Counterinsurgency in the Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan Borderlands A Discourse Analysis of the American Assessment of the Border Region to Pakistan in the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Mission Julia Karlsson Bachelor Thesis Department of Government Supervisor: Jorge Ojeda January 2017 Word Count: 10794, Page Count: 40 Abstract The main theatre of the war in Afghanistan is in its borderlands to Pakistan. There the Taliban strongholds never ceased and its local population seem to affiliate with the enemy. December 1 2009 President Barack Obama presented a new “comprehensive” strategy concerning the mission in Afghanistan. This was a strategy highly dominated by counterinsurgency – or in other words to change the main focus from the enemy to the population. The study’s aim was to analyse the assessment of the borderlands in the new Afghanistan counterinsurgency mission. This was done with the tools of critical discourse analysis and also in identifying ideal types in the counterinsurgency theory. The goal was to understand how the borderlands were assessed in the mission and if the concepts of regional aspects, external support, winning hearts and minds and securing the population were addressed. The results show that the borderlands were assessed well in accordance to counterinsurgency theory, but the specific cultural aspects of Afghanistan were given little attention. The situation in the borderlands is still to this day very unstable. 2 Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 2 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Aim and Scope ....................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 5 1.3 Outline ..................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Background .................................................................................................................... 7 2.1 The Ambiguity of the Border and Its Porosity ........................................................... 7 The Durand Line ........................................................................................................................................ 7 2.2 Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force ............................................................................................................................................... 8 3. Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 10 3.1 Counterinsurgency Theory ........................................................................................... 10 Border-­‐Crossings, Sanctuaries and External Support ............................................................. 11 Winning Heart and Minds .................................................................................................................. 12 The Necessity to Secure the Population ........................................................................................ 14 3.2 Theoretical Expectations ............................................................................................... 15 4. Method ........................................................................................................................... 18 4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis ............................................................................................ 18 Faircloughian Textual Analysis ........................................................................................................ 19 Categorizing the Analysis ................................................................................................................... 20 4.2 Material ................................................................................................................................ 21 4.3 Implementation of Method ............................................................................................ 22 5. Analysis and Results .................................................................................................. 23 5.1 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan ..................................................................................................... 23 5.2 COMISAF’S Initial Assessment ...................................................................................... 26 5.3 The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24........ 31 6. Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 35 7. Conclusive Summary ................................................................................................. 38 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 39 3 1. Introduction “The War on Terror” has shown proof of how the regional aspects of the Middle East and South East Asia are a matter as complex to understand as the characteristics of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Directly after 9/11, the American military mission Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in Afghanistan, with the preliminary goal to oust the Taliban from power and to destroy the al Qaeda network. The mission was thought to be a success and a new government was elected. Yet, 15 years later the situation in Afghanistan is far from stable and the Taliban has still influence over parts of the country. It is said that the terrorists never really left, but instead they sought a safe haven in Pakistan and in the mountainous border region. It took advantage of the tribal affiliation of the borderland villagers and of the porous border; like that the Taliban could continue its terror and to subsidise instability in the region from sanctuaries in the mountains. Eventually it could re-­‐cease one Afghan village after another and the new government was unceasingly weakened and undermined.1 It is clear that the regional aspects of a war theatre play a vital part and should be addressed accordingly. The porosity of the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan border has through history continuously been taken advantage of to smuggle drugs, weapons and humans between the countries: it is not respected by the people who live in the region as it divides families and villages with kinship and the border is routinely crossed without any formalities.2 On 1 December 2009 President Barack Obama announced a new “comprehensive” strategy concerning Afghanistan. This was a strategy dominated by counterinsurgency, meaning that the new goal was to focus on the population rather than the enemy and also to deepen the trilateral U.S.-­‐
Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan relation.3 The puzzle of the borderlands seemed to finally be addressed and it is of interest to examine how it was assessed in the new strategy. By conducting a discourse analysis of relevant reports and doctrines 1 Olsson 2011, pp. 17-­‐18 2 Gregory, p. 240 3 Remarks by the President In Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan. December 1, 2009. 4 this thesis seeks to shed light on the American conception of the Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan border and the region surrounding it. 1.1 Aim and Scope The aim of this thesis is to analyse the assessment of the borderlands in the American mission in Afghanistan. The scope has been set to post-­‐2009 with a focus on the comprehensive strategy and counterinsurgency in Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Assistance Force. Due to the word limit the research cannot be considered completely comprehensive, but it only serves as an indication of how the borderlands were assessed by the American administration. The choice of material will be explained further in section 4.2. 1.2 Research Questions Below the research question is stated, followed by two sub-­‐questions that the project wishes to address and attempt to answer. •
