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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations
The Graduate School
2007
From Revolution to Realpolitik: Iran's
Foreign Policy in Central Asia and the South
Caucasus since 1991
William Jerry Johnston Jr.
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
FROM REVOLUTION TO REALPOLITIK: IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS SINCE 1991
By
WILLIAM JERRY JOHNSTON, JR.
A Thesis submitted to the
Department of International Affairs
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2007
The members of the Committee approve the thesis of William Jerry Johnston, Jr.
defended on April 4, 2007.
________________________
Peter Garretson
Professor Directing Thesis
________________________
Jonathan Grant
Committee Member
________________________
Mark Souva
Committee Member
The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee
members.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My most sincere thanks go to Dr. Asbed Kotchikian for his tireless dedication,
helpful insight, and kind direction. Without his help this paper would not have been
written. Many thanks also to Mom, Dad, and Kendra for their support of whatever I
choose to do and wherever I choose to go in life.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract …………..……………………………………………………………………. v
INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………….
1
1. IRAN’S SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS …….……………………………………………………………………
Iran’s Ideological Warfare ……………………………………………………
Soviet Disintegration and New Realities ……………………………………..
Armenia and Azerbaijan: Iran’s Experience in the South Caucasus ………….
Religion and Atheism Collide in Central Asia: the Iranian Response to
Tajikistan’s Civil War ………………………………………………………..
The “Other” Neighbor to the North: Russia’s Impact on Iranian Security
Policy ………………………………………………………………………….
Energy, Economy, and Security Converge in Iran ……………………………
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………….
16
19
21
2. IRAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET SOUTH ………….
Iran, Iraq, and the Emergence of Economic Importance ……………………..
Economic Development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus …………...
Energy and Economy in Iran …………………………………………………
The Politics of Energy ………………………………………………………..
The Caspian Sea: Convergence or Conflict? ………………………………...
The ECO – an Iranian Pipe Dream? …………………………………………
Russian Interests and Iranian Response ……………………………………...
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………..
23
25
27
30
31
33
38
40
42
3. IRANIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS ………………………………………………………………………...
The Failures of the Islamic Revolution ……………………………………...
Cultural Cautiousness ………………………………………………………..
The Soviet Cultural Legacy ………………………………………………….
Culture and Nationalism in the Former Soviet South ………………………..
Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus ………………………………
Why not Revolutionary Islam in the Former Soviet South? …………………
If not Revolutionary Islam, then What? ……………………………………...
Regionalism and Iranian Culture …………………………………………….
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………
44
46
48
49
51
52
54
58
61
62
4
6
10
12
14
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………… 64
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ...…………………………………………………… 67
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ………………………………………………………… 71
iv
ABSTRACT
Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991 serves to
show Tehran’s foreign policy shift from revolutionary Islam to realpolitik. The Islamic
Republic’s failure to export the Islamic Revolution as well as economic troubles
precipitated by the Iran-Iraq War led Tehran to act with more pragmatism in its foreign
policy endeavors after Soviet Union disintegration. The shift to realpolitik reflects Iran’s
failure to support revolutionary Islam in Tajikistan as well as tacit support for Armenia
instead of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This paper examines the strong
role power politics now play in Iran’s foreign policy at the expense of revolutionary
Islam, particularly with regards to its relationships with Central Asia, the South
Caucasus, and Russia.
v
INTRODUCTION
The Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy have been of significant
interest to policymakers and political theorists alike worldwide since the tumultuous
Islamic Revolution that took place in 1979. After the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent
sectarian violence spreading throughout that nation, Iran has become the subject of
demonization as well as inquiry from both the hardliners and the curious in Western
media and governments. Many questions have been circulating around these Western
circles. Is Iran advocating violence and instability in the region, or is it simply
misunderstood? Does the Islamic Republic seek to establish an Islamic government in
her neighbors and consolidate power through religious means? How will Iran’s nuclear
energy endeavors affect the West, and is Tehran actively seeking nuclear armament?
While this paper does not directly address all of these questions and issues, it does seek to
find a particular example of the use of Iranian foreign policy in order to help characterize
Tehran’s objectives in geopolitics and to provide a Western audience with an assessment
of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in the former Soviet south.1
Foreign policy matters, particularly for a country as complex as the Islamic
Republic of Iran, are certainly not written in any codified manual for with a Western
audience in mind. Scholars are left with little choice but to observe historical actions
taken (or not taken) by the Islamic Republic coupled with government statements with
relation to other countries in order to evaluate and predict current Iranian foreign policy.
The decision-making process in terms of domestic actors and individuals for foreign
policy in Iran is highly confusing, and well outside the capabilities of this paper.
Therefore, this paper does not attempt to approach Iran’s foreign policy from the pluralist
international relations theory, which is highly dependent upon characterization of key
leaders and decision-makers as well as the decision-making process. Instead, this paper
approaches Iranian foreign policy from the realist international relations theory,
surmising that Iran’s actions in its foreign policy are made by the state as a unified
rational actor acting in its own Machiavellian self-interests.
1
The former Soviet south is comprised of the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations that were once
part of the USSR and include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
1
This paper therefore argues that in the particular context of Iranian foreign policy
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991, Tehran’s decisions have shifted away
from the revolutionary Islamic rhetoric2 that characterized its geopolitical stance
immediately after the ousting of the Shah in 1979 and toward pragmaticism and decisionmaking based on realpolitik.3 Furthermore, regionalism4 has been the primary tool that
Iran has used in its foreign policy relations with regard to Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. To that end, this paper addresses Iranian foreign policy in the former Soviet
south in its three most distinguishable facets: security policy, economic/energy policy,
and cultural policy. These facets are far from being mutually exclusive; decisions made
in one category can and do affect issues in another. While the paper’s approach to
understanding Iranian foreign policy categorically separates these facets, every attempt
has been made to explain the complex interdependence of the three categories.
The first chapter of this paper addresses Iran’s security policy. It shows that the
Islamic Republic’s primary concern in its foreign policy in the former Soviet south is its
own security. This concern stems from Iran’s experience with its war with Iraq from
1980-1988, and the subsequent aftermath. Examples of Iran’s foreign policy pragmatism
in the region are shown through its lack of support for Azerbaijan in the NagornoKarabakh conflict as well as its support for ex-communist leaders in Tajikistan. Tehran’s
actions are further explained by its complex and seemingly subservient regional relations
with Russia, as well as connections made between Iran’s security and pursuit of nuclear
technology.
The second chapter of this paper takes a look at Iranian energy and economic
policy. Economic difficulties that occurred as a result of the Iran-Iraq War led to a
government policy of economic liberalization, which opened more resources for the
Islamic Republic to use in obtaining regional influence in Central Asia and the South
2
The term “revolutionary Islam” is based on the principles set forward by Ayatollah Khomeini in his book
Islamic Government, available in English in Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and
Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley, California: Mizan Press, 1981), 27-166.
3
The use of the word “pragmatic” necessitates dependence on realist international theory, and that Iran is
indeed acting in its own self-interests. Realpolitik is, of course, politics based on power rather than
ideology. “Pragmatic” is the term used in contrast with the concept of “revolutionary Islam.”
4
I define regionalism as an attempt to garner and wield geopolitical power and influence in a particular part
of the world (in the case of Iran, the former Soviet south).
2
Caucasus. However, much of the Iranian economy is still heavily vested in its energy
production. As such, Tehran takes a realpolitik line on issues such as the delimitation of
the Caspian Sea in order to maximize its hydrocarbon production and profits.
Furthermore, Iran has attempted to use the regional organizations with which it is
involved, particularly the Economic Cooperation Organization, to extend its attempts at
regionalism in economic and political influence throughout the former Soviet south.
The third and final chapter of this paper addresses the Islamic Republic’s cultural
policy. It suggests that Tehran’s cultural objectives in the region (particularly the
promotion of its brand of revolutionary Islam) take a significant backseat to its security
and economic policies. This is due primarily to Iran’s failure to export the Islamic
Revolution to its Persian Gulf neighbors immediately following the departure of the Shah
in 1979. Furthermore, the Soviet legacy on the countries of the former Soviet south made
them particularly suspicious of Islam used in a political sense, as Soviet cultural policy
had a tremendous lasting effect particularly on the Central Asian countries. However,
this paper argues that former Soviet republics are quite open to other cultural ties with
Iran, especially in terms of promotion of linguistic, historical, and ethnic ties to the
Islamic Republic. Iran’s reliance upon realpolitik in its cultural policy is again evidenced
by its promotion of regionalism rather than radicalism to promote itself as a center of
cultural significance in the region.
3
CHAPTER 1
IRAN’S SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran’s security policy has been a balancing
act. Iran was once content to have the United States as a security partner, but the Islamic
Revolution led to a change in the security policy of Iran, its foreign relations, and Iranian
perceptions of the US and the Soviet Union. Tehran eliminated its ties with the US due
not only to the conflict of interest with fundamentalist Islam, but also because of the
strong relationship the previous regime, under the strong-handed government of the Shah,
had with the United States. This sentiment aroused the passions of students loyal to the
Islamic ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, and they overran the US Embassy in Tehran.
From November 4, 1979 until September 20, 1980, these students kept the American staff
of the embassy as hostages.5 Likely due to extreme actions such as these, after the
Islamic Revolution Iran’s list of allies became shorter and shorter as their list of potential
enemies became longer and longer.
The most immediate result of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the threat that
Iran’s Gulf neighbors perceived. The rhetoric of the Islamic Revolution espoused an
encompassing Islam that would unite the oppressed peoples of the world into one
community of solidarity. The Iranians supported Islamic movements throughout the
Middle East, and denounced what they interpreted as corruption in countries that
supported Western policies in the region.6 In turn, the elite rulers of these pro-Western
Middle Eastern countries were threatened by what they saw as radical Islamists explicitly
calling for an overthrow of their respective regimes.7 This perceived threat was
manifested as neighboring Iraq launched an attack against Iran in a war that lasted from
1980 until 1988.
5
Shireen Hunter, Iran After Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 110-111.
6
Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2001), 8.
7
Behrouz Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War (Plainview, NY: Guinan, 1989), 40.
4
Byman et al point to two distinguishing motivations for Iran’s security policy:
revolutionary Islam and nationalism.8 Revolutionary Islam provided an ideology for the
defense of Islamic interests, while nationalistic pride provided a history of Persian/Iranian
involvement in regional agenda setting in the Middle East. Both led to an inevitable
clash with great powers and regional actors alike; revolutionary Islam created an
irreparable rift with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq, while nationalism
reinforced the need for Iranian superiority in the region and garnered national support for
open hostilities with Iraq.
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s security policy in Central Asia and the South
Caucasus today is a direct result of its experiences during and after its war with Iraq.
Tehran’s policy immediately following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was to export the
Revolution to surrounding nations. However, this caused regional instability as it failed
to take root in the Gulf and turned Iran’s neighbors against the Islamic Republic. Tehran
found itself increasingly isolated as its Islamic neighbors allied with Iraq. This in turn
forced Iran to become more self-reliant and to attempt to expand ties with the Soviet
Union. Iran’s wartime experience opened the door to pragmatic security policy decision
making based on realpolitik rather than revolutionary Islamic ideology.
Iran began to implement its new security policies after it concluded its war with
Iraq, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union posed the first opportunity for the Islamic
Republic to put them into action in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The challenges
of both the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict as well as the Tajikistani civil war reinforced
Tehran’s security decisions based on realpolitik. Despite the many opportunities to
support revolutionary Islamic rhetoric during these conflicts, Iran instead elected to base
its decisions on pragmatism. While this pragmatism developed as a result of Iran’s
lengthy war with Iraq, it was reinforced by its understanding of its relationship with
Russia and its related economic posturing.
The Soviet Union developed a relationship with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War,
and its importance to the Islamic Republic as a trading partner increased as time passed.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia established itself as the most
significant military power in the region, and Iran was forced to make its own security
8
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 8-10.
5
decisions with Russia in mind. Iran’s relationship with Russia after 1991 as well as its
economic and energy concerns reinforced the realpolitik of its security policy in Central
Asia and the South Caucasus.
Iran’s Ideological Warfare
Post-Revolutionary Iran‘s greatest national security policy influences came from
its involvement in the Iran-Iraq War. Revolutionary Islamic rhetoric surmised that
surrounding Islamic countries would naturally support Iran. However, instead of Middle
Eastern countries showing Islamic solidarity and support for the Islamic Republic, the
Gulf nations almost unanimously supported secular Iraq; Arab nationalism as well as the
limited appeal of a Shi’ite Islamic Revolution for Sunni Muslims played a significant role
in the Gulf nations’ support for Iraq.9 Iran was supported regionally only by Libya and
Syria, with the latter supplying arms in an attempt to counter Iraq’s initiatives.10 This
lack of support led the Islamic Republic to believe that its protection could be guaranteed
only through its own self-sufficiency. Tehran’s security policy was highly influenced by
this realization: “self-reliance and domestic arms production,” rather than support from
other countries, were the means of which to protect Iran from invasion and attack.11
Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War, in which few outside powers came to the
assistance of the Islamic Republic, showed Tehran that any security guarantees made for
the country would have to be provided by the country itself.
Tehran initially saw the Iran-Iraq War through the eyes of revolutionary Islam.
The rhetoric propagated by the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini resonated
with the idealism of the religious movements that put him into power. The conflict
escalated as Khomeini and other religious leaders promoted the export of the Islamic
Revolution to the surrounding Muslim countries, particularly the predominantly Shi’ite
9
Barry Rubin, “The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications,
ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 121.
10
Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 47.
11
Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1995), 5.
6
Iraq, where it was likely to be accepted.12 This rhetoric threatened the leadership of most
predominantly Islamic countries in the region; this was certainly the case with Saddam
Hussein. Hussein had obtained control of the country by means of the Ba'ath party: a
party that was secular in nature and had members of varying religious organizations.13
Hussein feared that the religious rhetoric promoted by Khomeini could have a
destabilizing effect not only on his regime, but on the region as a whole. However, he
also saw the government of Iran as weak, though growing in strength. In 1980, when
Hussein perceived that the revolutionary government of Iran to be incapable of defending
itself sufficiently, he launched an attack against Iran to counter Iranian attempts at
subversion of his rule via the Kurdish and Shi’a opposition. 14
For its part, Iran supported the idea of war with Iraq at the onset of the conflict.
Tehran believed that its revolutionary Islam was stronger than the atheism of Hussein's
Ba'athist Party and thought that the war with Iraq would solidify that. It was the sincere
belief amid the revolutionary fervor that God was granting Iran an opportunity to spread
the Islamic Revolution to the world. A war with Iraq would topple the irreligious
government of Hussein and allow a more religious government to come into power in the
country. Iranian support for the war was based on this idealism; thousands of Iranians
volunteered for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to bring the Islamic
Revolution to Iraq.15
The Iran-Iraq War did not go entirely as the Islamic Republic’s leaders had
planned. Iran’s failure in the war led to significant developments in its national security
policy. One such development was an understanding of the importance of a professional
standing military. Both Iran and Iraq lost hundreds of thousands of men in the violence.
Some estimates put Iran’s losses at about 400,000 to 500,000 men, many of whom were
idealistic volunteers with the IRGC. One of the reasons the losses were so high on the
12
Efraim Karsh, “The Islamic Republic and the Gulf,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed.
E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 29.
