Purdue University
From the SelectedWorks of Peter J. Aschenbrenner
June, 2014
Table Annexed to Article: Henry Adams’s History
of the United States of America During the
Second Administration of James Madison in MR
Text
Peter J. Aschenbrenner, Purdue University
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/peter_aschenbrenner/252/
TABLE ANNEXED TO ARTICLE:
HENRY ADAMS’S
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF JAMES MADISON IN MR TEXT
[1890, 9 VOLUME EDITION PUB. 1892;
TEXT PRESENTED IS VOLS VII, VIII AND IX]
2 OCL 457
PETER J. ASCHENBRENNER
Department of History, Purdue University
[email protected]
TABLE 457A
{WORD COUNT [3 VOLS.] = 264,016 IN MR TEXT FORMAT
INCLUDES PREFATORY MATERIAL,TABLE OF CONTENTS, FOOTNOTES, BUT
EXCLUDES PAGE HEADERS, FOOTERS, AND INDICES}
History
of the
United States of America
During the Second Administration of
James Madison
By Henry Adams
Vol. I.
Copyright, 1890
By Charles Scribner’s Sons
CONTENTS OF VOL. I
OHAPTXB FAOM
I. England Angrt 1
n. Russian Mediation 26
III. The Extra Session of 1813 ...... 48
IV. The River Raisin 72
y. Proctor and Perrt 99
VI. The Battle of the Thames 128
VII. Dearborn's Campaign 144
VIII. Wilkinson's Campaign 172
IX. Mobile and Fort Mims 206
X. Campaigns among the Creeks 232
XI. The Blockade 262
Xn. ** Chesapeake " and ** Argus " 285
XIII. Privateering 809
XIV. Russia and England 339
XV. * The Last Embargo 364
XVI. Monroe and Armstrong 391
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER I.
The American declaration of war against England,
Julj 18, 1812, annoyed those European nations that
were gathering their utmost resources for resistance
to Napoleon's attack. Russia could not but. regard
it as an unfriendly act, equally bad for political and
commercial interests. Spain and Portugal, whose armies were fed largely if
not chiefly on American grain imported by British money under British
pro- tection, dreaded to see their supplies cut off. Ger- many, waiting only
for strength to recover her freedom, had to reckon against one more
element in Napoleon's vast military resources. England needed to make
greater efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in Russia
and Spain. Even in America, no one doubted the earnestness of England's
wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe insisted on her acquiescence in
their terms, they insisted because they believed that their military position
entitled them to expect it. The reconquest of Russia and Spain by Napoleon,
an erent
almost certain to happen, could hardly fail to force
from England the concessions, not in themselves
unreasonable, which the United States required.
This WBB9 as Madison to the end of his life v^tintained, ^^ a fair calculation ; " ^ but it was exasperating to England, who thought that America ought
to be equally interested with Europe in overthrowing the military despotism of Napoleon, and should
not conspire with him for gain. At first the new
war disconcerted the feeble Ministry that remained
in office ou the death of Spaicer Perceval : they
poiinted on preventing it, and did their utmost to
ptop it after it was begun. The tone of arrogance
which had so long characterized government and
press, disappeared for the moment. Obscure news*
papers, like the London ^' Evening Star," still sneered
fA the idea that Great Britain was to be ^^ driven
from the proud pre-eminence which the blood and
treasure of her sons have attained for her among the
nations, by a piece of striped bunting flying at the mastheads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful
of bastards and outlaws," — a phrase which had great
puccess in America, — but such defiances expressed
a temper studiously held in restraint previous to thi
moment when the war was seen to be inevitable.
Castlereagh did not abandon the hope of peace
mitil Jonathan Russell, August 24, reported to him
the concessions which the President required ante
^ Madison to Whei^ton, Feb. 26; 1827; Works, ill 653.
1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 8
cedent to negotiation, — the stoppage of impressments, dismissal of impressed seamen^ indemnity
for spoliations, and abandonment of paper blockades.
The British secretary intimated that he thought
these demands, as conditions precedent to an armistice, somewhat insulting;* and in conversation he
explained to Russell that such concessions would
merely cost the Ministry their places without result.
" You are not aware," he said,^ " of the great sensibility and jealousy of the people of England on
this subject; and no administration could expect to
remain in power that should consent to renounce
the right of impressment or to suspend the practice,
without certainty of an arrangement which should obviously be calculated to secure its object." Russell
then proposed an informal understanding, — adding of
his own accord, without authority from his Government, a proposal, afterward adopted by Congress,
that the United States should naturalize no more
British seamen. Castlereagh made the obvious reply that an informal understanding offered no more
guaranty to England than a formal one; that it
had the additional disadvantage of bearing on its
face a character of disguise; that in any case the
discussion of guaranties must precede the understanding; and that Russell had on this subject neither authority nor instructions.^
1 Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; State Papers, iii. 689.
* Russell to Monroe, Sept. 17, 1812; State Papers, iii. 693.
3 Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; State Papers, iii 692.
4 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.i.
The correspondence closed September 19, and BusBell left Englaud; but not until October IS, after
learning that the President had refused to ratify the
armistice made by Prevost with Dearborn, did the
British government order general reprisals, — and
even this order closed with a proviso that nothing
therein contained should affect the previous authority given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to
arrange a cessation of hostilities.
The realization that no escape could be found
from an American war was forced on the British
public at a moment of much discouragement. Almost simultaneously a series of misfortunes occurred
which brought the stoutest and most intelligent Englishmen to the verge of despair. In Spain Wellington, after winning the battle of Salamanca in July,
occupied Madrid in August, and obliged Soult to
evacuate Andalusia ; but his siege of Burgos failed,
and as the French generals concentrated their scattered forces, Wellington was obliged to abandon
Madrid once more. October 21, he was again in
full retreat on Portugal. The apparent failure of
his campaign was almost simultaneous with the apparent success of Napoleon's ; for the Emperor entered Moscow September 14, and the news of this
triumph, probably decisive of Russian submission,
reached England about October 3. Three days later
arrived intelligence of William Hull's surrender at
Detroit; but this success was counterbalanced by
simultaneous news of Isaac Hull's startling cap-
18ia. ENGLAND ANGRY. 5
ture of the " Guerriere," and the certainly of a
prolonged war.
In the desponding condition of the British people,
— with a deficient harvest, bad weather, wheat at
nearly five dollars a bushel, and the American supply likely to be cut off ; consols at 67i, gold at thirty
per cent premium ; a Ministry without credit or authority, and a general consciousness of blunders, incompetence, and corruption, — every new tale of
disaster sank the hopes of England and called out
wails of despair. In that state of mind the loss of
the " Guerriere " assumed portentous dimensions.
The "Times" was especially loud in lamenting the
capture : — r
"We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over
high and honorable minds. . • . Never before in the
history of the world did an English frigate strike to
an American; and though we cannot say that Captain
Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for this
act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English
navy who would a thousand times rather have gone down
with their colors flying, than have set their fellow sailors
so fatal an example."
No country newspaper in America, railing at Hull's
cowardice and treachery, showed less knowledge or
judgment than the London "Times," which had
written of nothing but war since its name had been
known in England. Any American could have assured the English press that British frigates before
the " Guerriere " had struck to American ; and even
6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1.
in England men had not forgotten the name of the
British frigate "Serapis," or that of the American
captain Paul Jones. Yet the "Times's" ignorance
was less unreasonable than its requirement that
Dacres should have gone down with his ship, — a
cry of passion the more unjust to Dacres because
he fought his ship as long as she could float. Such
sensitiveness seemed extravagant in a society which
had been hardened by centuries of warfare ; yet the
" Times " reflected fairly the feelings of Englishmen.
George Canning, speaking in open Parliament not
long afterward,^ said that the loss of the "Guerriere "
and the " Macedonian " produced a sensation in the
country scarcely to be equalled by the n^ost violent
convulsions of Nature. "Neither can I agree with
those who complain of the shock of consternation
throughout Great Britain as having been greater
than the occasion required. ... It cannot be too
deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility
of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate
captures."
Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of
believing itself invincible was perhaps the one most
profitably broken ; but the process of recovering its
senses was agreeable to no nation, and to England,
at that moment of distress, it was as painful as Canning described. The matter was not mended by the
" Courier " and " Morning Post," who, taking their
tone from the Admiralty, complained of the enor^ Cobbett's Debates, zziv. 463; Feb. 18, 1813.
1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 7
mous superiority of the American frigates, and called
them " line-of-battle ships in disguise." Certainly
the American forty-four was a much heavier ship
than the British thirty-eight, but the difference had
been as well known in the British navy before these
actions as it was afterward; and Captain Dacres
himself, the Englishman who best knew the relative
force of the ships, told his court of inquiry a different story : ^ "I am so well aware that the success
of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my
earnest wish, and would be the happiest period, of
my life, to be once more opposed to the * Constitution,' with them [the old crew] under my command,
in a frigate of similar force with the * Guerriere.' "
After all had been said, the unpleasant result remained that in future British frigates, like other
frigates, could safely fight only their inferiors in
force. What applied to the " Guerriere " and " Macedonian " against the " Constitution " and '' United
States," where the British force was inferior, applied
equally to the "Frolic" against the "Wasp," where
no inferiority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward admitted what America wished
to prove, that, ship for ship, British were no more
than the equals of Americans.
Society soon learned to take a more sensible view
of the subject, but as the first depression passed
away a consciousness of personal wrong took its
place. The United States were supposed to have
^ James, App. No. 77.
8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
stabbed England in the back at the moment when
her hands were tied, when her existence was in the
most deadly peril and her anxieties were most heayy.
England never could forgive treason so base and
cowardice so vile. That Madison had been from the
first a tool and accomplice of Bonaparte was thenceforward so fixed an idea in British history that time
could not shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so
historical had the causes of war become that no
one even in America could explain or understand
them, while Englishmen could see only that America
required England as the price of peace to destroy
herself by abandoning her naval power, and that
England preferred to die fighting rather than to die
by her own hand. The American party in England
was extinguished ; no further protest was heard
against the war ; and the British people thought
moodily of revenge.
This result was unfortunate for both parties, but
was doubly unfortunate for America, because her
mode of making the issue told in her enemy's favor.
The same impressions which silenced in England
open sympathy with America, stimulated in America
acute sympathy with England. Argument was useless against people in a passion, convinced of their
own injuries. Neither Englishmen nor Federalists
were open to reasoning. They found their action
easy from the moment they classed the United States
as an ally of France, like Bavaria or Saxony ; and
they had no scruples of conscience, for the practical
1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 9
alliance waa clear, and the fact proved sufficiently
the intent.
This outbreak of feeling took place in the month
of October, when the hopes of England were lowest.
While Wellington retreated from Madrid and Burgos
to Ciudad Rodrigo; while Napoleon was supposed
to be still victorious at Moscow, although his retreat
began October 19, two days before Wellington abandoned the siege of Burgos; and while, October 18,
the " Wasp " captured the " Frolic," and October 25
the " United States " captured the ^ Macedonian," —
in England public opinion broke into outcry against
the temporizing conduct of the government toward
America, and demanded vigorous prosecution of the
war.
'^ In any other times than the present," said the
" Times " of October 30, " it would appear utterly
incredible that men should adopt so drivelling a line of
conduct as to think of waging a war of conciliation and
forbearance, and that with enemies whom they themselves represent as alike faithless and implacable."
The Government hastened to pacify these complaints. Orders were given to hurry an overwhelming force of ships-of-the-line and frigates to the
American coast. Almost immediately England recovered from her dismay ; for November 11 news
arrived that the Russians were again masters of
Moscow, and that Napoleon was retreating. Day
after day the posts arrived from Russia, bringing accounts more and more encouraging, until when Par-
10 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
liament met, November 24, the hope that Napoleon
might never escape from Russia had become strong.
Thus the new Ministry found themselves able to
face opposition with unexpected strength. Madison's
calculations, reasonable as they seemed to be, were
overthrown, and the glow of English delight over
the success of Russia made the burden of the
American war seem easy to bear. In Parliament
hardly a voice was raised for peace. The Marquess
Wellesley in the debate on the King's speech attacked ministers, not because they had brought the
country into war with America, but because they
had been unprepared for it; "they ought as states-
men to have known that the American government
had been long infected with a deadly hatred toward
this country, and, if he might be allowed an unusual
application of a word, with a deadly affection toward
France."^ America had been suffered to carry on
hostilities without danger to herself, and must be
convinced of her folly and desperation. Lord Grenville also asserted that the American government
was always hostile to England, but that only the
conduct of ministers had enabled it to pluck up
courage to show its enmity.^ Canning, in the Commons, attacked still more sharply the forbearance
of the Ministry and their silence toward America :
*' It never entered into my mind that the mighty naval
power of England would be allowed to sleep while our
1 Cobbett's Debates, xxiv. 34 ; Nov. 30, 1812.
« Cobbett's Debates, xxiv. 47, 48 ; Nov. 30, 1812.
1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 11
commerce was swept from the surface of the Atlantic;
and that at the end of six months' war it would be proclaimed in a speech from the throne that the time was
now at length come when the long-withheld thunder
of Britain must be launched against an implacable foe,
and the fulness of her power at length drawn out. It
never entered into my mind that we should send a fleet
to take rest and shelter in our own ports in North
America, and that we should then attack the American
ports with a flag of truce." ^
Prom such criticisms Lord Castlereagh had no
difficulty in defending himself. Whitbread alone
maintained that injustice had been done to America,
and that measures ought to be taken for peace.
This debate took place November 30, two days
after the destruction of Napoleon's army in passing
the Beresina. From that moment, and during the
next eighteen months, England had other matters
to occupy her mind than the disagreeable subject
of the American war. Napoleon arrived in Paris
December 18, and set himself to the task of renewing the army of half , a mUlion men which had been
lost in Russia, and of strengthening his hold on
Germany, where a violent popular emotion threatened to break into open alliance with the Russian
Czar. December 30 the Prussian corps of the Grand
Army deserted to the Russians ; and soon afterward
the French abandoned Poland and the province of
old Prussia, and with difficulty, no enemy attacking,
held Berlin. The interest of England turned to the
1 Cobbett's Debates, xxiv. 72; Nov. 30, 1812.
12 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1*
negotiations and militarj movements of the Continent. After January 1, 1813, Englishmen never
willingly thought of the American war, or gave attention to terms of peace. They regarded the result
in America as dependent on the result in Germany ;
and they would have ignored the war altogether had
not the American frigates and privateers from time
to time compelled their attention.
With the prospect of a great trade about to open
with the continent of Europe, as the French garrisons
were driven out of Germany and Spain, English
manufacturers could afford to wait with patience for
better times ; but although a nation so long accustomed to the chances of war could adapt itself
quickly to changes in the course of trade, England
felt more than it liked to admit the annoyance of
American hostilities on the ocean. During the first
few months this annoyance was the greater because
it was thought to be the result of official negligence*
December 30, a merchant writing to the "Times"
declared that "the Americans have taken upward
of two hundred sail of British merchantmen and
three or four packets from the West Indies. Recent
advices from the Windward Islands state that the
Admiral is mortified at the depredations of the
American privateers, it not being in his power to
prevent them, most of the few cruisers under his
orders having been out so long from England that
their copper is nearly off, — so that the privateers
remain unmolested, as they can sail round our ships
1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 13
whenever thej think proper ; thej are in consequence
become so daring as even to cut vessels out of harbors, though protected by batteries, and to land and
carry off cattle from plantations. The accounts from
Jamaica by the mail which arrived on Friday represent that island to be literally blockaded by American
privateers."
When the press spoke at all of naval matters, it
talked wildly about the American frigates. " Such
fearful odds," said the " Morning Post " in regard
to the "Macedonian," December 26, "would break
the heart and spirit of our sailors, and dissolve that
charm, that spell, which has made our navy invmcible." " The land-spell of the French is broken, and
so is our sea-spell," said the " Times." The American frigates were exaggerated into ships-of-the-line,
and were to be treated as such, British frigates keeping out of their way. At first, the British naval
officers hesitated to accept this view of a subject
which had never before been suggested. Neither
Captain Dacres nor his court-martial attributed his
defeat to this cause ; but before long, nearly all
England agreed to rate the American frigates as
seventy-fours, and complained that the Americans,
with their accustomed duplicity, should have deceived
the British navy by representing the " Constitution
and " United States " to be frigates. The " Times
protested in vain against this weakness : —
**6ood God! that a few short months should have
so altered the tone of British sentiments! Is it truei
9f
14 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1.
or is it not, that our navy was accustomed to hold the
Americans in utter contempt? Is it true, or is it not,
that the ' Guerriere ' sailed up and down the American
coast with her name painted in large characters on her
sails, in boyish defiance of Commodore Rodgers ? Would
any captain, however young, have indulged such a foolish
piece of vain-boasting if he had not been carried forward
by the almost unanimous feeling of his associates ? " ^
To the charge that the British Admiralty had been
taken unprepared by the war, the Admiralty replied
that its naval force on the American station at the
outbreak of hostilities exceeded the American in the
:)roportion of eighty-five to fourteen.
"We have since sent out more line-of -battle ships and
heavier frigates," added the *' Times," January 4, 1813.
*' Surely t^e inust now mean to smother the American
navy. . . A very short time before the capture of the
• Guerriere ' an American frigate was an object of ridi-
cule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually
setting the other way, and great pains seem to be taken
by the friends of ministers to prepare the public for the
surrender of a British seventy-four to an opponent lately
60 much contemned."
The loss of two or three thirty-eight gun frigates
on the ocean was a matter of trifling consequence
to the British government, which had a force of
four ships-of-the-line and six or eight frigates in
Chesapeake Bay alone, and which built every year
dozens of ships-of-the-line and frigates to replace
those lost or worn out; but although the ALmerican
^ The Times, Jan. 2, 18ia
181S. ENGLAND ANGRY. 15
privateers wrought more injury to British interests
than was caused or could be caused by the American
navy, the pride of England cared little about mercantile losses, and cared immensely for its fighting
reputation. The theory that the American was a
degenerate Englishman, — a theory chiefly due to
American teachings, — lay at the bottom of British
politics. Even the late British minister at Washington, Foster, a man of average intelligence, thought
it manifest good taste and good sense to say of the
Americans in his speech of February 18, 1813, in
Parliament, that " generally speaking, they were not
a people we should be proud to acknowledge as our
relations."^ Decatur and Hull were engaged in a
social rather than in a political contest, and were
aware that the serious work on their hands had little
to do with England's power, but much to do with
her manners. The mortification of England at the
capture of her frigates was the measure of her previous arrogance.
The process of acquiring knowledge in such light
as was furnished by the cannon of Hull, Decatur,
and Bainbridge could not be rendered easy or rapid.
News of the American victories dropped in at intervals, as though American captains intentionally prolonged the enjoyment of their certain success, in
order to keep England in constant ill temper. News
of the" Java" arrived about the middle of March,
and once more the press broke into a chorus of
^ Cobbett's Debates, xxiv. 626 ; Feb. 13, 1813.
16 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.L
complaints. The "TimeB" renewed its outcry; the
"Courier" abused the "Times" for its "tone of
whining lamentation, of affected sensibility, and
puerile grief," but admitted that the behavior of
the American frigates seemed extraordinary ; while
the "Pilot," the chief naval authority, lamented in
set periods the incomprehensible event: —
** The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall
not presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has
struck to an American. This is an occurrence that calls
for serious reflection, — this, and the fact stated in our
paper of yesterday, that Loyd's list contains notices of
upwards of five hundred British vessels captured in seven
months by the Americans. Five hundred merchantmen
and three frigates ! Can these statements be true ; and
can the English people hear them unmoved? Any one
who had predicted such a result of an American war this
time last year would have been treated as a madman or
a traitor. He would have been told, if his opponents
had condescended to argue with him, that long ere seven
months had elapsed the American flag would be swept
from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States
annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap
of ruins. Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck her flag. They insult and laugh at
our want of enterprise and vigor. They leave their ports
when they please, and return to them when it suits their
convenience ; they traverse the Atlantic ; they beset the
West India Islands ; they advance to the very chops of
the Channel; they parade along the coasts of South
America ; nothing chases, nothing intercepts, nothing en*
gages them but to yield them triumph.'*
1818. ENGLAND ANGRY. 17
The immediate moral drawn from these complaints
was the necessity of punishing the United States ; but
no one could longer denj that the necessary punishment was likely to prove tedious and costly.
February 18 Parliament took up the subject of the
American war, and both Houses debated it. In the
Lords, Bathurst made a temperate speech devoted
to showing that America in claiming immunity from
impressments claimed more than England could afford to yield, — "a right hitherto exercised without
dispute, and of the most essential importance to
our maritime superiority." Lord Lansdowne replied
with tact and judgment, rather hinting than saying
that the right was becoming too costly for assertion.
^' Some time ago it was imagined on all hands that in
the event of a war with America, the first operation
would be the destruction of her navy. What the fact
had turned out to be, he was almost ashamed to mention. K any one were asked what had been the success of our navy in this war, he would unfortunately
find some difficulty in giving an answer." ^ Lord Liverpool, while defending his administration from the
charge of imbecility, tended to strengthen the prevailing impression by the tone of his complaints against
Amer ca : ^^ Although she might have had wrongs,
although she might have had grounds for complaint,
although she might have had pressing provocations,
yet she ought to have looked to this country as the
guardian power to which she was indebted not only
^ CobbeU's Debates, xziv. 682.
TOL. VII. — 2
18 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
for her comforts, not onlj for her rank in the scale
of civilization, but for her very existence." ^ Perhaps
these words offered as good an explanation as the
Prime Minister could give of the war itself, for apart
from the unconscious sarcasm they contained, they
implied that England assumed to act as guardian to
the United States, and had hitherto denied to the
United States the right to act independently.
Both Lord Holland and Lord Erskine gently
glanced at this assumption ; and Erskine went so far
as to intimate that sooner or later England must give
way. " It has been said that this war, if the Americans persist in their claims, must be eternal. If so,
our prospects are disheartening. America is a growing country, — increasing every day in numbers, in
strength, in resources of every kind. In a lengthened contest all the advantages are on her side, and
against this country." The warning lost none of its
point from Lord Eldon, who, always ready to meet
any logical necessity by an equally logical absurdity,
granted that " unless America should think proper to
alter her tone, he did not see how the national differences could be settled."
Such a debate was little likely to discourage
America. Every country must begin war by assert-
ing that it will never give way, and of all countries
England, which had waged innumerable wars, knew
best when perseverance cost more than concession.
Even at that early moment Parliament was evi^ Cobbett's Debates, zziv. 586.
I8ia. ENGLAND ANGRY. 19
dently perplexed, and would willingly have yielded
had it seen means of escape from its naval fetich,
impressment. Perhaps the perplexity was more evi*
dent in the Commons than in the Lords, for Castlereagh, while defending his own course with elaborate
care, visibly stumbled over the right of impressment.
Even while claiming that its abandonment would have
been " vitally dangerous if not fatal " to England's
security, he added that he " would be the last man in
the world to underrate the inconvenience which the
Americans sustained in consequence of our assertion
of the right of search." The embarrassment became
still plainer when he narrowed the question to one of
statistics, and showed that the whole contest was
waged over the forcible retention of some eight hundred seamen among one hundred and forty-five thousand employed in British service. Granting the
number were twice as great, he continued, " could the
House believe that there was any man so infatuated,
or that the British empire was driven to such straits,
that for such a paltry consideration as seventeen
hundred sailors, his Majesty's government would
needlessly irritate the pride of a neutral nation or
violate that justice which was due to one country
from another ? " If Liverpool's argument explained
the causes of war, Castlereagh's explained its inevitable result, for since the war must cost England at
least ten million pounds a year, could Parliament be
so infatuated as to pay ten thousand pounds a year
for each American sailor detained in service, when
20 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1.
one tenth of the amount, if employed in raising
the wages of the British sailor, would bring any required number of seamen back to their ships ? The
whole British navy in 1812 cost twenty million
pounds ; the pay-roll amounted to only three million
pounds; the common sailor was paid four pounds
bounty and eighteen pounds a year, which might
have been trebled at half the cost of an American
war.
No one rose in the House to press this reasoning.
Gastlereagh completed his argument, showing, with
more temper than logic, that England was wholly in
the right and America altogether in the wrong ; the
American government and people were infatuated ;
they had an inordinate and insolent spirit of encroachment and unreasonable hostility; had prostituted their character and showed an unexampled
degeneracy of feeling. "For America he confessed
that he deeply lamented the injury which her character had sustained by the conduct of her government ;
it was conduct unworthy of any State calling itself
civilized and free."
Castlereagh's invective had the merit of being as
little serious as his logic, and left as little sting ; but
what Gastlereagh could say without causing more than
a smile, never failed to exasperate Americans like
drops of vitriol when it came from the lips of George
Ganning. Ganning had not hitherto succeeded better
in winning the confidence of England than in curbing the insolence of America ; he was still in oppo-
1818. ENGLAND ANGRY. 21
sition, while the man whom ux 1807 he could hardly
condescend to consider a rival was Secretary for
Foreign Affairs and leader of the House. Worst of
all, Canning could not escape the necessity of supporting him, for Castlereagh's position in regard to
America was strong, while Canning's own position
was weak and needed constant excuse. In the debate of Feb. 18, 1813, he undertook the difficult task
of appearing to attack Castlereagh while defending
himself.
Canning's speech began by an argument so characteristic as to win the praise of John Wilson Croker,
Secretary to the Admiralty, — a man less than most
politicians prone to waste praise on opponents. Whitbread had quoted, in excuse of the American practice of naturalization, two Acts of Parliament, — one
the 6th Anne, according to which any foreigner who
served two years in any British vessel, military or
merchant, without further condition or even oath,
or more than the statement of the fact of service,
became entitled to every protection of a natural subject of the realm. No words could be more emphatic
than those of the statutes. " Such foreign mariner,"
said the 6th Anne, ^' shall to all intents and purposes be deemed and taken to be a natural-born
subject of his Majesty's kingdom of Great Britain,
and have and enjoy all the privileges, powers, rights,
and capacities " which a native could enjoy. Again,
by the 13th George II. every foreign seaman who in
time of war served two yeai*s on board an English
22 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
ship by virtue of the king's proclamation was ipso
facto naturalized. Other naturalization laws existed,
guaranteeing all the privileges of a natural -bom sub*
ject to foreigners under certain conditions ; but the
Acts of Anne and George II. were most in point, as
they referred to foreign sailors alone ; and with these
laws on the statute-book Parliament seemed to stand
in an unfavorable position for disputing the right of
America to adopt a similar system. Canning's argu*
ment on the meaning of these statutes was interesting, not only as an example of his own mind^but as
the only legal justification of a long war which Eng*
land fought against America at prodigious expense, —
a justification which she ma^ltained for years to be
sound.
*' My construction of the Acts of Anne was altogether
different," said Canning in reply to these quotations.
*' I understood that by it this country professed to give
that only which it is competent to bestow without interfering in any degree with the rights or claims of other
Powers ; that it imparted to foreigners on certain conditions certain municipal privileges, but leaves untouched
and unimpaired their native allegiance. . . . The enactments of this statute are a testimony of national gratitude to brave men of whatever country who may lend
their aid in fighting the battles of Great Britain, but not
an invitation to them to abandon the cause of their own
country when it may want their aid ; not an encouragement to them to deny or to undervalue the sacred and
hidestructible duty which they owe to their own sovereign
and to their native soil."
1818. ENGLAND ANGRY. 28
t
Something pecuUarly sacred must have inhered in
the statute of Anne which thus conferred natm^ali*
zation on Dutch or Swedish seamen as *' a testimony
of national gratitude " for " fighting the battles of
Great Britain " for two years in the British merchant
service in time of peace, and converted them into
citizens enjoying "all the privileges, powers, rights,
and capacities" of natural-born subjects of Great
Britain, which consisted, according to Canning, only
in " certain municipal privileges " in England, subject
to the will of a foreign sovereign. Such a definition
of the " privileges, powers, rights, and capacities "
of a natural-born subject of his Majesty's kingdom of
Great Britain seemed new to American lawyers ; but
it was received with applause by the House, and was
further developed by Croker, who laid down the principle, new to the popular view of England's pride,
that the naturalized citizen, who was by the law required " to all intents and purposes " to " be deemed
and taken to be a natural-born subject," was in fact
by the Admiralty " considered as having two countries, — the voluntary service of the one being looked
upon as unable to debar the natural allegiance to
the other."
The rest of Canning's speech consisted in defence
of impressment and of paper blockades, and in panegyric upon European republics at the expense of " the
hard features of transatlantic democracy." While
assailing the British government because "the arm
which should have launched the thunderbolt was 00*
24 HISTORr OF THE UNITED STATES. te.1.
cupied in guiding the pen/' he expressed his deyont
wish that the war might not be concluded until
England had smothered in victories the disasters to
which she was so little habituated. If an harangue
of this character served in any degree to guide or
aid the councils of England, it served much more
effectually the war-party of America, where Canning,
was held in singular antipathy, and where every admission he made in regard to ^^the shock of con*
stemation" caused by the American frigates gave
pleasure more acute than any pain his sarcastic
phrases could thenceforward inflict.
Alexander Baring spoke with his usual good sense,
pointing out that Castlereagh's speech proved chiefly
the greater interest of England to call for and court
negotiation on the subject of impressments. Whitbread challenged public opinion by going to the verge
of actual sympathy with America. The debate ended
in an unopposed vote for a vigorous prosecution of
the war, leaving the subject in truth untouched, except that England had avowed an extreme desire
to punish America, and naturally felt an extreme
irritation because America showed ability to bear
punishment.
The spring came, bringing no new prospects. England refused to make a suggestion on which the
governments could discuss terms of peace. She refused even to think upon the problem, but massed
a huge armament in Chesapeake Bay and Delaware
River to restore her naval invincibility. Yet reflec-
M18. ENGLAND ANGRY. 26
tion seemed still to be silently at work, for, March
22, the " Times " interrupted its outcry over the loss
of the "Java" by publishing a temperate article on
the new Foreign Seamen Bill of Congress, — an article in which the suggestion first appeared that peace
might after all be restored by simply omitting in the
pacification any mention of impressment. The idea
found support nowhere ; but while, insufficient as it
seemed,, the human imagination could hardly con-
ceive of any other expedient, at the same moment
the uselessness of trying to obtain peace on any
terms was made clear by the interference of the
Russian Czar.
CHAPTER n.
Napoleon declared war against Russia June 22,
four days after the American declaration against
England; crossed the Niemen June 24, and August 1
was already at Vitebsk, about three hundred miles
south of St. Petersburg, and about equally distant
from the frontier and from Moscow. There, in the
heart of Russia, he paused to collect his strength for
some blow that should lay the Russian empire at
his feet; and while he hesitated, the Czar, August 3,
returned to his capital to wait. At that moment
the chances of war favored Napoleon. Nothing was
more likely than his success in destroying the Russian army, and in dictating terms of peace in St.
Petersburg.
News of the American declaration of war reached
St. Petersburg August 6, and added a new anxiety to
the overburdened mind of Alexander. The American minister at that court found himseM in a delicate position. His Government declared war against
England and became for military purposes an ally
of France at the moment when Russia entered into
formal alliance with England and went to war with
France. If Napoleon caught and crushed the Russian
1812. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 27
army and marched on St. Petersburg, the American
minister would certainly be no favorite with Rus-
sians ; if Napoleon were beaten, the American minister need expect no consideration, for in that case
every influence at the Russian Court was certain to
be English, and from England could come no favors.
At the moment when Brock, with his force of a
few hundred men attacked Detroit, Napoleon with
two hundred thousand men moved upon Smolensk
and the Russian army. August 15, he celebrated his
fete-day on the banks of the Dnieper ; and while Hull
was surrendering the fort of Detroit, the Russian
army, hardly in better humor than the Ohio miUtia,
were preparing to abandon Smolensk to save themselves from Hull's fate. Napoleon took possession
of the town August 18, but failed to destroy the
Russian army, and then, turning away from St.
Petersburg, pursued his retreating enemy toward
Moscow. The battle of Borodino, or Moscowa, followed, September 6, and the French army entered
Moscow September 14. There it remained more
than a month.
During these weeks of alarm and incessant fighting,
the Czar still found time to think of American affairs.
The influence of Count Roumanzofif, though lessenmg
every day, still controlled the regular course of foreign relations. September 21 Roumanzoff sent, for
Adams, and said that the Emperor had been much
concerned to find the interests of his subjects defeated and lost by the new war, and it had occurred
28 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.2.
to him that perhaps an arrangement might be more
easily made by an indirect than by a direct negotiation : he wished to know whether an offer of medi*
ation on his part would meet with any difficulty on
the part of the United States.^ Adams replied that
his Govemment could not fail to consider it as a
new evidence of the Czar's friendship, but suggested
that there was a third parly to be consulted, '- — the
British government. Boumanzoff answered that he
had already sounded the British minister, who had
written to Lord Castlereagh on the subject.
The British minister, lately arrived in Russia, was
not a person calculated to aid Boumanzoff. Lord
Cathcart, who had been chosen by Castlereagh for
the post of ambassador at St. Petersburg, was best
known as the commander of the Copenhagen expedition in 1807. Some Americans might perhaps
remember that he had served in America during the
Bevolutionary War. A well-informed writer in the
London " Times," who belonged to the Wellesley interest, seemed to doubt Lord Cathcart's qualifications for his new post. " He is only better fitted for
it than the horse he rides," was the criticism ; * but
the better he had been fitted for it, the worse he would
have suited Boumanzoff's purpose, for his first object
could be no other than to overthrow Boumanzoff and
thwart his policy. No serious support of Bussian
mediation could be expected from him. He began his
1 Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 21, 1812; ii. 401.
* Varus, in the " Times,'* Oct. 26, 1812.
im. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 29
career by seeking access to the Emperor through other
channels than the chancellor.^
Adams, September 80, advised his Government of
the Czar's proposed mediation. October 15, Ron*
manzofF announced that his proposal was ready, and
would be sent at once to Washington, — which was
actually done, before receiving a reply from London.
The step could hardly please the British government ;
but Roumanzoff seemed almost to take pleasure in
disregarding England, and perhaps felt that the
course of events must either remove him entirely
from the government, or make him independent of
British support. He clung to the American media*
tion as the last remnant of his anti-British policy.
The British government would have preferred to
make no answer to the Russian offer of mediation.
To English statesmen the idea was absurd that England could allow Russia, more than France or the
United States themselves, to mediate on blockade
and impressment, or upon points of neutrality in
any form ; but Castlereagh had every reason to
conciliate the Czar, and rather than flatly reject a
suggestion from such a source, he replied that he
thought the time had not yet come, and that the
offer would not be accepted by America.* So it
happened that the offer of Russian mediation went
to America without positive objection from England,
* Diary of J. Q. Adams, Oct. 21, 1812 ; ii. 414.
' Diary of J. Q. Adams, ii. 433. Adams to Monroe, Dec. ] 1 ,
1812 ; State Papers, iii. 626.
80 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.2.
finding its way slowly across the Atlantic during the
winter months.
With it went the tale of Napoleon's immense disaster. October 23 he began his retreat; November
23 he succeeded in crossing the Beresina and escaping capture ; December 5 he abandoned what was
still left of his army ; and December 19, after travelling secretly and without rest across Europe, he
appeared suddenly in Paris, still powerful, but in
danger. Nothing could be better calculated to support the Russian mediation in the President's mind.
The possibility of remaining without a friend in the
world while carrying on a war without hope of success, gave to the Czar's friendship a value altogether
new.
Other news crossed the ocean at the same time, but
encouraged no hope that England would give way.
First in importance, and not to be trifled with, was
the British oflBcial announcement, dated December
26, 1812, of the blockade of the Chesapeake and
Delaware. Americans held that this blockade was
illegal,^ — a blockade of a coast, not of a port; a
paper-blockade, one of the grievances against which
the war was waged ; but whatever they might choose
to call it, they could not successfully disprove its
eflBciency, or deny that it made Chesapeake Bay, Delaware River, and the Vineyard Sound little better than
British waters. Export of American produce from
the Chesapeake and Delaware ceased.
^ Diary of J. Q. Adams, Feb. 1, 1813 ; ii. 44a
1S18. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 81
The blockade, though serious beyond all other
military measures, roused less attention and less
protest than another measure of the British government which had the character of a profitable insult. A circular dated November 9, addressed to
the governors of West Indian colonies by the British government, authorized them to issue licenses for
importation of necessary supplies during the war,
— a precaution commonly taken to meet the risk of
famine in those regions. The Governor of the Bermudas, in issuing a proclamation January 14, 1813,
published the circular, which contained one unusual
provision : ^ —
*' Whatever importations are proposed to be made, under the order, from the United States of America, should
be by yoiir licenses confined to the ports in the Eastern
States exclusively, unless you have reason to suppose that
the object of the order would not be fulfilled if licenses
are not also granted for the importations from the other
ports in the United States."
Probably the discrimination was intended, like the
exemption from blockade, as a favor to New England,
and must have been meant to be more or less secret,
since publication was likely to counteract its effect ;
but in time of war the British government was at
liberty to seek supplies where it chose.
Madison thought differently. He sent to Congress,
February 24, 1813, a special Message expressing indignation at the conduct of England.
• 1 State Papers, iii. 608.
82 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.2.
" The policy now proclaimed to the world," he charged,
<^ introduces into her modes of warfare a system equally
distinguished by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its character, — having for its object to dissolve the ties of allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty
in the adversary nation, and to seduce and separate its
component parts the one from the other. The general
tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing contrivances will be reprobated by the civilized world.**
Although many persons shared Madison's view of
war as a compulsory process of international law,
Federalists and Republicans were at a loss to under-
stand his view of " deformity " and " depravity " in
modes of warfare. The whole truth in regard to
West and East Florida was not known, but so much
was notorious, even in 1811, as to warrant the British minister in protesting ^' against an attempt so
contrary to every principle of public justice, faith, and
national honor." ^ What the United States could do
in Florida in time of peace, England could surely
do in Massachusetts in time of war ; but if England's
conduct was in reality deformed and depraved, as
charged, the celebrated proclamation of William Hull
to the Canadians in 1812, inviting them to quit their
allegiance and to "choose wisely" the side of the
United States, should have been previously disavowed
by the United States government. No little ridicule
was caused by the contrast between Madison's attitude toward Canada and his denunciation of England's attitude toward Massachusetts.
^ Foster to Monroe, July 2, 1811; State Papers, iiL 648.
1813. BUSSIAN MEDIATIOir. 88
Taken together, the news from Europe m the last
days of winter gave ground for deep reflection. With
the overthrow of Napoleon's authority and the close
alliance between Great Britain and Russia, the last
chance of forcing concessions from England vanished.
A long war, with no prospect of success, lay before
the United States. New York harbor, the Delaware
River, and Chesapeake Bay were already so nearly
closed to commerce as to foreshadow complete stoppage; and if Boston was still open, its privileges
must soon cease unless Great Britain deliberately
intended to regard New England as neutral. All
this, though alarming enough, might be met with
courage ; but against the pronounced disaffection of
Massachusetts and Connecticut no defence existed ;
and whenever those States should pass from stolid
inertia into the stage of active resistance to the war,
the situation would become hopeless. Under such
circumstances England would have a strong motive
for refusing peace on any terms.
The shadow of these fears lay over the Inaugural
Address which the President pronounced March 4,
1813, after taking for a second time the oath of
office at the Capitol. His speech contained only the
defence of a war that needed no defence, and complaints against England which were drowned in the
tumult of war, the loudest complaint that man could
make. Every tone showed that Mfidison felt doubtful of support, and that in proving the war to be
just he betrayed consciousness that it wbs not enerVOL. vn.— 8
84 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.2.
getic. Perhaps the most characteristic sentence in
the Address was that in which he congratulated the
country " with a proud satisfaction," that in carrying
on the war, "no principle of justice or honor, no usage
of civilized nations, no precept of courtesy or humanity, have been infringed ; the war has been waged on
our part with scrupulous regard to all these relations,
and in a spirit of liberality which was never surpassed." Madison's phrases were the more remarkable because at about the same time the British
government announced its intention of making America feel what war meant. The courtesy and humanity
of the war were to be all on the American side ;
while not a word in the Inaugural Address gave the
pledge which could win victories, — the assurance
that the President himself had energy and meant
to exert it.
Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly
from failure of military calculations at home and
abroad, but chiefly from want of national experience
in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded
the President, and could not fail to make him wish
for peace. Armstrong had not been six weeks in
the War Department before he set the members of
Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert
Smith returned, and the President foimd the task of
maintaining discipline as great in the Cabinet as it
was in the army. One of the strongest characters
called into prominence by the war, who was himself
destined to have charge of the War Department,
1818. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 35
spoke of Annstrong, four months later, in language
hinting impatient consciousness of something too
complicated to describe. "And Armstrong! — he
was the devil from the beginning, is now, and ever
will be."^ Only by studjring what Armstrong did,
could the causes be understood of the passion which
he excited in every man he crossed.
Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong's proceedings. Monroe's character, the opposite of Arm*
strong's, was transparent ; no one could mistake his
motives, except by supposing them to be complex;
and in his relations with Armstrong his motives were
simpler than usual, for Armstrong's views could not
be carried into effect without loss of pride to Monroe.
Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to him, with the expectation that if any one was
to have general command of the armies in the field,
Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time when
Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that
the next campaign was to be fought by Monroe.
Jan. 18, 1818, Serurier wrote to his Government : *
^' There is much talk of Mr. Monroe for the command
of the army, and he has shown a zeal in organizing his
Department which tends to confirm me in that belief. • . .
Mr. Monroe is not a brilliant man, and no one expects to
find a great captain in him ; but he served through the
War of Independence with much bravery under the orders
and by the side of Washington. He is a man of great
1 Adams's Gallatin, p. 488.
' Semrier to Bassano, Jan. 13, 1813 ; Archives des AS. £tT»
MSSi
86 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.J.
good sense, of the most austere honor, the purest patriotism, and the most universally admitted integrity. He
is loved and respected by all parties, and it is believed
that he would soon gain the hearts of all his officers and
soldiers. He would be given a staff as good as possible,
and with this assistance as well as all his own recognized
resources, it is believed that he would be perfectly suited
to carry on the campaign about to open against the last
continental possession of England in America."
As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged
Congress to increase the number of major-generals ;
and after Armstrong took charge of the Department
Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing the increase. February 27 the nominations
were sent to the Senate. In a letter to Jefferson,
Monroe told the story :^ —
*' On the day that the nomination of these officers was
made to the Senate the President sent for me and stated
that the Secretary of War had placed me in his list
of major-generals, at their head, and wished to know
whether I would accept the appointment, intimating that
he did not think I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to
leave my present station. I asked where I was to serve.
He supposed it would be with the Northern army under
General Dearborn. I replied that if I left my present
office for such a command it would be inferred that I had
a passion for military life^ which I had not ; that in such
a station I could be of no service in any view to the
general cause or to military operations, even perhaps
with the army in which I might serve ; that with a view
to the public interest the commander ought to receive all
^ Monroe to Jeffeison, June 7| 1813 ; Jefferson MSS.
181S. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 87
the snpport which the goveniment could give hun, and by
accepting the station proposed, I might take from General Dearborn without aiding the cause by anything that I
might add. I stated, however, that the grade made no
difQculty with me, a desire to be useful being my only
object; and that if the command was given me even
with a lower grade than that suggested, admitting the
possibility, I would accept it. The difficulty related to
General Dearborn, who could not well be removed to an
inactive station."
Monroe said, in. effect, that he would have the
conunand in chief or nothing. Armstrong said, in
effect, that he meant to be commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James Wilkinson,
Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina,
Morgan Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison
of Indiana Territory, and Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left
to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn's incompetence to conduct a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to conduct it
as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in
fhe field, performing the duties of lieutenant-general.
No sooner was Monroe satisfied that Armstrong
meant to follow this course than he took the unusual
step of writing to the President a formal remonstrance against his colleague's supposed plan. The
act appointing six major-generals was approved February 24. The same evening Monroe had a conversation on the subject with the President, and the next
day, February 25, submitted the substance of his
88 mSTOBY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.3.
remarks in writing.^ His argument chiefly regarded
the inconvenience and unconstitutionality of separating the War Department from the President and of
mixing military with civil functions: —
** As soon as Greneral Armstrong took charge of the
Department at War, I thought I saw his plan ; that is,
after he had held it a few days. I saw distinctly that he
intended to have no grade in the army which should he
competent to a general coutrol of military operations;
that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands ; that
each operation should he distinct and separate, with dis*
tinct and separate objects, and of course to be directed
by himself, not simply in outline but in detail. I antici*
pated mischief from this, because I knew that the movements could not be directed from this place. I did not
then anticipate the remedy which he had in mind."
From that moment began a feud between the two
Cabinet ministers. The cause was obvious. Armstrong had found that if a general command were
to be created, it must be given to Monroe. Prob-
ably he felt no more confidence in Monroe's military
abilities than in those of Dearborn; but determined
that his hand should not be thus forced, Armstrong
decided to retain Dearborn, although his opinion of
Dearborn, as shown afterward,^ made the retention
an act of grave responsibility. The decision once
taken, he had no choice but to supply Dearborn's
wants by his own presence with the army, — a course
^ Monroe to Madison, Feb. 26, 1813; Monroe MSS. State
Department Archives ; Oilman's Monroe, p. 108.
* Armstrong's Notices of the War, i. 113-116.
1818. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 39
certain to challenge attack from all Virginia. Had
Armstrong been bent on destroying his rival by
means which the world could have found no chance
to oppose or criticise, he would have removed Dearbom, and would have sent Monroe to waste his
reputation in the task of conquering and holding
Canada. The retention of Dearborn was an unfortunate beginning for the new Secretary of War.
The first effect of Armstrong's administration was
to turn Monroe into a vindictive enemy ; the second
was to alienate Gallatin. Of all the old Republican
leaders, Gullatin cared least for office and most for
consistency. Under any reasonable distribution of
party favors, the Presidency should have fallen to
him after Madison, not only because he was the fittest
man, the oldest, ablest, and most useful member of
the Executive government, but also because he represented Pennsylvania ; and if any State in the Union
had power to select a President, it was she. Madison
would have been glad to secure for Gallatin the succession; he had no special love or admiration for
Monroe, while his regard for Gallatin was strong and
constant ; but Pennsylvania cared more for interests
than for men, while Virginia cared so much for men
that she became prodigal of interests. Pennsylvania
allowed Virginia, through the agency of William B.
Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, to thrust
Gallatin aside and to open the path for a third
Virginian at the risk of the Union itself. Gallatin,
too proud to complain, had no longer an object of
40 HISTOKT OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn.a.
ambition; and from the moment ambition ceased
abstract ideas of duty alone remained to comiteract
the disgusts of disappointment.
Gallatin's abstract ideas were those of 1801, —
simplicity, economy, and purity. Financiering — the
providing of money for wasteful expenditure — was
his abhorrence. "I cannot consent to act the part
of a mere financier," he wrote to Jefferson in 1809 ; ^
" to become a contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans,
a seeker of resources for the purpose of supporting
useless baubles, of increasing the number of idle and
dissipated members of the community, of fattening
contractors, pursers, and agents, and of introducing
in all its ramifications that system of patronage,
corruption, and rottenness which you so justly execrate." These words were meant to apply only to
a state of peace, but they applied equally well to a
state of war from the moment war became useless.
In the beginning of Madison's second term, no man
of intelligence denied that the war had failed ; that
its avowed objects could not be gained ; that every
month of war increased the danger of disunion,
brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened
habits of extravagance and corruption on the country.
From his post at the Treasury, Gallatin could see
better than most men the dangers, both financial and
political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance with European affairs showed him the need of
rapid diplomacy.
^ Adams's Gallatin, p. 408.
UU. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 41
Armstrong represented everytliing antagonistic to
Ckdlatin ; his methods were arbitrary and underhand ;
his political training was that of the New York school,
tempered by personal contact with the court of
Napoleon ; from him economy could hardly be expected. Yet perhaps the worst feature of his administration was likely to be his use of patronage.
The number of Gktllatin's personal enemies was small,
and the use of patronage in a way that would outrage him seemed difficult ; yet within a few weeks
Armstrong offended him deeply. March 18, 1813,
William Duane, of the "Aurora" newspaper, was
appointed to the post of adjutant-general. The appointment was improper, and the motives to which
it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous
than the unfitness of the person made it harmful to
the service. Gallatin's anger was deep : " Duane's
last appointment has disgusted me so far as to make
me desirous of not being any longer associated with
those who have appointed him. "^
Into this embroglio of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff, the Russian charge at Washington,
suddenly dropped the Czar's offer to mediate a peace.
Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances, no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united. Daschkoffs letter bore date
March 8, and Monroe's reply was sent March 11.
The letter of reply was a civil and somewhat flatter-
^ Gallatin to Nicholson, May 5, 1813 ; Adams's QallatiD,
p. 482.
42 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 9.
ing compliment to Alexander ; ^ the mission itself was
a matter to be more deliberately arranged.
The next decision regarded the character of the
mission. The necessary powers might have been
sent, without further form, to Minister Adams at
St. Petersburg, but the President and his advisers
thought with reason that the addition of other negotiators to the mission would give more weight and political effect to the measure.^ They decided to send
two new envoys to join Adams; and on the same
reasoning to select promment men. As a guaranty
of their wish for peace, they decided that one of
these men should be a Federalist, and they chose
James A. Bayard of Delaware for the post. For
the other, Monroe thought of naming some Western
man, to secure the confidence of the Western country, and reconcile it to the result; but a different
turn was given to the measure by Gallatin, who
asked the appointment for himself. Oallatin's exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections. The President consented to appoint him ; and
Monroe, who had from the first attached himself to
Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury.
A question less easy to decide was whether the new
mission should be despatched at once, or should wait
until England should formally accept the mediation.
There again political motives dictated immediate ac1 State Papers, iii. 624.
* Monroe to Jefferson, June 7, 1813 ; Jefferson 1£SS.
1818. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 43
'tion. If England should accept, much time might be
saved if the mission were on the spot ; if she did not
accept, the peace-party in America would be more
effectually silenced. In either case, Russia would be
deeply pledged to support her own undertaking.
The President did not intend to lose Gallatin in
the Treasury. Abundant precedents warranted the
double employment of government officers. In 1794
John Jay, then chief-justice, had been sent to negotiate with England, and the Senate had approved the
appointment. In 1799 Oliver Ellsworth, also chiefjustice, was sent to negotiate with France, and the
Senate had again approved. These were Federalist
precedents, supposed to be binding, at least on the
Federalist party. If the chief-justice, the head of an
independent branch of government, could be sent
abroad as an Envoy Extraordinary in Executive employment, no objection could exist to sending an
Executive oflBcer on a temporary service of the same
kind, unless on the score of expediency. To prevent
diflSculty on that account, the Secretary of the Navy
consented to act as head of the Treasury until Gallatin's return. Gallatin himseH inclined to look on
his separation from the Treasury as final,^ but made
his axrangemente in agreement with the President's
views, which looked to his return in the autumn.
Before he could depart he was obliged to complete
the necessary financial arrangements for the coming
year, on which he was busily engaged at the moment
> Adams's Gallatin, p. 483.
44 mSTORT OP THE UNITED STATES. Cn.a.
when Daachkoff's letter arrived. First in importance
was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12,
subscription books were opened in all the principal
towns, and the public was invited to take the whole
amount at seven per cent interest, to be reduced to
six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four
million dollars were offered on these terms. Proposals in writing were then invited by a Treasury circular, dated March 18, and after an active negotiation
between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of New
York and Philadelphia, — John Jacob Astor, Stephen
Girard, David Parish, — the remainder of the loan
was provided. In aU about eighteen miUions were
offered. Fifteen and a half millions were taken, in
the form of six per cent stock, issued at eightyeight dollars for every hundred-dollar certificate, redeemable after the year 1825. About half a million
was taken at par, with an annuity of 1 1-2 per cent
for thirteen years, in addition to the six per cent
interest.
Calculated as a perpetual annuity, as English borrowers would have viewed it, the rate of this loan was
less than seven per cent ; but if the nominal capital
must or should be repaid after twelve years, the rate
was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government
paid 7.487 per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years. The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England in
effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could
not have been taken at all, had not credit and cur-
181S. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 45
rencj been already expanded to the danger-point, as
the allotment showed ; for while New England, where
most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half
a million, and Boston took but seventy-five thousand,
Pennsylvania, where banking had become a frenzy,
took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore
together contributed only half a million more than
was given by Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars
were taken by Astor, Girard, and Parish, — three foreign-bom Americans, without whose aid the money
could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all.
Doubtless they were bold operators ; but Americana
were supposed to be not wanting in the taste for
speculation, and the question could not but rise how
these men knew the secret of distributing the load
which no native American dared carry.
The bargain was completed April 7. At that moment the Treasury was empty, and could not meet
the drafts of the other departments ; but with sixteen
millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and
an estimated revenue of something more than nine
millions, Gallatin collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the Secretaries of War
and Navy,^ allotting to the one thirteen millions and
a quarter, to the other four and a half millions,
which could not be exceeded without the consent of
Congress. This done, and every question having
been settled that could be foreseen, — the tax-bills
ready to be laid before Congress, and even the draft
^ Gallatdn's Writings, i. 535.
46 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.2.
for a new bank-charter prepared, — Gallatin bade farewell to the Treasury, and May 9 sailed from the
Delaware River, with Bayard, for the Baltic.
Twelve years had passed since Gallatin took charge
of the finances, and his retirement was an event
hardly less serious than a change of President ; for
it implied that the political system he had done so
much to create and support stood so near the brink
of disaster as to call him from the chosen field of
his duties into a new career, where, if anywhere, he
could save it. As Monroe felt called to the army, so
Gallatin turned naturally to diplomacy. He knew
that after another year of war the finances must be
thrown into disorder like that of the Revolutionary
War, beyond the reach of financial skill ; and he
believed that if any one could smooth the path of
negotiation, that person was likely to serve best the
needs of the Treasury. Yet he took grave responsibility, of which he was fully aware, in quitting his
peculiar post at a moment so serious. Success alone
could save him from universal censure; and perhaps
nothing in his career better proved the high character
he bore, and the extraordinary abilities he possessed,
than the ease with which he supported responsibility
for this almost desperate venture.
The task he had set for himself was hopeless, not
80 much because of the concessions he was to require,
as on account of the change in European affairs which
made England indifferent for the moment to any
injury the United States could inflict. Monroe's in-
1813. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 4T
stractionB to the new commission, though long, consisted largely in argmnents against the legality of
impressment as a part of the jus gentium; although
the legality of European war-measures had long
ceased to be worth discussing. As the solution of
the dispute, Monroe could offer only the new For-
eign Seamen Act, which England had refused from
the first to consider, and which was certainly open
to objections, — on the American side because it offered too much ; on the British side because it offered
more than could in practice be performed. To make
the utmost possible concession, Monroe proposed that
no native-born British subject, thenceforward naturalized in America, should be allowed to serve either
in the national or the private vessels of the United
States, — a provision which carried one step further
the offer to naturalize no British seamen except on
condition of leaving the sea, and which went to the
yerge of conceding the right of impressment. Notwithstanding these concessions, the instructions were
still positive on the main point. Without a clear and
distinct stipulation against impressments, no treaty
was to be signed; negotiations must cease, and the
negotiators must return home.^
1 Monroe to the Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813 ; State
PaperB, ill. 695.
CHAPTER m.
During the winter the Republican legislature of
New York chose Rufus King, the chief Federalist in
the country, to succeed John Smith as United States
senator. Some Republicans charged that this election was the price paid by De Witt Clinton for
Federalist votes in the Presidential contest ; but
Clinton's friends declared it to be the price paid by
the Administration Republicans for Federalist aid in
granting a corrupt bank charter. That the choice
was due to a bargain of some kind no one denied,
and possibly both stories were true. Rufus King
himself stood above suspicion, and had been considered an opponent of the Federalist alliance with
Clinton ; but he was a powerful recruit to the opposi-
tion in the Senate, which numbered thenceforward
nine votes, or precisely one fourth of the body. The
annoyance to the Administration was the greater because King's Republican colleague, Obadiah German,
belonged to the Clintonian opposition, and voted with
the Federalists. At the same time Charles Cutts of
New Hampshire was succeeded by Jeremiah Mason,
a very able and extreme Federalist. Three more
senators — Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib —
1818. 'the extra session of 1813. 49
could be counted as personally hostile to the President. Jesse Franklin of North Carolina was succeeded by David Stone, an independent, opposed to
the war. Already the opposition threatened to outweigh the votes on which the President could depend.
Aa though legislation had become a matter of inferior
importance, William H. Crawford of Georgia, the only
vigorous Republican leader in the Senate, resigned his
seat, and followed Gallatin to Europe. He was sent
to take the place of Joel Barlow at Paris, and hurried
to his post. In this condition of party weakness, the
election of Bufus King and Jeremiah Mason to the
Senate was a disaster to the Administration ; and
all the more anxiously the President feared lest the
popular election in May should convert New York
altogether into a Federalist State, and give Massachusetts the necessary strength to stop the war.
This election, on which the fate of the war was
believed to turn, took place as usual, May 1, and
began by a Federalist success in the city of New York,
followed by another in Kings, Queens, and Westchester counties. These counties before the century
ended had a voting population of near half a mil«
lion, but in 1818 they cast in State elections about
eight thousand votes, and gave a majority of eight
hundred for the Federalist candidate Stephen Van
Bensselaer, the unfortunate general of the Niagara
campaign. Throughout the eastern and central coun*
ties the election was disputed ; three of the four districts into which the State was divided left the result
T0L.TII.'»4
60 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
80 close — within about three hundred votes — that
only the western counties of Cayuga, Seneca, and
Oenesee turned the scale. Governor Tompkins was
re-elected by the moderate majority of three thousand
in a total vote of eighty-three thousand ; but the Federalists obtained a majority of ten in the Assembly,
and gained confidence with their strength. In this
election, for the first time, the issue was distinct be*
tween those who supported and those who opposed
the war. The chief towns. New York, Hudson, and
Albany, were strong in opposition; the country districts tended to support.
In Massachusetts the Federalist governor Caleb
Strong, who had made himself peculiarly obnoxious
by refusing to call out the State's quota of militia, received nearly fifty-seven thousand votes, while
Senator Vamum, the Republican candidate, received
forty-three thousand. Considering that the population of Massachusetts was about one fourth smaller
than that of New York, the vote of one hundred
thousand persons in the smaller State, and only
eighty-three thousand in the larger, seemed a proof
of popular indifference ; but in truth the vote of
New York was larger than usual, and only one thousand less than at the next election of governor, in
1816. The difference was due to the unequal suffrage, which in New York State elections was re-
stricted to one hundred pound free-holds, while in
Massachusetts all citizens worth sixty pounds were
entitled to vote.
1818. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813, 61
At the same time John Randolph met with defeat,
for the only time in his life. John W. Eppes, one of
Jefferson's sons-in-law, took residence within Randolph's district for the purpose of contesting it ; and
after a struggle succeeded in winning the seat, on the
war-issue, by a vote of eleven hundred and twelve to
nine hundred and forty-three.^ This change of membership tended, like the New York election, to show
that the people were yielding to the necessity of
supporting the war. Yet the process was alarmingly
slow. In the second year of hostilities. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
New Jersey were Federal in all branches of their
State governments ; New York, Delaware, and Maryland were partly Republican and partly Federalist;
of the eighteen States only ten were wholly Republican, and seven of these were Southern. In the
United States Senate the Administration could count
upon twenty-two votes, with reasonable certainty; the
other fourteen senators were more or less lukewarm
or hostile. In the House, one hundred and fourteen
members supported the Administration, and sixtyeight opposed it. As far as concerned numbers,
the Administration was strong enough in Congress;
but the imiversal want of faith in its capacity to conduct a war of such consequence gave the Federalists
an advantage beyond proportion to their numerical
strength. The task of opposition was easy, and its
force irresistible when the ablest and oldest Repub1 Niles, iv. 168.
52 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
lican in oflSce — the Secretary of the Treasury — felt
himself helpless in face of the Oovemment's inaptitude for war, and wrote to his closest intimates that
no one could " expect much improvement in the
manner of making it more efficient I think that
there exists real incapacity in that respect, — an incapacity which must necessarily exhaust our resources
withm a very short time." i
Fortunately for the Government the same slowness
of movement which counteracted its undertakings, affected equally its internal enemies in their hostility.
The New England extremists wished and expected
to act energetically against the war. Chief-Justice
Parsons quieted Pickering in the autumn of 1812 by
assuring him that the Massachusetts House of Representatives would act at its winter session ; * yet the
legislature met and adjourned without action. The
party waited for the spring election of 1818, which
was to give them control of New York. Their disappointment at the re-election of Governor Tompkins
was extreme, and the temptation to wait until the
national government should become bankrupt and
disgraced became irresistible. Another campaign was
likely to answer their purpose. While England grew
stronger every day, America grew weaker; the
struggle became more and more unequal, the result
more and more certain; and the hope of peaceably
1 Gallatin to William Few, May 9, 1813 ; Gallatin MSS.
^ Pickering to Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; New England Federalism^
p. 404.
1818. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813. 58
restoring the Federalist party to power diminished
the temptation to adopt measures of force.
Thus when the Thirteenth Congress met for its
extra session, May 24, the Government felt stronger
than on March 5, when the old Congress expired.
The elections were safely passed; the peace negotiations might be considered as begun ; taxation was
no longer a matter of taste. The majority liked
taxation as little in 1813 as they had liked it in 1812
or in 1801 ; but they could no longer dispute or even
discuss it. Gallatin had gone, leaving the bills for
them to pass; and Congress, which at any other
time would have rebelled, had no choice but to pass
them.
Once more Henry Clay was chosen Speaker, and
setting Cheves aside he placed John W. Eppes at the
head of the Ways and Means Committee. The House
missed John Randolph, but gained John Forsyth of
Georgia, and Daniel Webster, — a new member from
New Hampshire, of the same age as Calhoun and
Lowndes, but five years younger than Clay. Otherwise the members varied little from the usual type,
and showed more than their usual faculty for discussing topics no longer worth discussion.
President Madison's Message of May 25 challenged
no angry comment. Its allusion to the Russian
mediation and the terms of peace had an accent of
eelf-excuse, as though he were anxious to convince
England of her true interests ; its allusion to France
contained the usual complaint of delays ^' so unrea*
64 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
Bonably spun out ; " and its reference to the war and
the finances was rather cheerful than cheering. Daring as Madison's policy had been, he commonly spoke
in tones hardly to be called bold ; and this Message
had the disadvantage, which under the circumstances
could not be called a fault, of addressing itself rather
to Europe and to enemies, than to a spirited and
united nation. It had also the merit of directing
Congress strictly to necessary business ; and Congress acted on the direction.
Nothing less than necessity could at that moment
of early summer have induced the members of Congress to remain in session at all. Stout as the majority might be in support of the war, the stoutest
were depressed and despondent. They saw themselves disappointed in every hope and calculation on
which they had counted a year before. Even their
unexpected naval glory was lost for the moment by
the victory of Broke's frigate the " Shannon " over
the "Chesapeake," June 1, as Congress began its
work. Disaster after disaster, disgrace upon disgrace, had come and were every moment multiplying. Suffocated with heat, members were forced to
sit day by day in the half-finished Capitol, with a
Southern village about them, their nearest neighbor
a British fleet. " Defeated and disgraced everywhere," said one of the stanchest war members describing the scene, " Congress was to impose the
burden of taxes on a divided people, who had been
taught by leaders of the war party to look upon a
1818. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813. 65
tax-gatherer as a thief, if not to shoot him as a burglar." ^ According to the same authority, " the country was at the lowest point of depression, where fear
is too apt to introduce despair." In this condition
of spirits, Gallatin's tax-bills were reported to the
House June 10, — measures such as the Republican
party had, till very lately, not conceived as within
the range of its possible legislation. They included
a direct tax of three million dollars ; taxes on salt,
licenses, spirits, carriages, auctions, sugar refineries ;
a stamp tax, and a complete machinery for the assessment and collection of these odious and oppressive imposts.
At the same moment, Daniel Webster began his
career in Congress by moving Resolutions which
caused a long and unprofitable debate on the conduct
of France and the character of the French repealing
Decree of April 28, 1811, — a debate that could have
no other result or object than to mortify and annoy
the President, who had been, like so many other
rulers, the victim of Napoleon's audacity. Pending
this debate, June 13, the President took to his bed
with a remittent fever, and for five weeks his recovery
was doubtful. Madison was still confined to his bed,
when, July 15, messengers from the lower Potomac
brought news that the British fleet, consisting of
eight or ten ships-of-the-line and frigates, was in the
river, sixty miles below, making its way up the diffi<*
cult channel to Washington. 'A reasonable and well*»
^ Ingersoll's History, i. 120.
66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch.S,
grounded fear took possession of the city. July 21,
Serurier wrote to his Government: ^ —
^* Every one is making ready to move. I know that
they are secretly packing up at the Departments. I have
as yet sent nothing away, in order not to show distrust of
the Government's power ; but I have got ready my most
valuable papers, and from the moment the President shall
quit his residence, I shall follow where he goes, with my
principal portfolios in one of my carriages."
The British ships were approaching the city; the
sound of their guns was believed to be heard; and
the Government had little means of stopping them.
Every man prepared for volunteer duty; other work
was suspended. About three thousand militia and volimteers, among whom were all the Cabinet and many
members of Congress, were mustered, and marched to
Fort Washington, which was occupied by some six
hundred regular troops, with the Secretary of War at
their head ; while the Secretary of the Navy took his
post on the 28-gun frigate " Adams " in the river
beneath, and the Secretary of State rode down the
river shore with a cavalry scouting party to reconnoitre the British ships.^ July 15 and 16 the House
of Representatives ordered a Fast, and went into
secret session to consider modes of defence.
Unfortunately the motion for inquiry was made by
a Federalist. The majority, determined to make no
^ Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813 ; Archives des AIL £tr.
HSS.
• National Intelligencer, July 17. 20, 22, 1813.
lau. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813. 57
admifisions, referred the subject to the Military Committee, which reported the next day through its chairman, Troup of (Georgia, that the preparation was ^^ in
every respect adequate to the emergence." When a
majority could benefit only its enemies by telling the
truth, history showed that honorable men often preferred to tell what was untrue. In this case the
British ships made their soundings, and obtained
whatever knowledge they sought ; then left the river
to visit other parts of the Bay, but never were so far
distant that they might not, with energy and a fair
wind, within four-and-twenty hours, have raided the
defenceless village. They had but to choose their
own time and path. Not a defensible fort or a picketfence stood within ten miles of Washington, nor could
a sufficient garrison be summoned in time for defence.
Armstrong, Jones, and Monroe doubtless assured Con*
gross that their means of defence were "in every
respect adequate," but Congress took the responsi*
bility on its own shoulders when it accepted their
assurance.
Perhaps of all the incompetence shown in the war
this example most exasperated patriotic citizens, because it was shared by every branch of the govern*
ment. For six months the Administration and ita
friends had denounced Hull, Van Rensselaer, and
Smyth for betraying the government, while the Clintonians and peace Democrats had denounced the
President for imbecility ; but in regard to the city of
Washington the generals were not in question, for no.
68 mSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
generals were there, while the President was dangerously ill in bed. The Legislature and Cabinet were
<5hiefly responsible for whatever should happen, — the
more because their warning was ample, even if under
such circumstances warning was needed. K Jefferson assumed as a matter of course that William Hull
was to be shot and Stephen Van Rensselaer broken
for their mistakes, Republicans might properly ask
what punishment should be reserved for Armstrong,
Jones, and Monroe of the Cabinet, Troup of Georgia,
Sevier of Tennessee, Wright of Maryland, and other
members of the Military Committees of the House
and Senate for their neglect of the national capital.
The debate on Webster's Resolutions, and the report made in consequence by Monroe, July 12, tended
to throw additional discredit on the Government.
In no respect did Madison's Administration make an
appearance less creditable than in its attitude toward
Napoleon's Decrees, again and again solemnly asserted by it to have been repealed, in the face of
proof that the assertion was unfounded. No Fed■eralist rhetoric was necessary to make this mortifi<2ation felt. Madison seldom expressed himself with
more bitterness of temper than in regard to the Emperor's conduct, and with Monroe the subject drew
forth recurrent outbursts of anger and disgust. His
report tacitly admitted everything that the Federalists charged, except that the Administration had a
secret engagement with France: it had deceived itself, but it had not wilfully deceived the public.
ma. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813. 69
While the House was busied with these unpleasant
subjects, the Senate look up the President's recent
nominations. May 29, four names were sent to it
for diplomatic appointments, — those of Albert Gallatin, J. Q. Adams, and James A. Bayard, to negotiate
treaties of peace and commerce with Great Britain,
and a treaty of commerce with Russia ; that of Jonathan Russell to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden.
Rufus King immediately began opposition by moving
three Resolutions of inquiry in regard to the nature
of the Russian appointments and the authority under
which the Treasury was to be administered in the
Secretary's absence. The President replied, June 3,
that the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury were
discharged by the Secretary of the Navy under the
provisions of the Act of 1792. The Senate, by a
vote of twenty to fourteen, referred the matter to
a committee consisting of Anderson of Tennessee,
Rufus King, Brown of Louisiana, and Bledsoe of
Kentucky. Anderson, the chairman, wrote to the
President and went to see him on behalf of the committee, but received only the answer that the President declined to discuss the matter with them in
their official character. The Senate then adopted a
Resolution that the functions of Secretary of the
Treasury and Envoy Extraordinary were incompatible. The Federalists obtained on this vote the support of Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smith, German of
New York, and Gilman of New Hampshire, all of
whom were disaffected Republicans; but even with
60 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3.
this aid they would have failed without the yotes of
Anderson, Bledsoe, and the two Louisiana senators,
who joined the malcontents.
Madison was then slowly recovering strength, and
greatly harassed by anxieties. He would not sacrifice Gallatin to the Senate; he hoped that firmness would carry the point,^ and at worst he could
throw upon senators the charge of factious opposition. This he succeeded in doing. July 16 the
Senate committee, naturally expecting Madison to
suggest some arrangement, once more sought and
obtained a conference, — "when the President was
pleased to observe," said their report,* " that he was
sorry that the Senate had not taken the same view
of the subject which he had done; and that he regretted that the measure had been taken under circumstances which deprived him of the aid or advice
of the Senate. After the committee had remained
a reasonable tune for the President to make any
other observations if he thought proper to do so,
and observing no disposition manifested by him to
enter into further remarks, the committee retired
without making any observations on the matter of
the Resolutions, or in reply to those made by the
President."
Finding itself thus defied, the Senate, without more
discussion, rejected Gallatin^s nomination by eighteen votes to seventeen, Anderson and the two Lou«
1 Madison to Qallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Works, ii. 566.
i Executive Joumal^ IL 388.
1813. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 181S. 61
isiana senators still adhering to the hostile interest.
Adams and Bayard were then confirmed with little
opposition.
After the passage of manj years, the propriety of
the decision may still be left open to debate. As far
as the Federalists were concerned, their yotes contradicted their own precedents; and if they conceded,
as their precedents required, that the question was
not one of law but of expediency, they assumed re*
sponsibility in acting as final judges. The incompatibility asserted by them was a matter of dispute.
Two successive chief-justices had been sent as envoys abroad. No one could doubt that the Secretary of the Treasury, or any other member of the
Executive or Judicial departments, might be appointed to negotiate a treaty in Washington. Temporary
absence from Washington had never implied incompatibility. Every one knew that the Secretary of War
meant in person to conduct the war on the frontier.
No one could question the President's right to appoint acting secretaries. If convenience alone was
the point at issue, surely the President knew best
the demands of his own Executive departments, and
might be trusted with the responsibility which belonged to him. That he should fail to see, as soon
as the Senate could discover, an incompatibility that
would work only against himself, need not be taken
for granted by his own party, whatever might be the
case with the opposition.
. On the other hand every one might admit that as
62 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3.
the country grew, Secretaries of the Treasury were
likely to find work in their own Department that
would effectually limit their capacity for foreign
travel ; and if the Senate thought that stage to be
already reached, senators were right in insisting
upon the appointment of a new secretary in Gallatin's place. Unfortunately for their argument, their
power did not extend so far. Gallatin remained Secretary of the Treasury, and continued to negotiate as
fluch, without paying attention to the Senate or its
theories.
The Senate further weakened its position in acting
on the nomination of Jonathan Russell as Minister
to Sweden. The subject was referred, June 2, to a
committee consisting of Senator Goldsborough of
JMaryland, together with Anderson and Rufus King.
Jonathan Russell had made himself obnoxious to the
peace party by eagerness shown, while he was in
charge at London, to bring on the war. The committee not only entered on an investigation of his
-doings at Paris, but also introduced a Resolution
declaring that any mission to Sweden at that time
was inexpedient, and by order of the Senate asked
a conference with the President. Monroe, angry at
this conduct, declared privately that a faction in the
Senate, counting on the death not only of President
Madison but of Vice-President Gterry, and the election of Giles as President of the Senate, were scheming to usurp the Executive power.^
1 Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams's Gkdlatin, p484.
1813. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1813. 6S
In order to counteract their manoeuvre, and also to
relieve the President, who was then dangerously ill,
Monroe took the ground that the Executive would
not confer with a co-ordinate branch of government
except through an agent, because his dignity would
not allow him to meet a committee except by. a committee of his own. Monroe thus expressed this somewhat unrepublican doctrine: "A committee of the
Senate ought to confer with a committee of the
President through a head of a Department, and not
with the Chief Magistrate; for in the latter case a
committee of that House is equal to the President."^
As a necessary conclusion, Monroe's argument seemed
to the Senate not beyond dispute; but they answered
it, three days afterward, still less logically, by passing Goldsborough's Resolution that it was inexpedient at that time to send a Minister Plenipotentiary
to Sweden.
Whatever might have been the case with Gallatin's rejection, no one could doubt that the vote on
Russell's appointment was factious. When twentytwo senators, including Jeremiah Mason, Christopher
Gore, Samuel Dana, Rufus King, and William B. GileSy
declared that a minister resident in Sweden was inexpedient in the summer of 1813, they declared what
every other well-informed man knew to be an error.
If any American envoy was ever expedient, it wa&
* Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813 ; Adams's Gallatin,
p. 484. Cf. Madison to the Senate, July 6, 1813 ; Executive
Journal, ii. 381.
64 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch,3.
an envoy to Sweden in 1818 ; for in Sweden at that
moment all that was left of American commerce
centred after being driven from England, and the
political interests of Sweden were greatly involved
with those of the United States. The error was the
less to be denied, because, only six months after*
ward, the Senate admitted itself in the wrong, and
approved the appointment of Russell.
These votes of the Senate made a deep impression.
In time of peace and safety the Senate might show
factiousness without necessarily exciting public anger,
although at no time was the experiment quite safe ;
but at a moment like July, 1813, when public opinion tended toward a serious temper, factiousness
was out of* place, and was the more dangerous because President Madison, though never showing great
power as a popular leader, had still a clear perception of the moment when to strike an enemy. He
rarely failed to destroy when he struck. The time
had come when the Republican party, with one voice,
would be obliged to insist that party discipline must
be restored ; and this result was precipitated by the
Senate's conduct in regard to the diplomatic nominations.
An illustration of the dangers into which the spirit
of faction at that excited moment led the factious,
was furnished by the legislature of Massachusetts,
which met. May 26, and after listening to a long
speech from Governor Strong arraigning the national government for its injustice to England and
1818. THE EXTRA SESSION O^ 1813« 65
partiality to France, referred the subject to committees which lost no time in reporting. One of these
reports, presented Jmie 4 by Josiah Quincy of the
State Senate, closed with a Resolution that the Act
admitting Louisiana into the Union violated the Constitution, and that the Massachusetts senators in Congress should use their utmost endeavors to obtain its
repeal. Another report, by a joint committee, contained a remonstrance addressed to Congress against
the war, couched in terms of strong sectional hostility to the Southern States, and marked throughout
by a covert argument for disunion. A third report,
also by Josiah Quincy, on a naval victory lately
won by Captain James Lawrence of the "Hornet,"
contained a phrase even longer remembered than
Quincy's assertion that the Government could not be
kicked into a war. The Government had in fact been
kicked into the war, but Quincy was not the better
pleased. He reported that in order not to give offence to many of the good people of the Commonwealth by appearing to encourage the continuance of
an unjust, unnecessary, and iniquitous war, the Massachusetts senate while admiring Lawrence's virtues
refrained from approving his acts, —
^^And to the end that all misrepresentations on this
subject may be obviated, —
Resolvedy as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts,
that in a war like the present, waged without Justifiable
cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that
conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not
VOL. vn. — 6
66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
becoming a moral and religious people to express any
approbation of military or naval exploits which are not
immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast
and soil."
Such tactics, whether in or out of Congress, were
more dangerous to their authors than any blunders
of the Administration could ever be to the party in
power. If the nation should be successful in the
war, it might perhaps in good nature leave unpunished the conduct of its malcontents; but if by
their means the nation should be conquered or
forced into a humiliating peace, the people would
never forget, and never forego revenge. Mere opposition to foreign war rarely injured public men,
except while the war-fever lasted. Many distinguished statesmen of Europe and America had been,
at one time or another, in opposition to some special
war, — as was the case with Talleyrand, Charles James
Fox, Lord Grey, Jefferson, and Madison ; but opposition became unpardonable when it took a form
which could have no apparent object except national
ruin. The Federalists who held the ideas expressed
by the legislature of Massachusetts could explain or
defend their future course only by the conviction that
the inevitable and long-expected " crisis " was at
hand, which must end either in disunion or in reconstruction of the Union on new ground. As " a moral
and religious people,'' they separated from the common stock, and thenceforward, if the Union lasted,
could expect no pardon.
1818. THE EXTBA SESSION OF 1818. 67
The extravagance of the Massachusetts Federalists
was counterbalanced by the same national disaste:^
which caused it. Nothing showed that the war was
popular in any of the sea-board States; but the
pressure of circumstances, little by little, obliged
lukewarm and even hostile communities to support
it. Virginia and the Southern States were drawn
into relations toward the government which they
had never intended to accept. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee submitted to exactions that
would at any previous stage of their history have
produced a revolution. Perhaps the strongest proof
of change in popular prejudices was furnished by
the taxes. Tax-bills which were supposed to have
already overthrown one great political party, — bills
which inflicted the evils so hotly and persistently
denounced by Jefferson, Gallatin, and John Randolph
in opposition, and which had been long delayed by
fear of their popular effect, — were passed by Congress quickly, by decided votes, and with less debate
than was given to the discussion whether the President had or had not told all he knew about Bassano's Decree of April 28, 1811. Prom the time
they were approved by the President, in July and
August, 1813, to the time of their repeal, neither the
President nor his party was troubled by popular discontent on account of the passage of these Acts. They
w^re accepted as a necessary part of the national
system; and of a war-policy.
The most curious symptom, and the one which
68 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
most perplexed the Federalists, was that this popular movement of concentration acted in direct resistance to the movement of e rents. In every respect
as the Federalists looked back at the past twelve
years their prophecies had come true. The Republi-
can party, they argued, had proved itself incompetent, and had admitted the failure of its principles ;
it had been forced to abandon them in practice, to
replace the government where the Federalists had
put it, and to adopt all the Federalists' methods;
and even then the party failed. Equally imbecile
in peace and war, the democratic movement had
ended in such disgrace and helplessness as few governments had ever outlived, and such as no nation
with a near and powerful neighbor could have survived. In 1813 the evidence of downfall had become patent. The government was ruined in credit
and character; bankrupt, broken, and powerless, it
continued to exist merely because of habit, and must
succumb to the first shock. All this the Federalists
had long foreseen. Fisher Ames in the press, scores
of clergymen in the pulpit, numberless politicians in
Congress, had made no other use of their leisure
than to point out, step by step, every succeeding
stage in the coming decline. The catastrophe was no
longer far away, it was actually about them, — they
touched and felt it at every moment of their lives.
Society held itself together merely because it knew
not what else to do.
Under circumstanced following each other in ne«
181S. THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1818. 69
cessity so stringent, no Federalist could doubt that
society would pursue the predicted course ; but it did
not. Illogical and perverse, society persisted in extending itself in lines which ran into chaos. The
threatened " crisis " had arrived, wanting no charac*
teristic of those so long foretold; but society made
no effort to save itself. A vaster ruin and still
more terrible retribution lay beyond. The Federalists were greatly and naturally perplexed at discov-
ering the silent under-current which tended to grow
in strength precisely as it encountered most resistance from events. They tried to explain the phenomenon in their own way, — the clergy according to
reUgious conceptions, the politicians according to their
ideas of popular character. The political theory was
the more plausible and less respectable. A. C. Hanson, the extreme Maryland Federalist, mobbed and
nearly killed in Baltimore in June, 1812, only to be
elected to Congress in November, thought that the
national movement of 1813 was due to military glory.
Hanson wrote to Pickering on the subject, in the
autumn:^ —
*^ The war is becoming more popular every day in this
State [Maryland]. Our successes, and the weak manner in which it is conducted by the enemy make it so.
... It would seem that after a while, unless the British
can gather the sense and courage to strike some severe
blows, the war by its own generative powers will create
the means for its support. The vanity of a people caa*
^ Hanson to Pickering, Oct. 16, 1813; Pickering MSS.
70 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. a,
not bear these brilliant nayal victories, and there is no
passion to which the rulers of a people can address them*
selves with greater effect Even in my district the active opposers of the war are falling off every day, and
unless we shortly meet with some reverses, the Administration will shortly find more friends than enemies in this
State by a great deal. . . . The impression is becoming
universal that the enemy cannot harm us if he would.
A few hard blows struck in the right place would be of
great service to the country."
A people that could feel its vanity flattered by such
glories as the war gave in 1813 must have felt the
want of flattery to an unusual degree. The idea was
extravagant. Not so much the glories as the disgraces of the war roused public sympathy ; not so
much the love of victory as the ignominy of defeat,
and the grinding necessity of supporting government
at any cost of private judgment. At such a moment any success was keenly felt, and covered every
failure. The slow conviction that come what would
the nation must be preserved, brought one man after
another into support of the war, until the Federalists
found their feet in a quicksand. The "crisis'* produced the opposite effect to that which Burke's philosophy predicted.
Congress finished its work, and August 2 adjourned. Immediately afterward the President went
to Montpelier to recover his strength in the air of
the Blue Ridge. The session had not been unsatisfactory, for although the Senate refused to impose
an embargo, wanted by the President in order to cut
18U. THE EXTEA SESSION OF 1818. 71
off illegitimate trade with England's dependencies,
and although the same body put its negative on the
appointments of Gallatin and Jonathan Russell, yet
Congress passed the tax-bills, authorized another loan
of seven and a half millions, and made the business
of trading under a British license a penal offence.
The operations of war alone remained to burden the
President's mind.
CHAPTER IV.
The fall of Detroit and Chicago in August, 1812,
threw the American frontier back to the line of the
Wabash and the Maumee, and threatened to throw
it still farther back to the Indian boundary itself.
The Miami or Maumee River was defended by Port
Wayne ; the Wabash had no other defence than the
little fort or blockhouse which Harrison built during
the Tippecanoe campaign, and named after himself.
Port Harrison stood near the later city of Terre
Haute, close to the border of Illinois; Port Wayne
stood within twenty miles of the Ohio border. The
width of Indiana lay between the two.
Had Brock been able, after the capture of Detroit,
to lead his little army into Ohio, he might have
cleared not only the Maumee River, but the whole
western end of Lake Erie from American possession.
Recalled in haste to defend Niagara, Brock left only
two or three companies of troops as garrison at
Detroit and Maiden. The Indians could do little
without the aid of regular forces, but they tried to
carry both Port Wayne and Port Harrison by stratagem. The attacks were made almost simultaneously
a few days after September 1, and not without skill.
1813. THE RIVER RAISIN, 78
In the case of Fort Harrison the Indians were nearly
successful, not so much in fighting as in burning it.
With great difficulty its young captain, Zachary Taylor, of the Seventh Infantry, succeeded in saving his
post. Fort Wayne was held by Captain James Rhea
of the First Infantry until reinforcements arrived,
September 12. Except the usual massacres of scattered families, the Indians accomplished nothing.
Upon the State of Ohio, with its quarter of a million
inhabitants, and of Kentucky with four hundred
thousand, fell the immediate burden of defending the
border between the Ohio and the Lakes. Governor
William Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory
leaving Vincennes June 19, the day after the declaration of war, was at Cincinnati when threatening news
began to arrive from Detroit. Harrison had military
knowledge and instincts. He saw that after the capture of Mackinaw Detroit must fall, and that Hull
could save himself only by evacuating it.^ Harrison's
ambition, which had drawn him to Tippecanoe, drew
him also to lead the new crusade for the relief or
recovery of Detroit. He went to Kentucky at the
invitation of Governor Scott, and under the patronage of Scott and Henry Clay he took the direction
of military affairs. August 24 news reached Kentucky that Hull was shut in Detroit, and must surrender unless immediately relieved.^ The Governor
of Kentucky at once summoned what was then called
^ Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 10, 1812 ; Dawson, p. 273.
* Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28^ 1812 ; Dawson, p. 283.
74 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4.
a caucus^ composed of himself, his successor elect
Governor Shelby, Henry Clay, Justice Todd of the
United States Supreme Court, Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky militia, various Congressmen,
judges, and other citizens,^ whose whole authority
was needed to warrant givmg to Harrison, who was
not a citizen of Kentucky, the conmiission of majorgeneral and the command of the expedition to Detroit. By general .acclamation, and on the warm
assurances of universal popular approval, the measure was taken; and Harrison started at once for
Cincinnati and Detroit to organize the campaign.
The news of Hull's surrender met him as he left
Frankfort.
By this combination of skill and accident, Harrison
reached the object of his ambition, — the conduct of
war on a scale equal to his faith in his own powers ; but
the torrent of Western enthusiasm swept him forward
faster than his secret judgment approved. Appointed
by caucus the general of volunteers, he could keep
his position only by keeping his popularity. Without
deciding precisely where to march, or what military
object to pursue, he talked and acted on the idea that
he should recover Detroit by a coujhde-main.^ He
knew that the idea was baseless as a practical plan,
and futile as a military measure ; but nothing less
would satisfy the enthusiasm of his Kentucky volunteers, and the national government almost com«
1 Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812 ; Dawson, p. 283.
* Dawson, p. 296.
ISU. THE RIVER RAISIN. 75
pelled him to pretend what he did not at heart believe
possible.
The confusion thus created was troublesome. First,
Harrison insisted on conmianding the troops march*
ing to relieve Port Wayne, and obliged the goodnatured (Jeneral Winchester, who outranked him, to
yield the point.^ Then after a forced march with
the Kentuckians down the St. Mary's River, having
relieved Port Wayne, Harrison was obliged, September 19, to surrender the command to Winchester,
who arrived with orders from the Secretary of War
to take general charge of the northwestern army.
Harrison then left Port Wayne for Piqua. Meanwhile the President and Eustis, learning what had
been done in Kentucky, September 17, after much
debate decided to give to Harrison the commission
of brigadier-general, with the command of the north-
western army, to consist of ten thousand men, with
unlimited means and no orders except to retake Detroit.* Brigadier-General Winchester, who was already at Port Wayne, was given the option of serving
under Harrison, or of joining the army at Niagara.
These new orders reached Harrison September 26
at Piqua. Harrison then resumed command, and two
days afterward, September 27, wrote to the secretary, announcing his plan for the autumn campaign.
Three columns of troops, from widely distant quar1 Wmchester to the ^National Intelligencer,'' Sept. 16, ISie.
* Eustis to Harrison, Sept. 17, 1812 ; Dawson, p. 299. Eustb to Qovemor Shelby, Sept. 17, 1812._McAflFee, p. 117.
76 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4.
ters, were to move to the Maumee Rapids, — the
right column, consisting of Virginia and Pennsylvania troops, by way of the Sandusky River; the
centre column, of twelve hundred Ohio militia, by
Hull's road ; the left column, consisting of four
Kentucky re^ments and the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, was to descend the Auglaize River to Fort
Defiance on the Maumee, and thence to fall down
that river to the point of junction with the two
other columns.
Compared with Hull's resources, Harrison's were
immense ; and that he had no serious enemy to fear
was evident from his dividing the army into three
columns, which marched by lines far beyond supporting distance of each other. At the same time he
ordered Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky
militia to march with two thousand men up the
Wabash into the Indian country, and to destroy the
Indian settlements on the Wabash and Illinois rivers.
Had a British force been opposed to the Americans,
its general would have had little difficulty in destroying some one of these four isolated columns, and
driving Harrison back to central Ohio ; but only
bands of Indians, not exceeding five hundred at most,
were to be feared before the army should cross the
Maumee, and little anxiety existed on account of
enemies, unless for the safety of Port Wayne.
Harrison's anxieties bore a different character.
