A Guide to the 18th
National Assembly
of Mexico’s Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)
A PRE-ASSEMBLY REPORT
OF THE CSIS AMERICAS PROGRAM,
MEXICO PROJECT
George W. Grayson
November 2001
Policy Paper on the Americas
A Guide to the 18th
National Assembly
of Mexico’s Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI)
OF
A PRE-ASSEMBLY REPORT
THE CSIS AMERICAS PROGRAM,
MEXICO PROJECT
George W. Grayson
Policy Papers on the Americas
Volume XII, Study 6
November 2001
CSIS Americas Program
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CSIS Mexico Project Leadership
Sidney Weintraub, Acting Director, Americas Program
Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, Director, Mexico Project
M. Delal Baer, Chairman, Mexico Project
Meghan Bishop, Research Assistant, Mexico Project
© 2001 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights
reserved. This report was prepared under the aegis of the CSIS Western
Hemisphere Election Study series. Comments are welcome and should be
directed to:
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E-mail: [email protected]
Web site: www.csis.org
George W. Grayson
Contents
List of Tables .......................................................................................................2
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................3
Section One: Introduction ....................................................................................4
Section Two: Key Players......................................................................................8
Section Three: Evolution of the Revolutionary Party............................................10
Section Four: Hot Issues and Hot Committees ....................................................12
Section Five: Possible Significance of the PRI’s 18th National Assembly...............20
About the Authors .............................................................................................24
1
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
List of Tables
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Chronology of Assembly Activities ..........................................................7
State-by-State Breakdown of PRI Vote on July 2, 2000 .........................15
PRI Performance in State and Local Elections.......................................16
Governors, November 2001 ..................................................................18
PRI Presidents and Secretaries-General, 1936–2001............................. 18
2
George W. Grayson
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Tess Owens, secretary in the Government Department of the
College of William & Mary, for spending countless hours expertly typing and
retyping this manuscript. Stacey Cooprider, another wonderful human being,
deserves recognition for her tremendous contribution to the preparation of the
text, as does Valerie Trovato, who expertly and gracefully manages William &
Mary’s Government Department. Student assistant Amanda Potts did a yeoman’s
job in revising various tables, and graduate student Andy Mack proved a superb
proofreader.
Mexico’s superb Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) provided incomparable help
in obtaining the statistical information that helps to fill these pages. In particular,
I am indebted to Jacqueline Peschard, Elecotoral Advisor, Lic. Manuel Carrillo
Poblano, IFE’s first-rate chief of staff for international affairs, and to Carlos
Navarro, Director of Electoral Studies and Political Agreements. Also assisting
hugely in finding electoral and biographical data were Lic. Miguel Medina
Hernández, director of the library of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and the
simpática staff member of the National Action Party’s social communications
office-María Feliciana Alvarez. No matter how often I called, Ms. Alvarez
immediately responded: “How can I assist you?-and she meant it! She is truly a
jewel in her party’s crown and I trust that National Actions leadership will reward
her with a huge private office in the party’s new headquarters. Lic. Heriberto
Sánchez, a staff member in the PAN’s Electoral Action Section, provided hard-tofind results for state and local elections held on October 7.
Long meals with Lic. Guillermo Máynez Gil and Professor Oscar Aguilar
Asencio, two of Mexico’s most astute political observers, provided culinary and
intellectual stimulation. They are both gold mines of knowledge and played a
crucial role in helping me revise my roughly hewn early drafts.
At a time when it’s fashionable to bash bureaucrats, I must say “muchas
gracias” to all of the Mexican and U.S. public servants who held off-the-record
conversations with me. Their observations were invaluable.
This Guide would not have seen the light of day without the hard work,
thorough commitment, and unparalleled professionalism of the Mexico Project’s
Meghan Bishop, one of the most talented young professionals in Washington, D.C.
At CSIS, I would also like to thank Amy Cougenour-Betancourt, Deputy
Director of the Americas Program and the Publications Department for their
editorial suggestions.
With such bountiful assistance, the author must bear full responsibility for any
errors that may have crept into these pages.
George W. Grayson
<[email protected]>
3
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Section One: An Introduction to the National Assembly
Why did PRI leaders decide to hold the party’s 18th National Assembly on November
17–20?
Above all, the inauguration of Vicente Fox Quesada, candidate of the National
Action Party (PAN), on December 1, 2000, converted the PRI into a rudderless
boat, making eccentric circles on Mexico’s political waters. Since 1929, the
revolutionary party had depended on the nation’s chief executive—who often
transmitted his wishes through the secretary of government (Gobernación)—for its
ideology, legislative agenda, leadership, dispute resolution, and general
orientation.
Suddenly, PRI officials faced a political foe in the Los Pinos presidential
palace. Without the country’s president to function as its North Star, the party
found itself adrift. The lack of direction sparked vicious infighting: Who was
responsible for the loss of the presidency? Who was best suited to assume the
party’s helm? What should be the PRI’s relationship with the Fox administration?
What procedures should the PRI follow in reaching key decisions in the new
environment?
As if in denial because of losing the presidency, many party bigshots cast
about for scapegoats. Some heaped scorn on their defeated standard-bearer,
Francisco Labastida Ochoa, and on his ally, party president Dulce María Sauri
Riancho. Others lambasted former president Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) for
championing neoliberal policies deemed responsible for the erosion of the PRI’s
grassroots support.
Fox’s Political Difficulties
Fortunately for priístas, Fox has encountered a series of political setbacks—some
his doing, some not—that make one wonder whether a reverse Midas touch has
affected him.
First, after devoting his first four months to indigenous issues, he satisfied
neither the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) nor opponents of autonomy
and expanded opportunities for Indian communities.
Second, the prominence given to Fox’s suggested extension of the unpopular
value-added tax (IVA) to food, medicine, and books supplied detractors with an
excuse to attack and attenuate his tax reform. This will postpone final action on
both compromise legislation and the 2002 budget.
Third, although a skilled vote winner, Fox has encountered difficulty in
negotiating and bargaining with legislators to build consensus in the 500-member
Chamber of Deputies and the 128-seat Senate.
Fourth, Fox has faced criticism for his extensive international travel instead
of, as some people feel, focusing on domestic priorities. In contrast to his
predecessors Fox will have made an unprecedented 13 trips abroad, visiting
upward of 25 countries during his first year at Los Pinos.