13
Monte Palmer, The Politics of the Middle East (Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 229230.
14
Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 36-37.
15
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 34.
7
Iranian side was due to a lack of an effective professional military.16 Many of the
officers of the military (Artesh) under the Shah were forced to resign or were prosecuted
under the Revolutionary Courts. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps became a de
facto replacement for the Artesh, although the latter was not completely dismantled. The
officers of the IRGC were oftentimes promoted to leadership positions not as a result of
military prominence or ability, but rather because of their character or reputation as a
good Muslim. In terms of military capabilities, this formula proved to have disastrous
consequences for Iran. As Byman et al. point out,
…the failure of Iran to translate its ideological fervor into military success
undermined the idea that military power counted for little, that professional
military forces were unnecessary, that revolutionary ardor mattered more than
professionalism, and that military hardware was unimportant.17
Iran’s lack of military success through its promotion of revolutionary Islam during the
Iran-Iraq War led Tehran to an understanding that military professionalism was more
valuable in conflict than revolutionary rhetoric. The Islamic Republic came to determine
that troops were more valuable defending Iran’s security interests than they were
attempting to export the Islamic Revolution.
Another security policy attitude developed as a result of the Iran-Iraq War was
that of self-reliance. Iran believed that all devout Muslims would rally to their cause and
support the spread of the Islamic Revolution. Indeed, Tehran thought that in the
particular case of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s majority Shi’a population would rise up, take
arms against Hussein’s government, and welcome the Iranian Islamists. However, Arab
nationalism and the power that Hussein wielded in Iraq proved to be a more profound
motivation for the Iraqi armed forces than the allure of revolutionary Islam.18
Furthermore, most leaders of other countries in the Arab world (excluding Syria and
Libya) threw their logistical, military, and moral support behind Iraq; the fear of the
spread of an Iranian-style theocracy was a significant factor for relatively irreligious
16
Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities & Impact (Washington, DC:
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 17.
17
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36.
18
Charles Tripp, “The Iran-Iraq War and Iraqi Politics,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications,
ed. E. Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 64, 67.
8
autocrats in the region to provide this support for Iraq. Additionally, the cooperation of
Syria with Iran was based more on an anti-Iraq policy rather than ideology; Syria, like
Iraq, was a secular Ba’athist dictatorship, while Iran was an Islamic Republic.19 Iran
therefore was unable to count on ideological breakthroughs in the region to provide allies
in its security policy agenda. This, coupled with the loss of the United States as an ally
and weapons provider, meant that the best military option in the long run would be for
Tehran to produce their own weapons and munitions. During the war with Iraq, however,
Iran was wholly incapable of doing so; industry had been crippled by internal politics and
continued Iraqi raids, and human resources were limited as men were needed on the front
line. Although military self-reliance remained a desired goal for Iran, it had to wait until
it was realistic to do so. In the meantime, Tehran pursued a more immediate solution to
its armament and equipment problems.
A softening of relations with the USSR was another security policy developed as
a result of the Iran-Iraq War. This was a significant turn to pragmatism that was
incorporated into Iran’s security policy after the war. Ideologically, the USSR was
denounced as the “lesser satan”20 for its official policies regarding religion, as the atheism
of the USSR was incompatible with Iran’s revolutionary Islam. However, Iran’s lengthy
war with Iraq brought a tempering of this ideological stance to the forefront of security
policy. Under the Shah, the United States had been the predominant supplier of all things
military for Iran: weapons, ammunition, aircraft, naval vessels, and even some military
training. When ties with the United States were severed, the Islamic Republic also lost
its primary source of military goods. Conflict with Iraq lasted longer than Iran’s leaders
expected, and equipment originally from the United States was constantly in need of
repair. Tehran needed a new supplier of arms, parts, military vehicles, and technology
since it cut ties with its old source, and was incapable of producing its own. Harsh
realities in terms of military necessity caused a significant shift in Iranian security policy
from ideological revolutionary Islam to cold realpolitik. Iran found a more willing
supplier of arms and technology in the USSR, and could not afford (in terms of national
security) to place the idealism and rhetoric of its revolutionary Islam before its security
19
Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 47-48.
20
The United States, of course, was classified as the “great satan.”
9
needs. The softening of relations between the USSR and Iran during the Iran-Iraq War,
therefore, did not take place due to a Soviet embrace of Islamic ideals. Rather, it took
place as a result of Tehran’s realpolitik security need for a new supplier of replacement
parts, arms, vehicles, and ammunition in its war against Iraq. Regardless of the rhetoric
spouted by Iran’s official state mouthpiece, Iran acted with pragmatism.
The Islamic Republic’s conflict with Iraq showed the Iranians first-hand the
consequences of its inability to secure itself. The internal instability perceived by
Saddam Hussein coupled with revolutionary rhetoric coming from Tehran gave Hussein
enough confidence to attack Iran in a war in which hundreds of thousands of lives were
lost on both sides of the front. Instability cost Iran more than lives, though, as it also
crippled the economic capabilities of Iran’s industry. The lack of an effective security
policy also meant that Iran was no longer free to pursue its ideological pursuits, as
realpolitik demanded that ideology be sacrificed to maintain national security. Iran’s
national security policy today owes much to the lessons learned from its war with Iraq;
understanding the need for professionalism in all branches of the military,21 abandoning
idealistic revolutionary Islam for realpolitik necessities, and the need for self-reliance in
military production are all security policy lessons learned and retained from Iran’s war
with Iraq. The security policy changes made as a result of the Iran-Iraq War essentially
came to light after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Soviet Disintegration and New Realities
While tensions were running high in the Soviet Union (particularly in the Soviet
Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia) from 1988 until Soviet disintegration in 1991, Iran
took the initiative to show support for the Soviet Union. This was a direct result of Iran’s
eight-year-long conflict with Iraq, which ended on July 18, 1988 as Iran officially
announced it would abide by the UN Security Council Resolution 598 passed in 1987,
which called for the cessation of hostilities.22 Iran desperately needed to repair its
economy, reduce unemployment, and improve the living conditions for its population to
21
Particularly, the IRGC was in most need of professionalism in order to increase its effectiveness against
the enemy and to reduce casualties.
22
Souresrafil, The Iran-Iraq War, 77.
10
quell potential or real discontent toward the Revolutionary regime. Iran’s President
Rafsanjani was given unprecedented access to Baku, where he spoke in a local mosque
urging restraint for ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. Experiences of the war with
Iraq taught Iranian security policymakers that instability in areas surrounding Iran were a
threat to Iran’s national security.23
The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union brought new security policy realities
to Iran. With the experience of the Iran-Iraq War behind them, Iran’s security policy
largely abandoned the revolutionary Islamic ideology in favor of realpolitik decisions;
this is due not only to Iran’s experiences in the war, but also to the death of Ayatollah
Komeini who, as Shireen Hunter notes, “though capable of pragmatism and realism, was
perhaps the only true revolutionary within the Iranian leadership.”24 Disintegration of the
Soviet Union, in terms of geographic change, gave Iran a shared border with three
countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) where there once was only the Soviet
Union. The lack of Soviet domination of the region of the former Soviet south (Central
Asia and the South Caucasus) created a new power vacuum in the area. As in the past,
Tehran saw the inevitability that this power vacuum would be filled by a great power
which would impose their model on the area.25 Iran’s security policy was such that it
sought to fill that power vacuum in order to limit destabilization on its borders that had
the potential to spill over into the Islamic Republic.
The new perception of a power vacuum meant that destabilization in the region
was a very strong likelihood; this new reality with which to be concerned demanded
Iran’s attention. In fact, Iran’s primary concern for its security policy was the ethnic and
political violence that took place in the former Soviet Union in years following its
disintegration, as Iran itself consists of many minority populations in nearby potential
breakaway regions. In particular, Iran was concerned with ethnic violence between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the civil war in Tajikistan. Iran’s security policy for
these countries focused on the need for stability in the region for a number of reasons,
including economic markets, ethnic factors within its own borders, regional stability, and
23
Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy, 3-5.
24
Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 108.
25
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 11.
11
national pride. Iran’s national security policy in these conflicts shows that the Islamic
Republic acted in terms of realpolitik rather than revolutionary Islam.
Armenia and Azerbaijan: Iran’s Experience in the South Caucasus
Armenia and Azerbaijan both share a border with Iran’s northwest, and began
fighting each other even before the Soviet Union disintegrated. The area of contention
between the two countries was an enclave known as “Nagorno-Karabakh,” a
mountainous region of Azerbaijan that had a predominantly ethnic Armenian population.
Iran originally viewed the conflict as an intrastate problem for the Soviet Union to solve,
but after Soviet disintegration it developed into an international regional issue that
included Iran.26 The destabilized region caused significant alarm for Iranian leaders,
specifically in terms of “the burgeoning of the Azerbaijani nationalist movement, with its
direct appeals to Iran’s Azerbaijanis and, in January 1990, publicized violation of the
Irano-Soviet border.”27 Even before the onset of independence for the former Soviet
nations, Iran had serious concerns regarding its territorial integrity and minorities within
its borders.
The bulk of the threat that Iran perceived in the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan came from its co-religionists in Azerbaijan. Azeris constitute a substantial
minority in Iran, with ten to twenty million Azeris living in the country.28 With the
advent of Azerbaijani independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, some ethnic Azeris
living on the north side of the border with Iran began to call for an integration with
Azeris living in Iran; this was certainly the rhetoric of the Azerbaijani Popular Front
leader, Abulfaz Elchibey.29 Furthermore, the successes of the Armenians in the NagornoKarabakh conflict led to a large flow of Azeri refugees to the more stable northern Iran
26
The full scale of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is beyond the capabilities of this paper. For a more
detailed account of the causes and results of the conflict, see M. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan
Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998).
27
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 16.
28
Ibid, 26.
29
Ibid, 27.
12
where co-ethnic minority Azeris reside.30 As the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 effectively
destroyed the Iranian economy, Iran was certainly in no position to accommodate a
sudden influx of refugees that could further destabilize an already disgruntled local
population.
While it is clear that Iran wanted a cessation of hostilities between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, its underlying motives may not have been limited to a “spillover” effect of
the conflict. Rather, Iran viewed with suspicion any movement that sought to destabilize
its own minority populations through a nationalist movement.31 As Byman et al note,
“Tehran fears that the disintegration of neighboring states and the assertiveness of their
ethnic groups could create models for Iran’s own potentially restive communities.”32
While Iran certainly wanted to keep refugees out of its borders, it was more inclined to
fear an uprising of (traditionally mistreated) ethnic minorities than population shifts. As
such, Iranian security policy dictated a certain amount of pragmatism when dealing with
the Shi’ite Islamic country and her Christian neighbor.
Though the idealism of Iran’s revolutionary Islam called for the unity of Muslims
worldwide under the banner of Islam, Iran’s dealings in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict
reflected a more practical line in terms of security policy. Instead of unconditional
support for their fellow Shi’a Muslims in Azerbaijan, Iran largely attempted to remain
unbiased in their endeavors to create a peace between the parties in order to avoid any
potential destabilization of its own borders. As more Azerbaijani refugees flooded Iran’s
border areas, Iran issued threats against Armenia that it would physically intervene if
necessary; when the flow of Azerbaijani refugees slowed, Iran acted to circumvent the
Azerbaijani-Turkish embargo against Armenia.33
30
Mohammad Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” in Iran and Eurasia, eds. A.
Mohammadi and A. Ehteshami, (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 2000), 116.
31
Azeris are not the only ethnic minority in Iran. Other minorities include Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds, Baluch
Mazandarani, Jews, and Christians. See Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era,
13. Any attempt by one minority population to gain autonomy or independence may, the Iranians fear, lead
to a cascading effect among all its minorities.
32
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 78.
33
See ibid, 79 and S. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal
of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 20 no.4 (1997): 15.
13
Iran’s security policy did not immediately classify Christian Armenia as a threat
to their national security as their revolutionary Islamic rhetoric might have dictated;
instead, the more pragmatic realpolitik line was taken with regard to the ArmeniaAzerbaijan conflict. When Iran perceived a threat to its security by an influx of
Azerbaijani refugees, it acted not with its revolutionary Islam in mind when it threatened
Armenia. Instead, Tehran acted but with a realist international policy to prevent
destabilization of the region. Contrary to what might be expected in terms of Iran’s
revolutionary Islamic rhetoric, Iran acted against the wishes of Azerbaijan as it
circumvented the embargo against Armenia for realpolitik purposes.
Religion and Atheism Collide in Central Asia: the Iranian Response to Tajikistan’s
Civil War
As mentioned above, Iran’s centrality in Central Eurasia means that it in security
terms, it is quite vulnerable to regional conflicts. Like the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, the
civil war in Tajikistan was considered a threat by Iran to the stability of its regime. Also
like the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, the Tajikistani Civil War had one side that was
predominantly Islamic. Unlike the Armenia-Azerbaijan War, though, the conflict was
limited to a single state and was political rather than ethnic. Iran reacted to the threat
posed by the Tajikistani Civil War not with increased revolutionary Islamic rhetoric, but
with the calculated pragmatism characterized by Iran’s security policy after the Iran-Iraq
War. Iran announced, in fact, that it had “no desire to export revolution to Tajikistan or
to interfere in its internal affairs.”34
The two major parties to the Tajikistani Civil War were the former Communist
Party leaders that sought power after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Islamic
Coalition that had gained control of the nation. Tajikistan did not have the natural
resources or wealth of Azerbaijan; its importance to Iran was very much along cultural
34
Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey,
and Russia (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 32.
14
lines.35 Tajik as a language is very similar to Farsi spoken in Iran, and there are many
Persian cultural ties between Iran and Tajikistan. Although the Muslims in Tajikistan are
predominantly Sunni and the Muslims in Iran are predominantly Shi’a, language and
cultural ties between the two countries were sufficient to make Tajikistan a
“responsibility” for Iran.36 The civil conflict that erupted in Tajikistan, therefore,
expected to see large scale support of Iran for Tajikistan’s Islamists against the excommunists. While vocal and moral support was given from Iran to the Islamists in
Tajikistan, there was no show of force by Iran’s military apparatus against the excommunists, nor was there any tacit transfer of arms or logistical support from Iran to the
Islamists.
Tajikistan’s ex-communists were quick to demonize the Tajikistani Islamists as
fundamentalist in nature although all indications tend to point to the contrary: the
Islamists were largely moderates. Furthermore, they were a conglomeration of both
Islamic leaders as well as secular intellectuals, and they simply desired a more religious
and ethical government. Nevertheless, the fear of a fundamentalist Islamic government
in Tajikistan roused suspicion among surrounding Central Asian nations that disruptions
could arise from their own Muslim populations, and that this would threaten their
respective authoritarian regimes. Additionally, “the excesses carried out by that regime
alienated a great number of Tajiks…”37 Simply put, the existence of a religious regime in
power in Tajikistan, regardless of the level of religiosity/fundamentalism, posed a
perceived threat to the stability of the region.
The attacks launched by the ex-communist forces, therefore, were not viewed
with wide contempt throughout the Central Asian region. Russia, the major power player
in the former Soviet sphere, voiced its support for the ex-communist opposition to the
democratic rule of the Islamists; Uzbekistan did likewise. Initially, Iran voiced some
criticism towards Russia’s support of the ex-communists, but quickly backed down.38 As
35
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia,
Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995),
119.