September 23 he wrote to the Secretary of War:
"If the fall should be very dry, I will take Detroit
1818. THE RIVER RAISIN. 77
before the winter sets in ; but if we should have much
rain, it will be necessary to wait at the rapids until
the Miami of the Lakes is sufficiently frozen to bear
the army and its baggage." ^ The promise was rash.
However dry the season might be, the task of marching an army with siege-artillery past Maiden to Detroit, and of keeping it supplied from a base two hundred miles distant, with the British commanding the
Lake, was one which Harrison had too much sense
to attempt. Nothing but disaster could have resulted
from it, even if Detroit had been taken. In the
actual condition of that territory, no army could be
maintained beyond the Maumee River without controlling the Lake. Perhaps Harrison was fortunate
that constant rains throughout the month of October
brought the army to a halt long before it reached the
Maumee. Only the left division of five Kentucky
regiments succeeded in getting to the river, and
camped in the neighborhood of old Fort Defiance,
waiting for the other columns to reach the rapids.
There the Kentuckians remained, under the command
of General Winchester, without food, clothing, or
sufficient shelter, in a state of increasing discontent
and threatening mutiny, till the year closed.
Within a month after assuming command Harrison
found himself helpless either to advance or to retreat,
or to remain in any fixed position. The supplies required for ten thousand troops could not be sent
forward by any means then known. October 22 the
^ Dawson, p. 312,
78 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
left column, consisting of the Kentucky regiments
and some regulars, was at Defiance on the Maumee ;
the central column of a thousand Ohio troops under
General Tupper was on Hull's road, a hundred miles
from the Maumee, unable to march beyond Urbana,
where its supplies were collecting ; the right column
of Pennsylvanians and Virginians was still farther
from the front, slowly approaching the Sandusky
River from the southeast, but far out of reach. General Hopkins's expedition up the Wabash ended in
failure, his troops becoming a mere mob, and at last
disbanding, leaving their general to follow them home.
Harrison himself was riding indef atigably through the
mud, from one end to the other of his vast concave
line, — now at Defiance, making speeches to pacify
Winchester's Kentuckians ; then at Piqua and Urbana with the Ohioans ; soon a hundred miles away
at the river Huron, east of Sandusky ; next at Wooster, Delaware, or Pranklinton, afterward Columbus,
in the centre of Ohio, looking for his right wing ;
but always searching for a passable ridge of dry
land, on which his supplies could go forward to the
Maumee Rapids. The result of his search was given
in a letter of October 22, from Franklinton, to the
Secretary of War : —
^^ I am not able to fix any period for the advance of
the troops to Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot
be done upon proper priuciples until the frost shall be*
come so severe as to enable us to use the rivers and the
margin of the Lake for transportation of the baggage and
Igl9. THE RIVER RAISIN. 79
artillery upon the ice. To get them forward through a
swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in wagons
or on packhorses which are to carry their own provisions,
is absolutely impossible."
The obstacle which brought Harrison's autumn
campaign to this sudden close was the vast swamp
that extended from the Sandusky River on his right
to the Auglaize Bivcr on his left, and for the moment barred the passage of his necessary supplies as
effectually as though it had been the Andes. Hull
had crossed it, cutting a road as he went, and no one
had then appreciated his effort ; but he had marched
with a small force in May and June. Harrison tried
to teanBport supplies, heavy guns, military stores, and
all the material for an army of ten thousand men on
a long campaign, as the autumn rains set in. On the
extreme right, with great effort and expense, a considerable quantity of rations was accumulated on the
Sandusky River, to be sent to the Maumee Rapids
whenever the frosts should harden the swamps. On
the extreme left, desperate efforts were made to carry
supplies to Winchester's army at Defiance by way of
the Auglaize and St. Mary's rivers. Hull's road was
impassable, and for that reason the column of Ohio
troops and their supplies were stopped in the neighborhood of Urbana.
Throughout the months of October and November
Harrison's army stood still, scattered over the State
of Ohio, while wagons and packhorses wallowed in
mud toward the Maumee Rapids. None arrived.
80 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
Sometimes the wagons were abandoned in the mud ;
sometimes the packhorses broke down; sometimes
the rivers were too low for boats ; then they froze and
stopped water-transport. Universal confusion, want
of oversight and organization, added to physical difficulties, gave play to laziness, incapacity, and dishonesty. No bills of lading were used ; no accounts were
kept with the wagoners ; and the teams were valued
so high, on coming into service, that the owners were
willing to destroy them for the price to be received.^
The waste of government funds was appalling, for
nothing short of a million rations at the Maumee
Rapids could serve Harrison's objects, and after two
months of effort not a ration had been carried within fifty miles of the spot. In Winchester's camp at
Defiance the men were always on half rations, except
when they had none at all. During the greater part
of December they had no flour, but lived on poor
beef and hickory roots. Typhus swept them away by
scores; their numbers were reduced to about one
thousand. The exact force which Harrison had in
the field was matter of conjecture, for he sent no
return of any description to the adjutant-general's
office.^ The Government gave him carte blanche^
and he used it.^ Chaos and misconduct reigned in
every department, while he, floundering through the
1 McAffee, p. 184.
' Armstrong to Harrison, April 4, 1813 ; Armstrong's Notices,
L 245.
* Harrison to Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813 ; Dawson, p. 337.
1813. THE RIVER RAISIN. 81
mud along his line of two hundred miles front, sought
in vain for a road.
For the train of errors and disasters in the northwest Secretary Eustis was chiefly responsible, and his
resignation, Dec. 3, 1812, left the campaign in this
hopeless condition. From Dec. 3, 1812, until Jan. 13,
1813, Monroe acted as Secretary of War ; and to him
Harrison next wrote from Delaware, December 12,
a letter which not only disheartened the Government,
but was calculated to create a prejudice against the
writer in the mind of any Secretary of War who was
not invincibly prejudiced in his favor.^
*' If there were not some important political reason,**
said Harrison, "urging the recovery of the Michigan
Territory and the capture of Maiden as soon as those
objects can possibly be effected, and that to accomplish
them a few weeks sooner expense was to be disregarded,
I should not hesitate to say that if a small proportion of
the sums which will be expended in the quartermaster's
department in the active prosecution of the campaign
during the winter was devoted to obtaining the command
of Lake Erie, the wishes of the Government, in their utmost extent, could be accomplished without difficulty in
the months of April and May. Maiden, Detroit, and
Mackinaw would fall in rapid succession. On the contrary, all that I can certainly promise to accomplish during the winter, unless the strait should afford us a passage
on the ice, is to recover Detroit. I must farther observe
that no military man Would think of retaining Detroit,
Maiden being in possession of the enemy, unless his army
< Dawson, p. 333. Armstrong's Notices, 1. 63, 86.
VOL. VII.— 6
82 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
was at least twice as strong as the disposable force of the
enemy. An army advancing to Detroit along a line of
operation passing so near the principal force of the enemy
as to allow them access to it whenever they think proper,
must be covered by another army more considerable than
the disposable force of the enemy. I mention this circumstance to show that the attack ought not to be directed
against Detroit, but against Maiden ; and that it depends
upon the ice affording a safe passage across the strait,
whether I shall be able to proceed in this way or not.
Detroit is not tenable. Were I to take it without having
it in my power to occupy the opposite shore, I should be
under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent
swamp to preserve it from the effects of the shot and
shells which the enemy would throw with impunity from
the opposite shore. This result is so obvious to every
man who has the least military information, that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other part of General
Hull's conduct that he should choose to defend Detroit
rather than attack Maiden."
Hull could have asked no better apology for his
surrender. Harrison did not know that the insubordination and refusal of the Ohio colonels to evacuate Detroit had forced Hull to remain there; but
that Detroit was not tenable came at last to the
surface as a self-evident truth of the campaign, —
which Hull had always, seen, and which Harrison
himself announced almost as clearly in August as in
December, but which he ignored in the interval.
"If it should be asked," he continued, "why these
statements were not made sooner, — I answer that al-
Mia. THE WVER RAISIN. 88
though I waB always sensible that there were great
difficulties to be encountered in the accomplishment of
the wishes of the President in relation to the recovery of
Detroit and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper
Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inexperience of the
public agents and the villany of the contractors. I am
still, however, very far from believing that the original
plan is impracticable. I believe on the contrary that it
can be effected."
The excuse did not satisfy the Cabinet, who thought
ihey saw that Harrison wished to throw upon Government the responsibility for a military failure fatal to
himself. Perhaps a simpler motive guided Harrison,
who from the first never had known precisely what
to do, or had seen any clear path to success. He
wrote, January 4, from Franklin ton, —
" When I was directed to take the command in the
latter end of September, I thought it possible by great
exertions to effect the objects of the campaign before the
setting in of winter. . . The experience of a few days
was sufficient to convince me that the supplies of provisions could not be procured for our autumnal advance ;
and even if this difficulty was removed, another of equal
magnitude existed in the want of artillery. There remained then no alternative but to prepare for a winter
campaign."
According to this account he had seen early in
October that advance was impossible, yet he wasted
millions of money and many of his best troops in
attempting it. Winter had come, and he was pledged
'84 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4
to a winter campaign as impracticable as the autumn campaign had proved to be. Without the
control of the Lake, any army beyond the Maumee
must starve or surrender. The government had already paid a vast price in money and men in order
to obtain this knowledge ; yet Harrison proposed
a winter campaign, .with full persuasion of its uselessness.
Becember 20 he sent orders^ to Winchester to
descend the Maumee River from Defiance to the
rapids, there to prepare sleds for an expedition
against Maiden, to be made by a choice detachment
when the whole army should concentrate at the rapids. Early in January, the ground being at last
frozen, provisions in large quantities were hurried to
the Maumee River. Artillery was sent forward. The
Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades moved to the
Sandusky River, making an effective force of fifteen
hundred men at that point. The whole effective force
on the frontier amounted to six thousand three
hundred infantry .^ Harrison intended to move his
headquarters forward from the Sandusky, and to
reach the Maumee Rapids January 20, to which
point he supposed General Winchester already in
motion from Defiance.^
This was the situation January 12; and although
* Dawsou, p. 454.
' Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813 ; Dawson,
p. 339.
* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813 ; Dawson,
p. 339.
UIM. THE RTVER RAISIN. 85
Harrison hinted in his reports of January 4 and 8
that his winter campaign would probably fail,^ he
showed the intention of advancing at least as far
as the strait opposite Maiden, about thirty-five miles
beyond the Maumee. This he might venture without
much danger^ and if he reached that point, supposing
the straits to be frozen, the enemy to show little sign
of resistance, and the weather to favor, he might
attack Maiden. Hull had been expected to take
Maiden with twelve or fourteen hundred men, with
an open river behind him, a British fleet on his flank,
fifty miles of road to cover, and supplies for only a
few days at Detroit ; but Harrison with six thousand
men, the river frozen and the British fleet frozen in
it, a secure base, with a million rations close in his
rear, and no Isaac Brock in his front, still spoke
with extreme doubt of his prospects, and said that
" most of the well-informed men who knew the character of the country " ^ expected a suspension of
operations for the winter.
Aware that from a military point of view no landcampaign could, except by accident, effect any result
proportionate to its cost, Harrison had placed himself
at the head of a popular movement so strong that
he would have met the fate of Hull and Alexander
Smyth, had he not made at least a demonstration
^ Hairison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813 ; Daweon, p. 339.
* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 8, 1813 ; Daweon, p. 339.
86 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
against an enemy whose face he had not yet seen.
Forced by his own pledges and the public discontent
to enter on an unmilitary campaign, he was anxious
to risk as little as possible where he could hardly
expect to gain anything; and he would probably
have contented himself with his first scheme of a
eoup'de-main against Maiden or Detroit, without attempting to hold either place, had not his subordinate. General Winchester, rescued him from an
awkward position by a blunder that relieved Harrison of further responsibility.
Brigadier-General Winchester was a planter of
Tennessee, sixty-one years old, and formerly an officer in the Revolutionary War. Though outranking
Harrison, he had allowed himself to be set aside by
what he thought intrigue,^ and consented to conduct
the left wing of the force under Harrison's command.
Winchester was not a favorite with his Kentucky
militia-men, who had no choice in electing him to
their command. Their term of service was to expire in February ; they had been imprisoned since
September in a wilderness at Defiance^ — hungry,
cold, sick, and mutinous, able to find no enemy willing to fight them, and disgusted with idleness. No
sooner was the ground frozen and the general movement of concentration possible, than Winchester's
command by common consent, under Harrison's or1 Winchester to the "National Intelligencer," Sept 16, 1817;
Major Eves's Statement ; Armstrong's Notices, L 203. Cf.
Dawson, p. 443.
UtM. THE RIVER RAISIN. 87
ders, broke up their camp near Defiance and marched
to the rapids, where Hull's road crossed the Maumee.
There they arrived January 10, as Harrison expected.
They fortified themselves on the north bank, and
waited for the arrival of Harrison, who intended to
join them January 20.
Winchester's force included three regiments of
Kentucky militia, numbering nine hundred effectives,^ and the Seventeenth United States Infantry,
numbering three hundred men, also Kentuckians;
Altogether he had under his command at the rapids
about thirteen hundred men,2 — a force barely sufficient to hold the exposed position it had taken on
the north bank of the river. The three Kentucky
militia regiments were soon to go home. The other
columns were not yet within supporting distance. If
Colonel Proctor, who commanded at Maiden, were
capable of imitating Brock's enterprise, he would
hardly throw away an opportunity, which might
never recur, to strike a blow at the Kentuckians,
and by defeating them to drive Harrison's army behind the Sandusky River. Every military motive
warned Winchester not to divide, detach, or expose his troops without caution. He was himself
a detachment, and he had no support nearer than
the Sandusky.
While the troops were busily engaged in building a
store-house and throwing up log-works in an injudi^ Winchester's Statement ; Armstrong's Notices^ L 197*
> McAffee, p. 230.
88 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4.
cious and untenable position,^ two FrcDclunen came
into camp, begging protection for the inhabitants of
Frenchtown on the river Baisin, thirty miles in front,
and within the British lines. Thirty-three families,
or about one hundred and fifty persons, were resident
at Frenchtown, and the place was held by a few Cana*
dian militia, supposed to consist of two companies,
with about as many Indians, — in all, some three
hundred men.* This force might easily be destroyed,
and the loss to the British would be serious. Winchester's troops became eager to dash at them. A
council of war decided, January 16, without a voice
in remonstrance, that the movement should be made.
The most ardent supporter of the adventure was Col.
John Allen of the Kentucky Rifle regiment ; but no
2)ne offered opposition, and Winchester agreed to the
council's opinion.^
The next morning, Jan. 17, 1813, Col. William
Lewis, of, the Fifth Kentucky militia, started for the
river Raisin, with four hundred and fifty men.* A
few hours afterward he was followed by Colonel
Allen with one hundred and ten men. No reports
told what regiments were taken, or where they were
at any moment stationed ; but Lewis and Allen probably led twelve companies, drawn from four Kentucky regiments, — the Seventeenth United States
1 McAffee, p. 237.
' Winchester's Statement; Armstrong's Notices, i. 199.
• Winchester to the " National Intelligencer," Dec. 13, 1817.
* Winchester to the f Jifitional Intelligencer," Dec. 13» 1817.
1815. THE mVER RAISIN. 89
Infantry, recruited in Kentucky, commanded by Col.
Samuel Wells ; the Kentucky Rifles, Col. John Allen ;
the First Kentucky Infantry; and Colonel Ijewis's
regiment, the Fifth Kentucky Infantry, — in all, six
hundred and sixty men, representing the flower of
Kentucky.
They marched on the ice, along the shore of
Maumee Bay and Lake Erie, until nightfall, whei)
they camped, and at two o'clock the next afternoon^
January 18, reached without meeting resistance tha
houses on the south bank of the river Raisin. The
north bank was occupied, according to British authority,^ by fifty Canadian militia and two hundred
Indians. The British force opened fire with a threepound howitzer. The action began at three o'clock
and lasted till dark, when the enemy after an obstinate resistance was driven about two miles into the
woods with inconsiderable loss.^ The action was
sharp, and cost the Americans not less than twelve
killed and fifty-five wounded, reducing their effective
niunber to six hundred.
Colonel Lewis had orders to take possession of
Prenchtown, and hold it. He reported his success
to General Winchester at the rapids, and remained
at Frenchtown waiting further orders. Winchester
became then aware that the situation was hazardous.
Six hundred men were with him in a half-fortified
camp on the north bank of the Maumee ; six hunAmes, i. 185: Eichardson, p. 74.
Itichardsou, p. 75.
90 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
dred more were thirty miles in advance, at the Raisin
River; while fully two thousand — or, according to
Harrison's estimate, four thousand^ — enemies held
two fortresses only eighteen miles beyond the Raisin.
The Kentuckians at the Maumee, equally aware of
their comrades' peril, insisted on going to their aid.
Winchester promptly started on the evening of January 19, and arrived at Prenchtown the next morning. Colonel Wells's Seventeenth United States
Infantry, two hundred and fifty men, followed, arrivfiig at Frenchtown in the evening.*
Winchester, before leaving the Maumee Rapids,
sent a despatch to Harrison with a report of the
battle of the 18th, which met Harrison on the road
hurrying to the Mamnee Rapids. The next morning, January 20, Harrison arrived at. the camp on
the Maumee, and found there about three hundred
Kentucky troops,' the remainder being all with WinChester at the river Raisin. Probably Harrison, whose
own caution was great, felt the peril of Winchester's
situation,* but he sent his inspector-general. Captain
Hart, forward with orders to Winchester " to hold the
ground we had got at any rate," ^ while he wrote to
the Secretary of War : —
^ Winchester's Statement; Armstrong's Notices, i. 198.
* Winchester to the " National Intelligencer," Dec. 17, 1817.
* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 26, 1813; Official
Letters, p. 125.
^ Harrison to Qovemor Meigs, Jan. 19, 1813; *' National In*
telligencer," Feb. 11, 1813.
* McAffee, p. 210 ; Armstrong's Notices^ i. 200.
1818. THE RIVER RAISIN. 91
" Upon my way to this place [Maumee Rapids] last evening, I received the letter from the General [Winchester]
of which the enclosed is a copy, informing me of the com-
plete success of the enterprise in the defeat of the enemy
and taking the stores they had collected. The detachment under Colonel Lewis remain at the river Raisin,
and Greneral Winchester very properly marched yesterday
with two hundred and fifty men to reinforce him and take
the command. ... It is absolutely necessary to maintain the position at the river Raisin, and I am assembling
the troops as fast as possible for the purpose." ^
Harrison added that his only fear was lest Winchester should be overpowered. He waited at the
Maumee Rapids two days, until at noon, January 22,
a messenger arrived with disastrous tidings from the
front.
Winchester afterward told the story of his own
proceedings with so much candor that his narrative
became a necessary part of any explanation of his
disaster : —
^* Suspecting that Proctor would make an attempt to
avenge this stroke, and knowing that our wounded men
could not be removed, I hastened to reinforce Colonel
Lewis with Wells's regiment, two hundred and fifty men ;
and set out myself to join him, and arrived on the morning of the 20th. The town, lying on the north side of
the rlver,^ was picketed on three sides, the longest facing
the north, and making the front. Within these pickets
Colonel Lewis's corps was found. Not thinking the posi* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Feb. [Jan.] 20, 1818;
MSS. War Department Archives.
92 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4.
tioB eligible, nor the pickets a sufScient defence against
artillery, I would have retreated but for the wounded, of
whom there were fifty-five ; but having no sufficient means
for transporting these, and being equally destitute of
those necessary for fortifying strongly, I issued an order
for putting the place in the best condition for defence
that might be practicable, intending to construct some
new works as soon as the means for getting out timber
might be had. On the evening of the 20th Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp on the right, in an
open field, immediately without the picketing. On the
21st a patrol as far as Brownstown [opposite Maiden]
was sent out, and returned without seeing anything of an
enemy. On the same day a man from Maiden came in
who reported that the enemy were preparing to attack
us; but knowing nothing of the kind or extent of the
preparation made or making, what he brought was
thought to be only conjecture and such as led to a belief that it would be some days before Proctor would be
ready to do anything. . . . Neither night-patrol nor
night-pickets were ordered by me, from a belief that both
were matters of routine and in constant use. . . . Not
to discommode the wounded men, ... I took quarters
for myself and suite in a house on the southern bank,
directly fronting the troops and only separated from
them by the river, then firmly frozen, and but between
eighty and a hundred yards wide."
The only educated oflScer under Harrison's command was Major E. D. Wood of the Engineers, one
of the early graduates of West Point, and an officer
of high promise. He was not with Winchester's
division, but with the right wing on the Sandusky,
mB. THE EIVEB RAISIN. 98
and arrived at the Maumee Rapids some ten days
afterward, where he built Fort Meigs, in February.
During the campaign he kept a diary, and his criti*
cisms of Winchester, Lewis, Allen, and their command were quoted with approval by the Kentucky
historian,^ as well as by Harrison's biographer : * —
" The troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such quarters on the west side of the river as might
please him best, whilst the general • • • took his quarters on the east side, — not the least regard being paid
to defence, order, regularity, or system, in the posting
of the different corps. . . . With only one third or one
fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute
of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen
or heard the least of an enemy ; and with but a very
inadequate supply of ammunition, — how he ever could
have entertained the most distant hope of success, or
what right he had to presume to claim it, is to me one
of the strangest things in the world. . . . Winchester
was destitute of every means of supporting his corps
long at the river Raisin ; was in the very jaws of the
enemy, and beyond the reach of succor. He who fights
with such flimsy pretensions to victory will always be
beaten, and eternally ought to be.*'
Defeat under such conditions was disgraceful
enough; but defeat by Colonel Proctor was one of
the worst misfortunes that happened to an American
general. The Prince Regent took occasion, at the
close of the war, to express his official opinion of
this officer, then Majpr-General Proctor, in language
^ McAffee, p. 233. * Dawson, p. 364.
94 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
of unusual severity.^ Yet Proctor's first movements
at the Raisin River showed no apparent sign of his
being "so extremely wanting in professional knowledge, and deficient in those active, energetic qualities
which must be required of every oflScer " as his later
career, in the Prince Regent's opinion, proved him
to be. He had opposed Brock's bold movement on
Detroit ; but he did not hesitate to make a somewhat
similar movement himself. January 21 he marched
with artillery across the river on the ice, to Brownstown opposite Maiden, in full view of any American
patrol in the neighborhood. His force consisted of
six hundred whites, all told,^ besides either four
hundred and fifty, six hundred or eight hundred
Indians, under the chief Round Head, Tecumthe being absent collecting reinforcements on the Wabash.^
This large body of more than a thousand men,
without an attempt at concealment, crossed to
Brownstown and marched twelve miles, January 21,
camping at night within five miles of Prenchtown.*
If the British historian James was correct, they
numbered eleven hundred and eighty men, of whom
five hundred and thirty were white, and the rest
Indians ; • but the oflScial return reported the whites,
* Life of Sir George Prevost ; App. xxv. p. 74. Christie,
ii. 115.
* Return of the whole of the troopa engaged at Frenchtown,
Jan. 22, 1813 ; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 678, p. 18.
* Christie, ii. 69 ; James, i. 186 ; Richardson, p. 75.
^ Proctor's Report of Jan. 25, 1813 ; James, L 418.
* James, i 185, 186.
1811. THE RIVER RAISIN. 95
including every person present, at five hundred and
ninety-seven men. Two hours before dawn, Janu*
arj 22, fhej again advanced, and before day-break
approached within musket-shot of the picket-fence,
and half-formed their line, before an alarm was
given.
Had Proctor dashed at once on the defenceless
Seventeenth regiment and the fence that covered the
militia, he would probably have captured the whole
without loss ; but he preferred to depend on his
three-pound guns, which gave the Eentuckians opportunity to use their rifles. In such fighting the
Americans had much the advantage, especially as
British regulars were opposite them. Within an
hour the Forty-first regiment lost fifteen killed and
ninety-eight wounded, and of the entire body of six
himdred British troops not less than twenty-four
were killed and one hundred and sixty-one wounded.^
Their three-pound guns were abandoned, so murderous were the Kentuckj rifles.^ Had all the American troops been under cover, the battle would have
been theirs; but Wells's Seventeenth regiment was
a hundred yards away, on open ground outside the
picket-fence on the right, where it was flanked by
the Canadian militia and Indians and driven back toward the river, until Allen's Rifle regiment went out
to help it Gradually forced toward the rear, across
the river, this part of the line was at last struck
' Return, etc; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 648, p. 18.
' Biehaxdson, p. 76.
96 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
with a panic and fled, carrying with it Winchester
himself, Colonel Allen, and Colonel Lewis ; while six
hundred Indians were in hot pursuit, or already in
advance of them.
In the deep snow escape was impossible. Nearly
a hundred Kentuckians fell almost side by side, and
were scalped. Among these was Colonel Allen.
General Winchester and Colonel Lewis were so fortunate as to fall into the hands of the chief Bound
Head, who first stripped them and then took them
to Proctor, who had for the time withdrawn his
forces and ceased firing. By Proctor's advice. General Winchester sent an order to the men within
the picket-fence to surrender.
By eight o'clock all resistance had ceased except
from three hundred and eighty-four Kentuckians
who remained within the picket^ence, under the
command of Major Madison of the Rifle regiment.
Surrounded by a thousand enemies, they had no
chance of escape. Their ammunition was nearly
exhausted ; retreat was impossible ; they could choose
only between surrender and massacre, and they surrendered.^ The British oflScers looked at them with
4
curiosity, as they came within the British line.
*' Their appearance," said Major Richardson,^ *' was
miserable to the last degree. They had the air of men
to whom cleanliness was a virtue unknown, and their
squalid bodies were covered by habiliments that had
1 Statement of Madison, March 13, 1813 ; Niles, iv. 83.
« Richardson's War of 1812, p. 79.
1818. THE RIVER RAISIN. 9T
evidently ondergone every change of season, and were
arrived at the last stage of repair. ... It was the depth
of winter ; but scarcely an individual was in possession
of a great coat or cloak, and few of them wore garments
of wool of any description. They still retained their
summer dress, consisting of cotton stuff of various colors
shaped into frocks, and descending to the knee. Their
trowsers were of the same material. They were covered
with slouched hats, worn bare by constant use, beneath
which their long hair fell matted and uncombed over
their cheeks ; and these, together with the dirty blankets
wrapped round their loins to protect them against the
inclemency of the season, and fastened by broad leathern
belts, into which were thrust axes and knives of an enormous length, gave them an air of wildness and savageness which in Italy would have caused them to pass for
brigands of the Apennines. The only distinction between
the garb of the officer and that of the soldier was that
the one, in addition to his sword, carried a short rifle
instead of a long one, while a dagger, often curiously
worked and of some value, supplied the place of the
knife."
This description gave a lifelike idea of what
Harrison justly thought the best material in the
world for soldiery, had it been properly handled.
Men who for four months had suffered every hardship, and were still unclothed, unfed, uncared for,
and sacrificed to military incompetence, but hardened
to cold, fatigue, and danger, had no reason to be
ashamed of their misfortunes or of their squalor.
Fortunately about five hundred were saved as prisVOL.VII. — 7
98 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
oners, and thirty or forty escaped to the rapids ;
the rest, four hundred in number, were killed in
battle, or massacred afterward.
Had Proctor acted with energy, he might have
advanced to the rapids, and there have captured
Harrison with his remaining force of nine hundred
men, his artillery train and stores. Even with the
utmost celerity Harrison could hardly have escaped^
if an active pursuit had been made by Indians through
the swamp which he had with extreme difficulty
crossed two days before,^ and in the heavy rain which
followed the battle ; ^ but Proctor had no wish for
fighting. So far from thinking of attack, he thought
only of escaping it, and hurried back to Maiden at
noon the same day, leaving the wounded prisoners
behind without a guard. Nothing excused such conduct, for Proctor knew the fate to which he was
exposing his prisoners. That night the Indians,
drunk with whiskey and mad with their grievances
and losses, returned to Prenchtown and massacred
the wounded. About thirty perished, some apparently burned. Fortunately for the United States the
glamour of Proctor's victory hid his true character,
and he was made a major-general, — the most favorable event of the war for the American armies he
was to meet, and one which cost Great Britain even
more in pride than in power.
^ Dawson, p. 362. ' Dawson, p. 356.
CHAPTER V.
If Proctor was afraid of Harrison, with more
military reason Harrison was afraid of Proctor ; and
while the British colonel, deserting his wounded
prisoners, hurried from the field of battle, and felt
himself in danger imtil the next daj he was again
entrenched at Maiden, at the same moment Harrison,,
burning the post at the Maumee Rapids and destroy*
ing such stores as were collected there, hastened back
to the Portage or Carrying River some fifteen miles
in the rear. Within thirty-six hours after the battle,.
the two enemies were sixty miles apart. At the Portage River Harrison remained a week, until he had
collected a force of two thousand men. With these-
he returned to the rapids February 1, and began ta
construct a regularly fortified camp on the south
bank of the river. Port Meigs, as it was called, did
credit to the skill of Major Wood, the engineer offi*
cer who constructed it; but such a fortress seemed
rather intended for defence than for the conquest of
Canada.
In fact, Harrison had succeeded only in making
Hie most considerable failure that had thus far
marked the progress of the war ; but while the^
100 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
public was still assuming treason and cowardice in
William Hull, who had been sent with fifteen hundred men to hold Detroit and conquer Canada, and
had been left unsupported to face destruction, — the
6ame public admitted the excuses of Harrison, who
with ten thousand men, unlimited means, and active
support at Niagara, after four months of effort, failed
even to pass the Maumee River except with a detachment so badly managed that only thirty-three
men in a thousand escaped. This was the crowning
misfortune which wrung from Gallatin the complaint
that a " real incapacity '' for war existed in the
government itself, and must inevitably exhaust its
resources without good result ; but although it drove
Oallatin to Europe, it left Harrison on the Maumee.
Harrison would not take on himself the disgrace of
admitting his inability to recapture Detroit, and the
President would not, without his express admission, order him to desist. As Armstrong afterward explained : ^ " The Cabinet, not inexpert at
deciphering military diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of
incurring any responsibility it could avoid, determined, with perhaps less of patriotism than of prudence, to leave the question of continuing the winter
campaign exclusively with the General." The General, not inclined to sink iiito obscurity or to admit
failure, set himself to a third campaign ad hopeless as
either of its predecessors. Ordering all the troops in
his rear to join him, making a body of four thou»
1 Armstrong's Notices, L 85.
102 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES, Ch.&
exposed to an active enemy. He called for more
militia from Kentucky and Ohio, but the people no
longer felt enthusiasm for war.
^^ I am sorry to mention," reported Harrison, March
17,^ ^^ the dismay and disinclination to the service which
appear to prevail in the Western country; numbers
must give that confidence which ought to be produced by
conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in
any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater
part of the militia who were with me through the winter.
The new drafts from this State [Ohio] are entirely of
another character, and are not to be depended on."
In short, Harrison, who had in 1812 commanded
ten thousand militia, seemed to think double tho
number necessary for 1813, besides regular troops
and a fleet.
President Madison and two successive Secretaries
of War had allowed themselves, for fear of displeasing Kentucky, to give Harrison carte blanche^ which
Harrison had used without other limit than that of
the entire resources of the West. The time at last
came when such management must be stopped, and
Secretary Armstrong, naturally impatient imder the
load of Eustis's and Monroe's failures, quickly decided to stop it. Harrison's letter of February 11,
announcing his failure, reached the Department
March 1. March 6 the -secretary wrote to Harrison ordering him to maintain a threatenmg attitude,
but altering the mode of warfare. Henceforward
^ Aimstron^s Notices, i. 242. ^ Dawson^ p. 337.
1813. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 108
the army was to be made subordinate, — the navy
was to take the lead ; and until the middle of May,
when the fleet on Lake Erie should be constructed,
Harrison was to maintain a strict defensive, and to
protect the line of the Maumee with six regular
regiments, only three of which had been yet partly
raised.
Meanwhile, Harrison had but a few hundred regulars and some Pennsylvania and Virginia militia, —
perhaps five hundred men in all, — to hold Port Meigs,
and mere squads of militia to guard eight other posts
which had cost the government some millions of
dollars. These five hundred troops, whose service
was mostly near its end, he left at Port Meigs, and in
the middle of March he set out for Chillicothe and
Cincinnati. Greatly annoyed at the summary manner
in which Armstrong had put an end to his campaigning, he protested only against the inadequacy of his
force for the defence required of it, and insisted on a
temporary reinforcement of militia to garrison the
fortress that had cost him so much effort to construct
at the Maumee Rapids.
Then the value of General Proctor to his enemy
became immense. Between January 22, when he
attacked Winchester, and the end of April, when he
moved on Port Meigs, Proctor molested in no way
the weak and isolated American garrisons. With
hundreds of scouts and backwoodsmen at his command, he had not the energy or the knowledge to
profit by his opponents' exposed and defenceless con-
104 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
dition. He allowed Major Wood to make Fort Meigs
capable of standing a siege ; he let Harrison, unmolested, pass a month away from his command; he
looked on while the Virginia militia marched home,
leaving only a handful of sickly men, under a major
of artillery, to defend the unfinished fort ; he made
no attempt to waylay Harrison, who returned with
reinforcements by way of the Auglaize River; and
not until Harrison had enjoyed all the time necessary
to prepare for attack, did Proctor disturb him.
Harrison, expecting an assault, hurried back from
Cincinnati to Fort Meigs with some three hundred
men, leaving a brigade of Kentucky militia to follow
him. April 12 he reached the fort, but not till
April 28 did Proctor appear at the mouth of the
Maumee, with about five hundred regulars and nearly
as many militia, — nine hundred and eighty-three
whites, all told, and twelve hundred Indians under
Tecumthe and other chiefs.^ Besides this large
force, he brought two twenty-four pound guns with
other artillery from Detroit, and two gunboats
supported the land-battery. While the guns were
placed in position on the north bank of the river,
the Indians crossed and surrounded the fort on
the south. May 1 the batteries opened, and during four days kept up a heavy fire. Proctor, like
Harrison, moved in the wilderness as though he were
conducting a campaign on the Rhine ; he liked regu^ Proctor's Report of May 4, 1813; Richardson, p. 94 ; James,
i. 196, 429.
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 105
lar modes of warfare, &nd with a force almost wholly
irregular, after allowing Port Meigs to be built, he
besieged it as though he could take it by battering its
earthen ramparts. Untaught by his losses at the
river Raisin, he gave once more advantage to the
Kentucky rifle; and with every opportunity of destroying the reinforcement which he knew to be near,
he allowed himseK to be surprised by it.
The Kentucky brigade of twelve hundred men,
imder Brigadier-General Green Clay, had descended
the Auglaize River in boats, and arrived at Defiance
May 8, where they learned that Fort Meigs was
invested. So neglectful of his advantages was Proctor that he not only failed to prevent General Clay
from advancing, but failed to prevent communication
between the besieged fort and the relief-column, so
that Harrison was able to arrange a general attack
on the investing lines, and came near driving the
British force back to Maiden with the loss of all its
artillery and baggage. At about nine o'clock on the
morning of May 5, Clay's brigade descended the
rapids, and eight hundred and sixty-six men under
Colonel William Dudley,^ landing on the north side
of the river, surprised and took possession of the
British batteries, which were entirely unsupported.
Had Clay's whole force been on the ground, and had
it been vigorously pushed forward, the small British
division which held the north bank must have abandoned all its positions; but Dudley's men were im^ Lossing, p. 486, note.
106 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5.
der no discipline, and though ready to advance were
in no hurry to retreat, even when ordered. Three
companies of the British Forty-first, and some of
the Canadian militia soon gathered together; and
although these could hardly have been half the number of Dudley's force,' yet with Tecumthe and a
body of Indians they attacked the batteries, drove
the Eentuckians out, dispersed them, and either captured or massacred the whole body, under the eyes
of Harrison and Fort Meigs.
This affair, though little less fatal to the Americans
than that of the river Raisin, was much less dearly
bought by the British. Five hundred prisoners fell
into Proctor's hands ; two or three hundred more of
the Kentucky brigade, including "the weak and obstinate but brave " ^ Dudley himself, must have been
either killed in battle or massacred after surrender ;2 only one hundred and seventy escaped; the
boats with the baggage were captured; while the
whole British loss on the north side of the river
hardly exceeded fifty killed and wounded. A bitter
feeling against Proctor was caused by the massacre of
some forty American prisoners while under a British
guard, and also, as was alleged, under the eyes of
General Proctor, who did not interpose, although a
^ Richardson, p. 86 ; James, i. 198.
> Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
* Richardson, pp. 87, 88. Harrison to Armstrong, May 9^
1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 107
fibldier of the Forty-first was murdered in trying to
protect them. Probably all the prisoners would have
been massacred had Tecumthe not ridden up at full
speed, tomahawk in hand, and threatened to kill the
first Indian who defied his authority.^
On the south side Harrison had better fortime, and
Colonel John Miller of the Nineteenth U. S. Infantry
by a sortie gallantly captured a battery, with some
forty prisoners ; but neither on the north nor on the
south did the fighting of May 5 decide any immediate
military result. Besides losing on the north bank half
the reinforcement brought by General Green Clay,
Harrison had lost in the siege and in the sorties on
the south bank nearly three hundred men in killed
and wounded.^ If the numbers loosely reported in the
American accounts were correct, the siege cost Harrison one thousand men, or fully half his entire force,
including his reinforcements. After the fighting of
May 6, he withdrew once more into the fort; the
British batteries reopened fire, and the siege went on.
No further attempt was made to trouble the enemy in
open field. Harrison felt himself too weak for further ventures; yet never had his chance of a great
success been so fair.
Proctor's siege of Fort Meigs was already a failure.
Not only had the fort proved stronger than he expected, but the weather was bad ; his troops were
^ Richardson, p. 88.
' Harnson to Armstrong, May 13, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
108 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5.
without shelter ; dysentery and loss in battle rapidly
weakened them; half his militia went home, and,
what was fatal to further action, his Indians could
not be held together. Within three days after the
battle of May 5, the twelve hundred Indians collected
by Tecumthe's influence and exertions in the northwest territory dispersed, leaving only Tecumthe himself and a score of other warriors in the British camp.^
Proctor had no choice but to retire as rapidly as
possible, and May 9 embarked his artillery and left
his encampment without interference from Harrison,
who looked on as a spectator while the movement
was effected.
From that time imtil the middle of July Proctor
remamed quiet. Harrison moved his headquarters to
Upper Sandusky and to Cleveland, and began to prepare for advance under cover of a naval force ; but he
was not allowed to rest, even though Proctor might
have preferred repose. Proctor's position was difficult. Told by Sir George Prevost^ that he must capture what supplies he needed from the Americans,
and must seek them at Erie and Cleveland, since
Lower Canada could spare neither food nor transport,
he was compelled to look for support to the American
magazines. He was issuing ten thousand rations a
day to the Indian families at Maiden, and his re* Proctor's Report of May 14, 1813 ; James, i. 428; Richard,
son, pp. 93, 94.
^ Prevost to Proctor, July 11, 1813 ; Armstrong's Koticea
i 228.
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 109
sources were near an end.^ Leaving Maiden with
either three hundred and ninety-one regulars, or about
five hundred regulars and militia, and by one British
account nearly a thousand Indians, by another between three and four thousand,^ Proctor returned
by water to the Maumee Rapids July 20, and tried
to draw the garrison of Fort Meigs into an ambush.
The attempt failed. General Green Clay, who was
in command, had learned caution, and imposed it on
his troops. Proctor then found that his Indians were
leaving him and returning to Detroit and Amherstburg. To occupy them. Proctor took again to his
boats and coasted the Lake shore as far as the
Sandusky River, while the Indians who chose to accompany him made their way by land. August 1
the expedition effected a landing at the mouth of
the Sandusky, and scattered panic into the heart
of Ohio.
In truth, nothing could be more alarming than this
movement, which threatened Harrison in all directions, — from Fort Meigs, on the Maumee, to Erie, or
Presqu'isle, where Perry's fleet was building. On
Sandusky River Harrison had collected his chief
magazines. All the supplies for his army were lying
at Upper Sandusky, some thirty miles above the
British landing-place, and he had only eight hundred
raw recruits to defend their unfortified position.^
^ Richardson, p. 111.
* James, i. 264, 265 ; Bichardson, p. 104 ; Christie, p. 117»
* Dawson, p. 408.
110 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5w
Nothing but an untenable stockade, called Fort
Stephenson, on the Sandusky River, where the town
of Fremont afterward grew, oflfered an obstacle to
the enemy in ascending; and Tecumthe with two
thousand Indians was said to be moving from Fort
Meigs by the direct road straight for the magazines,
thus flanking Fort Stephenson and every intermediate
position on the Sandusky.
In just panic for the safety of his magazines, the
only result of a year's campaigning, Harrison's first
thought was to evacuate Fort Stephenson in order to
protect Upper Sandusky. The flank-attack from two
thousand Indians, who never showed themselves, impelled him to retire before Proctor, and to leave the
river open. July 29, after a council of war, he sent
down a hasty order to young Major Croghan who
commanded Fort Stephenson, directing him immediately to bum the fort and retreat up the river or
along the Lake shore, as he best could, with the
utmost haste.^ Croghan, a Kentuckian, and an officer
of the Seventeenth U. S. regiment, refused to obey.
** We have determined to maintain this place, and by
Heaven, we will," he wrote back.* Harrison sent
Colonel Wells, of the same regiment, to relieve him ;
but Croghan went to headquarters, and by somewhat
lame excuses carried his point, and resumed his command the next day. Harrison gave him only conditional orders to abandon the fort, ^orders which
Croghan clearly could not regard, and which Harrisou
1 McAffee, p. 322. * McAffee, p. 323.
1«J8. PKOCTOR AND PERRY. Ill
seemed to feel no confidence in his wishing to follow.^
In the face of British troops with cannon he was to
retreat ; bnt ^^ yon must be aware that the attempt to
retreat in the face of an Indian force would be vain."
Proctor's main force was believed to be Indian.
Neither evacuating nor defending Fort Stephen-
son, Harrison remained at Seneca, ten miles behind it^
watching for Tecumthe and the flank attack, and
arranging a plan of battle for his eight hundred men
by which he could repel the Indians with dragoons
in the open prairie.^ Croghan remained at Fort
Stephenson with one hundred and sixty men, making
every preparation to meet an attack. August 1 the
woods were already filled with Indians, and retreat
was impoBsible, when the British boats appeared on
the river, and Proctor sent to demand surrender of
the fort* Immediately on Groghan's refusal, the
British howitzers opened fire and continued until it
became clear that they were too light to destroy the
stockade.
If experience had been of service to Proctor, he
should have learned to avoid direct attack on Americans in fortified places ; but his position was difficulty
and he was as much afraid of Harrison as Harrison
was afraid of him. Fearing to leave Croghan's little
fort in the rear, and to seek Harrison himself, ten
miles above, on the road to Upper Sandusky ; fearing
* Governor Duncan's Report, 1834; Armstrong's Notices,
i 230.
' Dawson, p. 408.
112 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6.
delay, which would discontent his Indian allies ; fearing to go on to Cleveland or Erie without crippling
Harrison ; still more afraid to retire to Maiden without striking a blow, — Proctor again sacrificed the
Forty-first regiment which had suffered at the river
Raisin and had been surprised at Fort Meigs. On
the afternoon of August 2 the Forty-first regiment
and the militia, in three columns of about one hun-
dred and twenty men each,^ with the utmost gallantry
marched to the pickets of Fort Stephenson, and were
shot down. After two hours' effort, and losing all its
officers, the assaulting column retired, leaving twentysix dead, forty-one wounded, and about thirty missing,
or more than one fifth of their force. The same night
the troops re-embarked and returned to Maiden.
Proctor's report ^ of this affair was filled with com• plaints of the Indians, who could not be left idle and
who would not fight. At Sandusky, he said, " we
•could not muster more hundreds of Indians than I
might reasonably have expected thousands."
" I could not, therefore, with my very small force remain more than two days, from the probability of being
out off, and of being deserted by the few Indians who had
not already done so. . . . On the morning of the 2d inst.
the gentlemen of the Indian department who have the
direction of it, declared formally their decided opinion
that unless the fort was stormed we should never be able
iio bring an Indian warrior into the field with us, and that
they proposed and were ready to storm one face of the
1 Richardson, p. 105.
^ Proctor to Prevost, Aug. 9^ 1813 ; MSS. Canadian Archives*
1818.
PROCTOR AND PERRY. US
fort if we would attempt another. I have also to observe that in this instance my judgment had not that
weight with the troops I hope I might reasonably have
expected. . . . The troops, after the artillery had been
used for some hours, attacked two faces, and impossibilities being attempted, failed. The fort, from which
the severest fire I ever saw was maintained during the
attack, was well defended. The troops displayed the
greatest bravery, the much greater part of whom reached
the fort and made every effort to enter ; but the Indians
who had proposed the assault, and, had it not been assented to, would have ever stigmatized the British character, scarcely came into fire before they ran out of its
reach. A more than adequate sacrifice having been made
to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave assailants."
Sir George Prevost seemed to doubt whether Proctor's excuse for the defeat lessened or increased the
blame attached to it.^ The defeat at Sandusky ruined
Proctor in the esteem of his men. On the American
side, Harrison's conduct roused a storm of indignation.
Through the whole day, August 2, he remained at
Seneca with eight hundred men, listening to the cannonade at Fort Stephenson till late at night, when he
received an express from Croghan to say that the
enemy were embarking. The story ran, that as the
distant sound of Groghan's guns reached the camp at
Seneca, Harrison exclaimed : " The blood be on his
own head ; I wash my hands of it.^ " Whatever else
* Life of Prevost, p. 106, note.
* Governor Duncan's Report, 1834; Armstrong's Notices,
1230.
TOL.TII. — 8
114 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
might be true, his conduct betrayed an extravagant
estimate of his enemy's strength. The only British
eye-witness who left an accomit of the expedition
reckoned Proctor's force, on its departure from Maiden, at about four hundred troops, and " nearly a
thousand Indians." ^ The Indians dispersed until
those with Proctor at Fort Stephenson probably numbered two or three hundred,^ the rest having returned
to Detroit and Maiden. Harrison reported the British force as five thousand strong, on the authority
of General Green Clay.*
Whether the British force was large or small,
Harrison's arrangements to meet it did not please
Secretary Armstrong. "It is worthy of notice," he
wrote long afterward,* " that of these two commanders, always the terror of each other, one [Proctor]
was now actually flying from his supposed pursuer;
while the other [Harrison] waited only the arrival
of Croghan at Seneca to begin a camp-conflagration
and flight to Upper Sandusky."
The well-won honors of the campaign fell to Major
George Croghan, with whose name the whole country
resounded. Whatever were the faults of the two
generals. Major Croghan showed courage and intelligence, not only before and during the attack, but
afterward in supporting Harrison against the outcry which for a time threatened to destroy the
Bichardson, p. 104. ' James, ii. 264.
^ Eichardson, p. 104. • Jam
* Dawson, p. 407 ; McAffee, p. 302.
^ Armstrong's Notices, i. 166, note.
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 115
Gleneral's authority. Immediately after the siege
of Fort Stephenson every energy of the northwest
turned toward a new offensive movement by water
against Maiden, and in the task of organizing the
force required for that purpose, complaints of past
failures were stifled. Secretary Armstrong did not
forget them, but the moment was not suited for
making a change in so important a command. Harrison organized, under Armstrong's orders, a force of
seven thousand men to cross the Lake in boats, imder
cover of a fleet.
The fleet, not the army, was to bear the brunt
of reconquering the northwest; and in nothing did
Armstrong show his ability so clearly as in the
promptness with which, immediately after taking
office, he stopped Harrison's campaign on the
Maumee, while Perry was set to work at Erie.
Feb. 6, 1813, Armstrong entered on his duties.
March 5 his arrangements for the new movements
were already made. Harrison did not approve them,^
but he obeyed. The Navy Department had already
begun operations on Lake Erie, immediately after
Hull's surrender ; but though something was accomplished in the winter, great difficulties had
still to be overcome when February 17 Commander
Perry, an energetic young officer on gunboat service
at Newport, received orders from Secretary Jones
to report to Commodore Chaimcey on Lake Ontario.
Chauncey ordered him to Presqu'isle, afterward
^ Haixison to Armstrong, March 17) 1813 ; Notices, L 242.
116 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6,
called Erie, to take charge of the vessels under construction on Lake Erie. March 27 he reached the
spot, a small village in a remote wilderness, where
timber and water alone existed for the supply of
the fleets.
When Perry reached Presqu'isle the contractors
and carpenters had on the stocks two brigs, a
schooner, and three gunboats. These were to be
launched in May, and to be ready for service in June.
Besides these vessels building at Erie, a number of
other craft, including the prize brig "Caledonia,"
were at the Black Rock navy-yard in the Niagara
River, unable to move on account of the British fort
opposite Buffalo and the British fleet on the Lake.
Perry's task was to unite the two squadrons, to man
them, and to fight the British fleet, without allowing
his enemy to interfere at any stage of these diflScult
operations.
The British squadron under Commander Finnis, an
experienced officer, had entire control of the Lake
and its shores. No regular garrison protected the
harbor of Presqu'isle; not two himdred men could
be armed to defend it, nor was any military support
to be had nearer than Buffalo, eighty miles away.
Proctor or Prevost were likely to risk everything in
trying to destroy the shipyard at Erie ; for upon that
point, far more than on Detroit, Fort Meigs, Sandusky, or Buffalo, their existence depended. If ^erry
were allowed to control the Lake, the British must
not only evacuate Detroit, but also Maiden, must
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. IIT
abandon Tecumthe and the military advantages of
three or four thousand Indian auxiliaries^ and must
fall back on a difficult defensive at the Niagara River.
That they would make every effort to thwart Perry
seemed certain.
Superstition survived m nothing more obstinately
than in faith in luck ; neither sailors nor soldiers ever
doubted the value of this inscrutable quality in the
conduct of war. The " Chesapeake '* was an unlucky
ship to the luckiest commanders, even to the British
captain who captured it. The bad luck of the
^^ Chesapeake " was hardly steadier than the good
luck of Oliver Perry. Whatever he touched seemed
to take the direction he wanted. He began with the
advantage of having Proctor for his chief enemy;
but Harrison, also a lucky man, had the same advantage and yet suffered constant disasters. Commander Finnis was a good seaman, yet Finnis failed
repeatedly, and always by a narrow chance, to injure Perry. Dearborn's incompetence in 1813 was
not less than it had been in 1812; but the single
success which in two campaigns Dearborn gained
on the Niagara obliged the British, May 27, to
evacuate Fort Erie opposite Buffalo, and to release
Perry's vessels at Black Rock. June 6, at leisure,
Perry superintended the removal of the five small
craft from the navy-yard at Black Rock ; several
hundred soldiers, seamen, and oxen warped them
up stream into the Lake. Loaded with stores, the
little squadron sailed from Buffalo June 13; the
118 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. &
wind was ahead ; they were five days makmg eighty
miles ; but June 19 they arrived at Presqu'isle, and
as the last vessel crossed the bar, Finnis and his
squadron came in sight. Finnis alone could explain
how he, a first-rate seaman, with a strong force and
a fair wind, in such narrow seas, could have helped
finding Perry's squadron when he knew where it
must be.
From June 19 to August 1 Perry's combined fleet
lay within the bar at Presqu'isle, while Proctor, with
a suflScient fleet and a military force superior to anything on the Lake, was planning expeditions from
Maiden against every place except the one to which
military necessity and the orders of his Government
bade him go. August 4, Perry took out the armaments of his two brigs and floated both over the
bar into deep water. Had the British fleet been at
hand, such a movement would have been impossible
or fatal ; but the British fleet appeared just as Perry's
vessels got into deep water, and when for the first
time an attack could not be made with a fair hope
of success.
These extraordinary advantages were not gained
without labor, energy, courage, and wearing anxieties
and disappointments. Of these Perry had his full
share, but no more; and his opponents were no
better off than himself. By great exertions alone
could the British maintain themselves on Lake
Ontario, and to this necessity they were forced to
sacrifice Lake Erie. Sir George Prevost could spare
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 119
only a new commander with a few officers and some
forty men from the lower Lake to meet the large
American reinforcements on the upper. When the
commander, R. H. Barclay, arrived at Maiden in
June, he found as many difficulties there as Perry
foimd at Presqu'isle. Barclay was a captain in the
British Royal Navy, thirty-two years old ; he had lost
an arm in the service, but he was fairly matched as
Perry's antagonist, and showed the qualities of an
excellent officer.
Perry's squadron, once on the Lake, altogether overawed the British fleet, and Barclay's only hope lay
in completing a vessel called the " Detroit," then on
the stocks at Amherstburg. Rough and unfinished,
she was laimched, and while Perry blockaded the
harbor, Barclay, early in September, got masts and
rigging into her, and armed her with guns of every
calibre, taken from the ramparts.^ Even the two
American twenty-four pound guns, used by Proctor
against Fort Meigs, were put on board the " Detroit.'*
Thus equipped, she had still to be manned; but no
seamen were near the Lake. Barclay was forced to
make up a crew of soldiers from the hardworked
Forty-first regiment and Canadians unused to service. September 6 the " Detroit " was ready to sail,
and Barclay had then no choice but to fight at any
risk. "So perfectly destitute of provisions was the
port that there was not a day's flour in store, and
the crews of the squadron imder my command were
^ Ridbaidson, p. 110; James, Naval O ccurr ences, p. 285.
120 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
on half allowance of many things ; and when that was
done, there was no more." ^
Early on the mommg of September 9 Barclay's
fleet weighed and sailed for the enemy, who was
then at anchor ofiF the island of Put-in-Bay near
the mouth of Sandusky River. The British squadron consisted of six vessels, — the "Detroit,*' a ship
of four hundred and ninety tons, carrjdng nineteen
guns, commanded by Barclay himself; the "Queen
Charlotte " of seventeen guns, commanded by Finnis ;
the " Lady Prevost " of thirteen guns ; the " Hunter "
of ten; the "Little Belt" carrying three, and the
" Chippeway " carrying one gun, — in all, sixty-three
guns, and probably about four hundred and fifty men.
The American squadron consisted of nine vessels, —
the "Lawrence," Perry's own brig, nearly as large
as the "Detroit," and carrying twenty guns; the
" Niagara," commander Jesse D. Elliott, of the same
tonnage, with the same armament ; the " Caledonia,"
a three-gun brig ; the schooners " Ariel," " Scorpion,"
" Somers," " Porcupine," and " Tigress," carrying ten
guns ; and the sloop " Trippe," with one gun, — in all,
fifty-four guns, with a nominal crew of five himdred
and thiriy-two men, and an effective crew probably
not greatly differing from the British. In other respects Perry's superiority was decided, as it was
meant to be. The Americans had thirty-nine thirtytwo pound carronades ; the British had not a gun of
^ Barclay's Report of Sept. 12, 1813 ; James, Naval Occorxences. Appendix, no. 54.
1818. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 121
that weight, and only fifteen twenty-four pound car
ronades. The lightest guns on the American fleet
were eight long twelve-pounders, while twenty-four
of the British guns threw only nine-pound shot, or
less. The American broadside threw at close range
about nine hundred pounds of metal; the British
threw about four himdred and sixty. At long range
the Americans threw two hundred and eighty-eight
pounds of metal ; the British threw one hundred and
ninety-five pounds. In tonnage the Americans were
superior as eight to seven. In short, the Navy Department had done everything reasonably necessary
to insure success; and if the American crews, like
the British, were partly made up of landsmen, soldiers or volunteers, the reason was in each case the
same. Both governments supplied all the seamen
they had.
Between forces so matched, victory ought not ixy
have been in doubt ; and if it was so, the fault certainly lay not in Perry. When, at daylight September 10, his look-out discovered the British fleet, Perry
got his own squadron under way, and came down.
with a light wind from the southeast against Barclay's line, striking it obliquely near the head. Perry
must have been anxious to fight at close range, where
his superiority was as two to one, while at long range
his ship could use only two long twelve-poundersagainst the " Detroit's " six twelves, one eighteen, and
two tweniy-f ours, — an inferiority amounting to helplessness. Both the ** Lawrence " and the " Niagara '"
122 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.s.
were armed for close fighting, and were intended for
nothing else. At long range their combined broad*
side, even if all their twelve-pounders were worked
on one side, threw but forty-eight pounds of metal ;
at short range the two brigs were able to throw six
hundred and forty pounds at each broadside.
Perry could not have meant to fight at a distance,
nor could Commander Elliott have thought it good
seamanship. Yet Perry alone acted on this evident
scheme ; and though his official account showed that
he had himself fought at close range, and that he
ordered the other commanders to do the same, it gave
no sufficient reasons to explain what prevented the
whole fleet from acting together, and made the result
doubtful. He did not even mention that he himself
led the line in the "Lawrence," with two gunboats,
the " Ariel '' and the " Scorpion," supporting him,
the " Caledonia," " Niagara," and three gunboats following. The " Lawrence " came within range of the
British Une just at noon, the wind bemg very light,
the Lake calm, and Barclay, in the "Detroit," opposite.
Perry's report began at that point : —
"At fifteen minutes before twelve the enemy commenced firing ; at five minutes before twelve the action
commenced on our part. Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, and its being mostly
directed to the ^ Lawrence,' I made sail (at quarter-past
twelve) and directed the other vessels to follow, for the
purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and
bowline being shot away, she became unmanageable.
18M. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 128
notwithstanding the great exertions of the sailing-master.
In this situation she sustained the action upwards of two
hours, within canister-shot distance, until every gun was
rendered useless, and a gi*eater part of the crew either
killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer annoy
the enemy, I left her in charge of Lieutenant Yarnall,
who, I was convinced from the bravery already displayed
by him, would do what would comport with the honor
of the flag. At half-past two, the wind springing up,
Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the
* Niagara,' gallantly into close action. I immediately
went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by
volunteering to bring the schooners, which had been kept
astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action.
... At forty-five minutes past two the signal was made
for * close action.' The ' Niagara ' being very little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy's line;
bore up, and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig,
giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and
to a large schooner and sloop, from the larboard side,
at half pistol-shot distance. The smaller vessels at this
time having got within grape and canister distance, under
the direction of Captain Elliott, and keeping up a welldirected fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt
to escape."
From this reticent report, any careful reader could
see that for some reason, not so distinctly given as
would have been the case if the wind alone were at
fatdt, the action had been very badly fought on the
American side. The British official account confirmed the impression given by Perry. Barclay's
124 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
story was as well told as his action was well
fought : —
^^ At a quarter before twelve I commenced the action
by a few long guns ; about a quarter-past, the American
commodore, also supported by two schooners, . . . came
to close action with the ^ Detroit.' The other brig [the
^Niagara'] of the enemy, apparently destined to engage
the ^ Queen Charlotte,' kept so far to windward as to
render the * Queen Charlotte's ' twenty-four pounder carronades useless, while she was, with the ^ Lady Prevost,'
exposed to the heavy and destructive fire of the ^ Caledonia' and four other schooners, armed with heavy and
long guns. • . . The action continued with great fury
until half-past two, when I perceived my opponent [the
^ Lawrence '] drop astern, and a boat passing from him
to the ^ Niagara,' which vessel was at this time perfectly
fresh. The American commodore, seeing that as yet the
day was against him, . . . made a noble and, alas ! too
successful an effort to regain it ; for he bore up, and supported by his small vessels, passed within pistol-shot and
took a rakmg position on our bow. . . . The weather-
gage gave the enemy a prodigious advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their position, but their
distance also, which they [the ^ Caledonia,' ^ Niagara,'
and the gunboats] did in such a manner as to prevent
the carronades of the ^ Queen Charlotte ' and ^ Lady
Prevost ' from having much effect, while their long ones
did great execution, particularly against the ^ Queen
Charlotte.' "
Barclay's report, agreeing with Perry's, made it \
clear that while Perry and the head of the American line fought at close quarters, the ^^ Caledonia,"
IMS. PROCTOR AND PERRY. 125
^^ Niagara," and the four gunboats supporting them
preferred fighting at long range, — not because they
wanted wind, but because the " Caledonia " and gunboats were armed with long thirty-two and twentyfour poimders, while the British vessels opposed to
them had only one or two long twelve-pounders.
Certainly the advantage in this respect on the side
of the American brig and gunboats was enormous;
but these tactics threw the "Niagara," which had not
the same excuse, out of the battle, leaving her, from
twelve o'clock till half-past two, firing only two
twelve-pound guns, while her heavy armament was
useless, and might as well have been left ashore*
Worse than this, the persistence of the " Caledonia,"
"Niagara," and their gunboats in keeping beyond
range of their enemies' carronades nearly lost the
battle, by allowing the British to concentrate on the
"Lawrence" all their heavy guns, and in the end
compelling the " Lawrence " to strike. On all these
points no reasonable doubt could exist. The two
reports were the only ofiicial sources of information
on which an opinion as to the merits of the action
could properly be founded. No other account, con
temporaneous tod authoritative, threw light on the
subject, except a letter by Lieutenant Yarnall, second
in command to Perry on the "Lawrence," written
September 15, and published in the Ohio newspapers
about September 29, — in which Yarnall said that if
Elliott had brought his ship into action when the
8?gnal was given, the battle would have ended in
126 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5.
much less time, and with less loss to the "Lawrence." This statement agreed with the tenor of
the two oflBcial reports.
Furious as the battle was, a more furious dispute
raged over it when in the year 1834 the friends of
Perry and of Elliott wrangled over the action. With
i;heir dispute history need not concern itself. The
official reports left no reasonable doubt that Perry's
plan of battle was correct; that want of wind was
not the reason it failed ; but that the " Niagara" was
badly managed by Elliott, and that the victory, when
actually forfeited by this mismanagement, was saved
by the personal energy of Perry, who, abandoning his
own ship, brought the " Niagara " through the enemy's line, and regained the advantage of her heavy
l)attery. The luck which attended Perry's career on
ihe Lake saved him from injury, when every other
officer on the two opposing flagships and four-fifths
of his crew were killed or wounded, and enabled him
1;o perform a feat almost without parallel in naval
warfare, giving him a well-won immortality by means
of the disaster unnecessarily incurred. No process
of argument or ingenuity of seamanship could deprive Perry of the fame justly given him by the public, or detract from the splendor of his reputation as
the hero of the war. More than any other battle of
the time, the victory on Lake Erie was won by the
oourage and obstinacy of a single man.
Between two opponents such as Perry and Barclay,
no one doubted that the ships were fought to their
1818. PKOCTOR AND PERRY. 127
utmost. Of the "Lawrence" not much was left;
ship, officers, and crew were shot to pieces. Such
carnage was not known on the ocean, for even the
cockpit where the sick and wounded lay, being above
water, was riddled by shot, and the wounded were
wounded again on the surgeon's board. Of one
hundred and three effectives on the "Lawrence,"
twenty-two were killed and sixty-one wounded. The
brig herself when she struck was a wreck, unmanageable, her starboard bulwarks beaten in, guns dismounted, and rigging cut to pieces. The British
ships were in hardly better condition. The long
guns of the gunboats had raked them with destructive effect. Barclay was desperately wounded; Finnis was killed ; Barclay's first lieutenant was mortally
wounded ; not one commander or second in command
could keep the deck ; the squadron had forty-one men
killed and ninety-four wounded, or nearly one man in
three; the "Detroit" and "Queen Charlotte" were
unmanageable and fell foul; the "Lady Prevost'^
was crippled, and drifted out of the fight. Perrj
could console himself with the thought that if hia
ship had struck her flag, she had at least struck to
brave men.
CHAPTER VI.
General Harbison, waiting at Seneca on the
Sandusky River, received, September 12, Perry's
famous despatch of September 10: "We have met
the enemy, and they are ours." The navy having
done its work, the army was next to act.
The force under Harrison's command was ample
for the required purpose, although it contained fewer
regular troops than Armstrong had intended. The
seven regular regiments assigned to Harrison fell
short in numbers of the most moderate expectations.
Instead of providing seven thousand rank-and-file,
the recruiting service ended in producing rather more
than twenty-five hundred.^ Divided into two brigades under Brigadier-Generals McArthur and Lewis
Cass, with a light corps under Lieutenant-Colonel
Ball of the Light Dragoons, they formed only one
wing of Harrison's army.
To supply his main force, Harrison had still to
depend on Kentucky; and once more that State
made a great effort. Governor Shelby took the
field in person, leading three thousand volunteers,*
^ McAffee, p. 334.
> Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239.
1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 129
organized in eleven regiments, five brigades, and
two divisions. Besides the militia, who volunteered
for this special purpose, Harrison obtained the services of another Kentucky corps, which had already
proved its eflSciency.
One of Armstrong's happiest acts, at the beginning of his service as War Secretary,^ was to accept the aid of Bichard M. Johnson in organizing
for frontier defence a mounted regiment of a thou-
sand men, armed with muskets or rifles, tomahawks, and knives.3 Johnson and his regiment
took the field about June 1, and from that time
anxiety on account of Indians ceased. The regiment patrolled the district from Fort Wayne to
the river Raisin, and whether in marching or fighting proved to be the most efiicient corps in the
Western country. Harrison obtained the assistance
of Johnson's regiment for the movement into
Canada, and thereby increased the efficiency of
his army beyond the proportion of Johnson's
numbers.
While the mounted regiment moved by the road
to Detroit, Harrison's main force was embarked in
boats September 20, and in the course of a few
days some forty-five hundred infantry were safely
conveyed by way of Bass Island and Put-in-Bay
to Middle Sister Island, about twelve miles from
^ Aimstiongy i. 171, note ; McAffee, p. 286.
* R. M. Johnson to AimBtrong, Dec. 22, 1834 ; Aimstrong,
i232.
VOL. VII. — 9
180 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES- Ch.«.
the Canadian shore.^ Harrison and Perry then
selected a landing place, and the whole force was
successfully set ashore, September 27, about three
miles below Maiden.
Although Proctor could not hope to maintain
himself at Maiden or Detroit without control of the
Lake, he had still the means of rendering Harrison's
possession insecure. According to the British account, he commanded at Detroit and Maiden a force
of nine hundred and eighty-six regulars, giving about
eight hundred effectives.^ Not less than thirty-five
hundred Indian warriors had flocked to Amherstburg, and although they greatly increased the British
general's diflSculties by bringing their families with
them, they might be formidable opponents to Harrison's advance. Every motive dictated to Proctor
the necessity of resisting Harrison's approach. To
Tecumthe and his Indians the evacuation of Maiden
and Detroit without a struggle meant not only the
sacrifice of their cause, but also cowardice ; and when
Proctor announced to them, September 18, that he
meant to retreat, Tecumthe rose in the council and
protested against the flight, likening Proctor to a
fat dog that had carried its tail erect, and now that
it was frightened dropped its tail between its legs
and ran.* He told Proctor to go if he liked, but the
Indians would remain.
^ Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 24, 1813; Official Letters,
p. 216.
* James, i. 269. ' Richardson, p. 119*
1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 181
Proctor insisted upon retiring at least toward the
Moravian town, seventy miles on the road to Lake
Ontario, and the Indians yielded. The troops immediately began to bum or destroy the public property at Detroit and Maiden, or to load on wagons or
boats what could not be carried away. September
24, three days before Harrison's army landed, the
British evacuated Maiden and withdrew to Sandwich,
allowing Harrison to establish himself at Maiden
without a skirmish, and neglecting to destroy the
bridge over the Canards River.
Harrison was surprised at Proctor's tame retreat
** Nothing but infatuation," he reported,^ ** could have
governed General Proctor's conduct. The day that I
landed below Maiden he had at his disposal upward of
three thousand Indian warriors; his regular force reinforced by the militia of the district would have made
his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which on the
day of landing did not exceed forty-five hundred. . .
His inferior officers say that his conduct has been a series
of continued blunders."
This crowning proof of Proctor's incapacity disorganized his force. Tecumthe expressed a general
sentiment of the British army in his public denunciation of Proctor's cowardice. One of the inferior
British oflScers afterward declared that Proctor's
^^ marked inefficiency" and "wanton sacrifice" of
the troops raised more than a doubt not only of
his capacity but even of his personal courage, and
^ Hiffrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 239.
132 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
led to serious thoughts of taking away his authority.^ The British at Sandwich went through the
same experience that marked the retreat of Hull
and his army from the same spot, only the year
before.
Harrison on his side made no extreme haste to
pursue. His army marched into Maiden at four
o'clock on the afternoon of September 27,^ and he
wrote to Secretary Armstrong that evening : " I
'will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is
no probability of my overtaking him, as he has uj>wards of a thousand horses, and we have not one
in the army."^ The pursuit was not rapid. Sand*
wich, opposite Detroit, was only thirteen miles above
Maiden, but Harrison required two days to reach
it, arriving at two o'clock on the afternoon of September 29. From there, September 30, he wrote
again to Secretary Armstrong that he was preparing
to pursue the enemy on the following day;* but he
waited for R. M. Johnson's mounted regiment, which
arrived at Detroit September 30, and was obliged
to consume a day in crossing the river. Then the
pursuit began with energy, but on the morning of
October 2 Proctor had already a week's advance
and should have been safe.
^ Richardson, pp. 126, 133, 134.
< Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 27, 1813 ; Official Letters^
p. 220.
* Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 27, 1813 ; Dawson, p. 421.
^ Harrison to Armstrong, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. '233.
1813. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 188
Proctor seemed to imagine that the Americans
would not ventiu^e to pursue him. Moving, according to his own report,^ "by easy marches," neither
obstructing the road in his rear nor leaving detachments to delay the enemy, he reached Dolson's
October 1, and there halted his army, fifty miles
from Sandwich, while he went to the Moravian
town some twenty-six miles beyond. He then intended to make a stand at Chatham, three miles
behind Dolson's.
*' I had assured the Indians," said Proctor's report of
October 23, "that we would not desert them, and it was
my full determination to have made a stand at the Forks
(Chatham), by which our vessels and stores would be protected; but after my arrival at Dover [Dolson's] three
miles lower down the river, I was induced to take post
there first, where ovens had been constructed, and where
there was some shelter for the troops, and had accordingly directed that it should be put into the best possible
state of defence that tipue and circumstances would admit
of ; indeed it had been my intention to have opposed the
enemy nearer the mouth of the river, had not the troops
contrary to my intention been moved, during my absence
of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the country in my rear."
The British army, left at Dolson's October 1, without a general or orders,^ saw the American army
arrive in its front, October 8, and retired three
1 Report of Oct. 23, 1813 ; MSS. British Archives. Lower
Canada, vol. cxxili.
* Richardson, pp. 133, 134.
134 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.e.
miles to Chatham, where the Indians insisted upon
fighting ; but when, the next morning, October 4,
the Americans advanced in order of battle,^ the
Indians after a skirmish changed their minds and
retreated. The British were compelled to sacrifice
the supplies they had brought bj water to Chatham
for establishing their new base, and their retreat
precipitated on the Moravian town the confusion of
flight already resembling rout.
Six miles on their way they met General Proctor
returning from the Moravian town, and as much
dissatisfied with them as they with him. Pressed
closely by the American advance, the British troops
made what haste they could over excessively bad
roads until eight o'clock in the evening, when they
halted within six miles of the Moravian town.^ The
next morning, October 5, the enemy was again reported to be close at hand, and the British force
again retreated. About a mile and a half from the
Moravian town it was halted. Proctor had then
retired as far as he could, and there he must either
fight, or abandon women and children, sick and
wounded, baggage, stores, and wagons, desert his
Indian allies, and fly to Lake Ontario. Probably
flight would not have saved his troops. More than
a hundred miles of unsettled coimtry lay between
them and their next base. The Americans had in
1 Harrison's Beport, Oct. 9, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 234.
* Narrative of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813 ; Richardson,
p. 137.
1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 185
their advance the mounted regiment of R. M. Johnson, and could outmarch the most lightly equipped
British regulars. Already, according to Proctor's
report, the rapidity of the Americans had destroyed
the eflBciency of the British organization : ^ —
^^ In the attempt to save provisions we became encumbered with boats not suited to the state of navigation. The Indians and the troops retreated on
different sides of the river, and the boats to which
sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed to the fire of the enemy who were
advancing on the side the Indians were retiring, and
most unfortunately fell into possession of the enemy,
and with them several of the men, provisions, and all
the ammunition that had not been issued to the troops
and Indians. This disastrous circumstance afforded the
enemy the means of crossing and advancing on both
sides of the river. Finding the enemy were advancing
too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry,
in a wood below the Moravian town, which last was not
cleared of Indian women and children, or of those of
the troops, nor of the sick."
The whole British force was then on the north
bank of the river Thames, retreating eastward by a
road near the river bank. Proctor could hardly claim
to have exercised choice in the selection of a battleground, unless he preferred placing his little force
under every disadvantage. " The troops were formed
with their left to the river," his report continued,
** with a reserve and a six-pounder on the road, near
* Proctor's Report of Oct. 23, 1813 ; MSS. British Archives.
186 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«,
the river ; the Indians on the right." According to
the report of officers of the Forty-first regiment, two
lines of troops were formed in a thick forest, two
hundred yards apart. The first line began where
the six-pound field-piece stood, with a range of some
fifty yards along the road. A few Canadian Light
Dragoons were stationed near the gun. To the left
of the road was the river ; to the right a forest, free
from underbrush that could stop horsemen, but offering cover to an approaching enemy within twentypaces of the British line.^ In the wood about two
hundred men of the British Forty-first took position
as well as they could, behind trees, and there as
a first line they waited some two hours for their
enemy to appear.
The second line, somewhat less numerous, two
hundred yards behind the first, and not within sight,
was also formed in the wood ; and on the road, in
rear of the second line, Proctor and his staff stationed
themselves. The Indians were collected behind a
swamp on the right, touching and covering effectually the British right flank, while the river covered
the left.
Such a formation was best fitted for Harrison's
purposes, but the mere arrangement gave little idea
of Proctor's weakness. The six-pound field-piece,
which as he afterward reported "certainly should
have produced the best effect if properly managed,"
had not a round of ammunition, and coidd not be
1 Richardson, pp. 122, 139.
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1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 137
fired.^ The Forty-first regiment was almosi mutinous, but had it been in the best condition it could
not have held against serious attack. The whole
strength of the Forty-first was only three hundred
and fifty-six rank-and-file, or four hundred and eight
men all told.^ The numbers of the regiment actu^^
ally in the field were reported as three hundred and
fifteen rank-and-file, or three hundred and sixty-seven
men all told.^ The dragoons were supposed not to
exceed twenty. This petty force was unable to see
either the advancing enemy or its own members.
The only eflBcient corps in the field was the Indians,
who were estimated by the British sometimes at five
hundred, at eight hundred, and twelve hundred in
number, and who were in some degree covered by
the swamp.
Harrison came upon the British line soon after two
o'clock in the afternoon, and at once formed his army
in regular order of battle. As the order was disregarded, and the battle was fought, as he reported, in.
a manner " not sanctioned by anything that I had
seen or heard of," * the intended arrangement mattered little. In truth, the battle was planned as well
as fought by Richard M. Johnson, whose energy impressed on the army a new character from the moment he joined it. While Harrison drew up his
* Richardson, p. 136. * James, i. 278.
* Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813 ; Richaidson,
p. 140.
« Harrison's Report of Oct. 9, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 233*
138 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«,
infantry in order of battle, Johnson, whose mounted
regiment was close to the British line, asked leave to
charge,^ and Harrison gave him the order, although he
knew no rule of war that sanctioned it.
Johnson's tactics were hazardous, though effective.
Giving to his brother, James Johnson, half the regiment to lead up the road against the six-pound gun
and the British Forty-first regiment, R. M. Johnson
with the other half of his regiment wheeled to the
left, at an angle with the road, and crossed the
swamp to attack twice his number of Indians posted
in a thick wood.
James Johnson, with his five hundred men, galloped
directly through the British first line,^ receiving a
confused fire, and passing immediately to the rear
of the British second line, so rapidly as almost to
capture Proctor himself, who fled at full speed.* As
the British soldiers straggled in bands or singly
toward the rear, they found themselves among the
American mounted riflemen, and had no choice but
to surrender. About fifty men, with a single lieutenant, contrived to escape through the woods ; all the
rest became prisoners.
B. M. Johnson was less fortunate. Crossing the
swamp to his left, he was received by the Indians in
^ R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1834 ; Armstrong's
Notices, 1. 232.
* Report of Lieutenant Bollock, Dec. 6, 1813 ; Richardson,
p. 140.
* Richardson, p. 136.
1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 139
underbrush which the horses could not penetrate.
Under a sharp fire his men were obliged to dismount
and fight at close quarters. At an early moment of
the battle, Johnson was wounded by the rifle of an
Indian warrior who sprang forward to despatch him,
but was killed by a ball from Johnson's pistol. The
fighting at that point was severe, but Johnson's men
broke or turned the Indian line, which was uncovered
after the British defeat, and driving the Indians toward the American left, brought them under fire of
Shelby's infantry, when they fled.
In this contest Johnson maintained that his regiment was alone engaged. In a letter to Secretary
Armstrong, dated six weeks after the battle, he
said : ^ —
*' I send you an imperfect sketch of the late battle on
the river Thames, fought solely by the mounted regiment ;
at least, so much so that not fifty men from any other
corps assisted. . . . Fought the Indians, twelve hundred or fifteen hundred men, one hour and twenty minutes, driving them from the extreme right to the extreme
left of my line, at which last point we came near Governor Shelby, who ordered Colonel Simrall to reinforce
me ; but the battle was over, and although the Indians
were pursued half a mile, there was no fighting."
Harrison's oflicial report gave another idea of the
relative share taken by the Kentucky infantry in the
action; but the difference in dispute was trifling.
^ R. M. Johnson to Armstrong, Nov. 21, 1813 ; MSS. War
Department Archives.
140 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
The entire American loss was supposed to be only
about fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The battle
lasted, with sharpness, not more than twenty minutes ;
and none but the men under Johnson's command enjoyed opportunity to share in the first and most
perilous assault.
The British loss was only twelve men killed and
thirty-six wounded. The total number of British
prisoners taken on the field and in the Moravian town^
or elsewhere on the day of battle, was four hundred
and seventy-seven ; in the whole campaign, six hundred. All Proctor's baggage, artillery, small arms,
stores, and hospital were captured in the Moravian
town. The Indians left thirty-three dead on the field,
among them one reported to be Tecumthe. After
the battle several oflBcers of the British Forty-first,
well acquainted with the Shawnee warrior, visited the
spot, and identified his body. The Kentuckians had
first recognized it, and had cut long strips of skin
from the thighs, to keep, as was said, for razor-straps,
in memory of the river Raisin.^
After Perry's victory on Lake Erie, Tecumthe's life
was of no value to himself or his people, and his
death was no subject for regret; but the manner
chosen for producing this result was an expensive
mode of acquiring territory for the United States.
The Shawnee warrior compelled the government to
pay for once something like the value of the lands
^ Bichardson, p. 125. Lewis Cass to Armstrong, Oct. 28,
1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
1818. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 141
it took. The precise cost of the Indian war could
not be estimated, being combined in many ways
with that of the war with England; but the British
counted for little, within the northwestern territory,
except so far as Tecumthe used them for his purposes. Not more than seven or eight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the Detroit River ; but the
United States raised fully twenty thousand men, and
spent at least five million dollars and many lives in
expelling them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign of Tippecanoe, the
surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres
at Fort Dearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs,
the murders along the frontier, and the campaign
of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian lands in
the Wabash Valley.
No part of the war more injured British credit on
the American continent than the result of the Indian
alliance. Except the capture of Detroit and Mackinaw at the outset, without fighting, and the qualified
success at the river Raisin, the British suffered only
mortifications, ending with the total loss of their fleet,
the abandonment of their fortress, the flight of their
army, and the shameful scene before the Moravian
town, where four hundred British regulars allowed
themselves to be ridden over and captured by five
hundred Kentucky horsemen, with hardly the loss of
a man to the assailants. After such a disgrace the
British ceased to be formidable in the northwest.
The Indians recognized the hopelessness of their
142 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6.
course, and from that moment abandoned their dependence on England.
The battle of the Thames annihilated the right
division of the British army in Upper Canada. When
the remnants of Proctor's force were mustered, October 17, at Ancaster, a hundred miles from the battlefield, about two hundred rank-and-file were assembled.^
Proctor made a report of the battle blaming his
troops, and Prevost issued a severe reprimand to the
unfortunate Forty-first regiment on the strength of
Proctor's representations. In the end the Prince
Regent disgraced both officers, recognizing by these
public acts the loss of credit the government had
suffered ; but its recovery was impossible.
So little anxiety did General Harrison thenceforward feel about the Eighth Military District which he
commanded, that he returned to Detroit October 7 ;
his army followed him, and arrived at Sandwich,
October 10, without seeing an enemy. Promptly discharged, the Kentucky Volunteers marched homeward
October 14 ; the mounted regiment and its wounded
colonel followed a few days later, and within a fortnight only two brigades of the regular army remained
north of the Maumee.
At Detroit the war was closed, and except for two
or three distant expeditions was not again a subject
of interest. The Indians were for the most part
obliged to remain within the United States jurisdiction. The great number of Indian families that
^ Return of Right Division, RichaidBon, p. 129.
1813. THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES. 143
had been collected about Detroit and Maiden were
rather a cause for confidence than fear, since they
were in effect hostages, and any violence committed
by the warriors would have caused them, their women
and children, to be deprived of food and to perish
of starvation. Detroit was full of savages dependent
on army supplies, and living on the refuse and offal
of the slaughter-yard; but their military strength
was gone. Some hundreds of the best warriors followed Proctor to Lake Ontario, but Tecumthe's northwestern confederacy was broken up, and most of the
tribes made submission.
CHAPTER Vn.
The new Secretaries of War and Navy who took
office in January, 1813, were able in the following
October to show Detroit recovered. Nine months
solved the problem of Lake Erie. The problem of
Lake Ontario remained insoluble.
In theory nothing was simpler than the conquest
of Upper Canada. Six months before war was declared, Jan. 2, 1812, John Armstrong, then a private
citizen, wrote to Secretary Eustis a letter containing
the remark, —
'* In invading a neighboring and independent territory
like Canada, having a frontier of immense extent ; destitute of means strictly its own for the purposes of
defence ; separated from the rest of the empire by an
ocean, and having to this but one outlet, — this outlet
forms your true object or point of attack."
The river St. Lawrence was the true object of
attack, and the Canadians hardly dared hope to defend it.
^^From St. Regis to opposite Kingston," said the
Quebec '^ Gazette " in 1814, ^^ the southern bank of the
river belongs to the United States. It is well known
that this river is the only communication between Upper
and Lower Canada. It is rapid and narrow in many
181S. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 145
places. A few cannon Judiciously posted, or even
musketry, could render the communication impracticable
without powerful escorts, wasting and parcelling the force
applicable to the defence of the provinces. It is needless
to say that no British force can remain in safety or maintain itself in Upper Canada without a ready communication with the lower province."
Closure of the river anywhere must compel the
submission of the whole country above, which could
not provide its supplies. The American, who saw his
own diflBculties of transport between New York and
the Lakes, thought well of his energy in surmounting
them ; but as the war took larger proportions, and
great fleets were built on Lake Ontario, the difficulties of Canadian transport became insuperable.
Toward the close of the war. Sir George Prevost
wrote to Lord Bathurst ^ that six thirty-two-pound
guns . for the fleet, hauled in winter four hundred
miles from Quebec to Kingston, would cost at least
£2000 for transport. Forty twenty-four-pounders
hauled on the snow had cost £4,800 ; a cable of
the largest size hauled from Sorel to Kingston, two
hundred and fifty-five miles, cost £1000 for transport. In summer, when the river was open, the
difficulties were hardly less. The commissary-general
reported that the impediments of navigation were
incalculable, and the scarcity of workmen, laborers,
and voyageurs not to be described.*
^ Prevoet to Bathurst, Feb. 14, 1815 ; MSS. British Archives.
* W. H. Robinson to Prevost, Aug. 27, 1814 ; MSS. British
Archives.
YOL.VU.«-10
146 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
If these reasons for attacking and closing the river
St. Lawrence had not been decisive with the United
States government, other reasons were sufficient.
The political motive was as strong as the military.
Americans, especially in New England, denied that
treasonable intercourse existed with Canada ; but
intercourse needed not to be technically treasonable
in order to have the effects of treason. Sir Gteorge
Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814,^
when the war had lasted two years, —
*' Two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef provided by American contractors,
drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New
York. This circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being
notorious in the United States, it is to be expected Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and
under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing
the lines coming into Lower Canada."
This state of things had then lasted during three
campaigns, from the beginning of the war. The
Indians at Maiden, the British army at Niagara, the
naval station at Kingston were largely fed by the
United States. If these supplies could be stopped,
Upper Canada must probably fall; and they could
be easily stopped by interrupting the British line
of transport anywhere on the St. Lawrence.
The task was not difficult. Indeed, early in the
^ Prevost to Bathuist, Aug. 27, 1814; MS9. British Archives,
Lower Canada, voL czxviii. no. 190.
ins. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 147
war an enterprising officer of irregulars, Major Benjamin Forsyth, carried on a troublesome system of
annoyance from Ogdensburg, which Sir George Prevost treated with extreme timidity.^ The British
commandant at Prescott, Major Macdonnell, was not
80 cautious as the governor-general, but crossed the
river on the ice with about five hundred men, drove
Forsyth from the town, destroyed the public property,
and retired in safety with a loss of eight killed and
fiifty-two wounded.2 This affair, Feb. 23, 1813, closed
hostilities in that region, and Major Forsyth was soon
ordered to Sackett's Harbor. His experience, and
that of Major Macdonnell, proved how easy the closure of such a river must be, exposed as it was
for two hundred miles to the fire of cannon and
musketry.
The St. Lawrence was therefore the proper point
of approach and attack against Upper Canada. Armstrong came to the Department of War with that
idea fixed in his mind. The next subject for his
consideration was the means at his disposal.
During Monroe's control of the War Department
for two months, between Dec. 3, 1812, and Feb. 5,
1813, much effort had been made to increase the
army. Monroe wrote to the chairman of the Military Committee Dec. 22, 1812, a sketch of his ideas.^
^ James, i. 140.
^ Report of Major Macdonnell, Feb. 23, 1813 ; James, i. Appendix no. 16.
• State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 60a
148 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
He proposed to provide for the general defence bj dividing the United States into military districts, and
apportioning ninety-three hundred and fifty men
among them as garrisons. For offensive operations
he required a force competient to overpower the British defence, and in estimating his wants, he assumed
that Canada contained about twelve thousand British regulars, besides militia, and three thousand men
at Halifax.
**To demolish the British force from Niagara to
Quebec," said Monroe, ^^ would require, to make the
thing secure, an efficient regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of ten thousand. . . .
If the government could raise and keep in the field thirtyfive thousand regular troops, . . . the deficiency to be
supplied even to authorize an expedition against Halifax
would be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be
amply sufficient ; but there is danger of not being able to
raise that force, and to keep it at that standard. . . .
My idea is that provision ought to be made for
raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present
establishment."
Congress voted about fifty-eight thousand men, and
after deducting ten thousand for garrisons, counted
on forty-eight thousand for service in Canada. When
Armstrong took control, Feb. 5, 1813, he began at
once to devise a plan of operation for the army which
by law aumbered fifty^ight thousand men, and in
fact numbered, including the staff and regimental
officers, eighteen thousand nine hundred and forty-
18ia. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 149
five men, according to the returns in the adjutantgeneral's oflBce February 16, 1813. Before he had
been a week in the War Department, he wrote, February 10, to Major-General Dearborn annoimcing that
four thousand men were to be immediately collected
at Sackett's Harbor, and three thousand at Buffalo.
April 1, or as soon as navigation opened, the four
thousand troops at Sackett's Harbor were to be embarked and transported in boats under convoy of
the fleet across the Lake at the mouth of the St.
Lawrence, thirty-five miles, to Kingston. After capturing Kingston, with its magazines, navy-yards, and
ships, the expedition was to proceed up the Lake to
York (Toronto) and capture two vessels building
there. Thence it was to join the corps of three
thousand men at Buffalo, and attack the British on
the Niagara River.^
In explaining his plan to the Cabinet, Armstrong
pointed out that the attack from Lake Ghamplain on
Montreal could not begin before May 1 ; that Kingston, between April 1 and May 15, was shut from
support by ice ; that not more than two thousand
men could be gathered to defend it ; and that by beginning the campaign against Kingston rather than
against Montreal, six weeks' time would be gained
before reinforcements could arrive from England.*
' Armstrong to Dearborn, Feb! 10, 1813 ; Armstrong's Notices^
i221.
' Note presented to Cabinet, Feb. 8, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxvi. ; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 43d.
150 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7.
Whatever defects the plan might have, Emgston,
and Kingston alone, possessed so much military
importance as warranted the movement. Evidently
Armstrong had in mind no result short of the capture of Kingston.