Fifth, despite the progress Fox made toward a guest-worker scheme and
broad amnesty for Mexicans living illegally in the United States, the September 11
tragedy has shifted U.S. priorities for now.
4
George W. Grayson
Sixth, The PRI could conceivably benefit from the fact that the economy is at
0 percent growth, a drastic contrast to the 7 percent originally projected during the
campaign. The potential gain will depend on the extent to which the Mexican
people perceive it to be beyond Fox’s control as opposed to directly attributable to
Fox’s economic policies.
Seventh, the international media pounced on the October 19 murder of
lawyer and human rights’ champion Digna Ochoa as evidence of Fox’s inability to
curb blatant lawlessness that is often directed against activists who challenge
powerful interest groups.
Finally, the pluralistic way Fox chose his cabinet and the perception that he
cannot keep the ministers in check and working together as a team has hampered
him.
Although Fox has maintained relatively high public approval and the PRI
has failed to offer alternatives to his proposals, the absence of promised changes
amid a recession could work to the advantage of the PRI. In fact recent PRI
electoral victories at the state and local level may suggest that Fox’s inability to
deliver on campaign promises is negatively affecting the PAN.
The August 5, 2001, victory in the Tabasco gubernatorial contest lifted the
spirits of PRI president Sauri and her colleagues. On the same day, the PRI ran
strongly in Oaxaca, capturing 24 of 25 directly elected seats in the state
legislature. Yet the big surprise came in PAN-dominated, middle-class
Aguascalientes, where the PRI regained control of the legislature, while boosting its
number of the 11 municipal presidencies from 6 to 9. One month later, the
revolutionary party also did well in local elections in Chiapas, Oaxaca, and
Tamaulipas. In the most recent gubernatorial election in Michoacán, the PRI’s bid
for the seat fell short with PRD candidate, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, proving that the
state remained a PRD bastion.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table Three, in the elections held between July 2, 2000,
and October 7, 2001, National Action witnessed its portion of the vote decline from
the 42.5 percent that Fox garnered with his PAN-Green “Alliance for Change” to
34.3 percent, while the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) endured repeated
setbacks. Meanwhile, the PRI mounted a comeback, capturing an average of 42.4
percent of the ballots cast in these post-presidential contests, almost 6 points
higher than the 36.7 percent captured by Labastida.
These gains encouraged the PRI to recognize that it possessed other political
assets—namely, 208 federal deputies, 60 senators, 17 governors, the control of 23
state legislatures, and a lion’s share of the nation’s mayors, although the
opposition occupied the city halls of most of the 20 biggest municipalities.
The electoral successes stanched defections from the revolutionary party,
sharpened competition for the party’s leadership, and reinforced the call by the
party’s National Political Council (CPN) to convene a National Assembly, the party’s
highest deliberative mechanism. Thanks to the establishment of the autonomous
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Mexico now has widely accepted rules for federal
elections. Internally, the PRI lacks agreed-on, clearly stated principles for
conducting its party affairs. The assembly can rectify this situation by hammering
out compromises on the party’s internal procedures, candidate qualifications, and
the party platform that had fallen within the purview of the nation’s chief
executive.
5
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
The divisions within the PRI become evident as the National Assembly fast
approaches. Oaxaca governor José Murat Casab, Sen. Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, and other
backers of former Tabasco governor Roberto Madrazo Pintado regarded party
president Sauri as no more than a puppet of Labastida and urged that the
National Assembly delegates be allowed to elect a new PRI head.
Although vowing that she would step down before her term ended in
December 2003, Sauri urged that the assembly devote itself to revising procedures
and policies, rather than embark upon the divisive project of choosing new leaders.
Because the PRI will not be electing its leadership until a few months after the
assembly, the PRI will have sufficient time for the election to be subject to the
revised procedures borne out of the assembly process. In keeping with Mexican
electoral law (COFIPE) the scope of the assembly had to be stipulated in advance.
Because the PRI initially failed to specify that it would elect party leaders, legally it
will be unable to do so during the assembly period. However, Madrazo and
Labastida, who allegedly have agreed to finesse the leadership issue, negotiated
the decision to wait until February or March.
Laying aside this matter did nothing to calm PRI officials in Hidalgo and
Mexico City who had other axes to grind. They were furious at the federal
government’s choice of Texcoco in Mexico state as the site for the country’s new
international airport. PRI peasant organizations joined in charges of favoritism,
and threats of lawsuits filled the air on the eve of the National Assembly.
The possibility of effervescence giving rise to disruptions indicates why the
organizers decided against inaugurating the assembly with a plenary session.
Instead, 23 committees will address key topics in five difference cities, and
closed-circuit television will link them all for the concluding session. The
November 2001 convention will differ from earlier conclaves in several important
ways:
·
the first to be held without a priísta in Los Pinos;
·
discouragement of participation of previous chief executives;
·
a record 11,700 delegates taking part in the four-day event;
·
23 committees (tribunas) charged with debating key questions;
·
grassroots assemblies to select the biggest number of these participants
(although many delegates were handpicked);
·
media spots to encourage citizens to take part in the assembly process;
·
50 percent representation for women and a focus on youth—with one-third
of the delegates required to be under age 30; and
·
holding the event—except for the closing session—in five cities, all of which
are located in PRI-governed states.
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George W. Grayson
Table One: Chronology of Activities Surrounding the PRI’s 18
Assembly
Date(s)
Feb. 16–18
(2001)
Activity
3
Decision by the PRI’s National Political
Council (CPN) to hold a national assembly
Creation of state and national organizing
committees
National publicity campaign concerning the
assembly
Preparation and holding of workshops,
meetings, and forums
District and municipal assemblies
Receipt and organization of proposals from
municipalities
Workshops for municipal delegates selected
for state assemblies
State assemblies
Workshops for assembly delegates
Preparations for the national assembly
Party president Sauri announced that she
would leave her post on March 4, 2002
National assembly
Transmission of changes in procedures and
regulations to the Federal Electoral
Institute (IFE)
Public dissemination of new procedures
and regulations, including the
qualifications of and the process for
electing the next party president.