How was the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands addressed in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency mission post-­‐ 2009? 1. How were the regional aspects, external support and the security of the population assessed in the “comprehensive” strategy of the Obama administration? 2. How were regional aspects, external support and the security of the population assessed in counterinsurgency doctrine? 1.3 Outline The thesis is divided into seven parts. The second part is devoted to background and it focuses on both the ambiguity of the border and the people of the border region and the characteristics of the American mission. The third section is called “theoretical framework” and it presents previous research and relevant theories concerning counterinsurgency and the regional aspects of the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands. 5 The following section involves a presentation of the method and material, or in other words information concerning how the analysis was made. In this thesis the analysis consists of a critical discourse analysis of the white paper for the new comprehensive strategy, the commander of the mission’s initial assessment of Afghanistan in 2009 and the field manual for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps concerning counterinsurgency warfare. A discussion concerning the choice of material is conducted in section 4.2. Section five is dedicated to the results of the analysis and subsequently a discussion concerning these in relation to theory is made. Lastly, a conclusion is drawn and hopefully more knowledge is gathered on how the Americans, given the material, indeed addressed the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands and its regional aspects. 6 2. Background 2.1 The Ambiguity of the Border and Its Porosity To understand the border, it is relevant to start with the simple question “what is the border?” By first glance it is nothing more than a way of dividing territory between states, but borders are also geographical boundaries of political entities and legal jurisdictions. They offer opportunities and risks, they are sites where transversal struggles are waged and they increase processes of othering. However conceptualised, international borders seem to be implicated by issues of power.4 One of the key ambiguities characterising borders is that they simultaneously create difference, as they can be considered to be merely socially produced institutions. On one side, boundaries are socio-­‐spatial markers of dissimilarity as they define the territorial extent of legal sovereignty, or in other words, boundaries actively order space. On the other side, such spatial entities are not static as different forms of social action constantly challenge them.5 The vast majority of international borders are an unceasing source of conflict and their exact placement and characteristics are therefore rather flexible.6 Still, some borders have been more commonly disputed, more violated and more arbitrary than others. In many cases this is the result of imperial boundaries imposed upon colonized regions. The urge to modernize together with imperial rivalries often leads to the creation of boundaries as a mean of keeping domains separate of two different imperials. In most cases, little or no respect is paid to regional specificities and the occupied states.7 The Durand Line The Durand Line is the present international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The name derives from Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British India, who initiated the creation of the border in 1893. It is said that 4 Novak, p. 741 5 Ibid, p. 743 6 Mishra, p. 106 7 Ibid 7 Afghanistan was a strategic buffer state between British India and Russia through the entire nineteenth century and nearly all of its boundaries are a result of British and Russian negotiations. Afghan leaders never had much say in the discussions.8 The last border to be negotiated was the Durand Line and it is also the most contentious one.9 The 2,450 kilometres long border bisects the cultural region of Pashtunistan, which means that it divides villages and families with kinship and strong cultural connections. Expectedly, the borderlands are highly porous and many of the inhabitants still routinely cross it without any border formalities.10 The wild and largely unregulated border-­‐region play an extremely important role in the Taliban insurgency. Pashtunistan provides a steady source of recruits, a safe haven for senior leadership and a base of operations and training for the Taliban and Al-­‐Qaeda associates.11 This will be discussed further in the theory section. 2.2 Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force It is often said that the war in Afghanistan began by the American invasion in 2001. Yet, for the Afghans the war began much earlier. In 1979 they were invaded by the Soviet Union and a guerrilla war has been fought in the country ever since. The Soviets tried to beat the Afghans with a strong conventional force, but since that resulted in a great loss the Americans decided to do the opposite. The strategy was to have as few “boots on the ground” as possible; the goal was to beat the Taliban in order to defeat Al-­‐Qaeda and then leave quickly. They said they wanted to leave a light footprint and the mission got the name “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF). It was in the same spirit that the NATO led “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) was created, but its purpose was 8 Mishra, p. 107 9 Ibid 10 Gregory, p. 240 11 Johnson & Mason, p. 82 8 instead to support the new Afghan government in its effort to remain stability and safety in the vicinity of Kabul.12 Something went wrong. The Taliban was successfully ousted from power and a new regime was implemented. Nonetheless, soon after it became clear that the Taliban was not defeated at all, but it was hiding in safe havens in Pakistan, on the other side of the Durand Line. From there the insurgent could continue its jihad mission and continuously cause instability in the region.13 According to Seth G. Jones, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, the freedom to use foreign territory as a sanctuary is often correlated to the presence of a weak government.14 In Afghanistan the state-­‐building process at the time never led to a regime that could offer stability and safety for its population. Yet, Afghanistan was in an American perspective considered to be under control and in 2003 most of the attention and resources were instead directed to Iraq. In Afghanistan the return of the Taliban was inevitable.15 In Pentagon the matter was not opened for discussion until Barack Obama was elected president. In late 2008 a 60-­‐day inter-­‐agency “strategy review” was done and on March 27, 2009, Obama announced a “comprehensive” strategy that announced deployment of an additional 21,000 U.S. forces.16 In June the same year General Stanley McChrystal was announced new commander for the mission: a general who was famous for his preference for counterinsurgency theory. After his first assessment of the situation in Afghanistan he unsurprisingly emphasised the importance and relevance of the guidelines given by counterinsurgency. 17 12 Olsson 2011, p. 16 13 Ibid, p. 17 14 Jones, p. 22 15 Olsson 2011, pp. 17-­‐18 16 Katzman, p. 24 17 Ibid, p. 25 9 3. Theoretical Framework Much of International Relations literature is focused on the interaction between states and also how different parts act during war. In counterinsurgency literature, the recognition of regional aspects and the importance of understanding the culture of the local population is a popular theme. The Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands is a good example of a region which has been highly contested and caused a lot of tension historically – both in war and in peace. 3.1 Counterinsurgency Theory For starters, in relation to the aim of this thesis, some general contemplations concerning counterinsurgency theory must be made. It normally considers a two-­‐part war: an insurgent and a counterinsurgent. Although contemporary counterinsurgency is often conducted by a third party, as the OEF and ISAF in Afghanistan, this thesis will not make any distinction between the host state and the third party. This is to make the argumentation as stringent as possible. There are two ways of approaching counterinsurgency theory: the population-­‐centric version and the enemy-­‐centric version. First the population-­‐