Dearborn received these instructions at Albany,
and replied, February 18, that nothing should be
omitted on his part in endeavoring to carry into
effect the expedition proposed.^ Orders were given
for concentrating the intended force at Sackett's
Harbor. During the month of March the preparations were stimulated by a panic due to the appearance of Sir George Prevost at Prescott and Kingston.
Dearborn hurried to Sackett's Harbor in person, under the belief that the governor-general was about
to attack it.
Armstrong estimated the British force at Kingston
as nine himdred regulars, or two thousand men all
told; and his estimate was probably correct. The
usual garrison at Kingston and Prescott was about
eight hundred rank-and-file. In both the British and
American services, the returns of rank-and-file were
the ordinary gauge of numerical force. Rank-andfile included corporals, but not sergeants or commissioned officers ; and an allowance of at least ten
sergeants and officers was always to be made for
every himdred rank-and-file, in order to estimate the
true numerical strength of an army or garrison. Unless otherwise mentioned, the return excluded also
^ State Papers; Military Affairs^ i. 440.
1818. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 151
the sick and disabled. The relative force of every
army was given in effectives, or rank-and-file actually
present for duty.
In the distribution of British forces in GaniEida for
1812-1818, the garrison at Prescott was allowed three
hundred and seventy-six rank-and-file, with fifty-two
officers including sergeants. To Kingston three
hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file were allotted,
with sixty officers including sergeants. To Montreal
and the positions between Prescott and the St. John's
River about five thousand rank-and-file were allotted.^
At Prescott and Kingston, besides the regular troops,
the men employed in ship-building or other labor, the
sailors, and the local militia were to be reckoned as
part of the garrison, and Armstrong included them all
in his estimate of two thousand men.
The British force should have been known to
Dearborn nearly as well as his own. No considerable movement of troops between Lower and Upper
Canada could occur without his knowledge. Yet
Dearborn wrote to Armstrong, March 9, 1818, from
Sackett's Harbor ,2 —
"I have not yet bad the honor of a visit from Sir
George Prevost. His whole force is concentrated at
Kingston, probably amounting to six or seven thousand,
— about three thousand of them regular troops. The ice
^ Distribution of Forces in Canada; Canadian Archives, Freer
Papersy 1812-1813, p. 47.
* Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Militaiy Affairs, i. 441.
162 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
is good, and we expect him -every day. • • . As soon as
the fall [fate?] of this place [Sackett's Harbor] shall be
decided, we shall be able to determine on other measures.
If we hold this place, we will command the Lake, and be
able to act in concert with the troops at Niagara."
A few days later, March 14, Dearborn wrote again.^
*^ Sir George," he said, had ^^ concluded that it is too
late to attack this place. . . . We are probably just
strong enough on each side to defend, but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it regards
the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett's Harbor,
cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the defensive."
Clearly Dearborn did not approve Armstrong's
plan, and wished to change it. In this idea he
was supported, or instigated, by the naval comman*
der on the Lake, Isaac Chauncey, a native of Connecticut, forty years of age, who entered the service in
1798 and became captain in 1806. Chauncey and
Dearborn consulted together, and devised a new
scheme, which Dearborn explained to Armstrong
about March 20 : ^ —
" To take or destroy the armed vessels at York will
give us the complete command of the Lake. Commodore
Chauncey can take with him ten or twelve hundred troops
to be commanded by Pike ; take York ; from thence pro^ Dearborn to Armstrongs March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442.
* State Papers, Military Affairs, L 442.
IMS. DEARBOKITS CAMPAIGN. 168
ceed to Niagara and attack Fort George by land and water,
while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry Forts
£rie and Chippewa, and join those at Fort George ; and
then collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston.
After the most mature deliberation the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as the most
certain of ultimate success."
Thus Dearborn and Chauncey inverted Armstrong's
plan. Instead of attacking on the St. Lawrence, they
proposed to attack on the Niagara. Armstrong acquiesced. "Taking for granted," as he did^ on Dearbom's assertion, "that General Prevost . . . hag
assembled at Kingston a force of six or eight thodsand men, as stated by you," he could not require
that his own plan should be pursued. " The alteration in the plan of campaign so as to make Kingston
the last object instead of making it the first, would
appear to be necessary, or at least proper," he wrote
to Dearborn, March 29.^
The scheme proposed by Dearborn and Chauncey
was carried into effect by them. The contractors
furnished new vessels, which gave to Chauncey for
a time the control of the Lake. April 22 the
troops, numbering sixteen hundred men, embarked.
Armstrong insisted on only one change in the expedition, which betrayed perhaps a shade of malice,
for he required Dearborn himself to conunand it,
^ ArmBtrong to Dearborn^ April 19, 1813 ; State Papers^ Mili*
tary Affairs, i. 442.
' State Papers, Military AffjEOis, i. 442.
154 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch,7.
and Dearborn was suspected of shunning service in
the field.
From the moment Dearborn turned away from
the St. Lawrence and carried the war westward,
the naval and military movements on Lake Ontario
became valuable chiefly as a record of failure. The
fleet and army arrived at York early in the morning
of April 27. York, a village numbering in 1806, according to British account, more than three thousand inhabitants, was the capital of Upper Canada,
and contained the residence of the lieutenant-governor and the two brick buildings where the Legislature met. For military purposes the place was
valueless, but it had been used for the construction
of a few war-vessels, and Chauncey represented,
through Dearborn, that "to take or destroy the
armed vessels at York will give us the complete
command of the Lake." The military force at York,
according to British account, did not exceed six hundred men, regulars and militia ; and of these, one
hundred and eighty men, or two companies of the
Eighth or King's regiment, happened to be there
only in passing.^
Under the fire of the fleet and riflemen. Pike's
brigade was set ashore; the British garrison, after
a sharp resistance, was driven away, and the town
capitulated. The ship on the stocks was burned;
the ten-gun brig " Gloucester " was made prize ; the
stores were destroyed or shipped ; some three hun1 James, 1. 143, 149.
18ia. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 166
dred prisoners were taken; and the public buildings, including the houses of Assembly, were burned.
The destruction of the Assembly houses, afterward
alleged as ground for retaliation against the capitol at Washington, was probably the unauthorized
act of private soldiers. Dearborn protested that it
was done without his knowledge and against his
orders.^
The success cost far more than it was worth. The
explosion of a powder magazine, near which the
American advance halted, injured a large number
of men on both sides. Not less than three hundred
and twenty Americans were killed or wounded in the
battle or explosion,^ or about one fifth of the entire
force. General Pike, the best brigadier then in the
service, was killed. Only two or three battles in
the entire war were equally bloody .^ " Unfortunately the enemy's armed ship the * Prince Begent, ' "
reported Dearborn,* " left this place for Kingston four
days before we arrived."
Chauncey and Dearborn crossed to Niagara, while
the troops remained some ten days at York, and were
then disembarked at Niagara, May 8, according to
Dearborn's report, "in a very sickly and depressed
state; a large proportion of the officers and men
» Letter of Dearborn, Oct. 17, 1814 ; Niles, viii. 36.
• Niles, iv. 238.
s Table of Land Battles; Niles, z. 154.
^ Dearborn to Armstrong, April 28, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 443.
156 HISTORY OF THE UNTTED STATES. C11.T.
were gicklj and debilitated."^ Nothing was ready
for the movement which was to drive the British
from Fort George, and before active operations could
begin, Dearborn fell ill. The details of command fell
to his chief-of-staff, Colonel Winfield Scott.
The military organization at Niagara was at best
unfortmiate. One of Secretary Armstrong's earliest
measures was to issue the military order previously
arranged by Monroe, dividing the Union into military
districts. Vermont and the State oi New York north
of the highlands formed the Ninth Military District,
under Major-General Dearborn. In the Ninth District
were three points of activity, — Plattsburg on Lake
Champlain, Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario, and
the Niagara River. Each point required a large force
and a commander of the highest ability ; but in May,
1818, Plattsburg and Sackett's Harbor were denuded
of troops and oflScers, who were all drawn to Niagara,
where they formed three brigades, commanded by
Brigadier-Generals John P. Boyd, who succeeded Pike,
John Chandler, and W. H. Winder. Niagara and the
troops in its neighborhood were imder the command
of Major-General Morgan Lewis, a man of ability, but
possessing neither the youth nor the energy to lead
an army in the field, while Boyd, Chandler, and
Winder were competent only to command regiments.
Winfield Scott in effect assumed control of the
army, and undertook to carry out Van Rensselaer's
^ Dearborn to Aimstrong, May 13, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i 444.
1818. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 167
plan of the year before for attacking Fort Creorge
in the rear, from the Lake. The task was not very
difficult. Chauncey controlled the Lake, and his fleet
was at hand to transfer the troops. Dearborn's force
numbered certainly not less than four thousand rank*
and-file present for duty. The entire British regular
force on the Niagara River did not exceed eighteen
hundred rank-and-file, and about five hundred militia.^ At Fort George about one thousand regulars
and three hundred militia were stationed, and the
military object to be gained by the Americans was
not so much the capture of Fort George, which was
then not defensible, as that of its garrison.
Early on the morning of May 27, when the mist
cleared away, the British General Vincent saw Chauncey's fleet, " in an extended line of more than two
miles," standing toward the shore. When the ships
took position, " the fire from the shipping so completely enfiladed and scoured the plains, that it became impossible to approach the beach," and Vincent
could only concentrate his force between the Fort and
the enemy, waiting attack. Winfield Scott at the
head of an advance division first landed, followed by
the brigades of Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, and after
a sharp skirmish drove the British back along the
Lake shore, advancing under cover of the fleet. Vincent's report continued : ^ —
^ James, L p. 151.
« Vincent to Sir George Prevost, May 28, 1813; James,! 407 ;
Appendix no. 21.
158 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.V.
*^ After awaiting the approach of the enemy for about
half an hour I received authentic information that his
force, consisting of from four to five thousand men, had
reformed his columns and was making an effort to turn
my right flank. Having given orders for the fort to be
evacuated, the guns to be spiked, and the ammunition
destroyed, the troops under my command were put In
motion, and marched across the country In a line parallel
to the Niagara River, toward the position near the Beaver
Dam beyond Queenston mountain. . . . Having assembled my whole force the following morning, which did
not exceed sixteen hundred men, I continued my march
toward the head of the Lake."
Vincent lost severely in proportion to his num*
bers, for fifty-one men were killed, and three hundred
and five were wounded or missing, chiefly in the
Eighth or King's regiment.^ Several hundred militia
were captured in his retreat. The American loss
was about forty killed and one hundred and twenty
wounded. According to General Morgan Lewis, Col.
Winfield Scott "fought nine-tenths of the battle."*
Dearborn watched the movements from the fleet.
For a time this success made a deep impression on
the military administration of Canada, and the abandonment of the whole coimtry west of Kingston was
thought inevitable.* The opportunity for achieving
a decided advantage was the best that occurred for
^ RetuTD of killed, etc. ; James, L 410.
' Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813 ; MSS. War De*
partment Archives.
' James, i. 203.
1818. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 159
flie Americans during the entire war ; but whatever
might be said in public, the battle of Fort George
was a disappointment to the War Department^ as well
as to the oflScers in command of the American army,
who had hoped to destroy the British force. The
chief advantage gained was the liberation of Perry's
vessels at Black Rock above the Falls, which enabled
Perry to complete his fleet on Lake Erie.
On Lake Ontario, May 31, Chauncey insisted, not
without cause, on returning to Sackett's Harbor.
Dearborn, instead of moving with his whole force,
ordered Brigadier-General Winder, June 1, to pursue
Vincent. Winder, with eight hundred or a thousand men marched twenty miles, and then sent for
reinforcements. He was joined, June 5, by General
Chandler with another brigade. Chandler then took
command, and advanced with a force supposed to
number in the aggregate two thousand men* to
Stony Creek, within ten miles of Vincent's position
at Hamilton, where sixteen hundred British regulars were encamped. There Chandler and Winder
posted themselves for the night, much as Winchester
and his Kentuckians had camped at the river Raisin
four months earlier.'
Vincent was not to be treated with such freedom.
^ Armstrong to Dearborn, June 19, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 449.
* Table of land battles ; Niles, z. 154.
* Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 166. Chandler to Dearborn, June 18, 1813 ; Official
Letters, p. 169.
160 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
Taking only seven hundred rank-and-file,^ he led
them himself against Chandler's camp. The attack
began, in intense darkness, at two o'clock in the
morning of June 6. The British quickly broke the
American centre and carried the guns. The lines
became mixed, and extreme confusion lasted till
dawn. In the darkness both American generals,
Chandler and Winder, walked into the British force
in the centre, and were captured.^ With diflBculty
the two armies succeeded in recovering their order,
and then retired in opposite directions. The British
suffered severely, reporting twenty-three killed, one
hundred and thirty-four wounded, and fifty-five missing, or two hundred and twelve men in all ; but they
safely regained Burlington Heights at dawn.* The
American loss was less in casualties, for it amoimted
only to fifty-five killed and wounded, and one hundred
missing; but in results the battle at Stony Creek
was equally disgraceful and decisive. The whole
American force, leaving the dead unburied, fell back
ten miles, where Major-General Lewis took command
in the afternoon of June 7. An hour later the British fleet under Sir James Yeo made its appearance,
threatening to cut off Lewis's retreat. Indians hovered about. Boats and baggage were lost. Dearborn
* Vincent to Prevost, June 6, 1813 ; James, i p. 431.
* Chandler's Report of June 18, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. p. 448.
* Report of Colonel Harvey, June 0, 1813; Oanadiana*
April, 1889. Report of General Vincent, June 6, 1813 ; James,
i p. 431.
1818. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 161
sent pressing orders to Lewis directing him to return, and on the morning of June 8 the division
reached Fort George.^
These mortifications prostrated Dearborn, whose
strength had been steadily failing. June 8 he wrote
to Armstrong : " My ill state of health renders it
extremely painful to attend to the current duties ;
and unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be
compelled to retire to some place where my mind
may be more at ease for a short time."^ June 10,
his adjutant-general, Winfield Scott, issued orders devolving on Major-General Morgan Lewis the temporary command not only of the Niagara army but also
of the Ninth Military district.' " In addition to the
debility and fever he has been afflicted with,'* wrote
Dearborn's aid, S. S. Connor, to Secretary Armstrong,
Jime 12,* " he has, within the last twenty-four hours,
experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his breast,
which has obliged him to relinquish business altogether." " I have doubts whether he will ever again
be fit for service," wrote Morgan Lewis to Armstrong,
June 14 ; ^ " he has been repeatedly in a state of
convalescence, but relapses on the least agitation of
mind." June 20 Dearborn himself wrote in a very
despondent spirit both in regard to his health and
^ Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14 (8 ?), 1813 ; Official
Letters, p. 166.
* State Papers
' State Papers
^ State Papers
• State Papers
VOL. VII. — 11
Military Affairs, i. 445.
Military Affairs, i. 447.
Military Affairs, i. 448.
Military Affairs, i. 446.
162 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
to the military situation : " I have been bo reduced
in strength as to be incapable of any command.
Brigadier-General Boyd is the only general officer
present." ^
The sudden departure of Morgan Lewis, ordered
to Sackett's Harbor, left General Boyd for a few days
to act as the general in command at Niagara. Boyd^
though well known for his success at Tippecanoe, was
not a favorite in the army. " A compound of ignorance, vanity, and petulance," wrote his late superior^
Morgan Lewis,^ " with nothing to recommend him but
that species of bravery in the field which is vaporing^
boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation, and
better adapted to the bully than the soldier."
Galled by complaints of the imbecility of the army^
Boyd, with Dearborn's approval,^ June 28, detached
Colonel Boerstler of the Fourteenth Infantry with
some four hundred men and two field-pieces, to batter a stone house at Beaver Dam, some seventeen
miles from Fort George.* Early in the morning of
June 24 Boerstler marched to Beaver Dam. There
he found himself surrounded in the woods by hostile Indians, numbering according to British authority about two hundred. The Indians, annoying both
front and rear, caused Boerstler to attempt retreat,
^ State Papers ; Military Affairs, i. 449.
* Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813 ; MSS. War
Department Archives.
* Memoir of Dearborn, etc., compiled by Charles Coffin, p. 139.
* Conrtof Inquiry on Colonel Boerstler, Feb. 17, 1815; Nilea
X. 19.
1818. DEARBORITS CAMPAIGN. 163
but his retreat was stopped bj a few militia*inen^
said to number fifteen.^ A small detachment of one
hundred and fifty men came to reinforce Boerstler,.
and Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the British Forty-ninth
regiment, with forty-seven men, reinforced the In«
dians. Unable to extricate himself, and dreading
dispersion and massacre, Boerstler decided to surrender ; and his five hundred and forty men accordingly capitulated to a British lieutenant with two*
hundred and sixty Indians, miUtia, and regulars.
Dearborn reported the disaster as " an unfortunateand imaccountable event ; " * but of such events the
list seemed endless. A worse disaster, equally due
to Dearborn and Chauncey, occurred at the other end
of the Lake. Had they attacked Kingston, as Armstrong intended, their movement would have covered
Sackett's Harbor ; but when they placed themselves
a hundred and fifty miles to the westward of Sackett's Harbor, they could do nothing to protect it.
Sackett's Harbor was an easy morning's sail from^
Kingston, and the capture of the American naval
station was an object of infinite desire on the part of
Sir Gteorge Prevost, since it would probably decide
the result of the war.
Prevost, though not remarkable for audacity, could
not throw away such an opportunity without ruining
his reputation. He came to Kingston, and while*
^ James, L 216.
* Dearborn to Armstrong, June 25, 1813 ; State Papers, Mil!*tary Affairs, L 449,
164 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ck.7.
Dearborn was preparing to capture Fort Greorge in
the night of May 26-27, Prevost embarked his whole
regular force, eight hundred men all told,^ on Yeo's
fleet at Kingston, set sail in the night, and at dawn
of May 27 was in sight of Sackett's Harbor.*
Had Yeo and Prevost acted with energy, they must
have captured the Harbor without serious resistance.
According to Sir George's official report, " light and
adverse winds" prevented the ships from nearing the
Fort until evening.* Probably constitutional vacillation on the part of Sir James Yeo caused delay, for
Prevost left the control wholly to him and Colonel
Baynes.*
At Sackett's Harbor about four hundred men of
different regular regiments, and about two hundred
and fifty Albany volunteers were in garrison; and
a general alarm, given on appearance of the British fleet in the distance, brought some hundreds of
militia into the place ; but the most important reinforcement was Jacob Brown, a brigadier-general of
State militia who lived in the neighborhood, and
had been requested by Dearborn to take command
in case of an emergency. Brown arrived at the
^ James, i. 165 ; Colonel Baynes to Prevost, May 30, 1813 ;
James, i. 413.
* Report of Sir George Prevost, June 1, 1813 ; MSS. British
Archives.
' Prevost to Bathorst, June 1, 1813 ; MSS. British Archives.
Prevost's Life, p. 82, 83.
^ James, i. 165, 166. Brenton to Freer, May 30» 1813 ;
MSS. Canadian Archives, Freer Papers, 1812-1813, p. 183.
181*. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 166
Harbor in time to post the men in order of battle.
Five hundred militia were placed at the point
where the British were expected to land; the regulars were arranged in a second line ; the forts were
in the rear.
At dawn of May 28, under command of Colonel
Baynes, the British grenadiers of the One Hundredth
regiment landed gallantly under " so heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe,
as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to
come up." ^ Pressing rapidly forward, without stopping to fire, the British regulars routed the militia
and forced the second line back until they reached a
block-house at the edge of the village, where a thirtytwo pound gun was in position, flanked by log barracks and fallen timber. While Brown with difficulty
held his own at the military barracks, the naval
lieutenant in charge of the ship-yard, being told that
the battle was lost, set fire to the naval barracks,
shipping, and store-houses. Brown's indignation at
this act was intense.
^^ The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous
a transaction as ever occurred among military men," he
wrote to Dearborn.* "The fire was set as our regulars
met the enemy upon the main line ; and if anything could
have appalled these gallant men it would have been the
fiames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered in
the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful
^ Report of Colonel Bajnefl, May 30, 1813 ; James, i. 413.
* Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS.
166 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATEa 01.7.
burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled
to much higher praise than though it had not occurred.
The navy are alone responsible for what happened on
Navy Point, and it is fortunate for them that they have
reputations sufficient to sustain the shock."
Brown's second line stood firm at the barracks,
and the British attack found advance impossible.
Sir Gteorge Prevost's report admitted his inability to
go farther:^ —
** A heavier fire than that of musketry having become
necessary in order to force their last position, I had the
mortification to learn that the continuation of light and
adverse winds had prevented the co-operation of the
ships, and that the gunboats were unequal to silence the
enemy's elevated batteries, or to produce any effect on
their block houses. Considering it therefore impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by
which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the
troops to leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven
before them for upwards of three hours, and who did not
venture to offer the slightest opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper deliberation and
in perfect order."
If Sir George was correct in regarding the Americans as "a beaten enemy," his order of retreat to
his own troops seemed improper; but his language
showed that he used the word3 in a sense of his
own, and Colonel Baynes's report gave no warrant
for the British claim of a victory.*
1 Prevost's Report of June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archive!.
* James, L 176.
1811. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 16T
** At thifl point," said Baynes,^ " the further energies
of the troops became unavailing. Their [American]
block-houses and stockaded battery could not be carried
by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces had we been provided with them. . . . Seeing no object within our reach
to attain that could compensate for the loss we were momentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy's
cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position we
had charged from. From this position we were ordered
to re-embark, which was performed at our leisure and in
perfect order, the enemy not presuming to show a single
soldier without the limits of his fortress."
Another and confidential report was written by
E. B. Brenton pf Prevost's staff to the governor's
military secretary, Noah Freer.^ After describing
the progress of the battle until the British advance
was stopped, Brenton said that Colonel Baynes came
to Sir George to tell him that the men could not
approach nearer the works with any prospect df
success : —
" It was however determined to collect all the troops
at a point, to form the line, and to make an attack immediately upon the battery and barracks in front. For
this purpose the men in advance were called in, the line
formed a little without the reach of the enemy's musketry, and though evidently much fagged, was, after being supplied with fresh ammunition, again led in line.
At this time I do not think the whole force collected in
the lines exceeded five hundred men."
^ Report of Colonel Baynes, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413.
* Brenton to Freer, May 30, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives*
Freer Papers, 1812-1813.
168 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
The attack was made, and part of the Hundredand-f ourth regunent succeeded in getting shelter behind one of the American barracks, preparing for a
farther advance. Sir George Prevost, under a fire
which his aid described as tremendous, — "I do
not exaggerate when I tell jou that the shot, both
of musketry and grape, was falling about us like
hail," — watched the American position through a
glass, when, "at this time those who were left of
the troops behind the barracks made a dash out to
charge the enemy; but the fire was so destructive
that they were instantly turned by it, and the retreat was sounded. Sir George, fearless of danger
and disdaining to run or to suffer his men to run,
repeatedly called out to them to retire in order;
many however made off as fast as they could."
These reports agreed that the British attack was
totally defeated, with severe loss, before the retreat
was sounded. Such authorities should have silenced
dispute ; but Prevost had many enemies in Canada,
and at that period of the war the British troops
were unused to defeat. Both Canadians and English attacked the governor-general privately and publicly, freely chargmg hun with having disgraced the
service, and offering evidence of his want of courage
in the action.^ Americans, though not interested
in the defence of Prevost, could not fail to remark
that the British and Canadian authorities who condemned him, assumed a condition of affairs alto-
^ Quarterly Review, xxvii. 419; Christie, ii. 81; James, i. 177.
mt. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 169
gether different from that accepted by American
authorities. The official American reports not only
supported the views taken by Prevost and Baynes
of the hopelessness of the British attack, but added
particulars which made Prevost's retreat necessary.
General Brown's opinion was emphatic : " Had not
General Prevost retired most rapidly imder the guns
of his vessels, he would never have returned to
Kingston."^ These words were a part of Brown's
official report. Writing to Dearborn he spoke with
the same confidence r^ —
** The militia were all rallied before the enemy gave
way, and were marching perfectly in his view towards
the rear of his right flank ; and I am confident that even
then, if Sir George had not retired with the utmost precipitation to his boats, he would have been cut off."
Unlike the Canadians, Brown thought Prevost's
conduct correct and necessary, but was by no means
equally complimentary to Sir James Yeo, whom he
blamed greatly for failing to join in the battle. The
want of wind which Yeo alleged in excuse. Brown
flatly denied. From that time Brown entertained
and freely expressed contempt for Yeo, as he seemed
also to feel little respect for Chaimcey. His experience with naval administration on both sides led
him to expect nothing but inefficiency from either.
Whatever were the true causes of Prevost's failure,
Americans could not admit that an expedition which
» Brown's Report of June 1, 1813; Niles, iv. 260.
« Brown to Dearborn, July 26, 1813; Dearborn MSS.
170 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
cost the United States so much, and which so nearly
ijucceeded, was discreditable to the British governorgeneral, or was abandoned without sufficient reason.
The British return of killed and wounded proved the
correctness of Prevost, Baynes, and Brown in their
opinion of the necessity of retreat. According to
the report of Prevost's severest critics, he carried
less than seven himdred and fifty rank-and-file to
Sackett's Harbor.^ The returns showed forty-four
rank-and-file killed; one hundred and seventy-two
wounded, and thirteen missing, — in all, two hundred
and twenty-nine men, or nearly one man in three.
The loss in officers was relatively even more severe ;
and the total loss in an aggregate which could hardly
have numbered much more than eight hundred and
fifty men all told, amounted to two hundred and fiftynine killed, wounded, and missing, leaving Prevost
less than six hundred men to escape,^ in the face
of twice their numbers and under the fire of heavy
guns.*
The British attack was repulsed, and Jacob Brown
received much credit as well as a commission of brigadier-general in the United States army for his sue
cess; but the injury inflicted by the premature destruction at the navy-yard was very great, and was
sensibly felt. Such a succession of ill news could
not but affect the Government. The repeated failures to destroy the British force at Niagiara; the
1 James, i. 166. « Return, etc. ; James, i. 417.
s Baynes's Report of May 30, 1813; James, i. 413.
1818. DEARBORN'S CAMPAIGN. 171
disasters of Chandler, Winder, and Boerstler; the
narrow and partial escape of Sackett's Harbor ; the total incapacity of Dearborn caused by fever and mortification, — all these evils were not the only or the
greatest subjects for complaint. The two command*
ers, Dearborn and Chauncey, had set aside the secretary's plan of campaign, and had substituted one
of their own, on the express ground of their superior information. While affirming that the garrison
at Kingston had been reinforced to a strength three
or four times as great as was humanly possible, they
had asserted that the capture of York would answer
their purpose as well as the capture of Kingston, to
" give us the complete command of the Lake." They
captured York, April 27, but the British fleet appeared June 6, and took from them the command of
the Lake. These miscalculations or misstatements,
and the disasters resulting from them, warranted the
removal of Chauncey as well as Dearborn from command ; but the brunt of dissatisfaction fell on Dearborn alone. Both Cabinet and Congress agreed in
insisting on Dearborn's retirement, and the President
was obliged to consent. July 6, Secretary Armstrong
wrote, —
" I have the President's orders to express to you the
decision that you retire from the command of District
No. 9, and of the troops within the same, until your
health be re-established and until further orders."
CHAPTER Vm.
Abmstbono's embarrassment was great in getting
rid of the generals whom Madison and Eustis left on
his hands. Dearborn was one example of what he
was obliged to endure, but Wilkinson was a worse.
According to Armstrong's account,^ New Orleans was
not believed to be safe in Wilkinson's keeping. The
senators from Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky
remonstrated to the President, and the President
ordered his removal. Armstrong and Wilkinson had
been companions in arms, and had served with Gates
at Saratoga. For many reasons Armstrong wished
not unnecessarily to mortify Wilkinson, and in conveying to him, March 10, the abrupt order ^ to proceed
with the least possible delay to the headquarters of
Major-General Dearborn at Sackett's Harbor, the
Secretary of War added^ March 12, a friendly letter
of advice:^ —
^ Strictures on General Wilkinson's Defence ; from the Albany *♦ Argus * Niles, ix. 425.
* Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 10, 1813 ; Wilkinson's
Memoirs, iii. 341.
* Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 12, 1813 ; Wilkinson's
Memoirs, iii. 342.
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18M. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 178
" Why Bhonld you remain in your land of cypresB when
patriotism and ambition equally invite to one where grows
the laurel? Again, the men of the North and East want
you ; those of the South and West are less sensible of
your merits and less anxious to have you among them.
I speak to you with a frankness due to you and to myself, and again advise, Come to the North, and come
quickly ! If our cards be well played, we may renew the
scene of Saratoga."
The phrase was curious. Saratoga suggested defeated invasion rather than conquest ; the surrender
of a British army in the heart of New York rather
than the capture of Montreal. The request for Wilkinson's aid was disheartening. No one knew better
than Armstrong the feebleness of Wilkinson's true
character. "The selection of this unprincipled imbecile was not the blunder of Secretary Armstrong,"
said Winfield Scott long afterward;^ but the idea
that Wilkinson could be chief-of-staff to Dearborn, —
that one weak man could give strength to another,
— was almost as surprising as the selection of Wilkinson to chief command would have been. Armstrong did not intend that Wilkinson should command
more than a division under Dearborn ; ^ but he must
have foreseen that in the event of Dearborn's illness
or incapacity, Wilkinson would become by seniority
general-in-chief.
Wilkinson at New Orleans received Armstrong's
^ Autobiography, p. 94, note,
' Strictures ; Niles, ix. 425.
174 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
letter of March 10 onlj May 19,^ and started, June 10,
for Washington, where he arrived Julj 81, having
consumed the greater part of the summer in the
journey. On arriving at Washington, he found that
Dearborn had been removed, and that he was himself
by seniority in command of the Ninth Military District.2 This result of Dearborn's removal was incalculably mischievous, for if its effect on Wilkinson's
vanity was unfortunate, its influence on the army was
fatal. Almost every respectable officer of the old service regarded Wilkinson with antipathy or contempt.
Armstrong's ill-fortune obliged him also to place
in the position of next importance Wilkinson's pronounced enemy. Wade Hampton. A major-general
was required to take command on Lake Champlain,
and but one officer of that rank claimed employment
or could be employed ; and Wade Hampton was accordingly ordered to Plattsburg.^ Of all the major-
generals Hampton was probably the best; but his
faults were serious. Proud and sensitive even for a
South Carolinian; irritable, often harsh, sometimes
imjust, but the soul of honor,* Hampton was rendered wholly intractable wherever Wilkinson was concerned, by the long-standing feud which had made
the two generals for years the heads of hostile sec^ Wilkinson to Armstrong, May 23, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Me*
moirs, iii. 341.
* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 23.
* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 23.
^ Scott's Autobiography, p. 60.
1818. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 175
tions in the army.^ Hampton loathed Wilkinson. At
the time of his appointment to command on Lake
Champlain he had no reason to expect that Wilkin*
son would be his superior; but though willing and
even wishing to serve under Dearborn, he accepted
only on the express understanding that his was a
distinct and separate command,^ and that his orders
were to come directly from the War Department.
Only in case of a combined movement uniting different armies, was he to yield to the rule of seniority.
With that agreement he left Washington, June 16,
and assumed command, July 3, on Lake Champlain.
Nearly a month afterward Wilkinson arrived in
Washington, and reported at the War Department*
By that time Armstrong had lost whatever chance
he previously possessed of drawing the army at Niagara back to a position on the enemy's line of supply..
Three insuperable difficulties stood in his way, — the
season was too late ; the army was too weak ; and
the generals were incompetent. Armstrong found
his generals the chief immediate obstacle, and struggled perseveringly and good-humoredly to overcome
it. Wilkinson began, on arriving at Washington,,
by showing a fancy for continuing the campaign at
Niagara.' Armstrong was obliged to give an em* Scotf 8 Autobiography, p. 36.
* Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xzxvi.
* Memorandum by Armstrong, July 23, 1813; Wilkinson to>
Armstrong, Aug. 6, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463 >
Armstrong's Notices, ii. 31.
176 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
phatic order, dated August 8, that Kingston should
be the primary object of the campaign, but he left
Wilkinson at liberty to go there by almost any route,
even by way of Montreal.^ Disappointed at the outset by finding Wilkinson slow to accept responsibility
or decided views,* he was not better pleased when the
new general began his duties in Military District No. 9.
Wilkinson left Washington August 11, and no
sooner did he reach Albany than he hastened to
write, August 16, two letters to Gteneral Hampton,
assuming that every movement of that general was
directly dependent on Wilkinson's orders.'* Considering the relations between the two men, these
letters warranted the inference that Wilkinson intended to drive Hampton out of his Military District, and if possible from the service. Hampton
instantly leaped to that conclusion, and wrote to
Armstrong, August 23, offering his resignation in
case Wilkinson's course was authorized by govern-
ment.* Wilkinson also wrote to the secretary August 30, substantially avowing his object to be what
Hampton supposed : * —
" You have copies of my letters to Major-Greneral
Hampton, which I know he has received, yet I have no
^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Aug. 8, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 464.
* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 32.
* Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix zzxv*
* Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813 ; Memoirsy iii. Ap*
pendix zxxvi.
* Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 358.
181S. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 177
answer. The reflectioii which natarally occurs is that
if I am aathorized to command he is boand to obey;
and if he will not respect the obligation, he should be
tamed out of the service."
Armstrong pacified Hampton bj promising once
more that all his orders and reports should pass
through the Department. Hampton promised to serve
cordially and vigorously through the campaign, but
he believed himself intended for a sacrifice, and declared his intention of resigning as soon as the
campaign was ended.^ Wilkinson, after having at
Albany provoked this outburst, started for Sackett's
Harbor, where he arrived August 20.
At Sackett's Harbor Wilkinson found several general oflScers. Morgan Lewis was there in command,
Commodore Chauncey was there with his fleet. Jacob
Brown was also present by virtue of his recent appointment as brigadier-general. The quartermastergeneral, Robert Swartwout, a brother of Burr's friend
who went to New Orleans, was posted there. Wilkinson summoned these ofBcers to a council of
war August 26, which deliberated on the different plans of campaign proposed to it, and unanimously decided in favor of one called by Armstrong
*' No. 8 of the plans proposed by the government." ^
^ Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 31, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives. Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvii.
* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 33 ; Memorandum of July 23« 1813 ;
State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463.
VOL. YII. — 12
178 mSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
As defined in Wilkinson's language^ tbe scheme
was —
^^ To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in
this vicinity, and in co-operation with our squadron to
make a bold feint upon Kingston, slip down the St.
Lawrence, lock up the enemy in our rear to starve or
surrender, or oblige him to follow us without artillery,
baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay down his
arms ; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in
concert with the division under Major-General Hampton
to take Montreal."
Orders were given, August 25, for providing river
transport for seven thousand men, forty field-pieces,
and twenty heavy guns, to be in readiness by
September 15.^
The proposed expedition closely imitated General
Amherst's expedition against Montreal in 1760, with
serious differences of relative situation. After Wolfe
had captured Quebec and hardly twenty-five hundred
French troops remained to defend Montreal, in the
month of July Amherst descended the river from
Lake Ontario with more than ten thousand men,
chiefly British veterans, capturing every fortified position as he went. Wilkinson's council of war proposed to descend the river in October or November
with seven thousand men, leaving a hostile fleet and
fortresses in their rear, and running past every for^ Minutes, etc. ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ill. Appendix no. 1.
' Wilkinson to Swartwout, Aug. 25, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 61«
Mia. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 179
tified position to arrive in the heart of a comparatively well populated country, held by a force greater
than their own, with Quebec to support it, while
Wilkinson would have no certain base of supplies,
reinforcements, or path of escape. Knowledge of
Wilkinson's favorite Quintus Curtius or of Armstrong's familiar Jomini was not required to satisfy
any intelligent private, however newly recruited, that
under such circumstances the army would be fortunate to escape destruction.^
Wilkinson next went to Niagara, where he arrived
September 4, and where he found the army in a bad
condition, with Boyd still in command, but restrained
by the President's orders within a strict defensive.
Wilkinson remained nearly a month at Port George
making the necessary preparations for a movement.
He fell ill of fever, but returned October 2 to Sackett's Harbor, taking with him all the regular troops
at Niagara. At that time Chauncey again controlled
the Lake.
Secretary Armstrong also came to Sackett's Harbor, September 6, and established the War Department at that remote point for nearly two months.^
When Wilkinson arrived, October 2, Armstrong's
difficulties began. Wilkinson, then fifty-six years
old, was broken by the Lake fever. "He was so
^ Of. Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers,
Military AiBfairs, i. 472.
^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvii.
180 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
much indisposed in mind and body," according to
Brigadier-Greneral Boyd,^ " that in any other service
he would have perhaps been superseded in his command." According to Wilkinson's story, he told
Secretary Armstrong that he was incapable of commanding the army, and offered to retire from it;
but the secretary said there was no one to take his
place, and he could not be spared. In private
Armstrong was believed to express himself more
bluntly, and Wilkinson was told that the secretary said : " I would feed the old man with pap
sooner than leave him behind."* Wilkinson's debility did not prevent him from giving orders, or
from becoming jealous and suspicious of every one,
but chiefly of Armstrong.' Whatever was suggested by Armstrong was opposed by Wilkinson.
Before returning to Sackett's Harbor, October 4,
Wilkinson favored an attack on Kingston.* On
reaching Sackett's Harbor, finding that Armstrong
also favored attacking Kingston, Wilkinson argued
"against my own judgment" in favor of passing
Kingston and descending upon Montreal.* Ten days
afterward Armstrong changed his mind. Yeo had
succeeded in returning to Kingston, bringing rein^
forcements.
^ Testimony of Brigadier-Gkneral Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs,
iii. 80.
• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 364.
• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 357.
• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 363.
• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii 190 ; Paper A, note.
M18. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 181
<^ He will bring with him aboat fifteen hundred effec«
tives/' wrote Armstrong;^ *^ and thanks to the storm
and our snail-like movements down the Lake, they will
be there before we can reach it. The manoeuvre intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we
now do against that place must be done by hard blows,
at some risk."
Accordingly, October 19, Armstrong wrote to
Wilkinson a letter advising abandonment of the
attack on Kingston, and an effort at "grasping the
safer and the greater object below." ^
'^I call it the safer and greater object, because at
Montreal you find the weaker place and the smaller force
to encounter ; at Montreal you meet a fresh, unexhausted,
efficient reinforcement of four thousand men; at Mon-
treal you approach your own resources, and establish
between you and them an easy and an expeditious
intercourse; at Montreal you occupy a point which
must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the
purposes of the war, and which, if seized now, will save
one campaign $ at Montreal you hold a position which
completely severs the enemy's line of operations, which
shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against
him, and which while it restrains all below, withers and
perishes all above itself."
As Armstrong veered toward Montreal Wilkinson
turned decidedly toward Kingston, and wrote the
* Armstrong to Hampton, Oct. 16, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii 361.
* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 472.
182 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
game day to the secretary a letter ^ of remonstrance,
closing by a significant remark: —
" Personal considerations would make me prefer a
visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston ; but before
I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am
ordered to make, it is necessary to my justification that
you should by the authority of the President direct the
operations of the army under my command particularly
against Montreal."
The hint was strong that Wilkinson believed
Armstrong to be trying to evade responsibility, as
Armstrong believed Wilkinson to be trying to shirk
it. Both insinuations were probably well-founded ;
neither Armstrong nor Wilkinson expected to cap-
ture Kingston, and still less Montreal. Wilkinson
plainly said as much at the time. " I speak conjecturally," he wrote ; " but should we surmount
every obstacle in descending the rivei* we shall
advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having
no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion." Armstrong's conduct was more extraordinary than Wilkinson's, and could not be believed
except on his own evidence. He not only looked
for no capture of Montreal, but before writing his
letter of October 19 to Wilkinson, he had given
orders for preparing winter quarters for the army
sixty or eighty miles above Montreal, and did this
1 Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct 19, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 472.
m9. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 188
without informing Wilkinson. In later years he
wrote : ^ —
*' Suspecting early in October, from the lateness of the
season, the inclemency of the weather, and the continued
indisposition of the commanding general, that the campaign then in progress would terminate as it did, — * with
the disgrace of doing nothing, but without any material
diminution of physical power,' — the Secretary of War,
then at Sackett's Harbor, hastened to direct MajorGeneral Hampton to employ a brigade of militia attached to his command, in constructing as many huts
as would be sufficient to cover an army of ten thousand
men during the winter."
The order dated October 16 and addressed to the
quartermaster-general,^ prescribed the cantonment
of ten thousand men within the limits of Canada,
and plainly indicated the secretary's expectation
that the army could not reach Montreal. In other
ways Armstrong showed the same belief more
openly.
All the available troops on or near Lake Ontario
were concentrated at Sackett's Harbor about the
middle of October, and did not exceed seven thousand effectives, or eight thousand men.^ " I calculate
on six thousand combatants," wrote Wilkinson after
^ Armstrong's Notices, iL 63/
• Armstrong to Swartwout, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 70.
• Council of War, Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii.
Appendix xziv. Report of Adjutant-Qeneral, Dec. 1, 1813, Ap*
pendiz vii.
184 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
starting,^ ^^ excluBive of Scott and Randolph, neither
of whom will, I fear, be up in season." The armj
was divided into four brigades under Generals Boyd,
Swartwout, Jacob Brown, and Covington, — the latter
a Maryland man, forty-five years old, who entered
the service in 1809 as lieutenant-colonel of dragoons.
The brigades of Boyd and Covington formed a division commanded by Major-Gteneral Morgan Lewis.
The second division was intended for Major-General
Hampton ; a reserve under Colonel Macomb, and
a park of artillery under Brigadier-Gteneral Moses
Porter, completed the organization.*
The men were embarked in bateaux, October 17,
at Henderson's Bay, to the westward of Sackett's
Harbor. The weather had been excessively stormy,
and continued so. The first resting-point to be
reached was Grenadier Island at the entrance of the
St. Lawrence, only sixteen or eighteen miles from
the starting-point; but the bateaux were dispersed
by heavy gales of wind, October 18, 19, and 20, and
the last detachments did not reach Grenadier Island
until November 3. " All our hopes have been nearly
blasted," wrote Wilkinson October 24 ; but at length,
November 6, the expedition, numbering nearly three
hundred boats, having safely entered the river, began
the descent from French Creek. That day they
» Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct 28, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
^ General Order of Encampment; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii.
126 ; Order of October 9, Appendix iiL
18U WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 185
moved forty miles, and halted about midnight six
miles above Ogdensburg. The next day was consmned in running the flotilla past Ogdensburg under
the fire of the British guns at Prescott. The boats
floated down by night and the troops marched by
land. November 7 the army halted at the White
House, about twenty miles below Ogdensburg. There
Wilkinson called a council of war, November 8, to
consider whether the expedition should proceed*
Lewis, Boyd, Brown, and Swartwout voted simply in
favor of attacking Montreal. Covington and Porter
were of the opinion " that we proceed from this place
under great danger, . . . but ... we know of no other
alternative." ^
More than any other cause, Armstrong's conduct
warranted Wilkinson in considering the campaign
at an end. If the attack on Montreal was seriously
intended, every motive required Armstrong to join
Hampton at once in advance of Wilkinson's expedition. No one knew so well as he the necessity
of some authority to interpose between the tempera
and pretensions of these two men in case a joint
campaign were to be attempted, or to enforce co-operation on either side. Good faith toward Hampton^
even more than toward Wilkinson, required that the
secretary who had led them into such a situation
should not desert them. Yet Armstrong, after waiting till Wilkinson was fairly at Grenadier Island^
began to prepare for return to Washington. From
^ Minutes etc. ; Wilkinson's Memoiis, iii. Appendix xxiv.
1
186 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cb.S.
the village of Antwerp, half way between Sackett's
Harbor and Ogdensburg, the secretary wrote to Wilkinson, October 27, " Should my fever continue I
shall not be able to approach you as I intended."^
Three days later he wrote again from Denmark on
the road to Albany, —
^' I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted
as to enable you to say with assurance when you will
pass Prescott. I should have met you there ; but bad
roads, worse weather, and a considerable degree of illness
admonished me against receding farther from a point
where my engagements call me about the 1st proximo.
The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at
Antwerp." "
Prom Albany Armstrong wrote, November 12, for
the last time, " in the fulness of my faith that you
are in Montreal," ^ that he had sent orders to Hampton to effect a junction with the river expedition.
Such letters and orders, whatever Armstrong meant
by them, were certain to impress both Wilkinson
and Hampton with a conviction that the secretary
intended to throw upon them the whole responsibility for the failure of an expedition which he as
well as they knew to be hopeless.
Doubtless a vigorous general might still have found
^ Annstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 27, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xli.
* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 30, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 474.
* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Nov. 12, 1813; State Papers,
Military Affairs, L 474.
1818. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 187
means if not to take Montreal, at least to compel the
British to evacuate Upper Canada; but Wilkinson
was naturally a weak man, and during the descent
of the river he was excessively ill, never able to
make a great exertion. Every day his difficulties
increased. Hardly had his flotilla begun its descent,
when a number of British gunboats commanded by
Captain Mulcaster, the most energetic officer in the
British naval service on the Lake, slipping through
Chauncey's blockade, appeared in Wilkinson's rear,
and caused him much annoyance. Eight hundred
British rank-and-file from Kingston and Prescott
were with Mulcaster, and at every narrow pass of
the river, musketry and artillery began to open on
Wilkinson from the British bank. Progress became
slow. November 7, Macomb was landed on the north
bank with twelve hundred men to clear away these
obstructions.^ The day and night of November 8
were consumed at the White House in passing troops
across the river. Brown's brigade was landed on
the north shore to reinforce Macomb. The boats
were delayed to keep pace with Brown's march on
shore, and made but eleven miles November 9, and
the next day, November 10, fell down only to the
Long Saut, a continuous rapid eight miles in length.
The enemy pressed close, and while Brown marched
in advance to clear the bank along the rapid, Boyd
was ordered to take all the other troops and protect
the rear.
^ Journal etc.; State Papers, Militaiy AffiekirSy L 477*
i
188 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8l
The flotilla stopped on the night of November 10
near a farm called Ghrystler's on the British bank ;
and the next morning, November 11, at half-past ten
o'clock Brown having announced that all was clear
below, Wilkinson was about to order the flotilla to
run the rapids when General Boyd sent word that the
enemy in the rear were advancing in column. Wilkinson was on his boat, imable to leave his bed ; ^
Morgan Lewis was in no better condition ; and Boyd
was left to fight a battle as he best could. Boyd never
had the confidence of the army ; Brown was said
to have threatened to resign rather than serve under
him,^ and Winfield Scott, who was that day with Macomb and Brown in the advance, described^ Boyd as
amiable and respectable in a subordinate position, but
^^ vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a
chief under high responsibilities."
The opportunity to capture or destroy Mulcaster
and his eight hundred men was brilliant, and warranted Wilkinson in turning back his whole force
to accomplish it. Boyd actually employed three
brigades, and made an obstinate but not united or
well-supported attempt to crush the enemy. Colonel
Ripley with the Twenty-first regiment drove in the
British skirmishers, and at half-past two o'clock the
battle became general. At half-past four, after a
^ Evidence of General Boyd ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ill. 84 ;
Evidence of Doctor Bull ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 214.
^ Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 364.
' Autobiography, pp. 93, 94.
1813. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 189
stubborn engagement. General Covington was killed ;
his brigade gave way, and the whole American line
fell back, beaten and almost routed.
This defeat was the least creditable of the disasters suffered by American arms during the war.
No excuse or palliation was ever offered for it.^ The
American army consisted wholly of regulars, and all
the generals belonged to the regular service. Wilkinson could hardly have had less than three thousand
men with him, after allowing for his detachments,
and was alone to blame if he had not more. Boyd^
according to his own account, had more than twelve
hundred men and two field-pieces under his immediate command on shore.^ The reserve, under Colonel
Upham of the Eleventh regiment, contained six hundred rank-and-file,® with four field-pieces. Wilkinson's official report admitted that eighteen hundred
rank-and-file were engaged ; Colonel Walbach, his adjutant-general, admitted two thousand,* while Swartwout thought that twenty-one hundred were in action.
The American force was certainly not less than two
thousand, with six field-pieces.
The British force officially reported by LieutenantColonel Morrison of the Eighty-ninth regiment, who
was in command, consisted of eight hundred rank* Wilkinson's Defence, Memoirs, iii. 461; Ripley's Evidence,
Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 139.
* Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 85.
* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 18, 1813; Niles, v. 236.
^ Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 151*
190 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
and-file, and thirty Indians. The rank-and-file consisted of three hundred and forty-two men of the
Forty-ninth regiment, about as many more of the
Eighty-ninth, and some Canadian troops. They had
three six-pound field-pieces, and were supported on
their right flank by gunboats.^
On the American side the battle was ill fought
both by the generals and by the men. Wilkinson
and Morgan Lewis, the two major-generals, who were
ill on their boats, never gave an order. Boyd, who
commanded, brought his troops into action by detachments, and the men, on meeting unexpected
resistance, broke and fled. The defeat was bloody
as well as mortifying. Wilkinson reported one hundred and two killed, and two himdred and thirtyseven wounded, but strangely reported no miss-
ing,2 although the British occupied the field of battle, and claimed upward of one hundred prisoners.*
Morrison reported twenty-two killed, one hundred
and forty-eight wounded, and twelve missing. The
American loss was twice that of the British, and
Wilkinson's reports were so little to be trusted
that the loss might well have been greater than
Tie represented it. The story had no redeeming
incident.
n three brigades, numbering two thousand men,
were beaten at Ghrystler's farm by eight hundred
^ James, i. 323-^25, 467.
' Betum, etc., State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 476.
* Morrison's Report of Nov. 12, 1813; James^ i. 461.
1813. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 191
British and Canadians, the chance that Wilkinson
could capture Montreal, even with ten thousand men,
was small. The conduct of the army showed its
want of self-confidence. Late as it was, in the dusk
of the evening Boyd hastened to escape across the
river. " The troops being much exhausted," reported
Wilkinson,^ " it was considered most convenient that
they should embark, and that the dragoons with the
artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation
took place without the smallest molestation from the
enemy, and the flotilla made a harbor near the head
of the Saut on the opposite shore." In truth, neither
Wilkinson nor his adjutant gave the order of embarkation,^ nor was Boyd willing to admit it as his.^
Apparently the army by common consent embarked
without orders.
Early the next morning, November 12, the flotilla
ran the rapids and rejoined Brown and Macomb near
Cornwall, where Wilkinson learned that General
Hampton had taken the responsibility of putting an
end to an undertaking which had not yet entered
upon its serious diflBculties.
Four months had passed since Hampton took com*
mand on Lake Champlain. When he first reached
* Journal, Nov. 11, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 478.
* Evidence of Colonel Walbach ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii.
146 ; Evidence of Colonel Pinkney, iii. 311.
* Evidence of Biigadier-Gkneral Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs^
lu. 91.
192 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
Burlington, July 8, neither men nor material were
ready, nor was even a naval force present to cover
his weakness. While he was camped at Burlington, a British fleet, with about a thousand regulars,
entered the Lake from the Isle aux Noix and the
Richelieu River, and plundered the American magazines at Plattsburg, July 31, sweeping the Lake clear
of American shipping.^ Neither Hampton's army
nor McDonough's small fleet ventured to offer resistance. Six weeks afterward, in the middle of September, Hampton had but about four thousand men,
in bad condition and poor discipline.
Wilkinson, though unable to begin his own movement, was earnest that Hampton should advance on
Montreal.^ Apparently in order to assist Wilkinson's plans, Hampton moved his force, September 19,
to the Canada line. Finding that a drought had
caused want of water on the direct road to Montreal,
Hampton decided to march his army westward to
the Chateaugay River, forty or fifty miles, and established himself there, September 26, in a position
equally threatening to Montreal and to the British
line of communication up the St. Lawrence. Armstrong approved the movement,* and Hampton remained three weeks at Chateaugay, building roads
^ James, i. 242; Oluistie, ii. d4.
* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Aug. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 466.
* Armstrong to Hampton, Sept. 28, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 460. Of. Armstrong's Notices, iL 25.
1813. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 198
and opening lines of communication while waiting
for Wilkinson to move.
October 16 Armstrong ordered Hampton, in view
of Wilkinson's probable descent of the river, to " approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or other point
which shall better favor our junction, and hold the
enemy in check." ^ Hampton instantly obeyed, and
moved down the Chateaugay to a point about fifteen
miles from its mouth. There he established his
army, October 22, and employed the next two days
in completing his road, and getting up his artillery
and stores.
Hampton's movements annoyed the British authorities at Montreal. Even while he was still within
American territory, before he adyanced from Chateaugay Pour Corners, Sir George Prevost reported,
October 8, to his government,* —
^^ The position of Major-General Hampton at the Four
Comers on the Chateaugay River, and which he continued to occupy, either with the whole or a part of his
force, from the latest infoimation I have been able to
obtain from thence, is highly judicious, — as at the
same time that he threatens Montreal and obliges me
to concentrate a considerable body of troops in this
vicinity to protect it, he has it in his power to molest
the communication with the Upper Province, and impede
the progress of the supplies required there for the Navy
and Army."
^ State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 461.
s Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 8, 1813; MSS. British Aichivei.
VOL. vu. — 18
194 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.g.
If this was the case, October 8, when Hampton was
still at Ghateaugay, fifty miles from its mouth, the
annoyance must have been much greater when he
advanced, October 21 , to Spear's, within ten miles of
the St. Lawrence on his left, and fifteen from the
mouth of the Chateaugay. Hampton accomplished
more than was expected. He held a position equally
well adapted to threaten Montreal, to disturb British
communication with Upper Canada, and to succor
Wilkinson.
That Hampton, with only four thousand men, should
do more than this, could not fairly be required. The
defences of Montreal were such as required ten times
his force to overcome. The regular troops defending Montreal were not stationed in the town itself,
which was sufficiently protected by a broad river and
rapids. They were chiefly at Chambly, St. John's,
Isle aux Noix, or other points on the Richelieu River,
guarding the most dangerous line of approach from
Lake Ohamplain ; or they were at Coteau du Lac on
the St. Lawrence about twenty miles northwest of
Hampton's position. According to the general weekly
return of British forces serving in the Montreal District imder command of Maj6r-6eneral Sir R. H.
Sheaffe, Sept. 15, 1818, the aggregate rank-and-file
present for duty was five thousand seven hundred
and fifty-two. At Montreal were none but sick, with
the general stafif. At Chambly were nearly thirteen
hundred effectives; at St. John's nearly eight hundred; at Isle aux Noix about nine hundred. Ex-
I8ia. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 195
eluding the garrison at Prescott, and including the
force at Goteau du Lac, Majpr-General Sheaffe commanded just five thousand effectives.^
Besides the enrolled troops, Prevost could muster a
considerable number of sailors and marines for the
defence of Montreal; and his resources in artillery,
boats, fortifications, and supplies of all sorts were
ample. In addition to the embodied troops, Prevost
could count upon the militia, a force almost as good
as regulars for the defence of a forest<5lad country
where axes were as effective as musketry in stopping
an invading army. In Prevost's letter to Bathurst
of October 8, announcing Hampton's invasion, the
governor-general said : —
^^ Measures had been in the mean time taken by MajorGeneral Sir Roger Sheaffe commanding in this district,
to resist the advance of the enemy by moving the whole
of the troops under his command nearer to the frontier
line, and by calling out about three thousand of the
sedentary militia. I thought it necessary to increase
this latter force to nearly eight thousand by embodying
the whole of the sedentary militia upon the frontier,
this being in addition to the six battalions of incorporated militia amounting to five thousand men ; and
it is with peculiar satisfaction I have to report to your
Lordship that his Majesty's Canadian subjects have
a second time answered the call to arms in defence
of their country with a zeal and alacrity beyond all
praise "
' Weekly General Betom, Sept 16, 1813 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives, FVeer Papers, 1813, p. 35.
196 mSTORT OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
Thus the most moderate estimate of the British
force about Montreal gave at least fifteen thousand
rank-and-file under arms.^ Besides this large array
of men, Prevost was amply protected by natural defences. If Hampton had reached the St. Lawrence
at Gaughnawaga, he would still have been* obliged to
cross the St. Lawrence, more than two miles wide,
under the fire of British batteries and gunboats.
Hampton had no transports. Prevost had bateaux
and vessels of every description, armed and imarmed,
above and below the rapids, besides two river steamers constantly plying to Quebec.
Hampton's command consisted of four thousand
infantry new to service, two hundred dragoons, and
artillery .2 With such a force, his chance of suffering
a fatal reverse was much greater than that of his
reaching the St. Lawrence. His position at the Ghateaugay was not less perilous than that of Harrison
on the Maumee, and far more so than that which
cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara.
The British force in Hampton's immediate front
consisted at first of only three hundred militia, who
could make no resistance, and retired as Hampton
advanced. When Hampton made his movement to
Spear's, Lieutenant-Golonel de Salaberry in his front
commanded about eight hundred men, and immedi^ Cf. Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxiy.; Council of
War, Nov. 8, 1813; Wilkinson's Defence, Memoirs, iii. 449.
' Hampton to Armstrong, Oct. 12, 1813; State Papers^ Military Affiairs, i. 460.
1S1». WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 197
ately entrenched himself and obstructed the road
with abattis.^ Hampton felt the necessity of dislodgmg Salaberry, who might at any moment be rein*
forced ; and accordingly, in the night of October 25,
sent a strong force to flank Salaberry's position, while
he should himself attack it in front.
The flanking party failed to find its way, and the
attack in front was not pressed.^ The American loss
did not exceed fifty men. The British loss was reported as twenty-five. Sir George Prevost and his
officers were greatly pleased by their success;' but
Prevost did not attempt to molest Hampton, who fell
back by slow marches to Chateaugay, where he waited
to hear from the Government. The British generals
at Montreal showed little energy in thus allowing
Hampton to escape ; and the timidity of their attitude before Hampton's little army was the best proof
of the incompetence alleged against Prevost by many
of his contemporaries.
Hampton's retreat was due more to the conduct
of Armstrong than to the check at Spear's or to the
movements of Prevost. At the moment when he
moved against Salaberry, October 25, a messenger
arrived from Sackett's Harbor, bringing instructions
from the quartermaster-general for building huts for
ten thousand men for winter quarters. These orders
^ James, i. 307.
* Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; State Papez% Mil>
tary Affairs, i. 461.
• Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 30, 1813 ; James, L 462.
198 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
naturally roused Hampton's suspicions that no serious
movement against Montreal was intended. .
^^ The papers sunk my hopes," he wrote to Armstrong,
November 1,^ ^^and raised serious doubts of receiving
that efficacious support that had been anticipated. I
would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and
the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable."
In a separate letter of the same date ^ whicli Hampton sent to Armstrong by Colonel King, assuming
that the campaign was at an end, he carried out his
declared purpose of resigning. "Events," he said,
" have had no tendency to change my opinion of the
destiny intended for me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can neither feel security
nor expect honor. The campaign I consider substantially at an end." The implication that Armstrong
meant to sacrifice him was certainly disrespectful,
and deserved punishment ; but when Colonel King,
bearing these letters, arrived in the neighborhood of
Ogdensburg, he found that Armstrong had already
done what Hampton reproached him for intending to
do. He had retired to Albany, " suspecting . . . that
the campaign . • • would terminate as it did."
A week afterward, November 8, Hampton received
a letter from Wilkinson, written from Ogdensburg,
asking him to forward supplies and march his troops
^ Hampton to Azmstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; State Papers, Military
A^airs, i. 461.
' Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; l^kinson's Memoirs
iii. Appendix Ixix.
1813. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 199
to some point of junction on the river below St.
Regis.^ Hampton replied from Chateaugay that ho
had no supplies to forward; and as, imder such
circumstances, his army could not throw itself on
Wilkinson's scanty means, he should fall back on
Plattsburg, and attempt to act against the enemy
on some other road to be indicated.^ Wilkinson received the letter on his arrival at Cornwall, November 12, the day after his defeat at Chrystler's farm ;
and with extraordinary energy moved the whole expedition the next day to French Mills, six or seven
miles up the Salmon River, within the United States
lines, where it went into winter quarters.
Armstrong and Wilkinson made common cause in
throwing upon Hampton the blame of failure. Wilkinson at j&rst ordered Hampton under arrest, but
after reflection decided to throw the responsibility
upon Armstrong.^ The secretary declined to accept
it, but consented after some delay to accept Hampton's resignation when renewed in March, 1814.
Wilkinson declared that Hampton's conduct had
blasted his dawning hopes and the honor of the
army.* Armstrong sneered at Wilkinson for seizing
^ Wilkinson to Hampton, Nov. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 462.
^ Hampton to Wilkinson, Nov. 8, 1813 ; State Papers, Military
Affairs, 462.
* Wilkinson to Hampton ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix V. Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, 1813 ; State Papers,
Military Affairs, L 480.
^ Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 17, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 478.
200 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
the pretext for abandoning his campaign.^ Both the
generals believed that Armstrong had deliberately led
them into an impossible undertaking, and deserted
them, in order to shift the blame of failure from himself.^ Hampton behaved with dignity, and allowed
his opinion to be seen only in his contemptuous
silence; nor did Armstrong publicly blame Hampton's conduct until Hampton was dead. The only
happy result of the campaign was to remove all the
older generals — Wilkinson, Hampton, and Morgan
Lewis — from active service.
The bloodless failure of an enterprise which might
have ended in extreme disaster was not the whole
cost of Armstrong's and Wilkinson's friendship and
quarrels. In November nearly all the regular forces,
both British and American, had been drawn toward
the St. Lawrence. Even Harrison and his troops,
who reached Buffalo October 24, were sent to Sackett's Harbor, November 16, to protect the navy. Not
a regiment of the United State^ army was to be
seen between Sackett's Harbor and Detroit. The village of Niagara and Port George on the British side
were held by a few hundred volunteers commanded
by Brigadier-General McClure of the New York militia. As long as Wilkinson and Hampton threatened Montreal, Niagara was safe, and needed no
further attention.
After November 18, when Wilkinson and Hampton
^ Annstrong's Notices, ii 43.
* Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii 362, note.
18ia. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 201
withdrew from Canada, while the American army
forgot its enemy in the bitterness of its own personal
feuds, the British generals naturally thought of recovering their lost posts on the Niagara River.
McClure, who occupied Port George and the small
town of Newark under its guns, saw his garrison
constantly diminishing. Volunteers refused to serve
longer on any conditions.^ The War Department
ordered no reinforcements, although ten or twelve
thousand soldiers were lying idle at French Mills
and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about
sixty men of the Twenty-fourth infantry, and some
forty volimteers, at Fort George, while the number
of United States troops present for duty at Fort
George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village. Black Bock,
and Buffalo, to protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or three hundred
and twenty-four men.
As early as October 4, Armstrong authorized
McClure to warn the inhabitants of Newark that their
town might suffer destruction in case the defence of
Fort George should render such a measure proper.^
No other orders were given, but Wilkinson repeat-
edly advised that Fort George should be evacuated,®
^ McClure to Armstrong, Dec 10, 1813; State Papers, Military
AfEiairs, i. 486.
' Armstrong to McClure, Oct. 4, 1813 ; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 484.
* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Sept. 16, 1813 ; Sept. 20, 1813;
State Papers, Militaiy Affairs, i. 467, 469.
202 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
and Armstrong did nothing to protect it, farther
than to issue a requisition from Albany, November
25, upon the Governor of New York for one thousand militia.^
The British, though not rapid in their movements,
were not so slow as the Americans. Early in De«
cember Lieutenant-Gleneral Gordon Drummond came
from Kingston to York, and from York to the head
of the Lake where the British had maintained themselves since losing the Niagara posts in May. Meanwhile General Vincent had sent Colonel Murray with
five hundred men to retake Fort George. McClure
at Fort George, December 10, hearing that Murray
had approached within ten miles, evacuated the post
and crossed the river to Fort Niagara; but before
doing so he burned the town of Newark and as much
as he could of Queenston, turning the inhabitants,
in extreme cold, into the open air. He alleged as
his motive the wish to deprive the enemy of winter
quarters ; * yet he did not destroy the tents or military
barracks,^ and he acted without authority, for Armstrong had authorized him to bum Newark only in
case he meant to defend Fort George.
'^ The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a
descent on this frontier if possible," wrote McClure from
^ Armstrong to McClure, Nov. 25, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 486.
' McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10 and 13, 1813 ; State Papery
Military Affairs, i. 486.
• Jamea, ii. 77.
1818. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN, 208
the village of Niagara, December 13 ; '^ bat I shall watch
them close with my handful of men until a reinforcement
of militia and volunteers arrives. ... I am not a little
apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of the
exposed condition of Buffalo and our shipping there.
My whole effective force on this extensive frontier docB
not exceed two hundred and fifty men."
Five days passed, and still no reinforcements arrived, and no regular troops were even ordered to
start for Niagara. " I apprehended an attack," wrote
McClure ; ^ and he retired thirty miles to Buffalo,
" with a view of providing for the defence." On the
night of December 18 Colonel Murray, with five
hundred and fifty regular rank-and-file, crossed the
river from Fort George unperceived ; surprised the
sentinels on the glacis and at the gates of Fort
Niagara ; rushed through the main gate ; and,
with a loss of eight men killed and wounded, captured the fortress with some three hundred and fifiy
prisoners.
Nothing could be said on the American side in
defence or excuse of this disgrace. From Armstrong
at the War Department to Captain Leonard who
conmianded the fort, every one concerned in the
transaction deserved whatever punishment the law or
army regulations could inflict. The unfortunate people of Niagara and Buffalo were victims fo official
misconduct. The British, thinking themselves re^ McClare to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1813 ; State Papers, Mill*
tary Affairs, i. 487.
204 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES, Ch.«.
leased from ordinary rules of war by the burning of
Newark and Queenston, showed unusual ferocity. In
the assault on Fort Niagara they killed sixty-seven
Americans, all by the bayonet, while they wounded
only eleven. Immediately afterward they "let loose" *
their auxiliary Indians on Lewiston and the country
around. On the night of December 29, Lieutenant(reneral Drummond sent a force of fifteen hundred
men including Indians^ across the river above the
falls, and driving away the militia, burned Black
Rock and Buffalo with all their public stores and
three small war-schooners.*
These acts of retaliation were justified by Sir
George Prevost in a long proclamation^ dated Jan.
12, 1814, which promised that he would not " pursue
further a system of warfare so revolting to his own
feelings and so little congenial to the British character
unless the future measures of the enemy should compel him again to resort to it." The Americans themselves bore Drummond's excessive severity with less
complaint than usual. They partly suspected that
the destruction effected on the Thames, at York and
at Newark, by American troops, though unauthorized
by orders, had warranted some retaliation ; but they
felt more strongly that* their anger should properly
be vented on their own government and themselves,
who had allowed a handful of British troops to cap» Christie, ii. 140. « Jamee, ii. 20, 21.
* James, u. 23.
« Christie, ii. 143: Niles, y. 382.
181S. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 206
ture a strong fortress and to ravage thirty miles of
frontier, after repeated warning, without losing two
hundred men on either side, while thousands of regular troops were idle elsewhere, and the neighborhood
ought without an effort to have supplied five thousand
militia.
Fort Niagara, which thus fell into British hands,
remained, like Mackinaw, in the enemy's possession
until the peace.
CHAPTER IX
Military moyements in the Southern department
attracted little notice, but were not the less important.
The Southern people entered into the war in the
hope of obtaining the Floridas. President Madison,
like President Jefferson, gave all the support in his
power to the scheme. Throughout the year 1812
United States troops still occupied Amelia Island
and the St. Mary's River, notwithstanding the refusal of Congress to authorize the occupation. The
President expected Congress at the session of 18121813 to approve the seizure of both Floridas, and
took measures in advance for that purpose.
October 12, 1812, Secretary Eustis wrote to the
Governor of Tennessee calling out fifteen hundred
militia for the defence of the " lower country." The
force was not intended for defence but for conquest ;
it was to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola,
and St. Augustine by the regular troops. For that
object every man in Tennessee was ready to serve;
and of all Tennesseeans, Andrew Jackson was the
most ardent. Governor Blount immediately authorized Jackson, as major-general of the State militia,
to call out two thousand volunteers. The call was
1813. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 207
issued November 14; the volunteers collected at
Nashville December 10; and Jan. 7, 1818, the infantry embarked in boats to descend the river, while
the mounted men rode through the Indian country
to Natchez.
'^ I have the pleasure to inform you/' wrote Jackson
to Eustis in departing,' '^ that I am now at the head of
two thousand and seventy volunteers, the choicest of our
citizens, who go at the call of their country to execute
the will of the Government ; who have no Constitutional
scmples, and if the Government orders, will rejoice at
the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine."
The Tennessee army reached Natchez, February 15,
and went into camp to wait orders from Washington,
which were expected to direct an advance on Mobile
and Pensacola.
While Jackson descended the Mississippi, Monroe,
then acting Secretary of War, wrote, January 13, to
Major-General Pinckney,* whose military department
included Georgia: "It is intended to place under
your command an adequate force for the reduction
of St. Augustine should it be decided on by Congress,
before whom the subject will be in a few days." A
fortnight later, January 30, Monroe wrote also to
Wilkinson,' then commanding at New Orleans : " The
^ Parton's Jackson, i. 372.
* MoDToe to Pinckney, Jan. 13, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.
s Monroe to Wilkinson, Jan. 30, 1813; MSS. War Department Recoids.
208 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch.».
subject of taking possession of West Florida is now
before Congress, and will probably pass. You will
be prepared to carry into effect this measure should
it be decided on."
Neither Madison nor Monroe raised objection to
the seizure of territory belonging to a friendly power ;
but Congress showed no such readiness to act. Senator Anderson of Tennessee, as early as Dec. 10,
1812, moved,^ in secret session of the Senate, that
a committee be appointed to consider the expediency
of authorizing the President " to occupy and hold the
whole or any part of East Florida, including Amelia
Island, and also those parts of West Florida which
are not now in the possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States." After much debate
the Senate, December 22, adopted the resolution by
eighteen votes to twelve, and the committee, consisting of Anderson, Samuel Smith, Tait of Georgia,
Vamum of Massachusetts, and Goodrich of Connecticut, reported a bill,* January 19, authorizing the
President to occupy both Floridas, and to exercise
government there, "provided . . . that the section
of country herein designated that is situated to the
eastward of the river Perdido may be the subject of
future negotiation."
The bill met opposition from the President's personal enemies, Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smifii, as well
as from the Federalists and some d the Northern
1 Annals of Congress^ 1813-1813, p. 124.
s Annals of CongtiM, 1812-1813, p. 127.
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MQIS. 209
Democrats. January 26, Samuel Smith moved to
strike out the second section, which authorized the
seizure of Florida east of the Perdido ; and the Sen*
ate, February 2, by a vote of nineteen to sixteen,
adopted Smith's motion. The vote was sectional.
North and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and
Louisiana supported the bill; Maryland, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island opposed it ; Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont were divided;
New Jersey threw one vote in its favor, the second
senator being absent. Had Leib not changed sides
the next day, the whole bill would have been indefinitely postponed; but the majority rallied, February 6, and by a vote of twenty-one to eleven authorized the President to seize Florida west of the
Perdido, or, in other words, to occupy Mobile. The
House passed the bill in secret session February 9,
and the President signed it February 12.^
In refusing to seize East Florida, the Senate greatly
disarranged Madison's plans. Three days afterward,
February 6, Armstrong took charge of the War Department, and his first orders were sent to Andrew
Jackson directing him to dismiss his force, ^^the
causes of embodying and marching to New Orleans
the corps under your command having ceased to
exist." ^ Jackson, ignorant that the Administration
was not to blame, and indignant at his curt dismissal,
1 Act of Feb. 12, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 339.
• Partou's Jackson, i. 377.
TOL.TII. — 14
210 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.».
marched his men back to Temiessee, making himself
responsible for their pay and rations. On learning
these circumstances, Armstrong wrote, March 22, a
friendly letter thanking him for the important services his corps would have rendered ^* had the Executive policy of occupying the two Floridas been adopted
by the national legislature." ^
After the Senate had so persistently refused to
support Madison's occupation of East Florida, he
could hardly maintain longer the illegal possession
he had held during the past year of Amelia Island.
February 15, Armstrong wrote to Major-General
Pinckney,* "The late private proceedings of Congress have resulted in a decision not to invade East
Florida at present ; " but not until March 7, did the
secretary order Pinckney to withdraw the troops
from Amelia Island and Spanish territory.^
The troops were accordingly withdrawn from
Amelia Island, May 16; but nothing could restore
East Florida to its former repose, and the anarchy
which had been introduced from the United States
could never be mastered except by the power that
created it. Perhaps Madison would have retained
possession, as the least of evils, in spite of the
Senate's vote of February 3, had not another cause,
1 Armstrong to Jackson, March 22, 1813 MSS. War Department Records.
< Armstrong to Pinckney, Feb. 15, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.
< Armstrong to Pinckney, March 7, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.
181S. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 211
independent of legislative will, oyercome his repug*
nance to the evaeuation. The Russian o£Fer of
mediation arrived while the President was still in
doubt. The occupation of Florida, being an act of
war against Spain, could not fail to excite the anger
of England, and in that feeling of displeasure the
Czar must inevitably share. From the moment their
cause against Napoleon was common, Russia, England, and Spain were more than likely to act together
in resistance to any territorial aggression upon any
member of their alliance. The evacuation of East
Florida by the United States evaded a serious diplomatic difficulty ; and probably not by mere coincidence, Armstrong's order to evacuate Amelia Island
was dated March 7, while DaschkofPs letter offering
the Czar's mediation was dated March 8.
The Cabinet was so little united in support of the
Executive policy that Madison and Monroe ordered
the seizure of Mobile without consulting Gallatin,
whose persistent hostility to the Florida intrigues
was notorious. When Monroe in April gave to Gallatin and Bayard the President's instructions^ for
the peace negotiations, among the rest he directed
them to assert "a right to West Florida by cession from France, and a claim to East Florida as
an indemnity for spoliations." On receiving these
instructions, Gallatin wrote to Monroe, May 2,
asking,^ —
* Oallatin's Works, i. 539, note,
< GuUatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; QaUatdn's Writings, i. 63d.
212 HISTORY OP T^E UNITED STATE& Ch.».
«« Where is the importance of, taking possession of
Mobile this summer? We may do this whenever we
please, and is it not better to delay every operation of
minor importance which may have a tendency to impede
oar negotiations with Great Britain and Russia? You
know that to take by force any place in possession of
another nation, whatever our claim to that place may be,
is war; and you must be aware that both Russia and
Great Britain will feel disposed, if not to support the
pretensions of Spain against us, at least to take part
against the aggressor/'
Monroe quickly replied:^ "With respect to West
Florida, possession will be taken of it before you get
far on your voyage. That is a question settled." In
fact, possession had been taken of it three weeks
before he wrote, in pursuance of orders sent in
February, apparently without Gallatin's knowledge.
Monroe added views of his own, singularly opposed
to Gfallatin's convictions.
" On the subject of East Florida," wrote Monroe to
Gallatin, May 6,' ^' I think I intimated to you in my last
that Colonel Lear was under the most perfect conviction,
on the authority of information from respectable sources
at Cadiz, that the Spanish regency had sold that and the
other province to the Britilsh government, and that it
had done so under a belief that we had, or should soon
get, possession of it. My firm belief is that if we were
possessed of both, it would facilitate your negotiations in
favor of impressment and every other object, especially if
1 Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i, 640.
* Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatrn's Writings, i. 542.
181S. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 218
it was distinctly seen by the British ministers or liiinister
that, instead of yielding them or any part of either, we
would push oar fortunes in that direction, and in Canada,
if they did not hasten to accommodate."
Gallatin, on the eve of sailing for Russia, replied
with good temper, expressing opinions contrary to
those of the President and Secretary of State.
" On the subject of Florida," Gallatin said,* «* I have
always differed in opinion with you, and am rejoiced to
have it in our power to announce the evacuation of the
province. Let it alone until you shall, by the introduction of British troops, have a proof of the supposed cession. In this I do not believe. It can be nothing more
than a permission to occupy it in order to defend it for
Spain. By withdrawing our troops, we withdraw the
pretence ; but the impolitic occupancy of Mobile will, I
fear, renew our difficulties. The object is at present of
very minor importance, swelled into consequence by the
representations from that quarter, and which I would
not at this moment have attempted, among other reasons,
because it was a. Southern one, and will, should it involve
us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of
Washington. You will pardon the freedom with which,
on the eve of parting with you, I speak on this subject.
It is intended as a general caution, which I think impor-
tant, because I know and see every day the extent of
geographical feeling, and the necessity of prudence if we
mean to preserve and invigorate the Union."
No sooner did the Act of Feburary 12 become law
than Armstrong wrote, February 16, to Wilkinson at
* Oallatin to Monroe, May 8, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i. 544.
214 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
New Orleans, enclosing a copy of the Act, and ordering him immediately to take possession of Mobile and
the country as far as the Perdido.^ Wilkinson, who
had for years looked forward to that step, hastened
to obey the instruction. When Gallatin remonstrated,
the measure had been already taken and could not be
recalled.
Since July 9, 1812, Wilkinson had again commanded at New Orleans. No immediate attack was
to be feared, nor could a competent British force be
collected there without warning ; but in case such an
attack should be made, Wilkinson had reason to fear
the result, for his regular force consisted of only sixteen hundred effectives, ill equipped and without defences.* The War Department ordered him to depend
on movable ordnance and temporary works rather
than on permanent fortifications ; ^ but with his usual
disregard of orders he began the construction or the
completion of extensive works at various points on
the river and coast, at a cost which the government
could ill afford.
While engaged in this task Wilkinson received,
March 14, Armstrong's order of February 16 for the
invasion of West Florida. When the government's
orders were agreeable to Wilkinson, they reached him
^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Feb. 16, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 339.
* Minutes of a Council of War, Aug. 4, 1813; Wilkinson's
Memoirs, i. 498-503.
* Eustis to Wilkinson, April 15, 1812 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs,
L 495.
18i3. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 215
promptly and were executed with rapidity. Within
three weeks he collected at Pass Christian a force of
about six hundred men, supported by gunboats, and
entered the Bay of Mobile on the night of April 10,
while at the same time the garrison at Fort Stoddert
descended the Tensaw River, and cut the communication by land between Mobile and Pensacola. At that
time Mobile Point was undefended. The only Spanish
fortress was Fort Charlotte at Mobile, garrisoned by
one hundred and fifty combatants. Wilkinson summoned the fort to surrender, and the commandant
had no choice but to obey, for the place was untenable and without supplies. The surrender took place
April 15. Wilkinson then took possession of the
country as far as the Perdido, and began the construction of a fort, to be called Fort Bowyer, on Mobile
Point at the entrance of the Bay, some sixty miles
below the town.^
This conquest, the only permanent gain of territory
made during the war, being effected without bloodshed, attracted less attention than it deserved. Wilkinson committed no errors, and won the President's
warm approval.^ Wilkinson was greatly pleased by
his own success, and wished to remain at New Orleans
to carry out his projected defences ; but Armstrong
had written as early as March 10, ordering him to
the Lakes. As so often happened with orders that
* Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 507-522.
' Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 22, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirsy i. 521.
216 raSTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
displeased the general, Annstrong's letter, though
dated March 10, and doubtless arriving in New
Orleans before April 10, was received by Wilkinson
only on his return, May 19. After another delay of
three weeks, he started northward, and travelled
by way of Mobile through the Creek country to
Washington.
Wilkinson's departure, June 10, and the evacuation
of Amelia Island by (reneral Pinckney May 16, closed
the first chapter of the war in the South. Armstrong
wrote to Wilkinson, May 27:^ "The mission to
Petersburg and the instructions to our envoys will
put a barrier between you and Pensacola for some
time to come at least, and permanently in case of
peace." The sudden stop thus put by the Senate
and the Russian mediation to the campaign against
Pensacola and St. Augustine deranged the plans of
Georgia and Tennessee, arrested the career of Andrew
Jackson, and caused the transfer of Wilkinson from
New Orleans to the Lakes. The government expected no other difficulties in the Southern country,
and had no reason to fear them. If new perils suddenly arose, they were due less to England, Spain,
or the United States than to the chance that gave
energy and influence to Tecumthe.
The Southern Indians were more docile and less
warlike than the Indians of the Lakes. The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who occupied the whole extent of
^ ArmstroDg to WiUdnson, May 27, 1813; MSS. War Department Records.
i
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 217
country on the east bank of the Mississippi River
from the Ohio to the Gulf, gave little trouble or
anxiety ; and even the great confederacy of Muskogees,
or Creeks, who occupied the territory afterward
called the State of Alabama and part of Georgia, fell
in some degree into a mode of life which seemed
likely to make them tillers of the soil. In 1800 the
Greeks held, or claimed, about three hundred miles
square from the Tennessee River to the Gulf, and
from the middle of Georgia nearly to the line which
afterward marked the State of Mississippi. The
Seminoles, or wild men, of Florida were a branch of
the Muskogees, and the Creek warriors themselves
were in the habit of visiting Pensacola and Mobile,
where they expected to receive presents from the
Spanish governor.
Two thirds of the Creek towns were on the Coosa
and Tallapoosa rivers in the heart of Alabama.
Their inhabitants were called Upper Creeks. The
Lower Creeks lived in towns on the Chattahooche
River, the. modern boundary between Alabama and
Georgia. The United States government, following
a different policy in 1799 from that of Jefferson
toward the Northwestern Indians, induced the Creeks
to adopt a national organization for police purposes ;
it also helped them to introduce ploughs, to learn
cotton-spinning, and to raise crops. The success of
these experiments was not at first great, for the
larger number of Indians saw no advantage in becoming laborers, and preferred sitting in the squares
218 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
of the towns, or hunting ; but here and there chiefs
or half-breeds had farms, slaves, stock, orchards, and
spinning-wheels.
Large as the Creek country was, and wild as it had
ever been, it did not abound in game. A good hunter,
passing in any direction through the three hundred
miles of Alabama and Georgia, found difficulty in
obtaining game enough for his support.^ For that
reason the Seminoles left their old towns and became
wild people, as their name implied, making irregular
settlements in Florida, where game and food were
more plenty. The mass of the Creek nation, fixed in
the villages in the interior, clung to their habits of
hunting even when obliged to cultivate the soil, and
their semi-civilization rendered them a more perplexing obstacle to the whites than though they had
obstinately resisted white influence.
Had the Indian problem been left to the people
of Greorgia and Tennessee, the Indians would soon
have disappeared; but the national government established under President Washington in 1789 put a
sharp curb on Georgia, and interposed decisively
between the Georgians and the Creeks.* President
Washington in 1796 appointed Benjamin Hawkins of
North Carolina as Indian agent among the Creeks,
and Hawkins protected and governed them with devotion; but the result of his friendliness was the
^ Hawkins's Sketch, p. 24.
* U. S. Commissioners to Governor Irwin, July 1, 1796; State
Papers, Indian AflPairs, i. 611.
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MDiS. 219
same as that of others' greed. The Indians slowly
lost ground.
The Creeks complained of grievances similar to
those of the Northwestern Indians, and their position was even more helpless. They had no other
outlet than Pensacola and Mobile. Except from the
Spaniards they could expect no aid in case of trouble,
and the Spanish governors of Florida, after the abdication of Carlos IV. in 1807, could scarcely maintain their own position, much less supply the Creeks
with arms or gunpowder. While the Northwestern
Indians could buy at Maiden all the weapons and
ammunition they wanted, the Creeks possessed few
firearms, and these in bad condition ; nor were they
skilful in using guns.
The United States government prevented the Georgians from compelling the Indians to sell their lands,
but nothing could prevent them from trespass ; and
the Indian woods along the frontier were filled with
cattle, horses, and hogs belonging to the whites, while
white men destroyed the game, hunting the deer by
firelight, and scaring the Indian hunters from their
hunting-grounds. " Every cane-swamp where they
go to look for a bear — which is part of their support — is near eat out by the stocks put over by
the citizens of Georgia." ^ This complaint was made
in 1796, and as time went on the Indian huntinggrounds were more rapidly narrowed. Not only from
1 Talk of the Creek Indians, June 24, 1796; State Papen^
Indian Affairs, i. 604.
220 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
Georgia but also from Fort Stoddert, along the course
of the Tombigbee River, above Mobile, intruders
pressed into the Greek country. The Indians had
no choice but to sell their lands for annuities, and
under this pressure the Creeks, in 1802 and 1803,
were induced to part with the district between the
Oconee and Ocmulgee in the centre of Georgia.
They retained their towns on the Chattahoochee,
where Hawkins's agency was established in the town
of Coweta, on the edge of the Creek country.
Hawkins was satisfied with their behavior, and
believed the chiefs to be well disposed. They showed
none of the restlessness which characterized the
Northwestern Indians, until Tecumthe conceived the
idea of bringing them into his general league to
check the encroachments of the whites. After Tecumthe's interview with Governor Harrison at Vincennes, in July, 1811, he made a long journey
through the Chickasaw and Choctaw country, and
arrived among the Creeks in October, bringing with
him a score of Indian warriors. The annual council of the Creeks was held in that month at the
village of Tuckaubatchee, — an ancient town of the
Upper Creeks on the Tallapoosa. The rumor that
Tecumthe would be present brought great numbers
of Indians, even Cherokees and Choctaws, to the
place, while Hawkins attended the council in his
character as agent.
Tecumthe and his warriors marched into the centre
of the square and took their places in silence. That
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MIM& 221
night ^' they danced the dance of the Indians of the
Lakes," which became thenceforward a political symbol of their party among the Creeks. Some nights
afterward Tecmnthe addressed the comicil. Versions more or less untrustworthy have been given of
the speech ; ^ but the only official allusion to it by a
person entitled to credit seemed to show that it was
in substance the address made by Tecumthe at Yincennes. Hawkins, recalling to the Creek chiefs in
1814 the course of events which had caused their
troubles, reminded them how "Tecumseh, in the
square of Tuckaubatchee, . . . told the Creeks not
to do any injury to the Americans; to be in peace
and friendship with them; not to steal even a bell
from any one of any color. Let the white people
on this continent manage their affairs their own
way. Let the red people manage their affairs their
own way." 2 Hawkins and the old chiefs would
have certainly interfered had Tecumthe incited
the Creeks to war or violence ; but according to
Hawkins the speech was a pacific "talk," delivered
by Tecumthe in the name of the British. Indian
tradition preserved another form of Tecumthe's
rhetoric, which seemed to complete the identity with
the Vincennes address. Unable to express himself
in the Muskogee language, Tecumthe used pantomime familiar to Indians. Holding his war-club
^ Life of Sam Dale, p. 69.
* Hawkins to the Creek Chiefe, June 16» 1814; State Papexs,
Indian Affairs, L 846.
222 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
with outstretched arm, he opened first the little
finger, then the next and the next, till the club fell
from his hand.
Indian union was unquestionably the chief theme
of all Tecumthe's public addresses. Whether in private he taught other doctrines must be matter of
surmise ; but he certainly brought into the Creek
nation a religious fanaticism of a peculiar and dangerous kind. Prophets soon appeared, chiefly among
the Alabamas, a remnant of an ancient race, not of
Creek blood, but members of the Creek confederacy .^
The prophets, with the usual phenomena of hysteria,
claimed powers of magic, and promised to bring
earthquakes to destroy an invading army. They
preached the total destruction of everything, animate
and inanimate, that pertained to civilization. As
the nation generally was badly armed, and relied
chiefly on their bows, arrows, and war-clubs for battle,2 the moral support of magic was needed to give
them confidence.
So secret was the influence of Tecumthe's friends
that no suspicion of the excitement reached Hawkins
even when the war with England began ; and the old
chiefs of the nation — known to be devoted to peace
and to the white alliance — were kept in ignorance
of all that was done among the young warriors. The
^ Beport of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papeis,
Indian Affairs, i. 845, 846.
' Hawkins to Qeneral Pinckney, July 9, 1813; State Papers^
Indian Affedrs, L 848.
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 223
Alabamas, or Coosadas, lived below the junction of
the Coosa and Tallapoosa, on the west bank of the
Alabama River, about eight miles above the modem
town of Montgomery ; they were considered by Hawkins the most industrious and best behaved of all
the Creeks, whose fields were the granaries of the
upper towns and furnished supplies even to Mobile.
Their town was the last place in which Hawkins expected to see conspiracy, violence, or fanaticism. The
young men " sang the song of the Indians of the
Lakes, and danced the dance " in secret for eighteen
months after Tecumthe's visit, without public alarm^
and probably would have continued to do so except
for an outbreak committed by some of their nation
three hundred miles away.
In 1812 a band of six Indians led by the Little
Warrior of Wewocau, a Creek town on the Coosa,
was sent by the nation on a public mission to the
Chickasaws.^ Listead of delivering their " talks" And
returning, they continued their journey to the northern Lakes and joined Tecumthe at Maiden. They
took part in the massacre at the river Raisin, Jan.