Election of party president
Installation of party president
15
June 1–30
30
June 1–July 31
61
Aug. 1–31
Sept. 1–15
31
15
Sept. 1–15
15
Sept. 15–30
Oct. 1–31
Oct. 1–15
Nov. 8
15
31
46
Nov. 17–20
By Nov. 30
4
10
Mid to late Feb. (2002)
March 4, 2002
National
Time
Period
(days)
June 1–15
Dec. 21–30
th
30
N/A
1
Source: PRI, Convocatoria y Reglamento: XVIII Asamblea General de Delegados (Mexico
City: PRI, May 2001); and Arturo Zarate, “Anunciara Sauri retiro del cargo el 8 de
noviembre,” El Universal, November 1, 2001, p.14.
7
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Section Two: Key Players at the National Assembly
A.
Dulce María Sauri Riancho, PRI president: born Aug. 14, 1951, Mérida,
Yucatán; degree in sociology (Iberoamerican Univ.); professor of
anthropology, Autonomous University of Yucatán; numerous party posts,
including Yucatán state president (1983–1987), national finance secretary
(1988–1990), and secretary general (1999); various governmental positions
in Ministries of planning and budget and government; elective positions:
federal deputy (1988–1990, 1994–1996), senator (1991–1997), and governor
of Yucatán (1991–1994).
B.
Rodolfo Echeverría Ruiz Jr., PRI secretary general: born June 19, 1946,
D.F.; law degree (UNAM), postgraduate work in politics and economics
(London); professor, Superior War College; numerous PRI posts, including
director of the National Youth Sector (1965) and oficial mayor (1970–1976);
various governmental positions in Ministries of Government and Labor, as
well as in the D.F. and Pemex; ambassador to Cuba (1982–1985); elective
positions: federal deputy (1973–1976, 2000–2003).
C.
Francisco Labastida Ochoa, 2000 PRI presidential nominee: born Aug. 14,
1942, Los Mochis, Sinaloa; economics degree (UNAM/1964); postgraduate
studies (CEPAL); professor (UNAM); numerous party posts; various
governmental positions in Ministries of Treasury, Public Education, the
Presidency, and Planning and Budget; secretary of energy (1982–1986),
secretary of agriculture (1992–1997); and secretary of government (1997–
1999); elective position: governor of Sinaloa (1986–1992).
D.
Roberto Madrazo Pintado, declared candidate for PRI presidency: born July
30, 1952, D.F.; law degree (UNAM/1974); advanced studies in urban affairs
(UCLA/1980-81); numerous party posts, including secretary general of the
National Revolutionary Youth Movement (1977–1978), adjunct secretary of
the National Executive Committee (1987–1988), and Tabasco party
president (1988); elective positions: federal deputy (1976-79, 1991–1994),
senator (1988–1991), governor of Tabasco (1994–1999); finished second in
the 1999 PRI presidential primary.
E.
Heladio Ramírez López, secretary general of Peasant Sector (CNC): born May
11, 1939, Huajuapam de León, Oaxaca; law degree (UNAM/1964); teacher
and professor; numerous party posts, including youth director in the D.F.
and president of the Oaxaca regional committee; elective positions: federal
deputy (1976–1979), senator (1982–1986), and governor of Oaxaca (1986–
1992).
F.
Leonardo Rodríguez Alcaine, secretary general of the Mexican Confederation
of Workers (CTM): born May 1, 1919, Texcoco, México state; rose through
the ranks to become secretary general of the Electrical Workers’ Union
(SUTERM); succeeded Fidel Velázquez as head of the CTM in 1997.
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George W. Grayson
G.
Carlos Flores Rico, secretary general of the Territorial Movement, which was
founded in February 1993: born in Cd. Victoria, Tamaulipas; degree in
sociology (UNAM); joined PRI in 1973 and has held numerous party posts—
deputy secretary of organization for the CNC, advisor to the secretary of the
organization in the D.F., state coordinator for the 1988 presidential election
(Chiapas, Campeche, Puebla, and Quintana Roo), and secretary of
operations and organization for the Territorial Movement; experience in
municipal, state, and federal bureaucracies.
H.
Beatriz Paredes Rangel, leader of the Chamber of Deputies and possible
candidate for PRI presidency: born Aug. 18, 1953, Tizatlán, Tlaxcala;
sociology degree (UNAM); numerous party posts, including secretary general
of CNC; elective positions: state deputy (1974–1977), federal deputy (1979–
1982, 1985–1988, 2000–2003), governor of Tlaxcala (1986–1992).
I.
Elba Esther Gordilla Morales, secretary general of the party’s popular sector
(CNOP): born Feb. 6, 1945, Comitán, Chiapas; education degree (Federal
Institute of Teacher Education), primary- and secondary-school teacher and
history professor at the PRI’s Institute of Political Education; active in the
National Educational Workers’ Union (SNTE)—the biggest in Latin
America—rising from local leader to secretary general (1989–1994);
numerous party posts, including national presidential campaign coordinator
(1975), coordinator of PRI senatorial campaign in San Luis Potosí (1975),
subsecretary of organization (1984); elective positions: federal deputy (l979–
1982, 1985–1988).
J. Jesús Murillo Karam, National Assembly organizer: born March 2, 1948,
Real del Monte, Hidalgo; law degree (U. of Hidalgo); university professor and
administrator; active in the state and federal bureaucracy; numerous party
posts, including state president, national subsecretary of organization, and
secretary of organization; elective positions: federal deputy (1979–1982,
1985–1988), senator (1991–1993), governor of Hidalgo (1993–1999); former
deputy secretary of public safety.
K. Manuel Bartlett Díaz, senator and longtime party leader: born February 23,
1936, Puebla, Puebla; law degree (UNAM) and graduate work in France and
the United Kingdom; number of party posts, including secretary general;
government positions: secretary of Gobernación and education; governor of
Puebla (1993-1999).
L. Jaime Aguilar Alvárez, secretary general of the assembly: born August 4,
1938, D.F.; degree in architecture (UNAM); number of party posts, including
delegate to state parties; elective position: federal deputy.
M. Eugenio Imaz Gispert, coordinator of advisers for the president of the
assembly: born July 24, 1957, D.F.; degree in anthropology (UNAM);
governmental positions include secretary of economy (Hidalgo State); first
secretary, Mexican Embassy in Canada; and president of PRI in Hidalgo.
