Nineteenth-Century Chile: A Case Study: Subordination, the Class Process, and the Relative
Autonomy of States
Author(s): Charles Pregger-Roman
Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 1, Military Rule and the Struggle for
Democracy in Chile (Winter, 1991), pp. 113-135
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633732 .
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Chile: A Case Study
Nineteenth-Century
theClass Process,
Subordination,
ofStates
andtheRelativeAutonomy
by
CharlesPregger-Roman
The purposeof thisarticleis to exploretheextenttowhicha statemay
toan external
underconditions
ofsubordination
achieverelativeautonomy
in
totracetheirrelationship
power.Itdealswiththreevariablesandattempts
Butbefore
historical
experience.
thecontextof Chile'snineteenth-century
inChile,itis necessary
discussthemfrom
tobriefly
theirinterplay
analyzing
a theoretical
pointofview.
is thefirst
variable.It includesthreebasicformsofexogSubordination
andmutations.
is themost
Imperialism
enouscontrol
andtheircombinations
as thehigheststage
fromtheLeninistperspective
recentand is understood
whichfinance
ofcapitalist
development
(Lenin,1940).Itis theperiodduring
state,
capitalcomes to dominatetheeconomyof theadvancedindustrial
industrial
capital.It is also theperiodduringwhichtheprofit
superseding
statebeginstodecline,leadingtoanexportof
rateintheadvancedindustrial
in
forces
oftheproductive
capital.Theresultis a decline therateofexpansion
social
of less industrial
withinthe imperialstateand the subordination
formations
toit(Lenin,1940:chap.8). Butas Marx(1977: 915) pointedout,
didnotcomeontheworldscene
andas Leninclearlyunderstood,
imperialism
but,rather,
developedfrom
as a fullydevelopedand maturephenomenon
formswhichaccompaniedtheearlier
colonialand mercantile
precapitalist
ofcapitalism.!
development
have,inthe
Socialformations
tomodemimperialist
domination
subjected
such
beensubjectedtoolderforms
ofexogenousdomination,
past,generally
or colonialism.This domination
or condias mercantilism
has distorted,
of classes and class factions.The class
tioned,the internaldevelopment
process,then,mustbe seenas a variable.The term"classprocess"indicates
ofdomirelations
arenotfixed.All relations
thatbothinterandintraclass
He is
Chileanhistory.
haspublished
variousworkson nineteenth-century
CharlesPregger-Roman
Vermont.
Department
atCastleton
StateCollegeinCastleton,
a member
oftheHistory
LATIN AMERICANPERSPECTIVES, Issue67,Vol. 18 No. 1 Winter1991,113-135
? 1991LatinAmerican
Perspectives
113
114
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
nationand subordination
are in a constantstateof change.Thatis, class
relations
arecreatedandconstantly
recreated
inresponsetoalterations
inthe
modeof production,
eithermajoror minor(Gordon,Edwards,and Reich,
1982: 9-13). Thustheterm"capitalist
class process"refersto somegroups
becomingbourgeoisand,concomitantly,
othersbecomingproletarian,
and
thecontinuousunfolding
of the relationship
betweenthesetwo primary
toexist,suchas thepeasantry
ortheir
classesandothergroupsthatcontinue
precapitalist
overlords,
orotherswhicharecalledintoexistence,
suchas the
middleclasses.
That the relationship
is based on the antagonistic
and diametrically
opposedinterests
ofthetwoprimary
classesis clear,butthatis nottosaythat
therelationship
Thepresenceofclass
is alwaysbasedonovertclassstruggle.
on
struggleimpliesthatthesubordinate
class recognizesitsown interests
somelevelandthatithastheopportunity
andthepoliticalwilltoactonthose
interests.
Itspresencealso impliesthattheideologyofthedominant
classhas
lostitspositionof hegemony
overat leastsomefactions
ofthesubordinate
class and thatat leastthesefactionshaveovercomeboththeirfatalism
and
theirinertia(PivenandCloward,1977:chap.1). Itmayimplytheformation
of a revolutionary
ideology(Valdez, 1975: 3). None of theseconditions
automatically
accompanydomination
and subordination
and,in fact,have
beenrelatively
rare.
But class struggle
does occurundersomecircumstances
andrequiresa
responsefromthe dominantclass and the statethatrepresents
it. The
effectiveness
ofworking-class
andoftheresponsetoitis determined
struggle
by manyfactors,amongthemthe relativeautonomyof the state.The
autonomous
stateplaysa dualrolebothofencouraging
overtworking-class
resistance
(overtclassstruggle)
andoflimiting
itspotential
foroverthrowing
I mean
thestate(PivenandCloward,1977: chap.1). By relativeautonomy
theextentto whichthestatecan maneuverwithinthepoliticalrealmin
ofa generalized
dominant
classinterest
thatitdefines,
whileremainsupport
ofthedominant
classorspecificfactions
ofit.In
ingsomewhat
independent
theextent
towhichthestatecancarveoutanddefinea position
generalterms,
ofautonomy
classthatitrepresents.
dependsonthecohesionofthedominant
The greater
themorehighlyanddeeply
thecohesion,theless theautonomy;
fractionalized,
thegreater
thestate'sautonomy.
Thus,during
periodsofcrisis
whendominant
classesaremostlikelyto fractionalize,
thestateis likelyto
have morelatitude,moreautonomy,
thanat othertimes."The mostopen
moments. . . are those at which a mode of productionreaches its limitsof
growth
anda newmodeofproduction
mustsoonbe adopted"(Harris,1977:
of the
291). At all times,theautonomyof thestatevariesas a function
ofthedominant
class.Thisfractionalization
fractionalization
is,insubordi-
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
115
natenations,a function
oftherelationship
betweenlocal dominant
classes
andtherepresentatives
oftheexogenousdominant
power.Thusmetropolitan
statescan
elites contribute
to the extentof autonomythatsubordinate
thatautonomy.
exercise,usuallylimiting
OVERVIEW OF CHILEAN CLASS PROCESS
In applying
thesegeneralizations
toChile,I willfocusonthreeperiodsof
therebellions
of the1850s,and
crisis,namely,theperiodof independence,
topresent
therevolution
of1891.Butitis necessary
first
a moregeneralized
ofbothChile'ssubordination
anditsclassprocess
viewofthedevelopment
duringthenineteenth
century.
thenineteenth
andachievedpoliticalindependence
Chileentered
century
dominated
witha predominantly
precapitalist
social structure
by a landed
incloseassociation
class.Butitalso
witha mercantile
commercial
oligarchy
Between1830 and
containeda miningandan agrocommercial
bourgeoisie.
factionwas transformed
intoa capitalist
1870, thedominant
precapitalist
configuration
butretainedmanyelementsof precapitalist
social structure,
sincetheir
transformation
was nottheresultofthecollapseoftheprecapitalist
modeofproduction
butwas imposedon themby theChileanbourgeoisie,
ontheother
ononehand,andbyrepresentatives
ofBritain's
informal
empire,
1983:44-50).
(Pregger-Roman,
Theresulting
dominant
classhasbeendescribed
as a bourgeois-traditional
rulingclass.Itwas bourgeoisinthattheaccumulation
ofcapital,rather
than
and statusgratification,
becametheoverriding
conspicuousconsumption
on theexploitation
of wage labor.It was
goal and was based increasingly
inthatthebourgeoisie
traditional
continued
toexerciseitshegemony
through
thenoblesseobligeoftheprevioussocialconfiguration
paternalism,
(Petras,
1970: 79; Pike,1973: 11-14).