22, 1813, and soon afterward began their return,
bringing talks from the Shawanese and British and
also a letter from some British oflBcer at Maiden to
the Spanish officials at Pensacola, from whom they
hoped to obtain weapons and powder. According to
common report, Tecumthe told the Little Warrior
^ Hawkins to the Cieek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers,
Indian Af&drs, i. 839.
224 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
that he was about to aid the British in capturing
Fort Meigs, and as soon as the fort was taken he
would come to join the Creeks.^ Until then his
friends were to increase their party by the secret
means and magic that had proved so successful, but
were not to begin open war.*
The Little Warrior and his party, including a
warrior from Tuskegee, a Creek town at the fork of
the Coosa and Tallapoosa, after crossing Indiana in
the month of February reached the north bank of
the Ohio River about seven miles above its mouth,
where were two cabins occupied by white families.*
Unable to resist the temptation to spill blood, the
band murdered the two families with the usual Indian
horrors. This outrage was committed February 9;
and the band, crossing the Ohio, passed southward
through the Chickasaw country, avowing the deed
and its motive.*
The Little Warrior arrived at home about the
middle of March, and reported that he brought talks
from the Shawanese and British. The old chiefs of
the Upper Creeks immediately held a council March
25, and after listening to the talks, reprimanded the
Little Warrior and ordered him to leave the Council
^ Hawkins to Armstrong, Ang. 23, 1813; State Papeis, Indian AfiEiEdis, i 851.
' Beport of Alexander Cornells, June 23, 1813; State Papers,
Indian Affidrs, i. 846.
• Letter from Kaskaskias, Feb. 27, 1813; Niles, iv. 135.
^ Hawkins to the Creek ChieSs, March 29, 1813; State Papera^
Indian Affairs, i. 839.
1818. MOBILE AND FOBT MIMa 225
HouBe.^ On the same day Hawkins wrote to them
from Coweta, demanding delivery of the Little Warrior and his six companions to answer for the mur«
ders they had committed. On hearing this demand,
the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee under the lead of
the Big Warrior held another council, while the
Little Warrior, the Tuskegee Warrior, and the murderers took to the woods. The old chiefs in council
decided to execute the murderers, and sent out parties to do it. The Little Warrior was found, in the
swamp, well armed, but was decoyed out and killed
by treachery ; " the first and second man's gun
snapped at him, but the third man's gun fired and
killed; . • • four men that had on pouches kept
them shaking following after him, so that he could
not hear the gun snap; if he had found out that,
he would have wounded a good many with his
arrows." ^
The Tuskegee warrior and four others were found
in a house on the Hickory Ground at the fork of the
rivers. As long as they had ammunition, they held
the attack at a distance, but at last the house was
fired. The Tuskegee Warrior being wounded, was
burned in the house, while his two young brothers
were taken out and tomahawked. One warrior broke
away, but was cdught and killed; two more were
^ Hawkins to ArmBtrong, March 25, 1813 ; State Papers,
Indian Aflfairs, i. 840.
* Report of the Big Warrior, April 26, 1813; State Papers,
Indian Affairs, i. 843.
VOL. VII. — 16
226 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 9.
killed elsewhere. One escaped, and ^^ set out the
morning after to kill white people.'' Warriors were
sent after him.
** He made battle, firing at the warriors, and was near
killing one; the bullet passed near his ear. He then
drew his knife and tomahawk, defended himself, and
the warriors shot three balls through him. He fell^
retained the power of speech till next day, and died.
He said he had been to the Shawanese helping of them^
and had got fat eating white people's flesh. Every one
to the very last called on the Shawanese general^
Tecumseh." *
Such political executions, in the stifled excitement
of the moment, could not but rouse violent emotion
throughout the Creek nation. The old chiefs, having
given life for life, felt the stronger for their assertion
of authority ; but they knew nothing of the true situation. For several weeks no open outbreak occurred^
but the prophets were more active than ever. About
June 4 the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee, hearing that
the prophets "kept as usual their fooleries," sent a
runner to the Alabamas with a message : * —
*^ You are but a few Alabama people. Tou say that
the Great Spirit visits you frequently ; that he comes in
the sun and speaks to you; that the sun comes down
just above your heads. Now we want to see and hear
what you say you have seen and heard. Let us have
1 Report of Nimiod Doyell, May 3, 1813; State Papers,
Indian Affairs, i. 843.
' Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papera^
Indian Affairs, i. 846.
1818. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 227
the same proof you have had, and we will beUeve what
we see and hear. You have nothing to fear ; the people
who committed murders have suffered for their crimes,
and there is an end of it.*'
The runner who carried this message was one of
the warriors who had aided in killing the seven
murderers. The Alabamas instantly put him ta
death, and sent his scalp to their friends at the forks
of the river. Then began a general uprising, and
every warrior who had aided in killing the murderers was himself killed or hunted from the Upper
Creek country. The chiefs of Tuckaubatchee with
diflBculty escaped to the agency at Coweta, where
they were under the protection of Georgia.
The Lower Creek towns did not join tiie outbreak ;,
but of the Upper Creek towns twenty-nine declared
for war, and only five for peace. At least two thousand warriors were believed to have taken the warclub by August 1, and got the name of Bed Clubs,,
or Red Sticks, for that reason. Everywhere they
destroyed farms, stock, and all objects of white civilization, and killed or drove away their opponents.^
With all this the Spaniards had nothing to do.
The outbreak was caused by the Indian War in the
Northwest, and immediately by the incompetence of
General Winchester and by the massacre at the
river Raisin. The Creeks were totally unprepared
for war, except so far as they trusted to magic j.
^ Talosee Fijdco to Hawkins, July 6, 1813; State Papers^
Indian Affairs, i. 847.
228 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
Uiey had neither guns, powder, nor balls. For that
reason they turned to the Spaniards, who could alone
eupplj them. When the Little Warrior was put to
death, the British letter which he carried from Maiden for the Spanish officials at Pensacola came into
the charge of another Creek warrior, Peter McQueen,
s, half-breed. In July, McQueen, with a large party
of warriors started for Pensacola, with the letter and
four hundred dollars, to get powder.^ On arriving
there they saw the Spanish governor, who treated
them civilly, and in fear of violence gave them, according to McQueen's account,* " a small bag of powder each for ten towns, and five bullets to each man."
With this supply, which the governor represented as
a friendly present for hunting purposes, they were
obliged to content themselves, and started on their
return journey.
News that McQueen's party was at Pensacola
instantly reached the American settlements above
Mobile, where the inhabitants were already taking
refuge in stockades.^ A large number of Americans,
without military organization, under several leaders,
one of whom was a half-breed named Dixon Bailey,
started July 26 to intercept McQueen, and succeeded
in surprising the Indians July 27 at a place called
^ Hawkins to Annstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papeis, Indian
Affairs, i. 849.
* Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813 ; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 851.
* Carson to Claiborne, July 29, 1813; Life of Dale, p. 78.
1813. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS- 229
Burnt Com, about eighty miles north of Pensacola.
The whites at first routed the Indians, and captured
the pack-mules with the ammunition ; but the Indians
quickly rallied, and in their turn routed the whites,
with a loss of two killed and fifteen wounded, —
although they failed to recover the greater part of
the pack-animals. With the small amount of powder left to him, McQueen then returned to his
people.
Angry at the attack and eager to revenge the death
of his warriors, McQueen summoned the warriors of
thirteen towns, some eight hundred in number, and
about August 20 started in search of his enemies.
The Creek war differed from that on the Lakes in
being partly a war of half-breeds. McQueen's strongest ally was William Weatherford, a half-breed, well
known throughout the country as a man of property
and ability, as nearly civilized as Indian blood permitted, and equally at home among Indians and
whites. McQueen and Weatherford were bitterly
hostile to the half-breeds Bailey and Beasley, who
were engaged in the affair of Burnt Corn.^ Both
Beasley and Bailey were at a stockade called Fort
Mims, some thirty-five miles above Mobile, on the
eastern side of the Alabama River, where about five
hundred and fifty persons were collected, — a motley
crowd of whites, half-breeds, Indians, and negroes, old
and young, women and children, protected only by a
1 Hawkins to Floyd, Sept 30, 1813; State Papeis, Indian
Affairs, i. 854.
280 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 9.
picket wall, pierced by five hundred loop-holes three
and a half feet from the ground, and two rude gates.^
Beasley commanded, and wrote, August 30, that he
could ^^ maintain the post against any number of Indians." ^ To Fort Mims the Creek warriors turned,
for the reason that Beasley and Bailey were there, and
they arrived in the neighborhood, August 29, without
giving alarm. Twice, negroes tending cattle outside
rushed back to the fort reporting that painted warriors were hovering about; but the horsemen when
sent out discovered no sign of an enemy, and Beasley
tied up and flogged the second negro for giving a
false alarm.
At noon, August 30, when the drum beat for dinner no patrols were out, the gates were open, and
sand had drifted against that on the eastern side
so that it could not quickly be closed. Suddenly
a swarm of Indians raising the warwhoop rushed
toward the fort. Beasley had time to reach the
gate, but 6ould not close it, and was tomahawked on
the spot. The Indians got possession of the loopholes outside, and of one inclosure. The whites,
under Dixon Bailey, held the inner inclosure and
fought with desperation ; but at last the Indians
succeeded in setting fire to the house in the centre,
and the fire spread to the whole stockade. The
Indians then effected an entrance, and massacred
most of the inmates. Fifteen persons escaped, and
1 Pickett's Alabama, ii 264.
< life of Dale, 106.
1813. MOBILE AND FORT MIMS. 231
among these was Dixon Bailey mortally womided.
Most of the negroes were spared to be slaves. Two
hundred and fifty scalps became trophies of the
Creek warriors, — a number such as had been seldom taken by Indians from the white people on a
single day.
CHAPTER X.
The battle at Burnt Com was regarded by the
Indians as a declariation of war by the whites. Till
then they seemed to consider themselves engaged in a
domestic quarrel, or civil war ; ^ but after the massacre
at Fort Mims they could not retreat, and yet knew that
they must perish except for supernatural aid. Their
destiny was controlled by that of Tecumthe. Ten
days after the massacre at Fort Mims, Perry won his
victory on Lake Erie, which settled the result of the
Indian wars both in the North and in the South.
Tecumthe had expected to capture Fort Meigs, and
with it Fort Wayne and the line of the Maumee and
Wabash. On the impulse of this success he probably
hoped to raise the war-spirit among the Chickasaws
and Choctaws, and then in person to call the Creeks
into the field. Proctor's successive defeats blasted
Indian hopes, and the Creeks had hardly struck their
first blow in his support when Tecumthe himself fell,
and the Indians of the Lakes submitted or fled to
Canada.
* Hawkiiis to ArmBtrong, July 20, 1813 ; State Papersi In*
dian Affairs, i. 849.
18ia. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 28S
At best, the Creek outbreak would have been hopeless. Although the number of hostile Creek warriors
was matter of conjecture, nothing showed that they
could exceed four thousand. At Pensacola, Peter
McQueen was said to have claimed forty-eight hundred " gun-men " on his side.^ At such a moment
he probably exaggerated his numbers. The Big Warrior, who led the peace party, estimated the hostile
Creeks, early in August, as numbering at least twenty-
five hundred warriors.^ If the number of gun-men
'was four thousand, the number of guns in their possession could scarcely be more than one thousand.
Not only had the Creeks few guns, and those in
poor condition, but they had little powder or lead,
and no means of repairing their weapons. Their
guns commonly missed fire, and even after discharging them, the Creeks seldom reloaded, but resorted to
the bow-and-arrows which they always carried. As
warriors they felt their inferiority to the Shawanese
and Indians of the Lakes, while their position was
more desperate, for the Choctaws and Cherokees
behind them refused to join in their war.
Four thousand warriors who had never seen a
serious war even with their Indian neighbors, and
armed for the most part with clubs, or bows-andarrows, were not able to resist long the impact of
^ Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813 ; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 854.
* Big Warrior to Hawkins, Aug. 4, 1813; State Papersy
Indian Affairs, i. 851.
284 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
three or four armies, each nearly equal to their whole
force, coming from every quarter of the compass.
On the other hand, the military difficulties of conquer*
Ing the Creeks were not triflmg. The same obstacles
that stopped Harrison in Ohio, stopped Pinckney in
(Georgia. Pinckney, like Harrison, could set in motion three columns of troops on three converging
lines, but he could not feed them or make roads
for them. The focus of Indian fanaticism was the
Hickory Ground at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, about one hundred and fifty miles distant from
the nearest point that would furnish supplies for
an American army coming from Georgia, Tennessee, or Mobile. Pinckney's natural line of attack
was through Georgia to the Lower Creek towns and
the American forts on the Chattahoochee, whence he
could move along a good road about eighty miles to
the Upper Creek towns, near the Hickory Ground.
The next convenient line was from Mobile up the
Alabama River about one hundred and fifty miles to
the same point. The least convenient was the pathless, mountainous, and barren region of Upper Alabama and Georgia, through which an army from
Tennessee must toil for at least a hundred miles in
order to reach an enemy.
The State of Georgia was most interested in the
Creek war, and was chiefly to profit by it. Greorgia
in 1813 had a white population of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and a militia probably
numbering thirty thousand. Military District No. 6^
1813. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 235
embracing the two Carolinas and Georgia, was sup*
posed to contain two thousand regular troops, and
was commanded by Major-General Pinckney. Under
Pinckney's command, a thousand regulars and three
thousand militia, advancing from Georgia by a good
road eighty miles into the Indian country , should have
been able to end the Creek war within six months
from the massacre at Fort Mims; but for some
reason the attempts on that side were not so successful as they should have been, and were neither rapid
nor vigorous. Tennessee took the lead.
In respect of white population, the State of Tennessee was more than double the size of Georgia ; but
it possessed a greater advantage in Andrew Jackson,
whose extreme energy was equivalent to the addition
of an army. When news of the Mims massacre
reached Nashville about the middle of September,
Jackson was confined to his bed by a pistol-shot,
which had broken his arm and nearly cost his life
ten days before in a street brawl with Thomas H.
Benton. From his bed he issued an order calling
back into service his two thousand volunteers of 1812 ;
and as early as October 12, little more than a month
after the affair at Fort Mims, he and his army of
tweniy-five hundred men were already camped on the
Tennessee River south of Huntsville in Alabama.
There was his necessary base of operations, but one
hundred and sixty miles of wilderness lay between
him and the Hickory Ground.
On the Tennessee River Jackson's position bore
286 mSTORT OP THE UNITED STATES. CalO.
some resemblance to that of Harrison on the Manmee
a year bef orer. Energy could not save him from fail*
ure. Indeed, the greater his energy the more serious
were his difficulties. He depended on supplies from
east Tennessee descending the river; but the river
was low, and the supplies could not be moved. He
had taken no measures to procure supplies from
Nashville. Without food and forage he could not
safely advance, or even remain where he was. Under
such conditions, twenty-five hundred men with half
as many horses could not be kept together. Har*
risen under the same difficulties held back his main
force near its magazines till it disbanded, without
approaching within a hundred miles of its object.
Jackson suffered nearly the same fate. He sent
away his mounted men under General Coffee to
forage on the banks of the Black Warrior River,
fifty miles to the southwest, where no Creeks were
to be feared. He forced his infantry forward through
rough country some twenty miles, to a point where
the river made its most southern bend, and there,
in the mountainous defile, he established, October 23,
a camp which he called Deposit, where his supplies
were to be brought when the river should permit.
Coffee's mounted men returned October 24. Then,
October 26, in the hope of finding food as he went,
Jackson plunged into the mountains beyond the river,
intending to make a raid, as far as he could, into the
Creek country. Except fatigue and famine, he had
nothing to fear. The larger Creek towns were a
1818. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CHEEKS. 287
hundred miles to the south\f^ard, and were busy
with threatened attacks nearer home. After a week's
march Jackson reached the upper waters of the
Coosa. Within a short distance were two or three
small Creek villages. Against one of these Jackson
sent his mounted force, numbering nine hundred
men, under (Jeneral Coffee. Early in the morning
of November 8, Coffee surrounded and destroyed
Talishatchee. His report represented that the Indians made an obstinate resistance.^ ^^Not one of
the warriors escaped to tell the news, — a circumstance unknown heretofore.** According to Coffee's
estimate, Talishatchee contained two hundred and
eighty-four Indians of both sexes and all ages. If
one in three could be reckoned as capable of bearing
arms, the number of warriors was less than one
hundred. Coffee's men after the battle counted one
hundred and eightyrsix dead Indians, and estimated
the total loss at two hundred. In every attack on
an Indian village a certain number of women and
children were necessarily victims, but the proportion
at Talishatchee seemed large.
" I lost five men killed, and forty-one wounded," reported Coffee, — " none mortally, the greater part slightly,
a number with arrows. Two of the men killed was with
arrows ; this appears to form a very principal part of the
enemy's arms for warfare, every man having a bow with
a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first fire with
the gun until a leisure time for loading offers.''
2 Report of General Coffee, Nov. 4, 1813 ; Niles, v. 218. »
288 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATED Ch.10.
Meanwhile Jackson fortified a point on the Coosa,
about thirty-five miles from his base on the Tennessee, and named it Fort Strother. There he expected
to be joined by a division of east Tennessee militia
under General Cocke, approaching from Chattanooga,
as he hoped, with supplies; but while waiting, he
received, November 7, a message from Talladega, a
Creek village thirty miles to the southward, reporting
that the town, which had refused to join the warparty, was besieged and in danger of capture by a
large body of hostile warriors. Jackson instantly
started to save Talladega, and marched twenty-four
miles November 8, surrounding and attacking the
besiegmg Creeks the next morning.
" The victory was very decisive," reported Jackson to
Governor Blount,* November 11; "two hundred and
ninety of the enemy were left dead, and there can be
no doubt but many more were killed who were not found.
... In the engagement we lost fifteen killed, and eightyfive wounded."
Coffee estimated the number of Indians, on their
own report,^ at about one thousand. Jackson mentioned no wounded Indians, nor the number of hostile
Creeks engaged. Male Indians, except infants, were
invariably killed, and probably not more than five or
six hundred were in the battle, for Coffee thought
very few escaped unhurt.
At Talladega Jackson was sixty miles from the
s Jackson to Blount, Nov. 11, 1813; Niles, v. 267.
s Parton's Jackson, i. 445.
1818. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 28»
Hickory Ground, and still nearer to several large
Indian towns, but he had already passed the limit of
his powers. News arrived that the army of eastern
Tennessee had turned eastward toward the Tallapoosa,,
and that his expected supplies were as remote as.
ever. Returning to Fort Strother November 10, Jack*
son waited there in forced inactivity, as Harrison had
waited at Fort Meigs, anxious only to avoid the disgrace of retreat. For two weeks the army had lived
on the Indians. A month more passed m idle starvation, until after great efforts a supply train was organized, and difficulties on that account ceased ; but
at the same moment the army claimed discharge.
The claim was reasonable. Enlisted Dec. 10, 1812^
for one year, the men were entitled to their discharge
Dec. 10, 1818. Had Jackson been provided witk
fresh levies he would doubtless have dismissed the
old ; but in his actual situation their departure would
have left him at Fort Strother to pass the winter
alone. To prevent this, he insisted that the men had
no right to count as service, within the twelve months
for which they had enlisted, the months between "May
and October when they were dismissed to their homes.
The men, unanimous in their own view of the contract, started to march home December 10 ; and
Jackson, in a paroxysm of anger, planted two small
pieces of artillery in their path and threatened to fire
on them. The men, with good-temper, yielded for
the moment ; and Jackson, quickly recognizing his
helplessness, gave way, and allowed them to depart
240 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.IO.
December 12, with a vehement appeal for volmiteers
who made no response.
Fort Strother was then held for a short time by
east Tennessee militia, about fourteen hundred in
number, whose term of service was a few weeks
longer than that of the west Tennesseeans. Jackson could do nothing with them, and remained idle.
The Governor of Tennessee advised him to withdraw
to the State frontier ; but Jackson, while admitting
that his campaign had failed, declared that he wouldperish before withdrawing from the ground he considered himself to have gained.^ Fortunately he stood
in no danger. The Greeks did not molest him, and
he saw no enemy within fifty miles.
While Jackson was thus brought to a stand-still,
Major-General Cocke of east Tennessee, under greater
disadvantages, accomplished only results annoying to
Jackson. Gocke with twenty-five hundred three*
months militia took the field at Knoxville October
12, and moving by way of Ghattanooga reached the
Coosa sixty or seventy miles above Gamp Strother.
The nearest Greek Indians were the Hiilabees, on
a branch of the Tallapoosa about sixty miles from
Gocke's position, and the same distance from Jackson. The Hiilabees, a group of four small villages,
numbered in 1800 one hundred and seventy warriors.^ Unaware that the Hiilabees were making
^ Blount to Jackson, Dec 22, 1813 ; Parton's Jackson, L 479^
480-484.
> Hawldns's Sketch, pp. 43, 44.
181S. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 241
their submission to Jackson, and were to receive his
promise of protection, Cocke sent a large detachment,
which started November 12 into the Indian country,
and surprised one of the Hillabee villages November
18, massacring siKty-one warriors, and capturing the
other inmates, two hundred and fifty in number,
without losing a drop of blood or meeting any
resistance.^
Jackson was already displeased with General
Cocke's conduct, and the Hillabee massacre increased
his anger. Cocke had intentionally kept himself and
his army at a distance in order to maintain an independent command.^ Not until Jackson's troops disbanded and marched home, December 12, did Cocke
come to Fort Strother. There his troops remained
a month, guarding Jackson's camp, until January
12, 1814, when their three months' term expired.
While five thousand men under Jackson and Cocke
wandered about northern Alabama, able to reach only
small and remote villages, none of which were actively concerned in the outbreak, the Georgians organized a force to enter the heart of the Creek
country. Brigadier-General John Floyd commanded
the (Jeorgia army, and neither Major-General Pinckney nor any United States troops belonged to it.
Jackson's battle of Talladega was fought November
9; Cocke's expedition against the Hillabees started
1 Cocke to the Secretaiy of War, Nov. 28. 1813 ; Niles, v.
282, 283.
* Cocke to White ; Parton's Jackson, i. 451. «
VOL. VIL — 16
242 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.IO.
November 12, and surprised the Hillabee village November 18. Moyd entered the hostile country November 24. The Georgians though nearest were last
to move, and moved with the weakest force. Floyd
had but nine hundred and forty militia, and three
or four hundred friendly warriors of the Lower Greek
villages.
Floyd had heard that large numbers of hostile
Indians were assembled at Autossee, — a town on
the Tallapoosa River near Tuckaubatchee, in the
centre of the Upper Greek country. He crossed
the Ghattahoochee November 24 with five days rations, and marched directly against Autossee, arriving within nine or ten miles without meeting resistance. At half-past six on the morning of November
29 he formed his troops for action in front of the
town.^
The difference between the Northwestern Indians
and the Greeks was shown in the battle of Autossee compared with Tippecanoe. Floyd was weaker
than Harrison, having only militia and Indians, while
Harrison had a regular regiment composing one third
of his rank-and-file. The Greeks were probably more
numerous than the Tippecanoe Indians, although in
both cases the numbers were quite unknown. Probably the Creeks were less well armed, but they occupied a strong position and stood on the defensive.
Floyd reported that by nine o'clock he drove the In-
dians from their towns and burned their houses,—
^ Floyd to Pinckney, Dec. 4, 1813; Kiles, v. 283.
1813. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKa 248
supposed to be four hundred in number. He es*
timated their loss at two hundred killed. His own
loss was eleven killed and fifty-four wounded. That
of Harrison at Tippecanoe was sixty-one killed or
mortally wounded, and one hundred and twentyseven not fatally injured. The Creeks hardly inflicted one fourth the loss caused by the followers
of the Shawnee Prophet.
General Floyd, — himself among the severely
wounded, — immediately after the battle ordered
the troops to begin their return march to the Chattahoochee. The Georgia raid into the Indian country was bolder, less costly, and more effective than
the Tennessee campaign; but at best it was only a
raid, like the Indian assault on Fort Mims, and offered no immediate prospect of regular military occupation. Another attempt, from a third quarter, had
the same unsatisfactory result.
The successor of General Wilkinson at New Orleans and Mobile, and in Military District No. 7,
was Brigadier-General Thomas Floumoy. Under
his direction an expedition was organized from Fort
Stoddert, commanded by Brig;adier-G^neral Claiborne
of the Mississippi volunteers. Claiborne was given
the Third United States Infantry, with a number of
militia, volunteers, and Choctaw Indians, — in all
about a thousand men. He first marched to a point
on the Alabama River, about eighty-five miles above
Fort Stoddert, where he constructed a military post,
called Fort Claiborne. Having established his base
244 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STAT£;^. Ch.10.
there, he marched, December 13, up the river till he
reached, December 23, the Holy Oromid, where the
half-breed Weatherford lived. There Claiborne approached within about fifty miles of the point which
Floyd reached a month before, but for want of cooperation he could not maintain his advantage. He
attacked and captured Weatherford's town, killing
thirty Indians, with a loss of one man; but after
destroying the place he retreated, arriving unharmed
at Fort Claiborne, on the last day of the year.
Thus the year 1813 ended without closing the
Creek war. More than seven thousand men had
entered the Indian country from four directions ; and
with a loss of thirty or forty Uves had kUled, according to their reports, about eight hundred Indians, or
one fifth of the hostile Creek warriors ; but this carnage had fallen chiefly on towns and villages not
responsible for the revolt. The true fanatics were
little harmed, and could offer nearly as much resistance as ever. The failure and excessive expense of
the campaign were the more annoying, because they
seemed beyond proportion to the military strength of
the fanatics. Major-General Pinckney wrote to the
War Department at the close of the year : ^ —
^' The force of the hostile Creeks was estimated by the
best judges to have consisted of three thousand five hundred warriors ; of these it is apprehended that about one
thousand have been put hors de combat"
* Pinckney to Armstrong, Dec 28, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.
181^. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 245
To Andrew Jackson, Pinckn^ wrote, Jan. 19, 1814,^
^^Your letter, dated December 26, did not reach me
until the last evening. Your preceding dispatches of
December 14 had led me to conclude what would probably soon be the diminished state of your force.* I
therefore immediately ordered to your support Colonel
Williams's regiment of twelve-months men, and wrote
to the Governor of Tennessee urging him to complete
the requisition of fifteen hundred for the time authorized
by law. I learn from the person who brought your
letter that Colonel Williams's regiment is marching to
join you ; if the fifteen hundred of the quota should also
be furnished by Governor Blount, you will in my opinion
have force sufficient for the object to be attained. The
largest computation that I have heard of the hostile
Creek warriors, made by any competent judge, is four
thousand. At least one thousand of them have been
killed or disabled; they are badly armed and supplied
with ammunition; little doubt can exist that two thousand of our men would be infinitely superior to any
number they can collect."
Jackson at Fort Strother on the departure of the
east Tennesseeans, January 14, received a reinforcement of sixty-day militia, barely nine hundred in
number.2 Determined to use them to the utmost,
Jackson started three days afterward to co-operate
with General Floyd in an attack on the Tallapoosa
villages, aiming at a town called Emuckfaw, some
forty miles north of Tuckaubatchee. The move^ Pinckney to Jackson, Jan. 19, 1814 ; MSS. War Department
Archives.
« Parton, i. 864. ,
246 mSTORT OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
ment was much more dangerous than any he had
yet attempted. His own force was fresh, motley,
and weak, numbermg only nine hundred and thirty
militia, including "a company of volunteer oflScers
headed by General Coffee, who had been abandoned
by his men," and assisted by two or threQ hundred
friendly Creeks and Cherokees. The sixty-day militia were insubordinate and unsteady, the march was
long, and the Creek towns at which he aimed were
relatively large. Emuckfaw was one of seven villages
belonging to Ocfuskee, the largest town in the Creek
nation, — in 1800 supposed to contain four hundred
and fifty warriors.^
As far as Enotachopco Creek, twelve miles from
Emuckfaw, Jackson had no great danger to fear;
but beyond that point he marched with caution. At
daylight, January 22, the Indians, who were strongly
encamped at about three miles distance, made an
attack on Jackson's camp, which was repulsed after
half an hour's fighting. Jackson then sent Coffee
with four hundred men to burn the Indian camp, but
Coffee returned without attempting it. " On viewing the encampment and its strength the General
thought it most prudent to return to my encampment," reported Jackson.^ Immediately after Coffee's
return the Indians again attacked, and Coffee sallied
out to turn their flank, followed by not more than
fifty-four men. The Indians were again repulsed with
^ Hawkins's Sketch, p. 45.
* Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427.
18U. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 247
a loss of forty-five killed, but Coffee was severely
wounded, and Jackson " determined to commence a
return march to Fort Strother the following day/'
At that moment Jackson's situation was not un«
like that of Harrison after the battle of Tippecanoe,
and he escaped less happily. Fortifying his camp,
he remained during the night of January 22 undisturbed. At half-past ten, January 23, he began his
return march, " and was fortunate enough to reach
Enotachopco before night, having passed without interruption a dangerous defile occasioned by a hurricane."^ Enotachopco Creek was twelve or fifteen
miles from Emuckfaw Creek, and the Hillabee towns
were about the same distance beyond.
At Enotachopco Jackson again fortified his camp.
His position was such as required the utmost caution
in remaining or moving. So hazardous was the passage of the deep creek and the defile beyond, through
which the army had marched in its advance, that
Jackson did not venture to return by the same path,
but on the morning of January 24 began cautiously
crossing the creek at a safer point: —
''The front guard had crossed with part of the flank
columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the
act of entering the creek, when an alarm-gun was heard
in the woods. ... To my astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by Colonel Carrol to halt
and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld the
right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately
^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29^ 1814; Niles, v. 427.
^8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CalO.
give way. This Bhamefnl retreat was disaBtrons in the
extreme ; it drew along with it the greater part of the
centre column, leaving not more than twenty-five men,
who being formed by Colonel Carrol maintained their
ground as long as it was possible to maintain it, and it
brought consternation and confusion into the centre of
the army, — a consternation which was not easily re*
moved, and a confusion which could not soon be restored
to order." *
The Indians were either weak or ignorant of warfare, for they failed to take advantage of the panic,
and allowed themselves to be driven away by a handful of men. Jackson's troops escaped unharmed, or
but little injured, their loss in the engagements of
January 22 and 24 being twenty-four men killed and
seventy-one wounded. Probably the Creek force consisted of the Ocfuskee warriors, and numbered about
half that of Jackson.^ Coffee supposed them to be
eight hundred or a thousand in number, but the exaggeration in estimating Indian forces was always
greater than in estimating white enemies in battle.
An allowance of one third was commonly needed for
exaggeration in reported numbers of European combatants ; an allowance of one half was not unreasonable in estimates of Indian forces.
In letting Jackson escape from Emuckfaw the
Creeks lost their single opportunity. Jackson never
repeated the experiment. He arrived at Fort Strother
^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814 ; Niles, v. 427«
< Pickett's Alabama, ii. 336.
1S14. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 249
in safety January 29, and did not again leave his
intrenchment until the middle of March, under much
better conditions.
General Floyd was no more successful. Jackson
started from Port Strother for Emuckf aw January 17 ;
Floyd left Fort Mitchell, on the Chattahoochee, January 18, for Tuc^aubatchee, only forty miles south
of Emuckf aw.^ Floyd's army, like Jackson's, was
partly composed of militia and partly of Lower Greek
warriors, in all about seventeen hundred men, including four hundred friendly Greeks. From the best
information to be obtained at the time, the effective
strength of the hostile Indians did not then exceed
two thousand warriors,^ scattered along the Goosa
and Tallapoosa rivers ; while experience proved the
difficulty of concentrating large bodies of Indians,
even when supplies were furnished them. The British
commissariat in Ganada constantly issued from five
to ten thousand rations for Indians and their families,
but Proctor never brought more than fifteen hundred
warriors into battle. The Creeks, as far as was
known, never numbered a thousand warriors in any
battle during the war. Floyd, with seventeen him-^
dred men well armed, was able to face the whole
Creek nation, and meant to move forward, fortifying
military posts at each day's march, until he should
establish himself on the Tallapoosa in the centra
^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles v. 427.
* Letter from Milledgeville, March 16, 1814 ; " The War/*
April 5, 1814.
250 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. Id.
of the Greek towns, and wait for a junction with
Jackson.
When Jackson was repulsed at Emuckfaw Jan*
uary 22, Floyd was about forty miles to the south-
ward, expecting to draw the chief attack of the
Indians. Having advanced forty-eight miles from
the Chattahoochee he arrived at a point about seven
or eight miles south of Tuckaubatchee, where he fortified, on Calibee Creek, a camp called Defiance.
There, before daybreak on the morning of January 27,
he was sharply attacked, as Harrison was attacked
at Tippecanoe, and with the same result. The attack
was repulsed, but Floyd lost twenty-two killed and
one hundred and forty-seven wounded, — the largest
number of casualties that had yet occurred in the
Indian war. The Indians " left thirty-seven dead on
the field ; from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses and war-clubs found in various
directions, their loss must have been considerable
independent of their wounded." ^
The battle of Calibee Creek, January 27, was in
substance a defeat to Floyd. So decided were his
militia in their determination to go home, that he
abandoned all his fortified posts and fell back to the
Chattahoochee, where he arrived February 1, four days
after the battle.^
* Floyd to Pinckney, Jan. 27, 1814; Nilea, v. 411.
« Floyd to Pinckney, Feb. 2, 1814 ; Military and Naval
Letters, p. 306. Hawkins to Armstrong, June 7, 1814 ; State
Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 858.^
18U. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE GREEKS. 251
Six months had then elapsed since the outbreak of
hostilities at Burnt Corn ; a year since the Little
Warrior murders on the Ohio River, yet not a post
had been permanently occupied within eighty miles
of the fanatical centre at the fork of the Coosa and
Tallapoosa.
Pinckney was obliged to apply to the governors of
North and South Carolina to furnish him with men
and equipments. The Governor of Georgia also exerted himself to supply the deficiencies of the national
magazines.^ By their aid Pinckney was able to collect an army with which to make another and a decisive movement into the Creek country : but before he
could act, Jackson succeeded in striking a final blow.
Jackson's success in overcoming the obstacles in
his path was due to his obstinacy in insisting on
maintaining himself at Port Strother, which obliged
Governor Blount to order out four thousand more
militia in January for six months. Perhaps this
force alone would have been no more effectual in
1814 than in 1813, but another reinforcement was
decisive. The Thirty-ninth regiment of the regular
army, authorized by the Act of January 29, 1818, had
been ofiicered and recruited in Tennessee, and was
still in the State. Major-General Pinckney sent orders, Dec. 23, 1813, to its colonel, John Williams, to
join Jackson.* The arrival of the Thirty-ninth regi^ Pinckney to the Governor of Georgia, Feb. 20, 1814 ; Niles,
vi. 132.
> Pinckney to Colonel William^, Dec. 23, 1813 ; MSS. War
Department Archives.
252 HISTOBY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
ment Febmary 6, 1814, gave Jackson the means of
coping with his militia. February 21 he wrote to
his quartermaster, Major Lewis, that he meant to use
his regulars first to discipline his own army.^ ^ I
am truly happy in having the Colonel [Williams]
with me. His regiment will give strength to my
arm, and quell mutiny.'' His patience with militiamen had been long exhausted, and he meant to
make a warning of the next mutineer.
The first victim was no less a person than MajorQenend Cocke of the east Tennessee militia. Cocke's
division of two thousand men, mustered for six
months, began January 17 its march from Enoxville
to Fort Strother.^ Learning on the march that the
west Tennessee division, mustered at the same time
for the same service, had been accepted to serve only
' three months, Cocke's men mutinied, and Cocke tried
to pacify them by a friendly speech. Jackson, learning what had passed, despatched a sharp order to one
of Cocke's brigadiers to arrest and send under guard
to' Fort Strother every officer of whatever rank who
should be found exciting the men to mutiny. Cocke
was put under arrest when almost in sight of the
enemy's country ; his sword was taken from him,
and he was sent to Nashville for trial.® His division came to Fort Strother, and said no more about
its term of service.
1 Parton's Jackson, i. 503.
* Parton's Jackson, i. 454.
* Cocke's Defence; ''National Intelligencer,'' October, 1852.
Parton's Jackson, i. 455. Eaton's Jackson, p. 155.
1814. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 258
Haying dealt thus with the officers, Jackson selected at leisure a test of strength with the men.
The conduct of the Payetteville company of the
Twenty-eighth regiment of west Tennessee Hght infantry gave him ground for displeasure. Not only
had they refused to obey the call for six months' ser-
vice and insisted on serving for three months or not
at all, but they had halted on their march, and had
sent their commanding officer to bargain with Jackson
for his express adhesion to then* terms. Leammg
that Jackson made difficulties, they marched home
without waiting for an official reply. Jackson ordered
the whole body to be arrested as deserters, accompanying his order by an offer of pardon to such as
returned to duty on their own understanding of the
term of service. The company was again mustered,
and arrived at Fort Strother not long after the arrival of the Thirty-ninth United States Infantry.
A few weeks later an unfortunate private of the
same company, named Woods, refused to obey the
officer of the day, and threatened to shoot any man
who arrested him. Jackson instantly called a courtmartial, tried and sentenced Woods, and March 14
caused him to be shot. The execution was a harsh
measure ;• but Jackson gave to it a peculiar character
by issuing a general order in which he misstated facts
that made Wood's case exceptional,^ in order to let
the company understand that their comrade was suffering the penalty which they all deserved.
^ Parton*8 Jackson, i. 511.
254 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
Without giving his army time to brood over this
severity, Jackson ordered a general movement, and
within forty-eight hours after Woods's execution, all
were well on their way toward the enemy. Jackson
liad with him about five thousand men, four fifths of
whom expected their discharge in a month. He left
ihem not a day's repose.
Two lines of advance were open to him in ap-
proaching the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa,
which was always the objective point. He might
descend the Coosa, or cross to the Tallapoosa by the
way he had taken in January. He descended the
Ooosa thirty miles, and then struck a sudden blow at
the Tallapoosa towns.
The Ocfuskee Indians, elated by their success in
January, collected their whole force, with that of
some neighboring towns, in a bend of the Tallapoosa,
where they built a sort of fortress by constructing
Across the neck of the Horse-shoe a breastwork composed of five large logs, one above the other, with
two ranges of port-holes.^ The interior was covered
with trees and fallen timber along the river side,
and caves were dug in the bank. Seven or eight
liimdred Indian warriors together with many women
And children were within the enclosure of eighty or a
iiundred acres.
Jackson, after leaving a garrison at a new fort
which he constructed on the Coosa, about half way
^ Col. Gideon Moi^gan to Gbvemor Blount, April I, 1814 ;
IJiles. vi. 148.
18U. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 255
to the Horsenshoe, had somewhat less than three
thousand effectives.^ With these he camped, on the
evening of March 28, about six miles northwest of
the bend, and the next morning advanced to attack it. "Determined to exterminate them," he reported,* he detached Coffee with the mounted force
of seven hundred men and six hundred friendly
Indians ^ to surround the bend, along the river bank,
while Jackson himself with all his infantry took
position before the breastwork. At half-past ten
o*clock he planted his cannon about two hundred
yards* from the centre of the work, and began a
rapid fire of artillery and musketry, which continued
for two hours without producing apparent effect.
Meanwhile the Cherokee allies swam the river in the
rear of the Creek warriors, who were all at the breastwork, and seizing canoes, brought some two hundred
Indians and whites into the Horse-shoe, where they
climbed the high groimd in the rear of the breastwork and fired on the Creeks, who were occupied in
defending their front.
Jackson then ordered an assault on the breastwork, which was carried, with considerable loss,
by the Thirty-ninth regiment, in the centre. The
Creeks sought shelter in the thickets and under
1 Eaton's Jackson, p. 156.
* Jackson to Pinckney, March 28, 1814; Military and Naval
Letters, p. 319.
* Coffee to Jackson, April 1, 1814 ; Niles, vi. 148.
^ Colonel Moi^gan to Qovemor Blount, April 1, 1814 ; Niles^
vi 148.
256 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ca.^.
the bluffs, where they were hunted or burned out,
and killed. "The slaughter was greater than all
we had done before," wrote Coffee ; it was continued all day and the next morning. When the
Horse-shoe had been thoroughly cleared, five hundred and fifty-seven dead bodies were counted within
the bend ; many were killed in the river, and about
twenty were supposed to have escaped. According
to Coffee, "we killed not less than eight hundred
and fifty or nine hundred of them, and took about
five hundred squaws and children prisoners." The
proportion of squaws and children to the whole number of Indians showed the probable proportion of
warriors among the dead. "I lament that two or
three women and children were killed by accident,"
reported Jackson.^
Jackson's loss was chiefly confined to the Thirtyninth regiment and the friendly Indians, who were
most actively engaged in the storm. The Thirty-ninth
lost twenty killed and fifty-two wounded. Among the
severely wounded was Ensign Samuel Houston, struck
by an arrow in the thigh. The major and two lieutenants were killed. The Cherokees lost eighteen
killed and thirty-five wounded. The friendly Creeks
lost five killed and eleven wounded. The Tennessee
militia, comprising two thirds of the army, lost only
eight killed and fifty-two wounded. The total loss
was fifty-one killed and one hundred and forty-eight
wounded.
^ Jackson to Gbvemor Blount, March 31, 1814; Niles, vi. 147*
1814. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 257
Jackson's policy of extermination shocked many
hmnane Americans, and would perhaps have seemed
less repulsive had the Creeks shown more capacity
for resistance. The proportion between two hundred
casualties on one side and seven or eight hundred
killed on the other would have been striking in any
case, but was especially so where the advantages of
position were on the side of the defence. A more
serious criticism was that the towns thus exterminated were not the towns chiefly responsible for the
outbreak. The Alabamas and the main body of
fanatical Creeks escaped.
Jackson was obliged to return to his new fort on
the Coosa, a march of five days ; and was delayed
five days more by preparations to descend the river.
When at length he moved southward, scouring the
country as he went, he could find no more enemies.
He effected his junction with the Georgia troops
April 15, and the united armies reached the fork
of the Coosa and Tallapoosa April 18, where MajorGteneral Pinckney joined them, April 20, and took
command ; ^ but the Bed Sticks had then fled southward. A few of the hostUe leaders, including Weatherford, made submission, but McQueen and the chief
prophets escaped to continue the war from Florida.
The friendly Creeks did not consider the war to be
finished; they reported to Hawkins^ —
^ Jackson to Gk)yemor Blount, April 18, 1814; Niles, vi. 212.
April 25, 1814 ; Nilea, vL 219.
* Hawkins to Pinckney, April 25, 1814 ; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 858.
VOL. VII.— n
268 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Cn-ia
*< They did not believe the hostile Indians were ready
for peace, although a part of them had suffered so severely in battle against our armies. They were proud,
haughty, brave, and mad by fanaticism. Those of the
towns of Tallapoosa below Tuckaubatchee and Alabama
had suffered the least, although they were the most culpable ; and it was probable they would mistake our object
in offering terms of peace to them."
The number of refugees was never precisely known,
but Hawkins reported that eight of the Tallapoosa
towns had migrated in a body to Spanish territory,^
and probably a larger proportion of the Coosa and
Alabama towns accompanied them. The Indians
themselves gave out that a few more than a thousand
Red Stick warriors survived, who meant to die fighting. In May the British admiral Cochrane sent Captain Pigot of the " Orpheus " to the Appalachicola to
communicate with the refugee Creek Indians and supply them with arms. Pigot received ten of the principal chiefs on board his vessel May 20, and reported^
on their authority that " the number of the warriors
of the Creek Nation friendly to the English and
ready to take up arms was about twenty-eight hundred, exclusive of one thousand unarmed warriors
who had been driven by the Americans from their
towns into the marshes near Pensacola, and who
were expected to rejoin the main body.'* The Creek
^ Hawkins to ArmBtrong^ July 19, 1814; State Papers, Indian
AfEairs, 1. 860.
* Abstract of Correspondence, Expedition to New Orleans,
1814-1815; MSS. British Archives.
18U. CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKa 259
warriors friendly to the Americans were estimated
at about twelve hundred, and the fugitive Red Sticks
at one thousand. Whatever their number, they included the most fanatical followers of Tecumthe, and
their obstinate outlawry caused long and costly diffi*
culties to the United States government.
Meanwhile the whites were conquerors and could
take as much of the Greek lands as suited them ; but
an irregularity of form could not be avoided. Secretary Armstrong first authorized General Pinckney
to conclude a treaty of peace with the hostile Greeks,
containing a cession of land and other provisions.^
A few days later Armstrong saw reason to prefer
that the proposed treaty with the Greeks should take
a form altogether military, and be in the nature
of a capitulation.* His idea required a treaty with
the hostile Greek chiefs ; ^ but the hostile Greeks
were not a separate organization capable of making
a treaty or granting lands of the Greek nation ; and
besides that difficulty the hostile chiefs had fled, and
refused either to submit or negotiate. The friendly
chiefs could hardly capitulate in " a form altogether
military," because they had never been at war.
They had fought in the United States service and
^ Armstrong to Pinckney, March 17, 1814; State Papers,
Indian Affairs, i. 836.
' Armstrong to Pinckney, March 20, 1814 ; State Papers,
Indian Affairs, i. 837.
* Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison's Works,
iii. 399. Madison's Works, iii. 400, 401.
260 mSTOBT OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 10.
were entitled to reward as allies, not to punishment
as enemies.
The solution of this legal problem was entrusted to
Andrew Jackson, whose services in the war earned
for him the appointment of major-general in the
regular army, and the command of Military District
No. 7, with headquarters at Mobile. Jackson met the
Greek chiefs in July. The Indians, parties to the
negotiation, were friendly chiefs, deputies, and warriors, representing perhaps one third of the entire
Greek nation. To these allies and friends Jackson
presented a paper, originallj intended for the hos-
tile Indians, entitled ^^ Articles of Agreement and
Capitulation," requiring as indemnity for war expenses a surrender of two thirds of their territory.
They were required to withdraw from the southern
and western half of Alabama, within the Chattahoochee on the east and the Coosa on the west. The
military object of this policy was to isolate them from
the Seminoles and Spaniards on one side, and from
the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the other. The
political object was to surround them with a white
population.
Unanimously the Creeks refused to accept the
sacrifice. Jackson told them in reply that their refusal would show them to be enemies of the United
States ; that they might retain their own part of the
country, but that the part which belonged to the hostile Indians would be taken by the government ; and
that the chiefs who would not consent to sign the
Itl4 CAMPAIGNS AMONG THE CREEKS. 261
paper might join the Red Sticks at Pensacola, — although, added Jackson, he should probably overtake
and destroy them before they could get there. Such
arguments could not be answered. A number of the
Greeks at last, after long resistance, signed the capitulation or agreement, although they continued to prptest against it, and refused their aid to carry it out.
Jackson's capitulation of Aug. 9, 1814,^ which,
without closing the Creek war, appropriated to the
government the larger part of the Creek lands, was
nearly simultaneous with a treaty^ signed July 22
by William Henry Harrison and Lewis Cass, at
Greenville in Ohio, with chiefs of the Wyandots,
Pelawares, Shawanese, Senecas, and Miamis. This
treaty contained no land-cession, but established
peace between the parties, and obliged the Indian
signers to declare war on the British. Neither Harrison's nor Jackson's treaty embraced the chief body
of hostile Indians; but Harrison's treaty served another purpose of no small value in appearing to
remove an obstacle to negotiation with England.
^ State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826.
* State Papers, Indian Aff&irs, 1. 826.
CHAPTER XI.
Badly as the United States fared in the campaign
of 1813, their situation would have been easy had
ihey not suffered under the annoyances of a blockade continually becoming more stringent. The doctrine that coasts could be blockaded was enforced
against America with an energy that fell little short
of demonstration. The summer was well advanced
before the whole naval force to be used for the purpose could be posted at the proper stations. Not
until May 26 did Admiral Warren issue at Bermuda
his proclamation of " a strict and rigorous blockade
of the ports and harbors of New York, Charleston,
Port Royal, Savannah, and of the river Mississippi,"
which completed the blockade of the coast, leaving
only the ports of New England open to neutrals.
Prom that time nothing entered or left the blockaded coast except swift privateers, or occasional fastsailing vessels which risked capture in the attempt.
Toward the close of the year Admiral Warren extended his blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given at Halifax November 16, and by the
blockading squadron off New London December 2^
1813. THE BLOCKADE. 263
thus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of
every description.^
The pressure of the blockade was immediatelj
felt. In August^ superfine flour sold at Boston for
$11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for f6.00, and at
Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston
for twenty cents a pound; at Charleston for nine
cents. Bice sold at Philadelphia for $12.00 a hundred weight ; in Charleston and Savannah for $3.00.
Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75 a hundred weight;
in Baltimore for $26.50. Already the American
staples were unsalable at the places of their prodiic*
tion. No rate of profit could cause cotton, rice, or
wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to Boston. Soon speculation began. The price
of imported articles rose to extravagant points. At
the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight cents
a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August.
Tea which could be bought for $1.70 per pound in
August, sold for three and four dollars in December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred weight in New Orleans, and in August sold for
twenty-one or twenty-two dollars in New York and
Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in December.
More sweeping in its effects on exports than on
imports, the blockade rapidly reduced the means of
the people. After the summer of 1813, Georgia
alone, owing to its contiguity with Florida, succeeded
^ Proclamation and Notice ; Niles, y. 264.
• Prices Current; Niles, v. 41.
264 mSTOEY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.U.
in continuing to send out cotton. The exports of
New York, which exceeded $12,250,000 in 1811, fell
to $209,000 for the year ending in 1814. The domestic exports of Virginia diminished in four years
from $4,800,000 to $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,819,000
for 1813, and $17,681 for the year ending Sept 80,
1814. At the close of 1813 exports, except from
Georgia and New England, ceased.^
On the revenue the blockade acted with equal
effect. Owing to the increase of duties and to
open ports, the New England States rather increased
than diminished their customs receipts. Until the
summer of 1818, when the blockade began in earnest. New York showed the same result; but after
that time the receipts fell, until they averaged less
than $50,000 a month instead of $500,000, which
would have been a normal average if peace had been
preserved. Philadelphia suffered sooner. In 1810
the State of Pennsylvania contributed more than
$200,000 a month to the Treasury ; in 1813 it contributed about $25,000 a month. Maryland, where
was collected in 1812 no less than $1,780,000 of net
revenue, paid only $182,000 in 1813, and showed an
actual excess of expenditures in 1814. After the
summer, the total net revenue collected in every
port of the United States outside of New England
did not exceed $150,000 a month, or at the rate of
$1,800,000 a year.*
» Table No. 11. ; Pitkin, p. 56.
« Table No. I.; Pitkin, p. 415.
1813. THE BLOCKADE. 265
No ordinary operations of war could affect the
United States so severely as this inexorable blockade. Every citizen felt it in every action of his life.
The farmer grew crops which he could not sell,
while he paid tenfold prices for every necessity.
While the country was bursting with wealth, it was
ruined. The blockade was but a part of the evil.
The whole coast was systematically swept of the
means of industry. Especially the Virginians and
Marylanders felt the heavy hand of England as it
was felt nowhere else except on the Niagara River.
A large British squadron occupied Chesapeake Bay,
and converted it into a British naval station. After
the month of February, 1813, the coasts of Virginia
and Maryland enjoyed not a moment's repose. Considering the immense naval power wielded by England, the Americans were fortunate that their chief
losses were confined to the farm-yards and poultry
of a few islands in Chesapeake Bay, but the constant
annoyance and terror were not the less painful to
the people who apprehended attack.
Fortunately the British naval ofiicers showed little
disposition to distinguish themselves, and their huge
line-of-battle ships were not adapted to river service
The squadron under the general command of Admi
ral Sir John Borlase Warren seemed contented for
the most part to close the bay to commerce. The
only officer in the fleet who proved the energy and
capacity to use a part of the great force lying idle
at Lynnhaven Bay was Rear-Admiral Sir George
286 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u.
Oockbum, whose efficiency was attested by the execration in which his name was held for fifty years in
the United States. His duties were not of a nature
to make him popular, and he was an admiral of the
old school, whose boisterous energy seemed to take
needless pleasure in the work.
Early in April, 1818, Admiral Warren sent Cock-
bum with a light flotilla to the head of Chesapeake
Bay to destroy everything that could serve a warlike
purpose, and to interrupt, as far as possible, communication along the shore.^ The squadron consisted
of only one light frigate, the " Maidstone," thirty-six
guns; two brigs, the "Fantome" and "Mohawk;'*
and three or four prize schooners, with four or five
hundred seamen, marines, and soldiers. With this
petty force Cockbum stationed himself at the mouth
of the Susquehanna River, and soon threw Maryland into paroxysms of alarm and anger. Taking
possession of the islands in his neighborhood, he
obtained supplies of fresh food for the whole British force in Chesapeake Bay. He then scoured every
creek and inlet above his anchorage. He first moved
into the Elk River, and sent his boats, April 28, with
one hundred and fifty marines, to Frenchtown, — a
village of a dozen buildings, which had acquired a
certain importance for the traffic between Baltimore
and Philadelphia since the stoppage of transit by
sea. Without losing a man, the expedition drove
^ Admiral Warien to J. W. Cioker, May 28, 1813; Londoa
" Gazette," July 6, 1813.
1818. THE BLOCKADE. 26T
away the few Americans who made a show of re*
sistance, and burned whatever property was found,
« consisting of much flour, a large quantity of army
clothing, of saddles, bridles, and other equipments
for cavalry, etc., together with various articles of merchandise," besides five vessels lying near the place.^
Cockburn next sent the same force to destroy a
battery lately erected at Havre de Grace. The attack was made on the morning of May 8, and like
the attack on Frenchtown, met with only resistance
enough to offer an excuse for pillage. The militia
took refuge in the woods ; Cockburn's troops destroyed or carried away the arms and cannon, and
set fire to the town of some sixty houses, " to cause
the proprietors (who had deserted them and formed
part of the militia who had fled to the woods) to
understand and feel what they were liable to bring
upon themselves by building batteries and acting
toward us with so much useless rancor."^ While
engaged in this work Cockburn was told that an
extensive cannon-foundry existed about four miles
up the Susquehanna River ; and he immediately
started for it in his boats. He met no resistance,
and destroyed the foundry with several small vessels. His handful of men passed the day undisturbed on the banks of the Susquehanna, capturing
fifty-one cannon, mostly heavy pieces, with one hun1 Warren's Report of May 28, 1813; London "Gazette."
* Cockbum to Warren, May 3, 1813; London '^Qazette," July
e, 1813.
268 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11.
dred and thirty stand of small arms. The party
then returned to their ships, "where we arrived at
ten o'clock, after being twenty-two hours in constant
exertion, without nourishment of any kind ; and I
have much pleasure in being able to add that, excepting Lieutenant Westphall's wound, we have not
suffered any casualty whatever."
These expeditions cleared every inlet in the Upper
Chesapeake except the Sassafras River on the eastem shore. During the night of May 5 Cockburn
sent his boats into the Sassafras. Militia in consid-
erable numbers assembled on both banks and opened
a fire which Cockburn described as " most heavy,"
aided by one long gun. Cockburn landed, dispersed
the militia, and destroyed Fredericktown and Georgetown, with the vessels and stores he found there.
This expedition cost him five men wounded, one
severely. The next day. May 6, he reported to
Admiral Warren, —
** I had a deputation from Charleston in the Northeast River to assure me that that place is considered by
them at your mercy, and that neither guns nor militia-men
shall be suffered there ; and as I am assured that all the
places in the upper part of Chesapeake Bay have adopted
similar resolutions, and as there is now neither public
property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in this
neighborhood, I propose returning to you with the light
squadron to-morrow morning."
Thus in the course of a week, and without loss of
life on either side, Cockburn with a few boats and
1818. THE BLOCKADE. 269
one hundred and fifty men terrorized the shores of
the Upper Chesapeake, and by his loud talk and random threats threw even Baltimore into a panic, causing every one to suspend other pursuits in order to
garrison the city against an imaginary attack. The
people, harassed by this warfare, remembered with
extreme bitterness the marauding of Cockburn and
his sailors ; but where he met no resistance he paid
in part for what private property he took, and as
far as was recorded, his predatory excursions cost the
Marylanders not a wound.
For six weeks after Cockbum's return to Warren's
station at Lynnhaven Bay, the British fleet remained
inactive. Apparently the British government aimed
at no greater object than that of clearing from
Chesapeake Bay every vessel not engaged in British
interests under British protection. The small craft
and privateers were quickly taken or destroyed ; but
the three chief depots of commerce and armaments
— Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington — required a
greater effort. Of these three places Norfolk seemed
most open to approach, and Admiral Warren deter*
mined to attack it.
The British navy wished nothing more ardently
than to capture or destroy the American frigates.
One of these, the " Constellation," lay at Norfolk,
where it remained blockaded throughout the war.
Admiral Warren could earn no distinction so great
as the credit of capturing this frigate, which not only
threatened to annoy British commerce should she
270 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.!!.
escape to sea, but even when blockaded in port required a considerable squadron to watch her, and
neutralized several times her force.
Another annoyance drew Warren's attention to
Norfolk. June 20, fifteen gunboats issued from the
harbor before daylight, and under cover of darkness
approached within easy range of a becalmed British
frigate, the " Junon " of forty-six guns. For half an
hour, from four o'clock till half-past four, the gunboats maintained, according to the official report of
Commodore Cassin who commanded them, ^^ a heavy,
galling fire at about three quarters of a mile distance." ^ Their armament was not mentioned, but
probably they, like the gunboats on the Lakes, carried in part long thirty-two and twenty-four-pound
guns. The attack was intended to test the offensive
value of gunboats, and the result was not satisfactory.
The fire of fifteen heavy guns for half an hour on
a defenceless frigate within easy range should have
caused great injury, but did not. "When a breeze
rose and enabled the ^' Junon" and a neighboring
frigate, the " Barrosa," to get under weigh, the gunboats were obliged to retire with the loss of one
man killed and two wounded. The "Junon" also
had one man killed, but received only one or two
shots in her hull.^
The " Constellation " lay, under the guns of two forts
and with every possible precaution, five miles up the
^ Cassin to Secretary Jones, June 21, 1813; Niles, iv. 291.
' James, ii. 55.
1818.
THE BLOCKADE. 271
Elizabeth River, at the Portsmouth navy-jard. The
utmost pains had been taken to provide against approach by water. Whatever incompetence or neglect
was shown elsewhere, Norfolk was under the command of able officers in both services, who neglected
no means of defence. Greneral Wade Hampton had
fortified the interior line immediately below the town,
where two strong forts were constructed under the
direction of Captain Walker Keith Armistead of the
Engineers, the first graduate of the West Point Academy in 1803. Five miles below these forts, where
the river widened into Hampton Roads, BrigadierGteneral Robert Taylor of the Virginia militia, and
Captain John Cassin commanding at the navy-yard^
established a second line of defence, resting on Craney
Island on the left, supported by fifteen or twenty gunboats moored across the channel. A battery of seven
guns was established on the island covering the approach to the gunboats, so that the capture of the
island was necessary to the approach by water. The
force on the island consisted of about seven hundred
men, of whom less than a hundred were State troops.
The rest were infantry of the line, riflemen, seamen,
and marines.^ The town and forts were strongly garrisoned, and a large body of State militia was constantly on service.
To deal with the defences of Norfolk, Admiral
Warren brought from Bermuda, according to newspaper account, a detachment of battalion marines
^ Report of Robert Taylor, July 4, 1813; Niles, iv. 324.
272 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u.
eighteen hundred strong ; three hundred men of the
One Hundred-and-second regiment of the line, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Charles James Napier,
afterward a very distinguished officer; two hundred
and fifty chasseurs, or French prisoners of war who
had entered the British service; and three hundred
men of the royal marine artillery,^ — in all, two thousand six hundred and fifty rank-and-file, or about
three thousand men all told, besides the sailors of
the fleet. At that time no less than thirteen sail
of British ships, including three ships-of-the-line and
five frigates, lay at anchor within thirteen miles of
Craney Island.
The attack was planned for June 22. The land
forces were commanded by Sir Sydney Beckwith, but
the general movement was directed by Admiral War-
ren.2 The main attack, led by Major-General Beckwith in person, was to land and approach Craney
Island from the rear, or mainland ; the second division, under command of Captain Pechell of the flagship " San Domingo," 74, was to approach the island
in boats directly under fire of the American guns on
the island, but not exposed to those in the gunboats.
The plan should have succeeded. The island was
held by less than seven hundred men in an open
earthwork easily assaulted from the rear. The water
was so shallow as to offer little protection against
energetic attack. The British force was more than
^ James, ii. 54.
* Warren's Report of June 24, 1813; James, ii. 414.
(
I
'I
i.
im. THE BLOCKADE. 273
twice the American, and the plan of attack took
from the gmiboats the chance of assisting the land*
battery.
At daylight on the morning of June 22 Beckwith^
with about eight hundred men, landed on the main
shore outside of Craney Island, and pushed forward
to take the island in the rear. Soon afterward
Captain Pechell, with about seven hundred men in
fifteen boats, approached the island from the northwest along the shore, far out of the reach of the gunboats. Toward eleven o'clock the British boats came
within range of the American battery on the island.
Contrary to the opinions of several ofiicers. Captain
Pechell insisted on making the attack independently
of Beckwith's approach, and pushed on. Two or
three hundred yards from land the leading boats
grounded in shoal water. Apparently the men might
have waded ashore ; but " one of the seamen, having
plunged his boat-hook over the side, found three or
four feet of slimy mud at the bottom ; " ^ the leading
officer's boat being aground was soon struck by a sixpound shot, the boat sunk, and himself and his crew,
with those of two other launches, were left in the
water. The other boats took a part of them in, and
then quickly retired.
The affair was not improved by the fortunes of Sir
Sydney Beckwith, who advanced to the rear of Craney
Island, where he was stopped by creeks which he reported too deep to ford, and accordingly re-embarked
^ James, ii. 59. *
TOI..TII.*18
274 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11.
his troops without further effort ; but the true causes
of the failure seemed not to be understood. Napier
thought it due to the division of command between
three heads, Warren, Cockbum, and Beckwith ; ^ but
incompetence was as obyious as the division of com-
mand. Admiral Warren's official report seemed to
admit that he was also overmatched:* —
^' Upon approaching the island, from the extreme shoalness of the water on the seaside and the difficulty of
getting across from the land, as well as the island itself
being fortified with a number of guns and men from the
frigate [' Constellation '] and the militia, and flanked
by fifteen gunboats, I considered, in consequence of the
representation of the officer commanding the troops of
the difficulty of their passing over from the land, that
the persevering in the attempt would cost more men
than the number with us would permit, as the other forts
must have been stormed before the frigate and dockyard
could be destroyed. I therefore directed the troops to
be re-embarked."
On neither side were the losses serious. The
American battery inflicted less injury than was to be
expected. Fifteen British boats containing at least
eight hundred men, all told, remained some two hours
under the fire of two twenty-four-pound and four sixpound guns, at a range differently estimated from
one hundred to three hundred yards, but certainly
beyond musketry fire, for the American troops had
1 Napier's Life, i. 221.
* Wairen's Report of June 24, 1813; London '* Qazette," Aug.
10, 1813.
1818, THE BLOCKADE. 275
to wade out before firing. Three boats were sunk;
three men were killed, and sixteen were wounded.^
Sixty-two men were reported missing, twenty-two of
whom came ashore from the boats, while forty deserted from Beckwith's land force.^ The Americans
suffered no loss.
To compensate his men for their check at Craney
Island, Admiral Warren immediately afterward devised another movement, which proved, what the
Craney Island affair suggested, that the large British
force in the Chesapeake was either ill constructed or
ill led. Opposite Craney Island, ten miles away on
the north shore of James River, stood the village of
Hampton, a place of no importance either military
or commercial. Four or five hundred Virginia militia
were camped there, covering a heavy battery on the
water's edge. The battery and its defenders invited
attack, but Admiral Warren could have no military
object to gain by attacking them. His ofiicial report ^
said '^ that the enemy having a post at Hampton defended by a considerable corps commanding the communication between the upper part of the country
and Norfolk, I considered it advisable, and with a
view to cut off their resources, to direct it to be attacked." Hampton could not fairly be said to " command" communication with Norfolk, a place which
lay beyond ten miles of water wholly commanded by
^ Eetum, etc.; James, ii. 414, 416.
3 Colonel Beatt/s Report of June 25, 1813 ; Niles, iv. 324.
* Warren's Report of June 27, 1813; James, ii 414.
276 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.U.
the British fleet; but Warren was not obliged to
excuse himself for attacking wherever he pleased,
and Hampton served his object best.
At dawn of June 25, Beckwith's troops were set
ashore about two miles above the village, and moved
forward to the road, taking Hampton in the rear,
while Cockburn's launches made a feint from the
front. The militia, after resistance costing Beckwith
a total loss of nearly fifty men, escaped, and the
British troops entered the town, where they were allowed to do what they pleased with property and
persons. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier of the One Hundred-and-second regiment, who commanded Beckwith's advance, wrote in his diary that Sir Sydney
Beckwith " ought to have hanged several villains at
Little Hampton ; had he so done, the Americans
would not have complained ; but every horror was
perpetrated with impunity, — rape, murder, pillage, —
and not a man was punished." The British ofiicers
in general shared Napier's disgust, but alleged that
the English troops took no part in the outrages, which
were wholly the work of the French chasseurs.
Warren made no attempt to hold the town; the
troops returned two days afterward to their ships, and
the Virginia militia resumed their station ; but when
the details of the Hampton affair became known, the
story roused natural exasperation throughout the
country, and gave in its turn incitement to more violence in Canada. Admiral Warren and Sir Sydney
Beckwith did not deny the wrong; they dismissed
1818. THE BLOCKADE. 277
their Frenchmen from the service, and the United
States had no further reason to complain of that
corps ; but the double mortification seemed to lower
the British oflBcers even in their own eyes to the
level of marauders.
After the failure to destroy the "Constellation,"
Admiral Warren could still indulge a hope of destroying the twenty-eight-gun frigate "Adams," and
the navy-yard at Washington ; for the defence of the
Potomac had been totally neglected, and only one
indifferent fort, about twelve miles below the Federal city, needed to be captured. July 1 the British
squadron entered the Potomac ; but beyond rousing
a panic at Washington it accomplished nothing, except to gain some knowledge of the shoals and windings that impeded the ascent of the river. Leaving
the Potomac, Warren turned up Chesapeake Bay
toward Annapolis and Baltimore, but made no attempt on either place. During the rest of the year
he cruised about the bay, meeting little resistance,
and keeping the States of Virginia and Maryland in
constant alarm.
Cockburn was more active. In the month of July
he was detached with a squadron carrying Napier's
One Hundred-and-second regiment, and arrived, July
12, off Ocracoke Inlet, where he captured two fine
privateers, — the " Atlas " and " Anaconda." Thence
he sailed southward, and established himself for the
winter on Cumberland Island, near the Florida boundary, where he vexed the Georgians. Besides the
278 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. u.
property consumed or wasted, he gave refuge to many
fugitive slaves, whom he assisted to the West Indies
or Florida. " Strong is my dislike," wrote Napier,
** to what is perhaps a necessary part of our job :
namely, plundering and ruining the peasantry. We
drive all their cattle, and of course ruin them. My
hands are clean; but it is hateful to see the poor
Yankees robbed, and to be the robber.'*
Compared with the widespread destruction which
war brought on these regions half a century afterward, the injury inflicted by the British navy in
1813 was trifling, but it served to annoy the Southern
people, who could offer no resistance, and were harassed by incessant militia-calls. To some extent the
same system of vexation was pursued on the Northern
coast. The Delaware River was blockaded and its
shores much annoyed. New York was also blockaded, and Nantucket with the adjacent Sounds became
a British naval station. There Sir Thomas Hardy,
Nelson's favorite officer, commanded, in his flag-ship
the " Ramillies." Hardy did not encourage marauding such as Cockburn practised, but his blockade
was still stringent, and its efficiency was proved by
the failure of Decatur's efforts to evade it.
Decatur commanded a squadron composed of the
" United States," its prize frigate the " Macedonian,"
and the sloop-of-war " Hornet," which lay in the harbor of New York, waiting for a chance to slip out.
Impatient at the steady watch kept by the British
fleet off Sandy Hook, Decatur brought his three ships
1818. THE BLOCKADE. 279
through the East River into Long Island Sound. He
reached Montauk Point, May 29, only to find Hardy's
squadron waiting for him. June 1 he made an attempt to run out, but was chased back, and took
refuge in the harbor of New London. A large British
squadron immediately closed upon the harbor, and
Decatur not only lost hope of getting to sea but
became anxious for the safety of his ships. He withdrew them as far as he could into the river, five miles
above the town, and took every precaution to repel
attack. The British ofiicers were said to have declared that they would get the " Macedonian " back
" even if they followed her into a cornfield." They
did not make the attempt, but their vigilance never
relaxed, and Decatur was obliged to remain all sum-
mer idle in port. He clung to the hope that when
winter approached he might still escape ; but in the
month of December the country was scandalized by
the publication of an ofiicial letter from Decatur to
the Secretary of the Navy, charging the people of
New London with the responsibility for his failure.
" Some few nights since," he wrote,^ Dec. 20, 1813,
^' the weather promised an opportunity for this squadron
to get to sea, and it was said on shore that we intended
to make the attempt. In the course of the evening two
blue lights were burned on both the points at the harbor's
mouth as signals to the enemy ; and there is not a doubt
but that they have, by signals and otherwise, instantaneous information of our movements. Great but unsuo1 Niles, V. 302.
280 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. u.
cesaful exertions have been made to detect those who
communicated with the enemy by signal. . . . Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated, and have
been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron,
there are men in New London who have the hardihood
to affect to disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow
their disbelief."
Decatur's charge roused much ill feeling, and remained a subject of extreme delicacy with the people
of New London. Perhaps Decatur would have done
better not to make such an assertion until he could
prove its truth. That blue lights, as well as other
lights, were often seen, no one denied ; but whether
they came from British or from American hands, or
were burned on sea or on shore, were points much
disputed. The town of New Londoi was three miles
from the river's mouth, and Decatur's squadron then
lay at the town. At that distance the precise position
of a light in line with the British fleet might be mistaken. Decatur's report, if it proved anything, proved
that the signals were concerted, and were burnt from
" both the points at the river's mouth.'* If the British admiral wanted information, he could have found
little difficulty in obtaining it; but he would hardly
have arranged a system of signals as visible to Decatur as to himself. Even had he done so, he might
have employed men in his own service as well as
Americans for the purpose. Decatur's letter admitted that he had made great exertions to detect the
culprits, but without success.
181». THE BLOCKADE. 281
The rigor of the British blockade extended nofarther north than the Vineyard and Nantucket.
Captain Broke in the ^' Shannon," with a companion
frigate, cruised off Boston harbor rather to watch for
ships-of-war than to interfere with neutral commerce.
Along the coast of Maine an illicit trade with the
British provinces was so actively pursued that one
of the few American sloops-of-war, the " Enterprise,'*
cruised there, holding smugglers, privateers, and
petty marauders in check. On no other portion of
the coast would an armed national vessel have been
allowed to show itself, but the " Enterprise," protected by the bays and inlets of Maine, and favored
by the absence of a blockade, performed a useful service as a revenue cutter. She was not a first-rate
vessel. Originally a schooner, carrying twelve guns
and sixty men, she had taken part in the war with
Tripoli. She was afterward altered into a brig,
and crowded with sixteen guns and a hundred men.
In 1813 she was commanded by Lieutenant William.
Burrows, a Pennsylvanian, who entered the navy in
1799, and, like all the naval heroes, was young, —
not yet twenty-eight years old.
On the morning of September 5, as the "Enterprise " was cruising eastward. Burrows discovered in
a bay near Portland a strange brig, and gave chase.
The stranger hoisted three English ensigns, fired several guns, and stood for the " Enterprise." Perhaps
escape would have been impossible ; but the British
captain might, without disgrace, have declined to
282 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.U.
fight, for he was no match for the American. The
" Enterprise " measm^d about ninet7-43eyen feet in
length ; the " Boxer," as the British brig was named,
measured about eighty-four. The " Enterprise "
was nearly twenty-four feet in extreme width; the
"Boxer" slightly exceeded twenty-two feet. The
" Enterprise " carried fourteen eighteen-pound carronades and two long-nines ; the " Boxer " carried twelve
eighteen-pound carronades and two long-sixes. The
"Enterprise" had a crew of one hundred and two
men ; the " Boxer " had only sixty-six men on board.
With such odds against him, the British captain
might have entertained some desperate hope of success, but could not have expected it.
The behavior of Captahi Blyth of the "Boxer"
showed consciousness of his position, for he nailed
his colors to the mast, and told his men that they
were not to be struck while he lived. The day was
calm, and the two brigs manoeuvred for a time before
coming together; but at quarter-past three in the afternoon they exchanged their first broadside within
a stone's throw of one another. The effect on both
vessels was destructive. Captain Blyth fell dead,
struck full in the body by an eighteen-pound shot.
Lieutenant Burrows fell, mortally wounded, struck by
a canister shot. After another broadside, at half-past
three the " Enterprise " ranged ahead, crossed the
"Boxer's" bow, and fired one or two more broadsides, until the " Boxer " hailed and surrendered, her
colors still nailed to the mast.^
18ia. THE BLOCKADE. 283
Considering the disparity of force, the two brigs
Buffered nearly in equal proportion. The "Boxer"
lost seven men killed or mortally wounded; the
" Enterprise " lost four. The " Boxer " had thirteen
wounded, not fatally ; the " Enterprise " had eight.
The " Boxer's " injuries were not so severe as to
prevent her captors from bringing her as a prize
to Portland; and no incident in this quasi-civil war
touched the sensibilities of the people more deeply
than the common funeral of the two commanders, —
both well known and favorites in the service, buried,
with the same honors and mourners, in the graveyard
at Portland overlooking the scene of their battle.
Neither the battle between the "Enterprise" and
"Boxer," nor any measures that could be taken by
sea or land, prevented a constant traffic between
Halifax and the New-England ports not blockaded.
The United States government seemed afraid to interfere with it. The newspapers asserted that hundreds of Americans were actually in Halifax carrying
on a direct trade, and that thousands of barrels of
flour were constantly arriving there from the United
States in vessels carrying the Swedish or other neutral flag. In truth the government could do little to
enforce its non-intercourse, and even that little might
prove mischievous. Nothing could be worse than the
spirit of the people on the frontier. Engaged in a
profitable illicit commerce, they could only be controlled by force, and any force not overwhelming
merely provoked violence or treason. The Navy
284 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ck.11.
Department had no vessels to send there, and could
not have prevented their capture if vessels in any
number had been sent. The Secretary of War had
abandoned to the State governments the defence of
the coast. When Armstrong allotted garrisons to the
various military districts, he stationed one regiment,
numbering three hundred and fifty-two effectives,
besides two hundred and sixty-three artillerists, in
Military District No. 1, which included the whole
coast north of Cape Cod, with the towns of Boston,
Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, Portsmouth, Portland,
and Eastport. Such a provision was hardly sufficient for garrisoning the fort at Boston. The government doubtless could spare no more of its small
army, but for any military or revenue purpose might
almost as well have maintained in New England no
force whatever.
CHAPTER XIL
DuBiNG the month of April, ISIS, four American
frigates lay in Boston Harbor fitting for sea. The
" President " and " Congress " returned to that port
Dec. 31, 1812. The " Constitution," after her battle
with the "Java," arrived at Boston February 27,
1813. The " Chesapeake " entered in safety April 9,
after an unprofitable cruise of four months. The
presence of these four frigates at Boston offered a
chance for great distinction to the British officer
stationed off the port, and one of the best captains
in the service was there to seize it. In order to
tempt the American frigates to come out boldly, only
two British frigates, the " Shannon " and " Tenedos,"
remained off the harbor. They were commanded by
Captain P. B. V. Broke of the " Shannon." Broke
expected Rodgers with his ships, the " President "
and " Congress," to seize the opportunity for a battle
with two ships of no greater force than the " Shannon " and " Tenedos ; " but either Rodgers did not
understand the challenge or did not trust it, or took
a different view of his duties, for he went to sea on
the night of April 80, leaving Broke greatly chagrined
286 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. ist
and inclined to be somewhat indignant with him for
escaping.^
After May 1, Broke on the watch outside, as he
ran in toward Nahant, could see the masts of onlr
the " Constitution" and " Chesapeake'' at the Charlestown navy-yard, and his anxiety became the greater
as he noticed that the " Chesapeake " was apparently
ready for sea.* May 25 Broke sent away his consort,
the " Tenedos," to cruise from Cape Sable southward,
ostensibly because the two frigates cruising separately
would have a better chance of intercepting the " Chesapeake" than if they kept together.' His stronger
reason was to leave a fair field for the ^^ Chesapeake '*
and '*' Shannon," as he had before kept all force at
a distance except the " Shannon " and " Tenedos " in
order to tempt Bodgers to fight.^ That there might
be no second misunderstanding, he sent several messages to Captain Lawrence commanding the ^^ Chesapeake," inviting a combat.
Nothing showed so clearly that at least one object
of the war had been gained by the Americans as the
habit adopted by both navies in 1813 of challenging
ship-duels. War took an unusual character when
officers like Hardy and Broke countenanced such a
practice, discussing and arranging duels between
matched ships, on terms which implied that England
^ Broke to Lawrence, June 1, 1813; Bioke's lafe, 159. Niles,
V. 29.
• Broke's life, pp. 150, 151. « Broke's Life, p. 156.
* Broke's Life, pp. 160, 383.
Mia. "CHESAPEAKE" AND "ARGUS.- 287
admitted half-a-dozen American frigates to be equal
in value to the whole British navy. The loss of a
British frigate mattered little to a government which
had more than a hundred such frigates actually at
sea, not to speak of heavier ships ; but the loss
of the " Chesapeake " was equivalent to destroying
nearly one fourth of the disposable American navy.
Already the " Constellation " was imprisoned at Norfolk ; the " United States " and " Macedonian " were
blockaded for the war; the "Congress" though at
sea was unseaworthy and never cruised again ; the
"Adams" was shut in the Potomac; the "Essex"
was in the Pacific. The United States Navy consisted, for active service on the Atlantic, of only
the " President," 44, at sea ; the " Constitution," 44,
replacing her masts at the Charlestown navy-yard ;
the "Chesapeake," 38, ready for sea; and a few
sloops-of-war. Under such circiunstances, British
ofiicers who like Broke considered every American
frigate bound to oflfer them equal terms in a duel,
seemed to admit that the American service had
acquired the credit it claimed.
The first duty of a British officer was to take risks ;
the first duty of an American officer was to avoid
them, and to fight only at his own time, on his own
terms. Rodgers properly declined to seek a battle
with Broke's ships. Captain James Lawrence of the
" Chesapeake^' was less cautious, for his experience in
the war led him to think worse of the British navy than
it deserved. Lawrence commanded the " Hornet " in
288 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.M.
Bainbridge's squadron at the time of the '^Java's"
capture. Bainbridge and Lawrence blockaded the
** Bonne Citoyenne,*' a twenty-gun sloop-of-war at San
Salvador in Brazil. Lawrence sent a message to the
captain of the " Bonne Citoyenne " inviting him to
come out and meet the "Hornet." The British captain declined, doubtless for proper reasons ; but the
reason he gave seemed to Lawrence insuificient, for
it was merely that Commodore Bainbridge, in spite
of his pledged word, might interfere.^ Bainbridge
sailed about Christmas, and was absent till January 8, capturing the " Java " in the interval. January 6 he sailed for Boston, leaving Lawrence in the
" Hornet " still blockading the " Bonne Citoyenne,"
which showed no more disposition to fight the
"Hornet" in Bainbridge's absence than before, although the British captain's letter had said that
*' nothing could give me greater satisfaction than
complying with the wishes of Captain Lawrence"
if the single alleged objection were removed.
The conduct of the " Bonne Citoyenne " — a vessel
at least the equal of the " Hornet"^ — gave Lawrence
a low opinion of the British service, and his respect
was not increased by his next experience. A British seventy-four arrived at San Salvador, January 24,
and obliged the " Hornet " to abandon the " Bonne
Citoyenne." During the next month the little vessel
cruised northward along the Brazil coast, making a
^ Letter of Captain Gieene; James, Appendix, no. 36.
' James, p. 209.
1813. «* CHESAPEAKE " AND "ARGUS.- 289
few prizes, until February 24 off the mouth of Demerara River, at half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, Captain Lawrence discovered a sail approaching him. Within the bar at the mouth of the river,
seven or eight miles distant, he saw another vessel
at anchor. Both were British sloops-of-war. The
one at anchor was the " Espidgle," carrying eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades. The other, approaching on the "Hornet's" weather-quarter, was
the "Peacock,** carrying eighteen twenty-four-pound
carronades, two long-sixes, and one or two lighter
pieces.
The "Peacock," according to British report,^ had
long been " the admiration of her numerous visitors,"
and was remarkable for the elegance of her fittings;
but in size she was inferior to the " Hornet." Lawrence reported his ship to be four feet the longer,
but the British believed the "Hornet" to measure
one hundred and twelve feet in length, while the
" Peacock " measured one hundred.^ Their breadth
was the same. The " Hornet" carried eighteen thirtytwo-pounders, while the British captain, thinking his
sloop too light for thirty-twos, had exchanged them
for twenty-fours, and carried only sixteen. The
American crew numbered one hundred and thirtyfive men fit for duty ; the British numbered one
hundred and twenty^wo men and boys.
At ten minutes past five, Lawrence tacked and
^ James, p. 202.
* James, p. 206 ; Roosevelt's Naval War of 1812, p. 48.
VOL. VII.— 19
290 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12.
stood for the brig. Fifteen minutes afterward the
two vessels, sailing in opposite directions, passed each
other and exchanged broadsides within a stone's*
throw. The British fire, even at point-blank range
of forty or fifty feet, did no harm, while the " Hornet's" broadside must have decided the battle; for
although both vessels instantly wore, and Lawrence
at thirty-five minutes past five ran his enemy close
aboard, the " Peacock " almost immediately struck
at thirty-nine minutes past five in a sinking condition, and actually went down immediately afterward,
carrying with her nine of the " Peacock's" wounded
and three of the " Hornet's " crew.
The ease of this victory was beyond proportion to
the odds. The British captain and four men were
killed outright, thirty-three officers and men were
wounded, and the brig was sunk in an action of less
than fifteen minutes; while the "Hornet" lost one
man killed and two wounded, all aloft, and not a
shot penetrated her hull. If the facility of this triumph satisfied Lawrence of his easy superiority in
battle, the conduct of the " Espidgle " convinced him
that the British service was worse than incompetent.
Lawrence, expecting every moment to see the " Espifigle " get under weigh, made great exertions to put his
ship in readiness for a new battle, but to his astonishment the British brig took no notice of the action.^
Subsequent investigation showed that the " Espifigle '*
knew nothing of the battle until the next day ; but
^ Lawrence's Eeport of March 19, 1813 ; Niles, iv. 84.
Uia. "CHESAPEAKE- AND "ARGUS.'* 291
Lawrence, assuming that the British captain must
have seen or heard, or at least ought to have suspected what was happening, conceived that cowardice
was a trait of the British navy.
When Lawrence reached New York he became
famous for his victory, and received at once promotion. The " Hornet," given to Captain Biddle, was
attached to Decatur's squadron and blockaded at
New London, while Lawrence received command of
the "Chesapeake." Lawrence was then thirty-two
years old ; he was bom in New Jersey in 1781, entered the navy in 1798, and served in the war with
Tripoli. He was first lieutenant on the " Constitution," and passed to the grade of commander in 1810,.
commanding successively the " Vixen," the " Wasp,"
the "Argus," and the "Hornet." His appointment
to the "Chesapeake" was an accident, owing to the
ill health of Captain Evans, who commanded her oik
her reoent cruise. The "Chesapeake's" reputation
for ill luck clung to her so persistently that neither
officers nor men cared greatly to sail in her, and
Lawrence would have preferred to remain in the
"Hornet;"^ but his instructions were positive, and
he took command of the " Chesapeake " about the
middle of May. Most of the officers and crew were
new. The old crew on reaching port, April 9, had
been discharged, and left the ship, dissatisfied with
their share of prize-money, and preferring to try the
' Biography; from "The Portfolio." Niles, Supplement to.
YoL v. p. 29. Cooper's Naval History^ ii. 247.
292 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1«.
privateer service. The new crew waa unequal in
quality and required training; they neither knew
their officers nor each other.
Lawrence's opponent, Captain Broke of the " Shannon," was an officer whose courage could as little
be questioned as his energy or skill. Among all
the commanders in the British service Broke had
profited most by the lessons of the war. More
than seven years' experience of his ship and crew
gave him every advantage of discipline and system.
Nearly every day the officers at the Charlestown
navy-yard could see the "Shannon" outside, practising her guns at floating targets as she sailed
about the bay. Broke's most anxious wish was to
fight the " Chesapeake," which he considered to be
of the same size with the " Shannon."^ The two frigates were the same length within a few inches, —
between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and
fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within
a few inches. The "Chesapeake" carried eighteen
thirty-two-pound carronades on the spar-deck; the
" Shannon " carried sixteen. Each carried twentyeight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The
"Chesapeake" carried also two long twelve-pounders
and a long eighteen-pounder, besides a twelve-pound
carronade. The " Shannon " carried four long ninepounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound
carronades. The "Chesapeake's" only decided advantage was in the number of her' crew, which con^ Broke's Life, p. 33a
1818. « CHESAPEAKE- AND "ARGUS.'* 298
Bisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, while
the "Shannon" carried three hundred and thirtyall told.
Broke sent the " Tenedos " away May 25, but Lawrence was not aware of it, and wrote. May 27, to
Captain Biddle of the " Hornet " a letter, showing
that till the last moment he hoped not to sail in
the " Chesapeake : " ^ —
"In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart, I
neglected writing to you according to promise; but as
I have given over all hopes of seeing him, and the ' Chesapeake ' is almost ready, I shall sail on Sunday, provided
I have a chance of getting out clear of the ' Shannon '
and 'Tenedos,' who are on the look-out."
Sunday, May 80, the ship was ready, though the
crew was not as good or as well disciplined as it
should have been, and showed some discontent owing
to difficulties about prize-money. On the morning of
June 1 the frigate was lying in President's Roads,
when between eight and nine o'clock the second lieutenant, George Budd, reported a sail in sight. Captain Lawrence went up the main rigging, and having
made out the sail to be a large frigate, ordered the
crew to be mustered, and told them he meant to
fight. At midday he stood down the harbor and
out to sea. The " Shannon," outside, stood off under
easy sail, and led the way until five o'clock, when
she luffed and waited till the ^^ Chesapeake " came
up. As the wind was westerly, Lawrence had the
1 Cooper's Naval Histoiy, ii. 247.
294 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.U.
choice of position, but he made no attempt to profit
by his advantage, although it might have been decisive. Bringing the " Chesapeake " with a fresh
breeze directly down on the " Shannon's " quarter, at
half-past five he luffed, at about fifty yards distance,
and ranged up abeam on the ^^ Shannon's " starboard
side.
The " Shannon " opened fire as her guns began to
bear, but discharged only her two stemmost guns
when the " Chesapeake " replied. The two ships ran
on about seven minutes, or about the length of time
necessary for two discharges of the first guns fired,
when, some of the ^' Shannon's " shot having cut
away the "Chesapeake's" foretopsail tie and jibn^heet,
the ship came up into the wind and was taken aback.
Lying with her larboard quarter toward the " Shannon's " side, at some forty or fifty yards distance,
she began to drift toward her enemy. None of the
" Chesapeake's " guns then bore on the " Shannon,"
and the American frigate wholly ceased firing.
Prom the moment the " Chesapeake " was taken
aback she was a beaten ship, and the crew felt it.
She could be saved only by giving her headway, or
by boarding the " Shannon ; " but neither expedient
was possible. The effort to make sail forward was
tried, and proved futile. The idea of boarding was
also in Lawrence's mind, but the situation made it
impracticable. As the "Chesapeake" drifted stemforemost toward the "Shannon," every gun in the
British broadside swept the American deck diago-
1818. « CHESAPEAKE " AND "ARGUS." 295
nally from stem to stem, clearing the quarter-deck
and beating in the stern-ports, while the musketry
from the "Shannon's" tops killed the men at the
"Chesapeake's" wheel, and picked off every ofl&cer,
sailor, or marine in the after-part of the ship. Boarders could not be rallied under a fire which obliged
them to seek cover. The men on the spar-deck left
their stations, crowding forward or going below.