9
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
N. Emilio Chaufett Chemor: born October 3, 1951, D.F.; law degree (UNAM);
joined PRI in 1969 and has held numerous party posts; active in state and
federal bureaucracy—secretary of government for Mexico state (1987),
director general of the Federal Electoral Institute (1991), and secretary of
government in the Zedillo administration (1995-97).
O. Enrique Jackson Ramírez: born December 24, 1945, Sinaloa; degree in
public administration (UNAM); joined PRI in 1970 and has held numerous
party posts and elective offices; president of Fundación Colosio and
secretary of Electoral Action; currently president of the PRI faction in the
Senate.
P. Manuel Aguilera Gómez, born July 27, 1936, D.F.; degree in economics
(UNAM); university professor and administrator; joined PRI in 1956 and has
held numerous party posts—including party presidency (1992); active in
state and federal bureaucracy—has worked for the governments of San Luis
Potosi, Guanajuato and D.F.; elective positions: federal senator (1991–1997).
Q. Several governors are expected to play major roles, including: Miguel
Alemán Velasco (Veracruz), Patricio Martínez García (Chihuahua), Juan S.
Millán Lizárraga (Sinaloa), Arturo Montiel Rojas (México state), Melquiades
Morales Flores (Puebla), Manuel Angel Nuñez Soto (Hidalgo), Fernando Silva
Nieto (San Luis Potosí), and Tómas Yarrington Ruvalcaba (Tamaulipas).
R. Among the technocrats who will participate in the National Assembly are
Deputy Enrique de la Madrid, Deputy Jorge Chávez Presa, former
undersecretary of foreign relations Juán Rebolledo, and Mario Luis Fuentes.
Section Three: Evolution of the Revolutionary Party
A.
March 4, 1929: President Plutarco Elías Calles announced the
establishment of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR). Calles called key
heads of small parties, powerful generals, and other local power brokers to
Querétaro to found this confederal organization—with him serving as
primum entre pares—to prevent political fragmentation and violence
following the assassination of President-elect Alvaro Obregón in mid-1928.
B. March 30, 1938: President Lázaro Cárdenas converted the PNR into the Party
of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), whose corporatist structure embraced
labor, peasant, middle-class, and military sectors. The military sector was
dissolved at the beginning of the administration of Cárdenas’ successor,
Manuel Avila Camacho (1940–1946), who also reorganized the middle-class
sector into the National Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP).
Meanwhile, the National Confederation of Campesinos (CNC) and the
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) emerged as the dominant forces in
the peasant and labor sectors, respectively.
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George W. Grayson
C.
January 18, 1946: The name of the PRM was changed to the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), as it is known today.
D.
March 10, 1987: The PRI expelled Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solorzano, leader
of the “Democratic Current,” who had excoriated the “antidemocratic
excesses and intransigence” of party elites. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, Andrés
Manuel López Obrador, and other Cárdenas allies also left the PRI, because
of the growing influence of technocrats and neoliberal policies within the
party.
E.
July 6, 1988: As the nominee of the five-party National Democratic Front,
Cárdenas ran for the presidency against the PRI’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari.
Although Cárdenas lost this disputed contest, his strength revealed the
inability of PRI stalwarts to deliver votes as they once had. Cárdenas and
other leaders of the Democratic Current joined with communists, socialists,
Trotskyites, and ex-guerrillas to form the Democratic Revolutionary Party
(PRD) in 1989.
F.
February 13–15, 1993: The PRI complemented its corporatist sectors with a
National Territorial Movement established to broaden the party’s base by
attracting professionals, environmentalists, and other groups.
G.
March 23, 1994: PRI presidential standard-bearer Luis Donaldo Colosio
Murieta is assassinated. This event leads President Salinas to select a
technocrat, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, as the party’s candidate.
H.
September 20–22, 1996: In a move against technocrats, the PRI’s 17th
National Assembly placed candados (padlocks) on prospective nominees for
major offices. Thus, a party member must have held a major elective or
party post as a prerequisite for become a candidate for president, governor,
or senator.
I.
July 6, 1997: The PRI loses its majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the
first time.
J.
November 7, 1999: In lieu of the incumbent PRI chief executive handpicking
the party’s presidential nominee via the dedazo (pointing his finger), the
party held a primary in which Francisco Labastida Ochoa defeated Roberto
Madrazo Pintado and two other aspirants.
K.
July 2, 2000: An opposition candidate, Vicente Fox Quesada, defeated
Labastida for the presidency, marking the first time that the revolutionary
party has lost this position since the PNR’s founding in 1929. The PRI also
lost its absolute majority in the Senate.
L.
November 17–20, 2001: 18th National Assembly.
11
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Section Four: Hot Issues and Hot Committees
Twenty-three committees or tribunas will undertake the heavy lifting at the
National Assembly. As indicated below, these committees are grouped according to
five themes, with an experienced PRI leader at the head of each cluster.
I. Principles and Values: Declaration of Principles and Values Chair: Emilio
Chuayffet Chemor, 68, ex-secretary of government and former governor of Mexico
state; meeting place: San Luis Potosi, S.L.P.
a.
b.
c.
Declaration of Principles
Code of Ethics
Struggle for the Popular, Worker, and Peasant Goals
II. Nation Project: Action Program Chair: Rogelio Montemayor Seguy, 54, exdirector-general of Pemex and ex-governor of Coahuila; meeting place: Toluca,
México state.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Sovereignty, Politics, and Governability
Economy and Sustained Growth
Social Development, Equal Opportunity, and the Fight against Poverty
Health, Employment, and Social Security
Education, Science and Technology, Culture and Recreation
Ecology, Resources, and Quality of Life
Rural Development
Indigenous Causes
Justice, Security, and Human Rights
International Politics
III.
Party Project: Statutes Chair: Manuel Aguilera Gómez, 65, ex-D.F. mayor
and ex-senator; meeting place: Veracruz, Veracruz.
a.
b.
c.
Revision of Statutes
Rules for the Election of [Party] Leaders
Rules for the Nomination of Candidates
IV.