The idea of a differential
transformation
of dominant
class factionsis
inthisformulation.
faction
implicit
Specifically,
Chile'ssouthern
agricultural
was transformed
intoa bourgeoisieat a slowerratethanthemine-owning
factionof theNorth,thoughmorerapidlythanthelandedoligarchyand
merchant
factionof theCentralValley.Hacendadosof thecentralregion
retained
precapitalist
relations
ofproduction
intothe1860sandbeyond.The
morerapidintegration
of theNorthand theSouthintoBritain'sinformal
in both
as well as chroniclaborshortages
empireof tradeand investment,
andrationalize
regions,
createdtheneedtomodernize
production
andled to
themorerapidalteration
ofprecapitalist
relations
ofproduction.
116
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
ofthedominant
Thisclass processcreatedtensions
betweenthefactions
in a struggleforcontrolof thestateas the
class whichwere manifested
increasingly
bourgeoisfactionsof theNorthand theSouthunsuccessfully
challengedtheirprecapitalist
contemporaries
overaccesstopoliticalpower
thedecadeofthe1850s.Thisstruggle
during
wasresolvedbetween1850and
1870 as thecentralregionbecameincreasingly
tiedto theemerging
British
commercial
andfinancial
empireinChileandas theCentralValley'sdominantfactionbecameincreasingly
integrated
intotheminingand agrocommercialbourgeoisie.
The resultsweretheemergence
ofa dominant
class anda statethatwere
tiedto theBritishcommercialempireand thecontinueddevelopment
of
was beginunderdevelopment.
thisstructure
By thelastthirdofthecentury,
ningtogenerate
a newclassfaction,
whichhadnot
anindustrial
bourgeoisie,
yetbecomea "classforitself'butjoinedother,
olderclassfactions
attempting
toachievestatepower.Thisalliancewas heldincheckbythebalanceofclass
forceswhichcontinued
todominate
thestate.Thecoppermineowners,some
sectorsoftheagrocommercial
wereable
elite,andtheindustrial
bourgeoisie
to gain controlof partof the stateapparatusin 1886 and attempted
to
manipulatestatepowerin such a way as to challengethe interests
of
imperialism
anditsrepresentatives
withinthelocalelite.Inshort,
thesemore
advancedclass factionsattempted
to increasetheautonomy
of thestate,
vis-a-visimperialism,
andtouse itin waysthatimperialists
and theirlocal
alliesconsidered
wasdefeated
antithetical
totheir
owninterests.
Thisattempt
in 1891 as imperialists
and theirlocal supporters
stageda rebellionthat
overthrew
andreshapedthestate.
intheforces
Theimpactoftheimperialist
stateis a function
ofdifferences
ofproduction
betweenitselfandthesubordinate
region.Theearlystagesof
thecolonialperiodsawsomechangesintherelations
ofproduction
(generally
an intensification
ofexploitation)
as a resultofSpain'stechnologspeaking,
ical superiority
in a fewkeyareas(thewheel
vis-a-visaboriginal
cultures,
andgunpowder,
forexample).Thefactthattherewas relatively
littlechange
in therelations
ofproduction
inthemostadvancedareasofIndianAmerica
demonstrates
therelativesimilarity
betweenSpanishandIndiantechnology.
Once theinitialchangeswere in place, boththerelationsand forcesof
production
becameverystable,although
thereweresomechanges,as inthe
mining
economywhichgradually
cametorelyonwage labor(Vitale,1971,
3: 146-149;Brading,1971: 146-149).
ontheclassstructure
Politicalindependence
ofChile
hadverylittleeffect
to makeChile's relationship
withthe
and,in fact,was designedprimarily
worldeconomymoreefficient.
Directlinesof commercewereestablished
betweenChileandBritain,
buttheprecapitalist
relations
ofproduction
were
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
Pregger-Roman
117
sufficient
toproducewhatwas neededforthattrade,andno newtechnology
was introduced
to affect
theclassprocess.
Gradually,
however,as Britain'sindustrialism
advanced,theBritishdemandfortheproducts
ofChile'sminesandfarmsgrew.ChileanandBritish
in moremoderntransportation
entrepreneurs
beganinvesting
facilities
and,
later,inmoremodemproductive
equipment.
The resulting
alterations
inthe
forcesof production
increasedthedemandforlaborand acceleratedthe
development
of capitalistrelationsof production
even in sectorsof the
economythatwerenottechnologically
altered.
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
was theresultofthedevelopment
On onehand,Chileanindependence
of
a seriesofcontradictions
itwas
duringthecolonialperiod,andon theother,
theresultofthecollapseoftheBourbonstateinSpain.TheBourbondynasty,
whichascendedto theSpanishthronein 1700 as a resultof theWarofthe
andrevitalize
theHapsburgstructure
SpanishSuccession,soughtto reform
ofdomination
toimprove
(VicensVives,1972;Floyd,1966).By attempting
theefficiency
ofthecolonial/mercantile
theBourbonreforms
system,
sharpbetweenChile's dominant
enedtheclass antagonisms
class factionsinternallyand, moreimportant,
dominant
vis-a-visPeru's also fractionalized
class,whichwas indirectcontrolofChile'seconomyandpolity.
The Bourbonreforms
structure
ofthe
alterednotonlytheadministrative
creoles(EuropeansborninAmerica)frompositionsof
empirebyremoving
moreefficient
butalsotheeconomicstructure
powerandmakinggovernment
(VicensVives,1972;Floyd,1966).Somecommercial
restrictions
werelifted.
Chileansweregivendirectaccess to all partsof theempireandfoundthat
themoreopentradebothincreasedthedemandfortheircommodities
and
reducedthepricesof goods imported
fromotherregions(Haring,1947:
inthecolonialsystem
314-325;Villalobos,1968: 92-94).Thesealterations
had bothpositiveand negativeeffectson Chile's dominantclass. The
oftradewas certainly
while
stimulation
viewedwithpleasurebyconsumers,
merchants
wereruined.Further,
increasedpoliticalefficiency
resultedin
highertaxesandbetterenforcement,
whileat thesametimereducing
their
levelofpoliticalparticipation
1972:
(Villalobos,1968: 98-104;Burkholder,
thatwere
408). TheBourbonreforms,
then,createda seriesofcontradictions
at therootsof theindependence
movement.
Primary
amongthemwas the
factthatthecreoleelitedominated
all sourcesofwealthandweredominant
socially,whilepoliticalpowerwas dominated
by Spaniards.All othercontradictions
andconflicts
flowedfromthatbasic one (Vitale,1971,3: 157).
118
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Butthesecontradictions
hadnotmatured
to thepointthattheywouldhave
rebellionon theirown.The outburst
generated
of separatism
was also the
resultof thecollapseof theBourbondynasty
in Spain itself,as Napoleon
invadedthepeninsulaandplacedhisbrother
on theSpanishthrone.
Thefactthatthismovement
first
ontheperiphery
originated
oftheempire
(in Caracas,BuenosAires,Santiago,andothercities)is a resultofthefact
thattheseareaswere,first,
moreautonomous
as politicalentities
thanwere
thecentersoftheempire.Second,theyweremoreaffected
bythedisadvantagesof theBourbonsystem,morehighlyexploitedby it thanwerethe
centersoftheempirewhichweremorehighlyintegrated,
and morehighly
favoredthantheperiphery.
inbothgreater
Chile'sisolationresulted
harmto,
andcohesionamong,thefactions
ofitsdominant
class,all ofwhichstoodto
gainfromindependence.