centric version will be presented, which is by far the most influential one.18 What the population-­‐centric version contains is that there is a core difference of counterinsurgency and of conventional warfare. David Galula, a French general of the wars in colonial Algeria and a counterinsurgency scholar that today has close to a cult status, expressed that conventional warfare strives to conquest the territory of the enemy and to destroy his forces. However in counterinsurgency the opposing part has no territory and that is also not what he is fighting for. “He is everywhere and nowhere”. 19 In his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Galula describes the parameters of insurgency war. According to him the major characteristic of these wars is the role of the population. Its support is necessary in order to seek legitimacy; the one who wins its “hearts 18 Moyar, p. 135 19 Galula, p. 53 10 and minds” will also win the war.20 From the insurgents perspective, as the more contemporary scholar David Kilcullen expressed it, “[it] needs the people to act in certain ways. [It] needs their sympathy, acquiescence, and silence, or simply their reaction to provocation, in order to survive and further [its] strategy.”21 Insurgents need the population in order to seek shelter, receive supplies and to gain new recruits. Counterinsurgents need the trust and support of the population in order to stop the insurgent from growing and surviving. In short, the population-­‐oriented version of counterinsurgency theory says that insurgency wars will be won if the hearts and minds of the population are won. Concerning the other approach, the enemy-­‐centric version, counterinsurgency is much more seen as a conventional war. It is seen as a military struggle between two enemies of which the goal is to eliminate the other.22 Today this logic is rare at the strategic level, but it is still relatively common at a tactical and operational level. In the most recent Iraq war for example, operations have been conducted with the aim of seizing physical terrain and by that disrupt insurgent operations.23 Border-­‐Crossings, Sanctuaries and External Support The aim of this thesis concerns the border region and therefore issues regarding that part of counterinsurgency theory will be given additional space. David Galula meant that the border areas are a constant source of weakness to the counterinsurgent, especially if the neighbouring country supports the insurgency. It is not rare that the insurgent exploits this advantage. He means that “by moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”24 Naturally border crossings must therefore be restricted and also as an effort to prevent terrorist insurgents a sanctuary on the other side of the border. 25 According to a study by Austin Long at the RAND Corporation, insurgents have 20 Galula, p. 6 21 Kilcullen, p. 146 22 Larsdotter, p. 138 23 Ibid, p. 139 24 Galula, pp. 25-­‐26 25 Sepp, p. 11 11 won almost half of the conflicts in which they have had access to a sanctuary (23 out of 52 studied cases). By contrast, out of the conflicts in which they did not enjoy a safe haven they won only three out of the 23 wars.26 It is close to impossible for an insurgent to win the war without a sanctuary and support from an external source. Yet, very little is written on how the counterinsurgent should address the issue. Long concludes that in the absence of a border security system, that at least hinders or deters the insurgent from crossing from one side to another, no model solution leads to conflict termination.27 The enemy-­‐centric logic would presumably argue for a military border blockade. However, it can in many cases lead to situations of which the population living in the region is forced to move in order to give space to the border security measurements.28 Assumingly though, this would lead to a loss of faith from the population and the insurgent Winning Heart and Minds In order to break the Taliban stronghold, the counterinsurgent could instead seek the trust of the population in the border region, the population in the neighbouring state and also the government of the neighbouring state. If the counterinsurgent successfully attains regional support it is less likely for the insurgent to achieve civil assistance to cross the border, smuggle weapons and resources, and to find a sanctuary.29 In the case of Afghanistan the key would then be the Pashtun population. However its association to the Taliban has traditionally been strong, which according to some theorists can partly be explained by it being an ethnic group that puts a lot of importance to tribal affiliation. This makes the loyalty within each clan very strong and in some cases it is even stronger than that to the state or other actors. This is a structural factor that plays a part in why some tribes have a strong allegiance to the Taliban rather than to the Afghan state.30 In fact, 26 Connable & Libicki, p. 50 27 Long, p. 51 28 Larsdotter, p. 142 29 Ibid p. 143 30 Olsson 2009, p. 18 12 most of the Taliban senior leaders were born in the same Pashtun tribe.31 The importance of the Pashtuns to the Taliban is illustrated in Figure 1. The shaded section of the map shows areas on both sides of the border in which the Taliban has its main influence and stronghold. Figure 1: Map over the borderlands and the Taliban influence32 To state that kinship is the only reason for the people of the borderlands to affiliate with the Taliban is still to oversimplify the situation. The Taliban is a master at psychological warfare and it is common that it has gained support as a result of verbal threats or intimidation. It normally focuses on the fact that the Americans can and will not stay forever, and when they leave the Taliban will kill 31 Johnson & Mason, p. 78 32 Attained from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐south-­‐asia-­‐
15149996 13 every family and person who has ever collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government.33 Evidently such messages have an overwhelming effect. The Necessity to Secure the Population The motive for an individual to support the insurgency is not obvious. It can be because of kinship, or it can be because he prefers its political agenda, but a citizen can also support the insurgents because of mere fear. Like that he will not choose the side that is the most in accord with his liking, but the one that creates the highest incitement for personal security. It is then not enough for the counterinsurgent to create affinity, but only by guaranteeing the safety of the population can the bound to the insurgent be broken.34 Bringing security and stability to the Pashtun tribal areas will reduce the implications of using the region as a sanctuary. This together with a guarantee of better governance is key to a successful counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.35 Like that it would create a credible motivation for the Pashtun population to seek trust in the new Afghan government. However, certain scholars argue for the fact that the counterinsurgency approach might be too costly in Afghanistan. They promote a solution close to the enemy-­‐oriented version of counterinsurgency, in which the aim is to disrupt Al-­‐Qaeda by persistent special operations and drone attacks. The main argument is that stabilising Afghanistan will not make any difference if Pakistan does not prosecute a similar pacification campaign: otherwise the insurgents will still benefit from safe havens across the Durand Line.36 Yet, unjust killings in the Pashtun belt might work as a catalyst for creating more Islamic militants. It creates a never-­‐ending cycle of radicalisation and killing in the tribal areas.37 A long-­‐term solution would instead include both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in order to win over the Pashtuns on both sides of the border. With the support of the local population targeted killing of insurgents will be possible, as the 33 Johnson & Mason, p. 87 34 Olsson 2011, p. 29 35 Cassidy, p. 41 36 Ibid, p. 42 37 Ibid, p. 43 14 provided intelligence will be more precise. The end result should be a disrupted Al-­‐Qaeda and fewer civilian casualties.38 3.2 Theoretical Expectations As mentioned in the above section, according to theory counterinsurgency wars are won by gaining the trust of the people. However, something that is important to note is that counterinsurgency theory derives from the 1950’s and 60’s and the colonial wars. Back then most sociological theorists believed that legitimacy and stability were implemented as a result of security, good governance and economical wealth. The heritage of the theory can be translated into a belief in the same model for success for the Afghanistan mission.39 It is not hard to see how the model is true for security; law and order need to be implemented in order to achieve long-­‐term stability. Few can argue with the fact that in a situation where there is no one to sustain security, each and one would need to do it him or her self, resulting in a situation of anarchy. If there instead is a clear authority, whether it is a cruel warlord or a working police force, the people will stay calm. However, the second part of the believed trinity is less obvious. A well functioning state might make life easier for its citizens, but it does not necessarily make it legitimate. Sociologist Max Weber wrote about different factors for legitimacy and it is true that efficiency is one of them, but not the only one. According to Weber there are three different types of legitimate authorities, namely legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority. It basically means that people spontaneously tend to follow leaders who are either very charismatic, because they have traditionally been the leader or because of a rational legal system and bureaucracy. 