Political Strategies: Chair: Beatriz Paredes Rangel, 48, president of the
Chamber of Deputies; meeting place: Pachuca, Hidalgo.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Relationship with Governmental Bodies
Relationship with Other Political Parties
Relationship with Social Movements and Organizations
Struggle for the Demands of Women, Young People, and Socially
Disadvantaged Groups
Vision for the Future: Chair: Enrique Jackson Ramírez, 55; head of PRI in the
Senate; meeting place: Taxco, Guerrero.
12
George W. Grayson
a.
b.
c.
Vision of the Future
Political Declaration
Political Commitment to Gender Equality
Before November 17, political activists combined and submitted their proposals in
a single document to each committee. The elected delegates may accept, discard,
or modify these suggestions. The committee’s recommendations will then be
presented to the National Elected Committee for Resolutions (CNER), which will
check the recommendations it receives from each committee against those of the
other 22 tribunas. The CNER can either resolve conflicts itself or return the item in
dispute to the committee or committees of origin. The 11,700 delegates to the
National Assembly will consider their 23 committee reports at the one and only
plenary session, which will be held in Toluca, México state, on November 20.
Although differences abound, a consensus prevails on certain matters:
•
Preserving the name, colors, and slogan of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party;
•
Professionalizing the selection of top leaders, rather than employing ad hoc
procedures for each election;
•
Creating a body to resolve disputes arising from internal elections;
•
Sharing IFE resources provided to the party’s National Executive Committee
with state committees;
•
Reducing the size of the party’s national bureaucracy—with greater reliance
on volunteers;
•
Electing more members of the National Political Council;
•
Welcoming ex-priístas like Alejandro Rojas Díaz-Durán, an erstwhile ally of
former D.F. Mayor Manuel Camacho Solís, who have asked to be readmitted
to the party;
•
Broadening opportunities for women, young people, and other groups
among whom Fox ran strongly;
•
Breaking the PRI’s dependency on Los Pinos if and when the party regains
the presidency; and
•
Discouraging the participation of former chief executives (Zedillo, Salinas,
De la Madrid, and Echeverría).
13
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Below is a list of key committees, as well as a sampling of anticipated controversial
questions that they will consider:
Committee 1: Declaration of Principles (Declaración de Principios)
Mario Moya Palencia, 68, ex-secretary of government.
; chaired by
Hot Issue:
Craft a party platform that includes a stated preference for NAFTA-type neoliberal
reforms or a return to greater economic statism and protectionism.
Committee 5: Economy and Sustained Growth (Economía y Sustentabilidad)
chaired by José Luis Medina A.
;
Hot Issue:
Establishing the party’s position on Fox’s proposals to reform the nation’s tax
system and electricity sector.
Revisión Estatutaria ); chaired by
Committee 14: Revision of Party Statutes (
Héctor Hugo Olivares Ventura, 57, ex-deputy, ex-senator, and unsuccessful
candidate for governor of Aguascalientes.
Hot Issues:
How should the party rewrite its statutes to reflect the absence of a guiding force
in Los Pinos? Should the party infuse greater collegiality into stances vis-à-vis the
federal government, rather than give the party president a relative freedom of
action? Should a body that can fairly judge alleged violators of party rules replace
the Honor Commission (Comisión de Honor y Justicia)?
Normatividad y
Committee 15: Rules for the Election of [Party] Leaders (
Elección de Dirigentes ; chaired by Marco Antonio Bernal Gutiérrez, 47, a former
senator and unsuccessful contender for the PRI gubernatorial nomination in
Tamaulipas.
Hot Issues:
Should a Political Coordinating Body (Unidad de Coordinacíon Política/UCP)—with
greater links between the national party and state parties, governors, and
legislators—replace the National Political Council? Should the rank-and-file elect
top party officials? Should 60 percent or more of UCP and/or CNP members (as
well as their state counterparts) be elected?
Normatividad y elección
Committee 16: Rules for the Election of Candidates (
de candidates ); chaired by Lorena Martínez Rodríguez, 37, federal deputy.
Hot Issues:
Will the party continue to require its candidates for the presidency and
governorships to have held previous public or party elective positions (an
14
George W. Grayson
antitechnocrat qualification or candado imposed in 1996 by the 17th National
Assembly)? Might the party add other candados? What nominating process will be
party favor—primaries, conventions, or other mechanisms?
Relación con Organos
Committee 17: Relations with Governmental Entities (
de Gobierno ); chaired by Laura Alicia Garza Galindo, 54, senator.
Hot Issues:
Should the early October National Political Accord, composed of a wish list of
objectives endorsed by most political parties be broadened into an alliance or
situational alliances with the Fox administration?