36
Ibid, 119.
37
Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” 117.
15
Mesbahi notes, “in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, the fight against Islamic
fundamentalism was the critical factor that brought together a variety of domestic,
regional, and international actors.”39 The Islamists, though democratically elected in
Tajikistan, were becoming increasingly unpopular within their own country, and the
opposition ex-communists were instrumental in uniting large portions of the population
of that nation against the Islamists.
Although Iran’s first reaction was to support the ideological revolutionary Islam,
it acted so as to protect its realpolitik interests instead. Ideology spoke to Tehran’s
revolutionary dedication to a worldwide community governed by Islam; pragmatism
spoke against fanning the flames of an already unstable situation. Any tacit support for
the Islamists would run quite contrary to Iran’s security policy. Regional stability would
decrease as Central Asian countries, and more importantly, Russia, would oppose any
moves made by Iran to support the Islamists in Tajikistan. Russia, as a regional power,
poses a more significant existential threat to the Islamic Republic if it opposes Russian
policy than any secular regime in Tajikistan. As more weight was assigned to realpolitik
necessity than religious rhetoric, Iran certainly acted with pragmatism in its attempt to
bring peace and reconciliation to Tajikistan, at the expense of a lack of support for its
Muslim counterparts in the country.
The “Other” Neighbor to the North: Russia’s Impact on Iranian Security Policy
Iran’s security decisions and actions in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and the
Tajikistani civil war were greatly influenced by Russia. The geographic proximity of
Russia to Iran, its great size, its nuclear power, and its past history of involvement with
Iran points to an inevitable impact of the Russians on Iran's Security Policy. As Herzig
points out, “for the past two centuries the greatest threat to the security and territorial
integrity of Iran has been posed by the Russian empire and its successor the Soviet
Union.”40 Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was clear that the
38
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 31.
39
Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 123-124.
40
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 1.
16
USSR was the single great power in the region. It was checked in power only by the
United States, and both nations held their spheres of influence across the world. Before
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran was a proxy of the United States; it received weaponry,
military advise, and technology from the United States to counter Soviet influence in the
region. After the Islamic Revolution, however, Iran stepped away from the influence of
the United States. The USSR was unable to sway a suspicious Iran toward its camp after
the Islamic Revolution: Iran's leaders were adamantly against the atheism that the Soviet
Union officially sponsored.41 Ayatollah Khomeini announced that Iran would be “neither
East nor West,” but would follow its own ideology of an Islamic Republic.42
The eight year long war with Iraq changed the relationship between the USSR and
Iran. As mentioned above, Iran was in desperate need of a supplier of arms, technology,
and replacement parts for their vehicles. The United States cut ties with the Islamic
Republic following the US Embassy hostage crisis, so Iran had little choice but to turn to
communist countries like North Korea, and eventually the USSR itself to obtain these
supplies. Although the USSR posed a great threat to Iran's security, Tehran’s most
pressing existential threat at the time was the war with Iraq; therefore, the USSR became
involved in supplying the Islamic Republic with weaponry, and posed less of a perceived
threat to Iran as it essentially supported Tehran's efforts against Iraq. For its part, Iran
was not perceived as much of a threat to the Soviet Union because it systematically
rejected the influence of the United States and was kept weak by the war with Iraq. The
USSR's regional power remained uncontested, and it seemed content to profit by
providing weapons to the Iranians.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained an important regional
player, and Iran's security policy remained contingent on the actions of the great power to
the north. Although nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan initially posed a threat to the Islamic
Republic, President Nazarbayev opted to have these weapons removed from his country
to storage in the United States and Russia.43 As Russia maintained its stock of nuclear
41
Yahya Noori, Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran (Glasgow, Scotland: Royston Limited,
1985), 37.
42
David Menashri, “Iran: Doctrine and Reality,” in The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, ed. E.
Karsh (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 54-55.
17
weapons, it remained a global power and the strongest authority in the region. Russia
also remained an important source of technology and weapons for Iran. Despite
American efforts to politically and economically isolate Iran from the rest of the world,
Russia has retained open trade and generally good relations with Iran.
Iran's security policy, therefore, tends to act in favor of Russia when it is
presented with a conflict of interests. For example, Russia's war with Chechnya in the
North Caucasus presented an ideological conflict of interests for the Iranians. The model
of revolutionary Islam calls for the support of oppressed Islamic peoples throughout the
world; however, the realpolitik necessities of the Iranian state recognize the military
superiority of Russia. Russia is also a major trading partner with Iran, and Iran must keep
this relationship in tact; any criticism of its handling of the Chechen rebellion must be
kept diluted, and open support for the Chechens avoided.
Russia also has a hand in Iran's security policy through the use of stationing its
troops throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus to maintain border integrity of
the former Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional
organization that consists of members of the Former Soviet Union and maintains a
peacekeeping force. This force is largely made up of Russian troops, and its use is
predominantly for Russian foreign policy purposes.44 As all of Central Asia and
Azerbaijan have Muslim majority populations, Russia initially feared that Iranian
involvement in the region would attempt to bring fundamentalist Islam to the former
Soviet republics. As such, Russia positioned itself as the dominant force in the region,
and used CIS troops to posture a containment of any threat posed by Iran.
For its part, Iran identifies the need for stability above all in the region, and
recognizes the ability of Russia to maintain that stability. The reality is that both Russia
and Iran benefit from the relationship they have with each other.
43
Atai, “Iran and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia,” 112-113. Although Kazakhstan would
have been a nuclear power, Atai notes that possible sanctions against Kazakhstan could have taken place as
a result of its proliferation. Given that Kazakhstan was in need of economic assistance following the
collapse of the communist apparatus in the country, it was within Nazarbayev's best interests to rid his
country of nuclear arms.
44
For background on the role Russian peace keepers play in the CIS and promoting their own foreign
policy, see Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and
Tajikistan (Houndmills, England: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000).
18
Geographically and geopolitically, Iran enjoys a unique position in both the CIS
and the Persian Gulf and can utilise this for a mutually beneficial relationship
with Russia by a long-term realistic policy geared to the improvement of security
in the region...45
As Iran benefits from Russian border security guarantees, Russia benefits from cultural
influence and stability provided by Iran to Central Asia.46
Russia's dominance in the region serves to reinforce the practical nature of Iran's
security policy since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Realpolitik dictates for Iran that overt
opposition to Russia's dominance in a military sense would not be beneficial to the
Islamic Republic. Having fought a brutal war for eight years based on idealism rather
than realpolitik, Iran understands the dangers of upsetting the great power to its north.
Furthermore, Iran receives benefits from its relationship with Russia; isolation from the
world is avoided, new technology is received, and its borders with the Former Soviet
Union are guaranteed. Iran is far from the early days of the Islamic Revolution when the
Soviet Union was denounced as the 'lesser satan;' instead, Russia is today seen as an
important impact player in Iran's security policy.
Energy, Economy, and Security Converge in Iran
Iran’s realpolitik decision making with regard to its involvement in regional
conflicts as well as its deference to Russia in security decisions stem from Tehran’s
economic posturing. Realpolitik in Iran's security policy can be attributed to its energy
and economic situation, which are inevitably intertwined, as the Islamic Republic's
economy is heavily dependent upon its vast sums of oil reserves and refineries. During
its war with Iraq in the late 1980s, the price of oil dipped, and Iran found itself strapped
for cash. This experience led Iran to the realization that a diversification of its economy
was necessary for the longevity of the regime.47 Tehran's need for the diversification of
45
Gholam-Reza Sabri-Tabrizi, “Chechnya and the Impact of the Chechen Conflict on Russia, the CIS and
Iran,” in Iran and Eurasia, eds. A. Mohammadi and A. Ehteshami (Reading, England: Ithaca Press, 2000),
178.
45
Ibid, 177.
47
Though beyond the scope of this paper, longevity of a democratic-style government is often tied to
economic performance. See Seymour Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
19
its economy has led to a desire for a more sustainable and renewable form of energy:
nuclear energy.
Iran has found a willing partner for its nuclear endeavors in Russia. Russia's
export of technology has made it possible for Iran to pursue development of its nuclear
power plants and uranium enrichment. The benefit to Russia is simply monetary; Iran
sees the arrangement as investment into its own infrastructure as well as a means by
which to switch to a more sustainable energy source.
The move toward nuclear energy is not without consequence, though, and these
consequences have implications for Iran's security policy. Iran's current president,
Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, as well as its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, have voiced
their determination to bring nuclear energy and its benefits to Iran. The former has also
launched severe criticism of Israel, calling for the disintegration of the state. As such, the
West in general, and the United States in particular, fears that Iran's move to acquire
nuclear energy also means that the nation will pursue nuclear armament. They believe
that such a move might indeed be beneficial for Iran's security, as it would allow for the
Islamic Republic to position itself against Israel and be on the short list of nuclear powers
in the world; it would also feed into Iran's nationalistic pride, which asserts the historic
power of the Persian Empire. In a regional context, however, Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons would not serve its realist security policy interests. While gaining nuclear
weapons would immediately serve to counter the influence of Russia in Central Asia and
the South Caucasus, a new dynamic of instability would be introduced into the
relationship between Russia and Iran. After nearly two decades of pragmatism, it seems
unlikely that a return to revolutionary ideology would take place. This is not to say that
Iran would not seek a nuclear weapon once its nuclear energy prospects were in place;
rather, nuclear energy is the primary nuclear objective that Iran actively and openly
seeks. If Tehran later develops nuclear weaponry as a result, that is simply a bonus.
In the context of its most recent decision making process, Tehran’s security policy
would be characterized as lacking pragmatism if it attempted nuclear armament; it would
Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 no.1 (1959): 69-105, Adam
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 no.2 (1997):
155-183, and Bernhard et al, “Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic
Survival,” Journal of Politics 63 no.3 (2001): 775-803.
20
be in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran ratified, and the Islamic
Republic would certainly be subject to economic sanctions that would not be in its best
interests. Iran is in desperate need of economic vitalization after its long conflict with
Iraq, and is unlikely to follow the course of North Korea and invest in nuclear bomb
making that could cause ten to fifteen years of economic regression, instead of pursuing
economic investment.48 Furthermore, overt pursuit of nuclear armament would likely
isolate rather than gather Iran's former Soviet south neighbors around it. As shown by
the example of Kazakhstan's president Nazarbayev, these countries are willing to do
away with the prospects of nuclear weapons in order to maintain regional stability. Iran
needs more economic partners rather than rivals, more friends than enemies, and more
stability than revolution. Although the assumption that the pursuit of nuclear energy can
lead to a pursuit of nuclear armament is a valid assumption, it is unlikely that Iran would
seek such a destabilization of the region, given its adherence to realpolitik pragmatism in
lieu of idealism in its security policy.
Conclusion
Iran's security policy began in 1979 heavily influenced by revolutionary Islam and
nationalism. At the onset of the Islamic Republic, these two influences led to a great deal
of idealism in its security policy, as a unified Muslim community was to be supported
against totalitarian regimes and exploitation by the West. This rhetoric served to isolate
Iran in the geopolitical realm: the West, the USSR, and the Gulf states all felt threatened
by the notion of Iran's exportation of the Islamic Revolution, and the impact that would
have on their respective spheres of influence.
This idealism and sense of adventurism49 drew Iran into a long conflict with its
secular neighbor, Iraq. When revolutionary fervor failed to translate into military success
for the Islamic Republic, a new security policy had to be envisioned. The Iran-Iraq War
48
Heidar Ali Balouji, “The process of national security decision making in Iran: the signing of the
Additional Protocol,” in Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation, ed Shannon Kile, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 77-78.
49
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era.
21
led to the development of a more professional military, a need for economic recovery,
and most significantly, regional stability to accommodate these goals.
Realpolitik pragmatism over revolutionary idealism is the most significant
characteristic of Iran's security policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991.
Pragmatism led to Iran's support of the ex-communist regime in Tajikistan, and its lack of
unconditional support for Azerbaijan's Shi'ite Muslims. The need for stability in these
neighboring states far outweighs any pan-Islamic pursuits that may be desired by the
Islamic Republic. Furthermore, realpolitik necessities are what drive Iran's security
policy with regard to Russia. It accepts CIS protection of former Soviet Union borders,
and avoids involvement in Russia's internal actions against some of its Muslim
population. Tehran realizes that Russia poses a more significant existential threat to its
security than a lack of promotion of revolutionary Islam in neighboring countries; it
therefore acts in its security policy accordingly as it defers its revolutionary Islam to
Russian foreign policy interests.
This trend of pragmatism should be noted when evaluating Iran's current row with
the West regarding its nuclear program. Although idealistic revolutionary Islam has an
important part in the history of Iran's security policy, Tehran has since the war with Iraq
systematically embraced realpolitik decision making at the expense of its revolutionary
Islam. Pragmatism rather than revolutionary Islam will likely continue to define Iranian
security policy in the near future as it has in its recent past.
22
CHAPTER 2
IRAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE FORMER SOVIET SOUTH
Iran’s economic policy is a subset of its foreign policy that is almost inseparable
from its security and social policies. The economic policy leftover from the Shah’s reign
had a great deal of impact on the Islamic Republic’s economic policy, especially in terms
of foreign investment and multinational corporation domination. One particular aspect of
Iran’s economic policy since the Revolution has been that of defiance to the United
States. It became institutionalized under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Komeini,
as defiance to the United States was one of the trademark policies that brought the
Islamists to power. Trade ties with the United States have since been severed, and Iran
continues to view American multinational corporations as damaging and exploitative of
the Iranian people. However, after the death of Khomeini and the disintegration of the
USSR, foreign investment on the part of other countries into Iran has been deregulated to
an extent, and the capabilities of Iranian foreign investment abroad have increased. As
such, Iran’s economy is increasing in terms of its capabilities to have an affect on foreign
policy. Economic policies have become the backbone of Iranian foreign policy since
1991 that supports engagement rather than isolation on a global scale, promotes regional
cooperation and economic integration, and seeks to limit Western (particularly American)
involvement in the region.
Iran’s economic policy since 1991 in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has its
roots in Iranian involvement in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 and its immediate
aftermath. The realities of war and the severe economic strain placed on the country led
to an increased emphasis on the part of the government toward developing a more
liberalized economic policy. This liberalization allowed for foreign investment and
increased the capabilities of the Iranian economy to put forth efforts and resources into
obtaining regional influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus after the break up of
the Soviet Union.
23
Although some diversification of industry has taken place since the beginning of
the Islamic Revolution, most of Iran’s economy is heavily dependent upon its oil
revenues.50 At the same time, some of the former Soviet states are also beginning to
develop their economies based on energy resources as well. Most of the economic
contact made between the Islamic Republic and the former Soviet south, therefore, is
based on energy trade and development of energy infrastructure. Much of the politics
that develop in terms of economic agreements occur in the oil-rich Caspian Sea region,
but also set Iran on a collision course at times with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, and Russia.