40 In Western societies the legal-­‐rational model is clearly the dominant one, in combination with a belief in democracy. We accept authority if it is applied by a democratic elected leader who implement an impartial bureaucracy. This is also the foundation for the counterinsurgency theory that was used in Afghanistan post-­‐2009: that by building schools, creating roads and infrastructure and the 38 Cassidy, p. 43 39 Olsson 2011, p. 31 40 Ibid, p. 32 15 implementation of rule of law, legitimacy would be created for the new government in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as just shown, it is a simplified version of how to reach legitimacy and the heart and minds of the people by just ensuring good governance and state building. 41 What is important to remember is that Afghanistan is an underdeveloped country and access to education and health care is not necessarily the highest priority for the population. For them it has never been an essential part of life and therefore not within their expectations of good governance.42 Especially in the case of Afghanistan in which religion and tribal affiliation play an essential role in what the population perceives as a legitimate source of power, the western way becomes problematic. This means that even in theory mullahs and heads of families and tribes receive more legitimacy and affiliation of the Afghan people than the Karzai government will ever be able to do. Also as mentioned earlier, the Taliban is a master at psychological warfare and many of its leaders are considered very charismatic; they use a combination of charismatic attraction, traditional tribe association and intimidation in order to win the affiliation of the Afghan people. The third part of what is believed necessary in order to receive legitimacy according to the model is to guarantee economical wealth. This is not completely uncontroversial either; it is assumed that economical development, an increased amount of jobs and business opportunities will lead to a lower risk for armed conflict. Yet, there is no proven connection between poverty and the use of violence. Though in Afghanistan many recruits to the Taliban occurred due to unemployment among young men, it does not mean that there is a direct connection to a feeling of injustice. This is rather an effect of the strategy of the Taliban in combination with a lack of other job opportunities; it does not mean that the insurgent is considered more legitimate.43 As shown the theoretical expectations on the strategy used in Afghanistan are relatively low. The problem with counterinsurgency theory and other theories like it is that they have a tendency to be too general and vague. There is 41 Olsson 2011, p. 33 42 Ibid, p. 34 43 Ibid 16 a very large step between the dependent and independent variable, between cause and effect.44 Another factor that is mentioned many times in the literature is that counterinsurgency is not a “quick-­‐fix”. To win the hearts and minds of the population is a long process that can take many years: the most common estimation is 10 years, but some researchers claim that it can take up to 40 years to see any real effects of society.45 It might sound like there is little interest in conducting research concerning counterinsurgency in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the low theoretical expectations. However, the area is considered key to the conflict and it is still of relevance to analyse its complexity. Due to an increase in psychological operations of the Taliban in the borderlands, this thesis aims at understanding if and how they were encountered by the Obama administration. Consequently there might be a connection between the American perception of counterinsurgency, the border, regional aspects and the fact that Afghanistan is still today far from stable. 44 Olsson 2011, p. 35 45 Ibid, p. 42 17 4. Method In order to identify the strategy regarding the borderlands in the American mission a qualitative discourse analysis of relevant documents and manuals was conducted. The research strategy was qualitative as it aims at a deeper understanding by interpretation of discourse and also because it is inductive in its approach to the relation between theory and research.46 The aim was to examine a piece of reality in order to see what it can provide to our understanding of the general picture. 4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis The concept of discourse and discourse analysis is rarely properly defined and it can therefore give a vague impression. Yet, in many cases underlying the term “discourse” is the general idea that language is structured in different patterns depending on both domain and social structure. Discourse analysis is the study of these patterns. It is thought that our ways of talking, writing and communicating in general do not neutrally reflect reality, but rather contribute to creating and changing it. 47 Discourse can therefore be understood as “a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)”48. The term critical discourse analysis (often abbreviated CDA) refers to theories and methods for the empirical study of relations between discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains.49 The theorist Norman Fairclough constructed a useful framework for the analysis of discourse as social practice. To Fairclough discourse is not only constitutive but also constituted, meaning that he appoints a function to the discourse. It is an important form of social practice that both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and social relations. 50 To investigate how the Durand Line was presented and addressed in different official discourses, will become of higher relevance when viewing the discourse in the Faircloughian 46 Bryman, p. 40 47 Winther-­‐Jørgensen & Phillips, p. 1 48 Ibid 49 Ibid, p. 60 50 Ibid, p. 65 18 manner. He has a very text-­‐oriented approach to CDA that tries to comprehend how discursive processes operate linguistically in certain texts. Yet for Fairclough a linguistic text analysis is not enough in itself, as it does not put the discourse into context nor shed light on its social structures. He argues for an interdisciplinary perspective where the researcher combines textual and social analysis.51 In order to do so he suggests his so-­‐called three-­‐dimensional model, which suggests that discourse should be seen as a text, a discursive practice and a social practice. However, Fairclough also mentions that not all three dimensions always need to be included in discourse analysis, as they can be seen as three different research projects.52 For the sake of this project only a textual analysis will be made, but in order to fully address the research questions more aspects than linguistics need to be addressed. Therefore the analysis will be complemented by the identification of certain ideal types. Faircloughian Textual Analysis By analysing the linguistic characteristics of a text in detail, it is possible to cast light on how discourses are activated on a textual level and how they arrive at a certain interpretation. Fairclough proposes a number of different tools for text analysis, for example interactional control, ethos, metaphors, wording and grammar. The textual factors that will be of focus for this project are the grammatical elements transitivity and modality. To investigate transitivity means that the focus is on how events and processes are connected (or not connected) with subjects and objects. The interest lies in the ideological consequences of different forms in the grammar. For example in the sentence “50 civilians were killed yesterday” a passive voice is used and the agent is omitted. It presents the event as a natural phenomenon with no one who is seemingly responsible.53 An analysis of modality does instead emphasis the speaker’s degree of affinity to his or her statement. The statements “it’s bad”, “I think it’s bad” and “perhaps it’s a little bit bad” are different ways of expressing an opinion: they 51 Winther-­‐Jørgensen & Phillips, p. 66 52 Ibid, p. 76 53 Ibid, p. 83 19 represent different modalities, meaning that the speaker commits to the statement of a varying degree.54 Categorizing the Analysis There are certain concepts derived from the theory that will be of main focus for the discourse analysis. Therefore it is of relevance to define them in an unambiguous manner in order to simplify their operationalization and also to make sure that they are understood in the same manner for every discourse. Worth noting is that the definitions given here should not be considered as direct reflections of reality, but they only serve the purpose of making analysis easier and more stringent.55 Regional aspects: The regional specificities of the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands. These consist of for example the presence of the Pashtun population, the porosity of the Durand Line and the increased presence of insurgency. External support: External support should be understood as support given to the insurgent from an external source, mainly it would involve a neighbouring country or in this case Pakistan. External support can also be given at a local perspective, when the population helps the insurgent. Winning hearts and minds: This concept should be understood as the effort of the counterinsurgent to gain the affiliation of the population. Securing the population: In the theory the need to secure the population in order to win its “hearts and minds” was emphasised. However “securing the population” should be understood differently than “winning hearts and minds”, since to secure rather reflect the physical security than the mental affiliation. “Regional aspects” and “external support” should be understood as the main concerns of the counterinsurgent, while “winning hearts and minds” and 54 Winther-­‐Jørgensen & Phillips, pp. 83-­‐84 55 Teorell & Svensson, p. 42 20 “securing the population” are the main solutions according to counterinsurgency theory. 