Table Two: State-by-State Breakdown of PRI Vote in the July 2, 2000,
Presidential Election
State
No. of
No. of
Votes Cast for
percent of
Municipalities
Registered
the PRI
PRI’s
Voters
National
Vote
Aguascalientes
11
562,390
127,184
0.9
Baja California
5
1,498,939
319,428
2.4
Baja California
Sur
5
250,155
56,234
0.4
Campeche
11
384,547
106,347
0.8
Coahuila
38
1,392,564
311,278
2.3
Colima
10
331,661
81,001
0.6
Chiapas
118
2,087,585
469,580
3.5
Chihuahua
67
1,938,388
460,767
3.4
Durango
39
868,791
222,784
1.6
Guanajuato
46
2,784,508
517,794
3.8
Guerrero
76
1,740,426
401,941
3.0
Hidalgo
84
1,322,845
355,398
2.6
Jalisco
124
3,846,656
941,834
6.9
México
122
7,547,729
1,637,625
12.1
15
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Table Three: PRI Performance in State and Local Elections, Aug. 20, 2000
Oct. 7, 2001
Election
PRI
PAN
PRD
Minor
Parties
and NonRegistered
Candidates
Null
Votes
Total
Votes
Tamaulipas
(Oct. 7,
2001)
State
Legislature
485,524
50.82
337,182
35.30
71,016
7.43
37,582
3.93
24,011
2.51
955,315
Municipal
472,788
49.34
347,111
36.22
79,020
8.24
34,965
3.65
24,383
2.54
958,267
Oaxaca
(Oct. 7,
2001)
Municipal
270,264
40.72
126,989
19.14
153,036
23.06
102,319
15.42
Chiapas
(Oct. 7,
2001)
State
Legislature
393,943
34.89
196,283
17.38
274,379
24.30
209,328
18.54
55,153
4.88
1,129,086
Municipal
383,451
33.82
207,821
18.33
232,634
20.52
264,465
23.33
45,428
4.01
1,133,799
Oaxaca
(Aug. 5,
2001)
State
Legislature
300,836
49.56
117,942
19.43
116,760
19.24
45,466
7.49
25,993
4.28
606,997
Tabasco
(Aug. 5,
2001)
Governor
364,688
50.67
14,949
2.77
330,721
45.95
1,672
0.23
7,717
1.07
719,747
Aguascalientes
(Aug. 5,
2001)
State
Legislature
95,648
34.95
108,140
39.51
21,872
7.99
41,281
15.08
6,754
2.47
273,695
Municipal
98,852
35.98
113,561
41.34
20,010
7.28
35,584
12.95
6,709
2.44
274,716
Zacatecas
(July 1,
2001)
State
Legislature
136,485
30.50
89,251
19.95
146,023
32.64
62,692
14.01
12,974
2.90
447,425
Municipal
131,844
29.49
91,432
20.45
152,140
34.03
59,120
13.23
12,479
2.79
447,015
State
Legislature
176,094
45.70
124,978
32.44
13,664
3.55
60,224
15.63
10,330
2.68
385,290
Municipal
180,854
46.26
124,555
31.86
11,700
2.99
64,111
16.40
9,725
2.49
390,945
State
Durango
(July 1,
2001)
16
11,026
1.66
663,634
George W. Grayson
Chihuahua
(July 1,
2001)
State
Legislature
357,035
45.80
324,456
41.60
40,557
5.20
40,957
5.25
16,776
2.20
779,781
Baja
California
(July 8,
2001)
Governor
200,363
36.65
266,1751
48.69
22,676
4.15
44,557
8.15
12,921
2.36
546,692
State
Legislature
179,492
35.29
231,3551
45.49
34,216
6.74
49,409
9.71
14,159
2.78
508,631
Municipal
184,180
36.34
234,3411
46.23
37,776
7.45
37,891
7.48
12,665
2.50
506,853
Governor
302,340
44.52
355,2802
52.31
6,660
0.98
14,900
2.19
679,180
State
Legislature
301,412
44.38
305,023
44.91
30,478
4.49
24,933
3.67
17,313
2.55
679,159
Governor
936,657
43.33
983,502
45.49
112,743
5.22
94,241
4.36
34,736
1.61
2,161,879
State
Legislature
858,412
38.25
1,020,377
45.46
170,311
7.59
155,346
6.92
39,870
1.78
2,244,316
Municipal
852,058
38.39
983,990
44.34
178,783
8.56
202,036
9.10
2,480
0.11
2,219,347
State
Legislature
284,213
42.38
81,798
12.20
265,836
39.64
23,299
3.47
15,476
2.31
670,622
Municipal
304,343
45.44
76,979
11.49
253,348
37.82
17,538
2.62
17,525
2.62
669,733
Governor
475,267
45.68
535,8603
51.50
5,682
0.55
23,598
2.27
1,040,407
8,727,04
3
41.38
7,399,330
35.08
1,721,358
8.16
475,101
2.25
21,092,531
Yucatán
(May 27,
2001)
Jalisco
(Nov. 12,
2000)
Tabasco
(Oct. 15,
2000)
Chiapas
(Aug. 20,
2000)
TOTAL
1.
2,769,699
13.13
PAN-PVEM Coalition
Coalition composed of the PAN, PRD, PT, and PVEM.
3. A Multiparty “Alliance for Chiapas” comprising the PRD, the PAN, and six minor
parties.
2.
17
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Table Four: PRI Governors 2001
State
Name
Campeche
Chihuahua
Coahuila
Colima
Durango
Guerrero
Hidalgo
México
Michoacán
Oaxaca
Puebla
Quintana Roo
José Antonio González Cun
Patricio Martínez García
Enrique Martínez y Martínez
Fernando Moreno Peña
Angel Sergio Guerrero Mier
René Juárez Cisñeros
Manuel Angel Nuñez Soto
Arturo Montiel Rojas
Víctor Manuel Tinoco Rubí
José Nelson Murat Casab
Melquiades Morales Flores
Joaquín Ernesto Hendricks
Díaz
Fernando Silva Nieto
Juan S. Millán Lizárraga
Armando López Nogales
Manuel Andrade Díaz
Tómas Jesús Yarrington
Ruvalcaba
Miguel Alemán Velasco
San Luis Potosí
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Veracruz
Year
1997
1998
1999
1997
1998
1999
1999
1999
1995
1998
1998
1999
1997
1998
1997
2000
1998
1998
Table Five: Revolutionary Party Presidents and Secretaries General
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
Time Period
1999 (November)
1999 (March)
1997 (September)
1996 (December)
President
Dulce María Sauri
Riancho
Secretary General
Rodolfo Echeverría Ortiz
Sergio García Ramírez
Esteban Moctezuma
Barragán
José Antonio González F.
Dulce María Sauri
Riancho
Mariano Palacios Alcocer
Carlos Rojas Gutíerrez
Humberto Roque
Villanueva
18
George W. Grayson
1995 (August)
1994 (December)
1994
Santiago Oñate Laborde
María de los Angeles M.
Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza
1993
1992
1990
1988
1986
1982
1981
1981
1979
1978
1976
1976
1975
1973
1972
1970
1968
1966
1965
1965
1964
1964
1962
1958
1956
1956
1953
1953
1952
1952
1952
1951
1949
1946
1946
Fernando Ortiz Arana
Genero Borrego Estrada
Luis Donaldo Colosio M.
Luis Donaldo Colosio M.
Jorge de la V. Domínguez
Adolfo Lugo Verduzco
Pedro Ojeda Paullada
Javier García Paniaga
Gustavo Carvajal Moreno
Carlos Sansores Pérez
Carlos Sansores Pérez
Porfirio Muñoz Ledo
Jesús Reyes Heroles
Jesús Reyes Heroles
Jesús Reyes Heroles
Manuel Sánchez Vite
Alfonso Martínez D.
