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A Chinese Perspective on IR Theory and Collective Security
The paper analyzes formal and informal mechanisms of collective security and their
theoretical foundations in East Asia with a focus on the Chinese perspective.
The first part summarizes the theory-based discussions regarding the security dilemma in East
Asia. According to neo-realist assumptions, the „rise“ of China will, in the regional context,
trigger a shift in power distributions and, on the global stage, result in an open confrontation
between the PRC and the old power centre(s) (Bett 1993/1994:34-77; Friedberg 1993/1994:533; Bernstein / Munro 1997; Goldstein 1997/1998:36-73; Christensen 1999:49-80).
By contrast, liberal and constructivist approaches postulate that, due to growing
interdependence and mutual learning processes, actors would avoid confrontation and stick to
cooperation in transnational issues (Kang 2003/04; Shambaugh 2004/05; Economy 2005).
It is obvious that both scenarios pose a challenge to the PRC's national interests and her vision
of regional (and international) order. If the other states perceive of the PRC as a threat to
world peace and regional security, they could resort to containment strategies. However,
liberalism and constructivism, which predict a non-military solution of the security dilemma,
imply that the PRC accepts and supports the rules and regulations defined by the international
community of states.
The second part of the paper thus takes a further look at the inner-Chinese expert discussions
concerning the role of the PRC in the East Asian region and China’s normative vision of the
(future) regional order. What are the theoretical considerations which motivate and guide the
PRC's foreign policy decision-making and her participation in regional cooperation and
bargaining processes?
I. Theory discussion: The security factor in IR theories
The “rise” of China in terms of economic growth and the PRC’s growing influence in
international affairs have triggered a shift in the distribution of power resources among (East)
Asian powers and already developed a remarkable spill-over effect on the level of world
politics. These shifts and changes in international politics are commonly analyzed with the
help of (neo-) realist theory frameworks in order to predict and anticipate China’s new role
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and future positioning in international affairs. Following realist theory assumptions, the nature
of the international system is per definitionem anarchic. There is no government or
supranational power center, which would be able to control that states behave according to the
rules of the international game and, in case of misbehavior and defection of cooperation,
could impose sanctions to reestablish and safeguard the international order. This lack of a
regulating and sanctioning power center results in the emergence of a self-help-system, in
which states strive to maximize power to defend and safeguard their national interests.
Whereas realists argue that states as rational and unitary actors focus exclusively on relative
power, traditional neo-realists would identify security and survival as the highest national
interests of any state actor. The “rise” of a new player in international politics and the related
redistribution of power resources would automatically threaten the interests of the other state
actors – as realists conceive of these constellations as a zero-sum-game, in which the old
power centers would lose in terms of relative power – and provoke counter-measures
including military (re-)actions. The question is not only, how states will react to the
emergence of a new power, but also what kind of development strategy the emerging new
power will choose.
Realist theories differentiate between two scenarios: “Offensive realism” (Mearsheimer 2001)
assumes that states behave entirely aggressively to maximize their power resources, as they
are not satisfied with their current power position but try to attain hegemony.
On the
contrary, “defensive realism” (Walt 1986; Waltz 1979) claims that states can achieve security
without resorting to war. Second strike capable nuclear arsenals are an often quoted example
to illustrate the validity of this approach, as the defense-offense balance is then in favor of the
“defender”. Another facet of “defensive realism” refers to the level of mutual trust and
confidence generating structures and processes.
Both scenarios are linked to the security dilemma of international relations (Herz 1951), as
due to (mis-)perception of threats and feelings of insecurity states will go to war. Given the
anarchic structure of the international system, states would continuously be involved in
military actions. As this is obviously not the reality of everyday politics, realist models
identify factors and constellations which enable cooperation among state actors. A nonmilitary stabilization of the international system is possible, if the hegemonic actor forces and
convinces the other states to cooperate according to the rules defined by the power center. But
smaller and weaker states that conceive the hegemon as a threat could also decide to join in a
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coalition to oppose the power center. Contrary, if the costs of opposing and balancing the
stronger power exceed the benefits or if the power center offers incentives to cooperate, the
weaker states could also choose a strategy of bandwagoning and join in a coalition with the
stronger power(s). “Hegemonic stability” (Gilpin 1981) and “bandwagoning” thus both offer
a solution to the security dilemma. Moreover, other variants of traditional realist models, as
regime theory, would add that cooperation under anarchy is possible in the context of political
regimes (trade regimes / human rights regimes / collective security regimes). Likewise, neoliberalism as an alternative approach opposed to the key assumptions of
(neo-)realism
postulates that though independent and sovereign nation states remain the central actors of
international politics, international institutions and organizations also matter. And as states are
concerned with absolute gains, they are mostly willing to cooperate and avoid military
confrontations.
Analysts of regional constellations in East Asia also make use of the above summarized
distinction between defensive and offensive realist scenarios which would at the end both lead
to a situation of stability and dialogue-based conflict solution mechanism.
Analogously to hegemony in world affairs, China could emerge as a new regional hegemonic
power practicing a benevolent form of rule (wangdao as opposed to the totalitarian form of
imperialist rule (badao)) (Shambaugh 2005:12). The problem with this approach is that the
PRC has officially renounced to strive for hegemony or to play a leading role (the formula
“bu dang tou” is one of the axiomatic principles of contemporary Chinese foreign policy).