4.2 Material The process of finding appropriate material to answer the research questions has proved to be complicated. There is a need for official sources in order to properly study how the borderlands were addressed in the mission by the Obama administration and also by doctrine. A lot of material is classified or partly classified and a lot of main Afghanistan reports focus on issues with no connection to the borderlands. Hence a selection has been made, mainly based on both accessibility and relevance. The scope of the thesis is also relatively small due to the word limit, making the study not completely comprehensive. Instead this thesis shows a fragment of the American understanding of the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands and only three source documents will be analysed. In order to answer the first research question (how were the regional aspects, external support and the security of the population assessed in the “comprehensive” strategy of the Obama administration?) the white paper that was sent from the White House to members of Congress on Mars 27 2009, “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan” and the report by General Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment”, will be used. The reason for the choice is because the comprehensive strategy is presented in the white paper and then the ideas are developed further by McChrystal in his assessment of the actual situation in Afghanistan. Though some parts of the report are classified, its public sections are still of relevance in the understanding of the American conception of the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands. To answer the second research question (how were regional aspects, external support and the security of the population assessed in counterinsurgency doctrine?) the actual counterinsurgency field manual was analysed. “The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24” (FM 3-­‐24) create a thorough picture of how commanders, staffs and forces were 21 guided in the counterinsurgency mission. The first version of FM 3-­‐24 was published in 2006 and it was later severely revised in 2014. However, due to the ISAF coming to an end in 2014 and OEF in 2015, the older version is in respect to this thesis of higher relevance. A contemplation that must be done is that it is not sure that the doctrine was completely followed on the field and also there might be classified documents that state other aspects. However, these are factors that cannot be taken into account in this analysis. Instead the results and conclusions will be based only on the information given from the material. 4.3 Implementation of Method The critical discourse analysis was conducted at a macro and a micro level. First a brief read-­‐through of each document was made in order to achieve an overview of the content. After, a second more thorough reading was conducted in which the four ideal types – regional aspects, external support, winning hearts and minds and securing the population – were identified. The identification focused on finding parts of the discourse that addressed the different concepts in one way or another. The parts that were identified as relevant were after analysed on a micro level. The tone of voice was taken into account, the transitivity and the modality. This was done in order to deepen the understanding of the actual assessment of a certain concept or issue. 22 5. Analysis and Results The analysis is divided up in a manner that first presents the results from each discourse individually. After a general discussion will be made in order to put the results into context and in relation to other social patterns. 5.1 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan The initial release of the new American strategy for Afghanistan began with the “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan” on Mars 27 2009. It is a document of 6 pages sent from the White House to members of Congress in order to explain, in some detail, the President’s new strategy and its goals concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan. Regional Aspects Due to the inclusion of Pakistan in the title of the policy paper, it seems already from the beginning to recognise the specific aspects of the borderlands and the relation between the two countries. In the introduction the following is stated: The ability of extremists in Pakistan to undermine Afghanistan is proven, while insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in Pakistan. The threat that al Qaeda poses to the United States and our allies in Pakistan -­‐ including the possibility of extremists obtaining fissile material -­‐ is all too real. Without more effective action against these groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan will face continuing instability.56 Although the aspects of the borderlands are hinted on many places in the relatively short paper, it is never explicitly mentioned and the only detail concerning the regional aspects that is mentioned is that Afghanistan is 70% rural.57 56 White Paper, p. 1 57 Ibid, p. 2 23 External Support The trilateral relation of U.S-­‐Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan is mentioned as essential and also that the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan bilateral cooperation should be bolstered. However the American relation to Pakistan seems to be thought of in different terms than that to Afghanistan. In many places the phrase “our allies in Pakistan” is used, while the same formulation is not applied to describe the U.S-­‐
Afghanistan relation. It is also said that the objective of disrupting terrorist networks is especially important in Pakistan.58 Through the paper there are several suggestions to Pakistan playing an essential part in the disruption of Al Qaeda (the insurgent). It is said that the engagement of the Pakistani government is required to successfully shut its safe havens and that Pakistan needs to work in both the civilian and military sphere. There is a clear goal of engaging the neighbouring state in the fight against extremists and American assistance is offered in order to strengthen its capability.59 Strengthening the civilian, democratic government must be a centrepiece of our overall effort. Key efforts should include fostering the reform of provincial and local governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province. We need to help Islamabad enhance the services and support in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from returning to those areas.60 Furthermore the international community is suggested to be of assistance, as the extremist threat is considered to be international. Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan cooperation is recommended to be bolstered and it is said that “in approaching allies we should emphasize that our new approach is integrated between civilian and military elements and in looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan as one theatre for diplomacy”.61 58 White Paper, p. 1 59 Ibid, p. 5 60 Ibid, pp. 5-­‐6 61 Ibid, p. 6 24 Winning Hearts and Minds It is stated that the U.S must overcome the “trust deficit” it is facing in the region, as many do not believe it to be a reliable long-­‐term partner. It is stating that the aim is to engage the Afghan people in “ways that demonstrate our commitment to promoting a legitimate and capable Afghan government with economic progress”.62 It is also written that in order to reach the objectives of the “new way forward” an enhanced engagement with the population in the region and at home is necessary. The strategy proposes a significant increase of civilian resources and a better civil-­‐military coordination. The following statement serves as an example of this: In a country that is 70 percent rural, and where the Taliban recruiting base is primarily among under-­‐employed youths, a complete overhaul of our civilian assistance strategy is necessary; agricultural sector job creation is an essential first step to undercutting the appeal of al Qaeda and its allies.63 Another recommendation concerning the prevention of new recruits to extremist organisations is to develop a communication strategy to counter the terror information campaign, or in other words to find a way of countering propaganda. It is a top priority and the goal is to improve the image of the U.S. in order to also increase its likability.64 Another purpose for the strategy of increasing civilian capacity is to strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their new government. A particular focus is given to the provincial and local levels and to create basic infrastructure and economic alternatives to the insurgency.65 It is stated many times that it is important that the integration is Afghan-­‐led and that the state eventually will not be dependant on the U.S. anymore. Securing the Population The most prominent dilemma is that it is evident that the purpose of the new 62 White paper, p. 2 63 Ibid 64 Ibid, p. 3 65 Ibid 25 strategy is not to secure the local population, but to secure the nation at home. Already the first sentence states that the “U.S. has a vital national security interest in addressing current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan”. Furthermore it states that the core goal of the U.S. is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda. 66 For this purpose increased assistance will be given to Pakistan, but it will be limited if they do not show a greater ability to cooperate in the elimination of insurgency sanctuaries. 67 However there are also suggestions concerning the security of the local population. One way is to build effective local governance and economic development and to expand the Afghan National Security Forces.68 Transitivity and Modality The chosen modality concerning the recommendations is very strong as each claim is expressed as “we must” or described as “urgent”, meaning that the degree of affiliation to each statement is very high. Concerning transitivity, it is evident that the U.S. takes the role as the responsible agent for the implementation of the suggestions and therefore for the outcome in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Each claim is presented as “our responsibility” or “we must ensure”. 5.2 COMISAF’S Initial Assessment In 2009 General Stanley McChrystal was appointed commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On June 26 2009 the U.S Secretary of Defence directed him to provide a multidisciplinary assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. He went to Afghanistan and his report was later published on August 30 under the name “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment“. It presents his findings and recommendations concerning the overall situation, review plans and on-­‐going efforts and it also tries to identify revisions to operational, tactical and strategic guidance. 69 The unclassified sections of the report were released by the Washington Post in September the same year. 66 White paper, p. 1 67 Ibid, p. 2 68 Ibid, p. 3 69 McChrystal, p. i 26 Regional Aspects General McChrystal’s assessment of Afghanistan focuses primarily on the need for a population-­‐centric strategy. In so doing he also recognises the difficult geography of Afghanistan and also the specificities of the tribal group in the borderlands. All isolating geography and a natural aversion to foreign intervention further works against ISAF. Historical grievances reinforce connections to tribal or ethnic identity and diminish the appeal of a centralized state. All ethnicities, particularly the Pashtuns, have traditionally sought a degree of independence from the central government, particularly when it is not seen as acting in the best interest of the population. These and other factors result in elements of the population tolerating the insurgency and calling to push out foreigners.70 He continues by marking out the complex social landscape of the country and how it might even be more difficult to understand than the characteristics of the insurgent. According to McChrystal there is a need to learn more about Afghanistan’s people and its needs, identities and grievances. He urges ISAF leaders to take regional aspects into consideration in order to better understand the population and also to more efficiently fight the enemy.71 Concerning the insurgent fighters they are described as being mainly Afghan, but that they are connected to a small number of senior leaders that are based in Pakistan.72 The insurgent’s key geographical objectives are described as being the provinces of the border region and a lot of its resources are drawn from Pakistan.73 The porosity of the Durand Line is not explicitly mentioned, but it is clear that the General is aware of it and that it is taken advantage of by the insurgent. 70 McChrystal, p. 2-­‐4 71 Ibid, pp. 2-­‐4 – 2-­‐5 72 Ibid, p. 2-­‐5 73 Ibid, p. 2-­‐6 27 External Support As stated in the section for “regional aspects” many of the insurgent’s senior leaders are based in Pakistan. Reportedly they are aided by some elements of Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-­‐services Intelligence). 74 It is clear that Afghanistan’s insurgency is supported from Pakistan, but the report also mentions external support from India, Iran and Russia/Central Asia.75 Winning Hearts and Minds Already on page 1 McChrystal states the need for “an integrated civilian-­‐military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment” 76. The people of Afghanistan represent many things in this conflict – an audience, an actor, and a source of leverage – but above all, they are the objective. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents. Communities make deliberate choices to resist, support, or allow insurgent influence. The reasons for these choices must be better understood.77 McChrystal continues by describing how ISAF and the new Afghan government have failed to focus on this objective. The weakness of the state and corruption has left few incitements for the population to feel trust: these problems have instead alienated large segments of the Afghan citizens and it has created fertile ground for the insurgent.78 74 McChrystal, p. 2-­‐10 75 Ibid, p. 2-­‐11 76 Ibid, p. 1-­‐1 77 Ibid, p. 2-­‐4 78 Ibid 28 Furthermore military and civilian personnel of ISAF are recommended to acquire a far better understanding of the Afghan people. The coalition must be seen as guests rather than an occupying army.79 To gain accurate information and intelligence about the local environment, ISAF must spend as much time as possible with the people and as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases.80 It is clear that McChrystal recognises counterinsurgency and the “winning of hearts and minds” of the people as the key to mission success. The concept is repeated many times through the report and is strongly emphasised. Securing the Population McChrystal focuses on “the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition”81. He means that there is a need to primarily protect the population from both of these threats. In doing so the importance of improving and resourcing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is raised and he also claims that there is a need to prioritize resources to the areas of the country in which the civilian population is threatened. 82 Additionally, McChrystal does not only identify security as something that necessarily has to be provided by an actual force: instead he believes in a softer version of protecting the people. Conventional wisdom is not sacred; security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population.83 79 McChrystal, p 2-­‐12 80 Ibid, p. 2-­‐12 81 Ibid, p. 1-­‐2 82 Ibid, p. 1-­‐1 83 Ibid, p. 1-­‐3 29 He believes in adaptation and to create a secure environment for the people in being reliable, respectful and create stability in the country. According to the assessment it is necessary that the ANSF learn to protect their own people, but there is still a need of assistance from ISAF as the Afghan forces still lack capabilities. The other part of McChrystal’s assessment regarding the security situation is the lack of governance that the Afghan people also find to be acceptable and state weakness. The second threat, of a very different kind, is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GIRoA institutions, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power-­‐brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement, and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity. ISAF errors have further compounded the problem. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power-­‐broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people’s security and quality-­‐of-­‐life, and undermine international will.84 By strengthening the state and improving governance, the affiliation of the people will be stronger and they will also achieve a more adequate feeling of security. Transitivity and Modality The transitivity of the report is rather neutral as most sentences are constructed without a responsible agent. However when a subject is used it is mainly abstract statements as “we must” or “our responsibility”. In general the tone of the report gives an impression of a high degree of accountability as the U.S. is pictured of being in charge of the outcome and future of Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly the modality is equally as strong the one in the white paper. The assessment does not express recommendations or findings as something that could be up for discussion, rather the use of language nearly recalls for orders or commands. 84 McChrystal, p. 2-­‐5 30 5.3 The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24 The Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24 (FM 3-­‐24) from 2006 was issued by Lieutenant General David Petraues, who in 2010 was appointed commander of the Afghanistan mission. The manual was designed to fill a doctrinal gap, as it had been 20 years since the Army had published a field manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency. Unsurprisingly the 281-­‐paged manual achieved a lot of attention when it was published both from military and civil academics. Regional Aspects Due to the generality of the FM 3-­‐24, there are no specific regional aspects mentioned. Yet, it is recognised that “environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict”85. The level of adaptation is explained as a factor that creates advantages and the effect is immediately visible.86 The complexity of porous borders is addressed and also how the insurgent relies heavily on it: it needs to be able to move across borders. 1-­‐99. Insurgent movements do not control the geographic borders of a country. In fact, insurgencies often rely heavily on freedom of movement across porous borders. Insurgencies usually cannot sustain themselves without substantial external support. An important feature of many transnational terrorist groups is the international nature of their basing. Terrorists may train in one country and fight or conduct other types of operations in another country. The movement of fighters and their support is vulnerable to intervention or attack.87 85 Field manual, p. 1-­‐16 86 Ibid 87 Ibid p. 1-­‐18 31 The general tone concerning regional aspects is that the counterinsurgent’s understanding of the environment is key to success. It is stated that soldiers and marines must understand organization of key groups in the society, relationships and tensions among groups, ideologies and narratives that resonate with groups, values of groups (including tribes), interests, and motivations, means by which groups (including tribes) communicate and the society’s leadership system.88 It is also stated that the insurgent has a clear advantage in its level of local knowledge and is therefore more likely to understand the population’s interest. This means that great efforts in educating the counterinsurgent is needed.89 External Support The FM 3-­‐24 expresses the necessity for the insurgent to gain external support because it has difficulties to attain itself without it. Border areas do therefore become of high interest and they should be seen as vulnerability for the counterinsurgent, especially if the neighbouring state supports the insurgency.90 1-­‐85. Access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Such assistance does not need to come just from neighboring states; countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the Internet to create a support network among NGOs. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of external support and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies.91 External support and sanctuaries in neighbouring countries have historically provided insurgents with a place to rebuild and reorganize in peace. However, the manual emphasises the fact that modern target acquisition and intelligence 88 Field manual, p. 1-­‐22 – 1-­‐23 89 Ibid, p. 1-­‐23 90 Ibid, p. 1-­‐16 91 Ibid 32 gathering technology make it more difficult for the insurgent. It would thus be more strategic to hide among the population.92 Winning Hearts and Minds The quest for the counterinsurgent to “win the hearts and minds” of the population is a constant theme of the entire manual. In order to create legitimacy and to stop the population from taking the side of the insurgent, it is important to show them a better alternative. It is mainly suggested that focus should be in fostering effective governance and the legitimacy of the new government in order to gain support from the population, six factors are listed as possible indicators of this: • The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats). • Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace. • A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes. • A culturally acceptable level of corruption. • A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development. • A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.93 It is also mentioned that if the counterinsurgent fails and the insurgent attains popular support it will to a greater degree receive safe havens and freedom of movement.94 Securing the Population The manual states that one of the cornerstones of counterinsurgency is to secure the population. The FM 3-­‐24 focuses mainly on delegating the mandate of security and border control to the host nation.95 It is suggested that transferring 92 Field manual, p. 1-­‐16 93 Ibid, p. 1-­‐21 94 Ibid, 3-­‐77, 3-­‐84-­‐3-­‐88 95 Ibid, 6-­‐3 33 the power back to the Afghans is a way of helping them to recreate their sovereignty and to be able to protect their own borders.96 An entire chapter is spent discussing the process and recommendations concerning development of a host-­‐nation security force. 6-­‐6. U.S. and multinational forces may need to help the host nation in improve security; however, insurgents can use the presence of foreign forces as a reason to question the HN government’s legitimacy. A government reliant on foreign forces for internal security risks not being recognized as legitimate. While combat operations with significant U.S. and multinational participation may be necessary, U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling the host nation’s ability to provide for its own security.97 As stated in the quote above, the U.S. troops should not be the primarily source of security as it can undermine the legitimacy of the government. Instead resources are recommended to be generously spent on the establishment of a national security force. This is thought to increase the sense of local security and also to attain popular support even for other matters. Transitivity and Modality The manual is written in a passive voice, as it directs instructions concerning how a counterinsurgency mission should be conducted. There is no responsible agent, but instead descriptions are given in a manner that make them sound as uncontested and obvious. The modality is very neutral as well, but regarding certain key issues enforcing words as “vital” or “governments must”. 96 Field manual, 2-­‐36 97 Ibid, p. 6-­‐2 34 6. Discussion In this section follows a discussion of the results from the analysis: they are sought to be better understood, put into context and measured to the situation of Afghanistan today. A discussion of the results in connection to the theoretical expectations of counterinsurgency will also be made. The Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands’ regional aspects were addressed by all three source-­‐documents, but to different degree and in different manners. It was mainly the COMISAF’s Initial Assessment that went into detail in the specificities of the borderlands, the Pashtun population and the relation to the Taliban. In FM 3-­‐24 the importance of recognising regional aspects was also brought up and several examples of how to do so were presented. The white paper focused mainly on the bilateral Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan relation and the trilateral U.S.