Lauro Ortega Martínez
Lauro Ortega Martínez
Carlos A. Madrazo
Carlos A. Madrazo
Alfonso Corona del Rosal
Alfonso Corona del Rosal
Alfonso Corona del Rosal
Augustín Olachea Avilés
Augustín Olachea Avilés
Gabriel Leyva Velázquez
Gabriel Leyva Velázquez
Gabriel Leyva Velázquez
Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada
Gabriel Leyva Velázquez
Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada
Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada
Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada
Rafael P. Gamboa
(May)
(May)
(December)
(December)
(October)
(December)
(October)
(October)
(July)
(December)
(April)
(April)
(March)
(February)
(December)
(February)
(July)
(November)
(April)
(December)
(January)
(n.a.)
(December)
(May)
(April)
(April)
(January)
(December)
(July)
(June)
(July)
(March)
(December)
(January)
Juan S. Millán Lizárraga
Pedro Joaquín Caldwell
José Francisco Ruiz
Massieu
Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza
Beatriz Paredes Rangel
Rafael Rodríguez Barrera
Rafael Rodríguez Barrera
Irma Cué de Duarte
Mario Vargas Saldaña
Manuel Bartlett Díaz
Guillermo Cosío Villegas
José de las Fuentes R.
Gustavo Carvajal Moreno
Juan Sabines Gutiérrez
Miguel Angel Barberena
Miguel Angel Barberena
Enrique González Pedrero
Enrique González Pedrero
Vicente Fuentes Díaz
Enrique Olivares Santana
Fernando Díaz Durán
Fernando Díaz Durán
Lauro Ortega Martínez
Lauro Ortega Martínez
Manuel M. Moreno
Juan Fernández Albarrán
Juan Fernández Albarrán
Gilberto García Navarro
Rafael Corrales Ayala
Gilberto García Navarro
José Gómez Esparza
Gilberto García Navarro
José Gómez Esparza
Adolfo López Mateos
José López Bermúdez
José López Bermúdez
Teófilo R. Borunda
Ernesto P. Uruchurtu
Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM)
Time Period
1943 (n.a.)
1940 (December)
President
Antonio I. Villalobos
Antonio I. Villalobos
19
Secretary General
Florencio Padilla
Gustavo Cárdenas Huerta
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
1939 (June)
1938 (April)
Heriberto Jara
Luis I. Rodríguez
Gustavo Cárdenas Huerta
Estéban García de Alba
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR)
Time Period
1937 (n.a.)
1936 (August)
1937 (June)
President
Silvano Barba González
Silvano Barba González
Emilio Portes Gil
Secretary General
Gilberto Flores Muñoz
Estéban García de Alba
Ignacio García Téllez
Source: For the period 1935 to 1993, see Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican Political
Biographies, 1935–1993 (3rd ed.; Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1995), pp. 958–
990.
Section Five: Possible Significance of National Assembly
Although the 11,700 delegates will debate scores of issues, two interrelated
questions will hang over the conclave: Can the priístas select a strong party
president? Will the next PRI leader enjoy sufficient legitimacy to prevent the party’s
fragmentation?
Can the priístas select a strong party president?
Former Tabasco governor Roberto Madrazo Pintado remains the odds-on favorite
to succeed outgoing President Sauri. Before the August 5 gubernatorial election in
his home state, Madrazo’s future looked uncertain. His party had lost every
gubernatorial election since Fox’s mid-2000 triumph—with the exception of a
narrow win in Tabasco in mid-October 2000 that the courts subsequently
invalidated. Although most public opinion surveys showed that the party’s
standard-bearer Manuel Andrade Díaz, a protégé of Madrazo, would win the
Tabasco gubernatorial contest, many observers believed the outcome would be
messy. A second disputed contest would be the political kiss of death for Madrazo,
who gained international attention for allegedly spending upward of $70 million to
capture Tabasco’s statehouse in 1994. Not only did PRI nominee Andrade run first
in Tabasco, but his 4.5 percent margin proved a godsend for Madrazo: large
enough to obviate a successful post-election challenge, but not so big as to
indicate that gift-giving and vote-buying had determined the results.
Now Madrazo is the man to beat for the PRI’s top spot. Other undeclared
aspirants are Chamber of Deputies president, Beatriz Paredes Rangel, 48; party
secretary general, Rodolfo Echeverría Ruiz, 55; Zacatecas senator and head of the
reformist “Renaissance Group,” Genaro Borrego Estrada, 52; peasant sector chief,
Heladio Ramírez López, 62; Puebla senator Manuel Bartlett Diaz, 65; and Senate
leader Enrique Jackson Ramírez, 50, to name a few.
Observers recognize Paredes as the party’s most distinguished devotee.
However, she shows little interest in seeking the PRI presidency in 2002, an action
that would spark infighting with Madrazo’s loyalists. She is expected to complete
her legislative responsibilities before taking on new challenges. The prospect of a
serious challenge to Madrazo diminished on the heels of the Tabasco voting, when
20
George W. Grayson
Veracruz’s Alemán and Hidalgo’s Nuñez Soto threw their weight behind the exgovernor. In addition, Oaxaca’s state executive José Murat Casab endorsed
Madrazo, a longtime ally.
Still, PRI-watchers alleged that defeated losing presidential candidate,
Labastida, who has crossed swords with Madrazo, was attempting to thwart the
Tabascan’s quest for the party’s number one spot. Allegedly, Labastida’s moves
include (1) spreading the word that Madrazo would campaign actively for the PRI’s
lackluster candidate in the November 11 gubernatorial contest in Michoacán, (2)
supporting his friend, ex-Tamaulipas governor Manuel Cavazos Lerma, for a
pivotal position in the PRI’s “popular” middle-class sector, CNOP, (3) backing his
former campaign coordinator Guillermo Ruiz de Teresa as “adjunct secretary” of
the PRI’s National Political Council, and (4) endorsing Paredes Rangel for the
presidency of the Chamber of Deputies.
Labastida attempted to lay these rumors to rest in late October, when—after
a four-hour meeting with Madrazo—he allegedly pledged not to interfere with the
ex-governor’s quest for the PRI presidency. For his part, Madrazo—who doubtless
realized the power that labastidianos would exercise at the assembly agreed not to
raise the issue of selecting the party leader. Madrazo’s backers are still wary of
Labastida’s motives. The wily Madrazo becoming party president could have
several consequences:
•
Rejuvenating the PRI’s grassroots elements, which resonate to the exTabasco governor;
•
Appealing to younger priístas, who feel neglected by the party’s
nomenklatura;
•
Marginalizing old-line leaders who cannot adapt to opposition status;
•
Spurring defections by many of the party’s technocrats, some Labastida
allies, and priístas associated with the Renaissance Group;
•
Providing the PRI with a convincing spokesman as it recruits candidates and
wages the 2003 congressional campaign;
•
Serving as an interlocutor with whom Fox could negotiate, secure in the
knowledge that the PRI legislators would honor any deal reached.