The other scenarios elaborated by international China watchers can be summarized as biversus multipolar security systems. The bipolar approach focuses on the stabilizing role and
ordering function of the US and China in the East Asian region. This could turn either in an
open competition and military confrontation between the two powers and their antagonistic
visions of regional order or lead to the situation of a Sino-US condominium in Asia. It is also
imaginable that one power – the US or China – will try to set up an alliance to balance the
other power center. The formation of the American-lead hub-and-spokes-system is now
answered by a wide set of regional security structures and collective security mechanisms, in
which the PRC plays an important role (ASEAN+1; ARF; SCO; CSCAP; 6-Party-Talks).
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II. Image campaigns: “Peaceful Rise” vs. “China Threat Theory”
As one of the earliest contributions to the general debate among political scientists on the
impact of psychology in IR, Boulding proposed that analyses of a nation’s perception of the
international environment and the self-image of the state actor should be used to explain
foreign policy decision making (Boulding 1959:121). In the 1970s, Jervis further revealed
how misperceptions and misinterpretations of the international environment and the selfdefined position of the perceiving state can trigger conflicts:
Actors exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in others’ policies.
Content of the resulting perception, however, varies with the effect of the other’s
behavior on the actor. When the other behaves in accord with the actor’s desires, he
will overestimate the degree to which his policies are responsible for the outcome.
When the situation is fluid, there is a less pronounced tendency for the actor to
overestimate his potential influence. When the other’s behavior is undesired, the actor
is likely to see it as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to his
own actions. In this case the actor believes that the other is trying to harm him rather
than that the effect was an unintended consequence or a side-effect (Jervis 1976:343).
Starting from the 1980s, analyses of Chinese foreign policy often referred to the level of
foreign decision making as the main level of analysis, arguing that mainstream IR approaches
lacked explanatory power, when applied to the study of the PRC, which was not only
characterized by a divergent political system, but also by a particular political culture
(Rozman 1987; Shambaugh 1991; Whiting 1989; Wang Jianwei 2000; Friedrich 2000;
Weigelin-Schwiedrzik et al. 2006). Nonetheless, regarding the Chinese case, it is not enough
to reduce foreign policy analysis to perceptions and images to explain irrational or even
provocative turns in Chinese foreign policy as misinterpretations of the international
environment. One should further differentiate between perceptions deriving from the
application of “Western” theories and those reflecting the state and nature of world politics as
seen through the theoretical lenses of “Chinese” frameworks of analysis. Since the decisions
on reform in the late 1970s, ideological orientations in foreign policy were gradually
substituted by scientific analyses. During this initial stage of modern Chinese IR Studies,
“Western” theory concepts were introduced as new universal frameworks (Ni, Shixiong / Xu,
Jia 1997:11-15). The idea to define a “Chinese” theory, which would also shape China’s
foreign strategy in the late 20th and 21st century, was first discussed in the mid-1980s. Deng
Xiaoping is quoted to have favored a theory-based definition of future world order based on
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Chinese perspectives and visionary strategies (see Tang, Guanghong / Zhu, Kaibin 2003:19).
In this context, Deng Xiaoping’s (and later also Jiang Zemin’s) political statements were
accepted as normative aspects which had to serve as guidelines for China’s foreign strategy,
most of them – “non-interference in domestic politics” e.g. Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang;
“symmetry in international affairs”; “conflict solution by peaceful means”; “win-win
constellations” and adherence to peace and stability in international cooperation – still echo
China’s dominant paradigm of “peace and development” and apparently also refer to the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.
Following the Chinese leadership transition in 2002/2003, it became more and more obvious
that China saw itself no longer as a passive actor outside international structures, but as an
active player in global affairs. Apart from perceiving the international system, Chinese
researchers began to develop new theory-based models, which should help China to influence
and shape the post-Cold War world order:
…States conduct diplomacy based on their self-images and images of the outside
world. In the past 20 years, China has undergone a profound transformation in how it
views itself and the world. It no longer views itself as a country on the edge of the
international community, but as a rising power, with limited but increasingly
significant capacity to shape its environment… (Ni, Feng 2004:151) (emphasis added)
The idea of “peaceful rise” thus has a dual connotation. It is part of the ongoing inner-Chinese
theory and strategy discussions and at the same time functions as “export” theory model, i.e.
an element that could be integrated into the ongoing global theory debates. And as part of
foreign strategy and positioning, the “peaceful rise” stands for China’s claim to be accepted as
equal partner in international affairs, whose development toward a major economic and
political power should be at least tolerated by the other great powers.
Besides, in his article “The rise of China in Chinese eyes”, the Chinese IR expert Yan
Xuetong contrasts fears and threat perceptions of Western analysts with a “socio-cultural”
reading of the theory-based concept. Yan Xuetong stresses the positive impacts of China’s
rise, as it does not necessarily pose a threat to the existing structure of the international
system, but first of all stimulates economic growth, scientific progress and global stability.
Furthermore, to explain the philosophical and political ideas underlying the concept of the
“peaceful rise”, Yan Xuetong tracks the idea of “rise” back to discussions in the early 20th
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century. By quoting Sun Yatsen’s call for a “rejuvenation of China”, which was also
integrated in the political concepts of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, he
explains that, from a Chinese perspective, the “rise” of China should not be confused with a
struggle for a new power position, but should instead be understood as a legitimate way to
regain the political and cultural status that China had lost in the conflicts with Western powers
(Yan, Xuetong 2001:34).