The influence of Russia in Tehran’s economic policy is evident as well. Russia
remains the most powerful country in what it can offer the countries of Central Asia and
the South Caucasus as well as regional hegemony. In its current economic state, the
Islamic Republic is incapable of supplanting Russia’s influence in the region, and must
play second-fiddle to its giant neighbor to the north. Iran must be careful not to upset the
Russian domination of the former Soviet south, for fear of the great economic
consequences it would have on the Islamic republic. Tehran stands a great deal to lose, in
terms of its security policy as much of its arms and technologies are received from
Russia. Any economic policy, trade concerns, infrastructure development or investment
on the part of Iran, therefore, must take Russian interests into consideration. Despite this,
Iran does have regional aspirations of its own, and Tehran has begun to offer an
alternative to Russian power via the Economic Cooperation Organization: a regional
organization that has the potential to develop into a more inclusive organization that can
challenge the Russian CIS.51
50
Nasser Karimi, “Iran refuses to budge under pressure, announcing missile tests as Ahmadinejad
dismisses economy criticism,” Associated Press Worldstream, (2007) [on-line]; available from Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe> (accessed 22 January 2007).
51
Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 148-149.
24
Iran, Iraq, and the Emergence of Economic Importance
At the onset of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, economic issues were not of
utmost importance to the incoming regime. Ayatollah Khomeini, Hunter notes, found
economics to be unimportant in the grand scheme of things.52 Khomeini thought that
implementation of a Revolutionary Islamic regime would eventually lead to a classless
society where greater importance would be placed on piety rather than salary.
Khomeini was unaware at the time of the Revolution of how much Iran’s devastating
eight-year long war with neighboring Iraq would take its toll on the Iranian economy and
how much it would have an affect on the surrounding political and social landscape.
The war with Iraq shifted industry and caused attention to be drawn to the effects
of economic performance on society and foreign relations. The locations of initial attacks
made by Iraq in 1980 were significant targets of economic importance; the province of
Khuzestan in the south of the country was home to “port facilities, steel factories, oil
refineries, and petrochemical complexes”53 which were repeatedly attacked by Iraqi
forces. Infrastructure, such as roads and fixed assets such as industrial machinery and
buildings, were destroyed and caused significant setbacks to the Iranian economy.
Potential growth in the economy was also prevented by the destruction of Iranian
industry, compounded by the opportunity cost of pumping potential profit-making
industrial resources into the war machine and shifting labor from the economic to the
security sphere. Additionally, Hunter notes that the Iran-Iraq War marked a significant
increase of Iranian government involvement with the nation’s economy; she notes that
this led to an unwillingness of domestic investment into “productive activities” that could
have stimulated economic growth during the war.54
Reconstruction of Iranian industry also became a point of contention, as limited
resources had to be allocated to the reconstruction of certain industries at the expense of
others. Should funds be first devoted toward the security apparatus to prevent another
52
Shireen Hunter, Iran After Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 59.
53
Hooshang Amirahmadi, “Economic Costs of the War and the Reconstruction in Iran,” in Modern
Capitalism and Islamic Ideology in Iran, eds. C. Bina and H. Zangeneh, (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992), 258.
54
Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 65.
25
attack akin to the likes of Saddam’s approach, or should funds be distributed to repair the
crippled oil industry? The post-war economic approach taken by the Islamic Republic of
Iran would reflect as well as have an influence on its foreign policy concerns. The path
chosen for reconstruction has been stimulation of the national economy in order to
produce more jobs and to stabilize prices.55
The ramifications for poor economic performance for almost a decade during the
Iran-Iraq War are felt through the pulse of the Islamic Republic’s youth. Almost twothirds of Iran’s 70 million people are under the age of 30 due largely to the estimated
300,000 casualties of the war; 56 unemployment, though listed officially at around 10%, is
believed by many to be as high as 30%57. Iran’s population, therefore, can be
characterized as young and unemployed. The economy is about 80% controlled by the
government, and many of the young educated professionals without jobs place blame on
the government for their lack of economic opportunities.58 As Byman et al point out, the
lack of economic success in the Islamic Republic has led the youth of the country to feel
more and more alienated and abandoned by its government; “the legitimacy of the
Islamic Republic of Iran is now based in large part on what it can deliver
economically.”59 The Iranian government is experiencing an increasing demand on
behalf of its young population to perform economically; religious rhetoric is not able to
supplant the need for jobs for a growingly disenfranchised population.
Iran's domestic problems regarding disenfranchisement and alienation of its youth
push over into foreign relations as well. As Hunter rightly notes, “the many unemployed
youth could become a very serious liability for the regime because they could be
55
Amirahmadi, “Economic Costs,” 263.
56
Simon Tisdall, “Weekly review: Power and the people: Iran says it wants nuclear energy to fuel its
economy. The US says it wants to make an 'Islamic bomb'. But what do Iranians think? Simon Tisdall asks
both the men in charge and people on the streets,” The Guardian Weekly (1 September 2006) [on-line];
available from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe> (accessed 23
January 2007).
57
See Karimi, “Iran refuses to Budge.”
58
See Tisdall, “Power and the People.”
59
Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2001), 16.
26
manipulated by its internal and external opponents.”60 This is particularly true of Iran’s
volatile border areas, where large numbers of ethnic minorities reside across national
borders from their ethnic kinsmen. Were the disenfranchised youth, particularly the
ethnic minorities, to join with a separatist movement, it would cause a domestic headache
for Iran from which it would be unlikely to recover. Furthermore, there have already
been outward signs of the discontent of the youth regarding their financial situation. The
largest demonstration since the advent of the Islamic Republic took place in 1999 as
around 20,000 youth took to the streets to protest the nation’s poor economy.61 In order
to solve these domestic problems, Tehran has pursued a foreign policy that would allow
the country to grow economically. Iran’s economic stance with regard to relations with
Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991, therefore, has been to seek a role in
which Iran benefits economically, even if the trade-off means ridding itself of
revolutionary ideals.62
Economic Development in Central Asia and the South Caucasus
Since the independence of the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations of the
former Soviet Union in 1991, the Islamic Republic has seen the potential to garner
influence in the region via economic influence.
However, Tehran entered the economic
scene with a great deal of cards stacked against it. As mentioned above, Iran in 1991 had
only recently begun reconstruction and restructuring efforts after the eight-year long war
with Iraq. Iran certainly had its hands full with regard to need for economic development
within its own borders. Furthermore, there was a great deal of infrastructure in place
between the former Soviet republics and Russia, but very little as far as road and rail
infrastructure (much less oil and gas pipelines) in place between the former Soviet
republics and Iran. In addition, soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov steered Russian foreign policy toward
60
Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 76.
61
Babak Rahimi, “Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs 7 no.3 (2003): 107.
62
Byman, et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 16.
27
multilateralism in geopolitics, with a heavy emphasis of strengthening ties and influence
with the former Soviet states.63 The “Primakov Doctrine” dictated that the former Soviet
Republics would be of the utmost importance to Russian foreign policy, especially since
these countries were in Russia’s “backyard.” Under Minister Primakov, Russia
intensified its involvement in the affairs of the former Soviet Republics.
Economic liberalization in Iran in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to change in
the way the Islamic Republic did business, as well as the way it saw its relations with
other countries (particularly those that were in close geographic proximity). Other
countries began to see post-war Iran as a country worthwhile of investment as the
government’s grip on industry lessened, and it “abandon[ed] its cardinal revolutionary
principle of rejecting foreign capital.”64 As the country opened its doors to investment,
economic isolation in Iran became a thing of the past. Iran became more dependent upon
imports,65 and it began to see a source of imports of raw materials from its newly
independent neighbors. Iran today is a lucrative destination for foreign investment. Nonenergy investment in industries like “aluminum, agriculture industries, public services
and the stock market” are at an all time high in Iran, estimated to reach $7 billion by the
end of March 2007.66 As the amount of investments in the Islamic Republic rises, Iran
has also expanded its own investment into its neighbors to the north.
As previously noted, Iran’s investment opportunity is limited. Herzig finds that
“Iran is hardly better able to provide this investment for the FSS [Former Soviet South]
states than they are to help Iran with its own investment needs.”67 As such, Herzig
suggests that Central Asian and South Caucasian interests for attracting investment would
thus largely be oriented towards Western or East Asian countries, such as the United
63
Robert Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s,” Middle East Review of International Affairs
4 no.2 (2000): 69-70.
64
Sohrab Behadad, “From Populism to Economic Liberalism: The Iranian Predicament,” in The Economy
of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State, ed. P. Alizadeh, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 113.
65
Ibid, 114.
66
“Foreign Investment in Iran to reach US$7 BLN this Year,” Asia Pulse (24 October 2006) [on-line];
available from Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe> (accessed 23
January 2007).
67
Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1995), 33.
28
States and China. Times as well as oil prices have changed since the time of Herzig’s
writing: oil is now valued at over $60 a barrel and is not expected to fall significantly in
the near future. This is almost triple the price from the time when the former Soviet
republics gained their independence.68 Oil is certainly not the cure-all for Iran’s
economic desires; it is, however, a step in the right direction for Iran to be able to pursue
a more aggressive economic policy, especially in the region.
Despite the economic setbacks, Iran is finding the means, motive, and opportunity
to invest in their Central Asian and South Caucasian neighbors. Free trade zones have
been set up in some border areas of Iran to increase the volume of trade in the region.69
Iran has been ardently attempting to build ties with former Soviet republics, including
bitter enemies Armenia and Azerbaijan. Trade with these two countries in the South
Caucasus is particularly indicative of Iranian interests with regard to both economics and
foreign policy. As tension were heightened between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
blockades on both sides were imposed, Iran became more important to both countries;
Iran supplied much-needed energy to the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, and trade
between Armenia and Iran increased “fifteen-fold” between 1991 and 1995.70 Iran came
to be, for both Azerbaijan and Armenia, not only an important trading partner, but also a
neutral party whose reputation was enhanced by their willingness to provide markets and
services to both countries during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Tehran has been
isolated in the region by the United States, however, not only in its attempts to mediate
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but also in its attempts to benefit from the Azerbaijani oil
market.71
68
Behdad, “From Populism to Economic Liberalism,” 114.
69
Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no.3 (2004), 509.
70
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 34.
71
Gareth Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey,
and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 108.
29
Energy and Economy in Iran
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, the Shah’s economic plan largely consisted of
dependence upon oil. Some estimates put the 1978 oil income of Iran accounting for
“more than 90 percent of its foreign exchange receipts,”72 and this lack of economic
diversity made the nation’s economy prey to the price of oil on the global market. Thus,
those thinkers in opposition to the Shah thought that in particular, Iran should move away
from Western multinational corporations (such as the oil conglomerates), and diversify
economically in order to remove the dependence of the Iranian economy away from the
West and towards a sense of self-sufficiency.73 A move towards economic
diversification during the advent of the Islamic Revolution, however, was not reached.
The war with Iraq proved to be a very destabilizing force for the Iranian economy,
especially as it relates to Iran’s hydrocarbon production.
As noted above, Iran’s economy during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was
largely dependent upon its oil revenues. When the price of oil dropped significantly in
1986, Iran’s economic performance was further damaged.74 Quite simply, Iran’s war
with Iraq greatly diminished the capabilities of the Iranian economy. The dependence of
the Iranian economy on the oil market was largely responsible for the poor economic
performance in the years following the Iran-Iraq War.
Because of the vast dependence of Iran’s economy upon its energy reserves, it is
impossible to separate Iran’s economic policy from its energy policy. Dependence upon
energy resources to drive economic growth has diminished since the time of the Shah.
However, some estimates suggest that “roughly 80% of Iran’s revenues come from oil,”75
and as such, Iran must ensure that its energy policy acts in a way that will be most
beneficial to its economic needs. Although diversification in industry is on the rise (Iran
72
Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 56.
73
Ibid, 59.
74
Cyrus Bina, “Global Oil and the Oil Policies of the Islamic Republic,” in Modern Capitalism and Islamic
Ideology in Iran, eds. C. Bina and H. Zangeneh, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 128.
75
See Karami, “Iran Refuses to Budge.”
30
has automobile production as well as a soft drink alternative to American products),
energy is still the primary agent in its economy.
Iran’s economic policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is thus largely tied
to its regional energy policy. This policy focuses on the trade and development of
hydrocarbon resources, as well as the geopolitics that result from energy concerns.
Understandably so, as Iran serves as a strategic position between Central Asia, the
Persian Gulf, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.76 Iran sees energy trade as a means with
which to avoid political isolation in the region and avoid marginalization in the world, a
way in which to stimulate economic growth and fund industrial diversification, and a
medium of promoting political and social stability at home and abroad by satisfying the
economic needs of its own people and the needs of its neighbors. Furthermore, it seeks to
promote a “collective self-reliance”77 in Central Asia and the South Caucasus in order to
limit Western (particularly American) dominance in the region. After all, for Iranians
“large numbers of hungry Muslims with their hands outstretched to foreigners are not
going to serve the interests of the Islamic world.”78
The Politics of Energy
One important aspect of Iran’s energy policy is that it seeks to prevent Iran’s
isolation in the international spectrum. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the US
Embassy hostage crisis that followed found an end to economic cooperation between the
United States and Iran. Indeed, the United States sought to impose punitive restrictions
on Iran in order to attempt to marginalize Iran’s Islamic government. After the breakup
of the Soviet Union in 1991, new nation-states were formed on Iran’s border, and Iran
saw another potential avenue to avoid economic and political isolation. The sanctions
levied by the United States in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 thus attempted to
further isolate Iran and limit the Islamic Republic’s influence and power in the region by
76
Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, 128.
77
Hunter, Iran After Khomeini, 60.
78
Ibid, 75.
31
removing its abilities to export or import high valued goods and services, as well as
punishing companies involved in developing Iran’s oil market.
Iran, however, has a commodity that has a significant ability to reduce the effects
of sanctions: large reserves of hydrocarbon energy sources. As the demand for oil and
natural gas are high, Iran’s neighbors and others who value receiving oil exports from
Iran were not as quick as the United States to end their trade with Iran. Despite the call
on the part of the United States for sanctions against Iran, only limited action on the part
of US allies has taken place.
Furthermore, since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has chosen a
path of regional integration through various economic organization initiatives in order to
secure its energy concerns in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It has established the
Caspian Sea Littoral Organization as well as the Economic Cooperation Organization to
serve the purposes of regional integration of its energy policies. The most important
economic concern on the part of Iran is to avoid isolation; by remaining party to these
organizations and reinforcing their effectiveness, Iran’s active engagement “solidifies its
role as an integral part of the regional community. It makes isolation or containment
unlikely or unworkable.”79
Iranian energy relations with Turkmenistan are emblematic of how the country
would like to extend its strategic role in the region. Iran’s longest border with a former
Soviet republic is Turkmenistan, and its attempts to solidify its influence in Central Asia
and the South Caucasus are exemplified in its economic and energy relations with
Ashgabat. Turkmenistan has large supplies of natural gas, which is one of its primary
exports. As is the case with most of the former Soviet republics, infrastructure for this
natural resource was oriented toward Moscow and the other former Soviet republics.
With the collapse of communism and the opening of free markets, Iran saw an
opportunity to expand ties and increase trade. In 1997, Iran began a project to link
Turkmenistan’s gas fields with Iranian infrastructure, which could offer Turkmenistan’s
product to a new market.80 Turkey in particular was keen to purchase Turkmen gas, and
79
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia,
Turkey, and Iran eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995),
118.
32
soon began to do so via pipeline shipments through Iran. The Turkmenistan venture is
important in that it is Iran’s attempt to prove to the other energy producing nations
surrounding it that it can provide economic benefits for these countries by expanding the
market for their product, as well as increasing political influence via bilateral economic
agreements between itself and the former Soviet republics. Iran’s energy policy in the
former Soviet republics seeks to establish Iran as a legitimate partner in economic
development and expansion of global markets.