Madrazo’s emergence as president would represent a mixed blessing for Fox.
On the one hand, he would have a “go-to person” in the PRI. On the other hand,
Madrazo has vehemently criticized Fox’s tax and energy reforms, which are
essential for the nation’s sustained growth. At the same time, he has raised
questions about Mexico’s coziness with the United States, including the “blank
check” bestowed on Bush for his international war against terrorism. Madrazo
would urge Fox to slow down neoliberal initiatives and to allocate more resources
to traditional social programs spawned by the PRI.
21
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
Madrazo’s political rebirth will force moderate, progressive governors—an
important center of power in the party—to decide whether to support him in the
name of unity or to field their own candidate. If united, these state executives
represent the only force that could derail Madrazo’s bid for the party’s top spot.
They include Tomás Yarrington Ruvalcaba (Tamaulipas), Juan S. Millán (Sinaloa),
Manuel Angel Nuñez Soto (Hidalgo), Melquiades Morales Flores (Puebla), Patricio
Martínez García (Chihuahua), Miguel Alemán Velasco (Veracruz), Fernando Silva
Nieto (San Luis Potosí), and Enrique Martínez y Martínez (Coahuila).
Meanwhile, should Madrazo fail to grab the brass ring, he may bolt the PRI
to form his own political party. Although the recent death of legendary billionaire
Carlos Hank González deprived him of a powerful ally, Madrazo still brandishes
close ties to important politicians like Murat, ex-governor Manuel Gurría Ordóñez
(Tabasco), Senators Ulises Ruiz Ortiz (Oaxaca) and Georgina Trujillo Zentella
(Tabasco), as well as to Deputies Benjamín Ayala Velázquez (Coahuila), Gustavo
Carvajal Moreno (Veracruz), Jesús de la Rosa Godoy (Coahuila), Efrén Leyva
Acevedo (Guerrero), Gustavo Lugo Espinosa (Durango), Irma Piñeyra Arias
(Oaxaca), Rafael Rodríguez Barrera (Campeche), and Nahum Zorilla Cuevas
(Oaxaca).
Madrazo toured the country before the PRI’s assembly, and campaigned for
his party’s state and local candidates. While stepping up his criticism of Fox’s
regime, he sought to project the image of a master conciliator, who could prevent
schisms in his own party. He has intimated, for example, that as party president
he might recruit a secretary general who could broaden his base—individuals like
Enrique Jackson, Murillo Karam, or Nuñez Soto. It is likely, though, that the PRI
assembly will collapse the positions of party president and secretary general into a
single post. Rumors abound that he might back Labastida for the Chamber of
Deputies, where the ex-presidential candidate could head the PRI’s congressional
faction. While such rhetoric may mitigate internal divisions, Labastida is
considered by some to be damaged goods and is unlikely to ascend to another key
post. Moreover, Madrazo might want the legislative position for himself inasmuch
as the PRI’s 2006 presidential nominee is likely to come from (1) the party’s
presidency (2) the ranks of PRI governors, or (3) the Chamber of Deputies. At the
same time, Madrazo has signaled a readiness to fling open the party’s doors to
young people, women, and elements of the middle class who are disaffected with
Fox.
Will the next PRI leader enjoy sufficient legitimacy to prevent the party’s
fragmentation?
Given the current state of affairs within the Mexican political party system, the
time to defect would be now. However, will the PRI have irreconcilable differences
that outweigh the financial benefit of remaining a unified party? The PRI will
receive close to U.S.$69 million of IFE disbursed funds for the year 2002. This
amount represents a nonelection year disbursement that will double for election
year 2003. The only viable option for a potential PRI defector would be a newly
created party. All newly created political parties will receive a mere U.S.$1.9
million of IFE disbursed federal funds in 2002. That translates into a difference of
U.S.$67.1 million dollars for 2002 and for an election year, a difference of
22
George W. Grayson
U.S.$134.2 million. The campaign disadvantage for a newly created party would be
astounding, although the overhead expenditures for a small, newly minted party
would be considerably less than the expansive network of the PRI. Only if
differences are irreconcilable would a faction be willing to forego that amount of
money. Prospective PRI defectors therefore would have to assume the opportunity
cost of joining a new party. The risk could be minimized only through a bloc
defection to one particular party. The defection would have to be carefully crafted,
consisting of individuals who are high profile, and who have grassroots level
support in various key electoral states. This would position that particular party to
make significant electoral gains in the 2003 mid-term elections, retaining its
political party registration and becoming eligible for a larger disbursement of
federal funds. A bloc defection, therefore, only makes sense with an eye toward the
2006 presidential election.
23
A Guide to the 18th National Assembly of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
About the Author
George W. Grayson , the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of
William & Mary, has made fifty research trips to Mexico since 1976, and lectures
regularly at the National Defense University and the Foreign Service Institute of
the U.S. Department of State. He is an adjunct fellow at CSIS and an associate
scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also senior adviser on
Mexican affairs for the Washington, D.C.-based Capital Insights Group. His recent
works include: Mexico: The Changing of the Guard (Foreign Policy Association,
2001), A Guide to the 2000 Mexican Presidential Election, (CSIS, 2000), Strange
Bedfellows: NATO Marches East (University Press of America, 1999), Mexico Armed
Forces: Factbook (CSIS, 1999), Mexico: From Corporatism to Pluralism? (HarcourtBrace, 1998), A Guide to the 1998 Mexican State Elections (CSIS, 1998); The North
American Free Trade Agreement (University Press of America, 1995), The North
American Free Trade Agreement (Foreign Policy Association, 1993), The Church in
Contemporary Mexico (CSIS, 1992), and Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy (University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1988). Professor Grayson earned his Ph.D. at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University and his
J.D. at the College of William & Mary. He served as a member of the Virginia State
Legislature for 27 years. He belongs to Phi Beta Kappa.
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