To regain China’s former power position, the PRC’s contemporary foreign policy thus has to
follow the ideas of opening-up and reform, as historical experience shows that isolation and
confrontation hinder China’s modernization plans. Yan Xuetong uses the historical
background of the CCP’s foreign policy and Chinese political culture to explain that China’s
rise will certainly be peaceful. Finally, Yan also underlines that most Chinese would not want
to challenge US hegemony, but would choose cooperation in the established framework of
world order instead of open confrontation (Yan, Xuetong 2001:35-36).
Leading Chinese IR experts still regard the so-called “China Threat Theory” as the dominant
paradigm among international China watchers. Confronted with the “China Threat Theory”
and the related negative image of China as a pernicious and destabilizing state, Chinese
scholars speak of a new security dilemma. The negative image threatens China’s new
international role as reliable mediator in regional conflicts e.g. the North Korea issue and
questions China’s self-defined image as peaceful state-actor in regional as well as in global
affairs. In the long-term perspective, this negative image could, if accepted by the majority of
states, also delegitimize the Chinese party-state, as – after the basis of political legitimacy had
shifted from revolution and ideology (Mao Zedong) to pragmatism and primacy of economic
development (Deng Xiaoping) – good performance and active participation in international
affairs, apart from economic prosperity and stability on the domestic level, have now become
core elements of the CCP’s power position.
III. Background: Patterns. Principles. Axiomatic concepts.
The PRC’s image campaigns illustrate that Chinese foreign policy is shaped by a certain path
dependence and reiterates patterns and foreign policy paradigms, which were defined in the
early decades of the PRC. To understand the inner-Chinese debate on war, peace and national
and / or collective security, it is necessary to take a further look at the emergence and
development of “Chinese” foreign policy concepts.
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It is remarkable that although following the Sino-Soviet controversy during the late 1950s and
early 1960s Chinese foreign policy witnessed a redefinition, the main Soviet-oriented IR
paradigms were not immediately replaced, but underwent numerous modifications and
adaptations to the Chinese context. The normative interpretation of world order shifted from
the Stalinist “two camps” theory to Mao’s concept of “intermediate zones” and later to his
“Three-World-Theory” (Ye, Zicheng 2001:128-131). In fact, foreign policy decision making
remained based on the principled ideas of national sovereignty, national unity and territorial
integrity. The “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, presented at the Bandung conference
by the Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai, reflect these paradigms and formulate a code of
conduct for interactions between the PRC and other socialist as well as non-socialist states
(see also Yang, Fan 2006).
But although interpretations of world order and conflict constellations became more and more
adapted to the Chinese context, overall, the dominant (Soviet) paradigm “war and revolution”
still persisted. The launching of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) posed an abrupt end to
political research in the PRC. Most institutes were closed and Chinese political scientists,
branded as counter-revolutionaries, were persecuted or sent to the countryside for reeducation. After this sharp interruption, IR research was restored and developed in new
directions. After the Cultural Revolution had come to an end, ideology- based paradigms as
“war and revolution” were substituted by more pragmatic research on constellations of war
and peace and prospects of future global constellations. But it was only in the early 1980s that
Deng Xiaoping officially replaced “war and revolution” by his more pragmatic model of
“peace and development”. Deng restrained from separating “peace” and “development”, but
instead defined these as interrelated and inseparable concepts. In 1985, “peace” was
characterized as part of the “East-West problem”, whereas “development” was seen as central
aspect of the “North-South problem” (Feng, Tejun 2005:91-93).
This new concept of “peace and development” was presented not only as part of China’s
modernization project, initiated by the decisions on reform and opening in 1978, but as new
universal IR paradigm. Global developments, e.g. the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War, seemed to allow a restructuring of the existing world order.
However, in the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping had to conclude that instead of solving the remaining
“North-South problem”, the restructuring of the former bi-polar world order had led to a
revival of colonialism and hegemonic orientations of Western powers. Deng therefore
modified his understanding of “peace and development” by stating that these were still
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dominant IR principles, but that both idealized concepts had not yet become realized (Feng,
Tejun 2005:93).
Adherence to “peace and development” as leading paradigms was confirmed by party
declarations in 1992 and 1997. Jiang Zemin’s normative interpretations of a future world
order also relied on Deng Xiaoping’s ideas on “peace and development”, and the main
assumptions were later once more repeated by Hu Jintao in his speech at the French
Assemblée Nationale (Feng, Tejun 2005:93).
The concept of “peaceful rise”, which was first introduced by Zheng Bijian at the Bo’ao
Forum in November 2003, presents a theory-based modification of “peace and development”.
Together with the concept of “harmonious society” and “harmonious world”, the “peaceful
rise” is a central element of the PRC’s officially proclaimed foreign strategy for the 21st
century (see Hu, Zongshan 2006:5). The concept was immediately integrated in China’s
foreign strategy, as Wen Jiabao referred to the “peaceful rise” already in his Harvard speech
entitled “Turning your eyes to China” in December 2003 (Wen, Jiabao 10-12-2003). To
explain the Chinese idea of world order and to define China’s position in the international
system, Wen Jiabao outlined China’s status and future development plans in relation to SinoUS relations. Instead of summarizing China’s current situation, he referred to main
philosophical concepts of China’s ancient culture to stress China’s interest in global harmony
and conflict solving.