Iranian relations with Russia, additionally, cannot be ignored in the context of
economic and energy policies. Despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was and
remains the largest regional power with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
In terms of economic power and confrontation, Iran is incapable of replacing Russian
influence in the Central Asian/South Caucasian region. As such, Iranian economic and
energy policy with regard to these areas of Russian influence and interest will keep
Russian relations in mind.
The Caspian Sea: Convergence or Conflict?
The Caspian Sea is the place where Iranian, Central Asian, Russian, and South
Caucasian interests converge, and for good reason: estimated energy reserves in the
Caspian Sea are vast, and the sea itself has long been used for its other natural resources.
Oil in the Baku area has been known of for centuries, and in the 18th and 19th centuries
the Caspian Sea, with its maritime advantages and natural resources, was an asset that
both Russia and Persia desired.81 Conflict between the two nations largely came to a halt
with the emergence of the Soviet Union and the implementation of the Soviet-Persian
Treaty of Friendship in 1921, which “established freedom of navigation for all Soviet and
Persian ships on the Caspian,” and the follow up Treaty on Trade and Navigation
80
Nader Entessar, “Iran: Geopolitical Challenges and the Caspian Region” in Oil and Geopolitics in the
Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 172.
81
Bülent Gökay, “History of Oil Development in the Caspian Basin,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian
Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 4-6.
33
between the USSR and Iran in 1940, which established a standard fishing zone. 82 The
Soviet Union comprised the majority of the Caspian Sea’s shoreline, and as such
developed offshore oil drilling in areas that it could claim under the two treaties between
itself and Iran. For its part, Iran concentrated on its land-based oil fields and did not
pursue hydrocarbon initiatives in the Caspian Sea.
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, in addition to Iran’s own economic
problems, created new realities and possibilities for the Islamic Republic. Instead of
dealing solely with the USSR, Iran had to contend with Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. The latter three did not pose as significant an existential
threat to Iran in terms of security as the USSR had. Additionally, these countries were
opening up to capitalism and foreign investment, and oil and energy companies were all
too willing to invest in the expanding and lucrative oil and gas industries in the Caspian
region. Iran’s issues with the Caspian Region became:
•
•
•
How to best delimit the Caspian Sea to obtain the maximum amount of
economic benefit for Iran.
How to marginalize foreign influence in Central Asian and South
Caucasian energy sectors while maximizing its own influence.
How to use energy markets in Central Asia and the South Caucasus to
expand its own power and influence in geopolitics.
These issues tie directly to Iran’s foreign policy insomuch as they allow Iran to flex its
geopolitical muscle. Iran has long realized that control of or influence in energy sectors
and other economically important resources is a good way to prevent geopolitical
isolation, and allow for engagement with the regime.83 The breakup of the Soviet Union
afforded Iran an opportunity to expand its reach into Central Asia and the South Caucasus
geopolitically via the Caspian Sea.
The delimitation of the Caspian Sea remains a key issue in Iranian-Former Soviet
South relations. To date, no agreement regarding demarcation of the Caspian Sea has
taken place between Iran and the other countries surrounding the Caspian Sea. The
disagreement centers on two different considerations of the Caspian Sea: whether it is a
82
Cynthia Croissant and Michael Croissant, “The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and
Compromise,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras,
(Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 23.
83
Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 117.
34
lake or a sea.84 Technically speaking, the Caspian Sea is a lake, as it has no access to any
other body of water and is surrounded on all sides by land. However, the size of the
Caspian is vast (roughly the size of Japan)85 and natural resources, particularly
hydrocarbons, abound in the basin. The importance of the argument of whether or not
the Caspian should be delimited as a lake or a sea is relevant in terms of how the seabed
and the surface of the Caspian should be divided amongst the countries that border it.86
Those countries that believe that the oil and gas contained in the Caspian are a
community resource and should be developed as the community sees fit tend to argue that
the Caspian Sea is a lake.87 The countries that believe that the Caspian should be
delimited according to maritime principles established for open seas (and the resources
contained therein) tend to argue that the Caspian Sea is a sea. Under the “sea argument”
of demarcation, the majority of proven offshore oil and gas reserves (as well as larger
percentages of the Caspian itself)88 would be within the territory of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, while Russia and Iran would be left with smaller portions of the Caspian that
are not proven to have, nor are likely to contain, hydrocarbon resources in large enough
quantities for development. As such, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan stand the most to gain
economically by supporting delimitation of the Caspian Sea according to the “sea
argument,” while Russia and Iran stand the most to gain economically by supporting the
demarcation of the Caspian according to the “lake argument.”
The delimitation issue of the Caspian is indicative of deeper Iranian economic and
energy concerns. In particular, Iran is concerned with the large portion of Caspian oil
allotted to Azerbaijan through proposed demarcation, and the political and economic
ramifications that Iran believes is certain to follow. For its part, Iran certainly considers
Azerbaijani plans to involve Western companies in the development of its offshore oil
84
For an excellent discussion about this and other Caspian Sea issues, see , M.P. Croissant and B. Aras,
eds., Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999).
85
Croissant, “Legal Status,” 23.
86
Maureen Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Security International, 2006), 44.
87
Croissant, “Legal Status,” 29.
88
Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region, 44-45.
35
fields to be against their foreign policy interests.89 In other words, Iranian interests in the
Caspian Sea region are not simply to secure additional economic resources for use at its
disposal; rather, Iran seeks to capture additional economic resources in the Caspian
region to limit the capabilities of its weaker neighbors to obtain the ability to either limit
Iran’s activities in the region, or to involve outside powers to counter Iranian interests. It
is important to note that Iran sees the “sea” demarcation of the Caspian Sea as Western
interference in the region.90 Western investment in Caspian oil markets in countries like
Azerbaijan has been welcomed by the former Soviet nations. Iran is wary of the United
States’ growing interest in the South Caucasian/Central Asian energy sector as a site of
investment and industrial development, as it does not want American political influence
to grow in an area that Iran already relies upon for trade in energy and other sectors.
Iran’s attempt to block Azerbaijan’s development of offshore oil fields by claiming to
avoid a future ecological catastrophe91 is really an attempt to give Iran a bigger share of
the Caspian and to “impede the growth of Western—especially American—influence in
the Caspian region.”92
Blocking Western access to the Azerbaijani oil market is not the only motivation
for the Iranians to seek “sea demarcation” of the Caspian. Iran also has a vested interest
in marginalizing Azerbaijan’s ability to maximize its hydrocarbon revenues. Iran is
particularly sensitive of its minority populations in border areas, one of which is, of
course, the Azeris. An economically successful Azerbaijan on the other side of a border
with an economically floundering Iran does little to allay Iran’s sensitivities. Iran fears
that if Azerbaijan were to reap a great deal of economic success from its Caspian Sea oil
fields, the separatist tendencies of its Azeri population in northwestern Iran would surface
and tear apart the multicultural Islamic Republic. It thus serves Iran’s domestic and
foreign policy interests to demarcate the Caspian Sea in such a way that it limits
Azerbaijani access to economic assets.
89
Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan: Oil and Politics in the Country’s Future,” in Oil and Geopolitics in the
Caspian Sea Region, eds. M. P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 115.
90
Croissant, “Legal Status,” 29.
91
Ibid, 38.
92
Ibid, 29.
36
Thus far, Iran has been unsuccessful in its bid to claim hydrocarbon resources in
the Caspian Sea. Iran has been forced to seek an alternative means, therefore, to increase
its role in the Caspian energy sector, and thereby increase its influence in geopolitics.
With development of oil fields out of the picture, the field that Iran believes will bring it
the highest degree of success in the Caspian energy sector is with transportation. As
DeLay notes, Iran’s infrastructure is well-suited for handling Caspian oil, it is
geographically at the center of the action, and would easily be able to ship oil to world
markets.93 However, the United States has been rather influential in preventing a pipeline
from Azerbaijan to Iran from being built. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was
designed to prevent further economic development of Iran’s energy sector, and was
successful in abrogating a pipeline supported by oil executives to move oil from Baku’s
oil fields to the Persian Gulf.94 Instead, the primary pipeline developed by Western oil
companies currently runs through Georgia and Turkey.
Despite being overlooked as a pipeline destination for Caspian Sea oil, Iran has
still been able to gain a solid foothold in the Caspian energy market through innovative
use of oil “swaps.” These swaps take oil from participating Caspian energy producers for
domestic use in Iran, and then allow the same amount of oil to be distributed from Iran’s
domestic production facilities to the international market in the name of the Caspian
energy provider. This arrangement is lucrative not only for Iran, who reduce
transportation costs of moving oil from its southern oil fields to northern refineries, but
also for Caspian energy providers, who are able to reduce the cost of moving their
product to Asian markets.95
Swaps are particularly useful in terms of Iranian foreign policy. They allow Iran
to raise its local influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, to expand its own
energy markets to increasing markets in Asia, and to more cost effectively provide energy
resources to its northern urban population. Swaps cause the Central Asian and South
Caucasian countries that use them to become dependent upon Iran’s access to distribution
93
Jennifer DeLay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle: A Steel Web of Confusion,” in Oil and Geopolitics in
the Caspian Sea Region, eds. M .P. Croissant and B. Aras, (Westoport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 64.
94
Ibid, 64.
95
Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region, 113.
37
markets for their product.96 If these countries are dependent upon Iran’s access to
distribution markets, it is unlikely that they will support any type of punitive action
recommended by the United States designed to isolate Iran from the global economy.
Indeed, it stands to reason that countries involved with swaps with Iran would be more
likely to support the Islamic Republic’s endeavors to avoid isolation. As such, swaps
enable Iran to be more influential in regional affairs by the “power of the purse.”
Moreover, swaps are a modest means by which Iran can pursue its overall economic
objective in terms of maximizing profits from Caspian energy reserves since it lowers the
price of oil products for its citizens in the northern urban areas of the country where the
vast majority of energy consumption takes place.
The ECO – an Iranian Pipe Dream?
As mentioned above, Iran seeks a legitimate place in the global economic system.
One of the best ways to establish itself in the global economy is via regional integration.
The states created by the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new life to the dead
organization known as the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which was
formed in 1964 by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. The organization was resurrected in 1985
as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), whose purpose is “promoting
economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the Member States.”97 The ECO has
been, since its resurrection, the primary means of contact and cooperation between Iran
and the former Soviet south. It is also the only regional organization of which Iran is a
part whose goal is largely economic in nature. Indeed, part of the Treaty of Izmir
documents the need to pursue “removal of trade barriers” and “integration of the
economies of the Member States with the World Economy to ensure their fuller
participation in the globalization process,” which ultimately would benefit Iran in its
search for regional power.98 Economic cooperation is a “priority in Iranian foreign
96
DeLay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle,” 65.
97
See the ECO secretariat website: http://www.ecosecretariat.org/Detail_info/About_ECO_D.htm
98
The Treaty of Izmir (1996), page 3, retrieved Feb. 3, 2007 from
http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ftproot/Documents/Basics/Treaty_of_Izmir.doc
38
relations with regard to Central Asia and the Caucasus”99 precisely because it is the most
effective means by which Iran can exercise regional influence.
Perhaps more importantly, the ECO as an economic organization is seen as a
politically stabilizing agent for Iran.100 Free trade amongst the member nations of the
ECO brings a greater amount of income to the member nations; greater income means a
more content population and less instability in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In
its pursuit of effective trade agreements and elimination of barriers to trade, Iran has
sought to “combat the drugs trade and organized crime,”101 two very destabilizing factors
in the former Soviet south as well as Afghanistan. Iran sees the economic viability of
Central Asia and the South Caucasus as vital to its own interests, as it promotes stability
in the region.
However, Iran has other designs for the ECO which may not directly be
associated with economics. Iran sees the ECO as a regional organization not only for
economic cooperation across the region, but as a potential free market inclusive of all
predominantly Muslim countries.102 The ECO may be seen by Iran in light of the humble
beginnings of the European Union: it began as a regional economic cooperation between
three Western European countries, but became an organization with decidedly more
ecumenical political agenda-setting powers. Iran’s wishes for the ECO, while currently
espousing the benefits of economics, certainly take into consideration the potential for a
larger international political body capable of wielding more geopolitical power.
Furthermore, the ECO may be an attempt by Iran to offer Central Asian and South
Caucasian nations an alternative to its grouping with the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), a Russian-dominated organization.103
Iran, however, faces hurdles in its attempt to use the ECO for any sort of platform
other than economic cooperation at its most basic level. One of the largest hurdles it
99
Tchangiz Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” in Post-Soviet Central Asia, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane,
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1999), 83.
100
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 32.
101
Ibid, 37.
102
Ibid.
103
Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, 148-149.
39
must contend with is a lack of common vision for the organization on the part of another
co-founder of the ECO, Turkey. Turkey, for the purposes of the Iranian government,
represents a proxy of the West, especially as it has its sights set on becoming integrated
into the European Union. Turkey is hesitant, if not opposed, to Iran’s attempts to use the
ECO for purposes other than economic cooperation. Herzig notes that other countries in
the ECO, such as Uzbekistan, are also wary of Iran’s use of the ECO as a “geopolitical
soapbox” speaking against American involvement in the region, and are not keen on
extending the organization to include cultural or religious matters.104 Moreover, Iran
must overcome obstacles of an economic nature if it wishes to use the ECO as a vehicle
for other geopolitical means; ECO members “have vulnerable economies characterized
by poor performance.”105 Poor economic performance of member nations is
counterintuitive to the organization’s purpose, and must be addressed if Iran wishes to
expand the organization to include matters of deeper social, religious, and political
conviction. It also seems unlikely that Russian interests in the former Soviet south would
accommodate Iran’s designs for a regional organization that would rival Russia’s CIS.
Russian Interests and Iranian Response
Russia has a vested interest in the economic affairs that take place between Iran
and the former Soviet south. Russia, like the countries in Central Asia, also takes part in
oil swaps. It is much cheaper for Russia to engage in swaps than it is for them to
transport oil all the way from Siberia to Western markets via pipeline. Furthermore,
Russia is also a rather important trading partner with Iran. Although Iran’s grand
schemes with regard to the ECO may pose somewhat of a threat to Russia’s regional
organization (CIS), Russia does not fear the organization, nor has it challenged Iran’s
attempts to open greater trade liberalization in the region. Russia largely views the ECO
as baring little teeth, and has been described by the Russian media as an organization that
is “more dead than alive.”106
104
Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South, 37.
105
Entessar, “Iran: Geopolitical Challenges and the Caspian Region,” 157.
40
The Caspian delimitation issue is an interesting caveat on the part of the Russians.
