeed; Kuwait’s Emir Sabah Al Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah; Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud;
Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and UAE President and Abu Dhabi Emir Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
It is therefore important to pay close attention to the
regional outlook of the GCC states, as they have a
vital stake in the security of the Gulf, and their reaction could have significant repercussions for the
security of the Gulf and the wider Middle East.
Yet it is a well known fact that since its inception,
the GCC has not forged anything resembling a se1 The GCC member states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates.
* Bart Hesseling wrote this piece during his internship at the EUISS. He is completing an MA in
International Studies and Diplomacy at the School
of Oriental and African Studies.
1
curity alliance. As a result, the military weakness of
the GCC states has been a constant over the past
decades, despite the shifting balance of power in the
region.
However, it is
important to consider the reason for the establishment of the GCC. Created in 1981, the GCC was
a response to the growing threat to the security of
the Arab Gulf states posed by the Islamic Revolution
in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. These threats were
nonetheless considered to be more salient to their
internal (read: regime) security than to their external security. During the 1980s, Khomeini’s Iran and
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq both vied for the loyalty of
the populaces of the GCC states. Khomeini’s public
call for the overthrow of the Sunni Arab monarchies
was directed at Shi’a communities in Saudi Arabia,
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Bahrain and Kuwait, while Saddam Hussein was the
self-proclaimed pan-Arab leader who would defeat
the historical ‘Persian’ enemy.
These appeals resonated with significant proportions
of the Arab Gulf state societies, and both were intended to de-legitimise the sovereign rule of the Arab
Gulf regimes. The setup of the GCC was an explicit
attempt to introduce a previously inexistent khaleeji
(‘gulf’) identity which could contain transnational loyalties and reinforce the power of the Gulf leaders. In
reality however, it is the lack of social cohesion within
GCC societies and the weak socio-economic position
of the Shi’a minorities therein that the regimes should
be concerned about.
In addition, the GCC states remain distrustful of
each other. Historically, the smaller Gulf countries
fear Saudi hegemony, and border disputes and even
armed conflict between member states have endured
until this day. The process of securitisation is driven
by the ruling families’ attachment to power, coupled
with a strict norm of non-interference in each other’s
domestic affairs.2
In terms of security cooperation, the GCC is thus
largely a symbolic creation, a fact that is corroborated
by its (under)achievements in this area. The question
is whether the geopolitical changes affecting the Gulf
- the planned US pull out from Iraq and an increasingly assertive and belligerent Iran - will prompt the
GCC to change its views on security affairs or, more
ambitiously, engage in significant regional cooperation.
The GCC states’ response to the Iranian challenge
The response of individual GCC states to the Iranian
challenge has been a mixture of continued reliance
on the security umbrella provided by the US, and
cautious and so far lacklustre diplomatic engagement with Iran.
There is a consensus within the GCC that Iranian
influence has grown since the US invasion of Iraq,
and that Iran is destined to play a predominant role
in regional affairs. This is a strategic reality that the
GCC states need to learn to deal with. The fear of
Iranian hegemony is not only related to the political
situation in Iraq and the Gulf, but also to its expanding influence in the Mashreq countries.
The notion of a ‘Shi’a crescent’ which has emerged
in recent years, predicts greater Iranian influence in
2 Kristian Ulrichsen, ‘The Evolution of Internal and External Security in the
Arab Gulf States’, Middle East Policy 16(2), Summer 2009. http://www.mepc.
org/journal_vol16/2Ulrichsen.asp
2
the region due to a commonly held religious identity.
However, although Arab-Iranian rivalry has certainly
manifested itself in increased sectarian conflict, this
notion exaggerates the strength of transnational
Shi’a loyalties. Although the GCC states have tolerated such rhetoric in order to rally public opinion and
deflect calls for much needed political reform, they
view Iran’s actions primarily through the lens of balance of power politics.3
The growing tension between the international community and Iran over its nuclear programme has
sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity by several GCC
members. Despite their proximity to Iran, the GCC
states do not regard a direct Iranian attack as the
greatest threat to their security, but rather the possibility of a US strike on Iran and the impact of the
resultant Iranian retaliation. Nonetheless, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran is a cause of serious concern for the GCC, which fears that nuclear
capability would further embolden Iran in its drive to
dominate the region.