Reference to China’s past as “big country with splendid civilization” underlines the
importance of Chinese ancient political philosophy for the construction of a modern Chinese
self-image. Furthermore, as Wen Jiabao stresses the reception of Chinese culture and
philosophy by Western intellectuals, especially through translations of the Confucian classics
by missionaries in the 17th and 18th century, it becomes obvious that contemporary visions of
world order imply integration of particular Chinese political ideas and national interests.
China not only underwent a transition from a state outside to one inside the international
system, it also tried to influence and redefine main guidelines and paradigms of global
interaction.
Wen then continues his speech by defining contemporary China as “a country in reform and
opening-up dedicated to peace”, coping with problems deriving from its transition and
modernization project, but still struggling to realize “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.
Wen’s direct and indirect use of classical philosophy concepts and quotations from ancient
Chinese literature and poetry are striking, as compared to the Maoist era, this marks a
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redefinition of Chinese political culture, as instead of Marxist-Leninist concepts and political
ideas of Mao Zedong, Wen Jiabao’s presentation is based on ancient political culture
undergoing a modern reinterpretation to justify and legitimize new strategic orientations in
China’s current foreign policy.
Wen’s prospect for China’s future development focuses on conflict solving strategies. In order
to cope with increasing social and regional dichotomies, China plans to build a “well-off
society” up to 2020 and to reach one level with medium-developed countries in 2049, one
hundred years after the founding of the PRC.
As major obstacles in rebuilding China as a central power, Wen Jiabao identifies feudalism,
seclusion and invasion by foreign powers. However, Wen points out that China’s future
development will overcome these challenges by realizing its utopian world concept based on
“peace and development” and “socialist” ideas (Wen, Jiabao 10-12-2003).
IV Perception-based security dilemmas
It is striking that critical analyses of China’s global intentions do not use the term “peaceful
rise”, but speak of China’s “rise to great power status”. This reflects prevailing fears
concerning the global implications of China’s development. The underlying assumption that
China would struggle to achieve great power status, which might lead to a restructuring of
world order, implies that the current developments are understood as a threat to the
established international structures and opposed to the interests of the old “great” powers.
Two years after the concept of “peaceful rise” had been presented to the international
community, the Washington Post undertook a first critical evaluation of the theory and its
meaning for China’s political praxis. By referring to the status of democracy in Hongkong,
the PRC’s support for so-called rogue states e.g. Sudan and Iran, as well as the adoption of the
“anti-secession” law, which allows the use of non-peaceful means in the case of a Taiwanese
declaration of independence, the article interprets the “peaceful rise” as a “hollow concept”
(Washington Post 23-04-2005).
Likewise, through recapitulating and evaluating some central aspects of the academic
discussions among Chinese scholars concerning the concept of “peaceful” rise, Kondapalli
comes to the conclusion that in opposition to the officially declared adherence to peaceful
means, the PRC did not always restrain from use of force to solve disputes for instance toward
Taiwan, the South China Sea or in the Indo-Pakistan conflicts (Kondapalli 2005).
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And Mearsheimer, focusing on the impact of China’s rise on bilateral and multilateral
structures, predicts an unavoidable security competition between China and the US, joined by
China’s neighboring states. He argues that due to threat perceptions, smaller East Asian states
would try to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony and therefore support countermeasures led by the US. In this context, Mearsheimer sees the role and status of Taiwan as the
crucial point for the future development of Sino-US relations (Mearsheimer 2004).
These neo-realist views are opposed by Economy who depicts three different constellations
which could shape future bilateral relations between the US and China. All scenarios are
slightly more optimistic than the realist interpretation, as China is seen as stabilizing power in
the East Asian region. However, it is almost impossible to predict the outcome of China’s
ascendance. A more active China could share leadership with the US and Japan for the East
Asian region, but it could also try to oppose US interests by forming alliances to balance the
old hegemonic power center (Economy 2005).
In most political analyses, the inner-Chinese debates on the meaning of China’s “peaceful
rise” are not given much attention. This also holds true for Crossick’s paper on China’s rise
and Sino-European relations. The aspect of “rise” is primarily reduced to economic aspects,
added by some reflections on domestic developments and their impact on China’s future
economic growth. Crossick’s paper differs from the above mentioned US-American articles in
so far that it promotes a strengthening of Sino-European relations and support for China’s
national development plans instead of containment or balancing (Crossick 2005).
Minxin Pei even goes a step further by reducing China’s rise to the domestic level, stating that
China’s future will neither be reform nor democratic transformation, but overall decay.
Minxin Pei makes avoids any further discussion of China’s role in international affairs, as,
according to his scenario, the instability on the PRC’s domestic level will destroy China’s
modernization and development plans in the regional as well as in the international context
(Pei, Minxin 2006).
Yang Guangbin’s examination of “peaceful rise” goes in the same direction arguing that
without political reform, China will not become a “first power”. Yang states that low political
participation, political corruption and increasing distance between the power centre and the
periphery are among the main problems which will obstruct China’s “rise” (Yang, Guangbin
2004:9). Men Honghua adds that the negative externalities of China’s transition from a
planned to a market economy pose further threats to China’s future development ambitions.