The NorthandtheSouth,alreadyheavilyinvolved
incommerce,
stoodtogainincreasedaccesstomarkets,
as didthemerchant
faction.The CentralValley oligarchy,which dominatedthe Santiago
Cabildo,or towncouncil,theonlypartof thestatedominated
by creoles,
stoodto gainincreasedpowerand also hopedto participate
morefullyin
commerce
through
greater
accesstoimported
goodsatlowerprices.Thefirst
actsoftheCabildoAbierto,
whichassumedcontrolofChilewiththefallof
theBourbondynastyin Spain,was to open theportsof Chile to foreign
commerce.
Thefactions
ofChile'sdominant
classunitedaroundthequestion
ofindependence.
The separatist
movement
thusresolvedthecontradictions
inthe
inherent
colonialsystem.The splitbetweeneconomicandpoliticalpowerimposed
by Spain was resolvedas was theinternational
contradiction
ofjuridical
on Spainbutactualdependence
dependence
on British
manufactured
goods
and markets.
Since in theimperialframework
itwas said that"Spainkept
thecow,andEnglanddrankthemilk,"independence
merelyeliminated
the
middlemanfromthe flowof international
trade.This is whatled Lord
Canningto observein 1822: "SpanishAmericais free,and if we do not
mishandle
ouraffairs,
sheis British."
Thustheseparatist
movement
resolved
thequestionofhomerulebutnotthequestionofwhoshouldruleat home.
The transition
was notsmooth.The construction
ofa rulingclass outof
theeconomically
dominant
colonialcreoleclass involvedinternal
factional
struggles
fordomination.
Thedistinct
interests
ofthefactions
ofthedominant
classcausedthemtosplitoverthequestionofwhoshouldruleathome,over
whichfactionwouldcontrolthestate.Thesedivisionsfollowedgeographic
linesas thegrain-exporting
Southand themineral-producing
Northfound
themachinery
ofthestate-thecustomshouse,revenues,
government
posts,
andso on-controlledbyanallianceoftheCentralValleyoligarchy
andthe
merchant
faction
inValparaiso,
centered
thenation'smajorport.Theperiph-
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
119
eralfactions
alsofoundthatthebenefits
ofthestatemachinery
werenotused
fortheirbenefit
butexclusively
to thebenefit
ofthecentralregion(Zeitlin,
1984: 40-41).
Thesedivisionswereexacerbated
bythetransformation
ofthesystemof
domination,
whichaffected
thethreedominant
class factionsat different
rates.NotonlydidBritainreplaceSpainas themetropolis
but,moreimporindustrial
was replacedby an emerging
tant,theold comprador
metropolis
metropolis,
withdramatic
consequencesforboththeChileanclass process
anditseconomicevolution.
The successof theindependence
movement
allowedtheChileandominantclass to attainpoliticalpower,buttheprice,even thoughtradewas
liberalizedfurther,
was a periodof economicdecline.The warof independencedisrupted
bothagriculture
andmining
whileatthesametimedestroying commerce.The periodfrom1810 to 1830 was chaoticnotonlyin a
were dispoliticalsense but economically.
Old, familiartradingpatterns
rupted,
minesandfarmsfellintodisuse,commercial
rivalries
wereexacerbated,thenewnationfellintodebttoforeign
banks,andChileanmerchants
fellintodebttoBritish
andproducers
creditors
(USSD, August4, 1830;FO
16/2,February
23, 1825).
Followingtheactivemilitary
phaseoftheindependence
movement,
Chile
was governed
byBernardo
O'Higgins(1817-1823)who,inalliancewithSan
As SuMartin,led themilitary
movement
thatestablishedindependence.
premeDirector,
O'Higginscontributed
tothesuccessful
movement
toliberate
Peruinordertoprotect
thenewChileanstate,butathome,hewas unableto
maintain
thesupportof thenewrulingclass. The structure
of thestate,in
fact,reflected
themajordivisionswithin
thatclass,whichduring
hissixyears
inpowerfurther
fractionalized.
O'Higginscontributed
tothesplitbyattempting
to rulein theinterests
of thedominant
class whileremaining
alooffromit
tocreateanautonomous
(Gajardo,1948:69-70).Inother
words,heattempted
state.Buthe wenttoofar,thusantagonizing
all ofitsfactions.
Specifically,
he attacked
thechurch,
imprisoning
priestsandexilingtheBishopofSantiago; he alienatedtheCentralValleyhacendadosbyattacking
primogeniture
andentail;heexactedforcedloansfromall sectors,
butespeciallythosewho
ownedliquidassets(i.e., thoseinvolvedin commerce);and he challenged
theautonomy
ofthetwoprovinces
ontheperiphery:
ConcepcionintheSouth
inthesecretLautarianLodge
andCoquimbointheNorth.His membership
schemeof
and his close associationwithSan Martinand theArgentine
continental
liberation
wereperceivedas further
threats
to Chileaninterests
class factions(Kinsbruner,
1973: 50-51). Takentogether,
by thedominant
thesefactorsexplainhis fall.The vacuumof powerthuscreatedfurther
exacerbated
overthestate.
theclass factional
struggle
120
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Theperiodbetween1823and1830saw thefactional
divisionswithin
the
inopenconfrontations.
Thebourgeoisfactions
classmanifested
of
dominant
a
theNorthand Southsoughtto strengthen
regionalautonomythrough
federalsystem,
whilethehacendado-merchant
allianceoftheCentralValley
attheexpenseoftheoutlying
soughttoexpanditscontrol
provinces
through
in theserviceof its
a highlycentralized
structure
thatit could manipulate
own interests.
The BritishConsul at Valparaisoaccuratelydescribedthe
divisionswhenhe wrote:
Therehas alwaysexistedmuchjealous emotionbetweenConcepcionand
SantiagobutnowConcepci6nfeltthisto a ten-fold
degreefromcomparison
ofherownmiserywiththedailyincreasing
ofherrival.A circumprosperity
stancewhichshe attributes
not to thedemandforproduce. . . and free
commercebutto thesteadyinfluxof herowncapitalandpopulationdrawn
northward
by ungenerous
and selfishdenialof succoron thepartof Santiago.... Duringthestruggle
withSpainthegeneralbenefit
unitedall parties;
self-interest
separatedthemafterthevictory.... The questionas to theexpediencyofa federal
orunitary
formofgovernment
hasled... tomanydisorders
andmuchdividedthecountry.
Eachstatedesirestobe independent
anddispose
forlocalpurposes
revenue
within
itsterritory
ofthenational
collected
(FO 16/11,
December30, 1829).
itsownmilitia,
eachfaction
ofthedominant
Sinceeachprovincemaintained
class possessedthemeansto resortto openconflict-anddidso. On April
17, 1830, the armiesof Concepcion and Santiago met at Lircay,where the
CentralValleyfactionemergedvictorious
(Loveman,1979: 132).
The leaders of the Central Valley alliance imposed a unitarypolitical
structure
onthenation,
butatthesametimeattempted
toplacatethemilitary
leadersoftheperiphery
bybringing
themintothegovernment.