€h.2m^
Hf -^54 ^J^
SS^a/mon
Nevertheless, Lawrence ordered up his boarders, —
he could do nothing else; but the affair hurried
with such rapidity to its close that almost at the
same instant the " Chesapeake's " quarter touched
the " Shannon " amidships. From the moment when
the " Chesapeake " was taken aback until the moment
when she fell foul, only four minutes were given for
Lawrence to act. Before these four minutes were
at an end, he was struck and mortally wounded by
a musket-ball from the "Shannon." His first lieutenant, Ludlow, had already been carried below,
wounded. His second lieutenant, Budd, was stationed below. His third lieutenant. Cox, improperly
assisted Lawrence to reach the gun-deck. Not an
ofl&cer remained on the spar-deck, and neither an
oflBcer nor a living man was on the quarter-deck
when the "Chesapeake's" quarter came against the
296 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. U.
^ Shannon's '^ gangway, as though inviting the British
captain to take possession.
As the ships fouled, Broke ran forward and called
for boarders. With about twenty men he stepped on
the "Chesapeake's" quarter-deck, and was followed
by thirty more before the ships parted. The error
should have cost him his life and the lives of all who
were with him, for the Americans might easily have
killed every man of the boarding-pariy in spite of
the fire from the " Shannon." For several moments
Broke was in the utmost peril, not only from the
American crew but from his own. His first lieutenant. Watt, hastening to haul down the American
ensign, was killed by the discharge of a cannon
from the " Shannon ; " and when Broke, leaving the
" Chesapeake's " quarter-deck, went forward to clear
the forecastle, enough of the American crew were
there to make a sharp resistance. Broke himself
was obliged to take part in the scuffle. According
to his report, he " received a severe sabre-wound at
the first onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy
who had rallied on their forecastle." According to
another British account he was first knocked down
with the butt-end of a musket, and then was cut by
a broadsword. Of his fifty boarders, not less than
thirty-seven were killed or wounded.^
Had the American crew been in a proper state of
discipline, the struggle would have taken an extraordinary character, and the two ships might have re^ Life of Broke, p. 203.
181«. « CHESAPEAKE •' AND "ARGUS.- 297
newed the combat, without officers, and in a more
or less unmanageable condition. Fortunately for
Broke, his fifty men outnumbered the Americans on
the spar-deck, while the men below, for the most
part, would not come up. About a score of sailors
and marines were on the forecastle, and about a
dozen more rushed up from below, led by the second lieutenant, George Budd, as soon as he, at his
station on the main-deck, learned what was happening above ; but so rapidly did the whole affair pass,
that in two minutes the scuffle was over, the Americans were killed or thrown down the hatchway, and
the ship was helpless, with its spar-deck in the hands
of Broke's boarders. The guns ceased firing, and the
crew below surrendered after some musket-shots up
and down the hatchways.
The disgrace to the Americans did not consist so
much in the loss of a ship to one of equal force, as in
the shame of suffering capture by a boarding-party
of fifty men. As Lawrence lay wounded in the cockpit, he saw the rush of his men from the spar-deck
down the after-ladders, and cried out repeatedly and
loudly, " Don't give up the ship ! blow her up ! "
He was said to have added afterward: "I could have
stood the wreck if it had not been for the boarding."
Doubtless the " Shannon " was the better ship, and
deserved to win. Her crew could under no circumstances have behaved like the crew of the " Chesapeake." In discipline she was admittedly superior ;
but the question of superiority in other respects was
298 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch. li.
not decided. The accident that cut the ^^ Chesapeake's " jibHsheet and brought her into the wind was
the only decisive part of the battle, and was mere
ill luck, such as pursued the ^^ Chesapeake " from the
begmning. As far as could be seen, in the favorite
American work of gunnery the *' Shannon '' showed
no superiority.
On that point the reports agreed. The action began at half -past five o'clock in the afternoon at close
range. In seven minutes the "Chesapeake" forged
ahead, came into the wind and ceased firing, as none
of her guns could be made to bear. Seven minutes
allowed time at the utmost for two discharges of
some of her guns. No more guns were fired from the
" Chesapeake " till she drifted close to the " Shannon." Then her two sternmost guns, the thirteenth
and fourteenth on the main deck, again bore on the
enemy, and were depressed and fired by Lieutenant
Cox while the boarders were fighting on the spardeck.^ Thus the number of discharges from the
" Chesapeake's " guns could be known within reasonable certainty. She carried in her broadside nine
thirty-two-pounders and fourteen or fifteen eighteenpounders, besides one twelve-pounder, — twenty-five
guns. Assuming them to have been all discharged
twice, although the forward guns could scarcely have
been discharged more than once, the " Chesapeake "
could have fired only fifty-two shot, including the
^ EvideDce of Midshipman Edmund Russell; Court- Martial
of Lieutenant Cox. MSS. Navy Department Archives.
1813. "CHESAPEAKE" AND "ARGUS.'* 299
two eighteen-pounders fired hj Lieutenant Cox at
the close.
According to the official report nearly every shot
must have taken effect. The " Shannon " was struck
by thirteen thirty-two-pound shot ; the " Chesapeake "
fired only eighteen, if she discharged every gun twice.
The " Shannon " was struck by twelve eighteen-pound
shot, fourteen bar-shot, and one hundred and nineteen grape-shot ; the " Chesapeake's " fifteen eighteenpounders could hardly have done more in the space
of seven minutes. In truth, every shot that was fired
probably took effect.
The casualties showed equal efficiency of fire, and
when compared with other battles were severe. When
the " Guerriere " struck to the " Constitution " in the
previous year, she had lost in half an hour of close
action twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and
fifty-six more or less injured. The " Shannon " seems
to have lost in eleven minutes, before boarding,
twenty-seven men killed or mortally wounded and
nineteen more or less injured.^
The relative efficiency of the " Shannon's " gunnery
was not so clear, because the " Shannon's " battery
continued to fire after the ^'Chesapeake" ceased. As
the " Chesapeake " drifted down on the " Shannon "
she was exposed to the broadside of the British
frigate, while herself imable to fire a gun.
'^ The shot from the ^ Shannon's' afteimost guns now
had a fair range along the ^ Chesapeake's ' decks," said
^ last of killed and wounded^ Life of Broke, p. 203.
800 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch-M.
fhe BritiBh acoount,^ ^^ beating in the stem-ports and
sweeping the men from their quarters. The shots from
the foremost guns at the same time entering the ports
from the mainmast aft did considerable execution.''
Broke's biographer^ said that the ^^ Chesapeake "
fired but one broadside, and then coming into the
wind drifted down, ^' exposed while making this crippled and helpless movement to the ^ Shannon's ' second and most deliberate broadside." The ^^ Chesapeake" was very near, almost touching the British
frigate during the four or five minutes of this fire,
and every shot must have taken effect. Broke ordered the firing to cease when he boarded, but one
gun was afterward discharged, and killed the British
first lieutenant as he was lowering the American flag
on the " Chesapeake's " quarter-deck.
The " Shannon's " fire lasted eleven or twelve minutes. She carried twenty-five guns in broadside.*
Eight of these were thirty-two-pound carronades,
and the ofiicial report showed that the " Chesapeake" was struck by twenty-five thirty-two-pound
shot, showing that three full broadsides were fired
from the "Shannon," and at least one gun was
discharged four times. The " Shannon's " broadside also carried fourteen eighteen-pounders, which
threw twenty-nine shot into the " Chesapeake," besides much canister and grape. Considering that
at least half the " Shannon's " shot were fired at so
1 James, p. 216. • life of Broke, p. 170.
* Broke's letter of challenge ; James, Appendix, p. 36.
18M. "CHESAPEAKE" AND "ARGUS.** 801
close a range that they could not fail to take effect^
nothmg proved that her guns were better served than
those of the " Chesapeake." The " Shannon," according to the British account, fired twice as many shot
under twice as favorable conditions, but the injury
she inflicted was not twice the injury inflicted in
return. Setting aside the grape-shot, the "Chesapeake " struck the " Shannon " thirty-nine times ; the
"Shannon" struck the "Chesapeake" fifty-seven
times. Including the grape-shot, which Broke used
freely, the " Shannon " probably did better, but even
with a liberal allowance for grape and canister,
nothing proved her superiority at the guns.
The loss in men corresponded with the injury to
the ships. The " Shannon " lost eighty-three killed
and wounded ; the " Chesapeake " lost one hundred
and forty-six. Thirty-three of the " Shannon's " men
were killed or died of their wounds ; sixty-one of
the " Chesapeake's " number were killed or mortally
wounded.
The injuries suffered by the " Chesapeake " told the
same story, for they were chiefly in the stem, and
were inflicted by the " Shannon's " second and third
broadsides, after the " Chesapeake " ceased firing.
The " Chesapeake's " bowsprit received no injury, and
not a spar of any kind was shot away. The " Shannon " carried her prize into Halifax with all its masts
standing, and without anxiety for its safety.
The news of Broke's victory was received in England and by the British navy with an outburst of
S02 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Co. 18.
pleasure that proved the smart of the wound mflicted
by Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge. The two official expressions of Broke's naval and civil superiors
probably reflected the unexaggerated emotion of the
service.
^^At this critical moment," wrote Admiral Warren^
by a curious coincidence the day before his own some-
what less creditable defeat at Craney Island, ^^ you could
not have restored to the British naval service the preeminence it has always preserved, or contradicted in a
more forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies
of a conceited, boasting enemy, than by the brilliant act
you have performed."
A few days later he wrote again : *—
^^ The relation of such an event restores the history of
Ancient times, and will do more good to the service than
it is possible to conceive."
In Parliament, July 8, John Wilson Croker iaid : '
^^ The action which he [Broke] fought with the * Chesapeake ' was in every respect unexampled. It was not —
and he knew it was a bold assertion which he made — to
be surpassed by any engagement which graced the naval
annals of Great Britain."
The Government made Broke a baronet, but gave
him few other rewards, and his wound was too senous to permit future hard service. Lawrence died
June 5, before the ships reached Halifax. His first
lieutenant, Ludlow, also died. Their bodies were
1 Broke's Life, p. 298. * Broke's Life, p. 300.
• Cobbett's Debates, xxvi. 1160.
1818. "CHESAPEAKE" AND "ARGUS." 808
brought to New York and buried September 16, with
formal services at Trinity Church.
By the Americans the defeat was received at first
with incredulity and boundless anxiety, followed by
extreme discouragement. The news came at a dark
moment, when every hope had been disappointed and
the outlook was gloomy beyond all that had been
thought possible.
^^ I remember,'' wrote Richard Bush in later life, — ^
"what American does not! — the first rumor of it. I
remember the startling sensation. I remember at first
' the universal incredulity. I remember how the postoffices were thronged for successive days by anxious<
thousands ; how collections of citizens rode out for miles<
on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something
by anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known,
I remember the public gloom ; funeral orations and badges
of mourning bespoke it. ' Don't give up the ship I ' —
the dying words of Lawrence — were on every tongue."
Six weeks afterward another American naval cap*
tain lost another American vessel-of-war by reason
of the same over-confidence which caused Lawrence's
mistakes, and in a manner equally discreditable to
the crew. The " Argus " was a small brig, built in
1803, rating sixteen guns. Li the summer of 1813
she was commanded by Captain W. H. Allen, of Rhode
Island, who had been third officer to Barron when
he was attacked in the " Chesapeake " by the " Leop^
ard." Allen was the officer who snatched a coal
from the galley and discharged the only gun that
was fired that day. On leaving the ^^ Chesapeake/^
804 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.m.
Allen was promoted to be first officer in the " United
States." To his exertions in training the men to
the guns, Decatur attributed his superiority in gunnery over the "Macedonian." To him fell one of
the most distinguished honors that ever came to the
•share of an American naval officer, — that of success-
fully bringing the " Macedonian " to port. Promoted
to the rank of captain, he was put in command of
the " Argus," and ordered to take William Henry
Crawford to his post as Minister to France.
On that errand the " Argus " sailed, June 18, and
after safely landing Crawford, July 11, at Lorient
in Brittany, Captain Allen put to sea again, three
days afterward, and in pursuance of his instructions
cruised off the mouth of the British Channel. During
an entire month he remained between the coast of
Brittany and the coast of Ireland, destroying a score
of vessels and creating a panic amJng the ship-owners
and underwriters of London. Allen performed his
task with as much forbearance as the duty permitted,
making no attempt to save his prizes for the sake
of prize-money, and permittmg all passengers to take
what they claimed as their own without inspection or
restraint. The English whose property he destroyed
fipoke of him without personal ill-feeling.
The anxiety and labor of such a service falling on
a brig of three hundred tons and a crew of a hundred men, and the impunity with which he defied
danger, seemed to make Allen reckless. On the
night of August 13 he captured a brig laden with
1818. "CHESAPEAKE- AND "ARGUa- 806
wine from Oporto. Within sight of the Welsh coast
and within easy reach of Milf ord Haven, he burned his
prize, not before part of his crew got drunk on the
wine. The British brig *' Pelican," then cruising in
search of the "Argus,'* guided by the light of the
burning prize, at five o'clock on the morning of August 14 came down on the American brig ; and Captain Allen, who had often declared that he would run
from no two-masted vessel, waited for his enemy.
According to British measurements, the '^ Argus"
was ninety-five and one-half feet long ; the "Pelican,"
one hundred. The " Argus " was twentynseven feet,
seven and five-eighths inches in extreme breadth ; the
*' Pelican " was thirty feet, nine inches. The " Argus "
carried eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, and
two long twelve-pounders ; the " Pelican " carried
sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, four long sixpounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The number of the " Argus's" crew was disputed. According
to British authority, it was one hundred and twentyseven,^ while the " Pelican " carried one hundred and
sixteen men and boys.^
At six o'clock in the morning, according to American reckoning,^ — at half -past five according to the
British report, — the " Argus " wore, and fired a
broadside within grape-distance, which was returned
^ Report of Gaptain Maples, Aug. 14, 1813; James, Appendix no. 48, p. Izv.
* James, pp. 276-282.
* Report of Lieutenant Watson, Maich 2, 1815; Kiles, viii. 43.
▼ou Yii.— '20
806 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12.
with cannon and musketry. Within five minutes
Captain Allen was struck by a shot which carried
away his left leg, mortally wounding him ; and fire
minutes afterward the first lieutenant was wounded
on the head by a grape-shot. Although the second
lieutenant fought the brig well, the guns were surprisingly inefficient. During the first fifteen minutes
the ^^ Argus'' had the advantage of position, and at
eighteen minutes after six raked the ^' Pelican " at
close range, but inflicted no great injury on the enemy's hull or rigging, and killed at the utmost but
one man, wounding only five. According to an English account,^ "the * Argus' fought well while the cannonading continued, but her guns were not levelled
with precision, and many shots passed through the
* Pelican's' royals." The " Pelican," at the end of
twenty-five minutes, succeeded in cutting up her opponent's rigging so that the "Argus" lay helpless
under her guns. The " Pelican " then took a position on her enemy's starboard quarter, and raked
her with eight thirty-two-pound carronades for nearly
twenty minutes at close range, without receiving a
shot in return except from musketry. According to
the report of the British captain, the action " was
kept up with great spirit on both sides forty-three
minutes, when we lay her alongside, and were in the
act of boarding when she struck her colors." *
1 Niles, V. 118.
* Beport of Captain Maples^. Aug. 14, 1813; Miles, v. 118.
James, Appendix no. 42.
im. « CHESAPEAKE "• AND ^ARGUS.** 807
This "Argus" repeated the story of the "Chesapeake/' except that the action lasted three quarters
of an hour instead of fifteen minutes. During that
time, the "Pelican" should have fired all her broadside eight or ten times into the " Argus " at a range
so close that no shot should have missed. Sixty
thirty-two-pound shot fired into a small brig less
than one hundred feet long should have shivered it
to atoms. Nine thirty-two-pound shot from the "Hornet " seemed to reduce the " Peacock " to a sinking
condition in fifteen minutes; yet the "Argus" was
neither sunk nor dismasted. The British account of
her condition after the battle showed no more injury
than was suffered by the " Peacock," even in killed
and wounded, by one or at the utmost two broadsides
of the " Hornet."
" The * Argus * was tolerably cut up in her bull.
Both her lower masts were wounded, although not badly,
and her fore-shrouds on one side nearly all destroyed;
but like the ' Chesapeake,' the ' Argus ' had no spar shot
away. Of her carronades several were disabled. She
lost in the action six seamen killed ; her commander, two
midshipmen, the carpenter, and three seamen mortally,
her first lieutenant and five seamen severely, and eight
others slightly wounded, — total twenty-four; chiefly, if
not wholly by the cannon-shot of the * Pelican.* " *
The " Pelican " lost seven men killed or wounded,
chiefly by musketry. On both sides the battle
showed little skill with the guns; but perhaps the
^ James, p. 27a
808 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.12.
^ Pelican/' considering her undisputed superiority
during half the combat, showed even less than the
"Argus/* As in the "Chesapeake's" battle, the
discredit of the defeated ship lay in surrender to
boarders.
Two such defeats were calculated to shake confidence in the American navy. That Allen should
have been beaten in gunnery was the more strange,
because his training with the guns gave him his chief
credit with Decatur. Watson, the second lieutenant
of the " Argus," attributed the defeat to the fatigue
of his crew. Whatever was the immediate cause, no
one could doubt that both the "Chesapeake" and
"Argus" were sacrificed to the over-confidence of
their commanders.
CHAPTER Xm.
The people of the Atlantic coast felt the loss of the
"Chesapeake" none too keenly. Other nations had
a history to support them in moments of mortification, or had learned by centuries of experience to
accept turns of fortune as the fate of war. The
American of the sea-coast was not only sensitive and
anxious, but he also saw with singular clearness the
bearing of every disaster, and did not see with equal
distinctness the general drift of success. The loss of
the " Chesapeake " was a terrible disaster, not merely
because it announced the quick recovery of England's
pride and power from a momentary shock, but also
because it threatened to take away the single object
of American enthusiasm which redeemed shortcomings elsewhere. After the loss of the " Chesapeake,"
no American frigate was allowed the opportunity to
fight with an equal enemy. The British frigates,
ordered to cruise in company, gave the Americans
no chance to renew their triumphs of 1812.
Indeed, the experience of 1813 tended to show that
the frigate was no longer the class of vessel best
suited to American wants. Excessively expensive
compared with their efficiency, the "Constitution,"
810 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18.
« President;* and "United States" could only with
difficulty obtain crews ; and when after much delay
they were ready for sea, they could not easily evade
a blockading squadron. The original cost of a frigate
varied from two hundred thousand dollars to three
hundred thousand ; that of a sloop-of-war, like the
*' Hornet," " Wasp," or " Argus," varied between forty
and fifty thousand dollars. The frigate required a
crew of about four hundred men; the sloop carried
about one hundred and fifty. The annual expense
of a frigate in active service was about one himdred
and thirty-four thousand dollars ; that of the brig was
sixty thousand. The frigate required much time and
heavy timber in her construction ; the sloop could be
built quickly and of ordinary material. The loss of
a frigate was a severe national disaster ; the loss of a
sloop was not a serious event.
For defensive purposes neither the frigate nor the
brig counted heavily against a nation which employed
ships-of-the-line by dozens ; but even for offensive objects the frigate was hardly so useful as the sloopof-war. The record of the frigates for 1813 showed
no results equivalent to their cost. Their cruises
were soon told. The " President," leaving Boston
April 30, ran across to the Azores, thence to the
North Sea, and during June and July haunted the
shores of Norway, Scotland, and Ireland, returning to
Newport September 27, having taken thirteen prizes.
The " Congress," which left Boston with the " President " cruised nearly eight months in the Atlantic,
1818. PRIVATEERING. 811
and returned to Boston December 14, having captured but four merchantmen. The " Chesapeake,'*
which sailed from Boston Dec. 13, 1812, cruised four
months in the track of British commerce, past Madeira and Cape de Verde, across the equator, and
round through the West Indies, returning to Boston
April 9, having taken six prizes ; at the beginning
of her next cruise, June 1, the " Chesapeake " was
herself captured. The adventures of the " Essex *'
in the Pacific were such as might have been equally
well performed by a sloop-of-war, and belonged rather
to the comparative freedom with which the frigates
moved in 1812 than to the difficult situation that
followed. No other frigates succeeded in getting to
sea till December 4, when the "President" sailed
again. The injury inflicted by the frigates on the
Atlantic was therefore the capture of twenty-three
merchantmen in a year. At the close of 1818, the
*' President " and the " Essex '* were the only frigates
at sea ; the " Constitution '* sailed from Boston only
Jan. 1, 1814 ; the " United States " and " Macedonian" were blockaded at New London; the "Constellation " was still at Norfolk ; the " Adams " was
at Washington, and the " Congress " at Boston.
When this record was compared with that of the
sloops-of-war, the frigates were seen to be luxuries.
The sloop-of-war was a single-decked vessel, rigged
sometimes as a ship, sometimes as a brig, but never
as a sloop, measuring about one hundred and ten feet
in length by thirty in breadth, and carrying usually
812 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18.
eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long
twelve-ponnders. Of this class the American navj
possessed in 1812 only four examples, — the "Hornet," the " Wasp," the " Argus," and the « Syren."
The " Wasp " was lost Oct. 18, 1812, after capturing
the " Frolic." The " Syren " remained at New Orleans during the first year of the war, and then came
to Boston, but saw no ocean service of importance
during 1818. The " Hornet " made three prizes, including the sloop-of-war "Peacock," and was then
blockaded with the *' United States" and "Macedonian;" but the smaller vessel could do what the
frigates could not, and in November the " Hornet "
slipped out of New London and made her way to
New York, where she waited an opportunity to escape
to sea. The story will show her success. Finally,
the "Argus" cruised for a month in the British
Channel, and made twenty-one prizes before she was
captured by the " Pelican."
The three frigates, " President," " Congress," and
" Chesapeake," captured twenty-three prizes in the
course of the year, and lost the " Chesapeake." The
two sloops, the " Hornet " ^d " Argus," captured
twenty-four prizes, including the sloop-of-war " Peacock," and lost the " Argus."
The government at the beginning of the war owned
four smaller vessels, — the " Nautilus " and " Vixen "
of fourteen guns, and the " Enterprise " and " Viper "
of twelve. Another brig, the " Rattlesnake," sixteen,
was bought. Experience seemed to prove that these
im. PRIVATEERING. 818
were of little use. The <^ Nautilus" fell into the
hands of Broke's squadron July 16, 1812, within a
month after the declaration of war. The "Vixen"
was captured Nov. 22, 1812, by Sir James . Yeo. The
"Viper," Jan. 17, 1813, became prize to Captain
Lumley in the British frigate "Narcissus." The
"Enterprise" distinguished itself by capturing the
" Boxer," and was regarded as a lucky vessel, but
was never a good or fast one.^ The " Rattlesnake,"
though fast, was at last caught on a lee shore by the
frigate "Leander," July 11, 1814, and carried into
Halifax.^
In the enthusiasm over the frigates in 1812, Congress voted that six forty-fours should be built, besides four ships-of-the-line. The Act was approved
Jan. 2, 1813. Not until March 8 did Congress pas&
an Act for building six new sloops-of-war. The loss
of two months was not the only misfortune in this
legislation. Had the sloops been begun in January,
they might have gone to sea by the close of the year.
The six sloops were all launched within eleven months
from the passage of the bill, and the first of them, the
" Frolic," got to sea within that time, while none of
the frigates or line-of-battle ships could get to sea
within two ytjars of the passage of the law. A more
remarkable oversight was the building of only six
sloops, when an equal number of forty-fours and four
^ Lieutenant Creighton to Secretary Jones, March 9, 1814^
Niles, vi. 69.
« NUes, vi 391.
814 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. te.ia.
aeventy-foors were ordered. Had Congress voted
twenly-four sloops, tiie proportion would not hare
been improper; but perhaps the best policy would
have been to build fifty such sloops, and to prohibit
privateering. The reasons for such a course were
best seen in tiie experiences of tiie privateers.
The history of the privateers was never satisfactorily written. Neither their number, their measurements, their force, their captures, nor their losses
were accurately known. Little ground could be given
for an opinion in regard to their economy. Only with
grave doubt could any judgment be reached even in
regard to their relative efficiency compared with government vessels of the same class. Yet their experience was valuable, and their services were very
great.
In the summer of 1812 any craft tiiat could keep
the sea in fine weather set out as a privateer to intercept vessels approaching the coast. The typical
privateer of the first few months was tiie pilot-boat,
armed with one or two long-nine or twelve-poimd
guns. Of twenty-six privateers sent from New York
in tiie first four months of war, fifteen carried crews
of eighty men or less. These small vessels especially
infested the West Indies, where fine weather and
light breezes suited their qualities. After the seas
had been cleared of such prey as these petty marauders could manage, they were found to be unprofitable, — too small to fight and too light to escape.
The typical privateer of 1813_was a larger vessel, — a
1813.
PKIVATEERING. 315
brig or schooner of two or three hundred tons, armed
with one long pivot-gun, and six or eight lighter
guns in broadside ; carrying crews which varied in
number from one hundred and twenty to one hundred
and sixty men; swift enough to escape under most
circumstances even a frigate, and strong enough to
capture any armed merchantman.
After the war was fairly begun, the British mercantile shipping always sailed either under convoy
or as armed " running ships " that did not wait for
the slow and comparatively rare opportunities of
convoy, but trusted to their guns for defence. The
new American privateer was adapted to meet both
chances. Two or three such craft hanging about a
convoy could conmionly cut off some merchantman,
no matter how careful the convoying man-of-war
might be. By night they could run directly into the
fleet and cut out vessels without even giving an
alarm, and by day they could pick up any craft that
lagged behind or happened to stray too far away.
Yet the "running ships" were the chief objects of
their search, for these were the richest prizes ; and
the capture of a single such vessel, if it reached
an American port in safety, insured success to the
cruise. The loss of these vessels caused peculiar
annoyance to the British, for they sometimes carried
considerable amounts of specie, and usually were
charged with a mail which was always sunk and lost
in case of capture.
As the war continued, experience taught the own*
816 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1».
era of privateers the same lesson that was taught to
Hie government. The most efficient vessel of war
corresponded in size with the " Hornet " or the new
sloops-of-war building in 1818. Tonnage was so arbitrary a mode of measurement that little could be
learned from the dimensions of five hundred tons
commonly given for these vessels; but in a general
way they might be regarded as about one hundred
and fifteen or one hundred and twenty feet long on
the spar-deck and thirty-one feet in extreme breadth.
Unless such vessels were swift sailers, particularly
handy in working to windward, thej were worse than
useless ; and for that reason the utmost effort was
made both by the public and private constructors to
obtain speed. At the close of the war the most
efficient vessel afloat was probably the American
sloop-of-war, or privateer, of four or five hundred
tons, rigged as a ship or brig, and carrying one
hundred and fifty or sixty men, with a battery varying according to the ideas of the captain and owners, but in the case of privateers almost invariably
including one "long Tom," or pivot-gun.
Yet for privateering purposes the smaller craft
competed closely with the larger. For ordinary service no vessel could do more effective work in a more
economical way than was done by Joshua Barney's
" Rossie " of Baltimore, or Boyle's " Comet " of the
same port, or Champlin's "General Armstrong" of
New York, — schooners or brigs of two or three hundred tons, "uxcoitifortable to their officers and crews.
1818. PRIVATEERING. 317
bat most dangerous enemies to merchantmen. Vessels of this class came into favor long before the
war, because of their speed, quickness in handling,
and economy during the experience of twenty years
in blockade-running and evasion of cruisers. Such
schooners could be built in any Northern sea-port
in six weeks or two months at half the cost of a
government cruiser.
The government sloop-of-war was not built for
privateering purposes. Every government vessel was
intended chiefly to fight, and required strength in
every part and solidity throughout. The frame
needed to be heavy to support the heavier structure ;
the quarters needed to be thick to protect the men
at the guns from grape and musketry ; the armament
was as weighty as the frame would bear. So strong
were the sides of American frigates that even thirtytwo-pound shot fired at forty or fifty feet distance
sometimes failed to penetrate, and the British com-
plained as a grievance that the sides of an American forty.four were thicker than those of a British
seventy-four.i The American ship-builders spared no
pains to make all their vessels in every respect — in
size, strength, and speed — superior to the vessels
with which they were to compete; but the government ship-carpenter had a harder task than the private ship-builder, for he was obliged to obtain greater
speed at the same time that he used heavier material
than the British constructors. As far as the navy
^ James, p. 18.
818 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18.
carpenters succeeded in their double object, they did
so by improving the model and increasing the proportions of the spars.
The privateer was built for no such object. The
last purpose of a privateer was to fight at close range,
And owners much preferred that their vessels, being
built to make money, should not fight, at all unless
much money could be made. The private armed vessel was built rather to fly than to fight, and its value
•depended far more on its ability to escape than on
its capacity to attack. If the privateer could sail
-close to the wind, and wear or tack in the twinkling
of an eye; if she could spread an immense amount
•of canvas and run off as fast as a frigate before the
wind ; if she had sweeps to use in a calm, and one
long-range gun pivoted amidships, with plenty of men
in case boarding became necessary, — she was perfect.
To obtain these results the builders and sailors ran
excessive risks. Too lightly built and too heavily
sparred, the privateer was never a comfortable or a
safe vessel. Beautiful beyond anything then known
in naval construction, such vessels roused boundless
admiration, but defied imitators. British construciiors could not build them, even when they had the
models ; British captains could not sail them ; and
when British admirals, fascinated by their beauty and
iempted by the marvellous qualities of their model,
ordered such a prize to be taken into the service, the
first act of the carpenters in the British navy-yards
was to reduce to their own standard the long masts.
1818. PRIVATEERING. 819
and to strengthen the hull and sides till the vessel
should be safe in a battle or a gale. Perhaps an
American navy-carpenter must have done the same ;
but though not a line in the model might be altered,
she never sailed again as she sailed before. She
could not bear conventional restraints.
Americans were proud of their privateers, as they
well might be ; for this was the first time when in
competition with the world, on an element open to
all, they proved their capacity to excel, and produced
a creation as beautiful as it was practical. The British navy took a new tone in regard to these vessels.
Deeply as the American frigates and sloops-of-war
had wounded the pride of the British navy, they
never had reduced that fine service to admitted inferiority. Under one pretext or another, every de*
feat was excused. Even the superiority of American gunnery was met by the proud explanation that
the British navy, since Trafalgar, had enjoyed no
opportunity to use their guns. Nothing could convince a British admiral that Americans were better
fighters than Englishmen ; but when he looked at the
American schooner he frankly said that England could
show no such models, and could not sail them if she
had them. In truth, the schooner was a wonderful
invention. Not her battles, but her escapes won for
her the open-mouthed admiration of the British cap»
tains, who saw their prize double like a hare and slip
through their fingers at the moment when capture
was sure. Under any ordinary condition of wind
820 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18.
and weather, with an open sea, the schooner, if onlj
she could get to windward, laughed at a frigate.
As the sailing rather than the fighting qualities of
the privateer were the chief object of her construction, those were the points best worth recording ;
but the newspapers of the time were so much absorbed in proving that Americans could fight, as to
cause almost total neglect of the more important
question whether Americans could sail better than
their rivals. All great nations had fought, and at
one time or another every great nation in Europe
had been victorious over every other ; but no people,
in the course of a thousand years of rivalry on the
ocean, had invented or had known how to sail a
Yankee schooner. Whether ship, brig, schooner, or
sloop, the American vessel was believed to outsail
any other craft on the ocean, and the proof of this
superiority was incumbent on the Americans to furnish. They neglected to do so. No clear evidence
was ever recorded of the precise capacities of their
favorite vessels. Neither the lines of the hull, the
dimensions of the spars, the rates of sailing by the
log in different weather, ike points of sailing, —
nothing precise was ever set down.
Of the superiority no doubts could be entertained.
The best proof of the American claim was the British admission. Hardly an English writer on marine
affairs — whether in newspapers, histories, or novels —
failed to make some allusion to the beauty and speed
of American vessels. The naval literature of Great
1813.
PRIVATEERING. 821
Britain from 1812 to 1860 was full of such material.
The praise of the invention was still commonly accompanied by some expression of dislike for the inventor, but even in that respect a marked change
followed the experiences of 1812-1814. Among the
Englishmen living on the island of Jamaica, and
familiar with the course of events in the West Indies
from 1806 to 1817, was one Michael Scott, born in
Glasgow in 1789, and in the prime of his youth at
the time of the American war. In the year 1829,
at the age of forty, he began the publication in
** Blackwood's Magazine " of a series of sketches
which rapidly became popular as " Tom Cringle's
Log.'* Scott was the best narrator and probably the
best informed man who wrote on the West Indies at
that period ; and his frequent allusions to the United
States and the war threw more light on the social
side of history than could be obtained from all official
sources ever printed. \
" I don't like Americans," Scott said ; ** I never did
and never shall like them. I have seldom met an American gentleman in the large and complete sense of the
term. I have no wish to eat with them, drink with them,
deal with or consort with them in any way ; but let me
tell the whole truth, — nor fight with them, were it not
for the laurels to be acquired by overcoming an enemy
so brave, determined, and alert, and every way so worthy
of one's steel as they have always proved."
The Americans did not fight the War of 1812 in
order to make themselves loved. According to Scott's
VOL. VII. — 21
822 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18.
testimony they gained the object for which they did
fight. ^^ In gunnery and small-arm practice we were
as thoroughly weathered on by the Americans during
the war as we overtopped them in the bull-dog courage with which our boarders handled those genuine
English weapons, — the cutlass and the pike." Superiority in the intellectual branches of warfare was
conceded to the Americans; but even in regard to
physical qualities, the British were not inclined to
boast.
*^In the field/* said Scott, ^'or grappling m mortal
combat on the blood-slippery quarter-deck of an enemy's
vessel, a British soldier or sailor is the bravest of the
brave. No soldier or sailor of any other country, saving
and excepting those damned Yankees, can stand against
them."
Had English society known so much of Americans
m 1807, war would have been unnecessary.
Yet neither equality in physical courage nor superiority in the higher branches of gunnery and smallarms was the chief success of Americans in the war.
Beyond question the schooner was the most conclusive triumph. Readers of Michael Scott could not
forget the best of his sketches, — the escape of the
little American schooner " Wave " from two British
cruisers, by running to windward under the broadside
of a man-of-war. With keen appreciation Scott detailed every motion of the vessels, and dwelt with
peculiar emphasis on the apparent desperation of the
.attempt. Again and again the thirty-two-pound shot,
M18. PRIVATEERING. 828
as he described the scene, tore through the slight
vessel as the two crafts raced through the heavy seas
within musket-shot of one another, until at last the
firing from the corvette ceased. " The breeze had
taken off, and the ^ Wave,' resuming her superiority
in light winds, had escaped." Yet this was not the
most significant part of "Tom Cringle's" experience.
The " Wave," being afterward captured at anchor,
was taken into the royal service and fitted as a shipof-war. Cringle was ordered by the vice-^tdmiral to
command her, and. as she came to report he took a
look at her: —
'^ When I had last seen her she was a most beautiful
little craft, both in hull and rigging, as ever delighted
the eye of a sailor ; but the dock-yard riggers and carpenters had fairly bedevilled her, at least so far as appearances went. First they had replaced the light rail
on her gunwale by heavy solid bulwarks four feet high,
surmounted by hammock nettings at least another foot ;
so that the symmetrical little vessel that formerly floated
on the foam light as a sea-gull now looked like a clumsy,
dish-^shaped Dutch dogger. Her long, slender wands of
masts which used to swing about as if there were neither
shrouds nor stays to support them were now as taut and
stiff as church-steeples, with four heavy shrouds of a
side, and stays and back-stays, and the Devil knows
what all."
" If them heave-'emtaughts at the yard have not
taken the speed out of the little beauty I am a
Dutchman" was the natural comment, — as obvious
as it was sound.
824 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18.
The reports of privateer captains to their owners
were rarely published, and the logs were never
printed or deposited in any public office. Occasionally, in the case of a battle or the loss of guns or
spars or cargo in a close pursuit, the privateer captain described the causes of his loss in a letter
which found its way into print; and from such letters some idea could be drawn of the qualities held
in highest regard, both in their vessels and in themselves. The first and commonest remark was that
privateers of any merit never seemed to feel anxious
for their own safety so long as they could get to
windward a couple of gunshots from their enemy.
They would risk a broadside in the process without
very great anxiety. They chiefly feared lest they
might be obliged to run before the wind in heavy
weather. The little craft which could turn on itself
like a flash and dart away under a frigate's guns
into the wind's eye long before the heavy ship could
come about, had little to fear on that point of sailing; but when she was obliged to run to leeward,
the chances were more nearly equal. Sometimes,
especially in light breezes or in a stronger wind, by
throwing guns and weighty articles overboard privateers could escape ; but in heavy weather the ship-ofwar could commonly outcarry them, and more often
could drive them on a coast or into the clutches of
some other man-of-war.
Of being forced to fly to leeward almost every priva*
teer could tell interesting stories. A fair example of
1818. PRIVATEERING. 825
such tales was an adventure of Captain George Coggeshally who afterward compiled, chiefly from newspapers, an account of the privateers, among which he
preserved a few stories that would otherwise have
been lost.^ Coggeshall commanded a two-hundredton schooner, the " David Porter," in which he made
the run to France with a cargo and a letter-of-marque.
The schooner was at Bordeaux in March, 1814, when
Wellington's army approached. Afraid of seizure by
the British if he remained at Bordeaux, Coggeshall
sailed from Bordeaux for La Rochelle with a light
wind from the eastward, when at daylight March 15,
1814, he found a large ship about two miles to windward. Coggeshall tried to draw his enemy down to
leeward, but only lost ground imtil the ship was not
more than two gunshots away. The schooner could
then not run to windward without taking the enemy's
fire within pistol-shot, and dared not return to Bordeaux. Nothing remained but to run before the wind.
Coggeshall got out his square-sail and studding-sails
ready to set, and when everything was prepared he
changed his course and bore off suddenly, gaining a
mile in the six or eight minutes lost by the ship in
spreading her studding-sails. He then started his
water-casks, threw out ballast, and drew away from
his pursuer, till in a few hours the ship became a
speck on the horizon.
Apparently a similar but narrower escape was made
by Captain Champlin of the " Warrior," a famous
^ Coggeshall's Histoiy of American Privateers^ p. 188.
826 raSTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Cb.U.
privateer-brig of four hundred and thiri;y tons, mount*
ing twenty-one guns and carrying one hundred and
fifty men.^ Standing for the harbor of Fayal, Dec.
15, 1814, he wa« seen by a British man-of-war lying
there at anchor. The enemy slipped her cables and
made sail in chase. The weather was very fresh and
squally, and at eight o'clock in the evening the ship
was only three miles distant. After a run of about
sixty miles, the man-of-war came within grape-shot
distance and opened fire from her two bow-guns.
Ghamplin luflfed a little, got his long pivot-gun to
bear, and ran out his starboard guns as though to
fight, which caused the ship to shorten sail for battle. Then Champlin at two o'clock in the morning
threw overboard eleven guns, and escaped. The
British ship was in sight the next morning, but did
not pursue farther.
Often the privateers were obliged to throw everything overboard at the risk of capsizing, or escaped
capture only by means of their sweeps. In 1813
Ghamplin commanded the " General Armstrong," a
brig of two hundred and forty-six tons and one hundred and forty men. Off Surinam, March 11, 181S,
he fell in with the British sloop-of-war " Goquette,"
which he mistook for a letter-of-marque, and approached with the intention of boarding. Having
come within pistol-shot and fired his broadsides, he
discovered his error. The wind was light, the twa
vessels had no headway, and for three quarters of an.
^ Extract of letter from Captain Champlin ; NileB, yiii. 110.
1813. PRIVATEERING. 827
hour, if Chainplin*8 account could be believed, he lay
within pistol-shot of the man-of-war. He was struck
by a musket-ball in the left shoulder; six of his
crew were killed and fourteen wounded ; his rigging
was cut to pieces ; his foremast and bowsprit injured,
and several shots entered the brig between wind
and water, causing her to leak ; but at last he succeeded in making sail forward, and with the aid of
his sweeps crept out of range. The sloop-of-war was
unable to cripple or follow him.^
Sometimes the very perfection of the privateer led
to dangers as great as though perfection were a
fault. Captain Shaler of the " Governor Tompkins,"
a schooner, companion to the " General Armstrong,"
chased three sail Dec. 25, 1812, and on near approach
found them to be two ships and a brig. The larger
ship had the appearance of a government transport ;
she had boarding-nettings almost up to her tops, but
her ports appeared to be painted, and she seemed prepared for running away as she fought. Shaler drew
nearer, and came to the conclusion that the ship was
too heavy for him; but while his first officer went
forward with the glass to take another look, a sudden squall struck the schooner without reaching the
ship, and in a moment, before the light sails could be
taken in, ^^ and almost before I could turn roimd, I
was under the guns, not of a transport, but of a large
frigate, and not more than a quarter of a mile from
her." With impudence that warranted punishment,
^ Extract from log, March 11, 1813 ; Niles, iv. 133.
828 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18.
Shaler fired his little broadside of nine or twelve
pounders into the enemy, who replied with a broadside of twenty-four-pounders, killing three men, wounding five, and causing an explosion on deck that threw
confusion into the crew ; but the broadside did no
serious injury to the rigging. The schooner was then
just abaft the ship's beam, a quarter of a mile away,
holding the same course and to windward. She could
not tack without exposing her stem to a raking fire,
and any failure to come about would have been certain destruction. Shaler stood on, taking the ship's
fire, on the chance of outsailing his enemy before a
shot could disable the schooner. Side by side the
two vessels raced for half an hour, while twenty-fourpound shot fell in foam about the schooner, but never
struck her, and at last she drew ahead beyond range.
Even then her dangers were not at an end. A calm
followed ; the ship put out boats ; and only by throwing deck-lumber and shot overboard, and putting all
hands at the sweeps, did Shaler " get clear of one
of the most quarrelsome companions that I ever met
with." 1
The capacities of the American privateer could to
some extent be inferred from its mishaps. Notwithstanding speed, skill, and caution, the privateer was
frequently and perhaps usually captured in the end.
The modes of capture were numerous. April 8, 1818,
Admiral Warren's squadron in the Chesapeake captured by boats, after a sharp action, the privateer
> Shaler's Eeport of Jan. 1, 1813 ; Niles, v. 429.
1818. PRIVATEERING. 829
" Dolphin " of Baltiinore, which had taken refuge in
the Rappahannock River. April 27 the "Tom" of
Baltimore, a schooner of neariy three hundred tons,
carrying fourteen guns, was captured by his Majesty's ships " Surveillante " and " Lyra " after a smart
chase. Captain Collier of the " Surveillante " reported : " She is a remarkably fine vessel of her
class, and from her superior sailing has already escaped from eighteen of his Majesty's cruisers." May
11, the " Holkar " of New York was driven ashore
off Rhode Island and destroyed by the " Orpheus "
frigate. May 19, Captain Gordon of the British
man-of-war " Ratler," in company with the schooner
" Bream," drove ashore and captured the " Alexander " of Salem, off Kennebunk, " considered the fastest
sailing privateer out of the United States," according
to Captain Gordon's report.^ May 21, Captain Hyde
Parker of the frigate " Tenedos," in company with
the brig " Curlew," captured the " Enterprise " of
Salem, pierced for eighteen guns. May 28, the " Paul
Jones," of sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty
men, fell in with a frigate in a thick fog off the coast
of Ireland, and being crippled by her fire surrendered. July 13, Admiral Cockburn captured by boats
at Ocracoke Inlet the fine privateer-brig "Anaconda"
of New York, with a smaller letter-of-marque. July
17, at sea, three British men-of-war, after a chase
of four hours, captured the "Yorktown" of twenty
guns and one hundred and forty men. The schooner
a London Gazette for 1813, p. 1674.
830 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.J«.
" Orders in Council " of New York, carrying sixteen
guns and one hundred and twenty men, was captured
during the summer, after a long chase of five dajs,
by three British cutters that drove her under the guns
of a frigate. The " Matilda," privateer of eleven
guns and one hundred and four men, was captured
off San Salvador by attempting to board the British
letter-of-marque " Lyon " under the impression that
she was the weaker ship.
In these ten instances of large privateers captured
or destroyed in 1813, the mode of capture happened
to be recorded ; and in none of them was the privateer declared to have been outsailed and caught by
any single British vessel on the open seas. Modes of
disaster were many, and doubtless among the rest a
privateer might occasionally be fairly beaten in speed,
but few such cases were recorded, although British naval officers were quick to mention these unusual victories. Unless the weather gave to the heavier British
vessel-of-war the advantage of carrying more sail in
a rough sea, the privateer was rarely outsailed.
The number of privateers at sea in 1813 was not
recorded^ The list of all private armed vessels during the entire war included somewhat more than five
hundred names.^ Most of these were small craft,
withdrawn after a single cruise. Not two hundred
were so large as to carry crews of fifty men. Nearly two hundred and fifty, or nearly half the whole
number of privateers, fell into British hands. Prob^ Emmons's Navy of the United States, pp. 170-197.
1S18, PRIVATEERING. 881
ably at no single moment were more than fifty seagoing vessels on the ocean as privateers, and the
number was usually very much less ; while the large
privateer-brigs or ships that rivalled sloops-of-war
in size were hardly more numerous than the sloops
themselves.
The total number of prizes captured from the British in 1818 exceeded four hundred, four fifths of
which were probably captured by privateers, national
cruisers taking only seventy-nine. If the privateers
succeeded in taking three hundred and fifty prizes,
the whole number of privateers could scarcely have
exceeded one hundred. The government cruisers
" President," " Congress," *' Chesapeake," " Hornet,"
and "Argus" averaged nearly ten prizes apiece. Privateers averaged much less ; but they were ten times
as numerous as the government cruisers, and inflicted
four times as much injury.
Such an addition to the naval force of the United
States was very important. Doubtless the privateers
contributed more than the regular navy to bring
about a disposition for peace in the British classes
most responsible for the war. The colonial and
shipping interests, whose influence produced the Orders in Council, suffered the chief penalty. The West
India colonies were kept in constant discomfort and
starvation by swarms of semi-piratical craft darting
in and out of every channel among their islands;
but the people of England could have borne with
patience the punishment of the West Indies had not
882 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa <^ia.
the American cruisers inflicted equally severe retribution nearer home.
Great Britain was blockaded. No one could deny
that manifest danger existed to any merchant-vessel
that entered or left British waters. During the
summer the blockade was continuous. Toward the
close of 1812 an American named Preble, living in
Paris, bought a small vessel, said to have belonged
in turn to the British and French navy, which he
fitted as a privateer-brig, carrying sixteen guns and
one hundred and sixty men. The " True-Blooded
Yankee," commanded by Captain Hailey, sailed from
Brest March 1, 1818, and cruised thirty-seven days
on the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, capturingtwenty-seven valuable vessels ; sinking coasters in
the very bay of Dublin ; landing and taking possession of an island off the coast of Ireland, and of a
town in Scotland, where she burned seven vessels
in the harbor. She returned safely to Brest, and
soon made another cruise. At the same time the
schooner " Fox " of Portsmouth burned or sunk vessel after vessel in the Irish Sea, as they plied between
Liverpool and Cork. In May, the schooner " Paul
Jones " of New York^ carrying sixteen guns and one
hundred and twenty men, took or destroyed a dozen
vessels off the Irish coast, until she was herself
caught in a fog by the frigate " Leonidas," and captured May 23 after a chase in which five of her crew
were wounded.
While these vessels were thus engaged, the brig
1818. PRIVATEERING. 838
** Rattlesnake " of Philadelphia, carrying sixteen guns
and one hundred and twenty men, and the brig
" Scourge " of New York, carrying nine guns and one
hundred and ten men, crossed the ocean and cruised
all the year in the northern seas off the coasts of
Scotland and Norway, capturing some forty British
vessels, and costing the British merchants and shipowners losses to the amount of at least two million
dollars. In July the " Scourge " fell in with Commodore Rodgers in the " President," and the two vessels remained several days in company off the North
Cape, while the British admiralty sent three or four
squadrons in search of them without success. July
19, after Rodgers had been nearly a month in British
waters, one of these squadrons drove him away, and
he then made a circuit round Ireland before he turned
homeward. At the same time, from July 14 to August 14, the " Argus " was destroying vessels in the
British Channel at the rate of nearly one a day. After
the capture of the " Argus," August 14, the " Grand
Turk " of Salem, a brig carrymg sixteen guns and
one hundred and five men, cruised for twenty days
in the mouth of the British Channel without being
disturbed. Besides these vessels, others dashed into
British waters from time to time as they sailed forward and back across the ocean in the track of
British commerce.
No one disputed that the privateers were a very
important branch of the American navy; but they
suffered under serious drawbacks, which left doubt-
884 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. C11.U.
fill the balance of merits and defects. Perhaps their
chief advantage compared with government vessels
was their lightness, — a quality which no government
would have carried to the same extent. The longrange pivot-gun was another invention of the privateer, peculiarly successful and easily adapted for
government vessels. In other respects, the same
number or even half the number of sloops-of-war
would have probably inflicted greater injury at less
cost. The "Argus" showed how this result could
have been attained. The privateer's first object was
to save prizes ; and in the effort to send captured
vessels into port the privateer lost a large proportion
by recapture. Down to the moment when Admiral
Warren established his blockade of the American
coast from New York southward, most of the prizes
got to port. After that time the New England ports
alone offered reasonable chance of safety, and privateering received a check.^ During the war about
twenty-five hundred vessels all told were captured
from the British. Many were destroyed ; many released as cartels ; and of the remainder not less
than seven hundred and fifty, probably one half the
number sent to port, were recaptured by the British
navy. Most of these were the prizes of privateers,
and would have been destroyed had they been taken
by government vessels. They were usually the most
valuable prizes, so that the injury that might have
^ Memorid of Baltimore merchants, Feb. 19, 1814; State
Papers, Naval Affairs, p. 300.
1818. PRIVATEERING. 886
been inflicted on British commerce was diminished
nearly one half by the system which encouraged
private war as a money-making speculation.
Another objection was equally serious. Like all
gambling ventures, privateering waa not profitable.
In the list of five hundred privateers furnished by the
Navy Department,^ three hundred were recorded as .
having never made a prize. Of the remainder, few
made their expenses. One of the most successful
cruises of the war was that of Joshua Barney on the
Baltimore schooner " Rossie " at the outbreak of hostilities, when every prize reached port. Barney sent
in prizes supposed to be worth fifteen hundred thousand dollars; but after paying charges and duties
and selling the goods, he found that the profits were
not sufficient to counterbalance the discomforts, and
he refused to repeat the experiment. His experience
was common. As early as November, 1812, the owners of twenty-four New York privateers sent to Congress a memorial declaring that the profits of private
naval war were by no means equal to the hazards,
and that the spirit of privateering stood in danger
of extinction unless the government would consent
in some manner to grant a bounty for the capture
or destruction of the enemy's property.
If private enterprise was to fail at the critical
moment, and if the government must supply the deficiency, the government would have done better to
undertake the whole task. In effect, the government
1 Emmons's Navy of the XJoited States.
886 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. C^ll.
in the end did so. The merchants asked chiefly for a
reduction of duties on prize-goods. Grallatin pointed
out the serious objections to such legislation, and the
little probability that the measure would increase the
profits of privateering or the number of privateers.
The actual privateers, he said, were more than enough
for the food offered by the enemy's trade, and privateering, like every other form of gambling, would
always continue to attract more adventurers than it
could support.^
Congress for the time followed Oallatin's advice,
and did nothing ; but in the summer session of 1813,
after Gallatin's departure for Europe, the privateer
owners renewed their appeal, and the acting Secretary
of the Treasury, Jones, wrote to the chairman of the
Naval Committee July 21, 1818,*—
^* The fact is that . • • privateering is nearly at an
end ; and from the best observation I have been enabled
to make, it is more from the deficiency of remuneration
in the net proceeds of their prizes than from the vigilance
and success of the enemy in recapturing."
In deference to Jones's opinion. Congress passed an
Act, approved Aug. 2, 1818, reducing one third the
duties on prize-goods. Another Act, approved August 8, granted a bounty of twenty-five dollars for
every prisoner captured and delivered to a United
States agent by a private armed vessel. A third Act,
^ Gallatin to Langdon Cheves, Dec. 8, 1812 ; AnnalB, 1818^
1813, p. 434.
• Annals, 1813-1814, L 473.
1813.
PRIVATEERING. 887
approved August 2, authorized the Secretary of the
Navy to place on the pension list any privateersman
who should be Wounded or disabled in the line of
his duty.
These complaints and palliations tended to show
that the privateer cost the public more than the equivalent government vessel would have cost. If instead
of five hundred privateers of all sizes and eflSciency,
the government had kept twenty sloops-of-war constantly at sea destroying the eiiemy's commerce, the
result would have been about the same as far as concerned injury to the enemy, while in another respect
the government would have escaped one of its chief
difficulties. Nothing injured the navy so much as
privateering. Seamen commonly preferred the harder
but more profitable and shorter cruise in a privateer,
where fighting was not expected or wished, to the
strict discipline and murderous battles of government
ships, where wages were low and prize-money scarce.
Of all towns in the United States, Marblehead was
probably the most devoted to the sea; but of nine
hundred men from Marblehead who took part in the
war, fifty-seven served as soldiers, one hundred and
twenty entered the navy, while seven hundred and
twenty-six went as privateersmen.^ Only after much
delay and difficulty could the frigates obtain crews.
The " Constitution " was nearly lost by this cause at
the beginning of the war ; and the loss of the " Chesapeake " was supposed to be chiefly due to the deter^ Roads's Marblehead, p. 255.
YOL. YII.«-22
888 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cm.13.
mination of the old crew to quit the government
service for that of the privateers.
Such drawbacks nused reasonable doubts as to the
balance of advantages and disadvantages offered by
the privateer system. Perhaps more careful inquiry
might show that, valuable as the privateers were, the
government would have done better to retain all military and naval functions in its own hands, and to
cover the seas with small cruisers c^Mtble of pursuing
a system of thorough destruction against the shipping
and colonial interests of England.
CHAPTER XIV.
Oallatin and Bayard, having sailed from the Delaware May 9, arrived at St. Petersburg July 21, only
to find that daring the six months since the C^ar
offered to mediate, Russia had advanced rapidly in
every direction except that of the proposed mediation. Napoleon after bemg driven from Russia in
December, 1812, passed the winter in Paris organizing a new army of three hundred thousand men on
the Elbe, between Dresden and Magdeburg, while a
second army of more than one hundred thousand
was to hold Hamburg and Bremen. Russia could
not prevent Napoleon from reconstructing a force almost as powerful as that with which he had marched
to Moscow, for the Russian army had suffered very
severely and was unfit for active service ; but the
Czar succeeded in revolutionizing Prussia, and in
forcing the French to retire from the Vistula to the
Elbe, while he gained a reinforcement of more than
one hundred thousand men from the fresh and vigorous Prussian army. Even with that assistance the
Czar could not cope with Napoleon, who, leaving
Paris April 17, during the month of May fought furi*
840 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.14.
ens battles at Liitzen and Bautzen, which forced the
allied Russian and Prussian armies back from the
Elbe to the Oder.
At that point Austria interfered so energetically as
to oblige Napoleon to accept an armistice for the purpose of collecting new forces. During the armistice
the Czar stationed himself at Gitschin in Bohemia,
nine hundred miles from St. Petersburg, and about the
same distance from London by the path that couriers
were obliged to take. When Gallatin and Bayard
reached St. Petersl^urg, July 21, the armistice, which
had been prolonged until August 10, was about to
expire, and the Czar could not be ^xious to decide
subordinate questions until the issue of the coming
campaign should be known.
Meanwhile the government of England had in
May, with many friendly expressions, declined the
Russian mediation.^ Castlereagh probably hoped that
this quiet notification to Lieven, the Russian envoy
in London, would end the matter ; but toward the
month of July news reached London that the American commissioners, GaUatin and Bayard, had arrived
at Gothenburg on their way to Russia, and Castlereagh then saw that he must be more explicit in his
refusal. Accordingly he took measures for making
the matter clear not only to the Russian government
but also to the American commissioners.
With the Russian government he was obliged by
the nature of their common relations to communi1 Diary of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813, ii. 479.
1813. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 841
cate oflScially, and he wrote instructions to Lord
Cathcart, dated July 5, directing communication to
be made.
" I am afraid," said Castlereagh's letter,^ " this tender
of mediation which on a question of maritime right cannot be listened to by Great Britain, however kindly and
liberally intended, will have had the unfortunate effect of
protracting the war with the United States. It is to be
lamented that the formal offer was made to America before
the disposition of the British government was previously
sounded as to its acceptance of a mediation. It has enabled the President to hold out to the people of America
a vague expectation of peace, under which he may reconcile them with less repugnance to submit to the measures
of the Government. This evil, however; cannot now
be avoided, and it only remains to prevent this question from producing any embarrassment between Great
Britain and Russia."
Embarrassment between Great Britain and Russia
was no new thing in European politics, and com-
monly involved maritime objects for which the United States were then fighting. Castlereagh had much
reason for wishing to avoid the danger. The most
fortunate result he could reasonably expect from
the coming campaign was a defeat of Bonaparte that
should drive him back to the Rhine. Then Russia
and Austria would probably offer terms to Napoleon ;
England would be obliged to join in a European Congress ; Napoleon would raise the question of mari1 Castlereagh to Cathcart. - 5, 1813 ; MSS. British
Archives.
842 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.14.
time rights, and on that point he would be supported
by Russian sympathies. Napoleon and Russia might
insist that the United States should take part in the
Congress, and in that case England might be obliged
to retire from it. Castlereagh felt uneasy at the
prospect, and ordered Gathcart to " press the Emperor of Russia in the strongest manner not to
push his personal interference on this point further." Cathcart was to use his utmost endeavors
to persuade the Czar " pointedly to discountenance
a design so mischievously calculated to promote the
views of France."
Another week of reflection only increased Castlereagh's anxieties, and caused the British government
to take a step intended to leave the Czar no opening
for interference. July 18 Castlereagh wrote Cathcart new instructions,^ directing him to present a
formal note acquainting the Czar that the Prince
Regent was " ready immediately to name plenipotentiaries to meet and treat with the American
plenipotentiaries in the earnest desire " of peace,
either in London or at Gothenburg; although he
could '^ not consent that these discussions should be
carried on in any place which might be supposed
to imply that they were in any way connected with
any other negotiations." He wrote privately to
Cathcart that the mere knowledge of the intervention of a third power in any arrangement with the
1 Castlereagli to Cathcart, July 13, 1813 ; MSS. British
Archives.
1813. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 843
United States would probably decide the British
people against it.^
Thus in July, 1813, when the war was barely a
year old, Castlereagh reached the point of offering
to negotiate directly with the United States. This
advantage was gained by the Russian offer of mediation, and was intended not to pacify America but to
silence Alexander and Roumanzoff. Castlereagh was
frank and prompt in his declarations. His offer of
direct negotiation was dated July 13, at a time when
Alexander Baring received a letter from Gallatin annoimcing his arrival at Gothenburg and inviting assistance for the proposed mediation. Baring consulted
Castlereagh, and wrote, July 22, a long letter to Gallatin, to inform the American commissioners what the
British government had done and was willing to do.
^'Before this reaches you," said Baring,* **you will
have been informed that this mediation has been
refused, with expressions of our desire to treat
separately and directly here; or, if more agreeable
to you, at Gothenburg." To leave no room for misimderstanding, Baring added that if the American
commissioners were obliged by their instructions to
adhere pertinaciously to the American demands in
respect to impressments, he should think negotiation
useless.
^ CasdeTeagli to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh Papers,
Third Series, L 35.
s Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Gallatin's Writings^
i. 546.
844 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.34.
In regular succession all these expressions of British
policy were received at St. Petersburg in the Czar's
absence, and in the doubtful state of mind which followed the battles of Liitzen and Bautzen. Alexander
had left Count Roumanzoff at St. Petersburg, continuing to act as Chancellor of the Empire and Foreign Secretary ; but in truth the Minister of Foreign Aifairs,
as far as the Czar then required such an officer, was
Count Nesselrode, who attended Alexander in person
and received his orders orally. Nesselrode at that
tune was rather an agent than an adviser; but in
general he represented the English alliance and hostility to Napoleon, while Roumanzoff represented the
French alliance and hostility to England.
Of English diplomacy Americans knew something,
and could by similarity of mind divine what was
not avowed. Of French diplomacy they had long
experience, and their study was rendered from time
to time more easy by Napoleon's abrupt methods. Of
Russian diplomacy they knew little or nothing. Thus
far Minister Adams had been given his own way.
He had been allowed to seem to kindle the greatest
war of modern times, and had been invited to make
use of Russia against England ; but the Czar's reasons for granting such favor were mysterious even to
Adams, for while Napoleon occasionally avowed mo-
tives, Alexander never did. Russian diplomacy moved
wholly in the dark.
Only one point was certain. For reasons of his
own, the Czar chose to leave Roumanzoff nominallj
1818. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 845
in oflSce until the result of the war should be decided,
although Roumanzoff was opposed to the Czar's policy. The chancellor did not stand alone in his hostility to the war ; probably a majority of the Russian
people shared the feeling. Even the army and its
old General Koutousoff, though elated with an immense triumph, grumbled at being obliged to fight
the battles of Germany, and would gladly have returned to their own soil. The Czar himself could not
afford to break his last tie with the French interest, but was wise to leave a path open by which he
could still retreat in case his war in Germany failed.
If Napoleon should succeed once more in throwing
the Russian army back upon Russian soil, Alexander
might still be obliged to use Roumanzoff^s services
if not to resume his policy. Such a suspicion might,
not wholly explain Alexander's course toward Roumanzoff and Koutousoff, but no one could doubt that
it explained the chancellor's course toward the Czar.
Indeed, Roumanzoff made little concealment of his
situation or his hopes. Adams could without much
diflSculty divine that the failure of the Czar in Germany would alone save Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg,
and that the restoration of Roumanzoff to power was
necessary to reinvigorate the mediation.
Castlereagh's first positive refusal to accept the
mediation was notified to Count Lieven in May, and
was known to Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg about the
middle of June. Early in July the Czar received it,
and by his order Nesselrode, in a despatch to Lieven
846 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cb.1L
dated July 9, expressed ^^the perfect satisfaction
which his Imperial Majesty felt in the reasons which
actuated the conduct of this [British] government on
a point of so much delicacy and importance." ^ The
Czar was then in the midst of difficulties. The result
of the war was doubtful, and depended on Austria.
Just as news of the armistice arrived in St. Petersburg, Minister Adams went to RoumanzofF, June
22, to inform him of Gallatin's and Bayard's appointment. Roumanzoff in return gave Adams ex«
plicit information of England's refusal to accept the
Czar's offer. Adams immediately recorded it in his
Diary:* —
<^ He [Rouman;zoff] said that he was very sorry to say
he had received since he had seen me [June 15] further
despatches from Count Lieven, stating that the British
government, with many very friendly and polite assurances that there was no mediation which they should so
readily and cheerfully accept as that of the Emperor of
Russia, had however stated that their differences with the
United States of America involving certam principles of
the internal government of England were of a nature
which they did not think suitable to be settled by a
mediation."
Adams expected this answer, and at once assumed it to be final; but Roumanzoff checked him.
"It would now be for consideration," he continued,
" whether, after the step thus taken by the American
^ Castleieagh to Cathcart, Sept. 1, 1813 ; MSS. Britiah
Archives.
* Diaiy of J. Q. Adams, June 22, 1813^ ii. 479.
1818. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 847
government [in sending commissioners to St. Petersburg], it would not be advisable to renew the proposition to Great Britain ; upon which he should write
to the Emperor." Not because of any American request, but wholly of his own motion, Roumanzoff proposed to keep the mediation alive. His motives were
for Adams to fathom. The chancellor did not avow
them, but he hinted to Adams that the chances of
war were many. "Perhaps it might be proper not
to be discouraged by the ill success of his first advances. After considerations might produce more
pacific dispositions in the British government. Unexpected things were happening every day; *and in
our own affairs,' said the count, ' a very general report prevails that an armistice has taken place.' " A
Congress had been proposed, and the United States
were expressly named among the Powers to be invited
to it.
Adams reported this conversation to his Government in a despatch dated June 26,^ and waited for his
two new colleagues, who arrived July 21. Personally
the colleagues were agreeable to Adams, and the proposed negotiation was still more so, for the President sent him official notice that in case the negotiations were successful, Adams's services would be
required as minister in London ; but with the strongest inducements to press the mediation, Adams could
not but see that he and his colleagues depended on
^ Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813 ; MSS. State Department
Archives.
848 mSTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14.
Bomnanzoff, and that Boumanzoff depended not on
Alexander, but on Napoleon. Bomnanzoff's only
chance of aiding them was by clinging to office until
the Czar should be weary of war.
Unwilling as Gallatin was to be thus made the
sport of imperial policy, he was obliged, like his colleagues, to submit. Two days after their arrival,
Boumanzoff told them that he meant, if possible, to
begin the whole transaction anew.
^^ The count said he regretted much that there was
such reason to believe the British would decline the
mediation ; but on transmitting the copy of the credential letter to the Emperor, he would determine whether to
renew the proposal, as the opposition in England might
make it an embarrassing charge against the Ministry if
they should under such circumstances reject it." ^
Boumanzoff had written soon after June 22 to ask
the Czar whether, on the arrival of the American
commissioners, the offer of mediation should be renewed. The Czar, overwhelmed with business, wrote
back, about July 20, approving Boumanzoff's suggestion, and authorizing him to send a despatch directly
to Count Lieven in London renewing the offer. The
Czar's letter was communicated to Adams August 10*
by Boumanzoff, who was evidently much pleased and
perhaps somewhat excited by it.
Such a letter warranted some excitement, for Boumanzoff could regard it only as a sign of hesitation
» Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 489.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 601. ..
181d. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 849
and anxiety. Alexander was in a degree pledged to
England to press the mediation no further. While
he assured England through Nesselrode, July 9, that
he was perfectly satisfied with the British reasons
for refusing his o£Fer of mediation ^^ on a point of so
much delicacy and importance," he authorized Boumanzo£F only ten days afterward to annoy England a
second time with an o£Fer which he had every reason
to know must be rejected; and he did this without
informing Nesselrode.
Gallatin and Bayard found themselves, August 10,
condemned to wait two or three months for the British answer, which they knew must be unfavorable,
because Gallatin received August 17 Baring's letter
announcing the determination of Castlereagh to negotiate separately. Roumanzoffs conduct became
more and more mysterious to the commissioners.
He did not notify them of Castlereagh's official offer
to negotiate directly. He confounded Adams, August
19, by flatly denying his own information, given two
months before, that England rejected mediation in
principle because it involved doctrines of her internal government. Boumanzoff insisted that England
had never refused to accept the mediation, although
he held in his hands at least two despatches from
Lieven, written as late as July 13, officially communicating England's determination to negotiate directly
or not at all. Castlereagh, foreseeing the possibility
of misunderstanding, had read to Lieyen the instructions of July 13 for communication to Boumanzoff,
850 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.14.
besides authorizing Cathcart to show them in extenso
to the Czar.^ In denying that such instructions had
been given, Boumanzoff could not have expected the
American commissioners to believe him.
The motive of RoumanzofPs persistence might be
open to the simple explanation that the chancellor
hoped to recover power, and within a few months to
re-establish his policy of antagonism to England.
Alexander's conduct could be explained by no such
obvious interest. When Castlereagh's letters of July
13 and 14 reached Cathcart at the Czar's headquarters in Bohemia about August 10, they arrived at the
most critical moment of the war. On that day the
armistice expired. The next day Austria declared
war on Napoleon. The combined armies of Russia,
Prussia, and Austria concentrated behind the mountains, and then marched into Saxony. While starting
on that campaign, August 20, the Czar was told by
Lord Cathcart the reasons why his offer of mediation was rejected, and answered at once that in this
case he could do nothing more.^ Cathcart wrote to
Nesselrode a formal note on the subject August 23 or
24, but did not at once communicate it,^ because the
campaign had then begun ; the great battle of Dresden was fought August 26 and 27, and the allies,
again beaten, retired into Bohemia August 28. The
^ Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813 ; Castlereagh's Papera,
Third Series, i. 35.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 23, 1813, ii. 639, 642.
• Diaiy of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 693.
1818. RUSSIA AOT) ENGLAND. 851
Czar saw his best military adviser Moreau killed by
his side at Dresden, and he returned to Toplitz in
no happy frame of mind.
At Toplitz, September 1, Cathcart delivered to Nesselrode his formal note,^ refusing Russian mediation
and communicating the offer of England to negotiate
directly. In an ordinary condition of government
Nesselrode should have taken care that the British
note should be made known without delay to the
American commissioners at St. Petersburg, but the
Czar kept in his own hands the correspondence with
Roumanzoff and the Americans, and neither he nor
Nesselrode communicated Cathcart's act to Roumanzoff.^ Possibly their silence was due to the new
military movements. August 29 the French marshal
Vandamme with forty thousand men, pursuing the
allies into Bohemia, was caught between the Prussians
and Austrians August 30 and crushed. During the
month of September severe fighting, favorable to the
allies, occurred, but no general advance was made by
the allied sovereigns.
Alexander next received at Toplitz toward September 20 a letter from Roumanzoff enclosing a renewal
of the offer of mediation, to be proposed in a despatch
to Lieven, read by Roiunanzoff to the American commissioners August 24, and sent to London August 28.
The Czar must have known the futility of this new
step, as well as the mistake into which Roumanzoff
^ Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. 1, 1813 ; State Papers, iii 622.
< Diaiy of J. Q. Adams, April 2^ 1814, ii. 699.
852 mSTOBY OF THE UNIT£D STATES. CSb. li.
had been led, and the awkward attitude of the American commissioners. Only a fortnight before, he had
received Gathcart's official note, and a few days earlier
he had assured Cathcart that he should do no more
in the matter. Yet, September 20, Alexander wrote
with his own hand a note of four lines to Boumanzoff,
approving his despatch to Lieven, and begging him to
follow up the afifair as he had begun it.^
The Czar's letter of September 20 completed the
embroglio, which remained unintelligible to every one
except himself. Cathcart was the most mystified of
all the victims to the Czar's double attitude. At the
time when Alexander thus for the second time authorized Roumanzoff to disregard the express entrear
ties of the British government, Cathcart was making
an effort to explain to Castlereagh the Czar's first
interference. If Castlereagh understood his minister's ideas, he was gifted with more than common
penetration.
^^ I believe the not communicating the rescript of the
Emperor concerning the American plenipotentiaries to
have been the effect of accident," wrote Cathcart' from
Toplitz September 25 ; " but what is singular is that
notwithstanding his [Nesselrode's] letter of the ninth
[July] , by the Emperor's command, to Count Lieven, this
communication from and instruction to Roumanzoff was
not known to Count Nesselrode till this day, when I
mentioned it to him, having received no caution to do
1 Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 10, 1813, ii. 531.
> Cathcart to Castlereagh, Sept. 25, 1813 ; MSS. Biitiah
Archives.
1813. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 858
otherwise, and he was not at all pleased with it. It
was during the advance to Dresden. But I cannot help
thinking that there must have been some policy of Roumanzoff's stated in regard to keeping hold of the mediation, which, whether it was detailed or not, would not
escape the Emperor's penetration, and upon which he
may have been induced to act as far as sanctioning the
proposal of treating at London under Russia's mediation,
which the Prince Regent's government might accept or
reject as they pleased; and that not wishing to go at
that time into a discussion of maritime rights with either
Nesselrode or me, he afterward forgot it.''
Cathcart's style was involved, but his perplexity
was evident. His remarks related only to the Czar's
first letter to Roumanzoff, written about July 20, not
" during the advance to Dresden." He knew nothing of the Czar's second letter to Roumanzoff, dated
September 20, renewing the same authority, only five
days before Cathcart's labored attempt to explain the
first. Of the second letter, as of the first, neither
Nesselrode nor Cathcart was informed.
The Czar's motive in thus ordering each of his two
ministers to act in ignorance and contradiction of
the other's instructions perplexed Roumanzoff as it
did Cathcart. Lieven first revealed to Roumanzoff
the strange misunderstanding by positively refusing
to present to Castlereagh the chancellor's note of
August 28 renewing the offer of mediation. Roumanzoff was greatly mortified. He told Gallatin that
the mediation had been originally the Czar's own
idea; that it had been the subject of repeated dis▼OL. YII. — 28
864 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.14.
cussions at his own motion, and had been adopted
notwithstanding Boumanzoff's hints at the possibility
of English reluctance.^ The chancellor sent Lieven's
despatch immediately to the Czar without comment,
requesting the Czar to read it and give his orders.
The British officials, unwilling to blame Alexander,
attacked Boumanzo£F. Lord Walpole, who came di*
rectly from Bohemia to St. Petersburg to act as
British ambassador, said ^^ he was as sure as he
was of his own existence, and he believed he could
prove it, that Roumanzoff had been cheating us alL"*
Cathcart wrote, December 12, to Castlereagh, —
^^ I think Nesselrode knows nothing of the delay of
communicating with the American mission ; that it was
an intrigue of the chancellor's, if it is one; and that
daring the operations of war the Emperor lost the dew
to it, so that something has been unanswered." *
Perhaps the Czar's conduct admitted of several
interpretations. He might wish to keep the mediation alive in order to occupy Boumanzo£F until the
campaign should be decided ; or he might in his good
nature prefer to gratify his old favorite by allowing
him to do what he wished ; or he took this method
of signifying to Roumanzoff his disgrace and the
propriety of immediate retirement. Apparently Roumanzoff took the last view, for he sent his resignation
to the Czar, and at the close of the year quitted his
» Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 3, 1813, ii. 541.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 691.
* Cathcart to Castlereagh, Dec. 12, 1813 ; Caatlereagh Fqpem
Mia. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 855
official residence at the Department of Foreign Affairs, telling Gallatin that he remained in office only
till he should receive authority to close the American
mission.
The American commissioners in private resented
Alexander's treatment, but were unable to leave Rus-
sia without authority. Gallatin learned, October 19,
that the Senate had refused to confirm his appointment, but he remained at St. Petersburg, chiefly in
deference to Roumanzoff's opinion, and probably with
ideas of assisting the direct negotiation at London
or elsewhere. Meanwhile the campaign was decided^
October 18, by Napoleon's decisive overthrow at
Leipzig, which forced him to retreat behind the
Rhine. Still the Czar wrote nothing to Roumanzoff,.
and the American commissioners remained month
after month at St. Petersburg. Not until Jan. 25^
1814, did Gallatin and Bayard begin their winter journey to Amsterdam, where they arrived March 4 and
remained a month. Then Gallatin received, through
Baring, permission to enter England, and crossed the
Channel to hasten if he could the direct negotiation which Castlereagh had offered and Madison
accepted.
The diplomatic outlook had changed since March,
1813, when the President accepted the offer of
Russian mediation ; but the change was wholly for
the worse. England's triumphs girdled the world,,
and foimd no check except where Perry's squadroa
blocked the way to Detroit. The allied armies crossed
856 BISTGRY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14.
the Rhine in December and entered France on the
east. At the same time Wellington after a long campaign drove Joseph from Spain, and entering France
from the south pressed against Bordeaux. The govemment and people of England, in their excitement
and exultation at daily conquests, thought as little
as they could of the American war. Society rarely
mentioned it. Newspapers alone preserved a record
of British feelings toward the United States during
the year 1813. The expressions of newspapers, like
those of orators, could not be accepted without allowance, for they aimed at producing some desired
effect, and said either more or less than the truth ;
as a rule, they represented the cool opinion neither
of the person who uttered nor of the audience who
heard them ; but in the absence of other records,
public opinion was given only in the press, and the
Xiondon newspapers alone furnished evidence of its
character.
The " Morning Chronicle " — the only friend of the
United States in the daily press of England — showed
its friendship by silence. Whatever the liberal opposition thought in private, no one but Cobbett ventured
in public to oppose the war. Cobbett having become
a radical at the time of life when most men become
conservative, published in his " Weekly Register "
many columns of vigorous criticism on the American
war without apparent effect, although in truth he expressed opinions commonly held by intelligent people.
Even Lord Castlereagh, Cobbett's antipathy, shared
1818. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 857
some of Cobbett's least popular opinions in the matter
of the American war.
English society, whatever shades of diversity might
exist, was frank and free in expressing indifference
or contempt. Of the newspapers which made a duty
of reflecting what was believed to be the prevailing
public opinion, the "Times,'' supposed to favor the
interests of Wellesley and Canning, was probably
the ablest. During the early part of the war, the
"Times" showed a disposition to criticise the Ministry rather than the Americans. From the " Times"
came most of the bitter complaints, widely copied by
the American press, of the naval defeats suffered
by the " Guerriere," the " Java," and the " Macedonian." British successes were belittled, and abuse
of Americans was exaggerated, in order to deprive
ministers of credit. " The world has seen President
Madison plunge into a war from the basest motives,
and conduct it with the most entire want of ability," said the " Times " of February 9, 1813. " The
American government has sounded the lowest depth
of military disgrace, insomuch that the official records of the campaign take from us all possibility
of exulting in our victories over such an enemy."
The "Times" found in such reflections a reason
for not exulting in ministerial victories, but it bewailed defeats the more loudly, and annoyed the
Ministry by the violence of its attacks on naval
administration.
As the year passed, and England's triumph ia
858 mSTOEY OP THB UNITED STATES. Ch,14.
!Europe seemed to overshadow the world, the "Times,'*
probably recognizing the uselessness of attacking the
Ministry, showed worse temper toward the United
States. The Americans were rarely mentioned, and
always with language of increasing ill humor. " Des*
picable in the cabinet, ridiculous in the field," ^ the
Americans disappeared from sight in the splendor of
victory at Vittoria and Leipzig. No wish for peace
was suggested, and if the "Times" expressed the
true feelings of the respectable middle class, as it
was supposed to aim at doing, no wish for peace could
be supposed to exist.
Of tiie ministerial papers the " Courier " was the
best, and of course was emphatic in support of the
Ajnerican war. The Ministry were known to be
lukewarm about the United States, and for that rea-
son they thought themselves obliged to talk in public
as strongly as the strongest against a peace. When
the Russian mediation called for notice. May 13, the
" Courier " at once declared against it : —
*^ Before the war commenced, concession might have
been proper; we always thought it unwise. But the
hour of concession and compromise is passed. America
has rushed unnecessarily and unnaturally into war, and
she must be made to feel the effects of her folly and in*
justice ; peace must be the consequence of punishment,
and retraction of her insolent demands must precede
negotiation. The thunders of our cannon must first
strike terror into the American shores.''
1 The Times, Oct 17, 1813.
1813. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 859
The " Courier '* felt that Americans were not Englishmen, and could not forgive it, but was unable to
admit that they might still exercise a considerable
influence on human affairs: —
^^ They have added nothing to literature, nothing to
any of the sciences; they have not produced one good
poet, not one celebrated historian ! Their statesmen are
of a mixed breed, — half metaphysicians, half politicians;
all the coldness of the one with all the cunning of the
other. Hence we never see anything enlarged in their
conceptions or grand in their measures." ^
These reasons were hardly sufficient to prove the
right of impressing Ajnerican seamen. The literary,
metaphysical, or social qualities of Americans, their
"enlarged conceptions," and the grandeur or littleness of their measures, had by common consent
ceased to enter into discussion, pending a settlement
of the simpler issue, whether Americans could fight.
For a long time the English press encouraged the
belief that Americans were as incapable of fighting
as of producing poets and historians. Their naval
victories were attributed to British seamen. Perhaps the first turn of the tide was in November, 1818,
when news of Perry's victory on Lake Erie crossed
in London the news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig.
Perry's victory, like those of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, was too complete for dispute : " It may, however, serve to diminish our vexation at this occur*
rence to learn that the flotilla in question was not
> The Courier, July 27, 1813.
860 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Call.
any branch of the British navy, . . . but a local
force, a kind of mercantile military.'* ^
By a curious coincidence, Castlereagh's official let*
ter to Monroe, offering direct negotiation, was dated
the same day, November 4, when news of the victory at Leipzig met in London news of the defeat
on Lake Erie, and Castlereagh probably meant to
allow no newspaper prejudices to obstruct a peace ;
but public opinion was slow to recover its balance.
When news arrived that the Americans had captured
Maiden, recovered Detroit, and destroyed Proctor's
army on the Thames, the " Courier " showed the
first symptom of change in opinion by expressing a
somewhat simple-minded wish to hear no more about
the Americans : —
*^ The intelligence is unpleasant, but we confess that
we do not view, and have never from the beginning of
the war viewed, the events in America with any very
powerful interest. The occurrences in Europe will no
doubt produce a very decisive effect upon the American
government ; and unless it is more obstinate and stupid
in its hostility than even we think it, it will do as the
other allies of Bonaparte have done, — abandon him.''
If the national extravagance could be expected to
show its full force in one direction rather than in
another, naturalized Americans taken in arms were
certain to produce it. The issue was regularly raised
after Van Rensselaer's defeat at Queenston in 1812.
When the American prisoners arrived at Quebec,
» The Courier, Nov. 4, 1813.
ms. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 861
ihey were mustered, and twenty-three native-bom
subjects of Great Britain, belonging to the First,
Sixth, and Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, were taken
from the ranks and shipped to England to be put
on trial as British subjects for* bearing arms against
their king. The American agent in London reported
to the President that the men had arrived there for
the reason given. Secretary Armstrong, May 15,
1813, then ordered twenty-three British soldiers into
close confinement as hostages. The British government directed Sir George Prevost to put double the
number of Americans in close confinement, and Sir
George, in giving notice of this measure to General
Wilkinson, October 17, 1813,i added : —
**I have been further instructed by his Majesty's
government to notify to you for the information of the
government of the United States that the commanders of
his Majesty's armies and fleets on the coasts of America
have received instructions to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, and villages
belonging to the United States, and against the inhabi-
tants thereof, if, after this communication shall have
been made to you, and a reasonable time given for its
being transmitted to the American government, that government shall unhappily not be deterred from putting to
death any of the soldiers who now are or who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in the
letter from Major-General Dearborn."
* Prevost to Wilkinson, Oct 17, 1813 ; State Papers, Foreign
Relations, iii. 635. Bathurst to Preyost, Aug. 12, 1813; State
Papers, Foreign Belations, iii. 641.
862 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.14.
The limit of retaliation was soon reached, for the
number of prisoners was small on both sides. The
British government somewhat carefully refrained from
committing itself too far; but the press treated the
matter as though 'it were vital.
** If Mr. Madison," said the " Courier " of July 24,
^^ dare to retaliate by taking away the life of one English
prisoner in revenge for a British subject fully proved to
be such being taken in the act of voluntarily bearing arms
against his country, America puts herself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an
outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then
be absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and
laws of war. Hostilities may be carried on against her
in any mode until she is brought to a proper sense of
her conduct."
The " Morning Post " of December 28 called for
the execution of British subjects taken in arms, and
for retaliation on retaliation in defiance of " the brutal wretches who, after betraying, are still suffered to
govern America." The "Times" of May 24 spoke
with hardly less vehemence. Probably such talk was
not shared by the government, for the government
never tested its sincerity by bringing the men to
trial ; but at the close of 1813 public opinion in England was supposed to be tending toward extreme
measures against the United States. The approaching fall of Napoleon threatened to throw America
outside the pale of civilization. Englishmen seemed
ready to accept the idea that Madison and Napoleon
1813. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND. 863
should be coupled together, and that no peace should
be made which did not include the removal of both
from office and power. Of all periods in American
history this was probably the least adapted to negotiation, but while England was at the moment of her
most extravagant sense of power, President Madison
received and accepted Castlereagh's offer to negotiate,
and Gallatin went with Bayard to London to hasten
the approach of peace.
CHAPTER XV.
GoNOBESS assembled Dec. 6, 1813, at a time of
general perplexity. The victories of Perry and Harrison, September 10 and October 5, had recovered
Detroit and even conquered a part of West Canada,
but their successes were already dimmed by the failures of Wilkinson and Hampton before Montreal,
and the retreat of both generals November 18 within
United States territory. In the Creek country the
Georgians had failed to advance from the east, and
Jackson was stopped at Fort Strother by want of
supplies and men. At sea the navy was doing little,
while the British blockade from New London southward was becoming more and more ruinous to the
Southern and Middle States, and through them to the
government. Abroad the situation was not yet desperate. The latest news from Europe left Napoleon
at Dresden, victorious for the moment, before the
great battles of October. From the American commissioners at St. Petersburg no news had arrived,
but England's refusal to accept mediation was imofficially known. With this material the President
was obliged to content himself in framing his Annual
Message.
1818. THE LAST EMBARGO. 865
The Message sent to Congress December 7 began
by expressing regret that the British govemment had
disappointed the reasonable anticipation of discussing
and, if possible, adjusting the rights and pretensions
in dispute. From France nothing had been received
on the subjects of negotiation. Madison congratulated Congress on the success of the navj upon the
ocean and the Lakes, and the victory won by Harrison
and B. M. Johnson in Canada. He mentioned briefly
the failure of the armies on the St. Lawrence, and at
greater length the success of Jackson on the Coosa ;
and he entered in detail into the retaliatory measures
taken on either side in regard to naturalized soldiers.
The finances were treated with more show of confidence than was warranted by the prospects of the
Treasury ; and the Message closed by a succession
of paragraphs which seemed written m a spirit of
panegyric upon war : —
" The war has proved moreover that our free govemment like other free governments, though slow in its
early movements, acquires in its progress a force proportioned to its freedom; and that the Union of these
States, the guardian of the freedom and safety of all and
of each, is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to
the test. In fine, the war with its vicissitudes is illustrating the capacity and the destiny of the United States
to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful nation."
The rule that feeble and incompetent governments
acquire strength by exercise, and especially in war,
had been as well imderstood in 1798 as it was in
866 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. ift.
1813, and had been the chief cause of Republican an«
tipathy to war ; but had Madison publicly expressed
the same sentiment in 1798 as in 1813, he would
have found himself in a better position to enforce the
rights for which he was struggling when the extreme
discontent of nearly one third of the States contradicted his congratulations on " the daily testimony of
increasing harmony throughout the Union." Whatever the ultimate result of the war might be, it had
certainly not thus far strengthened the Union. On
the contrary, public opinion seemed to be rapidly
taking the shape that usually preceded a rupture of
friendly relations between political societies. Elections in the Middle States showed that the war, if not
actually popular, had obliged the people there to support the government for fear of worse evils. New
Jersey by a small majority returned to its allegiance,
and the city of New York elected a Republican to
represent it in Congress ; but the steady drift of opinion in the Middle States toward the war was simultaneous with an equally steady drift in the Eastern
States ragainst it.
The evidences of chronic discontent in the Eastern
States were notorious. Less than a month before
Madison wrote his Annual Message, Governor Chittenden of Vermont, by proclamation November 10,
recalled the State militia from national service : ^
^^He cannot conscientiously discharge the trust reposed
in him by the voice of his fellow-citizens, and by the
^ Proclamation of Nov. 10, 1813; Niles, v. 212.
1813. THE LAST EMBARGO. 86T
Constitution of this and the United States, without an
unequivocal declaration that in his opinion the military
strength and resources of this State must be reserved
for its own defence and protection exclusively, excepting
in cases provided for by the Constitution of the United
States, and then under orders derived only from the
commander-in-chief."
The intercourse between the Eastern States and the
enemy was notorious. The Federalist press of Mas*
sachusetts, encouraged by Russian and English success in Europe, discussed the idea of withdrawing the
' State from all share in the war, and making a separate arrangement with England. The President's*
first act, after sending to Congress his Annual Mes*
sage, was to send a special Message incidentally calling attention to the want of harmony that paralyzed
the energy of the government.
The special and secret Message of December 9
asked Congress once more to impose an embargo.^
Considering the notorious antipathy of the Eastern
States to the system of embargo, the new experiment
was 80 hazardous bs to require proof of its necessity.
That it was directed against the commerce of the
New England States was evident, for the blockade
answered the purposes of embargo elsewhere. The
Message seemed to propose that all commerce should
cease because any commerce must favor the enemy ;.
in effect, it urged that New England should be for-
bidden to sell or buy so long as the rest of the
country was prevented from doing so.
«68 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. l&
<^ The tendency of our commercial and navigation laws
in their present state to favor the enemy/' said Madison,^ ^^ and thereby prolong the war, is more and more
developed by experience. Supplies of the most essential
kinds find their way not only to British ports and British
armies at a distance, but the armies in our neighborhood
with which our own are contending derive from our ports
and outlets a subsistence attainable with difficulty if at
all from other sources. Even the fleets and troops infesting our coasts and waters are by like supplies accommodated and encouraged in their predatory and incursive
warfare. Abuses having a like tendency take place in
our import trade. British fabrics and products find their
way into our ports under the name and from the ports of
other countries, and often in British vessels disguised as
neutrals by false colors and papers. ... To shorten as
much as possible the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the enemy should feel all the pressure that can
be given to it."