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As economic growth is the basis of China’s rise, in the long-term perspective, China will only
be able to acquire great power status, if it solves economic and socio-political tensions on the
domestic level first (Men, Honghua 2004:103-117).
It is more than obvious that most Western analyses of China’s modernization and its related
increase in national power refer to economic and military aspects to explain the meanings and
processes of China’s “rise” (Brown et al. 2000; Sutter 2005). The normative aspects of
China’s export model of “peaceful rise” are often neglected, as most Western analysts seem to
agree that current foreign politics reveal China’s “real” intentions, which are opposed to the
proclaimed “peaceful” image.
V. Modernization and defense
The PRC’s white papers on modernization and defense offer good insights into the strategic
modeling and recalculating of national images. They also provide diplomatic explanations of
the “real” intentions and motivations of China’s military build-up which are, at least
according to these statements, not in line with neo-realist conflict scenarios that guide most
“Western” China analyses. The quantity of terminological modifications in China’s white
papers during the last ten years underlines once more the PRC’s sensibility concerning the
shaping of China’s new international identity and the “misreading” of China’s intentions by
its strategic cooperation partners, which stick to neo-realist conflict scenarios.
The PRC’s white paper on national defense published at the turn of the century (WP 2000)
classifies the 20th century as one of war(s) and major global conflicts, whereas in the 21st
century by contrast, at least according to the PRC’s official statements, priority will be given
to peace, development and modernization. In the following short introductory retrospective,
the white paper focuses on the two World Wars and the Cold War, which shaped the PRC’s
regional and international environment during the 20th century. It is more than evident that
military aggression is exclusively attributed to the two antagonistic power centers, the US and
the SU, while China is presented as a victim of international power politics, as the PRC’s only
experience of military conflicts is – according to the white paper - China’s war of national
liberation. It has to be remarked that the PRC’s wars and military confrontations (with
Vietnam; India; the Soviet Union; and Taiwan not to forget China’s engagement in the
Korean War – see Ross 2006; Christensen 2006; Garver 2006; Goldstein 2006) are not
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mentioned. China’s military history is thus implicitly presented as a product of imperialist
aggression (e.g. the Opium Wars) and the PRC consequently defines herself as a mostly
casual bystander of the systemic conflict between the two camps during the Cold War. By
identifying China’s national interests and preferences – “state sovereignty”, “national unity”,
“territorial integrity”, “security” (WP 2000) – as a result of the experience of colonization and
imperialism, the white paper describes China’s ongoing modernization program as a
legitimate struggle to catch up with the rest of the developed world – and thus as part of a
modern nation-building project which had been postponed due to the military aggression of
imperialist powers against China. To realize this highly ambitious modernization program, the
PRC needs a “peaceful international environment” as well as a “favorable surrounding
environment” (WP 2000). Though not formulated in the paper, the underlying argumentation
is more than obvious: The current modernization program is identified as a modified and
updated version of the reform attempts of the late 19th century, which have now become
reactivated under the guidance of the CCP. The political legitimacy of the Chinese party-state
derives not from open and competitive elections, but from the assumption that the party-state
is able to provide and safeguard public goods – e.g. political stability, national unity,
territorial integrity and economic prosperity. Any interruption or abolition of the officially
proclaimed modernization program would weaken the people’s support of and the trust in the
political system of the PRC.
Successful “liberation”, “independence”; “democracy” and “freedom” are listed as attributes
of China’s political status quo; the modernization program however, as the paper stresses, has
still to be completed. National modernization requires stability and continuity on the domestic
and on the international level. Open rivalries and overt confrontations have to be avoided. In
consequence, according to the official diplomatic terminology, the PRC pursues an
“independent foreign policy of peace” and is “committed to a new world of peace, stability,
prosperity and development”. In terms of the white paper, China consequently pursues “a
defensive national defense policy” (WP 2000).
A revised and updated version of China’s national defense strategy was presented in 2004.
This was after the 16th party congress (2002), which marked the transfer of political power
from the third generation (Jiang Zemin) to the fourth generation (Hu Jintao) of political
leaders, and after Hu Jintao had been declared chairman of the Central Military Commission
(2003). In contrast to the last white paper, which depicted China’s modernization as a
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legitimate struggle to catch up with the developed states, the 2004 paper concentrates on the
aspect of military modernization,
which had also been part of China’s so-called four
modernizations (economy; agriculture; military / national defense; science and technology).
Nevertheless the military aspect had so far not been mentioned in the former official
statements and white papers of the PRC. Instead of a retrospective, the 2004 paper documents
the status quo of world politics and formulates future development prospects. The paper
outlines that “peace” and “development”, China’s normative guiding concepts for the
international system, and “security” and “stability”, the corresponding concepts related to the
nation-state level, still face major obstacles and challenges. However, the following lines
leave no doubt that the PRC’s blueprint for future global interactions rejects a return to open
power struggles for hegemony, attributed to the 20th century. The idealized 21st century is
one of (peaceful) “coexistence of diverse civilizations, social systems and development
models” (WP 2004). China’s official development goal is not to attain hegemony by winning
the zero-sum-game against the other major powers, but to build a “moderately prosperous
society”. Even if military modernization is now referred to as one central element of China’s
national defense policy, the 2004 paper does not take an isolationist look at “modernization”,
but links it to the concept of “development”. Additionally, the paper specifies China’s foreign
orientation not as a reiteration of the axiomatic term “independent foreign policy of peace”,
but elaborates on this point by adding that China practices a “national defense policy of a
defensive nature” (WP 2004) and restrains itself from any kind of expansionism or struggle
for hegemony.