The dilemma in which the GCC states find themselves
is that they feel their survival can only be guaranteed
by internationalising regional security, including hosting a foreign military presence. Yet this only feeds
into Iranian belligerence and ideological influence
throughout the Middle East.
The US retains an important military presence in
several GCC countries. In addition to the US Navy’s
Fifth Fleet which is based in Manama (Bahrain), and
CENTCOM in Doha (Qatar), the US operates bases
in Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, and has recently expanded the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to
its Arab allies.4 But Iran has repeatedly denounced
the US military presence in the region, and the GCC
countries are fearful of potential strikes on their territories in the event of war. For this reason, the GCC is
strongly opposed to any military action against Iran.5
Iranian defence minister, Ahmad Vahidi, recently announced that Iran had signed security agreements
with Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, which stipulated that
these states would not allow their territory to be used
to stage an attack against Iran.6
While the GCC states concerned have vehemently
denied having made such a deal, it would seem to
3 F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf
Region’, Middle East Policy 14(2), Summer 2007. http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol14/92Gause.pdf.
4 ‘U.S. Speeding Up Missile Defenses in Persian Gulf’, New York Times, 30 January 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/world/middleeast/31missile.
html?scp=1&sq=Patriot%20missile%20Kuwait&st=cse.
5 ‘Gulf states oppose military action against Iran’, Khaleej Times, 16 December
2009. http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2009/December/middleeast_December339.xml&section=middleeast.
6 ‘Iran signs security deals with three Gulf states’, Gulf News, 7 March 2010.
http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iran/iran-signs-security-deals-withthree-gulf-states-1.593086.
European Union Institute for Security Studies
fit the notion of Iran trying to oppose and undermine
a unified GCC front, an effort currently led by the
Saudis.
Several GCC countries have responded to the Iranian
threat by engaging in a significant conventional arms
build-up. According to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2010, Saudi
Arabia’s defence budget grew by 65 per cent, from
€18.8 billion in 2001 to €31.2 billion in 2009. In the
same timeframe, that of the UAE grew by a factor of 7,
from €1.4 billion to €11.7 billion. Kuwait and Bahrain
also dramatically increased their defence spending,
by 35 per cent and 80 per cent respectively. The
GCC defence markets are extremely lucrative for the
US and Europe, and recent deals have included the
purchase of American F-16, Eurofighter Typhoon and
French Rafale fighters, while there has also been a
proliferation of missile defence systems.7
Should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, some observers believe it is inevitable that Saudi Arabia
will react by seeking its own nuclear strike option.
Although Iran is still a long way from producing a
nuclear weapon - and notwithstanding the strong international opposition that it would face should it do
so - the GCC is making a push for nuclear energy, a
move clearly intended to counterbalance Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
All of the above options are problematic as they are
based on a policy of containment, which further contributes to a situation with the potential to rapidly spin
out of control. In the past, attempts to contain Iran
have not been successful and there are no indications that boxing it in now will yield a better result.
The GCC states have not pursued a common policy
towards Iran. Rather, the different diplomatic strategies adopted by individual member states have resulted in an awkward combination of engagement
and containment.
Ever since the Shah’s assistance in fighting the
Dhofar rebellion, Oman has kept a dialogue with Iran
and shies away from a confrontational approach.
Qatar, sharing the giant Pars gas field with Iran, is
engaged in a diplomatic balancing act, cajoling both
the US and Iran. In 2007, in an unforeseen move,
Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani invited Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the annual GCC
summit of heads of state, although the outcome was
considered disappointing by both sides.8
Kuwait, which still sees neighbouring Iraq as a threat,
7 ‘Gulf Missile Proliferation’, DefenseNews, 23 November 2009. http://www.
defensenews.com/story.php?i=4388212.
8 ‘Iran avoids nuclear talk’, Gulf News, 3 December 2007. http://gulfnews.
com/news/gulf/uae/general/iran-avoids-nuclear-talk-1.216919
3
is adamant about maintaining cordial relations with
nearby Iran, while Bahrain chooses caution because
of its Shi’a majority and recurrent Iranian claims over
its sovereignty. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the
most determined in countering Iranian influence in
the region. In line with familiar patterns in intra-GCC
relations, fears that Saudi Arabia uses US-Iran tensions to play a dominating role in regional diplomacy
abound.
In the UAE, the opening of French naval and airbases
in Abu Dhabi in 2009 marked a major new development allowing France to project its power across the
Strait of Hormuz, effectively becoming a new security
guarantor in the region.9 The UAE’s move underlines
a trend whereby Gulf states are seeking to diversify
their military partnerships as they are no longer comfortable relying solely on the US for their protection.