Although Madison pointed to the notorious supply
of food for the British forces in Canada as one of the
motives for imposing an embargo, no one supposed
that motive to be decisive. Other laws already forl)ade and punished such communication with the
-enemy; and experience proved that a general embargo would be no more effective than any special
prohibition. The idea that England could be distressed by an embargo seemed still less likely to
influence Government. Congress knew that Russia,
Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Spain, and
1 Message of Dec 9, 1813 ; AmuJs, 1813-1814, p. 2031.
1818. THE LAST EMBARGO. 869
South America were already open to English commerce, and that a few days must decide whether
Napoleon could much longer prevent Great Britain
from trading with France. The possibility of distressing England by closing Boston and Salem, New
Bedford and Newport to neutral ships was not to
be seriously treated.
Whatever was the true motive of the President's
recommendation, Congress instantly approved it. The
next day, December 10, the House went into secret
session, and after two days of debate passed an Embargo Act by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-seven,
which quickly passed the Senate by a vote of twenty
to fourteen, and received the President's approval
December 17, being the first legislation adopted at
the second session of the Thirteenth Congress.^ The
Act was at once enforced with so much severity that
within a month Congress was obliged to consider
and quickly adopted another Act* relieving from its
operation the people of Nantucket, who were in a
state of starvation, all communication with the main
land having been forbidden by the law ; but nothing
proved that the illicit commimication with Canada
ceased.
This beginning of legislation at a time when the
crisis of the war could be plainly seen approaching
suggested. much besides want of harmony. The em> Act laying an Embargo, Dec. 17, 1813 ; Annals, 1813-1814,
p» 2781.
s Act of Jan. 25, 1814; Annals, 1813-1814, p. 2788.
VOL. TII.«— 24
870 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.16.
bargo strengthened the antipathy of New England to
the war, — a result sufficiently unfortunate; but it also
led to a number of other consequences that were
doubtless foreseen by the Administration, since they
were prophesied by the Federalists. The Act was
approved December 17. Hardly had it gone into
operation when the British schooner ^^ Bramble " arrived at Annapolis, December 80, bringing a letter
from Gastlereagh to Monroe offering to negotiate
directly, though declining mediation. Important as
this news was, it did not compare with that in the
newspapers brought by the ** Bramble." These contained official reports from (Germany of great battles
fought at Leipzig October 16, 18, and 19, in which the
allies had overwhelmed Napoleon in defeat so disastrous that any hope of his continuing to make head
against them in Germany was at an end. Except
France, the whole continent of Europe already was
open to British commerce, or soon must admit it.
From that moment the New England Federalists no
longer doubted their own power. Their tone rose ;
their opposition to the war became more threatening ;
their schemes ceased to be negative, and began to
include plans for positive interference ; and the embargo added strength to their hatred of Madison and
the Union.
Madison was seldom quick in changing his views,
but the battle of Leipzig was an event so portentous
that optimism could not face it. Other depressing
news poured in. Fort George was evacuated; Fort
1014. THE LAST EMBARGO, 871
Niagara was disgracefully lost ; Lewiston, Black Rock,
and Buffalo were burned, and the region about Niagara was laid waste ; blue lights were seen at New
London. Every prospect was dark, but the battle of
Leipzig was fatal to the last glimmer of hope that
England could be brought to reason, or that New
England could be kept quiet. A change of policy
could not safely be delayed.
Castlereagh's offer was instantly accepted. January 5 Monroe replied, with some complaint at the
refusal of mediation, that the President acceded to
the offer of negotiating at Gothenburg. The next day
Madison sent the correspondence to Congress, with a
warning not to relax " vigorous preparations for carrying on the war." A week afterward, January 14,
he nominated J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay,
and Jonathan Russell as commissioners to negotiate
directly with Great Britain, and the Senate confirmed
the nominations, January 18, with little opposition
except to Jonathan RusselPs further nomination as
Minister to Sweden, which was confirmed by the narrow vote of sixteen to fourteen. Three weeks later,
February 8, Albert Gallatin was added to the commission, George W. Campbell being nominated to the
Treasury.
The prompt acceptance of Castlereagh's offer, the
addition of Henry Clay to the negotiators, and the
removal of Gallatin from the Treasury showed that
diplomacy had resumed more than its old importance.
The hope of peace might serve to quiet New England
i
872 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16.
for a time, but mere hope with so little to nourish it
could not long pacify any one, if the embargo was to
remain in force. Several signs indicated there also a
change of policy. Besides the embargo, and in support of its restrictions, Madison had recommended
the passage of bills prohibiting collusive captures,
ransoming vessels captured by the enemy, and interference by the courts, as well as the introduction of
British woollens, cottons, and spirits. The bill prohibiting woollens and other articles was reported to
the Senate December 80, the day when the ^ Bramble " reached Annapolis. The Senate waited nearly a
month, till January 27, and then passed the bill, January 31, by a vote of sixteen to twelve. The House
referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations
February 3, where it remained. On the other hand,
the bill prohibiting ransoms was introduced in the
House December 80, and passed January 26 by a
vote of eighty to fifty-seven. The Senate referred it
January 28 to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
which never reported it. The fate of these measures
foreshadowed the destiny of the embargo.
Yet the President clung to his favorite measure
with a degree of obstinacy that resembled desperation. Congress showed by its indifference to the two
supplementary bills that it had abandoned the President's system as early as January, but the embargo
continued throughout the winter, and the month of
March passed without its removal. The news from
Europe at the close of that month left no doubt that
1814. THE LAST EMBARGO. 878
Napoleon could offer little effectual resistance even
in France to the allies, whose armies were known to
have crossed the Rhine, while Wellington advanced
on Bordeaux. Holland was restored to her ancient
independence, and Napoleon was understood to have
accepted in principle, for a proposed Congress at
Mannheim, the old boundaries of France as a basis
of negotiation. In theory, the overthrow of Napoleon
should have not essentially affected the embargo or
the Non-importation Acts, which were expected to
press upon England independently of Napoleon's Continental system ; but in practice the embargo having
produced no apparent effect on Europe during the
war, could not be expected to produce an effect after
England had succeeded in conquering France, and
had abandoned her blockades as France had abandoned her decrees. For that reason avowedly Madison at last yielded, and sent a Message to Congress
March 81, recommending that the system of conunercial restriction should cease : —
** Taking into view the mutual interests which the
United States and the foreign nations in amity with her
have in a liberal commercial intercourse, and the extensive changes favorable thereto which have recently
taken place; taking into view also the important advantages which may otherwise result from adapting the
state of our commercial laws to the circumstances now
existing," —
Taking into view only these influences, Madison
seemed to ignore the supposed chief motive of the
8T4 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15.
embargo in stopping supplies for Canada, and to admit that embargo was an adjunct of Napoleon's Continental system ; but in truth Madison's motives, both
political and financial, were deeper and more decisive
than any he alleged. His retreat was absolute. He
recommended that Congress shoidd throw open the
ports, and should abandon all restriction on commerce
beyond a guaranty of war duties for two years after
peace as a measure of protection to American manufactures. The failure of the restrictive system was
not disguised.
The House received the Message with a mixed
sense of reUef and consternation, and referred it to
Calhoun's committee, which reported April 4 a bill
for repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts,
together with the reasons which led the committee to
unite with the Executive in abandoning the restrictive
system.
Calhoun had always opposed the commercial policy
of Jeflferson and Madison. For him the sudden Executive change was a conspicuous triumph ; but he
showed remarkable caution in dealing with the House.
Instead of attempting to coerce the majority, according to his habit, by the force of abstract principles,
he adopted Madison's reasoning and softened his
own tone, seeming disposed to coax his Southern
and Western friends from making a display of useless
ill-temper. " Men cannot go straight forward," he
said, " but must regard the obstacles which impede
their course. Inconsistency consists in a change of
1814. THE LAST EMBARGO. 375
conduct when there is no change of circumstances
which justify it." The changes in the world's circumstances required a return to free trade ; but the
manufactures would not be left unprotected, — on the
contrary, "he hoped at all times and under every
policy they would be protected with due care." ^
As an example of political inconsistency, as Calhoun
defined it, his pledge to protect American manufactures deserved to be remembered ; but hardly had
Calhoun's words died on the echoes of the House
when another distinguished statesman offered a prospective example even more striking of what Calhoun
excused. Daniel Webster rose, and in the measured
and sonorous tones which impressed above all the
idea of steadfastness in character, he pronounced a
funeral oration over the restrictive system : —
^^ It was originally offered to the people of this country as a kind of political faith; it was to be believed,
not examined ; ... it was to be our political salvation,
nobody knew exactly how; and any departure from it
would lead to political ruin, nobody could tell exactly
why."
Its opponents had uniformly contended that it was
auxiliary to Napoleon's Continental system, in cooperation with Napoleon's government ; and its abandonment with the fall of Napoleon showed the truth.
While thus exulting in the overthrow of the first
« American system," Webster qualified his triumph
by adding that he was, " generally speaking," not the
1 Annals, 1813-1814, p. 1965.
876 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1I.
enemy of manufactures ; he disliked only the rearing
them in hot-beds : —
^^ I am not in haste to see Sheffields and Birminghams
in America. ... I am not anxious to accelerate the approach of the period when the great mass of American
labor shall not find its employment in the field ; when the
young men of the country shall be obliged to shut their
eyes upon external Nature, — upon the heavens and the
earth, — and inmierse themselves in close and unwholesome workshops ; when they shall be obliged to shut their
ears to the bleatings of their own flocks upon their own
hills, and to the voice of the lark that cheers them at the
plough, that they may open them in dust and smoke and
steam, to the perpetual whirl of spools and spindles and
the grating of rasps and saws."
Potter of Rhode Island, where the new manufactures centred, spoke hotly against the change. Much
Federalist capital had been drawn into the manufacturing business as well as into speculation in all
articles of necessity which the blockade and the embargo made scarce. At heart the Federalists were
not unanimous in wishing for a repeal of the restrictive system, and Potter represented a considerable
class whose interests were involved in maintaining
high prices. He admitted that the average duties
would still give American manufactures an advantage
of thirty-six per cent, without including freight and
marine risks, but he insisted that the bill was intended to encourage importations of British goods
** that we do not want and can do very well without.
IBli. THE LAST EMBARGO. 377
in order to raise a revenue from the people in an
indirect way."
Probably Potter's explanation of the change in
system was correct. The necessities of the Treasury
were doubtless a decisive cause of Madison's step;
but these necessities were foreseen by the Federalists
when Madison recommended the embargo, and the
neglect to give them due weight exposed the Administration to grave reproach. **A government which
cannot administer the afifairs of a nation," said Web-
ster, ^^ without producing so frequent and such violent
alterations in the ordinary occupations and pursuits
of private life, has in my opinion little claim to the
regard of the community."
The Republicans made no attempt to defend themselves from such criticisms. Among the small number who refused to follow Calhoun was Macon, who
sat in his seat during the debate writing to his
friend Judge Nicholson.
" Those who voted the embargo so very lately," he
said,^ ^'and those or him who recommended it must, I
think, feel a little sore under Webster's rubs. ... I have
not for a long time seen the Feds look in so good humor.
They have all a smile on their countenances, and look at
each other as if they were the men which had brought
this great and good work about. . . . The Republicans
have not the most pleasing countenances. Those whosupport the bill do not look gay or very much delighted
with their majority, and those who expect to be in the
minority have a melancholy gloom over their faces."
^ Macon to Nicholson, April 6, 1814 ; Nicholson MSS.
878 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATEa OB.Uk
That the system of commercial restrictions had
failed was admitted, but the failure carried no conviction of error to its friends. Physical force had also
apparently failed. The Southern Republicans had no
choice but to adopt strong measures, giving to^ the
govemmetit powers which in their opinion they had
no constitutional right to confer ; but they remained
unshaken in their opinions.
" I confess to you," wrote Macon, ** that the parties
seem by their acts to be approaching each other, and I
fear that tough times is a strong argument with many
of us to stretch the Constitution ; and the difference between expediency and constitutionality becomes every
day less. Notwithstanding this, I do not despair of
the republic, because my dependence has always been
on the people; and their influence was felt in laying
the embargo, and probably that of the Executive in
repealing it."
No one imderstood or represented so well as Macon
the instincts and ideas of the Southern people at that
time, and he never represented them more truly than
in the matter of the embargo. Virginia and the
€arolinas were with him at heart. Macon's hopes
for the republic depended on his confidence in the
people ; and that confidence in its turn depended on
his belief that the people were still true to a dogma
which the Government had abandoned as impracti<5able. The belief was well founded, as the course of
events proved. The House, April 7, by a vote of one
hundred and fifteen to thirty-seven, passed the bill re-
1814. THE LAST EMBARGO. 879
pealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts ; the
Senate also passed it, April 12, by a vote of twentysix to four ; the President, April 14, approved it ; and
from that day the restrictive system, which had been
the cardinal point of Jefferson's and Madison's statesmanship, seemed to vanish from the public mind and
the party politics of the country. Yet so deeply riveted
was the idea of its efficacy among the Southern peo*
pie, that at the next great crisis of their history they
staked their lives and fortunes on the same belief of
their necessity to Europe which had led them into
the experiment of coercing Napoleon and Canning
by commercial deprivations ; and their second experiment had results still more striking than those which
attended their first.
The explanation of this curious popular trait certainly lay in the nature of Southern society; but
the experience was common to the whole Union.
When the restrictive system was abandoned of necessity in April, 1814, it had brought the coimtry
to the verjge of dissolution. The Government could
neither make war nor peace ; the public seemed
indifferent or hostile ; and the same traits which
characterized the restrictive system continued to
paralyze the efforts of Congress to adopt more energetic methods.
" I will yet hope we may have no more war," wrote
Mrs. Madison to Mrs. Gallatin Jan. 7, 1814.» " If we
do, alas ! alas ! we are not making ready as we ought
1 GaUatin MSS.
880 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.15.
to do. Congress trifle away the most precious of their
days, — days that ought to be devoted to the defence
of their divided country/'
Mrs. Madison doubtless echoed the language she
heard used at the White House ; yet the leaders of
Congress were neither triflers nor idlers, and they
did all that public opinion permitted. Within a week
after Mrs. Madison's complaint, the military committee of the House reported a bill for encouraging enlistments. Viewed as a means of embodying the
whole military strength of the republic to resist
the whole military strength of Great Britain, about
to be released from service in Europe, Troup's
bill ^ was not an efficient measure ; but it terrified
Congress.
During the campaign of 1813, as the story has
shown, the Government never succeeded in placing
more than ten W eleven thousand effective rank-andQle in the field in a single body. About as many
more were in garrison, and the sick-list was always
large. Armstrong reported to the Ways and Means
Committee that the aggregate strength of the army
in February, 1813, was 18,945 ; in June, 27,609 ; in
December, 34,325 ; and Jan. 17, 1814, it was 83,822 »
Discouraging as this report was, it concealed the
worst part of the situation. In truth, the abstract
furnished by the adjutant-general's office gave the
number of regular troops in service for January, 1814,
1 Annals, 1813-1814, p. 928.
' Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vL 94.
1814, THE LAST EMBARGO. 881
not as 83,822, but as 23,614; and to the return a
note was appended, explaining that ^^ although the
numerical force in January, 1814, was 23,614, the actual strength of the army at that time was less than
half that number, arising from the expiration of the
term of service of the troops raised in 1809 and enlisted for five years, and of the twelve and eighteenmonths men enlisted in 1812-1813."^ The establishment consisted of 58,254 men authorized by law ;
but the legal establishment was not half filled. The
European news showed that England would soon be
able to reinforce her army in Canada and take the
offensive. Instead of sixty thousand men, Armstrong
needed twice that number for a moderately safe defence, since every part of the sea-coast stood at the
enemy's mercy, and no adequate defence was possible which did not include au offensive return some-
where on the Canadian frontier. Needing more than
one hundred thousand, — authorized by law to enlist
sixty thousand, — he could depend on less than thirty
thousand men. Yet so far from attempting to increase the establishment, Armstrong hoped only to
fill the ranks.
Troup's bill aimed at that object, purporting to be
"A Bill making further provision for filling of the
ranks of the regular army." No system of draft
was suggested. Troup's committee proposed to treble
the bounty rather than rdise the pay, — a system
^ Note to abstract of regular troops in service, January, 1814 ^
adjutant-general's office. MSS. War Department Archives.
S82 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15.
I
-which might be economical in a long war ; but if
the war should last only one year, the soldier must
gain four fifths of his boimty without return. Troup
first suggested one hundred dollars as bounty, which
Congress raised to one hundred and twenty-four dollars, together with three hundred and twenty acres
of land as already fixed. The pay of privates remained at ten dollars. Twenty-four dollars of the
bounty was to be paid only on the soldier's discharge.
Eecruiting-agents were to receive eight dollars for
•each recruit.
Such a provision for filling the ranks could not be
called excessive. Even if the whole bounty were
added to the pay, and the soldier were to serve but
twelve months, he would receive only twenty dollars
a month and his land-certificate. If he served his
whole term of five years, he received little more than
twelve dollars a month. The inducement was not
great in such a community as the United States.
The chance that such a measure would fill the ranks
was small; yet the measure seemed extravagant to
a party that had formerly pledged itself against mercenary armies.
If the bill showed the timidity of the Republicans,
it called out worse qualities in the Federalists. The
speeches of the opposition were for the most part
general in their criticisms and denunciations, and de.served little attention ; but that of Daniel Webster
was doubly interesting, because Webster was not only
the ablest but among the most cautious of his party.
mi. THE LAST EMBARGO. 88&
His speech ^ suggested much of the famous eloquence
of his later oratory, but dwelt on ideas to which his.
later life was opposed, and followed lines of argument
surprising in a statesman of his great intellectual
powers. His chief theme was the duty of government to wage only a defensive war, except on the
ocean. " Give up your futile projects of invasion.
Extinguish the fires that blaze on your inland frontiers." He wished the government to use its forces
only to repel invasion.
^^ The enemy, as we have seen, can make no permanent
stand in any populous part of the country. Its citizens
will drive back his forces to the line ; but at that line
where defence ceases and invasion begins, they stop.
They do not pass it because they do not choose to pass
it. Offering no serious obstacle to their actual power, it
rises like a Chinese wall against their sentiments and
their feelings."
This advice, which echoed a Federalist idea rea-
sonable or excusable in 1812, was out of place in
January, 1814. The battles of Leipzig and Vittoria
had settled the question of offensive and defensive in
Canada. The offensive had passed into British hands,
and a successful defence was all that the United
States could hope. The interests of New England as
well as of New York and of the whole Union required
that the defensive campaign should, if possible, be
fought on Canadian soil rather than at Plattsburg,
Washington, or New Orleans ; and even the most ex^ Annals, 1813-1814, p. 940.
884 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15.
treme Federalist could scarcely be believed blind to
an idea so obvious.
Moderate as the bill was, fiftjr-eight members voted
against it, while ninety-seven voted in its favor. In
the Senate the bill passed without a division, and received, January 27, the President's approval. Meanwhile the Senate passed bills for converting the
twelve-months regiments into regiments enlisted for
the war, as well as for raising three rifle regiments
for the same term, and any number of volunteers that
in the President's opinion the public service required,
offering to all recruits for these corps the same inducements as to the regular regiments. These bills
produced another and a longer debate, but were
passed without serious opposition. No further addition was made to the regular army, and no other
effort to obtain recruits.
Thus organized, the army consisted of forty-six
regiments of infantry enlisted for five years, — four
rifle regiments ; an artillery corps and a regiment of
light artillery ; a regiment of dragoons ; the engineer
corps, the rangers, and searfencibles, — an aggregate
of 62,773 men authorized by law, an increase of only
five thousand men over that of the previous year.
The appropriations for the military establishment
amomited to nearly twenty-five million dollars, the
Federalists alone voting against them. The naval
appropriations amoimted to seven millions, and were
voted without opposition. The Secretary of the Navy
discouraged the building of more cruisers, owing to
1814. THE LAST EMBARGO. 885
want of timber and seamen; but Congress showed
more than ordinary sagacity by appropriating half a
million dollars for the construction of floating batteries with steam-power.
Such provision for the coming campaign offered
little evidence of increasing energy to make head
against the vastly increased military and naval power
of England; but the financial outlook was much
worse than the military, and Congress dared not face
it. The acting Secretary of the Treasury, William
Jones, sent his annual report to the House January
8, and bo far as his balance-sheet went, no difficulties
were apparent. He had disbursed thirty million dollars during the past fiscal year, and needed nearly
forty millions for the current year. These sums were
not excessive when compared with the wealth of the
country or its exertions at other periods of national
danger. Half a century afterward the people of the
Southern States, not much more numerous than the
people of the Union in 1812, and with a far larger
proportion of slaves, supported during four years the
burden of an army numbering nearly five hundred
thousand men. For the same period the Northern
people, not much exceeding twenty millions in num-
ber, lent their government more than five hundred
million dollars a year. The efforts of 1864, proportioned to the population, were nearly ten times as
great as those of 1814, when Secretary Jones looked
with well-founded alarm at the prospect of borrowing thirty millions for the year, and of maintaining
VOL. VIL — 26
886 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ca-li.
an anny which could scarcely be expected to niunber
forty thousand rank-and-file.
The United States, with a proper currency and
untouched resources, should have found no serious
difficulty in borrowing thirty or even fifty millions a
year in 1814 ; but they were in reality on the verge
of bankruptcy, although the national resources were
probably ample. The amount of private capital available for loans was imcertain, and the amount of
circulating medium was equally doubtful. Timothy
Pitkin of Connecticut, perhaps the best authority in
Congress, thought that the paid bank capital of the
United States did not much exceed sixty millions,^
and that the notes of these banks in circulation did
not reach thirty millions. His estimate of paid bank
capital was probably liberal, but his estimate of the
circulation was eight or ten millions too small. Had
the Treasury been able to count on the use of these
resources, they might have answered all necessary
purposes ; but between the mistakes of the government and the divisions of the people, the Treasury
was left with no sound resources whatever.
The first and fatal blow to the Treasury was the
loss of the Bank of the United States, which left the
government without financial machinery or a sound
bank-note circulation. The next blow, almost equally
severe, was the loss of the Massachusetts and Connecticut banks, which were the strongest in the Union.
1 Speech of Timothy Pitkin, Feb. 10, 1814 ; Annals, 1813«
1814, p. 1297.
ini. THE LAST EMBARGO. 887
Whether the responsibility for the loss rested on the
Executive, Congress, or the two States might be a
subject for dispute ; but whoever was responsible, the
effect was ruinous. The New England banks were
financial agents of the enemy. The bank capital of
Massachusetts including Maine was about twelve and a
quarter million dollars ; that of Connecticut exceeded
three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached eighteen millions,^ or nearly one third
of the paid bank capital of the whole country, if
Pitkin's estimate was correct. That nearly one third
of the national resources should be withdrawn from
the aid of government was serious enough; but in
reality the loss was much greater, for New England
held a still larger proportion of the specie on which
the bank circulation of other States depended.
The system of commercial restrictions was respon-^
sible for thus, at the most critical moment of the war,
throwing the control of the national finances into the
hands of the Boston Federalists. Against the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced
upon them by national legislation until New England
supplied the Union with articles of necessary use at
prices practically fixed by her own manufacturers.
From the whole country specie begaii to flow toward
Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after the war was declared. The British
blockade stimulated the movement, and the embargo
^ Considerations on Currency, etc By Albert Qallatin, 1831.
Statements II. and III., pp. 101, 103.
i
388 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.15.
of December, 1818, which lasted till April, 1814, cut
ofif every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable longer to send their crops even
to New England for a market, they were obliged to
send specie, and they soon came to the end of their
supply. The Massachusetts banks, which reported
about $820,000 in specie in 1809, returned more than
$8,680,000 in June, 1812 ; which rose to $5,780,000
in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in June,
1814. In five years the Massachusetts banks alone
drew more than six million dollars in specie from the
Southern and Middle States,^ besides what they sent
to Canada in payment for British bills.
No one knew how much specie the country contained. Gallatin afterward estimated it at seventeen
million dollars,^ and of that amoimt the banks of New
England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions.
The Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in
specie, had a bank-note circulation of less than three
millions. The Middle, Southern, and Western States
must have had a bank-note circulation approaching
forty millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in
specie to support it,' while the paper was constantly
increasing in quantity and the specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not
with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dol-
> Schedule, 1803-1837 ; Senate Document No. 38. Massachu*
0etts Legislature, 1838.
• Gallatin's Considerations, p. 45.
* Gallatin's Considerations, p. 45. Schedules II. an4 III.,
pp. 101, 103. Gallatin's Writings, iii. 286, 357, 359.
IBU. THE LAST EMBARGO. 889
lars to every specie dollar in the bank vaults; but
the banks in 1814 beyond New England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver or
gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper
without specie in their possession.
Already the banks of New England were pressing
their demands on those of New York, which in their
turn called on Philadelphia and Baltimore. The
specie drained to New England could find its way
back only by means of government loans, which New
England refused to make in any large amount. On
the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury
notes at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in
payment of them.^ Probably New England lent to
the British government during the war more money
than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New England to the United States loans
was less than three millions.
This situation was well understood by Congress.
In the debate of February, 1814, the approaching
dangers were repeatedly pointed out. The alarm was
then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means
reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank
with a capital of thirty million dollars, while Macon
openly advocated the issue of government paper,* declaring that "paper money never was beat.** Con-
gress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill
for twenty-five millions, and an Act for the issue of
» Gallatin's Writings, iii. 284.
« Annals, 1813-1814, p. 1787.
890 HISTORY OF THB UNITED STATES. Ch.1»^
five million interest-bearing Treasury notes^ leaving
with the President the option to issue five millions
more in case he could not borrow it. The legislation was evidently insufficient, and satisfied no one.
**You have authorized a loan for twenty-five millions/' said Orundy in the debate of April 2, ^^ and
have provided for the expenditure of so much money.
Where is the money ? "
Without attempting to answer this question, April
18 Congress adjourned.
CHAPTER XVI.
Whilb Congress was thus employed, much occurred behind the scenes that bore directly on the
movements of war. The French minister, Serurier,
alone made official reports, and his letters became
less interesting as his importance diminished; but
occasionally he still threw a ray of light on Madison's troubles. At midsummer in 1813 he was in
high spirits.
"Within the past week," Serurier wrote, July 21,
1813,* ** we have received^ one after another, news of
the fresh successes at the beginning of the campaign, —
the battle of Liitzen, the offer of armistice, and the battle
of Bautzen. These events, so glorious for France, have
been so many thunder-strokes for the enemy in America.
Their consternation is equal to their previous confidence,
which had no bounds. The Republicans of Congress, on
the other band, have received these news in triumph. All
have come to congratulate me, and have told me that they,
not less than we, had been victorious at Ltltzen. The as*
cendency, hencefoi^ard irresistible, which his Majesty is
1 Serarier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des AfL
ttr, MSS.
892 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.16.
acquiring over his enemies, will, I hope, supply a little
tone and vigor to this Grovemment, which had need of
them."
When the President returned to Washington, Oct.
25, 1818, Serurier reported with less enthusiasm, but
still with confidence, that Madison remained firm :
"He expressed himself in very proper, though very
measured, terms on the monstrous coalition that has been
renewed against his Majesty. I remarked to him that
among our advantages we must doubtless count the fact
that the coalition had ten heads, while France had but
one. ^And what a powerful head!' replied the President, instantly, with less grace than conviction in his
whole countenance."
The vigor of Napoleon postponed for a few months
the total downfall of Serurier's influence, but it slowly waned, and he became more and more grateful for
consideration shown him. The President's Annual
Message, December 7, met his approval. " All agree
that nothing more energetic or more warlike has
yet come from Mr. Madison's Cabinet." ^ The secret Message of December 9 and the embargo pleased
him more.
" Mr. Monroe assured me three days ago," continued
Serurier, writing December 10, " that the Government
had been informed of supplies to the eictent of nearly
thirty thousand barrels of flour furnished to Canada from
ports of the United States. A rigorous embargo can
^ Semrier to Bassano, Dec. 10, 1813 ; Archives dee Aff.
ttr. MSS.
18U. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 898
alone prevent such criminal speculations, and give the
war a decisive character which will shorten its duration
and assure its success. ... In this affair is seen a new
proof of Mr. Madison's obstinacy (roideur) which prevents him from abandoning a measure he has once put
forward, and judges to be for the public interest."
The arrival of the "Bramble" with news of the
battle of Leipzig, and with Castlereagh's offer to negotiate, left Serurier helpless. " In this state of things,"
he wrote,^ January 14, " it would have been difficult
for the Executive to refuse to negotiate; and I cannot
but think that he accedes to it only with regret and
without illusions." In deference to Serurier's opinion,
the President appointed Henry Clay as commissioner
to treat for peace rather than Crawford, then American envoy to Napoleon; but in the last week of March
news arrived from Bordeaux to February 10, announcing that the allies had reached Troyes and were
advancing on Paris, while Napoleon had accepted
their conditions of negotiation.
" For the moment the public believed everything to be
lost," reported Serurier, April 15.* *'I ought in justice
to say that the President and his Cabinet showed more
coolness and did not share the universal alarm, and that
they continued to show me great confidence in the Emperor's genius. I did not find them excessively disturbed
by the march of the allies, or doubtful of our power to
^ SeruTier to Bassano, Jan. 14, 1814; Archives des Aff.
ttT. MSS.
^ Serurier to Bassano, April 15, 1814 ; Archives des A&
ttr. MSS.
894 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. CH.lf.
repalse them; bat I know th^t his Majesty's adhesion
to the preliminary conditions of the allies, and yet more
the Congress of Chatillon, and the irresistible influence
necessarily acqaired for the British minister, greatly
(vivement) alarmed Mr. Madison. He thought he saw,
in the announcement of our adoption of those conditions,
our renunciation of every kind of power and control
over Spain and Germany, where England was to rule.
He believed that a peace, dictated by Lord Castlereagh,
must already have been signed, and that the United
States were to remain alone on the field of battle. It
was then that Mr. Madison, abruptly and without having in any way prepared the public for it, addressed
to Congress the Message recommending an immediate
repeal of the embargo and a partial repeal of the nonimportation."
While Serurier explained the suddenness of
Madison's action by the need of conciliating the
Continental powers and the manufacturing cities of
England, he added that domestic difficulties had a
large share in the decision. Contraband trade had
become general in the Eastern States. A sort of
civil war, he said, was beginning between the officers of customs and the smugglers; the Govern-
ment also felt serious anxiety for the success of its
loan, and began to doubt its ability to maintain payments for the army and navy. Revenue had become
necessary. Such was the terror caused by the French
news that the capitalists who had offered to contract
for the loan began to withdraw their offers and to say
that it was no longer practicable. "Analyze it as
18U. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 895
you please," said Serurier, " you will still find that it
was the passage of the Rhine and the progress of
the allies in France which, in spite of all I could
say, decided this retrograde movement of a Government which I have hitherto always found firm, wise,
and consequent. But fear does not reason."
Serurier failed even to obtain permission for French
letters-of-marque to be received with their prizes in
American ports. The President recommended it to
Congress, but Monroe told Serurier that the committee of Congress had not dared to make a report, being
persuaded that it would be rejected.^ " Mr. Monroe
agreed to all I said ; granted that Congress was in
the wrong, and I entirely in the right ; but nevertheless Congress has adjourned without considering the
question." Serurier was disposed to advise the withdrawal by France of the liberties granted to American privateers, — a measure which, he might almost
have foreseen, was likely in any case soon to be
taken.
With the repeal of the embargo ended the early
period of United States history, when diplomatists
played a part at Washington equal in importance to
that of the Legislature or the Executive. The statecraft of Jefferson and Madison was never renewed.
Thenceforward the government ceased to balance be-
tween great foreign Powers, and depended on its own
resources. As far as diplomacy had still a part to
^ Serurier to Bassano, April 25, 1814; Archives des AfL
£tr. MSS.
896 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1^
plaj in the year 1814, its field of action was in Europe ; and there the ablest men in civil life were sent.
GkJlatin, Bayard, J. Q. Adams, and Crawford were
already on the spot ; and Henry Clay, after resigning
the Speaker's chair, Jan. 19, 1814, sailed for Gothenburg to take part in the negotiation.
President Madison sought in vain for men of equal
ability to supply the gaps made by transferring so
many of his strongest supporters to Europe. The
House of Representatives, January 19, elected Langdon Cheves Speaker ; but the choice was a defeat for
Madison, whose friends supported Felix Grundy. The
Federalists, joining those Republicans who were hostile to commercial restrictions, numbered ninety-four
against fifty-nine votes for Grundy, — and the success
of Cheves foreshadowed the overthrow of the embargo.
In providing for other vacancies the President fared
worse. Cheves was a man of ability, and in general
policy was a friend of the Administration ; but most
of the other material upon which the President must
depend was greatly inferior to Cheves. The Cabinet
needed partial reconstruction, and Madison was at a
loss for choice.
The President's favorite candidate for the Treasury,
after Gallatin showed his determination to remain
abroad, was Alexander James Dallas of Pennsylvania. Dallas was one of Gallatin's strongest personal friends, an old Republican, and a lawyer of
undoubted ability. Born in Jamaica in 1759, like
Gallatin and Hamilton he had become a citizen of
1S14. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 897
the United States before the Constitution or the confederation was adopted. He had been a leader of
the Republican party in Federalist times, and was
made district-attorney of Pennsylvania by Jefferson ;
but Duane and the " Aurora " destroyed his influence
and left him isolated. In Pennsylvania Dallas commanded no support. Both the senators, Leib and
Lacock, opposed his appointment to the Treasury,
and were able to procure his rejection had Madison
ventured to make it.^
Obliged to abandon Dallas, the President offered the
appointment to Richard Rush, the comptroller, who
declined it. At last Madison pitched upon G. W.
Campbell, of Tennessee. Since Crawford's departure
Campbell had represented the Administration in the
Senate, but neither as senator nor as representative
had he won great distinction. Best known for his duel
with Barent Gardenier, his physical courage was more
apparent than his financial fitness. Campbell brought
no strength to the Administration, and rather weakened its character among capitalists; but Madison
could think of no one better qualified for the place.
The Republicans were at a loss for leaders. " I do
not complain that Campbell is unfit," wrote Macon
to Nicholson ; ^ " indeed, if the choice of secretary
must be made out of Congress, I do not know that
a better could be made." Yet the selection was
unfortunate.
^ IngersolPs History, ii. 253.
> Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 8, 1814; Nicholson MSS.
898 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. li,
Madison was also obliged to sielect a new attorneygeneral in place of William Pinkney. Till then the
attorney-general had not been regarded as standing
on the same footing with other members of the Ci^binet. The Secretaries of State and Treasury were paid
five thousand dollars a year ; those of the War and
Navy were paid forty-five hundred ; but the attorneygeneral was paid only three thousand. He had neither
office-room nor clerks, and was not required to reside
permanently at Washington, but pursued the private
business of his profession where he liked, attending
to the business of government rather as a counsel
under general retainer than as a head of Department. Pinkney lived in Baltimore, and his abilities
were so valuable that the President was glad to employ them on any terms, and was not inclined to
impose conditions of residence which Pinkney could
not accept without a greater sacrifice than he was
ready to make.^ Congress was not so forbearing as
the President. John W. Taylor, a member from New
York, moved a resolution January 6, directing the
Judiciary Committee to inquire into the expediency
of requiring the attorney-general to reside in Washington during the session of Congress. The committee reported a bill, January 22, requiring permanent
residence from the attorney-general, with an increase
of salary. The bill failed to become law, but Pinkney
at once resigned.
Madison offered the post to Richard Bush, who
1 Madison to Pinkney, Jan. 29, 1814; Works, ii. 581.
1«14 MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 899
accepted it. Bush's abilities were more than respectable, and caused regret that he had not accepted
the Treasury, for which he was better fitted than
Campbell; but these changes did not improve the
Cabinet. "His predecessor, Pinkney, I believe considered him the best lawyer in the nation," wrote
Macon ; ^ " but that Campbell and Rush are equal to
Gallatin and Pinkney is not, I imagine, believed by
any one who knows them." In the case of Pinkney
and Bush, the advantages of permanent residence
balanced in part the loss of ability; but no such
consideration affected the change of Campbell for
Oallatin.
Fortunately Madison lost enemies as well as friends.
Time worked steadily in his favor. The old Smith
faction, the Clinton party, and the "Aurora" were
already broken. Senators who claimed too much
independence of action found public opinion setting
strongly against them. Samuel Smith and Giles
were near the end of their terms, and had no chance
of re-election. The legislature of North Carolina,
in December, 1818, censured so severely the conduct
of Senator Stone that the senator resigned his seat.^
At the same time, Pennsylvania succeeded in ridding herself of Senator Leib, and Madison was able
to punish the postmaster-general, Gideon Granger,
whose friendship for Leib made him obnoxious to
his party.
1 Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 17, 1614; Nicholson MSS.
^ Report and Resolution of Dec. 16^ 1814; Niles, v. 356. '
/
^
400 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16.
Granger was not a member of the Cabinet, but his
patronage was the more important because at that
time, by some anomaly in the law, it was not subject
to approval by the Senate. Early in January one of
his best post-oflSces, that of Philadelphia, became vacant. One senator of the United States had already
resigned his seat to become postmaster of New York ;
and the Pennsylvanians had reason to fear that Leib,
whose term was about to expire, would resign to become postmaster of Philadelphia, and that Granger
wished to gratify him. Immediately all the Administration Republicans, including members of Congress
and of the State legislature, joined in recommending another man, and warned Granger in private that
his own removal from office would follow the appointment of Leib.^ C. J. Ingersoll — a young member
from Pennsylvania, among the warmest supporters of
Madison and the war — reinforced the threat by moving the House, January 7, for a committee to amend
the laws with a view to making postmasters subject
to the usual rule of confirmation. The committee,
was appointed.
Irritated by this treatment, Granger in defiance of
President and party appointed Michael Leib to the
office, and Leib instantly resigned his seat and hastened to assume the duties of his new post. In this,
transaction Madison was the chief gainer. Not only
did he rid himself of Leib, but he gained a warm
^ Qranger to John Todd, Februaiy, 1814 ; New England
(« Palladium^' March 4, 1814.
1814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 401
ally in the person of Leib's successor ; for the Pennsylvania legislature, February 28, transferred Jonathan Roberts from the House to take Leib's place in
'the Senate. Madison's advantage was not limited by
Leib's departure or Roberts's accession. He was able
also to punish Granger in a manner at that time almost or quite without parallel. Executive offices ran,
as a rule, during good behavior ; and although Jefferson made removals of party enemies, neither he nor
Madison had ventured to remove party friends, except
in cases of misbehavior. Granger's conduct exasperated the Pennsylvanians to a point where no rules
were regarded. Eighty-six members of the Pennsylvania legislature joined in addressing a memorial to
the President demanding the removal of Granger as
the only means of getting rid of Leib, who had not
only opposed Madison's election, but who, " when entrusted with one of the highest offices in the gift of
the State, . . . acted in direct hostility to her wishes
and interests, and aided as far as possible her political
enemies." Madison needed little urging. February
25 he nominated to the Senate as postmaster-general
the governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs. After
some little delay, the Senate confirmed the appointment, March 17, without a division.
Scarcely was this matter settled, when Congress
yielded to Madison's opinion in another instance
where for ten years the House had obstinately resisted his wishes. The Yazoo bill became law. For
this concession several reasons combined. The SuVOL. VH. — 26
402 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.16.
preme Court, through Chief-Justice Marshall, by an
elaborate decision in February, 1810, settled the law
in favor of the claimants. John Randolph's defeat
removed from Congress the chief obstacle to the proposed agreement. The threatening attitude of New
England made every palliative necessary. Under
these inducements, the Senate passed the bill, February 28, by a vote of twenty-four to eight, and the
House passed it, March 26, by a vote of eighty-four to
seventyHsix.
Little by little the pressure of necessity compelled
Congress and the country to follow Madison's lead.
Whether for good or for evil, he had his way. His
enemies were overcome and driven from the field;
his friends were rewarded, and his advice followed.
Of revolt witMn the party he stood no longer in fear.
Already political intrigue and factiousness began to
take a direction which concerned him only so far
as he felt an interest in the choice of his successor.
Three years more would complete Madison's public
career, and in all probability if another President of
the United States were ever elected, he would be one
of Madison's friends ; but many persons doubted
whether the country would reach another Presidential election, and the jealousy which actuated New
England against the South was not the only ground
for that opinion. In Madison's immediate circle of
friendsj the jealousy between Virginia and New York
threatened to tear the government in pieces. These
States did not, like Massachusetts, threaten to leave
1814 MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 403
the Union, but their struggles for power promised to
bring government to a standstill.
The antipathy of New York for Virginia was not
lessened by the success of Virginia in overthrowing
Aaron Burr and DeWitt Clinton. The Republican
party in New York quickly produced two new aspirants to the Presidency, whose hopes were founded on
public weariness of Virginian supremacy. One of the
two candidates was Governor Daniel D. Tompkins,
whose services as war-governor of New York were
great, and were rewarded by great popularity. Governor Tompkins was too remote from the capital to
annoy Madison by direct contact with factions or
activity in intrigue ; but the other rival stood at the
centre of Executive patronage. John Armstrong was
a man capable of using power for personal objects,
and not easily to be prevented from using it as he
pleased.
Armstrong was an unusual character. The local
influences which shaped Americans were illustrated
by the leaders whom New York produced, and by
none better than by Armstrong. Virginians could
not understand, and could still less trust, such a
combination of keenness and will, with absence of
conventional morals as the Secretary of War displayed. The Virginians were simple in everything ;
even their casuistry was old-fashioned. Armstrong's
mind belonged to modern New York. The Virginians were a knot of country gentlemen, inspired by
faith in rural virtues, and sustained by dislike for the
404 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.111.
citjr tendencies of Northern society. Among themselves they were genial, reluctant to offend, and eager
to remove causes of offence. The domestic history
of the government at Washington repeated the Virginian traits. Jefferson and his friends passed much
time in making quarrels, and more in making peace.
Unlike Pennsylvania, New York, and New England,
Virginia stood stoutly by her own leaders ; and however harsh Virginians might be in their judgment of
others, they carried delicacy to an extreme in their
treatment of each other. Even John Randolph and
W. B. Giles, who seemed to put themselves beyond
the social pale, were treated with tenderness and
regarded with admiration.
The appearance of a rough and harshly speaking
friend in such a society was no slight shock, and for
that reason William Henry Crawford was regarded
with some alarm ; but Crawford was socially one of
themselves, while Armstrong belonged to a different
type and class. The faculty of doing a harsh act in
a harsh way, and of expressing rough opinions in a
caustic tone, was not what the Virginians most disliked in Armstrong. His chief fault in their eyes,
and one which they could not be blamed for resenting,
was his avowed want of admiration for the Virginians themselves. Armstrong's opinion on that subject, which was but the universal opinion of New
York politicians, became notorious long before he entered the Cabinet, and even then annoyed Madison.^
1 Madison to Jefferson, April 19, 1811; Works, ii. 483.
1814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 405
The newspapers gossiped about the mean estimate
which Armstrong expressed for the capacities of the
Virginia statesmen. So old and fixed was the feud,
that from the first the Virginians lost no opportunity to express their opinion of Armstrong, especially
in the Senate, whenever he was nominated for office.
Madison unwillingly selected him for. the post of
secretary after Crawford refused it, but neither of
the Virginia senators voted on the question of con-
firmation. In appointmg Armstrong, Madison bestowed on him neither respect nor confidence. He
afterward declared the reasons that caused him to
invite a person whom he distrusted into a position
of the highest importance.
^^ Should it be asked," wrote Madison ten years after
the war,* " why the individual in question was placed,
and after such developments of his career continued, at
the head of the War Department, the answer will readily
occur to those best acquainted with the circumstances of
the period. Others may be referred for an explanation
to the difficulty, which had been felt in its fullest pressure, of obtaining services which would have been preferred, several eminent citizens to whom the station had
been offered having successively declined it. It was not
imknown at the time that objections existed to the person
fiiaally appointed, as appeared when his nomination went
to the Senate, where it received the reluctant sanction of
a scanty majority [eighteen to fifteen}. Nor was the
President unaware or unwarned of the temper and turn
of mind ascribed to him, which might be uncongenial
1 Works, iii. 384.
406 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. A.
with the oflScial relations in which he was to stand. Bnt
these coninderations were sacrificed to recommendationB
from esteemed friends ; a belief that he possessed , with
known talents, a degree of military information which
might be useful; and a hope that a proper mixture of
conciliating confidence and interposing control would
render objectionable peculiarities less in practice than
in prospect."'
Possibly Armstrong took a different view of Madison's conduct, and regarded his own acceptance of
the War Department in January, 1818, as proof both
of courage and disinterestedness. He knew that he
could expect no confidence from Virginians ; but apparently he cared little for Virginian enmity, and was
chiefly fretted by what he thought Virginian incompetence. No one could fail to see that he came into
the Government rather as a master than a servant.
According to General Wilkinson, he was quite as
much feared as hated. " I am indeed shocked,"
wrote Wilkinson in his Memoirs,^ " when I take
a retrospect of the evidence of the terror in which
that minister kept more than one great man at Washington." Wilkinson, who hated Madison even more
than he hated Armstrong, evidently believed that the
President was afraid of his secretary. Madison himself explained that he thought it better to bear with
Armstrong's faults than to risk another change in
the Department of War.
In that decision Madison was doubtless right*
* Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 762.
X814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 407
Whatever were Armstrong's faults, he was the strongest Secretary of War the government had yet seen.
Hampered by an inheritance of mistakes not easily
corrected, and by a chief whose methods were unmilitary in the extreme, Armstrong still introduced
into the army an energy wholly new. Before he
had been a year in office he swept away the old generals with whom Madison and Eustis had encumbered
the service, and in their place substituted new men.
While Major-Generals Dearborn, Pinckney, and Morgan Lewis were set over military districts where active service was unnecessary, and while Major-General
Wilkinson was summoned to the last of his many
courts of inquiry, the President sent to the Senate,
January 21 and February 21, the names of two new
major-generals and six brigadiers of a totally different
character from the earlier appointments.
The first major-general was George Izard of South
Carolina, born at Paiis in 1777, his father Ralph
Izard being then American commissioner with Franklin and Deane. Returning to America only for a few
years after the peace, George Izard at the age of fifteen
was sent abroad to receive a military education in
England, Germany, and France in the great school of
the French Revolution. As far as education could
make generals, Izard was the most promising ofiicer
in the United States service. Appointed in March,
1812, colonel of the Second Artillery, promoted to
brigadier in March, 1813, he served with credit under
Hampton at Chateaugay, and received his promotion
408 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.16.
over the heads of Chandler, Boyd, and one or two
other brigadiers his seniors. He was intended to
succeed Hampton on Lake Champlain.
The second new major-^neral was Jacob Brown,
who after receiving L appointment of brigadier,
July 19, 1818, was suddenly promoted to major-general at the same time with Izard. The selection was
the more remarkable because Brown had no military
education, and was taken directly from the militia.
Bom in Pennsylvania in 1775 of Quaker parentage,
Brown began life as a schoolmaster. At the instance
of the Society of Friends, he taught their public school
in New York city for several years with credit.^ He
then bought a large tract of land near Sackett's Har«
bor, and in 1799 undertook to found a town of Brownville. He soon became a leading citizen in that part
of New York, and in 1809 was appointed to the command of a militia regiment. In 1811 he was made a
brigadier of militia, and at the beginning of the war
distinguished himself by activity and success at Ogdensburg. His defence of Sackett's Harbor in 1813
won him a brigade in the regular service, and his
share in Wilkinson's descent of the St Lawrence led
to his further promotion.
Wilkinson, who regarded Brown as one of his enemies, declared that he knew not enough of military
duty to post the guards of his camp,^ and that he compelled his battery to form in a hollow for the advan1 Memoir of Brown from the " Port Folio ; " Nilea, viL 32.
* Wilkiiison*s Memoirs, iii. 402.
M14. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 409
tage of elevating the pieces to fire at the opposite
heights.^ Winfield Scott, who was one of Brown's
warmest friends, described him as full of zeal and
vigor, but not a technical soldier, and but little acquainted with organization, tactics, police, and camp*
duties in general.^ The promotion of an officer so
inexperienced to the most important command on
the frontier, gave a measure of Armstrong's boldness and judgment.
The six new brigadiers were also well chosen. They
were Alexander Macomb, T. A. Smith, Daniel Bissell,
Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, and Meazer W.
Ripley, all colonels of the regular army, selected for
their merits. Aj-mstrong supplied Brown's defects of
education by giving him the aid of Winfield Scott
and Ripley, who were sent to organize brigades at
Niagara.
The energy thus infused by Armstrong into the
regular army lasted for half a century ; but perhaps
his abrupt methods were better shown in another instance, which brought upon him the displeasure of the
President. Against Harrison, Armstrong from the
first entertained a prejudice. Believing him to be
weak and pretentious, the Secretary of War showed
the opinion by leaving him in nominal command in
the northwest, but sending all his troops in different
directions, without consulting him even in regard
to movements within his own military department.
^ Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 65.
* Autobiography, p. 118.
410 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch.1$.
Harrison, taking just offence, sent his resignation as
major-general, May 11, 1814, but at the same time
wrote to Grovernor Shelby of Kentucky a letter which
caused the governor to address to the President a remonstrance against accepting the resignation.^
At that moment Armstrong and Madison were discussing the means of promoting Andrew Jackson in
the regular service for his success in the Creek campaigns. No commission higher than that of brigadier
was then at their disposal, and a commission as brigadier was accordingly prepared for Jackson May 22,
with a brevet of major-general.^ Harrison's resignation had been received by Armstrong two days before
issuing Jackson's brevet, and had been notified to the
President, who was then at Montpelier.* The President replied May 25, suggesting that in view of Harrison's resignation, the better way would be to send a
commission as major-general directly to Jackson :
" I suspend a final decision, however, till I see you,
which will be in two or three days after the arrival of
this." * No sooner did Armstrong receive the letter,
than without waiting for the President's return he
wrote to Jackson, May 28 : " Since the date of my
letter of the 24th Major-General Harrison has resigned
* Dawson, p. 436 ; Lossing, p. 663.
' Armstrong to Jackson, May 23, 1814; Madison's Works,
iii. 376.
< Armstrong to Madison, May 20, 1814 ; Madison's Worka^
iii. 375.
* Madison's Works, iii. 375.
1814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 41!^
his commission in the armj, and thus is created ^
vacancy in that grade, which I hasten to fill with your
name." ^
Armstrong's course was irregular^ and his account
to Jackson of the circumstances was incorrect; for
Harrison's resignation had been received before, not
after, Armstrong's letter of the 24th. Madison be*
lieved that Armstrong wished to appear as the source
of favor to the army. Armstrong attributed Madison's hesitation to the wish of Madison and Monroe
that Harrison, rather than Jackson, should take command of Mobile and New Orleans.^ Both suspicions
might be wrong or right ; but Aj-mstrong's conduct,
while betraying the first motive, suggested the fear
that the President might change his mind ; and Harrison believed that the President would have done
so, had not Armstrong's abrupt action made it impossible. "The President expressed his great regret,"
said Harrison's biographer ,8 " that the letter of Governor Shelby had not been received earlier, as in that
case the valuable services of General Harrison would
have been preserved to the nation in the ensuing
campaign."
Little as the President likea Jiis Secretary of War,
his antipathy was mild when compared with that of
Monroe. The failure of the Canada campaign gave a
* Madison's Works, iii. 377.
' Kosciusko Armstrong's Notice of J. Q. Adams's Eulogy on
James Monroe, p. 32, note.
• Dawson, p. 436.^,
412 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1«.
serious blow to Armstrong ; but he had still recovered
Detroit, and was about to finish the Creek war. BGs
hold upon the army was becoming strong. His enemies charged him with ambition ; they said he was
systematically engaged in strengthening his influence
by seducing the young officers of talents into his personal support, teaching them to look for appreciation
not to the President but to himself, and appointing to
office only his own tools, or the sons of influential
men. He was believed to favor a conscription, and
to aim at the position of lieutenant-general. These
stories were constantly brought to Monroe, and drove
him to a condition of mind only to be described as
rabid. He took the unusual step of communicating
them to the President,^ with confidential comments
that, if known to Armstrong, could hardly have failed
to break up the Cabinet.
''It is painful to me to make this communication to
you," wrote the Secretary of State Dec. 27, 1813 ;* ''nor
should I do it if I did not most conscientiously believe
that this man, if continued in office, will ruin not you
and the Administration only, but the whole Bepubliean
party and cause. He has already gone far to do it, and
it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will
soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections
to him, if the above facts are true, • • . he wants a
head fit for his station. Indolent except to improper
purposes, he is incapable of that combination and activ^ Qilman's Monroe, p. 114.
* Monroe to Madison, Dec 27, 1813 ; Monroe MSS. State
Department Archives.
1814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 415
ity which the times require. My advice to yon, there*
fore, is to remove him at once. The near prospect of a
conscription, adopted and acted on without your approbation or knowledge, is a sufficient reason. The burning of Newark, if done by his orders, is another. The
failure to place troops at Fort George is another. In
short there are abundant reasons for it. His removal
for either of the three would revive the hopes of our
party now desponding, and give a stimulus to measures.
I do not however wish you to act on my advice, — consult any in whom you have confidence. Mr. A. has, as
you may see, few friends, and some of them cling to
him rather as I suspect from improper motives, or on
a presumption that you support him."
Armstrong's faults were beyond dispute, but his
abilities were very coasiderable ; and the President
justly thought that nothing would be gained by dismissing him, even to restore Monroe to the War Department. Armstrong, struggling with the load of
incapable officers and insufficient means, for which
Madison and Congress were responsible, required the
firm support of his chief and his colleagues, as well
as of the army and of Congress, to carry the burden
of the war ; but he had not a friend to depend upon.
Secretary Jones was as hostile as Monroe. Pennsylvania and Virginia equally distrusted him, and the
fate of any public man distrusted by Pennsylvania
and Virginia was commonly fixed in advance. Armstrong was allowed to continue his preparations for
the next campaign, but Monroe remained actively hostile. In a private letter to Crawford, written prob-
414 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1«.
ablj about the month of May, 1814, and preserved
with a memorandum that it was not sent, Monroe
said : ^ —
" There is now no officer free to command to whom
the public looks with any sort of confidence or even hope.
Izard stands next, but he is as you see otherwise engaged [on a court of inquiry on Wilkinson]. Thus the
door is left open for some new pretender, and Mr.
Armstrong is that pretender. This has been his object
from the beginning. . . . The whole affair is beyond my
control."
Thus the elements of confusion surrounding Armstrong were many. A suspicious and hesitating
President ; a powerful and jealous Secretary of State ;
a South Carolinian major-general, educated in the
French engineers, commanding on Lake Ohamplain ;
a Pennsylvania schoolmaster, of Quaker parentage,
without military knowledge, commanding at Sackett's
Harbor and Niagara ; a few young brigadiers eager
to distinguish themselves, and an army of some thirty
thousand men, — these were the elements with which
Armstrong was to face the whole military power of
England; for Paris capitulated March 81, and the
war in Europe was ended.
In one respect, Armstrong's conduct seemed inconsistent with the idea of selfishness or intrigue.
The duty of organizing a court martial for the trial
of William Hull fell necessarily upon him. Hull's
defence must inevitably impeach Hull's superiors ;
^ Monroe MSS. State Department Archives.
1814. MONBOE AND ABMSTKQNG. 415
hiB acquittal was possible only on the ground that the
OovemmeUt had been criminally negligent in supporting him. As far as Armstrong was interested
in the result, he was concerned in proving the incapacity of his predecessor Eustis, and of the President,
in their management of the war. He could have had
no personal object to gain in procuring the conviction of Hull, but he might defend his own course by
proving the imbecility of Dearborn.
The President ordered a court martial on Hull
before Armstrong entered the War Department. A.
J. Dallas drew up the specifications, and inserted,
contrary to his own judgment, a charge of treason
made by the Department. The other charges were
cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-like conduct.
Monroe, while temporarily at the head of the Department, organized the first court to meet at Philadelphia Feb. 25, 1818. Major-General Wade Hampton
was to preside.
Before the trial could be held, Armstrong came
into oflSce, and was obliged to order the members of
the court to active service. Hampton was sent to
Lake Champlain, and when his campaign ended in
November, 1813, he returned under charges resem-
bling those against HuU.^ Finding that neither Wilkinson nor Armstrong cared to press them, and satisfied that no inquiry could be impartial, Hampton
* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 24, and Dec. 8, 1813. State
Papers, Military Affairs, p. 480. Order of Arrest Wilkinson's
Memoirs, iiL Appendix v.
416 HISTOEY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1«.
determined to settle the question by once more sending in his resignation,^ which he did in March, 1814,
when it was accepted. Armstrong in effect acquitted
Hampton by accepting his resignation, and never publicly affirmed any charge against him until after
Hampton's death, when he attributed to the majorgeneral '' much professional error and great moral
depravity." ^ Hampton's opinion of Armstrong could
be gathered only from his conduct and his letters to
the Secretary of War, but was not materially differ<ent from Armstrong's opinion of Hampton.
Meanwhile Hull waited for trial. During the summer of 1818 he saw nearly all his possible judges
disgraced and demanding courts martial like himself.
Hampton was one; Wilkinson another; Dearborn a
third. Dearborn had been removed from command
of his army in face of the enemy, and loudly called
ior a court of inquiry. Instead of granting the request, the President again assigned him to duty in
•command of Military District No. 3, comprising the
<;ity of New York, and also made him President of
the court martial upon General Hull.
The impropriety of such a selection could not be
denied. Of all men in the United States, Dearborn
was most deeply interested in the result of Hull's
trial, and the President, next to Dearborn, would be
inost deeply injured by Hull's acquittal. The judg^ Defence of General Hampton; ''National InteUigenoery*
June 7, 1814.
* Notices, etc., iL 26.
II
1814. MONROE AND ARMSTRONG. 41T
ment of Dearborn, or of any court over which Dearbom presided, in a matter which affected both court
and government so closely could not command respect. That Armstrong lent himself to such a measure was a new trait of character never explained ; but
that Madison either ordered or permitted it showed
that he must have been unconscious either of Dearbom's responsibility for Hull's disaster, or of his
own.
Hull offered no objection to his court, and the trial
began at Albany, Jan. 3, 1814, Dearborn presiding,
and Martin Yan Buren acting as special judge-advocate. March 26 the court sentenced Hull to be shot
to death for cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficerlike conduct. April 25 President Madison approved
the sentence, but remitted the execution, and Hull's
name was ordered to be struck from the army roll.
That some one should be punished for the loss of
Detroit was evident, and few persons were likely to
complain because Hull was a selected victim; but
many thought that if Hull deserved to be shot, other
men, much higher than he in office and responsibility, merited punishment ; and the character of the
court-martial added no credit to the Government,
which in effect it acquitted of blame.
VOL. VII. — 27
Table 457B
HISTORY
or THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE SEOOND ADMINISmiTION OF
JAMES MADISON
By henry ^ADAMS
Vol. II.
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
X9IX
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
CKAPTBB PAOB
I. Massachusetts Decides 1
II. Chippawa and Lundt's Lake 24
m. Fort Erie 62
IV. Plattsburq 91
y. Bladensburg 120
VI. Baltimore 149
VII. Sloops-of-war and Privateers 174
VIII. Exhaustion 212
IX. Congress and Currency • • 239
X. Congress and Armt ...•••••• 26S
XI. The Hartford Convention *. 287
XII. New Orleans in Danger 811
Xm. The Artillery Battle 340
XIV. The Battle of New Orleans 867
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
CHAPTER L
At the beginning of the year 1814, the attitude of
New England pleased no one, and perhaps annoyed
most the New England people themselves, who were
conscious of showing neither dignity, power, courage,
nor intelligence. Nearly one half the people of the
five New England States supported the war, but were
paralyzed by the other half, which opposed it. Of
the peace party, one half wished to stop the war, but
was paralyzed by the other half, which threatened to
desert their leaders at the first overt act of treason.
In this dead-lock every one was dissatisfied, but no
one seemed disposed to yield.
Such a situation could not last. In times of revolution treason might be necessary, but inert perversity could at no time serve a useful purpose. Yet
ike Massachusetts Federalists professed only a wish
to remain inert. Josiah Quincy, who fretted at restraints, and whose instincts obliged him to act as
energetically as he talked, committed his party to
VOL. VIII. — 1
2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
the broad assertion that ^^ a moral and religious people" could not express admiration for heroism displayed in a cause they disapproved. Thej would
defend Massachusetts only by waiting to be invaded ;
and if their safety depended on their possessing the
outlet of Lake Champlain, they would refuse to seize
it if in doing so they should be obliged to cross the
Canadian line. With one accord Massachusetts Federalists reiterated that imtil their territory should be
actually invaded,^ they would not take arms. After
January 1, 1814, when news of the battle of Leipzig
arrived, the dreaded invasion of New England became imminent ; but the Federalists, officially and
privately, insisted on their doctrine of self-defence.
*^ In the tumult of arms," said Governor Strong in his
speech to the legislature, January 12, 1814, ^^the passions of men are easily inflamed by artful misrepresentations; they are apt to lose sight of the origin of a
contest, and to forget, either in the triumph of victory
or the mortification of defeat, that the whole weight of
guilt and wretchedness occasioned by war is chargeable
upon that government which unreasonably begins the
conflict, and upon those of its subjects who, voluntarily
and without legal obligation, encourage and support it."
The Massachusetts Senate echoed the sentiment
in language more emphatic : —
^^ Beyond that submission which laws enacted agreeably to the Constitution make necessary, and that selfdefence which the obligation to repel hostile invasions
justifies, a people can give no encouragement to a war
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECmES. 8
of saoh a character without becoming partakers in its
guilt, and rendering themselves obnoxious to those just
retributions of Divine vengeance by which, sooner or
later, the authors and abettors of such a war will be
assuredly overtaken."
The House of Representatives could see but one
contingency that warranted Massachusetts in making voluntary exertion : —
*^It is only after the failure of an attempt to negotiate, prosecuted with evidence of these dispositions on
the part of our Administration, that any voluntary support of this unhappy war can be expected from our
constituents."
In thus tempting blows from both sides, Massachusetts could hardly fail to suffer more than by choosing
either alternative. Had she declared independence,
England might have protected and rewarded her.
Had she imitated New York in declaring for the
Union, probably the Union would not have allowed
her to suffer in the end. The attempt to resist both
belligerents forfeited the forbearance of both. The
displeasure of Great Britain was shown by a new
proclamation, dated April 26, 1814, including the
ports of New England in the blockade; so that the
whole coast of the Union, from New Brunswick to
Texas, was declared to be closed to commerce by " a
naval force adequate to maintain the said blockade
in the most rigorous and effective manner." ^
^ Proclamation of Admiral Cochianey April 25, 1814 ; Niles,
vLl82.
4 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
However annoying the blockade might be, it was
a trifling evil compared with other impending dangers from Great Britain. Invasion might be expected, and its object was notorious. England was
known to regret the great concessions she had made
in the definitive treaty of 1788. She wished especially to exclude the Americans from the fisheries,
and to rectify the Canadian boundary by recovering
a portion of Maine, then a part of Massachusetts.
If Massachusetts by her neutral attitude should compel President Madison to make peace on British
terms, Massachusetts must lose the fisheries and
part of the District of Maine ; nor was it likely that
any American outside of New England would greatly
regret her punishment.
The extreme Federalists felt that their position
could not be maintained, and they made little concealment of their wish to commit the State in open
resistance to the Union. They represented as yet
only a minority of their party; but in conspiracies,
men who knew what they wanted commonly ended
by controlling the men who did not. Pickering was
not popular ; but he had the advantage of following
a definite plan, familiar for ten years to the party
leaders, and founded on the historical idea of a New
England Confederation.^ For Pickering, disunion
offered no terrors. "On the contrary," he wrote,
July 4, 1813, "I believe an immediate separation
* Pickering to John Lowell, Nov, 7, 1814; New England
Federalism, p. 404.
U14. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 5
I
would be a real blessing to the ^good old thirteen
States/ as John Randolph once called them." ^ His
views on this subject were expressed with more or
less fidelity and with much elaboration in a pamphlet
published in 1818 by his literary representative, John
Lowell.^ His policy was as little disguised as his
theoretical opinions ; and in the early part of the
year 1814, under the pressure of the embargo, he
thought that the time had come for pressing his
plan for a fourth time on the consideration of his
party. Without consulting his old associates of the
Essex Junto, he stimulated action among the people
and in the State legislature.
The first step was, as usual, to hold town-meetings
and adopt addresses to the General Court. Some
forty towns followed this course, and voted addresses
against the embargo and the war. Their spirit was
fairly represented by one of the most outspoken,
adopted by a town-meeting at Amherst, over which
Noah Webster presided Jan. 8, 1814.* The people
voted —
'' That the representatives of this town in the General
Court are desired to use their influence to induce that
honorable body to take the most vigorous and decisive
measures compatible with the Constitution to put an end
1 Pickering to Gkorge Logan, July 4, 1813 ; New England
Federalism, p. 391.
* Thoughts in Answer to a Question respecting the Division of
the States; by a Massachusetts Farmer.
• The Palladium, Feb. 1, 1814.
6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. l.
to this hopeless war, and to restore to us the blessings
of peace. What measures it will be proper to take, we
pretend not to prescribe ; but whatever measures they
shall think it expedient to adopt, either separately or in
conjunction with the neighboring States, they may rely
upon our faithful support." ,
The town of Newbury in Essex County made itself
conspicuous by adopting, January 81, a memorial
inviting bloodshed : —
^^We remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions which dwindle into insignificance when compared with those which we are called on to endure. The
rights * which we have received from Grod we will never
yield to man.' We call on our State legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges to assert
which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess
ourselves ready to resist unto blood. We pray your
honorable body to adopt measures immediately to secure to us especially our undoubted right of trade within
our State. We are ourselves ready to aid you in securing it to us to the utmost of our power, ^ peaceably if
we can, forcibly if we must ; * and we pledge to you the
sacrifice of our lives and property in support of whatever measures the dignity and liberties of this free, sovereign, and independent State may seem to your wisdom
to demand."
The voters of Newbury were constituents of Pickering. Their address could not have reached him at
Washington when a few days afterward he wrote to
Samuel Putnam, an active member of the Gleneral
Court, then in session, urging that the time for re-
1S14. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES* T
monstrances had passed, and the time for action had
come : ^ —
^^Declarations of this sort by Massachusetts, especially if concurred in by the other New England States^
would settle the business at once. But though made
now by Massachusetts alone, you surely may rely on the
co-operation of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and I doubt not of Vermont and New York.
With the executives and legislatures of most, and the
representatives of all of them, you can freely communicate. Ought there not to be a proposal of a convention
of delegates from those six States?"
The project of a New England convention was
well understood to violate the Constitution, and for
that reason alone the cautious Federalists disliked
and opposed it. Doubtless a mere violence done to
the law did not necessarily imply a wish for disunion.
The Constitution was violated more frequently by its
friends than by its enemies, and often the extent of
such violations, measured the increasing strength of
the Union. In such matters intent was everything ;
and the intent of the proposed New England convention was made evident by the reluctance with which
the leaders slowly yielded to the popular demand.
The addresses of the towns to the General Court
were regularly referred to a committee, vrhich reported February 18,^ in a spirit not altogether satis*
factory to the advocates of action : —
^ Pickering to Putnam, Feb. 4, 1814; New England Federalism, p. 391.
' Report of Ck>mmittee ; Nilea, VL 4-8.
8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
** Whenever the national compact is violated and the
citizens of this State are oppressed by cmel and unauthorized laws, the legislature is bound to interpose its
power and wrest from the oppressor his victim. This
is the spirit of our Union, and thus it has been explained
by the very man who now sets at defiance all the principles of his early political life. ... On the subject of
a convention, the committee observe that they entertain
no doubt of the right of the legislature to invite other
States to a convention and to join it themselves for the
great purposes of consulting for the general good, and
of procuring Amendments to the Constitution whenever
they find that the practical construction given to it by
the rulers for the time being is contrary to its true spirit
and injurious to their immediate constituents. • • • This
was the mode proposed by Mr. Madison^ in answer to
objections made as to the tendency of the general government to usurp upon that of the States.''
The argumentmn ad personam commonly proved
only weakness. Madison's authority on these points
had always been rejected by the Federalists when
in power ; and even he had never asserted the right
of States to combine in convention for resistance to
measures of the national government, as the (Jeneral
Court was asked to do. So revolutionary was the
step that the committee of both Houses shrank from
it: "They have considered that there are reasons
which render it inexpedient at the present moment
to exercise this power." They advised that the subject should not be immediately decided, but should
^ Fedeialisty no. 46.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 9
be referred to the representatives soon to be returned
for the next General Court, who would " come from
the people still more fully possessed of their views
and wishes as to the all-important subject of obtaining by future compact, engrafted into the present
Constitution, a permanent security against future
abuses of power, and of seeking effectual redress
for the grievances and oppressions now endured."
To the people, therefore, the subject of a New England convention was expressly referred. The issue
was well understood, and excluded all others in the
coming April election. So serious was the emergency, and so vital to the Administration and the
war was the defeat of a New England convention,
that the Republicans put forward no party candidate, but declared their intention to vote for Samuel
Dexter, a Federalist, — although Dexter, in a letter
dated February 14, reiterated his old opinions hostile to the embargo, and professed to be no further
a Republican than that he offered no indiscriminate
opposition to the war. His Federalism was that of
Rufus King and Bayard.
"What good is to be expected," he asked,* "from
creating division when engaged in war with a powerful
nation that has not yet explicitly shown that she is willing to agree to reasonable terms of peace ? Why make
publications and speeches to prove that we are absolved
from allegiance to the national government^ and hint
* Dexter to the Electors of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1814;
Niles, vi. d.
10 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. C?h. 1.
that an attempt to divide the empire might be justified?
• • • The ferocious contest that would be the effect of
attempting to skulk from a participation of the burdens
of war would not be the greatest calamity."
Under such circumstances the load of the embargo
became too heavy for the Massachusetts Republicans
to carry. They tried in every manner to throw it ofif,
as persistently as President Madison tried to hold it
on. Their candidate, Dexter, argued strongly against
the restrictive system in his letter consenting to
stand. They drew a distinction between the restrictive system and the war ; but even in regard to the
war they required not active support, but only abstinence from active resistance. The Federalists used
the embargo to stimulate resistance to the war, and
advocated a New England convention under cover of
the unpopularity of commercial restrictions.
With the pertinacity which was his most remarkable trait, Madison dung to the embargo all winter
in face of overwhelming motives to withdraw it A
large majority in Congress disliked it. England having recovered her other markets could afford to conquer the American as she had conquered the Euro.pean, and to wait a few months for her opportunity.
The embargo bankrupted the Treasury, threatened to
stop the operations of war, and was as certain as any
ordinary antecedent of a consequent result to produce a New England convention. Yet the President
maintained it until the news from Europe caused a
panic in Congress.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDEa 11
The Massachusetts election took place in the first
days of April, while Congress was engaged in repealing the embargo and the system of commercial restrictions. The result showed that Dexter might
have carried the State and defeated the project of a
New England convention, had the embargo been repealed a few weeks earlier, A very large vote, about
one hundred and two thousand in aggregate, was
cast. The Federalists, whose official vote in 1813
was 66,764, threw 66,374 votes; while the Republicans, who cast 42,789 votes in 1813, munbered 46,369
in 1814.
The reduction of the Federalist majority from fourteen thousand to eleven thousand was not the only
reason for believing that Dexter might have carried
Massachusetts but for the embargo. At the same
time William Plumer, supported like Dexter by the
Republicans, very nearly carried New Hampshire,
and by gaining a majority of the executive council,
precluded the possibility that New Hampshire as a
State could take part in a New England convention.
The President's Message recommending a repeal of
the embargo was sent to Congress March 31, and the
Act of Repeal was signed April 14. Two weeks later,
April 28, the New York election took place. To this
election both parties anxiously looked. The Administration press admitted that all was lost if New York
joined Massachusetts,^ and the New England Federalists knew that a decisive defeat in New York would
1 National Intelligencer, May 5, 1814.
12 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
leave them to act alone. The returns were watched
with such anxiety as had seldom attended a New
Y6rk election, although no general State officer was
to be chosen.
In May, 1813, Governor Tompkins carried the
State by a majority of only 8,506, and the Federalists in the House of Assembly numbered sixty, while
the Republicans numbered fifty-two. The city of
New York and the counties of Queens, Westchester,
Dutchess, Columbia, Rensselaer, and Washington —
the entire range of x^ounties on the east shore of the
Hudson — were then Federalist. The counties of
Albany, Montgomery, Oneida, Otsego, Madison, and
Ontario in the centre of the State were also Federalist. At the congressional election of 1812, twenty
Federalists and six Republicans had been chosen.
The May election of 1814 was for the State Assembly and for Congress. No opportunity was given for
testing the general opinion of the State on a single
issue, but no one could mistake what the general
opinion was. City and State reversed- their political
character. The Republicans recovered possession of
the Assembly with a large majority of seventy-four
to thirty-eight, and the Congressional delegation
numbered twenty-one Republicans and only six
Federalists.
The result was supposed to be largely due to a dislike of the New England scheme and to a wish among
New York Federalists that it should be stopped. The
energy of the demonstration in New York marked
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 13
the beginning of an epoch in national character ; yet
the change came too late to save Massachusetts from
falling for the first time into the hands of the extreme Federalists. The towns of Massachusetts chose
as their representatives to the General Court a majority bent on taking decisive action against the war.
Connecticut and Rhode Island were controlled by the
same impulse, and the discouraged Republicans could
interpose no further resistance. A New England
convention could be prevented only by a treaty of
peace.
The effect of the attitude of New England was felt
throughout the Union, and, combined with the news
from Europe, brought a general conviction that peace
must be made. No man in the Union was more
loyal to the war than Governor Shelby of Kentucky,
but Shelby already admitted that peace had become
necessary,
" I may in confldence confess to you," wrote Shelby,
April 8,^ ^^ that I lament over my country that she has
in her very bosom a faction as relentless as the fire that
is unquenchable, capable of thwarting her best interests,
and whose poisonous breath is extending to every corner
of the Union. There is but one way to cure the evil, and
that is an awful and desperate one ; and in the choice of
evils we had better take the least. Were we unanimous
I should feel it less humiliating to be conquered, as I
verily beUeve that the Administration will be driven to
peace on any terms by the opposition to the war."
1 Shelby to J. J. Crittenden, April 8, 1814; Life of Crittenden, p. 31.
14 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. L
If Governor Shelby had reached this conclusion before he knew the result of the Massachusetts election,
the great mass of citizens who had been from the first
indifferent to the war felt that peace on any terms
could no longer be postponed. Mere disunion was
not the result chiefly to be feared. That disunion
might follow a collapse of the national government
was possible ; but for the time, Massachusetts seemed
rather disposed to sacrifice the rest of the Union for
her own power than to insist on a separation. Had
the Eastern States suffered from the hardships of war
they might have demanded disunion in despair ; but
in truth New England was pleased at the contrast
between her own prosperity and the sufferings of her
neighbors. The blockade and the embargo brought
wealth to her alone. The farming and manufacturing
industries of New England never grew more rapidly
than in the midst of war and commercial restrictions.^
" Machinery for manufactures, etc., and the fruits of
household industry increase beyond calculation," said
a writer in the " Connecticut Herald " in July, 1813.
" Wheels roll, spindles whirl, shuttles fly. We shall
export to other States many more productions of
industry than ever were exported in any one former
season." Manufactures were supposed to amount in
value to fifteen or twenty million dollars a year. The
Federalists estimated the balance due by the Southem States to New England at six million dollars a
^ Letter of Jan. 15, 1814; *' National Intelligencer," Jan. 27,
1814.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 15
year.^ The New England banks were believed to
draw not less than half a million dollars every month
from the South.
^* We are far from rejoicing at this state of things,"
wrote a Connecticut Federalist;* "and yet we cannot
but acknowledge the hand of retributive justice in inflicting the calamities of war with so much more severity on
that section of the Union which has so rashly and so.
unmercifully persisted in their determination to commence hostilities. The pressure of this balance is sensibly felt, and will continue to increase as long as the war
continues."
John Lowell declared^ that "the banks are at
their wits' end to lend their capital, and money is
such a drug . • • that men against their consciences,
their honor, their duty, their professions and promises, are willing to lend it secretly to support the very
measures which are intended and calculated for their
ruin." To avoid the temptation of lending money to
support Madison's measures, many investors bought
British government bills of exchange at twenty to
twenty-two per cent discount. These bills were offered for sale in quantities at Boston; and perhaps
the most legitimate reason for their presence there
was that they were taken by New England contractors in payment for beef and flour furnished to the
British commissariat in Canada.
1 The Palladium, July 16, 1814.
« The Palladium, July 16, 1814.
• Road to Ruin, No. 6; The Examiner, Jan. S, 1814.
16 raSTORT OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
While New England thus made profitB from both
Bides, and knew not what to do with the specie that
flowed into her banks, the rest of the comitrj was
already insolvent, and seemed bent on bankruptcy.
In March, 1814, the legislature of Fennsylvania
passed a bill for the creation of forty-one new banks.
March 19 Governor Snyder vetoed it.^
^^ It is a fact well ascertamed," said Governor Snyder,
*^ that immense sums of specie have been withdrawn from
the banks in Pennsylvania and certain other States to
pay balances for British goods which Eastern mercantile
cupidity has smuggled into the United States. The
demand for specie has in consequence been and is still
so great that the banks in Philadelphia and in some
other parts have stopped discounting any new paper.
I ask a patriotic legislature, Is this an auspicious era
to try so vast an experiment? Shall we indirectly aid
our internal and external enemies to destroy our funds
and embarrass the government by the creating of fortyone new banks which must have recourse for specie to
that already much exhausted source? Is there at this
time an intelligent man in Pennsylvania who believes
that a bank-note of any description is the representative
of specie?"
The Pennsylvania legislature instantly overrode
Governor Snyder's veto and chartered the new banks,
which were, according to the governor, insolvent
before they had legal existence. In ordinary times
such follies punished and corrected themselves in
regular course ; but in 1814 the follies and illusions
» Niles, vi. 94.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDE& 17
of many years concentrated their mischiefe on the
national government) which was already imequal to
the burden of its own. The war was practically at
an end as far as the govemment conducted it. The
army could not show a regiment with ranks more
than half full.^ The first three months of the year
produced less than six thousand recruits.^ The government could defend the frontier only at three or
four fortified points. On the ocean^ government vessels were scarcely to be seen. The Treasury was as
insolvent as the banks, and must soon cease even
the pretence of meeting its obligations.
The Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by law
to borrow twenty-five millions and needing forty,
offered a loan for only ten millions shortly before
Congress adjourned. In Boston the government brokers advertised that the names of subscribers should
be kept secret,^ while the Boston " Gazette '* of April
14 declared that ^^ any man who lends his money
to the government at the present time will forfeit
all claim to common honesty and common courtesy
among all true friends to the country." The offers, received May 2, amounted to thirteen millions,
at rates varying from seventy-five to eighty-eight.
Jacob Barker, a private banker of New York, offered
five million dollars on his single account. The seo1 Scotfs Autobiography, pp. 114, 118, 121.
' Return, etc. ; State Papers, Military Affairs^ L 521.
* Advertisement of Gilbert & Deane, Boston ''Chronicle,''
April 14, 1814.
VOL. YIIL— >2
18 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa CmL
retary knew that Barker's bid was not substantial,
but he told the President that if it had been refused
^ we could not have obtained the ten millions without
allowing terms much less favorable to the gOTemment."^ The terms were bad at best. The secretary obtained bids more or less substantial for about
nine millions at eighty-eight, with the condition that
if he should accept lower terms for any part of the
sixteen millions still to be offered, the same terms
should be conceded to Barker and his associates.
The operation was equivalent to borrowing nine millions on an understanding that the terms should be
fixed at the close of the campaign. Of this loan
Boston offered two millions, and was allotted about
one million dollars.
The event proved that Campbell would have done
better to accept all solid bids without regard to rate,
for the government could have afforded to pay two
dollars for one within a twelve-month, rather than
stop payments ; but Campbell was earnest to effect
his loan at eighty-eight, and accordingly accepted
only four million dollars besides Barker's offer. With
these four millions, with whatever part of five millions could be obtained from Barker, with interestbearing Treasury notes limited to ten million dollars,^
and with the receipts from taxes, the Treasury was
to meet demands aggregating about forty millions
^ Secretary Campbell to Madison, May 4, 1814; Madison
MSS.y State Department Archives.
> Act of March 4, 1814 ; Annals, 1813-1814, p. 2795.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 19
for the year ; for the chance was small that another
loan could succeed, no matter what rate should be
offered.
For this desperate situation of the government
New England was chiefly responsible. In pursuing
their avowed object of putting an end to the war the
Federalists obtained a degree of success surprising
even to themselves, and explained only by general
indifference toward the war and the government.
No one could suppose that the New England Federalists, after seeing their object within their grasp,
would desist from effecting it. They had good reason
to think that between Madison's obstinacy and their
own, the national government must cease its funotions, — that the States must resume their sovereign
powers, provide for their own welfare, and enter into
some other political compact ; but they could not
suppose that England would forego her advantages,
or consent to any peace which should not involve the
overthrow of Madison and his party.
In such conditions of society morbid excitement
was natural. Many examples in all periods of history could be found to illustrate every stage of a
mania so common. The excitement of the time was
not confined to New England. A typical American
man-of-the-world was Gouverneur Morris. Cool, easytempered, incredulous, with convictions chiefly practical, and illusions largely rhetorical, Morris delivered
an oration on the overthrow of Napoleon to a New
York audience, June 29, 1814.
20 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
^^ And thou too, Democracy ! savage and wild ! '' began Morris's peroration, — ^^ thou who wouldst bring
down the virtuous and wise to the level of folly and
guilt! thou child of squinting envy and self -tormenting
spleen ! thou persecutor of the great and good ! — see !
though it blast thine eyeballs, — see the objects of thy
deadly hate! See lawful princes surrounded by loyal
subjects! . . . Let those who would know the idol of
thy devotion seek him in the island of Elba I "
The idea that American democracy was savage
and wild stood in flagrant contraat to the tameness
of its behavior; but the belief was a part of conservative faith, and Gouvemeur Morris was not ridiculed, even for bad taste, by the society to which he
belonged, because he called by inappropriate epithets
the form of society which most of his fellow-citizens
preferred. In New England, where democracy was
equally reviled, kings and emperors were not equally
admired. The austere virtue of the Congregational
Church viewed the subject in a severer light, and
however extreme might be the difference of conviction between clergymen and democrats, it was not
a subject for ridicule.
To men who believed that every calamity was a
Divine judgment, politics and religion could not be
made to accord. Practical politics, being commonly
an affair of compromise and relative truth, — a himian
attempt to modify the severity of Nature's processes,
— could not expect sympathy from the absolute and
abstract behests of religion. Least of all could war^
mi. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 21
even in its most necessary form, be applauded or
encouraged by any clergyman who followed the precepts of Christ. The War of 1812 was not even a
necessary war. Only in a metaphysical or dishonest
sense could any clergyman affirm that war was more
necessary in 1812 than in any former year since the
peace of 1783. Diplomacy had so confused its causes
that no one could say for what object Americans had
intended to fight, — still less, after the peace in
Europe, for what object they continued their war.
Assuming the conquest of Canada and of Indian
Territory to be the motive most natural to the depraved instincts of human nature, the clergy saw
every reason for expectmg a judgment.
In general, the New England clergy did not publicly or violently press these ideas. The spirit of
their class was grave and restrained rather than
noisy. Yet a few eccentric or exceptional clergymen
preached and published Fast-day sermons that threw
discredit upon the whole Congregational Church.
The chief offenders were two, — David Osgood, of
the church at Medford, and Elijah Parish, a graduate
of Dartmouth College, settled over the parish of Byfield in the town of Newbury, where political feeling
was strong. Parish's Fast-day sermon of April 7,
1814, immediately after the election which decided
a New England convention, was probably the most
extreme made from the pulpit : —
^^ Israel's woes in Egypt terminated in giving them
the fruits of their own labors. This was a powerful
22 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
motive for them to dissolve their connection with the
Ancient Dominion. Though their fathers had found
their union with Egypt pleasant and profitable, though
they had been the most opulent section in Egypt, yet
since the change of the administration their schemes
had been reversed, their employments changed, their
prosperity destroyed, their vexations increased beyond
all sufferance. They were tortured to madness at seeing
the fruit of their labors torn from them to support a*
profligate administration. . . . They became discouraged ;
they were perplexed. Moses and others exhorted them
not to despair, and assured them that one mode of relief
would prove effectual. Timid, trembling, alarmed, they
hardly dared to make the experiment. Finally they
dissolved the Union: they marched; the sea opened;
Jordan stopped his current; Canaan received their triumphant banners; the trees of the field clapped their
hands; the hills broke forth into songs of joy; they
feasted on the fruits of their own labors. Such success
awaits a resolute and pious people."
Although Parish's rhetoric was hardly in worse
taste than that of Gouverneur Morris, such exhortations were not held in high esteem by the great
body of the Congregational clergy, whose teachings
were studiously free from irreverence or extravagance in the treatment of political subjects.^ A
poor and straitened but educated class, of whom
not one in four obtained his living wholly from his
salary, the New England ministers had long ceased
to speak with the authority of their predecessors,
^ Defence of the Clergy; Concord, July, 1814.
1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 28
and were sustained even in their moderate protest
against moral wrong rather by pride of class and sincerity of conviction than by sense of power. Some
supported the war ; many deprecated disunion ; nearly all confined their opposition within the limits of
non-resistance. They held that as the war was unnecessary and unjust, no one could give it voluntary
aid without incurring the guilt of blood.
The attitude was clerical, and from that point of
view commanded a degree of respect such as was
yielded to the similar conscientiousness of the
Friends; but it was fatal to government and ruinous to New England. Nothing but confusion could
result from it if the war should continue, while the
New England church was certain to be the first
victim if peace should invigorate the Union.
CHAPTER IL
After the close of the campaign on the St. Lawrence, in November, 1813, General Wilkinson's army,
numbering about eight thousand men, sick and well,
went into winter-quarters at French Mills, on the
€anada line, about eight miles south of the St. Lawrence. Wilkinson was unfit for service, and asked
leave to remove to Albany, leaving Izard in command ; but Armstrong was not yet ready to make the
new arrangements, and Wilkinson remained with the
army during the winter. His force seemed to stand
in a good position for annoymg the enemy and interrupting communications beJeen Upper and Lower
Canada; but it lay idle between November 13 and
February 1, when, under orders from Armstrong, it
was broken up.^ Brigadier-Greneral Brown, with two
thousand men, was sent to Sackett's Harbor. The
rest of the army was ordered to fall back to Plattsburg, — a point believed most likely to attract the
enemy's notice in the spring.^
^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Jan. 20, 1814; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 625.
* Armstrong's Notices, IL 64.
18U. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 25
Wilkinson obeyed, and found himself, in March, at
Plattsburg with about four thousand effectives. He
was at enmity with superiors and subordinates alike ;
but the chief object of his antipathy was the Secretary of War. Prom Plattsburg, March 27, he wrote
a private letter to Major-General Dearborn,^ whose
hostility to the secretary was also pronounced : " I
know of his [Armstrong's] secret underworkings,
and have therefore, to take the bull by the horns,
demanded an arrest and a court-martial. . • . Good
God! I am astonished at the man's audacity, when
he must be sensible of the power I have over him."
Pending the reply to his request for a court-martial,
Wilkinson determined to make a military effort.
"My advanced post is at Champlain on this side.
I move to-day; and the day after to-morrow, if the
ice, snow, and frost should not disappear, we shall
visit the LacoUe, and take possession of that place.
This is imperiously enjoined to check the reinforcements he [Prevosl] continues to send to the Upper
Province." ^
The LacoUe was a small river, or creek, emptying
into the Sorel four or five miles beyond the boundary. According to the monthly return of the troops
commanded by Major-General de Rottenburg, the
British forces stationed about Montreal numbered,
Jan. 22, 1814, eight thousand rank-and-file present
for duty. Of these, eight hundred and eighty-five
^ Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.
* Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.
26 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.t.
were at St. John's ; six hundred and ninety were at
Isle aux Noix, with outposts at Lacadie and Lacolle
of three hundred and thirty-two men.^
Wilkinson knew that the British outpost at the
crossing of Lacolle Creek, numbering two hundred
men all told,^ was without support nearer than Isle
aux Noix ten miles away ; but it was stationed in a
stone mill, with thick walls and a solid front. He
took two twelve-poimd field-guns to batter the mill,
and crossing the boundary, March 30, with his four
thousand men, advanced four or five miles to Lacolle
Creek. The roads were obstructed and impassable,
but his troops made their way in deep snow through
the woods until they came within sight of the mill.
The guns were then placed in position and opened
fire ; but Wilkinson was disconcerted to find that
after two hours the mill was unharmed. He ventured neither to storm it nor flank it; and after
losing more than two hundred men by the fire of
the garrison, he ordered a retreat, and marched his
army back to Champlain.