The focus of the PRC’s external relations has thus shifted from the regional to the global
stage, as the white paper refers to the necessity of a “peaceful international environment” and
keeps silent on the status of regional constellations (WP 2004). This development is
“officially” documented in the terminology of the revised follow-up version, which appeared
two years later (WP 2006). The 2006 white paper explicitly pays respect to the phenomenon
of the ongoing globalization process and increasing mutual interdependence. Whereas the
two other white papers had discussed China’s (military) modernization as part of a postponed
nation-building project, constrained and determined by external structures and constellations,
the 2006 paper re-integrates the PRC’s modernization and development efforts into the global
context. The PRC’s modernization is not a unique phenomenon, but finds its equivalents in
form of nation-building projects of other states belonging to the old periphery (former
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colonies or developing states in Asia, Africa and Latin America) of international politics. Key
elements of China’s national modernization strategy are now inscribed into a universally valid
strategy of global development. “Peace”, “development”, “cooperation” and “win-winconstellation” are identified as universal and shared common goals. The Chinese concept of a
“harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” integrates elements of the
global discussion on a “new” world order for the 21st century, i.e. after the end of the Cold
War, plus key assumptions of idealist and liberalist theory-based models of international
relations (WP 2006).
A further look at the level of terminology in the white papers summarized above (WP 2000;
WP 2004; WP 2006) reveals a transition of Chinese foreign policy formulation from the
import and mostly unmodified application of “international” terminology toward the
emergence and export of a distinct “Chinese” terminology. The 2000 paper describes the
political status quo in China by referring to “democracy” and “freedom” – two concepts with
highly normative and value-based implications, as both were key elements of “Western”
transition theories and commonly used to describe and predict the necessity of system change
in communist states. The fact that the 2000 paper makes use of “Western” terminology does
not imply that the PRC accepted the normative claim for political reform and system change.
It seems that concepts taken from the international discussions were exploited to counter the
international skepticism and threat perceptions linked to China’s national development, as the
PRC’s modernization program was not presented as a particular Chinese development path
but as part of universal transition and transformation processes. The 2006 paper however
replaced the internationally agreed and unified terminology of international politics by
concepts and terms deriving from China’s domestic politics (e.g. harmonious society –
harmonious world).
The rules of future global interactions as fixed in the 2006 paper (WP 2006) are obviously
elements of the inner-Chinese discussion and IR theory formulation.
Though the “new
security concept” (xin anquanguan) – consisting of “mutual trust”, “mutual benefit”,
“equality”, “coordination” – presents itself as an universally valid and applicable model of
non-traditional common security, one should keep in mind that the “new security concept”
has been formulated as a particular “Chinese” concept and part of “China’s” (military)
modernization program. The concept is based on the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence”, officially formulated by Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference in 1955, which
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symbolized a first attempt to elaborate a concept which is based on China’s strategic interests
and foreign policy preferences, but at the same time flexible and universal enough to capture,
describe and guide foreign policy orientations and international interactions of the nonChinese world (Yang, Fan 2006:141;127-128).
To sum up, the rules of international politics remain officially unchanged, but the key
concepts have been modified or replaced by a new or partially redefined terminology. At the
moment, it seems that the revision and modification of the theoretical pillars of world order
do not aim at a reshuffling of “real” political power on the global stage. The models and
visions proposed by the Chinese side do neither reject the existing structures nor do they try to
transform the social systems of the other state-actors. The purpose of the formulation of
“Chinese” security and world order concepts is more likely thought to devaluate and
substitute elements of the international debate which classify the PRC and the Chinese
development path as a threat to world peace and common development. The 2006 paper
iterates the PRC’s self-obligation to a “defense policy which is purely defensive in nature”
and stresses that China would not engage in any arms race or pose a military threat to any
other country. According to China’s white paper, modernization in the sectors military and
defense have to be “conducted on the basis of steady economic development” and to follow a
“scientific development outlook” (WP 2006). The overall direction of this strategy shows a
tendency toward “defensive realism” including elements of social constructivist approaches
(e.g. China’s national image campaign).
Whereas the 2006 paper constructs an interdependent relationship between China’s national
and the global development and proposes a “Chinese” model of world order in form of the
“harmonious society”, the next updated version (WP 2008) returns to the level of China’s
domestic development. The introductory sentences emphasize that China sees itself now as an
integral part of the world economy and the international system (not of international politics!).
Furthermore, in 2008, China had to cope with major challenges and events - the earthquake in
Sichuan; the Olympic Games; 30 years of reform and opening – which, according to the white
paper, were all successfully managed and solved. China thus continues to follow the “road of
peaceful development” and to implement the reform and opening process as central part of
China’s so-called “socialist modernization”. The modernization program remains directly
related to the officially proclaimed “scientific outlook on development” and military
modernization is understood as a strategic “adaptation to (the) global military development”.