In 1994 when the issue of delimitation came to a head, Russia initially sided with the
Iranians; they thought that the Caspian should be divided as if it were a lake, and that all
the resources of the Caspian should be shared and regulated by all countries bordering the
it. This is largely due to the fact that like the Iranians, the Russian portion of the Caspian
is devoid of any great potential for oil reserves and stood the most to gain economically
by having a “lake” demarcated Caspian. However, as the geostrategic positioning of
Russia became more oriented towards increasing their influence over the former Soviet
states, their position regarding the demarcation of the Caspian also changed. By 1996
Russia took the position that “it can not stop the division of the sea”107 and began to seek
a way in which to demarcate the sea while assuring Iran that it would not renege on its
1921 and 1940 agreements regarding the Caspian. A likely explanation for the change of
heart on the part of the Russians involves Russian investment in the exploration and
development of oil fields in the former Soviet republics’ portions of the Caspian. The
Russian companies LUKoil and Gazprom have featured quite prominently on the Caspian
energy scene, and are keen to retain their profitability in the region.108 With the
withdrawal of support for a “lake” demarcation on the part of the Russians, it seems
unlikely that Iran will be able to gain a share of the Caspian energy wealth; it does not
seek to incur the wrath of Russia by direct conflict with Russian interests, and must
therefore seek alternative methods of profiting from the Caspian (such as pipelines or
swaps).
Iranian interests in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, while expanding, are
still no real threat to Russian power and influence in the region. As the price of oil
increases and Caspian-area dependence on swaps increase, so too could Iranian influence
in the region increase. Any conflict of interest on the part of the Russians would likely
take place at the UN Security Council, where Russia could support American attempts to
disrupt and isolate Iran economically so as to diminish its regional power capabilities.
106
Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” 514.
107
Croissant, “Legal Status,” 34.
108
For an excellent analysis of the involvement of Russian companies in the energy sector of the Caspian
Sea in the former Soviet Republics, see Crandall, Energy, Economics, and Politics in the Caspian Region.
41
Conclusion
Iran’s limited emphasis on economic performance directly following the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 changed significantly as a result of its experience in the Iran-Iraq War
of 1980-1988. The poor economic performance and steady decline of standards of living
combined with public discontent during this period led to a slow but steady liberalization
of their own economy. Increased capital enabled Iran to use economics as a tool of their
foreign policy, particularly after 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
The energy market in particular is tied to Iran’s economy. The economy is
necessary to provide for the Iranian people and limit discontent and potential calls for
secession on the part of ethnic minorities. Therefore, Iran acts in its own economic
interests in the region in order to provide for its people, even at the expense of
Revolutionary ideology. Economic liberalization and foreign investment are no longer
tools of the West’s control over Iran, but rather tools that Iran uses in a broader pursuit of
regional integration and influence in the former Soviet south.
The conflict of interests that has yet to be resolved in the demarcation of the
Caspian is indicative of Iran’s economic policy in the region. Iran sought the greatest
potential economic benefit for itself through development of Caspian oil fields, but
barring their ability to lay claim to the oil fields in the possession of countries like
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Iran has had to be creative in its approach. Iran’s greatest
economic asset in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is its geostrategic position as the
crossroads between the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.
Although attempts to use Iran as a hub for oil transport have been thwarted by the United
States, Iran is still influential in the swaps market, and is still a source of natural gas
transport between Turkmenistan and Turkey.
Iran’s attempt to increase its profile through the ECO has been limited, at best.
The organization has made certain gains so far as economic integration of the region is
concerned; conversely, it is far from the Islamic common market stretching from North
Africa to the Indian Ocean that Iran ultimately wishes to see. Furthermore, Iran’s
attempts to use the ECO for purposes other than trade and economic integration has been
severely limited, as member states have resisted attempts by Iran to expand the
42
organization to deal with matters of cultural identity and religion in the region. Russian
dismissal of the organization as being more “dead than alive” reflects the limited ability
of the ECO to garner regional support for Iran or to limit the influence of Russia.
The economic future bodes well for Iran and its foreign policy endeavors. The
price of oil continues to rise, and US efforts for a full embargo of the nation have been
resisted by Russia and China on the UN Security Council. So long as Iran’s nuclear
ambitions do not change the mind of Western investors or spark American retaliation,
Iran’s economy will likely continue to grow, and the nation will continue to expand its
influence in the former Soviet republics to the north. If this expansion of economic
power continues, though, Iran may have to check its endeavors to avoid a potential
confrontation with Russia. Iran will have to determine whether it finds its good relations
with Russia or an expansion of regional influence is more important to its foreign policy
concerns.
43
CHAPTER 3
IRANIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS
Although many foreign policy strategists put Iran’s cultural policy on the
forefront of its foreign policy agenda, in Central Asia and the South Caucasus the Islamic
Republic’s emphasis on culture is diminished when compared with its security and
economic foreign policies.109 Iran’s foreign policy today is shaped more by pragmatism
and realpolitik than it is by revolutionary Islam and a desire to export the revolution.
Tehran’s reasons for pursuing a foreign policy that relies more on pragmatism than
ideology are many.
The Islamic Republic’s current foreign policy objectives were molded
significantly by its experiences with incorporating radical ideology into its foreign policy
soon after the Islamic Revolution. A strong and coherent culturally-emphasized foreign
policy based on Revolutionary Islam as a prime motivator for geopolitical decision
making was emphasized by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The influence of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran clearly had a profound impact on Iran’s foreign policy objectives. As
such, in its early days the Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to spread the Islamic
Revolution beyond its borders into the Muslim countries of the Persian Gulf.110
However, the Islamic Revolution was not accepted by Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors, and
instead felt an existential threat on their security made by Tehran’s brand of radical
Islam. This threat was part of Saddam Hussein’s reasoning for attacking the Islamic
Republic in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The war had a significant impact on Iran’s
domestic capabilities to provide both a sense of security as well as economic stability for
its citizens. The impact of the conflict shifted Iranian thinking away from Islamic
ideology and towards a foreign policy that was focused on realpolitik and pragmatism.
As Iran was isolated geopolitically and devoid of any influence outside the circles that
supported Revolutionary Islam, the Islamic Republic was forced to reorient its foreign
109
Daniel Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2001), 7.
110
Ibid, 8.
44
policy to meet its security and economic needs. Thus, when the Soviet Union
disintegrated in 1991, a cultural foreign policy was not at the top of Iran’s agenda in the
new former Soviet south.
Nor was the environment ripe for an export of the Islamic Revolution in the
former Soviet republics. Islam had developed quite differently under the tutelage of the
Soviet Union than it had developed in Iran. Soviet leaders emphasized nationalism and
an overarching Soviet culture that naturally included use of the Russian language and
state-sponsored atheism. Religion was allowed to exist in the Central Asian and South
Caucasian Soviet Republics, but it remained in place as a tool of nationalism rather than
as a means of expression of piety.
The cultural impact of the Soviet Union on these countries was not limited to
Islam, and the need for cultural influence came soon after independence. For the
countries of Central Asia as well as Azerbaijan, nationalism was only wrought under the
watchful eye of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, while it flourished in Georgia and
Armenia centuries prior to Soviet occupation. It was the Central Asian countries,
therefore, that subscribed the most to the Soviet-influenced nationalism; independence
brought the overarching Soviet nationalism in these countries to an end, and opened the
door to increase cultural influence from countries like Iran.
Iran’s lack of use of revolutionary Islam as a cultural policy in Central Asia and
the South Caucasus thus stems from these two historical precedents: the lack of success
in exporting the Islamic Revolution to Persian Gulf countries, and the legacy of the
development of Islam under the Soviet Union. Iran’s non-pursuit of the export of the
Revolution is realpolitik at its finest. Tehran now views promotion of revolutionary
Islam outside its borders as potentially destabilizing for the Islamic Republic in terms of
both security and economy. Furthermore, the former Soviet republics are wary of
Revolutionary Islam due to the nature of the development of Islam under the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, Iran must check its own foreign policy desires in the context of
Russia’s foreign policy needs. Iran’s restraint in exporting the Islamic Revolution is best
characterized in the example of Tajikistan, where the political atmosphere was the most
likely to accept an export of radical Islam. Iran could have supported the Islamist
45
Coalition that was in power in Tajikistan, but instead chose to support the Russianbacked ex-communists.
Tehran’s tools for cultural foreign policy are not limited to revolutionary Islam
and ideology, but rather incorporate language, ethnicity, and moderate religious
advances. These tools are all used in Iran’s attempts to spread its influence through the
concept of regionalism. Rather than support the US-dominated unipolar world, Iran has
sought a multi-polar world with itself as a point of power. Its use of cultural influence in
Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, is to open the doors for potential regional
cooperation and to spread its geopolitical authority.
The Failures of the Islamic Revolution
One of the most interesting aspects of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is that it
developed not only as a political movement, nor solely as a cultural one. The Islamic
Revolution existed as a response to political concerns of the Shah’s dictatorship, as well
as a signaling of the desire to return to a less corrupt government based on religious
principles as well as social issues. Interestingly, the revolutionaries in Iran saw the
movement not simply as a domestic issue, but as a movement that Muslims worldwide
would join. The Islamic Republic promoted the export of the Islamic Revolution in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, as it “supported Islamist revolutionary groups in Iraq,
Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.”111 One of the intended aims of the Iranian
government was to bring about an end to the perceived corrupt rule of Muslim countries
who allowed Western and secular interests to supersede the religious interests of its
Muslim population. The leaders of Muslim countries, Iranian thinking supposed, had
allowed corruption of government to take place; the people of these countries would
support Islam rather than corruption for governance and guidance. Characterizing the
global nature of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Noori, a professor of theology at the
University of Tehran wrote in 1985,
111
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 8.
46
It [the Islamic Revolution] has sprung forth from the very souls of those
Muslim masses who were crushed by imperialism for centuries and whose
Islamic character was severely repressed.112
The export of the Islamic revolution was a grassroots movement supported by the
intelligentsia of Iran as a movement that would bring Muslim countries in the Persian
Gulf region into alignment with Iran against Western and Communist interests in the
region. Surrounding Persian Gulf countries, however, did not welcome the Islamic
Revolution with open arms as Iran assumed they would. Conversely, many of these
countries actually felt threatened by the Shi’ite dominated Iranian brand of Islam, and
more importantly felt threatened by what they saw as a potentially violent overthrow of
their respective governments.113 Rather than open direct lines of communication and
extend Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf region, the rhetoric to export the Islamic
Revolution instead isolated Iran in the Persian Gulf and precipitated a conflict with its
secular neighbor Iraq.
The war with Iraq and the isolation on the part of Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors
had a significant effect on Iran’s foreign policy as it relates to matters of cultural and
religious policy. Iran was no longer afforded the luxury of dealing with her neighbors
strictly in Revolutionary terms, but had to use a more realistic political approach. Issues
of economic and security concerns took precedence over religious and Revolutionary
concerns, particularly as the immediacy of the Islamic Revolution drew to a close.114
When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, the war with Iraq that had only just
ended in 1988 was a far more recent memory for Iranians than the Islamic Revolution of
1979. Tehran had two choices of what to do in the former Soviet south: they could either
continue to follow a policy centered on exporting revolutionary Islam as they had
attempted in the Persian Gulf, or they could institute a policy based on pragmatism. The
nation chose to approach relations with the former Soviet republics far more cautiously
112
Ayatollah Allama Yahya Noori, Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran (Glasgow, Scotland:
Royston Limited, 1985), 36.
113
Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia,
Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Rubeinstein and O. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 115.
114
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era , 9.
47
than its radical approach to Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbors immediately following the
Islamic Revolution.
Cultural Cautiousness
Cultural aspects of Iran’s foreign policy, particularly religion, had dominated the
international political scene under the guidance of Khomeini. Aggressive and unabashed
use of religion in developing Iran’s foreign policy had been the norm during the
leadership of Khomeini. Hunter describes the change of Iran’s foreign policy orientation
under the Ayatollah Khomeini as enhancing “the ideological and universalist – as
opposed to statist and nationalist – dimensions of its foreign policy” as Iran’s primary
foreign policy objective was “the spread of revolutionary Islam.”115 Iran’s foreign policy
changed significantly after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, as is exemplified in Iran’s
dealings with the former Soviet states on its northern frontier. With the advent of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iran approached its relations with its new neighbors to
the north with relative caution that it did not exhibit towards its Persian Gulf neighbors in
the decade following the Islamic Revolution.
There are a few reasons for this cautiousness, the most important of which is the
need for geopolitical stability. The Iran-Iraq War, which began only a year after the
Islamic Revolution, was in part the result of the threat perceived by Saddam Hussein of
the call by Iran for the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq. The war lasted eight
years and wreaked havoc upon Iran’s economy and its ability to provide for its own
security. The absence of economic and physical security as a result of exporting the
Islamic Revolution led to the belief that rather than establishing a multinational,
multiethnic Islamic safe haven, the exportation of the Revolution was in fact a catalyst
for conflict between Iran and the countries it sought to embrace through Islamic
solidarity.116 The revolutionary leadership of Iran, including Ayatollah Khomeini,
realized that Iran would have to change aspects of this revolutionary ideology in order to
maintain its own economic and security guarantees; in the mid-1980s diplomatic relations
115
Shireen Hunter, Iran after Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 106.
116
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 8-9.
48
were opened with all countries except the United States, Israel, and South Africa at the
behest of Khomeini.117
Current Iranian foreign policy follows the transition made from the early stages of
the Islamic Revolution to be more aware of the need for geopolitical stability. It is most
interesting to note, therefore, that Iran’s dealings with the independent former Soviet
republics have not emphasized religion to the extent that one might expect from a
revolutionary Islamic state. It is exceedingly more interesting as the majority of at least 6
former Soviet republics are predominantly Muslim,118 one of which (Azerbaijan) adheres
to the same particular branch of Shi’ite Islam as Iran: Twelver Shi’ism. The restraint
shown by Iran in its cultural dealings with the former Soviet republics reflects the shift of
importance of revolutionary ideology in the Islamic Republic. The relations between Iran
and the former Soviet republics are complex and necessarily involve the relations
between Iran and Russia as well as the relations between Russia and the former Soviet
republics. Iranian foreign policy with regard to culture has by and large shifted from a
religiously dominated orientation to a secular policy that emphasizes ethnic and linguistic
ties while, to a large degree, it deemphasizes radical Islam as a focal point of relations.
The Soviet Cultural Legacy
Iran’s positioning insomuch as cultural policy in the former Soviet south is
concerned must be taken into consideration along with an understanding of cultural
experiments that took place in these republics under Soviet rule. When the Bolsheviks
came to power in Russia, they quickly absorbed the territories of the Russian Empire,
created borders on maps, and named them Soviet Socialist Republics. During its long
rule over the Central Asian and South Caucasian nations, the Soviet Union exerted a
significant amount of influence and sought to change the landscape of the cultural
conditioning of these Soviet Socialist Republics. Josef Stalin’s Nationalist Policy was
most instrumental in changing the socio-political identity of Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. Stalin’s idea was that of “divide and rule.” He created arbitrary borders that
117
Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 115.
118
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan
49
were not indicative of ethnic populations, and then he attempted to create an ethnic
identity in that country if one did not exist prior to the Soviet absorption of Russian
Empirical territories.119 Countries like Armenia and Georgia, however, had a wellestablished national identity that was created centuries prior to Russian and Soviet rule,
and thus had no need of arbitrary nation creation by the Soviets. The attempt was to
create a sense of nationalism in the new Soviet republics, and then supplant that
nationalism with the idea of a superior all-encompassing Soviet identity. Stalin and
Lenin strategically developed a system in which nationalism, they believed, could not
grow unless it was the supra-nationalism of the Soviet state. This then, could consolidate
Soviet (Russian) authority, power, and influence in the region to serve its own selfinterests.120 Russian was promoted as the national Soviet language, and many Russians
immigrated to these new Soviet republics to provide good socialist leadership for the
indigenous peoples. The Russian culture was promoted significantly, and the process of
Russification began in the early years of the Soviet Union.