With this last example of his military capacityWilkinson disappeared from the scene of active life,
where he had performed so long and extraordinary a
part. Orders arrived, dated March 24, relieving him
from duty under the form of granting his request for
a court of inquiry. Once more he passed the ordeal
^ State of the Left Division, Jan. 22, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archivea. Freer Papers, 1814, p. 17.
s James, ii. 82, 83.
Mli. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDyS LANE. 2T
of a severe investigation, and received the verdict of
acquittal; but he never was again permitted to resiune
his command in the army.
The force Wilkinson had brought from Lake OntariOy though united with that which Wade Hampton
had organized, was reduced by sickness, expiration of
enlistments, and other modes of depletion to a mere
handful when Major-Oeneral Izard arrived at Plattsburg on the first day of May. Izard's experience
formed a separate narrative, and made a part of the
autumn campaign. During the early summer the
war took a different and imexpected direction, following the steps of the new Major-General Brown;
for wherever Brown went, fighting followed.
General Brown marched from French Mills, February 13, with two thousand men. February 28, Secretary Armstrong wrote him a letter suggesting an
attack on Kingston, to be covered by a feint on
Niagara.^ Brown, on arriving at Sackett's Harbor,
consulted Chauncey, and allowed himself to be dissuaded from attacking Kingston. " By some extraordinary mental process," Armstrong tjiought,* Brown
and Chauncey "arrived at the same conclusion, — ^that
the main action, an attack on Kingston, being impracticable, the ruse, intended merely to mask it, might
do as well." Brown immediately marched with two
thousand men for Niagara.
When the secretary learned of this movement, al* Armstrong to Brown, Feb. 28, 1814; Notices, ii. 213.
t Armstrong's Notices, ii. 66.
28 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ca.%
though it was contrary to his ideas of strategy, he
wrote an encouraging letter to Brown, March 20 : ^
*' You have mistaken my meaning. . . . K you hazard
anything by this mistake, correct it promptly by returning to your post. If on the otiier hand you left the Harbor with a competent, force for its defence, go on and
prosper. Good consequences are sometimes the result
of mistakes."
The correspondence showed chiefly that neither the
secretary nor the general had a distinct idea, and
that Brown's campaign, like Dearborn's the year before, received its direction from Chauncey, whose
repugnance to attacking Kingston was invincible.
Brown was shown his mistake by Gaines, before
reaching Buffalo March 24, and leaving his troops,
he hurried back to Sackett's Harbor, " the most unhappy man alive." ^ He resumed charge of such
troops as remained at the Harbor, while Winfield
Scott formed a camp of instruction at Buffalo, and,
waiting for recruits who never came, personally drilled
the officers of all grades. Scott's energy threw into
the little army a spirit and an organization strange
to the service. Three months of instruction converted the raw troops mto soldiers.
Meanwhile Brown could do nothing at Sackett's
Harbor. The British held control of the Lake, while
Commodore Chauncey and the contractor Eckford
were engaged in building a new ship which was to
^ Lossing, p. 793.
* Brown to ArmBtrong, March 24, 1814; Lowing, p. 793.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY^ LANE. 29
be ready in July. The British nearly succeeded in
prerenting Chauncey from appearing on the Lake
during the entire season, for no sooner did Sir
James Yeo sail from Kingston in the spring than
he attempted to destroy the American magazines.
Owing to the remote situation of Sackett's Harbor
in the extreme northern comer of the State, all
supplies and war material were brought first from
the Hudson River to Oswego by way of the Mohawk
River and Oneida Lake. About twelve miles above
Oswego the American magazines were established,
and there the stores were kept until they could be
shipped on schooners, and forwarded fifty miles along
the Lake-shore to Sackett's Harbor, — always a hazardous operation in the face of an enemy's fleet.
The destruction of the magazines would have been
fatal to Chauncey, and even the capture or destruction of the schooners with stores was no trifling
addition to his difficulties.
Sir James Yeo left Kingston May 4, and appeared
off Oswego the next day, bringing a large body of
troops, numbering more than a thousand rank-andfile.* They found only about three hundred men to
oppose them, and having landed May 6, they gained
possession of the fort which protected the harbor of .
Oswego. The Americans made a resistance which
caused a loss of seventy-two men killed and wounded
to the British, among the rest Captain Mulcaster of
the Royal Navy, an active officer, who was danger*
^ James, ii. 100.
80 mSTORT OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.J.
ously wounded. The result was hardly worth the
loss. Four schooners were captured or destroyed,
and some twenty-four hundred barrels of flour, pork,
and salt, but nothing of serious importance.^ Yeo
made no attempt to ascend the river, and retired to
Kingston after destroying whatever property he could
not take away.
Although the chief American depot escaped destruction, the disgrace and discouragement remained,
that after two years of war the Americans, though
enjoying every advantage, were weaker than ever
on Lake Ontario, and could not defend even so important a point as Oswego from the attack of barely
a thousand men. Their coastwise supply of stores
to Sackett's Harbor became a difficult and dangerous undertaking, to be performed mostly by night.*
Ghaimcey ^remained practically blockaded in Sack*
ett's Harbor ; and without his fleet in control of the
Lake the army could do nothing effectual against
Kingston.
In this helplessness, Armstrong was obliged to seek
some other line on which the army could be employed against Upper Canada ; and the idea occurred
to him that although he had no fleet on Lake Ontario he had one on Lake Erie, which by a little ingenuity might enable the army to approach the heart
of Upper Canada at the extreme western end of Lake
Ontario. " Eight or even six thousand men,'* Arm*
^ Report of Sir James Yeo; Jamesy ii. 428-430.
* M. T. Woolsey to Chaancey, June 1, 1814 ; Niles, vi 266.
MU. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANK 81
fitrong wrote ^ to the President, April 80, "landed
in the bay between Point Abino and Port Erie, and
operating either on the line of the Niagara, or more
directly if a more direct route is found, against the
British post at the head of Burlington Bay, cannot
be resisted with effect without compelling the enemy
80 to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring
them within reach of our means at Sackett's Harbor
and Plattsburg."
Armstrong's suggestion was made to the President
April 80. Already time was short. The allies had
entered Paris March 81 ; the citadel of Bayonne
capitulated to Wellington April 28. In a confidential despatch dated June 8, Lord Bathurst notified
the governor-general of Canada that ten thousand
men had been ordered to be shipped immediately
for Quebec* July 5, Major-General Torrens at the
Horse-guards informed Prevost that four brigades,
— Brisbane's, Kempt's, Power's, and Robinson's;
fourteen regiments of WelUngton's best troops,—
had sailed from Bordeaux for Canada.^ Prevost could
afford in July to send westward every regular soldier
in Lower Canada, sure of replacing them at Montreal
by the month of August.
"A discrepancy in the opinions of the Cabinet,'*
according to Armstrong,* delayed adoption of a plan
' Armstrong's Notices, iL 216.
* Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives.
* Torrens to Prevost, July 5, 1805; MSS. Canadian Archives.
^ Armstrong's Notices, ii 74, 82*
82 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. GB.t.
tni June, when a compromise scheme was accepted,'
but not carried out.
^^Two causes prevented its being acted upon in ea>
tensoj' Armstrong afterward explained,* — **the one, a
total failure in getting together by militia calls and volunteer overtures a force deemed competent to a campaign
of demonstration and manoeuvre on the peninsula; the
other, an apprehension that the fleet, which had been
long inactive, would not yet be found in condition to
sustain projects requiring from it a vigorous co-operation
with the army.''
Brown might have been greatly strengthened at
Niagara by drawing from Detroit the men that could
be spared there ; but the Cabinet obliged Armstrong
to send the Detroit force — about nine hundred in
number — against Mackinaw. Early in July the
Mackinaw expedition, commanded by LieutenantColonel Croghan, started from Detroit, and August 4
it was defeated and returned. Croghan's expedition
did not even arrive in time to prevent a British
expedition from Mackinaw crossing Wisconsin and
capturing, July 19, the distant American post at
Prairie du Chien.*
Armstrong did not favor Croghan's expedition,
wishing to bring him and his two batteries to reinforce Brown, but yielded to the Secretary of the Navy,
1 Armstrong to Izard, June 11, 1814; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 33.
^ Armstrong's Notices, ii 82.
* Colonel McKay to Colonel McDouall, July 27, 1814; Report
on Canadian Archives by Douglas Brymner, 1887, p. cv.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDrS LANE. 88
who wished to capture Mackinaw,^ and to the promises of Commodore Ghauncey that on or before July 1
he would sail from Sackett's Harbor, and command
the Lake. In reliance on Chauncey, the Cabinet,
except Monroe, decided that Major-General Brown
should cross to the Canadian side, above the Falls
of Niagara, and march, with Ghauncej's support, to
Burlington Heights and to York.^
This decision was made June 7, and Armstrong
wrote to Brown, Jime 10, describing the movement
intended.* The Secretary of the Navy, he said,
thought Chauncey could not be ready before July 16 :
^^To give, however, immediate occupation to your
troops, and to prevent their blood from stagnating, why
not take Fort Erie and its garrison, stated at three or
four hundred men? Land between Point Abino and Erie
in the night; assail the Fort by land and water; push
forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa ; and be
governed by circumstances in either stopping there or
going farther. Boats may follow and feed you. If the
enemy concentrates his whole force on this line, as I think
he will, it will not exceed two thousand men.''
Brown had left Sackett's Harbor, and was at BuJGFalo
when these orders reached him. He took immediate
measures to carry them out. Besides his regular
^ Madison to the Secretary of Navy, May A^ 1814; Madison's
Works, iii. 396.
' Madison's Cabinet Memoiandum, June 7, 1814; Madison's
Works, iii 403.
• Armstrong to Brown, June 10, 1814; MSS. War Department
Becords.
voL.yiii.^S
84 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATE& Oi-t.
force, he called for volunteers to be commanded bj
Peter B. Porter ; and he wrote to Chauncey, June 21,^
an irritatmg letter, complaining of havmg received
not a line from him, and giving a sort of challenge
to the navy to meet the army before Port George, by
July 10. The letter showed that opinion in the army
ran against the navy, and particularly against Chauncey, whom Brown evidently regarded as a sort of
naval Wilkinson. In truth. Brown could depend
neither upon Chaimcey nor upon volunteers. The
whole force he could collect was hardly enough to
cross the river, and little exceeded the three thousand
men on whose presence at once in the boats Alexander Smyth had insisted eighteen months before, in
order to capture Port Erie.
So famous did Brown's little army become, that
the details of its force and organization retained an
interest equalled only by that which attached to the
frigates and sloops-of-war. Although the existence
of the regiments ceased with the peace, and their
achievements were limited to a single campaign of
three or four months, their fame would have insured
them in any other service extraordinary honors and
sedulous preservation of their identity. Two small
brigades of regular troops, and one still smaller brigade of Pennsylvania volimteers, with a corps of artillery, composed the entire force. The first brigade
was commanded by Brigadier-General Winfield Scott^
^ Brown to Chauncey, June 21, 1814; enclosed in Brown to
Armstrong, June 22, 1814; MSS. War Department Archivea.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY-S LANE. 85
and its monthly return of June 80, 1814, reported its
organization and force as follows:^ —
Strength of the Firsts or Scott* $^ Brigade.
Pussirr FOB Dorr. Ambmaxi.
Non-oom. Offlcen, Oflloen. PtMent and
imnfc«nd-AIe. absent.
Ninth Regiment . . •
Eleventh Regiment • .
Twenty-second Regiment
Twenty-fifth Regiment .
General Staff ....
Total
332 16 642
416 17 577
217 12 287
354 * 16 619
44
1319 65 2129
The Ninth regiment came from Massachusetts, and
in this campaign waB usuallj commanded hy its
lieutenant-colonel, Thomas Aspinwall, or by Major
Henry Leavenworth. The Eleventh was raised in
Vermont, and was led by Major John McNeil. The
Twenty-second was a Pennsylvania regiment, commanded by its colonel, Hugh Brady. The Twentyfifth was enlisted in Connecticut, and identified by
the name of T. S. Jesup, one of its majors. The
whole brigade, officers and privates, numbered thirteen himdred and eighty-four men present for duty
on the first day of July, 1814.
The Second, or Ripley's, brigade was still smaller,
and became even more famous. Meazar Wheelock
Ripley was born in New Hampshire, in the year 1782.
He became a resident of Portland in Maine, and was
sent as a representative to the State legislature at
^ Monthly Returns, etc., MSS. War Department Archives.
86 mSTOBY OF THE UNITED STATEa G&t.
BoBton, where he was choeen speaker of the Maflaachusetts House of Representatives, Jan. 17, 1812, on
the retirement of Joseph Story to become a Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States. A few
weeks afterward, March 12, 1812, Ripley took the
commission of lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-first
regiment, to be enlisted in Massachusetts. A year
afterward he became colonel of the same regiment,
and took part in the battle of Ghrystler's Field.
Secretary Armstrong made him a brigadier-general
April 15, 1814, his commission bearing date about
a month after that of Winfield Scott. Both the
new brigadiers were sent to Niagara, where Scott
formed a brigade from regiments trained by himself ;
and Ripley was given a brigade composed of his old
regiment, the Twenty-first, with detachments from
the Seventeenth and Nineteenth and Twenty-third.
The strength of the brigade, July 1, 1814, was reported in the monthly return as follows : —
Strength of the Second, or Ripley's, Brigade.
PmiSBIT FOB
DUTT.
AoeiMAti.
Twenty-first Begiment •
Twentj*third Begiment .
General stftff • . • *
Non-eom. Offloen,
xmnk-and-flle.
• . 651
. . 341
Offloen.
35
8
_8
35
PzesentHid
absent
917
496
3
Total .....
. . 993
1415
Ripley's old regiment, the Twenty-first, was given
to Colonel James Miller, who had served in the
Tippecanoe campaign as major in the Fourth In*
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 87
fantrj, and had shared the misfortune of that regiment at Detroit. The other regiment composing the
brigade — the Twenty-third — was raised in New
York, and was usually commanded by one or another
of its majors, McFarland or Brooke. Ripley's brigade numbered one thousand and twenty-seven men
present for duty, on the first day of July.
The artillery, under the command of Major Hindman, was composed of four companies.
Stren^ of Hindman^s BcUtalion of ArtXUery.
PBC8BHT FOB DUTT. AOCnMATB.
Towson't Company 89 101
Biddle'a Companj .80 104
Ritchie's Company 96 183
Williams's Company _62 73
Total 327 413
The militia brigade was commanded by Peter B*
Porter, and consisted of six himdred Pennsylvania
volunteer militia, with about the same number of Indians, comprising nearly the whole military strength
of the Six Nations.^
Strength of MaJoT'Oenerdl Brown* s Army, Buffalo^ July 1, 1814.
PRBSSin FOR DOTT. AGOaOATI.
ArtiHexy . • •
Scott's Brigade .
Ripley's Brigade
Porter's Brigade
Total. . •
Non-oom. Offloen, OIBo«m, PreMnt and
xmnk-aiid-flie. abacnt.
330 15 413
1312 65 2122
992 36 1415
710 43 830
3344 159 4780
Stone's Life of Bed Jacket, p. 328.
38 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.t.
Thus the whole of Brown's army consisted of halfa^ozen skeleton regiments, and including every officer, as well as all Porter's volunteers, numbered barely
thirty-five himdred men present for duty. The aggregate, including sick and absent, did not reach
five thousand.
The number of effectives varied slightly from week
to week, as men joined or left their regiments ; but
the entire force never exceeded thirty-five hundred
men, exclusive of Indians.
According to the weekly return of June 22, 1814,
Major-deneral Riall, who commanded the right division of the British army, had a force of four thousand rank-and-file present for duty ; but of this
number the larger part were in garrison at York,
Burlington Heights, and Fort Niagara. His headquarters were at Fort George, where he had nine hundred and twenty-seven rank-and-file present for duty.
Opposite Fort George, in Fort Niagara on the American side, five hundred and seventy-eight rank-and-file
were present for duty. At Queenston were two
himdred and fifty-eight; at Chippawa, four hundred
and twenty-eight; at Fort Erie, one hundred and
forty-six. In all, on the Niagara River Riall commanded two thousand three himdred and thirty-seven
rank-and-file present for duty. The officers, musicians, etc., numbered three hundred and thirty-two.
At that time only about one hundred and seventy
men were on the sick list. All told, sick and well,
the regular force numbered two thousand eight hun-
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 89
dred and forty men.^ They belonged chiefly to the
First, or Boyal Scots; the Eighth, or King's; the
Hundredth, the Hnndred-and-third regiments, and
the Artillery, with a few dragoons.
As soon as Porter's volunteers were ready, the
whole American army was thrown across the river.
The operation was effected early in the morning of
July 8; and although the transport was altogether
insufficient, the movement was accomplished without
accident or delay. Scott's brigade with the artillery
landed below Fort Erie; Ripley landed above; the
Indians gained the rear ; and the Fort, which was an
open work, capitulated at five o'clock in the after-
noon. One hundred and seventy prisoners, including
officers of all ranks,^ being two companies of the
Eighth and Hundredth British regiments were sur>
rendered by the major in command.
The next British position was at Ghippawa, about
sixteen miles below. To Chippawa Major-General
Biall hastened from Fort George, on hearing that
the American army had crossed the river above ; and
there, within a few hours, he collected about fifteen
hundred regulars and six hundred militia and Indians, behind the Chippawa River, in a position not
to be assailed in front. The American army also
hastened toward Chippawa. On the morning of July
4 Scott's brigade led the way, and after an ex1 Weekly Distribution Betoin, June 22, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives, Freer Papers, 1814, p. 53.
* James, iL 117.
40 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Or. I.
hausting inarch of twelve hours, the enemy tearing
up the bridges in retiring, Scott reached Ghippawa
plain toward sunset, and found Biall's force in position beyond the Chippawa River. Scott could only
retire a mile or two, behind the nearest water, — a
creek, or broad ditch, called Street's Greek, — where
he went into camp. Brown and Ripley, with the
second brigade and artillery, came up two or three
hours later, at eleven o'clock in the night.^ Porter
followed the next morning.
Brown, knowing his numbers to be about twice
those of Riall, was anxious to attack before Riall
could be reinforced; and on the morning of July
6, leaving Ripley and Porter's brigades encamped in
the rear, he reconnoitred the line of the Ghippawa
River, and gave orders for constructing a bridge
above Riall's position. The bridge was likely to be
an affair of several days, and Riall showed a disposition to interfere with it. His scouts and Indians crossed and occupied the woods on the American left, driving in the pickets and annoying the
reconnoitring party, and even the camp. To dislodge them, Porter^s volunteers and Indians were
ordered forward to clear the woods; and at about
half-past four o'clock in the afternoon. Porter's advance began to drive the enemy's Indians back, pressing forward nearly to the Ghippawa River, There
the advancing volunteers and Indians suddenly became aware that the whole British army was in tiiie
1 Brown's Report of July 7^ 1814; Official Lettexs, p. 368.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 41
act of crossing the Ghippawa Bridge on their flank.
The surprise was complete, and Porter's brigade naturally broke and fell back in confusion.^
No one could have been more surprised than
Brown, or more incredulous than Scott, at Riall's
extraordinary movement. The idea that a British
force of two thousand men at most should venture
to attack more than three thousand, with artillery,
covered by a deep, miry creek, had not entered their
minds. Riall drew up his little army in three colmnns on the Chippawa plain, — the King's regiment
four himdred and eighty strong in advance, supported by the Royal Scots five hundred strong, and
the Hundredth four hundred and fifty strong, with a
troop of dragoons and artillerists ; in all about fifteen
hundred regular troops, with two twenty-four-pound
field-pieces and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer. Six
hundred militia and Indians occupied the woods.^
The whole force advanced in order of battle toward
Street's Creek.
Brown was at the front when this movement was
made. Porter was routed. Ripley with the second
brigade was in the rear. Scott, having rested his
brigade in the morning and given them a dinner to
celebrate the Fourth of July, had ordered a grand
parade ^^ to keep his men in breath," as he said ; and
while Riall's regular force, fifteen hundred strong,
formed on the Chippawa plain a mile away, Scott's
* Stone's Life of Red Jacket, p. 352.
• Biall'B Report of July 6, 1814 ; James^ ii 431.
42 mSTOBY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. I.
brigade — which a week before had been reported as
containihg thirteen hundred men present for dutjr,
and if all its details had been called in could hardly
have exceeded thirteen hundred men in the ranks
on the afternoon of July 5 — was forming, before
crossing the little bridge over Street's Creek to parade on the plain already occupied by the British.
Owing to the brushwood that lined the creek Scott
could not see the plain, and received no notice of
danger until he approached the bridge at the head
of his brigade. At that moment Greneral Brown in
full gallop from the front rode by, calling out in
passing, " You will have a battle ! " ^ Scott remarked
that he did not believe he should find three hundred
British to fight, and crossed the bridge.
If Riall was unwise to attack, Scott tempted destruction by leaving his secure position behind the
creek ; but at that moment he was in his tiappiest
temper. He meant to show what he and his brigade
could do. As his thin column crossed the bridge, the
British twenty-four-pound guns opened upon it; but
the American line moved on, steady as veterans, and
formed in order of battle beyond. Towson's three
twelve-pounders were placed in position near the river
on the extreme right, and opened fire on the heavier
British battery opposite. The infantry deployed in
three battalions, — the right, under Major Leavenworth of the Ninth ; the centre, under Major McNeil
of the Eleventh ; the left, imder Major Jesup of the
^ Scott's Autobiography, p. 128.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 43
Twenty-lSfth. Throwing the flanks obliquely forward,
and extending Jesup's battalion into the woods on
the left to prevent outflanking, Scott ordered an advance ; and at the same time Riall directed the Royal
Scots and the Hundredth to charge.^ The two lines
advanced, stopping alternately to fire and move forward, while Towson's guns, having blown up a British
caisson, were turned on the British column. The
converging American fire made havoc in the British
ranks, and when the two lines came within some
sixty or seventy paces of each other in the centre,
the flanks were actually in contact. Then the whole
British line broke and crumbled away.^ Ripley's
brigade, arriving soon afterward, foimd no enemy on
the plain. The battle had lasted less than an hour.
Riall's report made no concealment of his defeat.*
** I placed two light twenty-four-pounders and a fiveand-a-half inch howitzer," he said, " against the right
of the enemy's position, and formed the Royal Scots
and Hundredth regiment with the intention of making
a movement upon his left, which deployed with the
greatest regularity and opened a very heavy fire. I
immediately moved up the King's regiment to the right,
while the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiments were
directed to charge the enemy in front, for which they
advanced with the greatest gallantry under a most destructive fire. I am sorry to say, however, in this at1 Riairs Report, July 6, 1814; James, ii. 432.
* Scott's Autobiography, p. 130. Jesup's Narrative; Ingerfoll, ii. 90, 91. Mansfield's Scott, pp. 105-110.
* James, iL 432.
44 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.
tempt they suffered 00 severely that I was obliged to
withdraw them, finding their farther efforts against the
euperior numbers of the enemy would be unavailing."
For completeness, Scott's victory at Ghippawa
could be compared with that of Isaac Hull over the
*' Guerriere;" but in one respect Scott surpassed HulL
The ^^Constitution" was a much heavier ship than
its enemy ; but Scott's brigade was weaker, both in
men and guns, than Biall's force. Even in regulars,
man against man, Scott was certainly outnumbered.
His brigade could not have contained, with artillerists, more than thirteen hundred men present on
the field,^ while Biall officially reported his regulars
at fifteen hundred, and his irregular corps at six
hundred. Scott's flank was exposed and turned by
the rout of Porter. He fought with a creek in his
rear, where retreat was destruction. He had three
twelve-pound field-pieces, one of which was soon dismounted, against two twenty-four-pounders and a
five-and-a-half inch howitzer. He crossed the bridge
and deployed under the enemy's fire. Yet the relative losses showed that he was the superior of his
enemy in every respect, and in none more than in
the efficiency of his guns.
Riall reported a total loss in killed, wounded, and
missing of five hundred and fifteen men,^ not including Indians. Scott and Porter reported a total
loss of two hundred and ninety-seven, hot including
Indians. Biall's regular regiments and artillery lost
1 Mansfield's Scott, p. 112. * James ii. 434.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDTS LANE. 46
one hundred and thirfy-seven killed, and three hun*
dred and five wounded. Scott's brigade reported
forty-eight killed and two hundred and twenty-seven
wounded. The number of Riall's killed was nearly
three times the number of Scott's killed, and proved
that the battle was decided by the superior accuracy
or rapidity of the musketry and artillery fire, other
military qualities being assumed to be equal.
The battle of Chippawa was the only occasion during the war when equal bodies of regular troops met
face to face, in extended lines on an open plain in
broad daylight, without advantage of position; and
never again after that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by British troops. Small as the
affair was, and unimportant in military results, it
gave to the United States army a character and
pride it had never before possessed.
Biall regained the protection of his lines without
further loss ; but two days afterward Brown turned
his position, and Biall abandoned it with the whole
peninsula except Fort George.^ Leaving garrisons
in Fort George and Fort Niagara, he fell back toward
Burlington Bay to await reinforcements. Brown fol-
lowed as far as Queenston, where he camped July
10, doubtful what next to do. Fretting under the
enforced delay, he wrote to Commodore Chaimcey,
J uly 13, a letter that led to much comment : ^ —
1 Biall to Drummond, July 8, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
* Brown to Chauncey, July 13, 1814 ; Niles^ viL 38.
46 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Cb. i.
** I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety
since the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the
enemy in the field, and to march in any direction over
hia country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary
supplies. • • • There is not a doubt resting in my mind
but that we have between us the command of sufficient
means to conquer Upper Canada within two months, if
there is a prompt and zealous co-operation and a vigorous application of these means."
Brown, like Andrew Jackson, with the virtues of
a militia general, possessed some of the faults. His
letter to Chauncey expressed his honest belief; but
he was mistaken, and the letter tended to create a
popular impression, that Chauncey was wholly to
blame. Brown could not, even with Chauncey's help,
conquer Upper Canada. He was in danger of being
himself destroyed; and even at Queenston he was
not safe. Biall had already received, July 9, a reinforcement of seven hundred regulars ; ^ at his camp,
only thirteen miles from Brown, he had twenty-two
hundred men ; in garrison at Fort Greorge and Niagara he left more than a thousand men; LieutenantOeneral Drummond was on his way from Kingston
with the Eighty-ninth regiment four hundred strong,
under Colonel Morrison, who had won the battle of
Chrystler's Field , while still another regiment, DeWatteville's, was on the march. Four thousand men
were concentrating on Port George, and Chauncey, although he might have delayed, could not have prevented their attacking Brown, or stopping his advance.
^ James, ii. 132.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDyS LANR 4T
Brown was so well aware of his own weakness
that he neither tried to assault Fort George nor to
drive Biall farther away, although Ripley and the
two engineer officers McRee and Wood advised the
attempt.^ After a fortnight passed below Queenston, he suddenly withdrew to Chippawa July 24^
and camped on the battle-field. Riall instantly left
his camp at eleven o'clock in the night of July 24,
and followed Brown's retreat with about a thousand
men, as far as Lundy's Lane, only a mile below the
Falls of Niagara. There he camped at seven o'clock
on the morning of July 25, waiting for the remainder of his force, about thirteen hundred men, who
marched at noon, and were to arrive at sunset.
The battle of Chippawa and three weeks of active
campaigning had told on the Americans. According
to the army returns of the last week in July, Brown's
army at Chippawa, July 25, numbered twenty-six
hundred effectives.^
Strength of Major^Oeneral Brawn^s Army^
Chippawoj Jtdy 25, 1814.
PBMBIT POB DdTT. AflSBMAll.
Non-^om. Oflloen Pnflent and
and PriTatea. abaent.
tScotf 8 Brigade 1072 1422
Biplej's Brigade 895 1198
Porter's Brigade 441 538
Artillerj . . , 286 260
Total 2644 3418
^ Ripley's ** Facts relative to the Campaign on the Niagara,**
p. 8. Jesnp's Narrative ; Ingersoll, ii. 106.
« Ripley's « Facts," 1815.
48 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa C&t.
Thus Brown at Ghippawa bridge, on the morning
of July 25, with twenty-six hundred men present for
duty, had Biall within easy reach three miles away
at Lundy's Lane, with only a thousand men; but
Brown expected no such sudden movement from the
enemy, and took no measures to obtain certain information. He was with reason anxious for his rear.
His position was insecure and unsatisfactory except
for attack. From the moment it became defensive,
it was unsafe and needed to be abandoned.
The British generals were able to move on either
bank of the river. While Riall at seven o'clock in
the morning went into camp within a mile of Niagara
Falls, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond with the
Eighty-ninth regiment disembarked at Fort Gteorge,
intending to carry out a long-prepared movement on
the American side.^
Gordon Drummond, who succeeded Major-General
de Bottenburg in the command of Upper Canada
in December, 1813, and immediately distinguished
himself by the brilliant capture of Fort Niagara and
the destruction of Buffalo, was regarded as the ablest
military officer in Canada. Isaac Brock's immediate
successors in the civil and military government of
Upper Canada were Major-Generals Sheaffe and De
Bottenburg. Neither had won distinction ; but Gordon Drummond was an officer of a different character. Bom in 1772, he entered the army in 1789 as
» Harvey to Lieut-Colonel Tucker, July 23, 1814 ; MSS.
Canadian Archives.
1814. CHiPPAWA AlfD LUNDY'S LANE. 49
an ensign in the First regiment, or Royal Scots, and
rose in 1794 to be lieutenant-colonel of the Eighth,,
or King's regiment. He served in the Netherlands,,
the West Indies, and in Egypt, before being ordered
to Canada in 1808. In 1811 he became lieutenantgeneral. He was at Kingston when his subordinate
officer, Major-General Riall, lost the battle of Chip*
pawa and retired toward Burlington Heights. Having sent forward all the reinforcements he could
spare, .Drummond followed as rapidly as possible to
take command in person.
No sooner did Drummond reach Fort George than^
in pursuance of orders previously given, he sent a
detachment of about six hundred men across the
river to Lewiston. Its appearance there was at once
made known to Brown at Chippawa, only six or
seven miles above, and greatly alarmed him for the
safety of his base at Fort Schlosser, Black Rock, and
Buffalo. Had Drmnmond advanced up the American side with fifteen hundred men, as he might have
done, he would have obliged Brown to recross the
river, and might perhaps have destroyed or paralyzed
him ; but Drummond decided to join Riall, and accordingly, recalling the detachment from Lewiston
at four o'clock in the afternoon, he began his march
up the Canadian side with eight hundred and fifteen
rank-and-file to Lundy's Lane.^
At five o'clock, July 25, the British army was neaiv
Ij concentrated. The advance under Riall at Lundy'ft
^ James, ii. 142.
VOL.VIIL — 4
60 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ce.t.
Lane numbered nine hundred and fifty rank-and-file,
with the three field-pieces which had been in the
battle of Ghippawa, and either two or three sixpounders.^ Drummond was three miles below with
eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file, marching up
the river; and Colonel Scott of the One Hundredand-third regiment, with twelve hundred and thirty
rank-and-file and two more six-pound field-pieceS| was
a few miles behind Drummond.^ By nine o'clock in
the evening the three corps, numbering three thousand rank-and-file, with eight field-pieces, were to
unite at Lundy's Lane.
At a loss to decide on which bank the British
generals meant to move, Brown waited until afternoon, and then, in great anxiety for the American
side of the river, ordered Winfield Scott to march.,
his brigade down the road toward Queenston on the
Canadian side, in the hope of recalling the enemy
from the American side by alarming him for the
safety of his rear. Scott, always glad to be in motion, crossed Chippawa bridge, with his brigade and
Towson's battery, soon after five o'clock, and to his
great surprise, in passing a house near the Falls,
learned that a large body of British troops was in
sight below. With his usual audacity he marched )
directly upon them, and reaching Lundy's Lane, deployed to the left in line of battle. Jesup, Brady,
Leavenworth, and McNeil placed their little battalions, numbering at the utmost a thousand rank-and^ James, ii. 139. * James, ii. 144.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDyS LANE. 51
file, in position, and Towson opened with his three
guns. The field suited their ambition. The sun was
setting at the end of a long, hot, midsummer day.
About a mile to their right the Niagara River flowed
through its chasm, and the spray of the cataract rose
in the distance behind them.
At the first report that the American army was
approaching, Riall ordered a retreat, and his advance
was already in march from the field when Drummond arrived with the Eighty-ninth regiment, and
countermanded the order .^ Drummond then formed
his line, numbering according to his report sixteen
hundred men, but in reality seventeen hundred and
seventy rank-and-file,^ — the left resting on the high
road, his two twenty-four-pound brass field-pieces,
two six-pounders, and a five-and-a-half-inch howitzer
a little advanced in front of his centre on the sunmiit
of the low hill, and his right stretching forward so
as to overlap Scott's position in attacking. Lundy's
Lane, at right angles with the river, ran close behind
the British position. Hardly had he completed his
formation, when, in his own words, " the whole front
was warmly and closely engaged."
With all the energy Scott could throw into his
blow, he attacked the British left and centre. Drummond's left stopped slightly beyond the road, and
was assailed by Jesup's battalion, the Twenty-fifth
regiment, while Scott's other battalions attacked
^ Drommond's Report of July 27, 1814 ; James, ii. 436.
* James, ii. 143.
52 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ca-t.
in front. So yigorous was Jesup's assault that he
forced back the Boyal Scots and Eighty-ninth, and
got into the British rear, where he captured Major*
Greneral Biall himself, as he left the field seriously
wounded. "After repeated attacks,*' said Drummond's report, " the troops on the left were partially
forced back, and the enemy gained a momentary possession of the road." In the centre also Scott attacked with obstinacy ; but the British artillery was
altogether too strong and posted too high for Towson's three guns, which at last ceased firing.^ There
the Americans made no impression, while they were
overlapped and outnumbered by the British right.
Prom seven till nine o'clock Scott's brigade hung
on the British left and centre, charging repeatedly
close on the enemy's guns; and when at last with
the darkness their firing ceased from sheer exhaustion, they were not yet beaten. Brady's battalion,
the Ninth and Twenty-second, and McNeil's, the
Eleventh, were broken up; their ammunition was
exhausted, and most of their ofiicers were killed op
wounded. The Eleventh and Twenty-second reriments lost two hundred and thirty men killed,
wounded, and missing, or more than half their
number; many of the men left the field, and only
with difficulty could a battalion be organized from
the debris.^ McNeil and Brady were wounded, and
1 Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley's
" Facts/' p. 21.
* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815 ; Ripley's
*» Facts," pp. 18-27.
1814. CmPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 63
Major Leavenworth took command of the remnant.
With a small and exhausted force which could not
have numbered more than six hundred men, and
which Drummond by a vigorous movement might
have wholly destroyed, Scott clung to the enemy's
flank until in the darkness Ripley's brigade came
down on the run. The American line was also reinforced by Porter's brigade ; by the First regiment,
one hundred and fifty strong, which crossed from
the American side of the river; and by Ritchie's
and Riddle's batteries.
At about the same time the rest of Riall's force,
twelve hundred and thirty rank-and-file, with two
more six-pound guns, appeared on the field, and were
placed in a second line or used to prolong the Rritish right. If Scott had lost four hundred men from
the ranks Drummond had certainly lost no more,
for his men were less exposed. Rrown was obliged
to leave details of men for camp duty ; Drummond
brought three thousand rank-and-file on the field. At
nine o'clock Drummond could scarcely have had fewer
than twenty-six hundred men in Lundy's Lane, with
seven field-pieces, two of which were twenty-fourpounders. Rrown could scarcely have had nineteen
hundred, even allowing Porter to have brought five
hundred of his volunteers into battle.^ He had also
Towson's, Ritchie's, and Riddle's batteries, — seven
twelve-pound field-pieces in all.
1 Strength of the Army, July 26, 1814 ; Ripley's *' Facts,**
Appendix.
54 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
As long as the British battery maintained its fire
in the centre, victory was impossible and escape difficult.^ Ripley's brigade alone could undertake the
task of capturing the British guns, and to it the order
was given. Colonel Miller was to advance with the
Twenty-first regiment against the British battery in
f ront.2 Ripley himself took command of the Twenty
third regiment on the right, to lead it by the road
to attack the enemy's left flank in Lundy's Lane.
According to the story that for the next fifty years
was told to every American school-boy as a model
of modest courage, General Brown gave to Miller
the order to carry the enemy's artillery, and Miller
answered, "I'll try!"*
The two regiments thus thrown on the enemy's
centre and left numbered probably about seven hundred men in the ranks, according to Ripley's belief.
The Twenty-first regiment was the stronger, and may
have contained four hundred and fifty men, including officers ; the Twenty-third could scarcely have
hrought three hundred into the field. In a few minutes both battalions were in motion. The Twentythird, advancing along the road on the right, instantly attracted the enemy's fire at about one hundred
and fifty yards from the hill, and was thrown back.
Hipley reformed the column, and in five minutes it
^ Mansfield's Scott, p. 129 ; note 2.
s Miller's Letter in the Boston <« Patriot/' Sept 4, 1814 ;
Hipley's '* Facts," p. 27.
• LoBsing, p. 820, note.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 55
advanced again.^ Wlule the Twenty-third was thus
engaged on the right, the Twenty-first silently advanced in front, covered by shrubbery and the darkness, within a few rods of the British battery undiscovered, and with a sudden rush carried the guns,
bayoneting the artillery-men where they stood.
So superb a feat of arms might well startle the
British general, who could not see that less than
five hundred men were engaged in it; but according to the British account^ the guns stood immediately in front of a British line numbering at least
twenty-six hundred men in ranks along Lundy's
Lane. Drummond himself must have been near the
spot, for the whole line of battle was but five minutes*
walk ; apparently he had but to order an advance,
to drive Miller's regiment back without trouble. Yet
Miller maintained his ground until Ripley came up
on his right. According to the evidence of Captain
McDonald of Ripley's staff, the battle was violent
during fifteen or twenty minutes : —
•*Havmg passed the position where the artiUery had
been planted, Colonel Miller again formed his line facing
the enemy, and engaged them within twenty paces distance. There appeared a perfect sheet of fire between
the two lines. While the Twenty-first was in this situation, the Twenty-third attacked the enemy's flank, and
advanced within twenty paces of it before the first volley
was discharged, — a measure adopted by command of
General Ripley, that the fire might be effectual and more
1 Evidence of Captain McDonald ; Ripley's " Facts," p. 12.
> Drummond's Report, July 27« 1814; James^ ii. 437.
66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.a.
completely destructive. The movement compelled the
enemy's flank to fall back immediately by descending the
hill out of sight, upon which the firing ceased." ^
Perhaps this feat was more remarkable than tL
surprise of the battery. Ripley's Twenty-third regiment, about three hundred men, broke the British
line, not in the centre but on its left, where the
Eighty-ninth, the Royal Scots, King's, and the Fortyfirst were stationed,^ and caused them to retire half
a mile from the battle-field before they halted to
reform.
When the firing ceased, Ripley's brigade held the
hill-top, with the British gims, and the whole length
of Lundy's Lane to the high-road. Porter then
brought up his brigade on the left ; Hindman brought
up his guns, and placed Towson's battery on Ripley's
right, Ritchie's on his left, while Biddle's two guns
were put in position on the road near the corner of
Lundy's Lane. Jesup with the Twenty-fifth regiment was put in line on the right of Towson's battery ; Leavenworth with the remnants of the Ninth,
Eleventh, and Twenty-second formed a second line in
the rear of the captured artillery ; and thus reversing the former British order of battle, the little army
stood ranked along the edge of Lundy's Lane, with
the British guns in their rear.
The British force was then in much confusion, a
part of it marching into the American line by misJ Evidence of Captain McDonald ; Ripley's « Facts/' p. 13.
* Drummond's Beport ; James, iL 143.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDrS LANE. 67
take, and suffering a destructive fire; a part of it
firing into the regiment on its own right, and keeping up the fire persistently.^ In order to recover
their artillery they must assault, without guns, a
steep hill held by an enemy with several field-pieces.
Had Brown been able to put a reserve of only a few
hundred men into the field, his victory was assured ;
but the battle and exhaustion were rapidly reducing
his force. He had at ten o'clock not more than
fifteen hundred men in the ranks, and almost every
ofl&cer was wounded.
After a long interval the British line was reformed,
and brought to the attack. General Drummond's
report said nothing of this movement, but according
to the American account the two lines were closely
engaged their whole length at a distance of ten or
twelve yards. In the darkness the troops could aim
only at the flash of the muskets. " We having much
the advantage of the ground, the enemy generally
fired over our heads," said Captain McDonald of
Ripley's staff ; " but the continual blaze of light was
such as to enable us distinctly to see their buttons."
After a sharp combat of some twenty minutes the
enemy retreated. Three times, at intervals of half
an hour or more, the British line moved up the hill,
and after the exchange of a hot fire retired ; between the attacks, for half an hour at a time, all was
darkness and silence, hardly interrupted by a breath
of air. Brown and Scott were with Porter on the
^ James, iL 145.
68 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch,9.
extreme left In the centre, by the captured cannon,
Ripley sat on his horse, ten or twelve paces in rear
of his line. Two bullets passed through his hat, but
he was unhurt. Captain Ritchie was killed at his
battery on the left ; Jesup was wounded on the right.
Each attack sorely diminished the number of men in
the ranks, until at the close of the third about seven
hundred rank-and-file, with few ofl&cers, were believed
to remain in position.^
Scott, with Leavenworth's consolidated battalion,
after ranging somewhat wildly the entire length of
the line in the attempt to turn the enemy's flank,
and receiving the fire of both armies, joined Jesup's
Twenty-fifth regiment on the right, and was at last
severely wounded.^ At about the same time Brown
was wounded on the extreme left,^ where Porter's volunteers held the line. Major Leavenworth, with the
remnants of the first brigade, moving from the left
to reinforce Jesup on the right after the third repulse of the enemy, met Scott retiring from the field,
and soon afterward was hailed by General Brown,
who was also returning to camp severely wounded.
The time was then about eleven o'clock, and every
one felt that the army must soon retreat.* Farther
in the rear General Brown met Major Hindman of
1 Evidence of Captain McDonald ; Ripley's " Facts," p. 16.
a Cf. Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 712.
■ Letterof Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815 ; Ripley's "Facts,*
p. 23. Jesup's Narrative ; IngersoU, ii. 107.
* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 16, 1816; Ripley's '* Facts,**
p. 23. Jesup's Narrative ; Ligersoll, iL 107.
ML CHIPPAWA AND LUNDYTS LANE. 69
the artillery, who was bringing up his spare ammunition wagons. Brown ordered Hindman to collect his
artillery as well as he could, and retire immediately ;
^we shall all march to camp." He said that they
had done as much as they could do ; that nearly all
their officers were killed or wounded ; that he was
himself wounded, and he thought it best to retire to
camp. Hindman on arriving at the hill, firing having wholly ceased, immediately began to withdraw the
guns. Ripley first learned the order to withdraw by
discovering the artillery to be already gone.^ Next
came a peremptory order to collect the wounded and
retire.* The order was literally obeyed. The enemy
in no way molested the movement; and at about
midnight the wearied troops marched for camp, in
as good order and with as much regularity as they
had marched to the battle-field.'
Hindman withdrew his own guns, and having with
some difficulty procured horses to haul off the British pieces, on returning to the hill after Ripley's
withdrawal found the enemy again in possession, and
some men and wagons captured.* He left the field
at once, with the British in possession of their guns,
and followed the retreating column.
1 Riple/s ** Facts," Appendix.
« Letter of Captain Clarke, March 15, 1815 ; Ripley's «' Facts,"
p. 30. Letter of Adjutant Livingston, March 6, 1815; Ripley's
*' Facts," p. 31.
* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815 ; Ripley's
" Facts," p. 26.
^ Colonel Hindman's statement ; Ripley's ** Facts," p. 43.
60 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.^.
Lieutenant-Oeneral Drummond^B report of the battle,
though silent as to the repeated British repulses,
declared that the Americans fought with uncommon
gallantry : —
^^ In so determined a manner were the attacks directed
against our guns that our artUlery-men were bayoneted
by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the
enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours.
The darkness of the night during this extraordinary conflict occasioned several uncommon incidents ; our troops
having for a moment been pushed back, some of our guns
remained for a few minutes in the enemy's hands."
Drummond's "few minutes" were three hours.
According to the British account, the One-Hundredand-third regiment, with its two field-pieces, arrived
on the field just at nine, and " passed by mistake
into the centre of the American army now posted
upon the hill." ^ The regiment " fell back in confusion" and lost its two field-pieces, which were
captured by Miller, with RialPs five pieces. By
British report. Miller was at nine o'clock " in possession of the crest of the hill and of seven pieces of
captured artillery."* Drummond admitted that in
retiring "about midnight" the Americans carried
away one of his light pieces, having limbered it up
by mistake and leaving one of their own. During
the entire action after nine o'clock Drummond did
not fire a cannon, although, according to Canadian
authority, the fighting was desperate : —
^ James, ii. 144-145. * James, iL 146.
1814. CHIPPAWA AND LUNDY'S LANE. 61
*^ The officers of the army from Spain who have been
engaged in Upper Canada have acknowledged that they
never saw such determined charges as were made by the
Americans in the late actions. ... In the action on the
25th Jnly the Americans charged to the very muzzles
of our cannon, and actually bayoneted the artillery-men
who were at their guns. Their charges were not once or
twice only, but repeated and long, and the steadiness
of British soldiers alone could have withstood them.'* ^
^ Letter in Halifax newspaper ; Niles, vii. 410l
CHAPTER m.
Thb battle of Lundy's Lane lasted five hours, and
Drummond believed the American force to be five
thousand men. In truth, at no moment were two
thousand American rank-and-file on the field.^ ^^ The
loss sustained by the enemy in this severe action,'^
reported Drummond,^ ^^ cannot be estimated at less
than fifteen hundred men, including several hundred
prisoners left in our hands." Drummond's estimate of
American losses, as of American numbers, was double
the reality. Brown reported a total loss, certainly severe enough, of eight hundred and fifty-three men, —
one hundred and seventy-one killed, five hundred and
seventy-two wounded, one hundred and ten missing*
Drummond reported a total loss of eight hundred and
seventy-eight men, — eighty-four killed, five hundred
and fifty-nine wounded, one hundred and ninety-three
missing, and forty-two prisoners. On both sides the
battle was murderous. Brown and Scott were both
badly wounded, the latter so severely that he could
^ Strength of the American army; Bipley's *' Facts," Ap»
pendix.
^ Drommond's Eeport of July 27, 1814 ; James, ii. 438. '
mi. FOBT ERIE. 68
not reBume his command during the war. Drummond and Biall were also wounded. On both BideB,
but especially on the American, the loss in officers
was very great.
The effect of the British artillery on Scott's brigade, while daylight lasted, had been excessive, while
at that period of the battle the British could have suffered comparatively little. Among Scott's battalions
the severest loss was that of Brady's Twenty-second
regiment, from Pennsylvania, — at the opening of the
campaign two hundred and twenty-eight strong, officers and men. After Lundy's Lane the Twentysecond reported thirty-six killed, ninety wounded, and
seventeen missing. The Ninth, Leavenworth's Massachusetts regiment, which was returned as numberinjg three hundred and forty-eight officers and men
June 31, reported sixteen killed, ninety wounded,
and fifteen missing at Lundy's Lane. The Eleventh,
McNeil's Vermont battalion, which numbered three
hundred and four officers and men June 31, returned
twenty-eight killed, one hundred and two wounded,
and three missing. The Twenty-fifth, Jesup's Connecticut corps, numbering three hundred and seventy
officers and men at the outset, reported twenty-eight
killed, sixty-six wounded, and fifteen missing. These
four regiments, composing Scott's brigade, numbered
thirteen hundred and eighty-eight officers and men
June 31, and lost in killed, wounded, and missing at
Lundy's Lane five hundred and six men, after losing
two hundred and fifty-seven at Chippawa.
64 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Gb.8.
Ripley's brigade BufiPered less; but although, after
the British guns were captured, the Americans were
exposed only to musketry fire, the brigades of Ripley
and Porter reported a loss of two hundred an^ fiftyeight men, killed, wounded, and missing. The three
artillery companies suffered a loss of forty-five men,
including Captain Ritchie. The total loss of eight
hundred and fifty-three men was as nearly as possible one third of the entire army, including the unengaged pickets and other details.
When Ripley, following the artillery, arrived in
camp toward one o'clock in the morning,^ Brown sent
for him, and gave him an order to return at day-break
to the battle-field with all the force he could collect,
" and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again
appeared."^ The order was impossible to execute.
The whole force capable of fighting another battle
did not exceed fifteen or sixteen hundred effectives,
almost without oflBcers, and exhausted by the night
battle.^ The order was given at one o'clock in the
morning; the army must employ the remainder of
the night to reorganize its battalions and replace its
oflBcers, and was expected to march at four o'clock
to regain a battle-field which Brown had felt himself unable to maintain at midnight, although he then
1 Letter of Capt McDonald, March 20, 1815 ; Ripley's " Facts,"
p. 29.
« Brown's Report of the battle of July 26 ; Niles, vi. 433.
* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815 ; Ripley's
"Facts," p. 27.
1814. FORT ERIE. 65
occupied it, and held all the enemy's artillery. The
order was futile. Major Leavenworth of the Ninth
regiment, who though wounded commanded the first
brigade after the disability of Scott, Brady, Jesup,
and McNeil, thought it ^' the most consummate folly
to attempt to regain possession of the field of battle," and declared that every officer he met thought
like himself.^
Yet Ripley at dawn began to collect the troops,
and after the inevitable delay caused by the disorganization, marched at nine o'clock, with about
fifteen hundred men, to reconnoitre the enemy. At
about the same time Drummond advanced a mile, and
took position in order of battle near the Falls, his
artillery in the road, supported by a column of infantry. A month earlier Drummond, like Riall, would
have attacked, and with a force greater by one half
could hardly have failed to destroy Ripley's shattered regiments ; but Chippawa and Lundy's Lane
had already produced an effect on the British army.
Drummond believed that the Americans numbered
five thousand, and his own force in the ranks was
about twenty-two hundred men. He allowed Ripley
to retire unmolested, and remained at the Falls the
whole day.
Ripley returned to camp at noon and made his
report to Brown. The question requiring immediate
decision was whether to maintain or abandon the line
* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 16, 1816 ; Ripley's
" Facts," p. 27.
VOL. VIII. — 5
66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cat.
of the Chippawa River. Much could be said on both
sides, and only officers on the spot could decide with
certainty how the enemy could be placed under most
disadvantage, and how the army could be saved from
needless dangers. Ripley, cautious by nature, recommended a retreat to Fort Erie. With the assent, as
he supposed, of Brown and Porter,^ Ripley immedi*
ately broke up the camp at Chippawa, and began the
march to Fort Erie, sixteen miles in the rear. Although complaint was made of the retreat as confused, hasty, and unnecessary, it was conducted with
no more loss or confusion than usual in such movements,^ and its military propriety was to be judged"
by its effects on the campaign.
The same evening, July 26, the army arrived at Fort
Erie and camped. Brown was taken from Chippawa
across the river to recover from his wound. Scott was
also removed to safe quarters. Ripley was left with
the remains of the army camped on a plain, outside
the unfinished bastions of Fort Erie, where the destruction of his entire force was inevitable in case of
a reverse. Ripley favored a withdrawal of the army
to the American side ; but Brown, from his sick bed
at Buffalo, rejected the idea of a retreat, and fortunately Drummond*s reinforcements arrived slowly.
The worst result of the difference in opinion was to
make Brown harsh toward Ripley, who — although
* Ripley's "Facts." C£ Brown's Narrative ; IngersoU, ii. 105.
s Letter of Migor Leavenworth, Jan. 16, 1816; Bipley's
**Fact8,'»p. 383.
1814. FOBT ERIE. 67
his record waa Bingular in showing only patient,
excellent, and uniformly Buccessful service — leaned
toward caution, while Brown and Scott thought
chiefly of fighting. The combination produced admirable results ; but either officer alone might have
failed.
Distrusting Ripley, and angry at losing the British
cannon at Lundy's Lane as well as at the retreat
from Chippawa, Brown wrote, August 7, to the Secretary of War a report containing an improper implication, which he afterward withdrew, that Ripley
was wanting either in courage or capacity .^ He also
summoned Brigadier-Gteneral Gaines from Sackett's
Harbor to command the army.^ Gaines arrived, and
as senior brigadier assumed command at Fort Erie,
August 4, while Ripley resumed command of his brigade. • During the week that elapsed before Gaines's
arrival, the army, under Ripley's orders, worked energetically to intrench itself in lines behind Fort Erie ;
and after Gaines took command the same work was
continued without interruption or change of plan,
under the direction of Major McRee, Major Wood,
and Lieutenant Douglass of the Engineers.
The result was chiefly decided by Drummond's
errors. Had he followed Ripley closely, and had he
attacked instantly on overtaking the retreating army
at Fort Erie or elsewhere, he would have had the
^ Report of Aug. 7, 1814; Niles, vi. 434. Brown to Dallafl^
May, 1815 ; Ripley's « Facts," p. 46.
' Brown's Diary; IngersoU's History, iL 105.
68 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
chances in his favor. Had he crossed the river and
moved against Buffalo, he would have obliged Brown
to order the instant evacuation of Fort Erie, and
would have recovered all the British positions without
the loss of a man. Drummond took neither course.
He waited two days at Chippawa before he moved up
the river within two miles of Fort Erie. About August 1 his reinforcements arrived, — DeWatteville's
regiment from Kingston, and the Forty-first from
Fort George, — replacing his losses, and giving him
three thousand one himdred and fifty rank-and-file ; ^
but he seemed still undecided what course to adopt.
The battles of Chippawa and Limdy's Lane had given
the British army respect for American troops, and
Drummond hesitated to assault the unfinished works
at Fort Erie, although he was fully one half stronger
in men than Gaines and Ripley, who had barely two
thousand rank-and-file after obtaining such reinforcements as were at hand.
Strength of Scotfs Brigade^ Fort Erie, July 81, 1814.
Pbisiht lOB Dcrr. AessMAn.
A.
Non-com. Offloen, Offloext. Present and
xank-and-flle absent.
Ninth Regiment 139 8 569
Eleventh Regiment . . • • 293 11 624
Twenty-second Regiment « . 218 10 408
Twenty-fifth Regiment . . 255 7 676
General Staff j4 4^
Total 905 40 2281
^ James, IL 161, 162.
1814. FORT ERIE. 69
Strength of Ripley's Brigade.
First Regiment 141 6 220
Twenty-first Regiment. . . 441 20 849
Twenty-third Regiment • . 292 12 713
General Staff 4 4
Total 874 42 1786
Monthly return of troops under Majors General Broum^ Fort Erie,
July 81, 1814.
Bombardiers, etc .... 58 2 69
light Dragoons 47 1 64
Artillery Corps 241 12 364
First Brigade 905 40 2281
Second Brigade 874 42 1786
Total of Brown's army . 2125 97 4564
Drummond began operations by ordering a detachment of six hundred men to cross the river and destroy the magazines at Black Rock and Buffalo.^
During the night of August 3 Colonel Tucker of the
Forty-first, with four hundred and sixty rank-and-file
of his own and other regiments,^ landed two or three
miles below Black Rock, and advanced against it.
They were met at the crossing of a creek by two
hundred and forty men of Morgan's Rifles, then garrisoning Black Rock, with some volunteers. The
effect of the rifles was so deadly that the British
troops refused to face them, and Tucker returned
after losing twenty-five men. This repulse, as creditable in its way to the American army as the battles
1 Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 4^ 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
' James, ii. 162, 163.
70 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATED Ch-S.
at Chippawa and Lund/s Lane, caused much annoyance to Drummoad, who issued an order, August 5,
expressing "the indignation excited by discovering
that the failure of an expedition, the success of
which . . . would have compelled the enemy's forces
to surrender or . . . encounter certain defeat, was
attributable to the misbehavior of the troops employed."^ The only success achieved by British
detachments was the cutting out of two American
schooners which covered the approach to Fort Erie,
near the shore.
Drummond having decided not to assault the lines
of Fort Erie until he had made an impression on the
works, next sent for guns of heavy calibre.* Ten days
were passed in openmg trenches and constructing batteries. Gaines and Ripley employed the time in completing their defences. Of these, the so-called Fort
Erie was the smallest part, and made only the salient
angle toward Drummond's approaches. As the British had constructed the fort, it was a small, unfinished
work, about one hundred and fifty yards from the
Lake-shore, open in the rear, and mounting three
guns. The American engineers completed its rear
bastions, and constructed an earthwork seven feet
high, with a ditch, to the shore, where a small stonework completed the defence on that side, and brought
^ Ingersoll's History, ii. 145. Of. Beport of Major Moigan,
Aug. 6, 1814 ; Niles, vi. 437.
* Dnunmond to Pievost, Ang. 4, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
mi. FORT EBIE. 71
the lines to the water's edge. The stone-work was
called the Douglass battery, after the lieutenant of
engineers who built it. Fort Erie, Battery Douglass^
and their connecting breastwork secured the camp
on the right. A similar breastwork, nearly at right
angles with the first, was extended three hundred
and fifty yards westward parallel with the Lake-shore,
then turning slightly ran Hiree hundred and fifty
yards farther till it neared the Lakenshore, where it
was finished on Snake Hill by a projecting battery
called Towson's. Traverses were constructed, and a
strongly intrenched camp, about seven hundred yards
by two hundred and fifty, was thus formed, open on
its rear to the Lake.
Hindman had general charge of the artillery.
Battery Douglass mounted one gun ; another was
mounted on the neighboring line ; Fort Erie contained
six,^ under Captain Williams ; Biddle's and Fanning's
(Ritchie's) four guns were placed on the long line in
the front; and Towson had six field-pieces at the
extreme left.* Scott's brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall, was posted on the right;
Porter's volunteers and the First Rifles occupied the
centre ; and Ripley with the Twenty-first and Twentythird regiments defended the left.
Drummond opened with six guns, August 13, and
prepared for assault the following day. His arrauge^ Charges of Lientenaiit-Colonel Trimble against Gtoeial
Gaines; Niles, zi. 219.
' Beport of General Qaines, August, 1S14 ; Niles, vii. 19.
T2 mSTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
•
ments were somewhat complicated. He divided the
attacking force into three columns, retaining another
division in reserve. The strongest column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer of DeWatteville's regiment, was composed of portions of four
regular regiments, and numbered about thirteen hundred men ; these were to assault Towson and Ripley
on Snake Hill. The centre column, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundredand-fourth, numbered only one hundred and ninety
rank-and-file, including a party of seamen and marines ; ^ these were to attack Fort Brie. The third
column, under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundredand-third regiment, numbered six hundred and fifty
rank-and-file; these were to assault the breastworks
between Fort Erie and Battery Douglass.* According to these numbers, Drummond meant to assault
with twenty-one hundred and forty rank-and-file, or
about twenty-four hundred men all told. His reserve
numbered one thousand men.* Some further number
must have been detailed in camp duty.
Drummond's instructions, dated August 14, to
Colonel Fischer were minute.* Fischer's column was
to march immediately, in order to pass through the
woods before dark, and halt for the night opposite
1 James, ii. 170, 171.
* Drummond's orders of Aug. 14, 1814; Niles, vii. 21. James,
ii. 16d-171.
■ James, ii. 178.
^ Instractions to Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 14, 1814;
HSS. Canadian Aichives.
18U. FORT ERIE. 78
the point of attack, with eveiy precaution against
discoTery : ^^Yoa are to advance to the attack precisely at two
o'clock. You are to enter the enemy's positioo hetwixt
Snake Hill and the Lake, whieh is represented to be sufficiently open; but this is not to prevent your making
your arrangements for assaulting any other part of the
position by means of the short ladders and hay-bags with
which you will be furnished. In order to insure succesSj
the Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends that
the flints be taken out of the firelocks, with the exception
of a reserve of select and steady men who may be permitted to retain their flints, if you think it necessary oi
advisable, not exceeding one third of your force. This
reserve, with the detachment of artillery, should take post
on Snake Hill."
A demonstration was to be made a few minutes
before two o'clock against the American pickets
opposite the centre of the line.
Drummond'0 general orders concluded by encouraging his men to consider their task easy : ^ —
<^The Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends
a free use of the bayonet. The enemy's force does not
exceed fifteen hundred fit for duty, and those are represented as much dispirited."
The British general underestimated Gaines's force,
which probably contained at least two thousand rankand-file fit for duty August 14, who though possibly
overworked and inclined to grumble, were ready to
^ Lieutenant-Gteneial Drummond's Order for attack [Secret];
Kiles, vii. 21.
74 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch-S.
fight. Neither Gaines nor Ripley, nor any of the
excellent officers of engineers and artillery who defended the lines of Port Erie, were likely to allow
themselves to be surprised or even approached by a
force no greater than their own without ample resistance. They kept strong pickets far in advance of
their lines, and were alive to every sign of attack.
Soon after midnight of August 14 the fire of the
British siege-guns slackened and ceased. At the
same moment Gaines left his quarters and Ripley
ordered his brigade to turn out. Both officers looked
for an assault, and were not mistaken. ^ At two
o'clock the pickets fired and fell back, and at halfpast two o'clock Colonel Fischer's advancing column
moved agamst Snake Hill.
There at the breastworks were Towson's guns and
the Twenty-first regiment commanded by Major
Wood of the Engineers, only two hundred and fifty
strong, but as steady as at Lundy's Lane.^ A part
of Fischer's brigade marched gallantly up to the
abattis, bayonets charged and guns without flints,
and approached within ten feet of the breastwork,
but failed to reach it. The other column, DeWatteville's regiment at its head, " marching too near the
Lake," according to Colonel Fischer's report,* " found
themselves entangled between the rocks and the
1 Gaines's Beport of Aug. 23, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 19. Ripley's
Beport of Aug. 17, 1814 ; Niles^ vii. Supplement, p. 129.
* Beport of lientenaBt-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 16, 1814; James,
ii. 45a
1814. FORT £BI£. 75
water, and by the retreat of the flank companies were
thrown in such confusion as to render it impossible
to give them any kind of formation during the darkness of the night, at which time they were exposed to
a most galling fire of the enemy's battery." A part
of DeWatteville's regiment waded through the water
round the American line, and came into the camp on
the flank, but found there two companies posted to
meet such an attempt, and were all captured, so that
Colonel Fischer, writing his report the next day,
seemed ignorant what had become of them.
The attack and repulse of Colonel Fischer on the
extreme American left were soon over, and the story
was easy to understand ; but the attack on Fort Erie
and the extreme right was neither quickly ended nor
easily understood. There a column of more than
seven hundred men, all told, under Colonel Scott of
the One-Hundred-and-third, was to attack the Douglass battery. Another column, numbering somewhat
more than two hundred men, all told, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundred-and-
fourth, was to assault Fort Erie. The American line
between Battery Douglass and Fort Erie was held
by the Ninth regiment and the volunteers, and was
covered by the battery. Fort Erie was defended by
about one hundred and eighteen men of the Nineteenth regiment under Major Trimble, and about sixty
artillerists ^ under Cajitain Williams.
The most intelli^ble account of the battle at the
1 Ghaiges of M^or Trimble; Niles, jL 210.
76 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
eastern end of the lines was given neither in Gaines's
nor Drummond's reports, but in some charges after"Ward brought against Gaines by Major Trimble, who
was angry at the language of Gaines's report. Trimble's charges were judged to be frivolous, but his
story of the battle was more precise than any other.
According to Major Trimble, Lieutenant-Colonel
Drummond's colimm was directed against the north
curtain of the fort, and was repulsed, but continued
the assault. Colonel Scott's column at the same time
advanced within about sixty yards of the Douglass
battery, but deterred by the fire of the guns served
under the direction of Major McRee and Lieutenant
Douglass of the Engineers, and by the loss of its
commanding oflScer Colonel Scott, who fell before
the American line, the column moved quickly to the
right, gained the ditch of the northeast bastion of
Fort Erie, and under cover of the smoke and darkness entered the bastion. There they were joined
by Drummond's men. They surprised the artillerists,
and in the scuffle Captain Williams and his lieutenants — McDonough, Fontaine, and Watmough — were
killed or disabled.
Without support the British columns could do no
more, and Lieutenant-General Drummond did not
come to their support. None of the reports mentioned the time at which the bastion was captured ;
but the small British force, which could not have
exceeded six or seven hundred men, remained for
more than two hours in or about the bastion, exposed
1814. FORT ERIE. 7T
to the American fire, to which they could not reply
with effect, and waiting for Drummond and the reserve, which the Americans also expected and tramed
their gnns to enfilade. The British in the bastion
repeatedly attempted to advance from the bastion
to gain possession of the Fort, and twice tried to
force the door of the stone mess-house from which
the men of the Nineteenth regiment kept up a destructive fire. They repulsed the attacks made by
reinforcements ordered by Gaines into the Fort to
recover the bastion ; yet their destruction was inevitable as soon as the dawn should arrive, for they
could neither advance nor escape, nor remain where
they were, under the guns of the garrison.
After maintaining themselves till five o'clock in
this difficult position, the British soldiers and sailors
in the bastion were panic-struck by the explosion of
an ammunition-chest under the platform. According
to General Drummond's official report, *' Some ammunition, which had been placed under the platform,
caught fire from the firing of guns in the rear, and
a most tremendous explosion followed, by which almost all the troops which had entered the place were
dreadfully mangled. Panic was instantly communicated to the troops, who could not be persuaded
that the explosion was accidental ; and the enemy at
the same time pressing forward and commencing a
heavy fire of musketry, the Fort was abandoned, and
our troops retreated toward the battery."
The explosion merely hastened the rout. Probably
78 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. CSh.8.
the attacking columns would have fared still worse,
had thej remained. Even their panic-stricken flight
saved only a remnant. Of Drummond's column, said
to number one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, one
hundred and eighty-eight officers and men were reported as missing, wounded, or killed. Of Scott's
column, said to number six hundred and fifty* rankand-file, — the Royal Scots and the One-Hundredand-third regunents, — f our hundred and ninety-six
officers and men were returned as killed, wounded, or
missing. Of the whole rank-and-file engaged under
Fischer, Scott, and Drummond, numbering two thousand one hundred and fifty men, if the British report
was correct, seven hundred and eighty were officially
reported among the casualties. The loss in officers
was equally severe. Colonel Scott was killed before
the lines. Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond was killed
in the bastion. One major, ten captains, and fifteen
lieutenants were killed, wounded, or missing. The
total British loss was nine hundred and five among
some twenty-four hundred engaged. The total American loss was eighty-four men.i
General Drummond was excessively mortified by
his failure, in truth the severest blow that British
arms could suffer at that moment. For the fourth
time in six weeks a large body of British troops met
a bloody and unparalleled check, if not rout, from an
inferior force. In a private letter to Prevost, dated
1 British Betom; James, ii. 454. American Betoni; Niles,
vii. 21.
1814. FORT ERIE. 79
August 16, Drummond attributed the disaster to the
misconduct of DeWatteville's regiment, a foreign
corps, which was struck by panic :^ —
^^It appears that part of the forlorn hope and about
half of Watteville's Light Company, by wading through
the water, though the footing was excessively rough and
rocky along the Lake-shore, turned the left flank of an
abattis which extended from the enemy's battery on
Snake Hill, the left of their position, to the Lake, and
part penetrated through the abattis itself, and thereby
gained the rear of the enemy's works. The fire of the
enemy at this time being extremely heavy both from artillery and musketry, it would seem as if a simultaneous
shock of panic pervaded the greater part of those not in
immediate advance ; and the forlorn hope, not finding itself sufficiently supported, was reluctantly under the necessity of relinquishing the advantages they had gained,
and of retuing again through the water under a most
galling fire. They lost many men, and DeWatteville's
Light Company nearly half their number. The Light
Company of the Eighty-ninth, notwithstanding they were
almost overwhelmed by the grenadiers of DeWatteville in
the precipitancy of their retreat, was the only body that
preserved its order and remained firm upon its ground.
By this act of steadiness they fortunately lost scarcely
a man. The main body of DeWatteville's regiment retreated in such confusion that they carried the King's
regiment before them like a torrent. Thus by the misconduct of this foreign corps has the opportunity been
totaUy lost."
^ Drummond to Prevost| Aug. 16, 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archivok
80 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATED CSh.8.
The mortification of Drummond was acute in having to charge both his attacking columns with being
panic-stricken : ^^ The agony of mind I suffer from
the present disgraceful and unfortunate conduct of
the troops committed to my superintendence, wounds
me to the soul ! " Yet he offered no evidence to show
that his troops fled before they were beaten, nor did
he explain why he had thought it useless to order
the reserve to their support after they had captured
the bastion. In reality the battle of Fort Erie was
more creditable to the British than the battles of
Chippawa or Lundy's Lane, and the Americans could
not admit that in either of the three the conduct of
Drummond's troops was " disgraceful."
The defeat so much weakened Drummond that he
could no longer keep the field without support, and
immediately sent for two more regiments, — the
Sixth and the Eighty-second from Burlington and
York, — numbering about one thousand and forty
rank-and-file, and making good his losses.^
At that time Chauncey was in control of Lake
Ontario. The anxieties and delays in fitting out his
new ship had ended in a f^ver, under which he was
still suffering when he received General Brown's
challenge of July 13 to meet him opposite Port
George. Chauncey did not immediately reply except
by message through General Gaines. July 31, everything being at last ready, he was carried on board his
^ James, ii. 814. Drummond to Prevoet, Aug. 16, 1814 ;
MSS. Canadian Archives.
mi. FORT EBI£. 81
ship, and the next day he sailed, arriying August 5
off Port George. Brown's army was then besieged in
Fort Erie, and could not approach the fleet. This
situation gave to Chauncey the opportunity of writing a letter to Brown, repaying the harshness that
Brown had shown to him.
*^ Was it friendly or just or honorable/' asked Chauncey,^ ««not only to furnish an opening for the public,
but thus to assist them to infer that I had pledged my^
self to meet you on a particular day at the head of the
Lake, for the purpose of co-operation, and in case of
disaster to your army, thus to turn their resentment from
you, who are alone responsible, upon me, who could not
by any possibility have prevented, or retarded even, your
discomfiture? You well know, sir, l^at the fleet could
not have rendered you the least service during your late
incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able
to approach Lake Ontario on any point nearer than
Queenston."
Brown's quarrel with Chauncey made much noise
in its day, and, like the less defensible quarrel with
Ripley, proved that Brown was unnecessarily aggressive ; but in the situation of the United States, aggressiveness was the most valuable quality in the
service. That Brown might have become a great
general was possible, had his experience been larger;
but whatever was his merit as a general, his qualities
as a fighter were more remarkable than those of any
other general officer in the war. Except immediately
1 Chatmcey to Biown, Aug. lO, 1814 ; Niles^ vii. 38.
VOL. nil.— 6
82 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. CSh.8.
after receiving his wound at Lundj's Lane, when his
army was exhausted by four hours of extreme effort,
he never seemed satiated with fighting. Among all
the American major-generals, he alone made raw
troops as steady as grenadiers, and caused militia to
storm entrenched lines held by British regulars.
Brown might have been well satisfied to let Drummond exhaust his strength in attacking Fort Erie.
Prom a military point of view. Port Erie was worthless for any other purpose than to draw the enemy
to the extreme end of their line, where they could
with difficulty obtain supplies, and could take no
part in the serious campaigning intended on Lake
Champlain. For that object, no more pitched battles
were needed. Drummond's force was wasting away
by sickness and exposure.^
After the battle of August 15, the British continued
to bombard Fort Erie. No great damage was done ;
but a shell exploded in Gaines's quarters August 29,
injuring him severely and obliging him to relinquish
command. Brown was still unfit for service, but was
bent upon more fighting, and knew that Ripley pre*
f erred to abandon Fort Erie altogether. Accordingly
he resumed command at Buffalo, September 2, and
set himself to study the situation.
The situation was uncomfortable, but in no way
"perilous. The lines of Fort Erie were stronger than
ever, and beyond danger of capture from any British force that could be brought to assault them,
^ James, ii. 230.
1814. FORT ERIE. 88
until Drummond should discover some new means
of supplying troops with subsistence. The army
return of August 81 gave the precise strength of
the garrison.
Strength of the Army at Fort Erie, Aug. 81, 1814.
Prkutt for DcttT. AooBiOAn.
,c
Non-com. Offloen, Oflioen. Present and
rank-and-file. absent.
Dragoons •••••.. 27 1 48
Bombardiers, etc 34 51
ArtiUery Corps 206 10 369
First Brigade 725 39 2311
Second Brigade 698 42 1646
Porter's Brigade 220 16 599
First and Fourth Rifles . . 217 11 504
Total . 2127 119 5528
The regular force in Port Erie numbered two thousand and thirty-three effectives^ September 4, and
though annoyed by the enemy's fire and worn by
hard work, they were in both these respects better
situated than the besiegers. Sooner or later the
British would be obliged to retreat ; and Brown was
informed by deserters that Drummond was then contemplating withdrawal.* Brown estimated the British force very loosely at three or four thousand ; * and
it was in fact about the smaller number.
Drummond's situation was told in his reports to
^ Ripley to Armstrong, Sept 4, 1814 ; MSS. War Department.
■ Lossingy p. 837.
* Brown to Izard, Sept 10, 1814; Izard's CoxieBpondence^
p. 86.
84 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES, Ch.«.
Sir George Prevost. September 8 he wrote ^ that he
should not fail to seize any favorable opportunity to
attack ; ^^ but should no such opportunity present itself, I feel it incumbent on me to prepare your Excellency for the possibility of my being compelled by
sickness or suffering of the troops, exposed as they
will be to the effects of the wet and unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw them from
their present position to one which may afford them
the means of cover. Sickness has, I am sorry to say,
already made its appearance in several of the corps."
Three days afterward, September 11,^ Drummond
was warned by several signs that his lines were 'to
be attacked by Brown, although "whether the account which is invarially given by deserters of his
intention to act offensively ... be correct, I have not
yet been able accurately to ascertain." Drummond's
batteries had been almost silent for several days for
want of ammunition, and he could do nothing till
the arrival of reinforcements, — the Ninety-seventh
regiment, — unaccountably delayed. Rain had begun, and he dreaded its effect on the troops. In his
next despatch, dated September 14,^ he said that the
rain had been incessant, and " as the whole of the
troops are without tents, and the huts in which they
^ Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 8y 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
' Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
* Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 14, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian
Archives.
1814. FORT ERIE. 86
are placed are wholly incapable of affording shelter
against such severe weather, their situation is most
distressing." The roads were impassable ; the nearest depot of supplies was Port Gteorge, and Drummond had not cattle enough to move a third of his
heavy ordnance if* a sudden movement should be
necessary. The enemy seemed about to cross the
river in his rear, and the Ninety-seventh regiment
had not yet arrived : —
^^ In the mean tune I have strong grounds for thinking that the enemy will risk an attack, — an event which
though from the necessity of defending my batteries in
the first instance with the pickets alone I shall have to
meet under every possible disadvantage, yet I am very
much disposed to hope may be the most fortunate circumstance which can happen, as it will bring us in contact with the enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we were
to be the assailants."
While Drummond struggled between the necessity
of retreat and the diflSculty of retreating, Brown was
bent on attacking his lines. The plan was open to
grave objections, and a council of war, September 9,
discouraged the idea. Brown was much disappointed
and irritated at the result of the council, especially
with Ripley ; but while giving the impression that he
acquiesced, he brought over all the volunteers he could
obtain.^ The nmnber was never precisely given, but
according to the official reports of General Peter B.
Porter who conmianded them, and of General Brown
^ Jesnp's Naiiative; Lossing, p. 837, note; Ingeraoll, ii. 151.
86 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
himself, they did not exceed one thousand.^ With
these, and an equal number of regular troops, Brown
undertook to assault Drummond's entrenchments.
The nearest British line was about six hundred
yards from old Fort Erie. From the first British
battery on the Lake-shore, to Battery No. 3 in the
woods, the line extended nearly half a mile, covered
by abattis, but defended only by the brigade of troops
on actual duty. If carried, the first line could not
be held without capturing the second line, about fifty
yards distant, and a third line, farther in the rear ;
while the main British force was encamped, for reasons of health and comfort, a mile behind, and was
supposed to number at least three thousand six hundred men, or quite suflScient to recover their works.
Brown professed no intention of fighting the British
army. He proposed only "to storm the batteries,
destroy the cannon, and roughly handle the brigade
upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought
into action."^
Although Drummond expected and wished to be
attacked, he kept no proper pickets or scouts in the
woods, and all day of September 16 American fatigue
parties were at work opening a path through the forest the distance of a mile, from Snake Hill on the
extreme left to the extremiiy of the British line in
the *^ods. So little precaution had Drummond's
^ Porter's Beport of Sept. 22, 1814» and Brown's Report of
Sept. 29, 1814; Niles, vii. 100, 101.
* Brown's Beport of Sept. 29, 1814; Niles, viL 100.
1814. FORT ERIE. 87
engineers taken that they left the dense forest standing within pistol-shot of the flank and rear of their
Battery No. 8 on their extreme right, and the American parties opened a path within one hmidred and
fifty yards of the flank of the British line without
being discovered.
At noon, September 17, General Porter led a coltimn of sixteen hundred men — of whom one thousand
were militia volunteers, and a part were the Twentythird regiment — along the path through the woods,
in three divisions, commanded by Colonel Gibson of
the Fourth Rifles, Colonel E. D. Wood of the Engineers, and Brigadier-General Davis of the New York
militia. At three o'clock, under cover of heavy rain,
the whole force fell suddenly on the blockhouse
which covered the flank and rear of the British battery No. 8, and succeeded in capturing the blockhouse and mastering the battery held by DeWatteville's regiment. While detachments spiked the guns
and blew up the magazine, the main column ad-
vanced on Battery No. 2, while at the same time
General Miller, promoted to the command of Scott's
old brigade, moved with " the remains of the Ninth
and Eleventh Infantry and a detachment of the Nineteenth" from a ravine in front of Battery No. 3 to
pierce the centre of the British line between Battery
No. 8 and Battery No. 2.^
Within half an hour after the first gun was fired,
Porter and Miller had effected their junction within
^ Brown's Bepcart of Oct. 1, 1814; Official Letters, p. 445.
88 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES* CSh.5.
the British lines, had captured Battery No. 2, and
moved on Battery No. 1, by the Lake-shore. There
the success ended. Battery No. 1 could not be carried. By that time the Boyal Scots, the Eighty-ninth,
the Sixth, and the Eighty-second British regiments
had arrived, — probably about one thousand men.^
A sharp engagement followed before Brown, after
ordering his reserve under Ripley to the assistance
of Porter and Miller, could disengage his troops.
The three commanders of Porter's divisions — Gibson,
Wood, and Davis — were killed or mortally wounded,
— Gibson at the second battery, Davis and Wood in
assaulting the shore battery. Ripley was desperately
wounded at the same time. General Porter, Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall of the Ninth, and Major
Trimble of the Nineteenth, as well as a number of
other officers, were severely wounded. That the last
action was sharp was proved by the losses suffered
by the British reinforcements. According to the
British official return, the four regiments which came
last into the field — the Royal Scots, Sixth, Eightysecond, and Eighty-ninth — lost thirty-six killed, one
hundred and nine wounded, and fifty-four missing, —
a total of two hundred men, in a short action of
half an hour at the utmost, without artillery.
The American forces were recalled by Brown and
Miller as soon as their progress was stopped, and they
retired without serious pursuit beyond the British
^ James, ii. 232, 233. Report of Migor-General DeWattevill^
Sept. 19, 1814; James, ii. 469.
1814 FORT ERIE. 89
lines. Their losses were very severe, numbering five
hundred and elevien killed, wounded, and missing,
or about one fourth of their number. Among them
were several of the best oflScers in the United States
service, including Ripley, Wood, and Gibson. Drummond's loss was still more severe, numbering six
hundred and nine,^ probably almost one man in three
of the number engaged. The British killed numbered one hundred and fifteen. The Americans
reported seventy-nine killed, — sixty regulars, and
nineteen militia.
The next day Drummond issued a general order
claiming a victory over an American force of "not
less than five thousand men, including militia ; " but
his situation, untenable before the sortie, became impossible after it. Three out of six battering cannon
were disabled;^ he had lost six hundred men in battle,
and his losses by sickness were becoming enormous.
"My effective numbers are reduced to considerably
less than two thousand firelocks," he reported, September 21. Immediately after the sortie, although
reinforced by the Ninety-seventh regiment, he made
his arrangements to retreat.
" Within the last few days," he wrote to Prevost, Sep-
tember 21,* '^ the sickness of the troops has increased to
such an alarming degree, and their situation has really
become one of such extreme wretchedness from the tor^ James, ii. 234. ^ James, it. 236.
• Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 21, 1814; MSS. Canadian
ArchiveB.
90 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CH.a.
rents of rain which have continued to fall for the last
thirteen days, and from the circumstance of the Division
being entirely destitute of camp-equipage, that I feel it
my duty no longer to persevere in a vain attempt to
maintain the blockade of so vastly superior and increasing a force of the enemy under such circumstances. I
have therefore given orders for the troops to fall back
toward the Ghippawa, and shall commence my movement
at eight o'clock this evening."
CHAPTER IV.
Weak as was the army at Niagara, it was relativelj
stronger than the defence at any other threatened
point. . Sackett's Harbor contained only seven hundred effectives.^ On Lake Champlain, Major-General
Izard tried to cover Plattsburg and Burlington with
about five thousand regular troops.^ Already Armstrong knew that large British reinforcements from
Wellington's army were on their way to Canada;^
and within a few weeks after the battle of Lundy'a
Lane eleven thousand of the best troops England
ever put in the field were camped on or near the
Sorel River, about to march against Izard's five
thousand raw recruits.
They could march nowhere else. Not only was.
the line of Lake Champlain the natural and necessary path of an invading army, but the impossibility
of supplying any large number of troops in Upper
Canada made Lake Champlain the only region in
* Chatmcey to Jones, Aug. 10, 1814; Niles, vii. 37.
* Izard to ArmBtrong, July 19, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 54.
* Armstrong to Izaid, July 2, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 51.
92 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4
which a large British force could exist. Sir George
Prevost had reached the limit of his powers in defending Upper Canada. His commissary-general,
W. H. Robinson, wrote to him, August 27, expressing "the greatest alarm" on account of deficient
supplies at Burlington Heights and Niagara, where
instead of nine thousand rations daily as he expected, he was required to furnish fourteen thousand,
half of them to Indians.^ Much as Prevost wanted
to attack Sackett's Harbor, and weak as he knew
that post to be, he could not attempt it, although
he had thirteen or fourteen thousand rank-and-file
idle at Montreal. In October he went to Eangston
expressly to arrange such an attack, and found it
impossible.
^^ An investigation of the state of the stores at this
post," he wrote to Lord Bathurst October 18,* "proved
that the articles for the armament and equipment for a
ship of the class of the ^ St. Lawrence,' carrying upward
of one hundred guns, had absorbed ahnost the whole of
the summer transport-service from Montreal, leaving the
materials for an undertaking of the magnitude of the
destruction of Sackett's Harbor still at the extremity of
the line of communication ; and now, by giving precedence to that supply of provisions and stores without
which an army is no longer to be maintained in Upper
Canada, its removal is inevitably postponed until the
winter roads are established."
1 W. H. Robmson to Sir Q. Prevoet, Aug. 27, 1814; MS&
British Archives.
* Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 18^ 1814 ; MSS. British
1814. PLATTSBURG- 98
Not only were military operations on a large scale
impossible in Upper Canada, but for the opposite
reason occupation of Lake Champlain by a British
force was necessary. Northern New York and Vermont furnished two thirds of the fresh beef consumed
by the British armies. General Izard reported to
Armstrong, July 31,^ —
*^ From the St. Lawrence to the ocean, an open disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with
the enemy. The road to St. Regis is covered with droves
of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy.
The revenue officers see these things, but acknowledge
their inability to put a stop to such outrageous proceedings. On the eastern side of Lake Champlain the high
roads are found insufficient for the supplies of cattle which
are pouring into Canada. like herds of buffaloes they
press through the forest, making paths for themselves.
. . . Nothing but a cordon of troops from the French
Mills to Lake Memphramagog could effectually check
the evil. Were it not for these supplies, the British
forces in Canada would soon be suffering from famine,
or their government be subjected to enormous expense
for their maintenance."
After Chauncey, August 1, regained possession of
Lake Ontario, any British campaign against Sackett's Harbor or Detroit became doubly impossible,
and the occupation of Lake Champlain became
doubly necessary. Prevost wrote to Bathurst, August 27,«—
^ Izaid's Correspondence, p. 57.
* Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814 1 MSS. British
94 HISTORY OF THE XJNITED STATES. Ch.4.
<^ In fact, my Lord, two thirds of the army in Canada
are at this moment eating beef provided by American
contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as
that of the introduction of large sums in specie into this
province, being notorious in the United States, it is to
be expected that Congress will take steps to deprive us
of those resources; and under that apprehension large
droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower
Canada.''
The fear that Izard might at any moment take
efficient measures to cur off the British supplies gave
double force to the reasons for occupying Lake
Champlain, and forcmg the military frontier back
beyond Plattsburg and Burlington.
The political reasons were not less strong or less
notorious than the military. England made no
secret of her intention to rectify the Canadian frontier by loppmg away such territory as she could
conquer. July 5, the day of the battle of Chippawa,
Lieutenant-Colonel Pilkington sailed from Halifax,
and imder the naval protection of Sir Thomas Hardy
in the " Ramillies," landed at Eastport, July 11, with
the One-Hundred-and-second regiment, some engineers and artillery,— a detachment of six hundred
men, — and took possession of Moose Island.^ Port
Sullivan, with six officers and eighty men, capitulated, and Oreat Britain took permanent possession
of the place.
^ Lieat.-Colonel Pilkington to lieaU-Qeneral Sherbrooke^
July 12, 1814 ; James, ii. 472.
mi. PLATTSBURG. 95
Moose Island was disputed territory, and its occupation was not necessarily conquest; but the next
step showed wider views. August 26, LieutenantGeneral Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, the British governor of
Nova Scotia, set sail from Halifax with a powerful
fleet, carrying near two thousand troops, and arrived
September 1 at the Penobscot.^ At his approach,
the American garrison of the small battery at Castine blew up their fort and dispersed. In all Massachusetts, only about six hundred regular troops
were to be found, and beyond the Penobscot, in
September, 1814, hardly a full company could have
been collected. The able-bodied, voting, male population of the counties of Eennebeck and Hancock,
on either side of the Penobscot River, capable of
bearing arms, was at that time about twelve thousand, on an estimate of one in five of the total population; but they offered no resistance to the British
troops.
One misfortune led to another. A few days before
Sherbrooke's arrival at Castine the United States
ship "Adams," a heavy corvette carrying twenty-
eight guns, having escaped from Chesapeake Bay and
cruised some months at sea struck on a reef on the
Isle of Haut, and was brought into the Penobscot
in a sinking condition. Captain Morris, who commanded her, took the ship up the river about twentyfive miles, as far as Hampden near Bangor, and removed her guns in order to repair her. Sherbrooke,
^ Sherbrooke to Bathuist, Sept. IB, 1814; James, iL 475.
96 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES- Ch. 4.
on occupying Castine, sent a detachment of some
six hundred men in boats up the river to destroy
the ship, while he occupied Belfast with another
regiment.^ Captain Morris hastily put his guns in
battery, and prepared to defend the ship with his
crew, numbering probably more than two hundred
men, relying on the militia to cover his flanks. On
the morning of September 3, in a thick fog, the
enemy's boats approached and landed their infantry,
which attacked and routed the militia, and obliged
Captain Morris to set fire to the " Adams," abandon
his guns, and disperse his men.a The British force
then marched to Bangor, which they occupied without opposition. Their entire loss was one man killed
and eight wounded.^ At Bangor they remained
nearly a week, destroying vessels and cargoes; but
Sir John Sherbrooke had no orders to occupy the
country west of the Penobscot, and his troops returned September 9 to Castine.
At Castine the British remained, while another
detachment occupied Machias. All the province of
Maine east of the Penobscot was then in Sherbrooke's
hands. The people formfdly submitted. One hundred miles of Massachusetts sea-coast passed quietly
under the dominion of the King of England. The
male citizens were required to take, and took, the
oath of allegiance to King George,* and showed no
^ Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept. 18, 1814 ; James, 11. 476.
^ Morris to Jones, Sept. 20, 1814 ; Niles, vil. 03.
* Jamesy ii. 482. ^ Lossing, p. 903, note.
1814. PLATTSBURG- 97
unwillingness to remain permanently British subjects*
After September 1 the United States government
had every reason to expect that Great Britain would
require, as one condition of peace, a cession of the
eastern and northern portions of Maine.