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The PRC will therefore stick to an “independent foreign policy of peace” and project a
“national defense policy solely aiming at protecting its territory and people”. “National
sovereignty”, “security” and “development” are defined as the “fundamental purpose” of
China’s foreign policy formulation. Likewise, the PRC still favors the construction of a
harmonious world and repeats the central aspects of the “new security concept” as guiding
and constraining parameters of future international and global interactions (WP 2008).
The content and the implications of China’s “new security concept” are discussed in a
separate white paper (2002). China’s concept is drafted against the background of the
antagonistic power constellations and overt conflicts in the two World Wars as well as during
the Cold War. To attain common security and mutual benefit, flexible cooperation through
multi-lateral security mechanisms and strategic dialogues are required. The modifications and
adaptations of China’s official defense policy reflect thus a transition from a unilateral
national strategy to multilateral collective security structures (WP 2002).
VI. Terminology matters
At a first glimpse, most Chinese publications on IR theory seem to transfer the terminology
and basic assumptions of the international academic discussion to the analysis of the Chinese
case. Nevertheless, a further look at Chinese materials reveals that the fact that Chinese
scientists do apparently operate with the same terminology, does not automatically mean that
the contents and values linked to it remain unmodified. A good illustration is the translation of
“national interests”. The official translation as “guojia liyi” can be conceived as an equivalent
to the internationally agreed definition of “national interests”, but at the same time can also be
retranslated into English as “interests of the state”, which has a completely different
connotation and refers to a Marxist approach of IR theorizing (Yan, Xuetong 1996).
Other central elements and key concepts witness a similar re-modulation and re-configuration,
when translated and integrated into the Chinese context. The Chinese concept of power, often
translated as “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli), is conceived as an all
encompassing form of power integrating not only the aspect of military strength, but
furthermore also incorporates political influence and cultural soft power resources. This
broader understanding of power thus allows labeling a state as “great nation” though his
military resources would not versify this ranking. It was and is likewise possible to argue that
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the PRC is an integral part of the concert of great powers in world affairs, or to construct the
EU as a pole in international politics, though the EU still lacks a European defense and
security structure independent of NATO structures and capabilities.
Apart from China’s matrix of comprehensive national power (CNP) shares, which is used to
calculate the limits, restraints and options of the major state actors in international
constellations, a second derivate of the power aspect is the concept of “soft power” as a new
strategy to win control and influence without resorting to the use of force. It is striking that
the turn toward a soft and constructivist approach in foreign policy is not a unique feature of
the PRC’s strategic positioning attempts in the early decades of the 21st century. Not only the
new emerging power centers in the former periphery of international politics, but also the old
power centers, namely the US, undertake steps to reformulate their official understanding of
power and security as elements of their international strategy. It is therefore hardly
astonishing that the US version of “Smart Power” and the concept of “Soft Power” attributed
to the current reorientation of China’s foreign activities seem to converge. The US strategy
paper defines ”Smart Power” in the following terms:
Smart power is neither hard nor soft – it is the skillful combination of both. Smart
power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve
American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that
underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances,
partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish
the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this
effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power wit the rest of the
world’s interests and values (CSIS 2007:7).
The Chinese concept of “Soft Power” – a concept attributed to the US-American scientist
Joseph Nye, but used by Western and also by Chinese analysts to categorize China’s approach
in international affairs – had originally been presented as a model to oppose and balance
hegemonic hard power politics. The terminology (ruanshili / Soft Power) is nothing
particularly Chinese and the necessity to put an end to the return of history, i.e. the repetition
of worldwide struggles for hegemony, had been recognized long before in a broad variety of
academic publications and political statements. But it is remarkable that an imported concept
now serves as the guiding model of Chinese foreign policy orientation and thus underwent a
transition from a mostly theoretical concept (Nye 1990; 2002; 2004) to a strategic element
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combing both universally applicable assumptions and particular features of Chinese political
culture and diplomatic experiences.
VII. Collective security mechanisms: Leaving the security spiral?
During the Maoist era, China’s IR experts and foreign policy advisors assumed an
unavoidable confrontation between the capitalist (often referred to as imperialist) and the
socialist states of the world. According to these interpretations and perceptions of world
constellations, the PRC had to fear a foreign military attack and thus a violation of its
officially proclaimed national core interests, i.e. territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
Because of these (mis-) perceptions and the assumption of an inevitable antagonism between
the “two camps”, the Maoist PRC’s security strategy generally relied on deterrence.
Conversely, during the period of reform and opening and especially after the renormalization
of China’s bi- and multilateral external relations in the 1990s, the focus shifted from
traditional to non-traditional security concerns. Transnational terrorism; energy security;
environmental security and domestic stability are only the most essential elements of China’s
modified security strategy. The PRC’s national interests have obviously not changed, but
concepts and strategies have been adapted to the regional and international environment of the
increasingly interdependent post-Cold-War world. Due to economic and financial
globalization, individual security can only be achieved through multilateral cooperation and
mechanisms of collective security. The PRC participated in most of the UN’s peacekeeping
missions and actively contributed to the stabilization of the world economy during the Asian
crisis and the ongoing financial crisis. The PRC has joined cooperation and consultation
mechanisms set up by the South East Asian states (ASEAN; CSCAP etc.)