The GCC states are worried that Washington’s mixed
signals towards Iran might sideline them in the event
of a US-Iran deal. The possibility of such a deal,
whereby Iran would be required to abandon its nuclear programme or accept strict regulatory controls
in return for greater leeway in influencing regional affairs, is unnerving for the GCC states.
The Arab Gulf states are status quo powers when
it comes to relations with Iran. Unsure about the intentions and even competence of the US in dealing
with Iran, they have adopted a policy of ‘no war, no
rapprochement’ since, in the conventional zero-sum
game approach of the region, neither course of action would be in their interest. But this strategic shortsightedness does not effectively address growing
Iranian influence in the Gulf.
In the end, different internal calculations in the GCC
stand in the way of a consensus on what stance to
take towards Iran. This is partly due to extensive
trade ties and shared commercial interests that link
Iran with several GCC countries, notably Qatar and
the UAE. Yet, it is precisely these sorts of links that
could provide the GCC with the necessary economic
leverage to adequately deal with Iran.
Building a stable regional security
system
A stable regional security system can only be
achieved with the inclusion of the two dominant nonGCC states, Iran and Iraq. The stakes in all other
approaches are simply too high: a continuation of the
current policy of containment and balancing would
ensure that the Gulf region remains in a state of perpetual conflict.
9 ‘Sarkozy opens French military base in Abu Dhabi’, France 24, 27 May
2009. http://www.france24.com/en/20090526-sarkozy-inaugurates-francesfirst-gulf-base-abu-dhabi-military.
European Union Institute for Security Studies
The danger of this state of play is not only possible
inter-state war, but also further delays in instituting the
necessary political and economic reforms in the Arab
Gulf states.
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Others have pointed to a possible ‘GCC + 2’ arrangement, reflecting
the security dialogue that evolved in the ‘ASEAN + 3’
forum.10
For the US too, a balancing policy is politically costly,
for it requires a sustained military presence in the
Gulf and the consequent risk of fuelling radicalisation
across the region. The US is indispensable for the establishment of a new regional security system, and it
would likely provide support alongside wider multilateral security initiatives and assurances to her allies.
The idea of collective security in the region has many
critics who posit that Gulf politics is so mired with
distrust and competition that balancing will prevail
under any circumstances. However, the rationale behind such a regional order would not be do away with
balancing, but to relieve as much tension as possible
by having regular dialogue and building on common
interests.
It would be wise for the EU to participate in building
a new regional order by ramping up its political and
security dialogue with the GCC and aiming for a swift
conclusion of the long-awaited EU-GCC free trade
agreement. After all, the Gulf region is of great importance for Europe’s economy and security. The EU,
as a normative power, could play an important role in
shaping GCC security thinking. By engaging the GCC
more on these issues, and in time raising the possibility of involving Iran and Iraq, the EU has an opportunity to use its own experiences as a confidence-building
project in subduing regional antagonisms.
The shifting global geo-economic balance will also
have an effect on security cooperation in the region.
Asia, which imports 70 per cent of its oil from Iran
and the GCC, is increasingly embedding itself in the
Gulf. It is therefore not inconceivable that China and
India will at some point become active players in the
region.
Some observers have called for the creation of a regional security system aimed at confidence-building
along the lines of the Organization for Security and
Power capabilities matter. The GCC states have been
upgrading their individual military forces over the last
few years. Nonetheless, they cannot ensure their own
security without external security guarantees. In order
to be seen as legitimate actors in their own right within
a new regional security system, the GCC states need
to further improve their military capabilities but - and
this is the crucial point - they need to get serious about
doing it collectively and in a coordinated fashion.
The ultimate question will be whether the Gulf countries can overcome classic balance of power politics
and build an inclusive regional order. The first step is
for the Arab states in the Gulf to learn to trust each
other, and then to recognise and capitalise on their
shared interests with Iran.
10 Cf. Mohammed Jaber Al-Ansari, ‘The Case for a Collective Security Organization in the Gulf’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
June
2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=23281&zoom_highlight=Collective+security+Gulf];
and
Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Strengthen Regional Cooperation’, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2007. [http://www.cfr.org/publication/14174/
strengthen_regional_cooperation.html.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS
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European Union Institute for Security Studies