Thismadeit
"nationalize"
intothe
possibletotemporarily
themilitary,
andbringitfirmly
stateas a subordinate
class factions
ofthe
specialinterest,
butthedominant
Northand Southwereexcluded.Firstmerchants
and thenCentralValley
hacendadosdominated
thestate(Kinsbruner,
1973:60-66).Butthepolitical
thatwas imposedmadea revivalof agriculture,
stability
mining,
andcommercepossible,althoughitdid noteliminatethefactionaldivisionswithin
thedominant
classwhichfestered
ofthese
belowthesurface.
Theimportance
divisionswasfurther
reducedas theCentralValleyalliancesoughttoexpand
commerce
sectors
and,therefore,
encouragethemining
andagrocommercial
attheexpenseofPeruandBolivia.The 1836-1839war,wagedostensibly
to
theunification
ofChile'snorthern
prevent
neighbors,
was commercial
war
aimedat protecting
Chile's expandingcommerce(Burr,1974: 33-44). As
intheinterests
such,itwas,liketheanticolonial
separatist
movement,
ofall
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
121
ofthedominant
classfactions
andbrought
themtogether,
atleasttemporarily.
Buttheveryexpansionofcommerce
inthe
thatthewarguaranteed
resulted
ofinterclass
intensification
andusheredina periodofrenewed
antagonisms
struggleover access to thestate.It further
openedtheway forBritain's
financial
penetration
andfortheeventualreunification
ofthedominant
class
in theclass process.
through
alterations
THE MID-CENTURY REBELLIONS
TheperiodofBritish
commercial
penetration
(1827-1850)sawcommerce
againregularized
as Britishmerchant
housesand commissionagentsprovidedbotha market
forChileangoodsand a supplyof Europeanimports,
especiallyafter1839.The Chileaneconomybecameincreasingly
tiedtothe
British
commercial
empire.In a longreport
totheForeignOffice,
theBritish
Consul observedthat"withtheexceptionof flourand tobaccofromthe
UnitedStatesand a veryinconsiderable
ofFrenchgoods,Great
proportion
Britainand BritishIndiasupplyall of thewantsof Chile in manufactured
goods"(FO 16/2,March17,1825).Thoseimports,
whichtheBritish
Consul
estimated
at 5,150,000pesos forthethreeyearsendingin 1825,accounted
for77 percent
ofall goodsimported
intoChile.In thesameperiod,minerals
accountedforabout58 percent
ofChileanexports,
two-thirds
ofwhichwere
copperand one-third
preciousmetals.Agricultural
productsmade up 42
percentof exportsandweredominated
bywheat.The balanceoftradewas
withChileansimporting
decidedlynegative,
4,260,000pesosmorethanthey
exported.
Withthediscovery,
in 1832,oftherichChafiarcillo
silverdepositsinthe
NorteChicoaroundLa Serena,mineralexportsgaineda dominant
position
whichtheyneverlost.Agriculture
remainedimportant,
butmineralsmade
up thebulkofexports.In 1834,theU.S. Consulat Valparaisoreported
that
in the previousyear,Chile exported2,340,017pesos worthof minerals
comparedto 354,570pesosofagricultural
products.
Oftheminerals,
silver
accountedfor63 percent,
whilewheatmadeup 53 percent,
byvalue,ofthe
agricultural
products
(USSD, February
19, 1834).Clearly,by1844,Chilean
weredominated
exports
bymineral
products
produced
bytheChileanmining
faction(Chile [Razon], Ministryof the Interior,1852), while Britain
remainedboththemostimportant
supplierof imports
and Chile'sbiggest
a pattern
thatcontinued
customer,
thenineteenth
throughout
Thus
century.
commerce
was controlled
merchants
byBritish
(Chile [Memoria],
Ministry
oftheInterior,
variousyears).
122
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
In addition,
Britainquicklygainedcontrol
ofthetransport
trade,as Chile
neverdevelopeda merchant
marineora shipbuilding
industry
whichwould
haveprovidedlinkagesto otherareasof theeconomy(Wliz, 1963: 52-60;
in Chile,a
Hirshman,
1959). A largenumberof vesselswere registered
phenomenon
explainedbytheBritish
ConsulatConcepcioninthefollowing
terms:
A great
ofthevesselsinthisreturn,
proportion
although
sailing
under
theflag
ofChile,andcoverofnative
becauseforeign
owners,
vesselsmaynotcarry
onthecoasting
arereally
ownedbyBritish
trade,
British
built,
subjects,
with
andaboutonethird
thecrewBritish
masters
seamen;
andthecapitalinvested
inthetrade
itself
belongs
chiefly
toBritish
merchants,
orarising
from
credit
June
bythem
given(FO 16/18,
30,1832).
The coastaltrade,whichin 1844was valuedat5,153,605pesos,brought
agricultural
goods fromthe South and mineralsfromthe Northto the
international
market
atValparaiso,
as wellas supplying
therapidly
expanding
oftheNorthwithfoodstuffs.
TheNorthandSouthbecamelinked
population
through
thistrade,whichhad important
social and politicalconsequences
oftheInterior,
(Chile [Resumen],
Ministry
1901).
The activitiesof Britishcommissionhousesled to thesecondstageof
financial.
Fromtheverybeginning
oftheir
whichI havetermed
penetration,
intoChile,British
advancedcredittoChile'sproducers
penetration
merchants
of exportgoods,mineowners,wheatgrowers,and millers.In 1840, the
British
hissuperiors
thatsixBritish
merchant
ConsulatValparaisoinformed
houseshadfiledsuitagainsta "number
ofChileanmineowners"inorderto
recoverloansamounting
to700,000pesos(FO 16/41,December28, 1840).
Chileanmerchants
as well tendedto fall intodebt.In 1848, the Consul
a long
observedthat"thenativemerchant
andretailer
requires
unfortunately
is settled
beforehe
credit,anditis seldomthathisaccountwiththeimporter
has disposedofhisarticlesinretail"(FO 16/63,May22, 1848).Thepointis
ofthe
thatcreditextendedbyBritishmerchants
addedto thesubordination
Chileaneconomy.But thedemandsthatwereplacedon thatcreditby the
whoseresources
expanding
economycouldnotbe metbyBritish
merchants,
were limited(Mayo, 1979; 297). Theses limitations
createda scarcityof
harshtermswhichincludedinterest
ratesthatnever
creditthatled to rather
fellbelow 12 percentand a systemof optionswhichnotonlyassuredthe
themfromthedrastic
commission
merchants
ofaccesstogoodsbutinsulated
inthepriceofexportgoodsbyfixing
fluctuations
theoptionpriceatthetime
the creditwas extended(USSD, May 30, 1830; Pregger-Roman,
1978:
forbanking
76-81). In response,Chile'sexporting
sectorsbeganagitating
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
Pregger-Roman
123
In 1850, such a reformwas initiatedin the formof a proposal
reform.
tocongresstoestablisha nationalbankof issue.
submitted
At thattime,boththeexecutiveandlegislativebranchesof thegovernaccompaniedby a
mentwere dominatedby CentralValleylandowners,
This was madepossibleby thefactthat,
of merchants.
strongcontingent
on thebasisofpopulaincongresswas apportioned
representation
although
oreventhe
toliveinthedepartment,
werenotrequired
tion,representatives
both
1833).As a result,
(Chile,Constitution,
thattheyrepresented
province,
inthecongress
weregrosslyunderrepresented
andSoutherners
Northerners
electionsso as toexcludethem.