-­‐Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan relation. This can be understood as a way of recognising the aspect of Pashtunistan and its importance to the Taliban, but also as an idea to undermine the external support from Pakistan. What stood out as the main issue concerning the borderlands was the difficulty of “winning hearts and minds”. This is a complex concept that needs a close to impossible level of adaptation and there are many vital factors in its success. Commander McChrystal emphasised the need of a strong Afghan state that can guarantee the safety of the population. However, as mentioned in the theory section, this is a simplified version of what is needed to achieve legitimacy. Afghanistan is a tribal society and affiliation to its traditional leaders will be hard for the Americans to trump. Also the Taliban is a master at psychological warfare; it deters the local population by threatening to kill them if they collaborate with the Americans or the new government: it focuses on the fact that the Americans can and will not stay forever and the protection from the Afghan government is still weak.98 The main focus of the entire American mission seems to have been the necessity to provide security to the population. Allocating more resources to the Afghan National Security Forces and to assist in training have been pictured as essential and also to help the Afghan government concerning the 98 Johnson & Mason, p. 78 35 implementation of governance and rule of law. However, little focus has been put on the psychological factors of the war and the specific cultural aspects of the Afghan people and their way of perceiving a legitimate authority. According to the theories presented in this thesis and the results from the attempted discourse analysis, it seems like the Americans have assessed the borderlands almost completely in accordance with counterinsurgency theory. However, today probably very few would call the Afghanistan mission a success. Despite the millions of dollars spent by the international community to stabilize the country and increase human security, Afghanistan has seen little improvement. The Afghan population is today at greater risk than it has been since the Taliban rule, with a dramatic increase in the number of people fleeing the country.99 It is also thought that the Taliban still achieves external support from Pakistan and that the U.S. efforts so far have been ineffective. Pakistan managed the art of pretending to help the U.S. while in reality being on the side of the enemy: a good example being how it made the Americans believe they were negotiating with Mohammad Omar, the then leader of the Taliban, while the truth was that he had been killed long ago.100 The Pakistani army has by several scholars even been described as “the godfather” of the Taliban, due to its heavy support. The Pakistani action against the U.S. is a good example of psychological and information warfare, which is part of counterinsurgency but still a relatively fresh area of research. The results of the analysis of this thesis do in many ways correspond to the expectations on the counterinsurgency theory that were presented earlier on. The problem with the American strategy is that it in many ways tries to implement a western way of achieving legitimacy in a country with very different traditions and priorities. This in combination with advocacy of opinion and psychological operations being of a lower priority within ISAF, functioning as a complement to the conventional forces rather than a necessity, could explain 99 Doctors without borders: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/support-­‐
us/events/stability-­‐and-­‐human-­‐security-­‐afghanistan-­‐2016-­‐brookings-­‐
institution-­‐event 100 Zakaria 36 the difficulties the Americans met.101 Also the issue of time was never properly addressed. Counterinsurgency is not a quick-­‐fix, but it requires many years of implementation as it takes a long time to change the behaviour of the population and its deep-­‐rooted feelings of affiliation. However, this is also a very costly process. The main research question asked does not have a simple answer, but according to the analysis of the discourse chosen for this thesis the Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan borderlands were addressed in a what seems to be oversimplified manner. The way of trying to implement a western doctrine on eastern countries is something that the US has been accused for in the past. In the case of Afghanistan however there seem to have existed a willingness to take regional aspects into consideration, but the complexity of the task and the fact that resources are limited have made the mission very difficult to properly conduct. 101 Olsson 2009, p. 51 37 7. Conclusive Summary The aim of the thesis was to analyse the assessment of the borderlands in the American mission in Afghanistan. This was done via a critical discourse analysis of the “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan”, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment” and “The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24”. The results of the analysis showed how the Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan borderlands were assessed very much in accordance to the recommendations of counterinsurgency theory. However it also shows that the theoretical expectations discussed came out painfully true. The situation in Afghanistan is far from stable and the U.S. troops together with the Afghanistan National Security Forces have still failed to make the population feel safe and to guarantee legitimacy of the new Karzai government. Even if a lot of resources have been directed to Pakistan, in an effort to stabilise the country and deepen the bilateral relation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, support to the Taliban is still given from the Pakistani army, government and intelligence service. The results of this thesis raise the question of whether counterinsurgency is an oversimplified theory. It seems like the difference between cause and effect is too large and issues concerning cultural differences in relation to legitimacy are left out. As also mentioned in the discussion, there is an issue of the mission being too short. It is believed that counterinsurgency takes at least 10 years in order to be effective, but this also requires immense resources that do not exist. In the end the research question can be answered as the aspects of the borderlands were assessed in an oversimplified way and that not enough consideration was taken on cultural differences. The Western way of creating legitimacy and stability might seem obvious for Europeans and Americans, but the Afghan people view the problem in a different manner. This is something that ISAF failed to address. 38 Bibliography Cassidy, Robert M. (2010) The Afghanistan Choice. The RUSI Journal, 155:4, pp. 38-­‐44 Connable, Ben, Libicki, Martin C. (2010) How Insurgencies End. RAND Corporation Doctors without Borders (2016) Stability and Human Security in Afghanistan 2016. Accessed January 1 2016. URL: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/support-­‐us/events/stability-­‐and-­‐
human-­‐security-­‐afghanistan-­‐2016-­‐brookings-­‐institution-­‐event Galula, David (1964) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Gregory, Derek (2011) The Geographical Journal: The Everywhere War and Flexible Boundaries. Vol. 177 No. 3 pp. 238-­‐250 Royal Geographical Society, 09/2011. Johnson, Thomas H, Mason, M. Chris (2007) Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Research Institute Jones, Seth G. (2008) Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RAND Corporation Katzman, Kenneth (2016) Afghanistan: Post-­‐Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service 7-­‐5700. Accessed 2016-­‐12-­‐20 from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf Kilcullen, David (2006) Counter-­‐insurgency Redux, Survival, 48:4, pp. 111-­‐130 Larsdotter, Kersti (2014) Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine, Journal of Strategic Studies, 37:1, pp. 135-­‐162 Long, Austin (2002) On “Other War”: Lessons From Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. RAND Corporation Mishra, Atul (2008) Boundaries and Territoriality in South Asia: From Historical Comparisons to Theoretical Considerations. International Studies, vol. 45 no. 2 pp. 105-­‐132 Olsson, Stefan (2009) Kampen om “hearts and minds” i Afghanistan. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Olsson, Stefan (2011) Stabilitet i Afghanistan. En kritisk granskning av ISAF:s strategi för counterinsurgency, COIN. FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency 39 Sepp, Kalev I. (2005) Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review, May-­‐
June 2005 Teorell, Jan, Svensson, Torsten (2007) Att fråga och att svara. Samhällsvetenskaplig metod. Liber AB: Malmö Winther Jørgensen, Marianne & Phillips, Louise (2002) Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. SAGE Publications: London Zakaria, Fareed (2015) The key to solving Afghanistan is Pakistan. Washington Post, October 8 2015 Source Material The White House (2009) White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. McChrystal, Stanley (2009) COMISAF’S Initial Assessment. Kabul Department of the Army (2006) The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-­‐24. Washington 40