Another effect of the Soviet control over the Central Asian and South Caucasian
Soviet Socialist Republics was that it changed the history of these countries. A great deal
of Persian influence had been wielded in Central Asia and the South Caucasus from prehistory until the Russian conquest in the 19th century. At one point in time or another, the
Persian Empire extended from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea to Egypt and the
Arabian Peninsula to the borders of China. The Soviet conquest erased this long chapter
of cultural connections between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Iran. In order to
attempt to create separate national identities, the Soviets chose different aspects of the
common cultural identity of the peoples of the region, and attributed them to different
countries they had created. Hunter mentions that “the heritage of the Iranian Sammanids
was attributed to the Uzbeks, while Iranian cultural heritage was attributed to the Tajiks,”
a process which did not reconcile the connection of both groups to a common Iranian
culture.121 This historical revisionism was rather useful for the Soviets in creating a
119
The Uzbeks, for example, were a creation of the Soviet State but became a separate cultural identity
under Moscow’s designs.
120
Shireen Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 9.
121
Ibid, 10.
50
national identity for the Central Asian countries that did not have a solid foundation of a
sense of “nationhood.” However, what was a convenient tool for the Soviets in the
creation of a Soviet identity ultimately became the undoing of the Soviet Union, as
nationalism reached a fever pitch that reached its apex in the disintegration of the USSR
in 1991.
The Soviets left another cultural legacy for Central Asia and the South Caucasus
in terms of the pursuit of religion. As the Soviets were ardent atheists, the cultural policy
they instituted succeeded Christianity and Islam with atheism. Although atheism did not
really take strong root in the Central Asian and South Caucasian Soviet Socialist
Republics, they did to a large extent limit the ability of believers to worship freely.
Religious movements were taken underground, and the influence of religious institutions
paled in contrast to the influence of the Soviet apparatus.
Culture and Nationalism in the Former Soviet South
Independence can be characterized differently for the South Caucasus and Central
Asia. The countries in the South Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Armenia, had a very
solidified and institutionalized cultural self-identification. The conflict over
administration rights between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the province of NagornoKarabakh during the waning moments of the Soviet Union had blossomed into a fullscale war that further nationalized the two states. Georgia, for its part, was busy fighting
a civil war to assert Georgian nationalist control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For
these countries, independence from the Soviet Union meant the opportunity to extend
regional autonomy and authority over culturally and historically significant areas. For
Central Asia, however, independence came largely as a shock. As Atabaki mentions, the
Central Asian Soviet Republics “were founded as territorial states and not as nationstates” and largely continued to be so after independence.122 The nationalistic tendencies
of the Central Asian states were not as defined as they were in the South Caucasus, and
the notion of a civil society was not strongly developed in Central Asia. The Soviet
122
Touraj Atabaki, “The Impediments to the Development of Civil Societies in Central Asia,” in PostSoviet Central Asia, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1999), 38.
51
nationality thus appealed to those in Central Asia as a means of identification, and this
identity was stripped after the advent of independence.
The ramifications for the notion of cultural identification are two-fold. Firstly, the
newly independent nations that already have a strong sense of identity and culture are
unlikely to seek new means of identification after independence. Instead, they will look
to nationalistic figures from their well-established history as a means to further
nationalistic agenda and to solidify their cultural identification. Secondly, the newly
independent nations that do not have a strong sense of national identity, namely the
Central Asian nations, will be forced to find a source for nationalism. Some would find
nationalism in the revised history presented to the nation via the Soviet Union (ie
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), while others would be more apt to cultural identification
from a point in time further in the past. For Iran’s cultural policy, then, those countries
without a significant civil society or cultural identity that was firmly established prior to
the conquest by the Soviet Union would be more open to establish cultural ties with Iran
in a search for national identity.
Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus123
Although Communism had taken root in the Soviet Union as a whole, it was not
able to replace religious ideology completely. In the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic, for example, the Orthodox Church was not stamped out completely; the
Communist Party did, however, put a great deal of pressure on the adherents of
Orthodoxy and did not make it easy for them to practice their religion freely. Similarly,
in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Socialist Republics, the Communist Regime was
unable to replace Islam completely with its ideology in a cultural context.124
123
As Armenians and Georgians would identify themselves primarily as Christians, discussions of Islam in
the South Caucasus for the purposes of this paper are limited to Azerbaijan, as Iranian cultural inroads to
Armenia and Georgia would not involve Islam.
124
Tchangiz Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” in Post-Soviet Central Asia, eds. T. Atabaki and J. O’Kane,
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), 81-82.
52
The brand of Islam that was brought to the Central Asian countries was Sunni
Sufism, which embraced a mystical understanding of one’s relation to God.125 As such,
there was not a need to attend a mosque or to even have traditional infrastructure in place
for the cultural Islamic character to remain within Central Asia. Islam as a system of
beliefs that governed every day life and how the individual acted in society was not
supplanted by Communism. The impact of Communism on Islam in Central Asia was
more on the infrastructure of Islamic organizations, as religious organizations operated
under the supervision of the Communist Party.126 Official religion was therefore largely
a source of nationalism rather than spirituality,127 and was seen by the Communist Party
as a tool of control rather than a threat to Party authority.
By contrast, Azerbaijan was influenced most by Twelver Shi’ite Islam, as it was
heavily influenced by the Persian Empire until Russian and later Soviet occupation. This
sect of Islam is the same type of Islam that is predominant in Iran, and its history is full of
existence within the regimes of detractors. From the early days of the Shi’at ‘Ali, or
“Partisans of Ali,” the Shi’a have been more or less opposed by the widespread and
dominant Sunni Islam sect. Shi’ism accounts for this opposition, and “taqiyya,” the act
of concealing true faith for the purposes of prolonging the lives of family or self, is a
long-standing tradition that is highly acceptable for adherents to the religion.128
Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, was not removed by
Communism although it was shaped and influenced by it. Communism did not provide a
true alternative to Islam as a cultural means of self-identification and action within
society. Conversely, it affected the structure of Islam and the ability of Muslims to
practice Islam as they saw fit within the Soviet Union. The Islam that emerged out of the
ashes of the Soviet Union in the newly independent republics of Central Asia and
125
Edward Walker, “Islam, Islamism, and Political Order in Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs
56 no.2 (2003): 23.
126
Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” 82.
127
Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan: reform, reaction, and civil war,” in New States, New Politics: Building the
Post-Soviet Nations, eds. I. Bremmer and R. Taras, (Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press,
1997), 618.
128
For an excellent discourse of this and other Shi’a development issues, see S.H.M. Jafri, The Origins and
Early Development of Shi’a Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
53
Azerbaijan was not the same type of Islam that developed in countries with regimes that
supported Islam. It developed more as a means of which to promote nationalism (ie “all
Turkmen are Muslims”) and a cultural tool that gave the community a certain notion of
ethos rather than regulating every aspect of life. In other words, that it emerged from
Azerbaijan and Central Asia at all speaks of Islam’s abilities in self-preservation; that it
emerged in the form shaped by the Communist Party speaks of its practical and secular
applications as a means of which to solidify Communist rule by promoting nationalism.
Why not Revolutionary Islam in the Former Soviet South?
With the advent of independence in the former Soviet republics, many political
scientists theorized that the influence of Iran in the region would largely stem from its
export of Revolutionary Islam to Central Asia and Azerbaijan. However, Iran has shied
away from using its brand of Revolutionary Islam as a means of which to bring cultural
ties closer with these nations. Although religion does play a role in Iran’s foreign policy,
it has developed a more “secular” foreign policy in its dealings with Central Asia and the
South Caucasus.129 When Turkmenistan’s president was asked about the threat posed by
the potential Iranian export of the Islamic Revolution, he responded that he “could see
neither an exporter nor anybody who can use such exports.”130 Tehran’s emphasis for
cultural ties in the region have been more focused on historical ties with Iran than any
push to start an Islamic Revolution in these predominantly Muslim countries.
There are a few key reasons that leadership in Iran has decided not to pursue an
aggressive policy of radical revolutionary Islam in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
One of the biggest obstacles for an Iranian export of the Islamic Revolution to the former
Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is Iran’s need for political and
economic stability in the region.131 Political stability is necessary because of the large
numbers of minorities within Iran that have the potential ability to cause problems for the
129
Hooman Peimani, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey,
and Russia, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 32.
130
Shireen Hunter, “Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy,” Journal of International Affairs 56 (2), 140.
131
Peimani, Regional Security, 32.
54
leadership of Tehran.132 The Islamic Republic had a profoundly negative experience in
its conflict with Iraq, and sees the potential for other conflicts just on the other side of the
border or within its own borders. As Byman et al poignantly remind us, in Iran “ethnic
minority groups are concentrated mainly in border areas and have ties with ethnic groups
or states across the border.”133 The Islamic Republic is multi-ethnic, and Iran fears that
some of its citizens will identify more with their ethnic identity than with their national
identity. Iran is most fearful of its Azeri minority in the northwest of the country, and the
potential for that population to be disengaged and dissatisfied with Tehran’s governance
in lieu of its independent northern neighbor.134 If Iran were to pursue a policy of export
of the Islamic Revolution, they will likely run into opposition from leadership in these
countries. Furthermore, there is a great probability that these countries would attempt to
marginalize Iran’s ability to export revolutionary Islam by attempting to mobilize ethnic
minorities against Tehran. For its own security and to maintain stability in Central Asia
and the South Caucasus, it is within Iran’s best interests not to pursue a cultural foreign
policy designed around the export of the Islamic revolution as its keystone.
Regional stability is desired by Iran mostly, however, because of the economic
repercussions of its war with Iraq. The Islamic Republic lost a great deal in terms of
infrastructure, industry, and manpower during the Iran-Iraq War. Its economy was in
shambles, and its economic relations with other countries proved to be rather weak and
incapable of obtaining resources and money to repair the country’s damage. Iran’s
efforts with regard to Central Asia and the South Caucasus, therefore, are “to improve
bilateral relations with Iran’s trading partners and neighbors in particular, and to avoid or
minimize tension.”135 Revolutionary Islam is certainly a point of tension, and is capable
of closing potential economic partners off from Iran. In terms of cultural policy, Iran
places a greater emphasis on stability and ease of obtaining economic cooperation than
on the export of the Islamic Revolution.
132
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 78-79.
133
Ibid, 13.
134
Gareth Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia Turkey,
and Iran, eds. A. Rubinstein and O. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 102-103.
135
Peimani, Regional Security, 32.
55
Iran has declined to pursue an aggressive promotion of revolutionary Islam in
Central Asia and the South Caucasus also because of the wariness and fear on the part of
the newly independent republics of Islamic radicalism.136 One of the results of the Soviet
occupation and the Soviet control of religious groups and promotion of atheism was in
some Central Asian countries a resurgence of religious political parties and movements.
Many of these movements have been particularly Islamic in character, and some have
been violent in their attempts to obtain their political goals. This is the case of the
Russian North Caucasus just across the border from Georgia, particularly in the area of
Chechnya. Radical Islam in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989
led to a civil war that only ended when the Taliban took full control of the country in
2000. Radical Islam borders both the South Caucasus as well as Central Asia, and the
result of such a form of Islam has resulted in conflict in both cases; opposition in the
region to radical Islam runs high.
After the fall of the Soviet empire, Iran was seen largely as the bastion of Islamic
involvement in political struggles in the region because of its past Islamic Revolution.
However, as Byman et al remind us, Iran’s war with Iraq caused Tehran to be rather
cautious, as it failed time and time again to spread the Islamic Revolution to its Persian
Gulf neighbors.137 Iran had to work hard, therefore, if it was to convince its neighbors,
particularly those countries with Islamic opposition parties138 that the sights it had set on
those countries did not involve an export of the Islamic Revolution. As Iran’s motivation
for involvement in the region is largely economic, as mentioned above, export of the
Revolution would be contrary to Tehran’s realpolitik needs. Although revolutionary
Islamic rhetoric in terms of both a cultural policy and a security policy would demand
that Iran support Islamic parties in the former Soviet Union, Iran has instead actively
pursued non-involvement with Islamic movements in the region.
Another reason for the restraint in seeking an export of the Islamic Revolution in
the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus has to do with
Iran’s relations with Russia. The Russian Federation is the most important partner that
136
Ibid.
137
Byman et al, Iran’s Security Policy, 8.
138
Namely, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
56
the Islamic Republic has in the region: in addition to their cooperation on trade issues,
Russia is also Iran’s primary source of arms and technology. Moscow is also the most
powerful country in the region, and it would not bode well for Iran’s security interests to
intentionally provoke its neighbor to the north. What this means for Iran’s cultural policy
is that it must check its interests in promoting Iranian cultural ties with Central Asia and
the South Caucasus to ensure that its interests do not clash with those of Russia. 139
Russian troops acting in the interest of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) are stationed throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus,
in order to protect the territorial integrity of the CIS members as well as to act swiftly
against any perceived threat to Russia or the CIS. One of the perceived threats Russia is
prepared to act against is the Islamic “threat from the south.”140 If Iran was to export the
Islamic Revolution to its new northern neighbors in an attempt to garner cultural
influence, it would likely instead find itself faced, at the very least, with increased tension
with Russia. The export of the Revolution in Central Asia and the South Caucasus would
cause Iran to lose its most important trading partner and source of arms and technology,
as well as turn that partner into an enemy.141 Realpolitik interests in its relations with
Russia mean that the export of the Islamic Revolution to the former Soviet south is
simply not an option for the Islamic Republic in terms of its cultural policy.
The case of Tajikistan clearly characterizes both the former Soviet republics’
opposition to radical Islam as well as Iran’s restraint in supporting revolutionary Islam in
the region. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a political power struggle emerged in
Tajikistan between the former Communist leadership of the country and an alliance of
various Islamic-oriented parties. The Islamic party coalition was far from the
revolutionary Islam characterized by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and it promoted
democratic reform coupled with an Islamic sense of morality.142 This, however, did not
stop the characterization of the coalition by the former Communists as being “radical
139
Shahram Chubin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Intentions Capabilities & Impact (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 7.
140
Winrow, “Azerbaijan and Iran,” 106.
141
Peimani, Regional Security, 57.
142
Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 121.
57
Islamists” that would employ tactics and rule similar to the Iranians in their Islamic
Revolution.143 The relatively moderate and modest aims of the Islamic-democratic
coalition were seen regionally in light of the Islamists in neighboring Afghanistan or
Chechnya on the other side of the Caspian Sea. This characterization was further
solidified as the political conflict between the ex-Communists and the Islamists turned
into a full-scale civil war that devastated the country.
Iran operated in the Tajikistani civil war with a great deal of restraint in terms of
its potential to export the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic republic officially declared
that it would remain uninvolved in the civil war, and that it had no desire to export the
Islamic Revolution to Tajikistan.144 Furthermore, Iran went so far as to show support for
the secular ex-Communist Tajikistani leaders when they took over the Tajikistani capital
of Dushanbe, and to deliver humanitarian aid to the civil war-ravaged country.145 This
restraint in Iran’s actions was coupled with Iran’s desires and attempts to broker a peace
deal between the warring parties in Tajikistan. Tehran was attempting to send a clear
signal to the rest of the former Soviet south in terms of how it would deal with the
question of where Islam belonged in former Soviet politics. The signal sent by Iran
seems to be that Islam is less important than the normalization of relations between the
Islamic Republic and the former Soviet republics, a stable and productive former Soviet
south, and strong economic relations between Iran and the former Soviet south.