Partymanipulated
as therulingConservative
weredrawnfromtheCenter
bythepresident
appointed
Thecabinetministers
of theInterior,
1951; Chile [Patentes],Ministry
as well (ValenciaAvairia,
1863). Butthispoliticalalliancebrokedownoverthenationalbankproject.
intheFrenchRevolution
AntonioArcos,a Chileanwhohadparticipated
a
successful
banking
businessinFrance,was
of1848andwhohadconducted
which
receivedwidespread
Bank
of
the
National
legislation,
the author
as
the BritishConsul
hacendados,
but,
from
the
Central
Valley
support
reported:
of
hostility
Mr.Arcos... has had to contendnotonlywiththeundisguised
of Valparaiso(who were at thesame time
mostof theforeignmerchants
and were
in keepingup thepresenthighrateof interest
interested
naturally
fearfulthattheprojectof a nationalbankmightlead to an abuse of paper
. . . the
ofFinancewho,havingpredicted
money)butalso withtheMinister
a reality....He
thatfailure
torender
failure
ofMr.Arcos'bank,didhisutmost
intheChamber[ofDeputies]byforce
party
[Arcos]hascreateda considerable
of intrigue,
and of wealth,and it is probablethathis original
of persuasion,
proposal[willpass](FO 16/68,April28, 1850).
bythe
promised
involvement
ofcommercial
Buttheincreasedpossibilities
of therailroadfromSantiagoto Valpara<161sois enoughto
construction
would supporta mechanismthat
explainwhyCentralValleylandowners
bythe
termsthanthoseoffered
wouldensurethemaccesstocreditatbetter
allies in conTheybrokerankswiththeirmerchant
merchant
community.
who,
gressand passedthemeasure,onlyto see itvetoedby thepresident,
was able to sustainthat
factionin congress,
withaid fromthecommercial
veto.
brought
community
bank,butthecommercial
Arcosthenopeneda private
thatgave
suitagainstit,objectingto a provisionin theenablinglegislation
thebanktherightto issue legal tender.The SupremeCourtupheldtheir
refusedtoacceptthebank'spaperin
community
position,andthemerchant
commercialtransactions.
The bankwas forcedto close (FriasValenzuela,
124
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
itscredit
community
haddefended
1970:60-62).TheBritish-led
commercial
monopoly.
thefactionalantagonisms
amongthedominant
Thisincident
sharpened
class andbecamea cause celebrein theelectionof 1850.Atthesametime,
in Europe inspiredliberals,
movements
the impactof the revolutionary
and Southerners
(i.e., thebourgeoiselements)with
especiallyNortherners
that"frank
politicalclubswere
newideologies.The BritishConsulreported
and revolutionary
organized,cheap scurrilousnewspaperswere printed,
in humbleimitation
of thesocialistsof France"
banquetswereestablished
the
was launchedto reform
(FO 16/69,November23, 1850). A movement
and plots forrevolutionor presidential
assassinationwere
constitution,
uncovered
(FO 16/69,August28, 1850).
theCentral
Valleyfaction
Fearingviolencemorethantheydesiredreform,
ranks
merchant
allies
around
the
candidacy
of Manuel
closed
withtheir
whohadwritten
Montt,
theSupremeCourt'sdecisionintheArcosBankcase
andwas thehand-picked
candidateofPresident
Bulnes,whohadvetoedthe
originalbankinglegislation.Monttwas opposedby GeneralCruz,commanderofthesouthern
army(FO 16/71,April24, 1851):
Supportfortheopposition(led by Cruz) comesfromthemineownerswho
favora nationalbank, and from
find themselvesin debt and therefore
Concepcion,as manyof the wheatfarmersalso owe large sums to the
ofValparaiso(FO 16/69,August18,1850).
merchants
andintimbribery,
Monttwontheelection,
whichwas markedbyfraud,
was followed
idationon bothsides(FO 16/72,July25, 1851). His victory
almostimmediately
by an open rebellion,as firstCoquimboand then
himandprotect
which
theirregionalinterests,
Concepcionrosetooverthrow
their
wereseverelylimitedbytheirlackof accessto thestateandtherefore
lack of controlover the nation'seconomicstructure.
The rebellionwas
crushedtemporarily
butbrokeoutagainin1859whentheforcesoftheNorth
Montt
and Southwereagaindefeated.Between1850 and 1859,President
internal
further
andsouthern
factions
by sponsoring
provokedthenorthern
thatwerefinanced
improvements
onlyin thecentralregion,improvements
intheNorthandSouth.Atthesametime,
revenues
through
export
originating
andsouthern
imnorthern
financedtheirown infrastructural
entrepreneurs
provements.
of O'Higgins,whichresultedfroman attempt
to
Unliketheoverthrow
ofthedominant
classwere
makethestatemoreautonomous
thanthefactions
ofthe1850sweretheresultofthefactthatthe
willingtoallow,theuprisings
itwas tootightly
controlled
statewas notautonomous
bythe
enough.Rather,
factiontorespondto theneedsofthemore
CentralValley'sagromercantile
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
125
dynamicand moremodernclass factionsof the Northand South.The
a fissure
inthe
allianceindicated
oftheagromercantile
rupture
congressional
autonbutthestatedidnotrespondwithincreasing
class faction,
dominant
fromthebeginning
ofthenationalbankepisodetotheendof
omy.Rather,
and advocatedthepositions
theinterests
therebellion,thestateprotected
anditsChileanallies.
community
markedoutbytheBritishmerchant
AFTERMATH
didnothing
toalterthebasicdivisionsandanimosThe failedrebellions
andsouthern
class norwerethenorthern
itieswithintheChileandominant
didreturn
toChile.
butpoliticalstability
beatenintosubmission,
bourgeoisie
class
thathaddividedthedominant
The reasonwas thattheclassdistinctions
theCentralValley,the
penetrated
as railroads
Gradually,
begantodisappear.
becausethecheaper
hacendadostherebeganto increasetheirproductivity
commodities
intheValparaiso
freight
ratesmadeitpossibleforthemtocompete
projectsthatweremodernizing
At thesametime,theconstruction
market.
ofworkers
who
thenationabsorbedlargenumbers
throughout
transportation
(NlifiezOleachea,1910: 51).
fromthehaciendasthemselves
wereattracted
on
of production
As a result,hacendadoswereforcedto altertherelations
ofwagelabor,sharecropping,
theirestates,
introducing
variouscombinations
inorderto maintain
theirlaborforce(Kay,1977).
andlease agreements
Thatis,jointstock
At thesametime,thebankingsystemwas reformed.
were
that
had
the
resources
tomeetthecredit
commercial
banks
established
ratesandoptionsthat
thehighinterest
As a result,
needsofChile'seconomy.
merchants
ofthecreditsystemcreatedbyBritish
hadbeenthemajorfeature
1978: 81-88). The resultwas thatcreditbedisappeared(Pregger-Roman,
Thesebankscontinued
availabletoChileanentrepreneurs.
camemorereadily
and
thatis,mining
todirectcapitalintothetraditional
areasoftheeconomy,
riskcapital
buttheydidnotserveas sourcesforindustrial
exportagriculture,
(ArchivoNotorialde Valparaiso,vols. 165, 171, 176). Theywerecorporationsformedin Chile thattendedto be runby membersof the British
who servedas theexecutiveofficers
and also domimerchant
community
1978:88-93),thiseventhough
(Pregger-Roman,
natedtheboardsofdirectors
Other
ofthestocksinthesecorporations.