– initially
established as security alliances to balance China’s increasing influence and supposed
assertive power ambitions – and has contributed to the construction of a regional security
architecture, the SCO, independent of the NATO and in the long run opposed to the US
security strategy for East Asia. Nevertheless, an overt confrontation with the US is, at least at
this point, not intended. The PRC acts as a mediator in the Six-Party-Talks and supports the
US in combating transnational terrorist actions. Xinjiang is often presented as China’s
Chechnya - any intervention by the military or the armed police is consequently in line with
the international efforts to combat terrorist activities (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik et al. 2006).
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Nonetheless, the PRC’s foreign policy orientation in the above mentioned case studies is
mainly motivated by Chinese security concerns, which are subsequently identified as common
and collective security concerns. This strategic move allows to legitimize China’s
participation in international organizations, whose rules have generally be defined by the nonChinese part of the world, and also explains China’s attempts to re-organize the existing
structures of international and global interactions (e.g. China’s paper on the reform of the UN:
sina.com 12-06-2005).
One should also keep in mind that the PRC only agrees to enter international cooperation
structures which do not request a transfer of national power to the supranational level or a
pooling of sovereignty. The Chinese concept of the “state” is shaped by two slightly divergent
philosophical traditions. The first can be traced back to the self-image of “all under heaven”
(tianxia), the second is more inspired by the idea of modern nation-states. But both concepts
exclude the individual and non-state actors from foreign policy making and do not conceive
of the international system as anarchic. It is almost impossible to predict, which self-image as
state will dominate Chinese foreign policy in the next decades. The search of a Chinese IR
theory is still under construction, so one could assume that the preference for the one or the
other concept will vary due to shifting domestic and international power constellations.
VIII. Reflections on national IR concepts
Concepts of peace – and the related strategies of safeguarding national security concerns – in
IR theory are not necessarily universal frameworks of analysis. As Takeshi Ishida has shown
by comparing peace concepts and terminology in different world cultures, the idea of peace is
closely linked to national political philosophy as well as national interests (Takeshi Ishida
1969:133-145).
One example for the emergence of national peace and security concepts in global theory
discussions would be the Chinese idea of “peaceful rise. As Chinese political scientists
underline, this concept is not to be understood as the result of learning from “Western” IR
theory, but as a particular Chinese peace model deriving from the “Five principles of peaceful
coexistence” and the ideas of “peace and development”, reflecting both particular Chinese
and universal global security interests.
Looking at the Chinese case, it is only too obvious that Democratic Peace Theory can not
solve the supposed security dilemma resulting from China’s new positioning ambitions on the
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international level. In Chinese political terminology, the expression “democracy” is used in
numerous political concepts or strategies e.g. “new democratic revolution”, which describes
the interim cooperation of Communist and bourgeois forces to overcome foreign domination,
“democratic centralism”, serving as one of China’s four basic organization principles, or
“people’s democratic dictatorship”. Especially since the leadership transition in 2002/2003,
the term “democratization” describes inner-party democratization and “democratization” of
global politics. From the Chinese perspective, “democratization” is opposed to hegemony and
hierarchy, defined as domination of global decisions by the most influential actor or groups of
states sharing the same (“Western”?) interests. If, from a “Western” point of view, China does
not democratize, post-Cold War IR theory will have to cope with the persistence of a
“socialist system with Chinese characteristics” opposed to idealized concepts of Western
“democracies”.
Chinese IR theory and methodology researchers are aware of contemporary discussions in the
“West” and often make use of already established theory frameworks by officially declaring
their works as deriving from realist, liberal or constructivist assumptions. But even if they are
quite familiar with Democratic Peace Theory, in the inner-Chinese discussion, the concept is
usually not applied to the PRC. The reason is that Democratic Peace Theory is classified as an
attempt to transplant “Western” values to the East Asian region. Thus, the idea to
“democratize” China is declassified as a “Western” strategy to establish a post-Cold War
world order and security mechanisms consisting of more or less functioning democracies, a
strategy, which obviously conflicts with the normative elements of the “Chinese” theory
discussion.
China’s transition from a state outside the international system to one inside it has led to the
still ongoing search of particular “Chinese” interpretations of the international system. Due to
the fact that mainstream IR theory is understood as highly influenced by the national interests
of the theory progenitor states, the request to be accepted as an “equal” partner in global
affairs implies a modification or a partial rebuilding of normative IR theory, which prescribes
interaction structures and processes on the international level.
On the one hand, China’s political leaders are aware that foreign policy has to rely on
scientific interpretations of the international environment and China’s position in the system.
The substitution of central IR paradigms, the replacement of “war and revolution” by “peace
and development”, illustrates this shift in theory building and strategy discussions.
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On the other hand, the concepts of “peaceful rise” and “harmonious society” represent
alternative, yet quite utopian models of future world order. The main motivating factor behind
this discussion remains the construction of a theory-based future world order, which should
allow the realization of China’s national interests through cooperation and convince the
international community of states not to impose any sanctions or to balance China’s reascendance.
The only way to leave the security spiral of East Asian and global politics seems to consist in
the integration of divergent security concerns and development strategies, which can be found
in China’s IR theory reflections or other peripheral discourses. It is more than evident that to overcome parochialism and hegemony in IR theory building and to avoid misperceptions
and misinterpretations of foreign policy orientations - core assumptions and units of analysis
have to be modified or replaced, even if divergent political cultures make it difficult to find
common definitions.
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