If not Revolutionary Islam, then What?
Although Revolutionary Islam is the most visible aspect of Iranian culture, it is far
from being the only viable cultural connection between Iran and the republics of the
former Soviet Union. Linguistic and ethnic issues are at the forefront of Iran’s cultural
foreign policy as Tehran seeks to build bridges of understanding and inroads of influence
into its neighbors to the north. Persian language and culture has a history and had an
impact in the Central Asian and South Caucasian states, Iranian logic surmises, and time
143
Ibid.
144
Peimani, Regional Security, 32.
145
Ibid.
58
spent under the domination of the Soviet Union severed those ties. Iran’s realpolitik
interests hold that in order to garner influence in geopolitics, it must first start with reestablishing the cultural ties that were severed by the Soviet Union with the countries of
Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Furthermore, religion does play a part in Iran’s
foreign cultural policy, albeit a much more diminished role when compared to the aims of
revolutionary Islam. Religion is used in Iran’s foreign policy only in terms of its cultural
connection with the countries of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and not in any sense of the
export of revolutionary Islam characterized by the Islamic Republic’s early days of
foreign policymaking.
Languages are a key form of self-identity in a cultural context, and also can be
used as a component of nationalism. In the case of Central Asia and the South Caucasus
after 1991, linguistic ties help to establish a line of communication as well as orientation
between the former Soviet republics and their more powerful neighbors. Prior to the
establishment of the Soviet Union, the people of Central Asia and Azerbaijan used Arabic
script for writing, and Persian was the “administrative and cultural language” of the
area.146 Eventually, however, the Soviet Union introduced Cyrillic script for use in
Central Asia as a means by which to solidify the created nationalism (Peimani notes that
the republics each had a unique set of Cyrillic letters to differentiate nationalities)147 as
well as to pave the way for Russian to be used as the de facto administrative and
supranational Soviet official language.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, therefore, one of Iran’s policy
objectives is to reunite Central Asia with its Iranian cultural roots, and language is the
keystone with which Iran can make this connection. The only country in the region that
speaks Farsi, the most widespread language used in Iran, is Tajikistan.148 Therefore,
although Tajikistan does not share a border with Iran, it is a country that is of utmost
importance for Iran insofar as culture is concerned. Tehran actively supported the
decision to replace Cyrillic script with the Arabic script in Tajikistan in order to make the
146
Peimani, Regional Security, 45.
147
Ibid.
148
Mesbahi, “Iran and Tajikistan,” 119.
59
written language mutually intelligible in both countries.149 The result of this change
increased education opportunity and cooperation between the two countries, as Iran
provided school textbooks and other media to Tajikistan.150 The Islamic Republic also
provided scholarships for Tajik students to study in Iranian universities. Furthermore,
this cleared a path for an increased cultural exchange of literary work, both Iranian and
Tajik, as well as television broadcasts from Iran into Tajikistan.
All of these efforts to increase the language compatibility between Iran and
Tajikistan should really be viewed as an Iranian attempt to gain influence in Tajikistan
through cultural means. By promoting the use of Farsi and Arabic script, Iran was then
able to promote prominent Iranian literary works. Additionally, the promotion of the use
of Arabic script undeniably sought to attach the Tajik people historically to the Persian
through the use of their common language. Most importantly, the promotion of the use
of Arabic script was a harmless and non-intrusive means by which Iran could shift
identification on the part of the Tajikistanis away from the Cyrillic script-using Russians
toward the camp of the Arabic script-using Iranians. Iran could simply use the argument
that the language is more easily expressed in written form through use of the Persian
script without eliciting much argument from the Russians.
Religion has also been used in Iran’s foreign policy, although it has not been in
the form of Revolutionary Islam that many expected. Although Rubinstein characterizes
the Russians as unconcerned about Iran’s spread of the “Iranian revolution” in Central
Asia and the South Caucasus,151 the reality is that the religious factors promoted in the
region bear hardly any semblance of the Islamic Revolution that ousted the Shah in 1979.
It is more accurate to characterize the Iranian spread of missionaries, teachers, and
assistance in building mosques not as a spread of Revolutionary Islam, but rather as a
counter to the strong Sunni presence in the region supported by countries like Saudi
149
Ibid, 123.
150
Edmund Herzig, Iran and the former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1995), 51.
151
Alvin Rubinstein, “Moscow and Tehran,” in Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia
Turkey, and Iran, eds. A. Z. Rubinstein and O. M. Smolansky, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995),
52.
60
Arabia and Egypt.152 The Iranian use of religion is not an attempt to overthrow
governments and spread the Islamic Revolution; it is simply an attempt to gain regional
credibility and spread regional influence.
Regionalism and Iranian Culture
The cultural issues put forth by Iran’s foreign policy seek to reinforce a strong
sense of regionalism in Central Asia and the South Caucasus with Iran at the core.
Regionalism is the tool that Iran can use to reorient the former Soviet nations away from
dependency on Russia, and towards a more solidified relationship with the Islamic
Republic. Iran’s endeavors in regionalism are important not only to keep the country
from being isolated geopolitically, but rather to reinforce the potential for Iranian
influence and build the nation up in terms of geopolitical authority. Herzig recognizes
the importance of culture in developing a regional policy, as “Iranian conceptions of
regionalism generally attach importance to culture both as a defining feature and as a
basis for cooperation.”153 In regional organizations promoted by Iran, then, the influence
of culture is inseparable from both the means in which cooperation is promoted as well as
the reasons for cooperation to begin with.
Promotion of a clear cultural policy is for Iran a means by which it can promote
its desire for regionalism. It is not globalism that Iran fears; rather, it is the American
dominance in geopolitics and unipolarity that the Iranians wish to marginalize.154 In this
context, the nature of the Islamic Republic’s cultural policy with regard to Central Asia
and the South Caucasus becomes clearer. By promoting cultural understanding and
linking Central Asian and South Caucasian cultural identity to Iran, Tehran is attempting
to garner support for its regional capabilities and limit American unipolar influence in the
region as a whole.
152
Peimani, Regional Security, 57-58.
153
Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia” International Affairs 80 no.3 (2004): 510.
154
Ibid.
61
For example, within Iran’s primary regional organization, the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Islamic Republic strongly touts shared cultural
values between members of the organization. Although some critics, such as Pahlevan,
see the ECO as ineffective as an economic organization and “only a framework for a
minimum possible cooperation at the regional level,”155 Iran sees the organization in
terms of not only its economic effectiveness. Iran views the successes of the ECO with
regard to its ability to connect member states culturally as well as economically, with the
former eventually contributing to the success of the latter.156 It has been the Islamic
Republic of Iran that has emphasized the Islamic nature of the ECO, and that has
attempted to use the organization to expand cooperation between the member nations
beyond economics to include issues of language, culture, and religion.157 Iran has used
the ECO as a tool to promote regionalism and as a means of which to expand its regional
power to the detriment of the United States and Russia; it has used cultural issues, such as
religion, in order to attempt to forge strong relations between the member states of the
ECO and Iran.
Conclusion
Iran’s cultural foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus was strongly
influenced by its experiences in attempting to export the Islamic Revolution as well as the
legacy left by Soviet occupation of the region. Its failures in its attempts to export the
Islamic Revolution to countries of the Persian Gulf immediately after the ousting of the
Shah in 1979 signaled Iran’s shift toward more pragmatic and realpolitik orientation of its
foreign policy in lieu of a culturally dominated policy. The impact of Soviet structure left
Central Asian countries in particular in need of cultural influence, but the development of
Islam within the region left it suspicious of any kind of radical Islam, particularly of the
Shi’ite variety.
155
Pahlevan, “Iran and Central Asia,” 87.
156
Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet South, 37.
157
Ibid.
62
The Iranian choice to pursue an aggressive export of radical Islam in the region is
notably absent from the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy agenda. Iran chose not to
pursue an export of Revolutionary Islam to Central Asia and the South Caucasus because
it was not a pragmatic policy to follow. Revolutionary Islam could be a destabilizing
factor in the region, as Iran’s own experience in the war with Iraq showed. Tehran needs
stability in the region in order to protect its own security and economic interests.
Furthermore, the Soviet legacy left the countries of the former Soviet south convinced
that radical Islam would supplant its unique national independence with domination by a
foreign regime. Finally, Iran’s relations with Russia are tenuous enough that Iran must
defer its own foreign policy desires to Russia’s. Russia is too important a trading partner
and too great a power in the region for Iran to upset Russia in its attempts to gain
influence.
Iran’s cultural policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus has promoted
linguistic, ethnic, and religious ties to Iran with the attempt at solidifying its position as a
regional power. Its use of cultural policy as a tool of regionalism signals Tehran’s
pragmatic approach to a geopolitical response to American unipolarity. In contrast to its
foreign policy approach immediately after the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s foreign policy
today does not rely heavily on cultural issues. When it does use cultural issues, however,
it is as a tool to promote regionalism and a return on the part of Central Asian and South
Caucasian countries to the Iranian sphere of influence.
63
CONCLUSION
Iran’s foreign policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus since 1991 provides
a telling example of its foreign policy objectives after the death of its primary ideologue,
Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather than continuing the line of Khomeini’s revolutionary
Islamic objectives, Tehran has instead shifted its foreign policy to reflect a more
pragmatic approach to foreign policy based on realpolitik. The necessity to shift to a
policy based on realpolitik is based on Iran’s experience in the Iran-Iraq War where its
vital security, economic, and cultural needs were threatened and compromised by an
outside power. Therefore, Tehran’s experiences with the former Soviet south in terms of
foreign policy objectives were based on realpolitik rather than tenants of the Islamic
Revolution.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Iran’s primary foreign policy
objective was to guarantee its own security. Accordingly, Tehran advocated a resolution
to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and did not support the Azerbaijani side
in the conflict as revolutionary Islam might have dictated. Iranian fears of the
empowerment of its Azeri minority and the strong possibility of an Azeri separatist
movement were the pragmatic motivation for Tehran to establish strong ties with
“Christian” Armenia in opposition to “Muslim” Azerbaijan.
Tehran’s security concerns of the instability surrounding the Tajikistani civil war
also led it to oppose the Islamists in that country. The other former Soviet Central Asian
countries saw political Islam as a destabilizing factor for the country with the potential to
spillover into their respective countries. As such, the Islamic Republic could not support
the Islamists in Tajikistan without arousing suspicion among the other Central Asian
nations. Therefore, it tacitly voiced its support for the ex-communists in opposition to the
Islamists. Whereas Khomeini’s teachings overtly reflect the need for Muslims to support
other Muslims in opposition to “tyrannical” secularism, Iran instead opted to follow
realpolitik and support the ex-communists.
Iran’s realizations that Russia is the true source of regional authority and power in
the region, as well as its importance in supplying arms and technology (particularly
nuclear technology) to the Islamic Republic play an integral role in Iranian foreign policy
64
in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Due largely to Russia’s development of the
Primakov Doctrine, Iran must play a secondary role in matters involving the former
Soviet south. In terms of Iran’s security policy, it must recognize the role of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces in former Soviet space
acting as the guardian of Russian regional interests. Furthermore, this prevents Iran from
actively supporting any type of Islamic-related government in the region.
The Islamic Republic’s economic and energy foreign policies have likewise
followed realpolitik rather than revolutionary ideology. Although revolutionary Islam
emphatically rejects the notion of Western involvement in the economy of the Islamic
Republic, pragmaticism led to the liberalization of Iran’s economy and the advent of
foreign investment. In terms of Tehran’s foreign policy, most of its contact with the
former Soviet south has been in the economic and energy sphere.
Iran has significant interests in the oil-rich Caspian region, where its interests
converge with those of the other former Soviet nations bordering the sea. Realpolitik in
Iran’s economic foreign policy supposes that those with resources have more power; thus
in the demarcation of the Caspian, Iran seeks a share for itself that will maximize its
profits and ergo, regional power. Furthermore, Iran seeks to marginalize foreign
influence in the Caspian, and therefore it particularly sees Western involvement in
Caspian pipeline development as a threat to its regional authority. Barring a resolution of
the demarcation of the Caspian that is beneficial to Tehran, the Islamic Republic’s most
effective means of maximizing its economic capabilities in the Caspian will likely result
from its use of oil swaps to encourage regional dependence on Iran.
The Economic Cooperation Organization remains another regionalist tool at
Iran’s disposal that seeks to reiterate and reinforce its geopolitical power. Although
established as a means of which to open economic ties, the ECO is becoming a platform
for Iran’s political agenda. It is quite possible, though only theorized, that Iran sees the
ECO as an organization that is similar to the European Economic Community, which was
the forerunner to the European Union. This would certainly seem probable, as economic
integration with the former Soviet Union (among other states) would be a beneficial,
effective, and bloodless way for Iran to end its reliance upon Russia and Russia’s
domination in the region.
65
In terms of Iran’s cultural policy, it is not nearly as important to its foreign policy
as it was in the period directly following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. As is the
case with its security and economic policies, Tehran’s cultural policy also follows
realpolitik rather than revolutionary ideology. The Islamic Republic’s failure to export
the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent invasion by Iraq set the tone for Iran’s cultural
policiy following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union had a great impact on the culture of the former
Soviet republics. Although the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan were
predominantly Muslim in name, in practice they were far more influenced by Soviet
nationalism than they were by Islam. Additionally, Islam was used in these countries as a
means of which to reinforce nationalism under Stalin’s nationalist policy, and thus
religions political movements in these countries were viewed through the lens of their
experience with the Soviet Union.
As revolutionary Islam had a very limited appeal in the former Soviet south, the
Islamic Republic sought different means with which to increase its regional appeal.
Therefore, it has sought to develop ties with Central Asia and the South Caucasus
through linguistic (especially in Tajikistan) and historical ties. At the very least, Tehran
wishes to subvert Russian cultural dominance in the region by promoting the use of
Arabic script instead of Cyrillic script, and has had limited success in these efforts.
The example of Iran’s foreign policy realpolitik in Central Asia and the South
Caucasus since 1991 can be very helpful (though not all-encompassing) to predict future
Iranian action in other regions of the world. This is particularly true of the current
situation in Iraq. If relations with the former Soviet south are any indication, it seems
clear that Iran’s pursuits in Iraq will also be based on realpolitik rather than revolutionary
Islam. Iran will no doubt seek stability in the area in order to reinforce its own security
guarantees, though it no doubt sees American military presence as a threat rather than a
stabilizing factor. It is likely that if and when sectarian violence ends in Iraq, Tehran will
attempt to solidify economic ties with Iraq and extend regional influence through security
and economic measures rather than purely cultural ones. Unless diplomatic ties between
the Islamic Republic and the United States are resolved, however, it remains a guessing
game as to what Iran has planned for its foreign policy future.
66
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70
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
William Jerry Johnston, Jr. was born February 24, 1983 in Wichita, Kansas.
Raised in the Cocoa Beach, Florida area, Johnston attended the Florida State University
where he received his BA in Media Production and Religion in 2004, and his MA in
International Affairs in 2007. His research interests include Russia and the post-Soviet
space, the Middle East, and Iran. In his spare time he enjoys studying religion and
theology, as well as American foreign policy.
71