Chileansalwaysownedthemajority
thisperiod.First,alongwiththebanks
werealsoforming
during
corporations
cameinsurance
companies.Thesewerefollowedbyjointstockcopper,coal,
silver,and nitrateminingcompanies.Railroadswerealso builtand other
madeby jointstockfirms(Pregger-Roman,
infrastructural
improvements
by
also tendedtobe dominated
1978: 88-93).As withthebanks,thesefirms
126
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
heldonlya smallproportion
of thestock
who typically
Britishinvestors
issued.The firmswere also highlyinterlocked
throughtheirboardsof
1978: 83-85).Thusthedevelopment
of thecordirectors
(Pregger-Romain,
of Britishparticipation
in theChilean
porateeconomyalteredthepattern
economyanddeepeneditscontrolofit.
as well.It provided
ofcorporations
had a socialeffect
The development
inall areasoftheeconomy.
forthosewithcashtoparticipate
an opportunity
while mine
CentralValleyhacendadosinvestedin miningcorporations,
ownersand wheatgrowersinvestedin banksand insurancecompanies.
Capitalbegan to flowfromeach regionintothe others.The economic
of theregionalelitesbeganto breakdownandwas replaced
specialization
of economicinterests
unitedthe
thatgradually
by a growingcommonality
ofthedominant
threefactions
class.Thisgrowing
class unitywas reflected
inthegrowing
ofthestateas theneedforanyonefaction
todominate
stability
unitedthedominant
itdeclined.The WarofthePacific(1879-1883)further
intowhich
themwithanimmense
ofnewterritory
amount
classandprovided
for
a
of
the
toexpand.It also setthestage
rupture
politicalconsensus.
THE REVOLUTION OF 1891
ofthenitrate
werenotabletogaincontrol
Chileanentrepreneurs
industry
in theNorteGrande,whichin largepartwas claimedby foreign,
mostly
British
on thebasisofbondsthathadbeenissuedbythePeruvian
capitalists
beforethe War of the Pacificin whichChile seized these
government
class was unwillingand unableto
territories
fromPeru.Chile's dominant
economybecauseof weaknessesin
successfully
gaincontrolof thenitrate
thefiscalstructure
pressure
of thestateand becauseof Britishdiplomatic
(O'Brian,1976).
moreimportant
factorwas thattherulingclass,ingeneral,and
Another,
thefinancial
inparticular,
in theexpansion
wereactiveparticipants
faction,
of Britishcontrolof thenitrate
fields.Chileanbankshad financeda major
inthePeruviannitrate
bondsonwhichBritishcontrol
partofthespeculation
was based (RamirezNecochea,1969: 22). In fact,thefinancialhealthof
Chile'sbankswas firmly
tiedtothesuccessoftheBritishnitrate
enclave.
thenational
class,whichcontrolled
The financefactionofthedominant
mining
branchinalliancewiththeChileannitrate
congressandtheexecutive
cameintoconflict
withagrarianandolderminingcapitalandwith
faction,
thenascentindustrial
andthequestion
bourgeoisie
overbothprotectionism
of economicdevelopment.
whichhad become
The agrarianbourgeoisie,
inforeign
itsemphasisto
commerce,
hadshifted
increasingly
less important
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
127
theexpanding
nationalmarket
but,eventhere,facedstiff
competition
from
Argentine
imports.
Nonetheless,
theagrarian
faction
remained
a strong
force
in thestate,withinterests
diversified
intoall areasoftheeconomy.
The industrial
faction,whichgrewup aroundserviceto the railroad
network,
miningeconomy,
andtheexpanding
internal
market,
was excluded
fromthestate(AlvarezAndrews,
1936: 135-138;FO 16/256,
November
20,
in neither
1889).2Thatis, itsmembers
participated
theexecutivenorlegisin
lativebranches.
However,members
ofbothbranchesretained
an interest
economicgrowthand industrialization.
In 1883,theMinistry
of Hacienda
commissioned
economist
RamonEspechtoconducta studyon thepossibilitiesof increasinginternal
manufacturing
activity.
The Espechstudyproposedtheintroduction
of an import-substitution
development
that
strategy,
is, theerectionof protective
tariffs,
encouragement
fortheformation
of
industrial
corporations,
government-sponsored
training
facilities
forindustrialworkers,
and theformation
of a government-sponsored
associationof
manufacturers
(Espech,1883: 10-21).Thesepolicieswereopposedby the
nitrate
faction,
whichwas themainsourceofthestate'srevenuebecausethey
calledforhigher
nitrate
exportdutiesandcameata timeofdecreasing
prices
(Brown,1963). But theNationalSocietyforIndustrial
Developmentwas
inpushing
formed
andin 1888joinedtheSociedadNacionalde Agricultura
fora protective
tariff
(Wright,
1975). Thatlegislationwas favoredby the
president,
JoseManuelBalmaceda,whoalsohadcreateda cabinet-level
post
forIndustry
andPublicWorks(ValenciaAvaria,1951:343-350).
oftheCentralValleyagrarian
Balmaceda,electedin 1886,was a member
in
was
involved
several
modernization
and
faction,
projectsin agriculture,
had broadexperiencein government
(Encina,1952: 30-39). He and his
in banks designedto provide
familyhad made substantialinvestments
in eitherthecommercial
creditbutavoidedinvestments
banks
agricultural
or othersectorsofthejointstockeconomy.3
of
He was a longtime
member
the LiberalParty,and an ardenteconomicnationalist
(Chile, Congress,
1888). Further,
hebelievedinusingthestatetoguidethenation'seconomic
development
(USSD, October1,1886).Thesepositions
puthimatoddswith
classicalliberalphilosophy
andwiththemainstream
ofhisownparty.
in both"Chileanizing"
Balmacedawas especiallyinterested
thenitrate.
and usingit to fueltheexpansionof theeconomyin otherareas
industry
was that
andinvestors
(Brown,1963).The reactionoftheBritish
diplomats
he was antiforeign
(FO 16/259,August12, 1890). In effect,Balmaceda
to alterthecourseof Chile's economicevolutionby usingthe
attempted
of the
thedevelopment
ofspecificfactions
powersof thestateto stimulate
andcoal,copper,andsilvermining
rulingclass (i.e.,theindustrial,
agrarian,
Buthisactions,
whichinvolvedanextensive
factions).
publicworksprogram
128
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
in
ofthebalancebetweenChileanandforeign
ownership
andthealteration
or were
the interests,
thenitratesectorin favorof Chileans,threatened
to theinterests
ofthenitrate
andtheirallies
capitalists
perceivedas threats
whoarguedthat
hacendados,
inbanking,
as well as bythemoretraditional
wouldincreaselaborcostsand cause
initiative
Balmaceda'sdevelopment
laborshortages
(RamirezNechochea,1969: 121). As was pointedout,the
enclave.Their
financialsectorwas highlyinvolvedin theforeignnitrate
The Chileannitratemining
resistanceto Balmaceda is understandable.
sinceitwas integrated
intothefinancial
sector
faction
as wellwas threatened,
stockownershipand was also heavilyinvolvedwiththeBritish
through
and
thedevelopment
enclave.Further,
Balmaceda'suse ofthestatetofoster
the
incorporation
of a new class factionintotherulingclass threatened
class.
balanceofforcesthatmadeup thedominant
As a result,largesectorsof therulingfactiondesertedBalmacedaand
withtheenclaveimperialists
who mobilizeddiplomatic
alliedthemselves
insupport
intheruling
The first
signsofa rupture
pressure
oftheirinterests.
coalitioncame,in fact,in theelectionof 1886, whentheRadical Party,
brokewith
sectorandtheChileannitrate
faction,
dominated
bythefinancial
therulingLiberalcoalitionandnominated
a candidatefromtheirownparty,
Nitrateand
JoseFranciscoVergara,formerpresident
of theAntofagasta
inearliercontroversies
(USSD,
RailwayCompany.
Sucha breakwasforecast
ofthe
January
6, 14, 1886). Balmacedawas also opposedbytheremnants
had
the
class
landed
faction
that
been
least
affected
by
old, precapitalist
theConservative
a voiceingovernment
through
process.Thisgroupretained
tradition-bound
positionin the
Party,whose economicallyanachronistic,
intheiropposition
classstructure
ofthe
tothesecularization
was manifested
stateandtheliberalization
oftheeducational
system
(Woll,1975).Thesetwo
diversegroups,the Radicals and the Conservatives,
unitedto oppose
fromtheBritishenclaveimperialists.
Balmaceda'spolicies,withsupport
of as much of
Their strategywas to preventthe implementation
Balmaceda'sprogram
as possiblebycreatinga seriesofcabinetcrisesand
of thestate.Therehad been cabinetcrisesin
by challenging
thestructure
sincethe 1850s,witheach president
sincethattime
everyadministration
anaverageoffivecabinets.ButBalmacedawas forcedtoappoint
appointing
13 (Pizzaro,1971:30). The result
was thatthepassageoflawsimplementing
hisprogram
becamealmostimpossible.As to thestructure
ofthestate,the
of 1833 established
a strongexecutivesystemon themodelof
constitution
theU.S. Constitution.
factionduringBalmaceda'sterm
Buttheopposition
advancedthe argument
thatthe constitution
establisheda parliamentary
12,1891;FO 16/259,
February
systemon theBritish
model(USSD, January
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
129
28, 1890). Clearly,duringthe1860sand 1870s,as class factionaldivisions
electionlaws had
declined,theapparatus
of thestatehad beenliberalized,
hadbeenintroduced,
butthe
been reformed,
andministerial
accountability
statewas stillessentially
presidential.
whenBalmaceda,followingwellThe politicalbattlewas intensified
tonamehisownsuccessor,
EnriqueSalvaestablished
precedent,
attempted
to
in the1891 election.Sanfuentes
wouldhavecontinued
dorSanfuentes,
intheeconomyanda reform
ofthenitrate
industry.
pushforstateintervention
The majority
of LiberalPartyofficialsrejectedBalmaceda'schoice.The
of the
to a headwhenBalmacedaagreedto a reform
contestwas brought
believedwouldhavegivenitcomplete
electoralsystemthattheopposition
ofthestate.Thatestimation
incorrect.
BoththeBritish
control
was,however,
ofelectoralalignment,
that
andU.S. ambassadors
agreed,intheirestimations
at theupcoming
Balmaceda'sfactionin congresswouldsecurea majority
wouldsee his policiesimpleelectionand thatthebeleagueredpresident
mentedby his successor(USSD, October17, 1890; FO 16/264,April27,
1891).
submission
Atthispoint,theopposition
wasfacedwithtwochoices:either
andabandonment
or openrebellion.To justifyits
of itsperceivedinterests
choice and to attractbroadersupportforrebellion,it was necessaryto
oppositionheld up
discreditthepresident.
As a result,thecongressional
bytheconstitution.
routine
taxandbudgetmeasureswhichweremandated
Balmaceda,drawingonprecedent,
continued
thepreviousyear'sbudget,as
otherpresidents
haddonebeforehimandas he hadbeenforcedto do early
declaredhima tyrant
in 1887(USSD, January
19, 1891).Buttheopposition
anddeclareditselfthelegitimate
Santiago,andwith
government,
abandoning
the supportof theNavy,beginninga rebellionthatended Balmaceda's
was supported
by the
presidency
andwithit,his program.
The opposition
in Chile and by the Britishdiplomaticcorps.U.S.
Britishentrepreneurs
AmbassadorPatrick
Eganreported
that
I maymention
as a feature
of theinterest
thefactthattherevolution
has the
undividedsympathy,
and in manycases theactivesupportof theEnglish
inChile.ColonelRobles,theill-fated
residents
ofthegovernment
commander
forcesatIquique[themajornitrate
tothegovernment
reported
port],officially
thatthemanagers... oftheEnglish[nitrate]
oficinasinTarapacaiurgedtheir
workmen
tojoin therevolutionists,
them$2 perday duringtheir
promising
termofserviceandholdingoutthethreat
thatunlesstheydidjoin theywould
in Tarapaca.It is rumoredthatmanyEnglish
neveragainget employment
fund.Amongothers,
itis
houseshavesubsidizedliberally
totherevolutionary
Mr.JohnThomasNorth[ownerof
openlystatedbyleadersoftherevolution,
severalnitrate
(USSD, March17,1891).
mines]contributed
?100,000sterling
130
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
In a confidential
letter
totheForeignOfficelawyerchargedwithprotecting
North'sChileaninterests,
J.G. Kennedy,
theBritishambassador,
madethe
following
observations:
[Captain]St. Clairhas keptme ... informed
ofmovements
andintentions
of
therebelfleetandwe haveprivately
managedtocontrolthem.... The fleet
seceded suddenlybecause somethingwas suspectedand the government
decidedtodispersetheships.Ifonlytheycouldhavewaitedthearmywhich
hadbeenmainlyboughtwouldhaverisenandthenall was easy(FO 16/264,
January
24, 1891 [emphasisadded]).
BylateAugust,
therebelforcehadmovedagainstthecapitalanddefeated
thearmy,
whichhadremained
loyaltothepresident,
atleastostensibly,
and
Balmacedawas oustedfromoffice.His policies,whichattempted
tomanipulatethenation'seconomicevolution
inwaysrepugnant
totheclassfactions
thatdominated
thestate,wereabandoned.
Clearly,Balmacedawas attempting
to use thestateas a relatively
autonomous actorin the social configuration
to alterthe nation'seconomic
ofintegration
andpattern
intotheworldeconomy.
development
In doingso,
he awakeneddeepfissures
withinthedominant
classand,infact,intensified
thosefissures(Pregger-Romain,
1979: 226-230). His policies politically
dividedthefractionalized
classintotwocamps:oneconsisting
ruling
ofChile's
nitrate
entrepreneurs,
bankers,
someagriculturalists,
andtheir
foreign
supportandtheother-theloyalfaction-composed
of
ers,whoopposedthepresident;
thecopper,silver,and coal miningentrepreneurs,
and
manyindustrialists,
some agricultural
Nor
groups.But theChileanstatewas notautonomous.
was eitherfactionable toappealtoworkers
orpeasantsforsupport
fortheir
project(USSD, January
12, 1891). The state,and thesocial configuration
whichit represented,
was subordinate,
thatis, influenced
by exogenous
forceswhichitcouldnotcontrol.It cameunderattackfromthoseforcesof
imperialism
andfromfactions
ofthedominant
classmostcloselytiedtothe
Britishnitrate
enclave,anditfellbeforetheircombinedmight.
CONCLUSIONS
Thisstudydemonstrated
thattheChileanclassprocessresponded
toand
was shapedby external
pressures
as muchas itwas influenced
byinternal
in themodeof production
transformations.
Alterations
weretheresultof
Chile's increasinglevel of integration
intothe British-dominated
world
economy.As a result,differential
ratesofclass transformation
exacerbated
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
131
thefactionaldivisionswithinthedominantclass. Further,
since theprecapitalist
modeofproduction
neverreacheditslimitsofgrowth,
butwas only
partiallyreplacedas a resultof thatlevel of integration,
vestigesof it
survived,
existing
sidebysidewithmoremodernmodesofproduction.
Thisheightened
fractionalization
was expressedintherelativeinstability
of theChileanstateas class factionsattempted
to monopolizeitspowerin
theserviceoftheirowninterests,
whichwereoftendiametrically
opposedto
theinterests
ofotherfactions.
Yetatnopointdidtheopposingclassfactions
successfully
appeal to other,nondominant
classes in theirefforts
to gain
in itself,gain
controlof thestate.At no timedidthestate,as an institution
sufficient
of the dominantfactions.
autonomyto disregardthe interests
Balmaceda'sefforts
ofthe
can be seenas an attempt
to foster
theautonomy
state.But he failedpreciselybecause his appealwas to an incipient
class
factionthatwas notpartof therulingclass and to dominant
class factions
thatwerelesscloselytiedtoimperialism.
Balmaceda'sBismarkian
developmentdriveitselfservedto weakenimperialism
by creatinglocal demands
fortheproductsproducedby thesefactions,
thatis, coal, copper,primary
capitalgoods,andthecommodities
neededto manufacture
them.
The theoretical
ofthisattempt
is that,as a subordinate
implication
state
representing
a moreor less subordinate
social structure,
thestatehad no
autonomy.
Duringperiodsofextreme
crisis,whenone modeofproduction
has reacheditslimitsand is beingreplacedby another,
or evenwhenone
formofa modeofproduction
is beingreplacedbya newsocialstructure
of
statesmay experiencerelativeautonomyfromdominant
accumulation,
classes(Gordonetal., 1982: 8-17),butonlyto theextentthatclass factions
areunabletocoalesce,orfindexogenoussupport,
andtotheextent
thatlower
class factionscan become,albeitbriefly,
actorsin thearenasof
important
thethreeperiodsstudied,
power.InChileduring
therewasnostructural
crisis
in thesocialstructures
andno alteration
of accumulation,
notto mention
in
themodeofproduction.
theeffort
to use thestateas an autonoTherefore,
mousforcewas doomed.Dominantclass factions
wereabletocoalesceand
tofindexternal
The counterrevolution
support.
of 1891didresultfromdeep
fissureswithinChile's dominant
class,and clearly,itsoutcomewas partly
theresultofBritishintervention
on behalfoftheiralliesin thatclass.
Butthequestionofrelativeautonomy
remains.WasBalmacedaattemptingto createan autonomous
state?Or was he rather
attempting
to realigna
subordinate
ofclassfactions
stateintheinterests
thatwereless enmeshedin
Chile'ssubordinate
capitalismandpotentially
capableof achievinggreater
independence?
Clearly,sincenotonlyopposingclass factions
wereable to
132
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
was tousestatepower
also,andsincehisattempt
coalescebuthissupporters
his statewas, andwouldremain,tiedtofactions
to advancetheirinterests,
of the dominantclass had he been victorious.Since neitherthe social
northemodeofproduction
hadreacheda point
of accumulation
structures
ofcrisis,littleelse couldbe expected.
statesis,to
sincetheclassprocessofsubordinate
In moregeneralterms,
determined
thatis, by thelevelof
a largeextent,
by exogenousinfluences,
thestateprocessis also
integration
intoanddemandsoftheworldeconomy,
This
autonomy.
levelsofrelative
andcannotdevelopsignificant
subordinate
in thedominant
statedo
is notto say thatcrisesin themodeofproduction
do,butsincemodes
states.Theycertainly
nothaveanimpactonsubordinate
and moreso, social structures
of accumulation
reachtheir
of production,
limitsofgrowthin thecoremorequicklybeforetheydo so in subordinate
in theirimpact.In thedominant
state,they
regions,thereis a discontinuity
states,they
ofthestate,whileinsubordinate
heighten
therelativeautonomy
of
and structures
need notdo so. There,since new modesof production
areintroduced
fromthedominant
statebeforetheold modes
accumulation
havereachedtheirgrowth
theoldandnewexistsideby
ofproduction
limits,
withers
sideuntiltheold modeofproduction
away.Tensionsarecreatedto
be sure,whichmayreachlevelsconducivetoviolence,buttheclassprocess
thetransformations,
andtherefore
thestatehavemoretimetoaccommodate
at thesametimethatarchaicclass factions
to integrate
risingclass factions
evolve.I amarguing
thatsubordination
itselfalterstheclassprocessinsuch
as
to
reduce
of
of thestate.This explainsthe
a way
thelevels autonomy
ofmodesofproduction
resilience
ontheperiphery
thathavebecome
apparent
in thedominant
regionsandthesurvivalofclass factionsassocimoribund
atedwiththem.
thesearguments
aretentative.
Theyfitwellwiththecase ofChile
Clearly,
but thereis always a dangerin drawing
century,
duringthe nineteenth
universal
especiallysinceChileis unique
conclusionsfromone case study,
unique?Of all Spanish-American
in manyways. But is Chile critically
potential
toachievea moredevelopedposition
nations,
Chilehadthegreatest
withintheworldeconomy,
ifnotforindependent
development.
Chilefailed
Andwhilethe
subordinate.
torealizethatpotential
becauseitwas rendered
insocialsciencehaveneverdeviseda "domination/subordination
quantifiers
fora more
stateswithless potential
scale," is it notlikelythatperipheral
developedpositionwithintheworldeconomywouldbe morethoroughly
I
affected
Chileandevelopment?
by theexogenousforcesthatfrustrated
believethat,in fact,theyare.As a result,Chile's uniquenessmakesit an
on boththeclass process
important
exampleoftheresultsofsubordination
andthestate.
Pregger-Roman
/SUBORDINATION AND CLASS PROCESS
133
NOTES
1. The passage reads: "The discoveryof gold and silverin America,the extirpation,
in theminesoftheindigenous
enslavement
andentombment
population
ofthatcontinent,
the
oftheconquestandplunder
beginnings
ofIndia,andtheconversion
ofAfricaintoa warrenfor
thecommercial
ofblackskins,areall thingswhichcharacterize
hunting
thedawnoftheeraof
capitalistproduction.
Theseidyllicproceedings
arethechiefmoments
ofprimitive
accumulation"
2. AlvarezAndrewsreports
in
on themanufacture
of locomotives
and miningequipment
firms
ofvarious
Chile,andeventheirexport,
whiletheBritish
Consullistsover2,000industrial
inhis
sortsincluding
212 ironfoundries,
150 copperandsilverfoundries,
and50 shoefactories
report.
Thesize ofthesefirmsis notgiven.
3. Thisstatement
isbasedona studyofthebiannualreports
of53jointstockfirms
inexistence
between1852and 1891,whichlistedthestockholders.
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