For this purpose the British needed also to occupy Lake Champlain, in order to make their conquests respectable. The British general might move
on Plattsburg or on Burlington ; but in order to
maintain his position he must gain naval possession
of the Lake. In such a case the difficulties of the
American government would be vastly increased, and
the British position would be impregnable. Armstrong knew these circumstances almost as well as
they were known to Sir George Prevost.
In May the British flotilla entered Lake Champlain from the Sorel River, and cruised. May 9, as
far southward as Otter Creek, terrifying Vermont
for the safety of the American flotilla under Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough at Vergennes. Irritated
and alarmed by this demonstration, Armstrong ordered Izard to seize and fortify Rouse's Point, or the
mouth of LacoUe River, or Ash Island, and so close
the entrance to the Lake.^ Apparently Armstrong
gave the order in ignorance that LacoUe River and
Ash Island were strongly fortified British positions,^
^ Armstrong to Izard, May 25 and June 30, 1814 ; Izard's
Correspondence, pp. 23, 48.
^ Izard to Armstrong, July 12, 1814; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 52.
VOL. vni. — 7
98 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
and that a battery established at Rouse's Pomt, in
the relative situation of forces, must have fallen into
British hands. On this point the opinion of Izard
-vras more valuable than that of Armstrong; and
Izard, after much study and inquiry, decided to erect
his fortifications at Plattsburg. He preferred the
task of taking a position , which he could certainly
hold, although it would not prevent the enemy from
passing if they chose to leave it behind them. At
Plattsburg, therefore, he collected his troops, amounting to five or six thousand men, and constructed
strong forts, while Macdonough's fleet took position
in the bay.
While thus occupied, Izard cast anxious glances
westward, doubting whether, in case of a reverse at
Niagara or Sackett's Harbor, he ought not to move
on the St. Lawrence and threaten the British communications between Montreal and Kingston.^ The
same idea occurred to Armstrong, who in a letter
dated July 27 recommended Izard to carry it out.^
The letter reached Izard August 10, when he had
advanced with his army to Chazy, and had learned
enough of the concentration of British troops in his
front to be assured that they meant to direct their
serious attack against Lake Champlain. He wrote
Armstrong a letter, August 11, which failed only in
^ Iz^rd to AmiBtrong, July 19, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 54.
^ Armstrong to Izard, July 27, 1814; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 64.
1814. PLATTSBUBG. 99
saying too little, rather than too much, of the dangers
risked in obeying Armstrong's order : ^ —
^^I will make the movement you direct, if possible;
but I shall do it with the apprehension of risking the
force under my command, and with the certainty that
everything in this vicinity but the lately erected works
at Plattsburg and Cumberland Head will in less than
three days after my departure be in the possession of
the enemy. He is in force superior to mine in my front ;
he daily threatens an attack on my position at Champlain ; we are in hourly expectation of a serious conflict.
That he has not attacked us before this time is attributable to caution on his part, from exaggerated reports
of our numbers, and from his expectation of reinforcements. ... It has always been my conviction that the
numerical force of the enemy has been under-rated. I
believe this to be the strong point of our frontier for
either attack or defence, and I know that a British force
has been kept in check in Lower Canada for many weeks
past, greatly superior to that which I could oppose to
it."
Izard was right. Every week new British forces
poured into Quebec and were forwarded to MontreaL
The arrival of the first division at Quebec was announced in the American newspapers early in August.
Within a few weeks three brigades arrived and were
sent to the front. When Izard wrote, he was probably faced by ten thousand veteran British troops
within twenty or thirty miles of his position, and more
were known to be on their way. At such a moment
^ Izard to Armstrong, Aag. 11, 1814; Izard's Coirespondexioe.
100 mSTORT OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4.
the danger of attempting a diversion was great ; but
Armstrong refused to believe it. Irritated by Izard's
remonstrance, the secretary not only persisted in his
own opinion, but, abandoning the idea of a movement against the British commmiications along the
St. Lawrence, ordered Izard to march his army to
Sacketf s Harbor, and from there to operate either
directly in force against Kingston,^ or to go on to
Niagara and assist Brown, then hard pressed at Fort
Erie. "It is very distinctly my opinion," wrote the
secretary August 12,- " that it haa become good policy
on our part to carry the war as far to the westward
as possible, particularly while we have an ascendency
on the Lakes."
Izard obeyed. His troops, numbering four thousand men, began their march August 29 for Sackett's Harbor, and for several weeks at the crisis of
the campaign ceased to exist for military purposes.
Within the fortifications at Plattsburg Izard left a
miscellaneous body of three thousand, three hundred
men,^ without an organized battalion except four
companies of the Sixth regiment. Brigadier-General
AJexander Macomb, who as senior officer was left in
command, reported his force aa not exceeding fifteen
hundred effectives.*
^ Armstrong to Izard, July 27, 1814; Izazd's CoiieBpondence,
p. 64.
* Armstrong to Izard, Aug. 12, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 69.
' Izard's Correspondence, p. 144.
^ Macomb to Armstrong, Sept. 16, 1814; Niles, vii 60.
1814. PLATTSBURG. 101
Armstrong's policy of meeting the enemy's main
attack by annihilating the main defence never received
explanation or excuse. At times Armstrong seemed
to suggest that he meant to rely on the navy ,^ — and
indeed nothing else, except Izard's forts, was left to
rely upon; but in truth he rajther invited the invasion of a British army into New York to " renew the
scene of Saratoga." ^ As Izard predicted, the enemy
crossed the frontier at once after his departure, occupying Ohazy September 3, and approaching, Septeniber 5, within eight miles of Plattsburg.
Great Britain had never sent to America so formidable an armament. Neither WoKe nor Amherst,
neither Burgoyne nor Comwallis, had led so large
or so fine an army as was under the command of Sir
George Prevost. According to his proposed arrangement, the light brigade, under Major-General Robinson, contained four battalions of the Twenty-seventh,
Thirty-ninth, Seventy-sixth, and Eighty-eighth foot,
with artillery, and numbered two thousand eight
hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file. The second
brigade, under Major-General Brisbane, contained
battalions of the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Forty-ninth,
De Meuron's regiment and Canadian voltigeurs and
chasseurs, numbering four thousand and forty-eight
rank-and-file. The third brigade, under Major-General
Power, contained battalions of the Third, Fifth,
^ Armstrong to Izard, Aug. 2, 1814; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 61.
* See ante, vol. vii. p. 173.
102 HISTORT OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
Twenty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth, and numbered three
thousand eight hundred and one rank-and-file. The
reserve, under Major-General Kempt, contained battalions of the Ninths Thirty-seventh, Fifty-seventh,
and Eighty-first, numbering three thousand five hundred and forty-nine rank-and-file. Finally, fourteen
hundred and eighty-eight men of the Sixteenth and
Seventieth regiments, under the command of MajorGeneral DeWatteviUe, were stationed between Coteau
du Lac and Gananoque on the St. Lawrence.^
Thus the left division of the British army in Canada
numbered fifteen thousand seven hundred and seventy
effectives, or, including officers, probably eighteen
thousand men, without reckoning the Canadian militia,
either incorporated or sedentary. Two lieutenantgenerals and five major-generals were in command.
Amply provided with artillery and horses, every brigade well equipped, they came fresh from a long
service in which the troops had learned to regard
themselves as invincible. As they were at last organized, four brigades crossed the border, numbering not
less than " eleven thousand men with a proportionate
and most excellent tram of artillery, commanded m
chief by Sir George Prevost, and ^der hhn by officers of the first distinction in the service."^ A reserve of about five thousand men remained behind.
The fleet was almost as formidable as the army.
^ Proposed Distribution of the Forces in the Left Division;
MSS. Canadian Archives, Freer Papers, 1812-1813, p. 107.
s James, iL 206.
1814. PLATTSBURG. 108
As the force of the flotilla was reported to Prevost, it
consisted of a thirty-six-guii ship, the ^^ Confiance ; '^
an eighteen-gun brig, the ^' Linnet ; " two ten-gun
sloops and twelve gunboats, carrying sixteen guns,^-—
all commanded by Captain Downie, of the Royal Navy,
detached by Sir James Yeo for the purpose.
Such an expedition was regarded with unhesitating
confidence, as able to go where it pleased within the
region of Lake Champlain. About every other undertaking in America the British entertained doubts^
but in regard to this affair they entertained none.*
Every movement of the British generals showed conviction of their irresistible strength. Had Prevost
doubted the result of attacking Plattsburg, he could
have advanced by St. Albans on Burlington,^ which
would have obliged Macomb and Macdonough to
leave then- positions. So Uttle did his army approhend difficulty, that in advancing to Plattsburg in
face of Macomb's skirmishers they did not once form
in line, or pay attention to the troops and militia
who obstructed the road. "The British troops did
not deign to fire on them except by their flankers
and advanced patrols," reported Macomb.* " So undaunted was the enemy that he never deployed in
Mb whole inarch, always pressing on in column."
^ Comparatiye Force of the Flotillas; MSS. Canadian Archives*
Freyost's Report ; James, ii. 462 ; Christie, ii. 211, note,
* Christie, ii. 221, 222.
• Montreal Herald, Sept 24, 1814.
« Beport of Sept 16, 1814; Niles, vii M.
104 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
The fleet felt the same certainty. Accordmg to the
best Canadian authority,^ "the strongest confidence
prevailed in the superiority of the British vessels,
their weight of metal, and in the capacity and experience of their officers and crews." Captain Downie
informed Sir George Prevost's staff-officer that he
considered himself with the " Confiance " alone a
match for the whole American squadron.^ Taking
the British accoimt of the "Confiance" as correct, she
was one hundred and forty-six feet long on the gundeck, and thirty-six feet broad ; she carried a crew
of three hundred officers and men ; ' her armament
was thirty-seven guns, — twenty-seven long twentyfour-pounders, six thirty-two-pound carronades, and
four twenty-four-pound carronades, — throwing in all
nine hundred and thirty-six pounds.* The American
account, which was more trustworthy because the
■** Confiance " became better known in the American
than in the British service, gave her thirty-one long
twenty-four-pounders and six carronades.*
Macdonough's best ship was the " Saratoga." Her
dimensions were not recorded. Her regular complement of men was two hundred and ten, but she
fought with two hundred and forty ; she carried eight
twenty-four-pounders, twelve thirty-two and six fortytwo-pound carronades, — or twenty-six guns, throwing
1 Christie, ii. 212. • Christie, ii. 212.
.* London Naval Chronicle, zxxii. 292. Niles, viii.; Supplement, p. 173.
* James, p. 413. * Cooper's Naval Histotyi ii 429.
1814.
PLATTSBURG.
106
eight hundred and twenty-eight pounds. Her inferiority to the " Confiance " at long range was immense,
and within carronade range it was at least sufficient
to satisfy Captain Downie. He believed that 9, few
broadsides would dispose of the ^^ Saratoga/' and that
the other American vessels must then surrender.
Assuming Sir George Prevost's report to have been
correct, the two fleets compared as follows : ^ —
Force of British Fleet,
Qans.
Jjoiog, Short'
Loiur Short Weight of
metaL metal. metal
Confiance • . •
37
31
6
744
192
936
Linnet ....
16
16
192
192
Chubb ....
U
1
10
6
180
186
Finch ....
10
4
6
24
108
132
Twelve Gunboats
16
8
8
162
256
418
Total . . .
90
60
30
1128
736
1864
Force
of American Fleet,
Vesieli.
Qnnfl.
Long.
A■
Long
metal.
Short
metal.
Weight of
metal
Saratoga ... 26
Eagle .... 20
Ticonderoga . . 17
Preble .... 7
Ten Gunboats . 16
Total ... 86
8
8
12
7
10
45
18
12
S
6
41
192
144
168
63
192
636
384
146
108
828
528
814
63
300
759 1274 2033
In this calculation the possible error consists only
in one disputed eighteen-pound columbiad on the
^ Macdonough's Report of Sept. 12, 1814; Niles, vii. 42.
Cooper's Naval Histoiy, chap, xxviii. James's Naval Occuirences,
pp. 414, 416. Roosevelt's Naval War of 1812, pp. 378-384.
106 HISTORY OP THE UOTTED STATES. Cai.
^^FincV and three disputed guns — one long and
two short — on the British gunboats. In one case
the British would have thrown about nineteen hundred pounds of metal,-— in the other , about eighteen
hundred. A glance at the two tables shows that in
one respect Downie held a decisive superiority in his
guns. He had no less than sixty long-range pieces,
while Macdonough had but forty-five. Downie's longrange guns threw at least eleven hundred pounds of
metal; Macdonough's threw but seven hundred and
sixty. If Downie chose . his own distance beyond
range of the thirty-two-pound carronades, and fought
only his long guns, nothing could save Macdonough
except extreme good fortune, for he had but fourteen twenty-four-pound guns against Downie's thirtyfour. Firing by broadsides, Downie could throw from
his single Ship, the " Confiance," sixteen twenty-fourpound shot, to which Macdonough could reply only
with eight, even if he used all his long guns on the
same side.
The Americans had a decided advantage only in
their commander. Thomas Macdonough, born in
Delaware in 1783, was thirty years old when this responsibility fell upon him. He had been educated,
like most of the naval heroes, in the hard service of
the Tripolitan war, and had been sent to construct
and conmiand the naval force on Lake Champlain in
the spring of 1818. Macdonough's superiority over
ordinary commanders consisted in the intelligent forethought with which he provided for the chances of
PLATTSBURG
FV>silion of vessels
20 M. after anchoring
4'
4
1814. PLATTSBURG. 107
battle. His arrangement showed that he foresaw,
and as far as possible overcame in advance, every
conceivable attack. He compelled the enemy to fight
only as pleased himseK.
Macdonough anchored his four large vessels across
Plattsburg Bay, where it was a mile and a half wide,
and placed his gimboats in their rear to fill the gaps.
Cumberland Head on his^ left and front, and Crab
Island on his right obliged the enemy to enter in a
line so narrow that Downie would find no room to
anchor on his broadside out of carronade range, but
must sail into the harbor under the raking fire of
the American long guns, and take a position within
range of the American carronades.^ As the battle
was to be fought at anchor, both squadrons would as
a matter of course be anchored with springs on their
cables ; but Macdonough took the additional precaution of laying a kedge oflf each bow of the " Saratoga,"
bringing their hawsers in on the two quarters, and
letting them hang in bights under water .^ This arrangement enabled him to wind his ship at any time
without fear of having his cables cut by the enemy's
shot, and to use his larboard broadside if his starboard guns should be disabled. In effect, it doubled
his fighting capacity.
Sir George Prevost and the army were ready to
move before Downie's fleet could be prepared. Marching directly forward with the utmost confidence, Sir
* Cooper's Naval History, ii. 427, 431.
* Coopei's Naval Histoiy, ii. 432.
108 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
George turned the advanced American position at
Dead Creek Bridge and drove away the gunboats that
covered it. He reached the Saranac River September 6, and saw beyond it a ridge " crowned with three
strong redoubts and other field-works, and blockhouses armed with heavy ordnance, with their flotilla
at anchor out of gunshot from the shore." ^ The description was not exaggerated. Izard was himself a
trained engineer, and the works built by him, under
the direction of Major Totten of the Engineer Corps,
were believed capable of resisting for three weeks
a combined attack by land and water, even if the
British fleet were victorious.^ Three good companies
of artillery manned the guns. Excellent officers of
every arm were in command.
Prevost properly halted, and declined to assault
without the co-operation of the fleet. He waited five
days impatiently for Downie to appear. Not till
seven o'clock on the morning of September 11 did
the British flotilla sail roimd Cumberland Head. At
the same time Prevost ordered his troops to cross the
Saranac and storm the American works.
Downie intended, without regarding his superiority
in long-range guns, to sail in and to lay the " Confiance " alongside of the " Saratoga ; " but the wind
was light and baflling, and his approach was so slow
that he could not long bear the raking fire of the
American guns. As he came within carronade range
* Prevost's Report of Sept. 11, 1814; James, ii. 461.
' Izard to Monroe, Oct. 7, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence, p. 97*
18U. PLATTSBURG. 109
the wind baffling, he was obliged to anchor at two
cables* lengths,^ or three hundred yards,^ and begin
action. With the same discipline that marked the
movements of the troops on shore, Downie came to,
anchored, made everything secure, and then poured a
full broadside into Macdonough's ship. The " Saratoga" shivered under the shock of sixteen twentyfour-pound shot and canister charges striking her
hull ; almost one-fifth of her crew were disabled ; but
she stood stoutly to her work, and the whole line was
soon hotly engaged.
Americans usually had a decided advantage in their
better gunnery, but three hundred yards was a long
range for thirty-two-pound carronades, which at pointblank carried less than two hundred and fifty yards,
and lost accuracy in proportion to elevation.8 Macdonough was slow to prove superiority. Early in the
battle the British suffered a severe, and perhaps in
the experience of this war a decisive, loss in their
commander, Captain Downie, instantly killed by one
of his own guns thrown off its carriage against him
by a solid shot. Yet at the end of two hours' combat the British squadron was on the whole victorious,
and the American on the point of capture. Of the
three smaller American vessels, the " Preble " on the
extreme right was driven out of the engagement, and
^ Report of Captain Pring, Sept. 12, 1814 ; James, Appendix
no. 90.
* Report of Commodore Macdonongh, Sept. 13, 1814 ; Niles,
vii. 41.
* Howard Douglas's Naval Gunnery, p. 115. (Fourth edition).
110 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
the British gunboats, turning the American flank,
attacked the " Ticonderoga," which maintained a
doubtful battle. The American left was also turned,
the "Eagle" having been driven to take refuge between the " Saratoga " and " Ticonderoga," in the
centre. Macdonough's ship was then exposed to the
concentrated fire of the " Confiance " and " Linnet,"
and his battery was soon silenced. The " Saratoga "
could no longer use a gun on the engaged side, and
the battle was nearly lost.
Then Macdonough's forethought changed the impending defeat into victory. His fire had nearly
silenced the " Confiance," and disregarding the " Linnet," he ceased attention to the battle in order to
direct the operation of winding ship. Little by little
hauling the ship about, he opened on the " Confiance "
with one gun after another of the fresh broadside,
as they bore ; and the " Confiance," after trying in
vain to effect the same operation, struck her colors.
Then the British fleet was in the situation which
Downie had anticipated for the Americans in the
event of silencing the " Saratoga." The three smaller
vessels were obliged to surrender, and the gunboats
alone escaped. The battle had lasted from quarter
past eight till quarter before eleven.
By land, the British attack was much less effective
than by water. The troops were slow in reaching
their positions, and had time to make no decisive
movement. A column under Major-General Robinson
was ordered to move round by the right flank to a
1814. PLATTSBURG. Ill
ford previously reconnoitred, some distance up the
Saranac, in order to gain a position whence they
could reverse the American works and carry them
by assault ; but Robinson's column missed its way,
and before reaching the ford heard the cheers of the
American troops, and halted to ascertain its cause.^
The remainder of the army waited for Robinson's
column to assault. The casualties showed that nothing like a serious engagement took place. The entire
loss of the British army from September 6 to September 14 was oflBcially reported as only thirty-seven
killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, and of
this loss a large part occurred previous to the battle of September 11. The entire American loss was
thirty-seven killed and sixty-two wounded.
In the naval battle, Macdonough reported fifty-two
killed and fifty-eight wounded, among about eight
hundred and eighty men. The British reported fiftyseven killed and seventy-two wounded, in crews whose
number was never precisely known, but was probably
fully eight hundred. In neither case was the loss,
though severe, as great relatively to the numbers
as the severity of the action seemed to imply. The
" Saratoga" lost twenty-eight killed in a crew of two
hundred and forty. In Perry's battle on Lake Erie,
the " Lawrence " lost twenty-two men killed in a
crew of one hundred and thirty-one. About one man
in eight was killed on Macdonough's ship ; about one
man in six on Perry's.
1 Christie, u. 215, 216.
112 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATEa Ch.4.
With needless precipitation, Prevost instantly retreated the next day to Ghamplain, sacrificing stores
to a very great amount, tnd losing many men by desertion. The army was cruelly mortified, and Prevost
lost whatever military reputation he still preserved
in Canada. In England the impression of disgrace
was equally strong. " It is scarcely possible to conceive the degree of mortification and disappointment,"
said the "Annual Register,"^ "which the intelligence
of this defeat created in Great Britain." Yeo brought
official charges of misconduct against Prevost, and
Prevost defended himself by unusual arguments.
** With whatever sorrow I may think of the unfortunate occurrences to which I allude," he wrote to Bathurst,
three weeks later,^ ^^I consider them as light and trivial
when compared to the disastrous results which, I am solemnly persuaded, would have ensued had any considerations of personal glory, or any unreflecting disregard of
the safety of the province, or of the honor of the army
committed to my charge, induced me to pursue those
offensive operations by land, independent of the fleet,
which it would appear by your Lordship's despatch were
expected of me. Such operations, my Lord, have been
attempted before, and on the same ground. The history
of our country records their failure ; and had they been
undertaken again with double the force placed under my
command, they would have issued in the discomfiture of
his Majesty's arms, and in a defeat not more disastrous
than inevitable."
1 Annual Register for 1814, p. 332.
s Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 6, 1814; Christie, ii. 395.
1814. PLATTSBURG. 118
The Duke of Wellington was not so severe as other
critics, and hesitated to say that Prevost was wrong ;
^^ though of this I am certain, he must equally have
returned . . . after the fleet was beaten ; and I am
inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the Lakes
is a sine qua non of success in war on the frontier of
Canada, even if our object should be wholly defen*
sive." ^ Yet the Duke in conversation seemed to
think that his army in Canada was also at fault.
"He had sent them some of his best troops from
Bordeaux," he said five-and-twenty years afterward,*
"but they did not turn out quite right; they wanted
this iron fist to command them."
Meanwhile Major-General Izard, by Armstrong's
order, marched his four thousand men as far as
possible from the points of attack. Starting from
Champlain, August 29, the army reached Sackett'a
Harbor September 17, having marched about twohundred and eighty miles in twenty days. At Sackett's Harbor Izard found no orders from the government, for the government at that time had ceased toperform its functions ; but he received an earnest ap*
peal from General Brown to succor Fort Erie. " I will
not conceal from you," wrote Brown, September 10,^
" that I consider the fate of this army very doubtful
1 WeUington to Sir George Murray, Dec. 22, 1814; Despatches,
zii. 224.
' Stanhope's Conversatioiis, p. 252.
< Brown to Izard, Sept. 10, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence, p. 86,.
TOL. VIII.— 8
114 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
unless speedy relief is afforded." Izard, who had
no means of testing the correctness of this opinion,
decided to follow Brown's wishes, and made, September 17, the necessary preparations. Violent storms
prevented Chamicey from embarking the troops until
September 21 ; but September 27 the troops reached
Batavia, and Izard met Brown by appointment. The
army had then been a month in movement. The distance was more than four hundred miles, and no
energy could have shortened the time so much as to
have affected the result of the campaign. At one
end of the line Sir Greorge Prevost retreated from
Plattsburg September 12 ; at the other end, Lieutenant-Greneral Drummond retreated from Fort Erie
September 21 ; and Izard's force, constituting the
largest body of regular troops in the field, had
been placed where it could possibly affect neither
results
Izard was a friend of Monroe, and was therefore
an object of Armstrong's merciless criticism.^ Brown
was a favorite of Armstrong, and shared his prejudices. The position of Izard at Buffalo was calculated to excite jealousy. He had implicitly obeyed the
wishes of Armstrong and Brown ; in doing so, he had
sacrificed himself, — yielding to Macomb the credit
of repulsing Prevost, and to Brown, who did not wait
for his arrival, the credit of repulsing Drummond.
As far as could be seen, Izard had acted with loyalty
toward both Armstrong and Brown; yet both dis» Notices, ii. 102-107.
18U.
PLATTSBURG. 116
trusted him. Brown commonly inclined toward severity, and was the more sensitive because Izard, as
the senior oflBcer, necessarily took command.
Until that moment Izard had enjoyed no chance of
showing his abilities in the field, but at Niagara he
saw before him a great opportunity. Drummond lay
at Chippawa, with an army reduced by battle and sickness to about twenty-five hundred men. Izard commanded .fifty-five hundred regular troops and eight
hundred militia.^ He had time to capture or destroy
Drummond's entire force before the winter should
set in, and to gather the results of Brown's desperate
fighting. Brown was eager for the attack, and Izard
assented. October 13 the army moved on Chippawa,
and stopped. October 16, Izard wrote to the War
Department,^ —
"I have just learned by express from Sackett's Harbor
that Commodore Chauncey with the whole of his fleet has
retired into port, and is throwing up batteries for its protection. This defeats all the objects of the operations by
land in this quarter. I may turn Chippawa, and should
General Drummond not retire, may succeed in giving him
a good deal of trouble ; but if he falls back on Fort
George or Burlington Heights, every step I take in pursuit exposes me to be cut off by the large reinforcements
it is in the power of the enemy to throw in twenty-four
hours upon my flank or rear."
^ Izard to Monroe, Oct 16, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 100.
' Izard to Momoe, Oct. 16^ 1814; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 103.
116 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
In this state of mind, notwithstanding a successful
skirmish, October 19, between BisselFs brigade and
a strong detachment of the enemy, Izard made a
decision which ruined his military reputation and destroyed his usefulness to the service. He reported
to the Department, October 23,^ —
*' On the 2l6t, finding that he [Drummond] still continued within his works, which he had been assiduously
engaged in strengthening from the moment of our first
appearance, the weather beginning to be severe, and a
great quantity of our officers and men suffering from
their continued fatigues and exposure, at twelve at noon
I broke up my encampment, and marched to this ground
[opposite Black Bock] in order to prepare winter quarters
for the troops."
Nothing remained but to break up the army.
Brown was sent at his own request to Sackett's
Harbor, where the next fighting was expected. A
division of the army went with him. The remainder
were placed in winter quarters near Buffalo. Fort
Erie was abandoned and blown up, November 6, and
the frontier at Niagara relapsed into repose.
Izard felt the mortification of his failure. His feelings were those of a generous character, and his tone
toward Brown contrasted to his advantage both in
candor and in temper with Brown's language toward
^ Izard to Monroe, Oct. 23, 1814; Izard's Correspondence,
p. 105. Of. Brown to Armstrong, Nov. 28, 1814 ; Kosciusko
Armstrong's ^ Notice of J. Q. Adams's Eulogy on James Monroe,"
p. 29.
1814. PLATTSBURG. 117
him ; but great energy generally implied great faults,
and Brown's faults were better suited than Izard's
virtues for the work of an American general at Niagara. Greatly to Izard's credit, he not only saw
his own inferiority, but advised the government of it.
He wrote to the Secretary of War, November 20,^ —
^>The success of the next campaign on this frontier
will in a great measure depend on concert and good understanding among the superior officers. . . . General
Brown is certainly a brave, intelligent, and active officer.
Where a portion of the forces is composed of irregular
troops, I have no hesitation in acknowledging my conviction of his being better qualified than I to make them
useful in the pubUc service."
So sensitive was Izard to the public feeling and his
loss of standing that he sent his resignation to the
secretary, December 18,^ in terms which betrayed and
even asserted his consciousness of shrinking under
the weight of responsibility: —
*^ I am fully aware that attempts have been made to
lessen the confidence of government as well as of the
public in my ability to execute the important duties intrusted to me, — duties which were imposed unexpectedly
and much against my inclination. It is therefore not
improbable that my voluntary retirement will relieve the
Department of War from some embarrassment, and that
my individual satisfaction will accord with the public
^ Izard to Monroe, Nov. 20, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 119.
' Izard to Monroe, Dec. 18, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^
p. 130.
118 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.4.
advantage, — especially as my view of the connection
between military command and responsibility differs
materially from that entertained by persons in high
authority."
A man who showed so little confidence in himfielf could not claim the confidence of others, and
in contact with stronger characters like Armstrong,
Brown, Scott, or Andrew Jackson could play no part
but that of a victim. His resignation was not accepted, but his career was at an end. When he
relieved the pressure kept by Brown constantly applied to the extremity of the British line, the movement of war necessarily turned back to its true object,
which was Sackett's Harbor. Drunmiond no sooner
flaw Fort Erie evacuated and his lines re-established,
November 5, than he hurried on board ship with a
part of his troops, and reached Kingston, November
10,^ where Sir George Prevost had already prepared
for an attack on Sackett's Harbor as soon as supplies
i5ould be brought from Quebec to Kingston over the
winter roads. Soon afterward Sir George Prevost
Vras recalled to England, and a new conunanderIn-chief, Sir George Murray, supposed to be a man
t)f higher capacity, was sent to take direction of the
next campaign. Reinforcements continued to arrive .^
About twenty-seven thousand regular troops, including officers, were in Canada;^ a seventy-four-gun ship
«nd a new frigate were launched at Kingston; and
^ James, iL 241. ' James, ii. 393.
* MSS. Canadian Archives. Freer Papers, 1814, p. 31.
1814. PLATTSBURG. 119
no one doubted that, with the springy Sackett's Har«
bor would be formally besieged. Izard remained at
Buffalo, doing nothing, and his only influence on the
coming as on the past campaign was to leave the
initiative to the enemy.
CHAPTER V.
ARAiSTBONa's management of the Northern cam*
paign caused severe criticism ; but his neglect of the
city of Washington exhausted the public patience.
For two years Washington stood unprotected ; not a
battery or a breastwork was to be found on the river
bank except the old and untenable Fort Washington,
or Warburton.^ A thousand determined men might
reach the town in thirty-six hours, and destroy it
before any general alarm could be given.^ Yet no
city was more easily protected than Washington, at
that day, from attack on its eastern side ; any good
engineer could have thrown up works in a week
that would have made approach by a small force
impossible. Armstrong neglected to fortify. After
experience had proved his error, he still argued in
writing to a committee of Congress* that fortifications would have exhausted the Treasury; "that
* Lieutenant Edwards's Beport of July 26, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 545.
* Winder to Armstrong, July 9, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 543.
* lietter of Secretary Armstrong, Oct. 17, 1814 ; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 538..
1814. BLADENSBURG. 121
bayonets are known to form the most efficient barriers ; and that there was no reason in this case to
doubt beforehand the willingness of the comitry to
defend itself," — as though he believed that militia
were most efficient when most exposed! He did
not even provide the bayonets.
In truth, Armstrong looking at the matter as a military critic decided that the British having no strategic object in capturing Washington, would not make
the attempt. Being an indolent man, negligent of
detail, he never took unnecessary trouble ; and having no proper staff at Washington, he was without
military advisers whose opinion he respected. The
President and Monroe fretted at his indifference, the
people of the District were impatient under it, and
every one except Armstrong was in constant terror of
attack ; but according to their account the secretary
only replied: "No, no! Baltimore is the place, sir;
that is of so much more consequence."^ Probably
he was right, and the British would have gone first
to Baltimore had his negligence not invited them to
Washington.
In May the President began to press Armstrong
for precautionary measures.* In June letters arrived
from Gallatin and Bayard in London which caused
the President to call a Cabinet meeting. June 23
1 Letter of J. P. Van Ness, Nov. 23, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 681.
' Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814 ; Madison's Works,
iii. 399.
122 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.»,
•
and 24 the Cabinet met and considered the diplomatio
situation.^ The President proposed then for the first
time to abandon impressment as a sine qtui nan of
negotiation, and to approve a treaty that should be
silent on the subject. Armstrong and Jones alone
suppoi-ted the idea at that time, but three days afterward, June 27, Monroe and Campbell acceded to it.
The Cabinet then took the defences of Washington
in hand, and July 1 decided to organize a corps
of defence from the militia of the District and the
neighboring States. July 2, the first step toward
efficient defence was taken by creating a new military district on the Potomac, with a military head
of its own. Armstrong wished to transfer BrigadierGeneral Moses Porter from Norfolk, to command the
new Potomac District;* but the President selected
Brigadier-General Winder, because his relationship
to the Federalist governor of Maryland was likely to
make co-operation more effective.
Political appointments were not necessarily bad;
but in appointing Winder to please the governor of
Maryland Madison assumed the responsibility, in Armstrong's eyes, for the defence of Washington. The
Secretary of War seemed to think that Madison and
Monroe were acting together to take the defence of
Washington out of his hands, and to put it in hands
in which they felt confidence. Armstrong placed
Winder instantly in command, and promptly issued
^ Madison's Works, ill. 408, 409.
' Notices, ii. 140.
1814. BLADENSBUB6. 128
the orders arranged in Cabinet; but he left further
measures to Winder, Monroe, and Madison. His conduct irritated the President ; but no one charged that
the secretary refused to carry out the orders, or to
satisfy the requisitions of the President or of Gleneral
Winder. He was merely pa*8ive.i
Winder received his appointment July 6, and went
to Washington for instructions. He passed the next
month riding between Washington, Baltimore, and
points on the lower Potomac and Patuxent,* obtaining
with great fatigue a personal knowledge of the coun*
try. August 1 he established his permanent headquarters at Washington, and the entire result of his
labors till that time was the presence of one company
of Maryland militia at Bladensburg. No line of defence was selected, no obstructions to the roads were
prepared, and not so much as a ditch or a breastwork
was marked out or suggested between Annapolis and
Washington. Another fortnight passed, and still
Winder was not further adyanced. He had no more
men, arms, fortifications, and no more ideas, on the
18th of August than on the 6th of July. " The call
for three thousand militia under the requisition of
July 4 had produced only two hundred and fifty
men at the moment the enemy landed at Benedict." ^
^ Madison's Works, iii. 422, 426.
* Winder to Armstrong, July 27, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 546.
* Winder's letter of Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 552.
124 HISTORY OF THE UNTTED STATES. Cb.S.
Winder had then been six weeks in command of
the Washington defences.
Meanwhile a British expedition under command of
Major-General Robert Ross, a distinguished officer of
the Peninsula army, sailed from the Gironde, June 27,
to Bermuda. Ross was instructed "to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America
in favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada." The point of attack was to
be decided by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, subject to the
general's approval; but the force was not intended
for " any extended operation at a distance from the
coast," nor was Ross to hold permanent possession
of any captured district.^
^' When the object of the descent which yoa may make
on the coast is to take possession of any naval or military stores, yoa will not delay the destruction of them in
preference to the taking them away, if there is reasonable ground of apprehension that the enemy is advancing
with superior force to effect their recovery. If in any
descent you shall be enabled to take such a position as
to threaten the Inhabitants with the destruction of their
property, you are hereby authorized to levy upon them
contributions in return for your forbearance; but you
will not by this understand that the magazines belonging
to the government, or their harbors, or their shipping, are
to be Included in such an arrangement. These, together
with their contents, are in all cases to be taken away or
destroyed."
1 Bathuist to Boss, 1814 ; War Office Despatches, MSS. British
Archives.
1jB14.
BLADENSBURG. 125
Negroes were not to be encouraged to rise upon
their masters, and no slaves were to be taken away as
slaves; but any negro who should expose himself to
vengeance by joining the expedition or lending it assistance, might be enlisted in the black corps, or carried away by the fleet.
Nothing in these orders warranted the destruction
of private or public property, except such as might
be capable of military uses. Ross was not authorized,
and did not intend, to enter on a mere marauding
expedition; but Cochrane was independent of Boss,
and at about the time when Ross reached Bermuda
Cochrane received a letter from Sir George Prevost
which gave an unexpected character to the Chesapeake expedition. A small body of American troops
had crossed Lake Erie to Long Point, May 15, and
destroyed the flour-mills, distilleries, and some private
houses there. The raid was not authorized by the
United States government, and the officer commanding it was afterward court-martialed and censured;
but Sir George Prevost, without waiting for explanations, wrote to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, June 2,
suggesting that he should " assist in inflicting that
measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy
from a repetition of similar outrages."^
When Cochrane received this letter, he issued at
Bermuda, July 18, orders to the ships under his
command, from the St. Croix River to the St. Mary's,
^ Cochrane to Prevost, July 22, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian Archives. C. 684, p. 221.
126 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.»,
directing general retaliation.^ The orders were interesting as an illustration of the temper the war had
taken.
"You are hereby required and directed," wrote the
Vice- Admiral to the British blockading squadrons, ^^to
destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the
coast as you may find assailable. You will hold strictly
in view the conduct of the American army toward his
Majesty's unoffending Canadian subjects, and you will
spare merely the lives of the unarmed inhabitants of the
United States. For only by carrying this retributory
justice into the country of our enemy can we hope to
make him sensible of the impropriety as well as of the
inhumanity of the system he has adopted. You will
take every opportunity of explaining to the people how
much I lament the necessity of following the rigorous
example of the commander of the American forces.
And as these commanders must obviously have acted
under instructions from the Executive government of the
United States, whose intimate and unnatural connection with the late government of France has led them
to adopt the same system of plunder and devastation,
it is therefore to their own government the unfortunate
sufferers must look for indemnification for their loss of
property."
This ill-adyised order was to remain in force until
Sir George Prevost should send information " that the
United States government have come under an obligation to make full remuneration to the injured and
1 OrdeiB of Yice-Admiial Cochrane, July 18, 1814; MSS.
Canadian Aichives, C. 684, p. 204.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 127
unoffending inhabitants of the Canadas for all the
outrages their troops have committed." Cochrane
further wrote to Prevost that " as soon as these orders have been acted upon " a copy would be sent to
Washington for the information of the Executive
government.
Cochrane's retaliatory order was dated July 18, and
Boss's transports arrived at Bermuda July 24. As
soon as the troops were collected and stores put on
board, Cochrane and Ross sailed, August 3, for Chesapeake Bay. They arrived a few days in advance of the
transports, and passing up the bay to the mouth of the
Potomac, landed, August 16, with Bear Admiral Cockburn, to decide on a plan for using to best effect the
forces under their command.
Three objects were within reach. The first and
immediate aim was a flotilla of gunboats, commanded
by Captain Joshua Barney, which had taken refuge in
the Patuxent Biver, and was there blockaded. The
next natural object of desire was Baltimore, on account of its shipping and prize-money. The third
was Washington and Alexandria, on account of the
navy-yard and the vessels in the Potomac. Baltimore
was the natural point of attack after destroying Barney's flotilla ; but Cockburn, with a sailor's recklessness, urged a dash at Washington.^ Boss hesitated,
and postponed a decision till Barney's flotilla should
be disposed of.
^ James, ii. 275, 276 ; Cockburn to Cochrane, Aug. 27, 1814 ;
Boss to Bathurst, Aug. 30, 1814 ; James, ii. 492-499.
128 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
Two days afterward, August 17, the troops arrived,
and the squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, moved twenty miles up the bay to the mouth
of the Patuxent, — a point about fifty miles distant
from Annapolis on the north, and from Washington
on the northwest. Having arrived there August 18,
Cochrane wrote, or afterward ante-dated, an official
letter to Secretary Monroe:^ —
" Having been called on by the Governor-General of
the Canadas to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United
States for the wanton destruction committed by their
army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my
duty, conformably with the nature of the GovernorGeneral's application, to issue to the naval force under
my command an order to destroy and lay waste such
towns and districts upon the coast as may be found
assailable."
The notice was the more remarkable because
Cochrane's order was issued only to the naval force.
The army paid no attention to it. Ross's troops
were landed at Benedict the next day, August 19;
but neither there nor elsewhere did they destroy or
lay waste towns or districts. They rather showed
unusual respect for private property.
At Benedict, August 19, the British forces were
organized in three brigades, numbering, according
to different British accounts, four thousand five hun1 Cocbrane to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814 ; State Papers, Foreign
Affairs, iii. 693.
]fil4. BLADENSBUR6. 129
dred, or four thousand rank-and-file.* Cockbum
with the boats of the fleet the next day, August 20,
started up the river in search of Barney's flotiUa;
while the land force began its march at four o'clock
in the afternoon abreast of the boats, and camped
four miles above Benedict without seeing an enemy,
or suffering from a worse annoyance than one of the
evenmg thunder-storms common in hot weather.
The next day at dawn the British army started
again, and marched that day, Sunday, August 21,
twelve miles to the village of Nottingham, where it
camped.^ The weather was hot, and the march resembled a midsunmier picnic. Through a thickly
wooded region, where a hundred militia-men with
axes and spades could have delayed their progress
for days, the British army moved in a solitude apparently untenanted by human beings, till they
reached Nottingham on the Patuxent, — a deserted
town, rich in growing crops and full bams.
At Nottingham the army passed a quiet night, and
the next morning, Monday, August 22, lingered till
eight o'clock, when it again advanced. Among the
ofScers in the Eighty-fifth regiment was a lieutenant
named Gleig, who wrote afterward a charming narrative of the campaign under the title, " A Subaltern
in America." He described the road as remarkably
good, running for the most part through the heart of
thick forests, which sheltered it from the rays of the
* Gleig's Washington and New Orleans, p. 51. James, ii. 283.
* Map of General Ross's Route ; Wilkinson's Memoira.
VOL. Tin. — 9
180 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
sun. During the march the army was startled by the
distant sound of several heavy explosions. Barney
had blown up his gunboats to prevent their capture.
The British naval force had thus performed its part
in the enterprise, and the army was next to take the
lead. Ross halted at Marlboro after a march of only
seven miles, and there too he camped, undisturbed
by sight or sound of an armed enemy, although the
city of Washington was but sixteen miles on his left,
and Baltimore thirty miles in his front. Boss had
then marched twenty or twenty-one miles into Maryland without seeing an enemy, although an American army had been close on his left flank, watching
Mm all day.
At Marlboro Boss was obliged to decide what he
should next do. He was slow in forming a conclusion. Instead of marching at daybreak of August
23, and moving rapidly on Baltunore or Washington,
the army passed nearly the whole day at Marlboro
in idleness, as though it were willing to let the
Americans do their utmost for defence. "Having
advanced within sixteen miles of Washington," Boss
oflBcially reported,^ " and ascertained the force of the
enemy to be such as might authorize an attempt to
carry his capital, I determined to make it, and acCO Jngly put the troops in movement on th; evening
of the 23d." More exactly, the troops moved at two
o'clock in the afternoon, and marched about six miles
on the road to Washington, when they struck Ameri^ Ross's Report of Aug. 30, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 277.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 181
can outposts at about five o'clock, and saw a force
posted on high ground about a mile in their front.
As the British formed to attack, the American force
disappeared, and the British army camped about nine
miles from Washington by way of the navy-yard
bridge over the Eastern Branch.
Thus for five days, from August 18 to August 28,
a British army, which though small was larger than
any single body of American regulars then in the
field, marched in a leisurely manner through a longsettled country, and met no show of resistance before
coming within sight of the Capitol. Such an adventure resembled the stories of Cortez and De Soto ; and
the conduct of the United States government offered
no contradiction to the resemblance.
News of the great fleet that appeared in the Patuxent August 17 reached Washington on the morning
of Thursday, August 18, and set the town in commotion. In haste the President sent fresh militia requisitions to the neighboring States, and ordered out
the militia and all the regular troops in Washington
and its neighborhood. Monroe started again as a
scout, arriving in the neighborhood of Benedict at
ten o'clock on the morning of August 20, and remaining there all day and night without learning
more than he knew before starting.^ Winder was
excessively busy, but did, according to his own account, nothing. "The innumerably multiplied or^ Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20 and 21, 1814; State Papery
Military Affiedis, i. 537. Winder's Nanative, Ibid. 554.
182 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ce-i.
ders, letters, consultations, and demands which
crowded upon me at the moment of such an alarm
can more easily be conceived than described, and
occupied me nearly day and night, from Thursday
the 18th of August till Sunday the 21st, and had
nearly broken down myself and assistants in preparing, dispensing, and attending to them." Armstrong, at last alive to the situation, made excellent suggestions,^ but could furnish neither troops,
means, nor military intelligence to carry them out ;
and the President could only call for help. The single step taken for defence was taken by the citizens,
who held a meeting Saturday evening, and offered at
their own expense to erect works at Bladensburg.
Winder accepted their offer. Armstrong detailed
Colonel Wadsworth, the only engineer oflBcer near
the Department, to lay out the lines, and the citi*
zens did such work as was possible in the time
that remained.
After three days of confusion, a force was at last
evolved. Probably by Winder's order, although no
such order was preserved, a corps of observation was
marched across the navy-yard bridge toward the
Patuxent, or drawn from Bladensburg, to a place
called the Woodyard, twelve miles beyond the Eastern Branch. The force was not to be despised.
Three hundred infantry regulars of different regiments, with one hundred and twenty light dragoons,
formed the nucleus ; two hundred and fifty Maryland
^ State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 547, 549.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 133
militia, and about twelve hundred District volunteers
or militia, with twelve six-pound field-pieces, composed a body of near two thousand men,^ from whom
General Brown or Andrew Jackson would have got
good service. Winder came out and took command
Sunday evening, and Monroe, much exhausted, joined
them that night.
There the men stood Monday, August 22, while
the British army marched by them, within sight
of their outposts, from Nottingham to Marlboro.
Winder rode forward with his cavalry and watched
all day the enemy's leisurely movements close in
his front,2 but the idea of attack did not appear to
enter his mind. "A doubt at that time," he said,^
** was not entertained by anybody of the intention
of the enemy to proceed direct to Washington." At
nine o'clock that evening Monroe sent a note to the
President, saying that the enemy was in full march
for Washington ; that Winder proposed to retire till
he could collect his troops ; that preparations should
be made to destroy the bridges, and that the papers
in the government offices should be removed.* At
the same time Monroe notified Serurier, the only
foreign minister then in Washington, that the sin* Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military AflFairs, i. 554.
General W. Smith's Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 563.
• Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 554.
General W. Smith's Statement, i. 563.
^ Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 555.
^ State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 538.
184 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.».
gle hope of saving the capital depended on the verj
doubtful result of an engagement, which would probably take place the next day or the day after, at
Bladensburg.^
At Bladensburgy of necessity, the engagement
must take place, unless Winder made an attack or
waited for attack on the road. One of two courses
was to be taken, — Washington must be either defended or evacuated. Perhaps Winder would have
done better to evacuate it, and let the British take
the undefended village ; but no suggestion of the
sort was made, nor did Winder retreat to Bladensburg as was necessary if he meant to unite his troops
and make preparations for a battle. Instead of re*
treating to Bladensburg as soon as he was satisfied —
at noon of Monday, August 22 — that the British were
going there, he ordered his troops to fall back, and
took position at the Old Fields, about five miles in
the TQBX of the Woodyard, and about seven miles by
road from the navy-yard. Another road led from
the Old Fields to Bladensburg about eight miles
away. The American force might have been united
at Bladensburg Monday evening, but Winder camped
at the Old Fields and passed the night.
That evening the President and the members of
the Cabinet rode out to the camp, and the next
morning the President reviewed the army, which
had been reinforced by Commodore Barney with four
^ Serorier to Talleyrand, Aug. 22, 1814; Archives des AS»
ttt. MSS.
1S14. BLADENSBURG. 1S5
hundred sailors, the crews of the burned gunboats.
Winder then had twenty-five hundred men, of whom
near a thousand were regulars, or sailors even better
fighting troops than ordinary regulars. Such a force
vigorously led was suflBcient to give Ross's army a
sharp check, and at that moment Boss was still hesitating whether to attack Washington. The loss of a
few hundred men might have turned the scale at any
moment during Tuesday, August 23 ; but Winder
neither fought nor retreated, but once more passed
the day on scout. At noon he rode with a troop of
cavalry toward Marlboro. Satisfied that the enemy
was not in motion and would not move that day^
he started at one o'clock for Bladensburg, leaving
his army to itself. He wished to bring up a brigade
of militia from Bladensburg.^
Winder had ridden about five miles, when the British at two o'clock suddenly broke up their camp and
marched directly on the Old Fields. The American
army hastily formed in line, and sent off its baggage
to Washington. Winder was summoned back in
haste, and arrived on the field at five o'clock as
the British appeared. He ordered a retreat. Every
military reason required a retreat to Bladensburg.
Winder directed a retreat on Washington by the
navy-yard bridge.
The reasons which actuated him to prefer the navy*
yard to Bladensburg, as explained by him, consisted
* Winder^s Nanative; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp. 565,
55&
186 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
in anxiety for the safety of that " direct and important pass," which could not without hazard be left
unguarded.^ In order to guard a bridge a quarter
of a mile long over an impassable river covered by
the guns of war-vessels and the navy-yard, he left
unguarded the open high-road which led- through
Bladensburg directly to the Capitol and the White
House. After a very rapid retreat that "literally
became a run of eight miles," * Winder encamped in
Washington near the bridge-head at the navy-yard
at eight o'clock that night, and then rode three miles
to the White House to report to the President. On
returning to camp, he passed the night until three
or four o'clock in the morning making in person
arrangements to destroy the bridge "when necessary," assuring his officers that he expected the
enemy to attempt a passage there that night.^ Toward dawn he lay down, exhausted by performing a
subaltern's duty all day, and snatched an hour or
two of sleep.
The British in their camp that evening were about
eight miles from Bladensburg battle-field. Winder
was about five miles distant from the same point.
By a quick march at dawn he might still have arrived there, with six hours to spare for arranging
^ Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp.
566, 667.
* Statement of John Law ; State Papers, Military Affairs,
L 686.
* Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, MiHtaiy Affedrs, L 667.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 137
his defence. He preferred to wait till he should
know with certainty that the British were on their
way there. On the morning of Wednesday, August
24, he wrote to Armstrong : ^ —
^^ I have found it necessary to establish my headquarters here, the most advanced position convenient to the
troops, and nearest information. I shall remain stationary as much as possible, that I may be the more readily
found, to issue orders, and collect together the various
detachments of militia, and give them as rapid a consolidation and organization as possible. . . . The news
up the river is very threatening. Barney's or some
other force should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's
Point and the navy-yard. I should be glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and the Government.
If more convenient, I should make an exertion to go to
you the first opportunity."
This singular note was carried first to the President, who, having opened and read it, immediately rode
to headquarters. Monroe, Jones, and Bush followed.
Armstrong and Campbell arrived last. Before Armstrong appeared, a scout arrived at ten o'clock with
information that the British army had broken up its
camp at daylight, and was probably more than half
way to Bladensburg.*
Winder's persistence in remaining at the navyyard was explained as due to the idea that the
enemy might move toward the Potomac, seize Fort
^ State Papers, Military Affairs, L 548.
* Captain Burch's Statement, Oct. 12, I8I4 ; State Papers,
MiHtaiy AffiEdrs, i. 574.
188 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES C5h.5.
Washington or Warburton, secure the passage of
his ships, and approach the city by the river .^ The
general never explained how his presence at the
navy-yard was to prevent such a movement if it
was made.
The whole eastern side of Washington was covered
by a broad estuary called the Eastern Branch of the
Potomac, bridged only at two points, and impassable,
even by pontoons, without ample warning. From the
Potomac River to Bladensburg, a distance of about
seven miles, the city was effectually protected. Bladensburg made the point of a right angle. There the
Baltimore road entered the city as by a pass ; for
beyond, to the west, no general would venture to enter, leaving an enemy at Bladensburg in his rear.
Roads were wanting, and the country was difficult*
Through Bladensburg the attacking army must come ;
to Bladensburg Winder must go, unless he meant
to retreat to Georgetown, or to re-cross the Eastern
Branch in the enemy's rear. Monroe notified Serurier Monday evening that the battle would be fought
at Bladensburg. Secretary Jones wrote to Commodore Rodgers, Tuesday morning, that the British
would probably "advance to-day toward Bladensburg." * Every one looked instinctively to that spot^,
^ Rush's Narrative; State Papers, Military AffjEiirs, i. 542.
Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 557.
* Beview of J. Q. Adams by Kosciusko Armstrong, p. 7.
' William Pinkney's Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs^
I 572.
htOHu
mi. BLADENSBURO. 139
jet Winder to the last instant persisted in watching
the navy-yard bridge, using the hours of Wednesday
morning to post Barney's sailors with twenty-fourpound guns to cover an approach ^ where no enemy
could cross.
No sooner did Winder receive intelligence at ten
o'clock Wednesday morning that the British were in
march to Bladensburg, than in the utmost haste he
started for the same point, preceded by Monroe and
followed by the President and the rest of the Cabinet and the troops. Barney's sailors and their guns
would have been left behind to guard the navy-yard
bridge had Secretary Jones not yielded to Barney's
vigorous though disrespectful remonstrances, and allowed him to follow.*
In a long line the various corps, with their military
and civil commanders, streamed toward Bladensburg,
racing with the British, ten miles away, to arrive
first on the field of battle. Monroe was earliest on
the ground. Between eleven and twelve o'clock he
reached the spot where hills slope gently toward
the Eastern Branch a mile or more in broad incline,
the little straggling town of Bladensburg opposite,
beyond a shallow stream, and hills and woods in the
distance. Several militia corps were already camped
on the ground, which had been from the first desig* Secretary Jones's Report, Oct. 3, 1814; State Papers, Military
A£EaiT8, i. 576.
* Armstrong's Letter; State Papers^ Military Affidrs, L 540.
IngersoU's History, ii. 173.
140 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6.
nated as the point of concentration. A Baltimore
brigade, more than two thousand strong, had arrived
there thirty-six hours before. Some Maryland regiments arrived at the same time with Monroe. About
three thousand men were then on the field, and their
officers were endeavoring to form them in line of
battle. General Stansbury of the Baltimore brigade
made such an arrangement as he thought best. Monroe, who had no military rank, altered it without
Stansbury's knowledge.^ General Winder arrived at
noon, and rode about the field. At the same time
the British light brigade made its appearance, and
wound down the opposite road, a mile away, a long
column of redcoats, six abreast, moving with the
quick regularity of old soldiers,* and striking directly
at the American centre; They reached the village on
one side of the stream as Winder's troops poured
down the hill on the other ; and the President with
two or three of his Cabinet officers, considerably in
advance of all their own troops, nearly rode across
the bridge into the British line, when a volunteer
scout warned them of their danger.^
Much the larger portion of the American force
arrived on the ground when the enemy was in sight,
and were hastily drawn up in line wherever they
* Stansbury's Report; Monroe's Letter; State Papers, MiKtary
AfiTaiis, i. 561, 536.
* Gleig's Subaltern, p. 68.
* Letter of William Simmons; State Papers, Military Affairs,
L 596.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 141
could be placed.^ They had no cover. Colonel
Wadsworth's intrenchments were not used,* except
in the case of one field-work which enfiladed the
bridge at close range, where field-pieces were placed.
Although some seven thousand men were present, nothing deserving the name of an army existed. "A
few companies only," said the Subaltern, " perhaps
two or at the most three battalions, wearing the blue
jacket which the Americans have borrowed from the
French, presented some appearance of regular troops.
The rest seemed country-people, who would have
been much more appropriately employed in attending
to their agricultural occupations than in standing
with muskets in their hands on the brow of a bare,
green hill." Heterogeneous as the force was, it would
have been sufQcient had it enjoyed the advantage of
a commander.
The British light brigade, some twelve or fifteen
hundred men, under Colonel Thornton of the Eightyfifth regiment, without waiting for the rear division,
dashed across the bridge, and were met by a discharge of artillery and musketry directly in their
face. Checked for an instant, they pressed on,
crossed the bridge or waded the stream, and spread
to the right and left, while their rockets flew into the
American lines. Almost instantly a portion of the
American line gave way ; but the rest stood firm, and
^ Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 557.
Stansbory'B Report ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 562.
* Van Ness^B Letter ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 580.
142 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5.
drove the British skirmishers back luider a heavy fire
to the cover of the bank with its trees and shrubs.
Not until a fresh British regiment, moving well to the
right, forded the stream and threatened to turn the
American left, did the rout begin. Even then several
strong corps stood steady, and in good order retired
by the road that led to the Capitol; but the mass,
struck by panic, streamed westward toward Georgetown and Bx)ckville.
Meanwhile Bamey'd sailors, though on the run,
could not reach the field in time for the attack, and
halted on the hillside, about a mile from Bladensburg,
at a spot just outside the District line. The rout had
then begun, but Barney put his five pieces in position
and waited for the enemy. The American infantry
and cavalry that had not fled westward moved confusedly past the field where the sailors stood at their
guns. Winder sent Barney no orders, and Barney,
who was not acting under Winder, but was commander-in-chief of his own forces under authority of
the Navy Department, had no idea of running away.
Four hundred men against four thousand were odds
too great even for sailors, but a battle was not wholly
disgraceful that produced such a commander and
such men. Barney's account of the Combat was as
excellent as his courage:^ —
^^At length the enemy made his appearance on the
main road in force and in front of my battery, and on
* Barney's Report of Aug. 29, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 579.
mi BLADENSBURG. 143
seeing as made a halt. I reserved oar fire. In a few
minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an
eighteen-poonder to be fired, which completely cleared
the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt
was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were
destroyed. They then crossed over into an open field,
and attempted to fiank our right. He was met there by
three twelve-pounders, the marines under Captain Miller,
and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally
cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American
fumy remained, except a body of five or six hundred
posted on a height on my right, from which I expected
much support from their fine situation."
Such a battle could not long continue. The British
turned Barney's right ; the corps on the height broke
and fled,^ and the British, getting into the ^ear, fired
down upon the sailors. The British themselves were
most outspoken in praise of Barney's men. ''Not
only did they serve their guns with a quickness and
precision that astonished their assailants," said the
Subaltern, " but they stood till some of them were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands ; nor was
it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they
saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers,
that they left the field." Barney held his position
nearly half an hour, and then, being severely wounded,
ordered his oflScers to leave himi where he lay. There
he was taken by the British advance, and carried to
their hospital at Bladensburg. The British officers,
admiring his gallantry, treated him, he said, '' with
' Colonel Beall's Statement; State Papersy MHitaiy AfiEiAiia^
L 671.
144 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.».
the most marked attention, respect, and politeness
as if I was a brother," — as though to show their opinion that Barney instead of Winder should have led
the American army.
After the sailors retired, at about four o'clock, the
British stopped two hours to rest. Their victory,
easy as it seemed, was not cheaply bought. General
Ross officially reported sixty-four killed and one
hundred and eighty-five wounded.^ A loss of two
hundred and fifty men among fifteen hundred said
to be engaged * was not small ; but Gleig, an officer
of the light brigade, himself wounded, made twice,
at long intervals, an assertion which he must have
intended as a contradiction of the official report.
" The loss on the part of the English was severe," he
said,® "since out of two thirds of the army which
were engaged upward of five hundred men were killed
and wounded." According to this assertion, Ross
lost five hundred men among three thousand engaged,
or one in six. Had Winder inflicted that loss while
the British were still oji the Patuxent, Ross would
have thought long before risking more, especially as
Colonel Thornton was among the severely injured.
The Americans reported only twenty-six killed and
fifty-one wounded.
At six o'clock, after a rest of two hours, the British
troops resumed their march; but night fell before
1 James, ii. 499.
' Cockbum to Cochiane, Aug. 27, 1814; James, ii. 493.
' Campaigns, p. 67; Cf. Barney to the National Intelligencer*
Niles, vii. Supplement, p. 159.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 1,4^
thej reached the first houses of the town. As Robs
and Cockbum, with a few oflScers, advanced before
the troops, some men, supposed to have been Barney's sailors, fired on the party from the house formerly occupied by Gallatin, at the northeast comer
of Capitol Square. Boss's horse was killed, and the
general ordered the house to be burned, which was
done. The army did not enter the town, but camped
at eight o'clock a quarter of a mile east of the Capitol. Troops were then detailed to burn the Capitol,,
and as the great building burst into flames, Ross
and Cockburn, with about two hundred men, marched
silently in the darkness to the White House, and set
fire to it. At the same time Commodore Tingey, by
order of Secretary Jones, set fire to the navy-yard
and the vessels in the Eastern Branch. Before mid-'
night the flames of three great conflagrations made
the whole country light, and from the distant hills of
Maryland and Virginia the flying President and Cabinet caught glimpses of the ruin their incompetence
had caused. I
Serurier lived then in the house built, by John
Tayloe in 1800, called the Octagon, a few hundred^
yards from the War and Navy Departments and the
White House.^ He was almost the only civil official
. left in Washington, and hastened to report the event
to Talleyrand :* —
^ Benjamin Ogle Tayloe. In Memoriam, p. 164.
* Seniiiet to Talleyiand, Aug. 212 and 27, 1814. Axchives
des Aff.£tr. MSS.
TOUYIU.— >10
146 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cb.6.
^* I never saw a scene at once more terrible and more
magnificent. Your Highness, knowing the picturesque
nature and the grandeur of the surroundings, can form
an idea of it. A profound darkness reigned in the part
of the city that I occupy, and we were left to conjectures
and to the lying reports of negroes as to what was passing in the quarter illuminated by these frightful flames.
At eleven o'clock a colonel, preceded by torches, was
seen to take the direction of the White House, which
is situated quite near mine ; the negroes reported that
it was to be burned, as well as all those pertaining to
government offices. I thought best, on the moment, to
send one of my people to the general with a letter, in
which I begged him to send a guard to the house of the
Ambassador of France to protect it. . . . My messenger
found General Ross in the White House, where he was
collecting in the drawing-room all the furniture to be
found, and was preparing to set fire to it. The general
made answer that the King's Hotel should be respected
as, much as though his Majesty were there in person ;
that he would give orders to that effect ; and that if he
was still in Washington the next day, he would have the
pleasure to call on me/'
Boss and Cockbum alone among mUitary officers,
during more than twenty years of war, considered
their duty to involve personal incendiarism. At the
time and subsequently various motives were attributed to them, — such as the duty of retaliation, —
none of which was alleged by either of them as their
warranty.^ They burned the Capitol, the White
House, and the Department buildings because they
^ Reports of Ross and Cockbum ; James, ii. 499.
1814. BLADENSBURG. 147
thought it proper, as thej would have burned a negro
kraal or a den of pirates. Apparently they assumed
as a matter of course that the American government
stood beyond the pale of civilization; and in truth
a government which showed so little capacity to defend its capital, could hardly wonder at whatever
treatment it received.
A violent thunder-storm checked the flames; but
the next morning, Thursday, August 25, fresh detachments of troops were sent to complete the destruction
of public property. Without orders from his Government, Ross converted his campaign, which till then
had been creditable to himself and flattering to British pride, into a marauding raid of which no sensible
Englishman spoke without mortification. Gockbum
amused himself by revenging his personal grievances
on the press which had abused him. Mounted on
a brood mare, white, uncurried, with a black foal
trotting by her side, the Admiral attacked the ofiice
of the " National Intelligencer," and superintended
the destruction of the types. " Be sure that all the
C's are destroyed,'' he ordered, "so that the rascals cannot any longer abuse my name." ^ Boss was
anxious to complete the destruction of the public
buildings with the least possible delay, that the army
might retire without loss of time ; * and the work
was pressed with extreme haste. A few private buildings were burned, but as a rule private property was
* Ingersoll's History, ii. 189.
* Boss's Beport of Aug. 30, 1814; James, ii. 496»
148 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.5.
respected, and no troops except small detachments
were allowed to leave tihe camp.
Soon after noon, while the work was still incomplete, a tornado burst on the citj and put an end
to the effort. An accidental explosion at the navyyard helped to check destruction. Boss could do no
more, and was in haste to get away. No sooner had
the hurricane, which lasted nearly two hours and
seemed especially violent at the camp, passed over,
than Ross began preparations to retire. With precautions wholly unnecessary, leaving its camp-fires
burning, the British column in extreme silence, after
nine o'clock at night, began its march. Passing
Bladensburg, where the dead were still nnburied,
Ross left his wounded in the hospital to American
care, and marched all night till seven o'clock Friday
morning, when the troops, exhausted with fatigue,
were allowed a rest. At noon they were again in
motion, and at night-fall, after marching twenty-five
miles within twenty-four hours, they arrived at Marlboro. Had the advance from Benedict been equally
rapid, Ross would have entered Washington without
a skirmish.
CHAPTER VI.
•
While Bobs and Cockburn were hastily burning
the White House and the Department buildings,
anxious only to escape, and never sending more
than two hundred soldiers beyond Capitol Square,
the President, his Cabinet, his generals, and his
army were performing movements at which even the
American people, though outraged and exasperated
beyond endurance, could not but laugh.
The President, after riding over the battle-field
until the action began, remarked to Monroe and
Armstrong that "it would be now proper for us to
retire in the rear, leaving the military movement
to military men," which they did.^ A moment afterward the left of the line gave way, and the panic»^
stricken militia poured along the road leading westward toward the point which in later times became
known as the Soldier's Home. The President retired with them, " continuing to move slowly toward
the city,*' according to Monroe, in company with
Attomey-Gteneral Rush. The slowness of movement,
on which Monroe seemed to lay stress, was compen* Monroe's Letter, Nov. 13, 1814; State Papers, Military
AfEairs, i. 637.
160 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6.
sated bj steadiness. The President left Bladensburg
battle-field toward two o'clock. He had already
ridden in the early morning from the White House
to the navy-yard, and thence to Bladensburg, — a
distance of eigLt miles at the least. He had six
miles to ride, on a very hot August day, over a road
encumbered by fugitives. He was sixty-three years
old, and had that day already been in the saddle
since eight o'clock in the morning, probably without
food. Soon after three o'clock he reached the White
House, where all was confusion and flight.^ He had
agreed with his Cabinet, in case of disaster, to meet
them at Frederick in Maryland, fifty miles away, but
he did not go toward Frederick. Before six o'clock
he crossed the Potomac in a boat from the White
House grounds, and started by carriage westward,
apparently intending to join his wife and accompany her to his residence at Montpelier in Loudoun
County, adjoining Frederick County, on the south side
of the Potomac. Secretary Jones, Attorney-General
Bush, and one or two other gentlemen accompanied
him. In the midst of a troop of fugitives they travelled till dark, and went about ten miles, passing
the night at a house ^^ a few miles above the lower
falls." a
The next morning, August 25, the President trav^ Mn. Madison to her sister, Aug. 24, 1814; Memoiis and
Letters of Dolly Madison, p. 108.
' Memorandum of Colonel Monioe ; MSS. State Department
Archives.
iai4. BALTIMORE. 151
elled about six miles and joined his wife at an inn
on the same road, where he remained during the tornado, subjected to no little discomfort and some in*
suit from fugitives who thought themselves betrayed.
Although far beyond reach of the British troops and
some twenty miles from their camp, the panic was
still so great as to cause an alarm on the following
night, which drove Madison from his bed for refuge
in the Virginia woOds,^ at the time when Ross's army,
more than twenty miles distant, was marching at the
utmost speed in the opposite direction.
Of all the rulers, monarchical or republican, whose
capitals were occupied by hostile armies in the Napoleonic wars, Madison was personally the most roughly
treated. Monroe's adventures were not less mortifying. As a scout the Secretary of State's services were hardly so valuable as those of a common
trooper, for he was obliged to be more cautious ; as
a general, his interference with the order of battle
at Bladensburg led to sharp criticisms from General
Stansbury, whose arrangements he altered ,2 and to
the epithet of " busy and blundering tactician " from
Armstrong.' After the battle he was not less busy,
and opinions greatly differed whether he was less
blundering. He did. not return to the White House
^ IngersoU's History, ii. 208 ; Memoirs and Letters of Dolly
Madison, p. 116.
' Beporfc of General Stansbury, Nov. 15. 1814 ; State Papers^
Military Affairs, i. 560.
* Notices, IL 148.
152 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATED CH,a
with Madison, but joined Winder and rode with him
to the Capitol, where he assented to an evacuation,
and retired after the flying troops through Georgetown, passing the night on the Maryland side of the
Potomac. The next morning, August 25, he crossed
the river and overtook the President. After an
interview with him, Monroe recrossed the river to
Winder's headquarters at Montgomery Court House,
where he resumed military functions.
The Secretary of the Treasury, G. W. Campbell,
on the morning of the battle went to the Cabinet
meeting at the navy-yard, but his health, which had
become much affected, obliged him to return to his
lodgings instead of riding to Bladensburg. In parting from Madison, Campbell lent him a pair of pistols, which the President put in his holsters. Federalists were curious to know whether the pistols were
the same with which he shot Barent Gardenier, but
learned only that they were fine duelling pistols, and
that they were stolen from the President's holsters
during his short stay at the White House after the
battle. The secretary's duelling pistols became the
best known of all the weapons unused that day ; but
the secretary himself made no further appearance on
the scene. He went to Frederick. The Secretary
of the Navy and the Attorney-General accompanied
the President, and shared his fortunes.
Although ridicule without end was showered on
the President and the other civilians, their conduct
was on the whole creditable to their courage and
1814. BALTIMORE. 153
character; but of the commandmg general no kind
word could be said. Neither William Hull, Alexander Smyth, Dearborn, Wilkinson, nor Winchester
showed such incapacity as Winder either to organize,
fortify, fight, or escape. When he might have prepared defences, he acted as scout; when he might
have fought, he still scouted ; when he retreated, he
retreated in the wrong direction ; when he fought, he
thought only of retreat ; and whether scouting, retreating, or fighting, he never betrayed an idea. In
the brief moment of his preparations on the field at
Bladensburg he found time to give the characteristic
order to his artillery : " When you retreat, take
notice that you must retreat by the (Jeorgetown
road."^ When he left the field of Bladensburg he
rode past Barney's sailors, at their guns, and sent his
aid to Colonel Beall, on the hill covering Barney's
right, with an order to retreat.^ " After accompanying the retreating army within two miles of the
Capitol, I rode forward for the purpose of selecting
a position." * He reached the Capitol first, and was
presently joined there by Monroe and Armstrong.
Having decided not to fight at the Capitol, or at any
point between the Capitol and Georgetown, he rode
to Georgetown.* Behind Rock Creek his army would
^ Statement of John Law, Nov. 10, 1814; State Papers,
Militaiy Affairs, p. 585.
' Wilkinson's Memoirs, L 786.
• Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 668.
* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 231 ; Appendix no. 28. Winder's
Nanatiye ; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 659.
164 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
have been safe, and be could certainly baye rallied
more tban a tbousand men to stop tbe panic ; but be
tbougbt a f artber retreat necessary, and went on to
tbe beigbts. On tbe beigbts notbing could reacb
bim witbout bours of warning, but be rode tbree
miles fartber to Tenallytown. At Tenallytown bis
exbausted men stopped a moment from inability to
run fartber, yet he seemed angry at their faAigue.
Struck by a fresb panic at tbe glare of tbe burning
city, he pressed bis men on at midnigbt. "After
waiting in tbis position [Tenallytown] until I supposed I collected all tbe force tbat could be gathered,
I proceeded about five miles fartber on tbe river road^
wbicb leads a little, wide to tbe left of Montgomery
Court House, and in tbe morning gave orders for tb^
wbole to assemble at Montgomery Court House." Tbe
river road was tbe road tbat led farthest from tbe
enemy westward, when every motive required retreat
toward Baltimore if anywhere. Tbe next morning
Winder returned to the Rockville road, till be reached
Rockville, or Montgomery Court House, sixteen miles
from Washington, where at last he paused.
Prom tbe beginning to tbe end of tbe campaign
Winder showed no military quality. In other respects his conduct tallied with his behavior in the
field. He lost no opportunity of throwing responsibility on the President and on his troops, and he. so
far succeeded as to save himself from public anger
by encouraging tbe idea that tbe President and the
Cabinet bad directed tbe campaign. Universal as
U14. BALTIMORE. 15&
that belief was, and continued to be, it was with*
out foundation. While Winder courted advice from
every quarter, and threw on the President at every
instant the responsibility for every movement, neither
the President nor the Cabinet showed a disposition
to interfere with his authority in any way except to
give the support he asked. Under the strongest
temptation they abstained even from criticism.
More than all the rest, Armstrong refrained from
interference with the movements of Winder. Of all
the unfortunate or incapable generals of the war.
Winder was the one whom Armstrong treated with
least bitterness,^ although he was not Armstrong's
choice, and was the direct cause of the secretary's
ruin. So careful was Armstrong not to interfere,,
that his non-interference became the chief charge
against him. At one moment the President told
the secretary that he interfered too much, at another moment that he should interfere more ; but
in truth Armstrong was the only man connected
with the defence of Washington whom no one
charged with being ridiculous. After August 20 his
conduct was not open to reproach. He was cool
when others were excited ; he tried to check the
panic; his suggestions were sensible; he gave all
possible aid both to Winder and to the citizens ; he
attended the President in his expeditions, used wisely
such power as he had, and indulged in few words.^
* Kotdces, vol. ii. chap. v.
' Madison's Memorandum^ Aug. 24, 1814; Works, iii*. 422.
166 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
At the President's request he went to Bladensburg
to support and assist Winder; at the President's
order he retired after the battle began. He returned,
after Winder, to the Capitol, hoping to convert that
strong building into a fortress, — a measure not unreasonable, if the regulars and sailors were rallied
to make a stand there. When Winder decided to
retire to Georgetown, the secretary acquiesced without a word. Then, in pursuance of a Cabinet decision made a few hours before, he set out in company
with Secretary Campbell for Frederick, and arrived
there in the course of the next day.
Armstrong and Campbell were at Frederick when
the British army began its retreat Thursday night;
the President was in Virginia, sixteen miles up the
river ; Winder and Monroe, with the remaining
troops, were at Montgomery Court House sixteen
miles from Washington. There they learned, Friday
morning, that the British had marched toward Bladensburg, probably going to Baltimore ; and at about
ten o'clock in the morning Winder marched from
Montgomery Court House toward Brookville and Baltimore with all his force. Passing through Brook
ville, they camped, Friday night, " about half way
between Montgomery Court House and Ellicott's upper mills," ^ and Winder there left them, starting
late that evening alone for Baltimore, and leaving
Monroe and Stansbury in command, with directions
to follow.
^ Stansbury's Beport ; State Papers, Military Afifairs, i. 562.
mil BALTIMOBE. 15T
Meanwhile the President had crossed the Potomac
that morning, expecting to find Winder and Monroe
at Montgomery Court House; but on arriving there
at six o'clock in the evening, and learning that the
army had marched toward Baltimore, he followed as
far as Brookville, about ten miles, where he passed
the night.^ Attorney-General Rush was with him.
Saturday morning, August 27, the President sent notes
to all his Cabinet requesting them to unite in Washington.^ The same afternoon he returned with Monroe and Rush to the city, which they reached at about
six o'clock, after three days' absence.
Armstrong and Campbell, ignorant of the change
in plan, waited at Frederick for the President's
arrival, while the President and Monroe, Sunday,
August 28, began the task of restoring the functions
of government. The task was difficult, not so much
on account of the British ravages, which had been
confined to public property, as on account of the
general irritation and the continued panic. Hardly
had Ross's army disappeared when a squadron of
British war-vessels, under Captain Gordon of the
frigate " Seahorse," worked its way up the river, approaching Fort Washington or Warburton August 27.
The commander of that post, misunderstanding his
orders, abandoned it and crossed the river with his
men. Grordon's squadron reached Alexandria the
^ Madison to Monroe, Aug. 26, ten o'clock p.m.; Ingraham's
^ Sketch of the Events," p. 61.
« Note of Aug. 27, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
158 HISTORY OF TH£ UNITED STATES. CH.ft.
next day, and the town capitulated, since it could not
resist. Until August 31 the frigates remained at
Alexandria, loading such vessels as were there with
the tobacco and other produce which the warehouses
contained.^
The citizens of Washington and Georgetown, expecting to be visited in their tun\, and conscious
of their inability to resist, talked of a capitulation.
Public feeling ran strong against the President. Armstrong was absent. Winder was at Baltimore. Monroe alone was in a position to act, and upon Monroe
the President was obliged to depend.
^^ Under these circumstances," said Monroe in the only
authentic account of the event which remains,^ ^^the
President requested Mr. Monroe to take chaige of the
Department of War and command of the District ad
interim^ with which he immediately complied. On the
28th, in the morning, the President with Mr. Monroe and
the Attorney-General visited the navy-yard, the arsenal
at Greenleaf 's Point, and passing along the shore of the
Potomac up toward Georgetown. Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of War and military commander, adopted measures
imder sanction of the President for the defence of the
city and of Georgetown."
Colonel W[adsworth?] who was placing some
guns on the opposite shore refused to obey an order
of Monroe to change their position. Monroe rode
across the bridge and gave the order in person. The
^ Report of Captain Gordon, Sept 9, 1814 ; James, Appendix
no. 84.
' Monroe's Memorandmn; Oilman's Monroe, p. 119.
1814. BALTIMORE. 159
colonel replied that he did not know Mr. Monroe as
Secretary of War or commanding general. Monroe ordered him to obey or leave the field, and the
colonel left the field.
Monroe's act, whether such was his intention or
not, was a coup 3^ Stat. The citizens, unable to punish the President, were rabid against Armstrong.
No one could deny that they had reason for their
anger, although the blame for their misfortunes was
80 evenly distributed between every officer and every
branch of government that a single victim could not
justly be selected for punishment. Monroe, instead
of giving to Armstrong in his absence such support
as Etiight have sustained him, took a position and exercised an authority that led necessarily to his overthrow. The influence of such acts on the citizens was
obvious. That evening the first brigade of militia
held a meeting, and passed a formal and unanimous
resolution that they would no longer serve under the
orders or military administration of (Jeneral Armstrong, whom they denounced as the willing cause of
the fate of Washington.^ This mutinous resolution,
adopted in the immediate presence of the enemy,
was taken to the President by two officers of the
brigade, one of whom at least was a strong friend
of Monroe.^
The resolution of the first brigade was communicated to the President the next morning, Monday,
^ Williams; Capture of Washington, p. 105.
' McEenney's Memoirs, p. 47.
160 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6.
August 29. All the President's recorded acts and
conversation for months after the capture of Washington implied that he was greatly shaken bj that
disaster. He showed his prostration by helplessness.
He allowed Monroe for the first time to control him ;
but he did not dismiss Armstrong. At one o'clock
on the afternoon of the same day the Secretary of
War arrived in Washington.^ The President that
evening rode to his lodgings. Madison preserved a
memorandimi of their conversation, and Armstrong
also immediately afterward recorded what passed.^
The President described to the secretary the violent
prejudices which existed in the city against the Administration, and especially against himself and the
Secretary of War. " Before his arrival there was
less difiiculty, as Mr. Monroe, who was very acceptable to them, had, as on preceding occasions of his
absence, though very reluctantly on this, been the
medium for the functions of Secretary of War;"
but since Armstrong had returned, something must
be done.
Armstrong replied that he was aware of the excitement, and knew its sources ; that evidently he could
not remain if his functions were exercised by any one
else; that he would resign, or retire from Washington
at once, as the President preferred.
Madison deprecated resignation, and recommended
^ Madison's Memoiandom; Works, iii. 424. Letter of Jacob
Barker, Feb. 8, 1843; Life of Barker, pp. 114, 115.
' Armstrong's Letter of Sept. 13, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 6.
U14. BALTIMORE 161
" a temporary retirement, as he suggested;" and after
some further conversation, in which the President
complained of the secretary's mistakes, they parted
with the understanding that Armstrong should leave
Washington the next morning. Armstrong behaved
with dignity and with his usual pride ; but he understood, if Madison did not, the necessary consequences of his retirement, and on reaching Baltimore sent his resignation to the President. At the
same time he announced it to the public in a letter,
dated September 3, containing comments on the weakness of Madison's conduct calculated to close their
relations.
Between conscious intrigue and unconscious instinct no clear line of division was ever drawn*
Monroe, by the one method or the other, gained his
point and drove Armstrong from the Cabinet; but
the suspicion that he had intrigued for that object
troubled his mind to the day of his death.^ Even
m
after Armstrong's departure, the dangers and disadvantages of appointing Monroe his successor were so
great that for three weeks the post remained unfilled, until, after many doubts and hesitations, Monroe wrote to Madison a letter claiming the appointment
of Secretary of War.
^^ I have thought much of the state of the Departments
at this time," he informed the President, September 25,'
^ McKenney'B Memoirs, p. 44.
• Monroe to MadisoD, Sept. 25, 1814; Madison MSS. State
Department Archives.
VOL. viii. — 11
162 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
*^ and of the persons whom it may be proper to place in
them, and have concluded that whatever may be the arrangement with respect to other Departments, the Department of War ought to be immediately filled. I think also
that I ought to take charge of it. . . . By taking charge
of the Department twice, and withdrawing from it a second time, it may be inferred that I shrink from the responsibility from a fear of injuring my reputation ; and
this may countenance the idea that the removal of the
others was an affair of intrigue in which I partook, especially in the latter instance, from selfish and improper
motives, and did not proceed from his incompetency or
misconduct. It seems due, therefore, to my own reputation to go through with the undertaking by accepting
permanently a trust which I have not sought, never
wished, and is attended with great responsibility and
hazard. By taking the place, all clamor will be silenced.
It is known, here at least, that I was put into it when the
other could no longer hold it. Those who wished it in
the first instance will be satisfied, and I shall go on with
your support and a favorable expectation of the public
that I shall discharge to advantage its duties."
While Monroe in private communications with Madison thus treated Armstrong's retirement as a " removal," due to his "incompetency or misconduct,"
and Madison apparently acquiesced in that view, in
public Madison seemed inclined to convey the idea
that Armstrong was not removed or meant to be removed from office, but rather deserted it. Whichever view was correct, Madison certainly dreaded the
political effect of appearing to remove Armstrong;
lau. BALTIMORE. 168
and while he gave to Monroe the appointment of
Secretary of War, he wrote, September 29, to Governor Tompkins of New York, offering him the State
Department.
Governor Tompkins declined the offer. Apart
from the great need of his services as governor, the
experience of Northern men in Virginia Cabinets
was not calculated to encourage anj aspirant to the
Presidency in seeking the position. Monroe remained Secretary of State as well as Secretary of
War. As Secretary of State he had little or nothing to do, which was partly the cause of his activity
in military matters ; but as Secretary of War he was
obliged to undertake a task beyond the powers of
any man.
During an entire month after the appearance of
the British in the Patuxent, the United States government performed few or none of its functions.
The war on the frontiers was conducted without
orders from Washington. Every energy of the government was concentrated on its own immediate
dangers, as though Washington were a beleaguered
fortress. Slowly the tide of war ebbed from the
Potomac and Chesapeake, and not until it had
wholly subsided could men cease to dread its possible return.
Captain Gordon's squadron began its descent of
the river September 1, greatly annoyed ^ by batteries
^ Report of Captain Gk)rdon, Sept. 9, 1814; James, ii Appendix no. 84.
164 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6.
erected on the banks by Commodore Rodgers, Perry,
and Porter, who were sent from Baltimore, by order of Secretary Jones, for the purpose. Not until
September 6 did Captain Gordon escape from his
perilous position and rejoin the fleet. Meanwhile
the shores of Chesapeake Bay continued to be ravaged with all the severity threatened by Cochrane.
Frederick Chamier, afterward the author of several
popular searstories, was then a lieutenant on the
*'Menelaus" in Cochrane's squadron, and his recollections in " The Life of a Sailor " gave a lively picture of the marauding in which he took part.^ Like
Napier, Chamier was too tender-hearted for his work.
" I am willing to make oath,'* he wrote, in reply to
Captain Scott's contradictions, " that on the day that
the 'Menelaus' entered the Potomac, three houses
were burning at the same time on the left-hand bank
of the river. We burnt more than five ourselves."
War was commonly accompanied by destruction, but
the war in the Chesapeake was remarkable for the
personal share taken by the highest officers, especially
by Cockbum and Ross, in directing the actual opera-
tion of setting fire to private and public property.*
At last the practice caused a disaster that cost the
British navy a life more valuable than all the property it could destroy or carry away. The " Menelaus," commanded by Sir Peter Parker, was sent up
1 Chamier's " Life of a Sailor." Prefaoe to Second Edition^
chap, xviii.
« Life of a Sailor, Bentley, 1860, p. 180.
1814. BALTIMORE. 165
Chesapeake Bay to divert attention from the general
movement of troops and ships on the Potomac.^ The
" Menelans " took position off the Sassafras River,
which Cockbum had cleared of vessels the year be^
fore. Nothing in the river could injure the navy,
but the " Menelaus " was ordered to make a diversion; and Sir Peter Parker learned from negroes
that two hundred militia, encamped behind a wood
half a mile from the beach, intended to cross the
bay for the protection of Baltimore.* One hundred
and twenty-four men were landed at eleven o'clock
on the night of August 30, and went in search of
the militia. Instead of half a mile, they were led by
their guides three or four miles, and at last found
the militia drawn up, ready to receive them. Sir
Peter Parker ordered an attack, and while cheering
it on in the moonlight was struck by a buckshot,
which severed the femoral artery. The sailors carried him back to the ship, but he died long before
reaching it.® His party escaped with a loss of thirteen killed and twenty-seven wounded besides their
captain.
The Americans regretted only that the punishment
had fallen on the wrong person, for Cochrane and
Cockbum rather than Parker were the true marauders; but the lesson was effectual, and the British
^ James, ii. 276.
* Report of Acting-Commodore Crease, Sept. 1, 1814; Niles^
vii., Supplement, p. 160.
• Chamier'B " Life of a Sailor," pp. 183-191.
166 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6.
became more cautious after Parker's death. Indeed, their activity in the Chesapeake centred thenceforward in an effort to capture Baltimore, which
required all their strength.
Baltimore should have been first attacked, but
Cockbum's influence by diverting Ross to Washington gave the larger city time to prepare its defence.
The citizens themselves, headed by the mayor, took
charge of the preparations ; and their first act, contrary to the course pursued by Armstrong and Winder at Washington, was to construct intrenchments
round the city, and to erect semi-circular batteries
at a number of points, mounted with cannon and
connected by a line of works. After the capture of
Washington the citizens toiled still more earnestly
at their task, until a formidable line of redoubts protected the town, and, though not wholly finished,
gave cover to the militia. The batteries were manned
by sailors, commanded by officers of the navy. The
harbor was protected by Fort McHenry, small but
capable of defence, and occupied by a strong force of
regular troops, sailors, and volunteer artillerists numbering about one thousand, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Armistead of the Artillery.^
These precautions made the capture of Baltimore
impossible by such a force as had taken Washington,
even though aided by the fleet. The precise number
of troops present in the city, according to the official
^ Report of LieutenaatrColonel Aimistead, Sept. 24, 1814;
Niles, viL 40.
Mi. BALTIMORE. 167
return for September 10, waB twelve thousand nine
hundred and ninety-one men present for duty, with
eight hundred and ninety-seven officers. The aggregate of present and absent was sixteen thousand
eight hundred and five men.^ The force was ample
to man the works, but the fortifications chiefly decided the result. No army on either side during the
war succeeded in stonning works in face, except by
surprise ; and to tuim the works of Baltimore a
larger army was required than Boss had at his
command.
' The militia major-general commanding at Baltimore
was no other than Samuel Smith, senator of the
United States. He had lately passed his sixty-second
year. The brigadier-general in the United States
service who commanded the military district was
W. H. Winder, whose defence of Washington ended
abruptly August 24, and who left that neighborhood
on the evening of August 26 to take command of
the defences of Baltimore. Winder was a Baltimore
lawyer, only three years Smith's junior, when Eustis
and Madison gave him a regiment in March, 1812.
Smith was not disposed to accept the idea of subordination to a man of inferior rank, military and
civil, who knew no more of war than Smith knew^
and whose career had been twice marked by unusual
ridicule. Winder on arriving in Baltimore notified
Smith that he should take command, and was as^ Army Betoms ; MSS. AdjutantrGeneral's office^ War
Department
168 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
tonished when the senator declined to surrender
iis authority. Winder appealed to the President
and to the governor of Maryland, his cousin Levin
Winder; but nothing could be done to assist him,
and in the end he submitted. Samuel Smith remained in command.
The British leaders having succeeded in turning
their demonstration up the Patuxent into an attack
on Washington, next decided to make " a demonstration upon the city of Baltimore, which might be converted into a real attack should circumstances appear
to justify it," ^ and sailed from the Potomac September 6 for the Patapsco River. They anchored September 11 off its mouth. From that point Boss's
axmy when landed had only fourteen miles to march,
and no water in their way, while Cochrane's fleet had
but twelve miles to sail. Compared with the approaches to Washington, the approach to Baltimore
was easy.
Boss's troops were all landed at daylight on the
northern point, and were in motion by eight o'clock
September 12, without firing a shot. Their numbers
were differently given by British authorities, — one
reporting them at three thousand two hundred and
seventy rank-and-file;* the other reckoning them at
upward of five thousand.^ Boss made on the Patap1 Cochrane's Report of Sept. 17^ 1814; James, ii. Appendix
no. 73.
< James, ii. 313, 314.
* Glelg's Campaigns, p. 116.
mi. BALTIMORE. 169
8C0 no such leisurely movements as on the Patuxent,
but began his march at once, and proceeded about five
miles without meeting resistance. The light brigade
with the Eighty-fifth regiment was in advance; the
second brigade, under Colonel Brooke of the Fortyfourth, followed ; and the third brigade, under Colonel
Patterson of the Twenty-first, formed the rear. At
the same time the fleet moved up the channel toward
Port Henry.
The city was naturally excited at the news that the
British had arrived. General Smith, on receiving the
intelligence September 11, detached a brigade of Baltimore militia, under General Strieker, to check the
enemy if possible, and Strieker advanced that evening about seven miles toward North Point. His force
numbered about three thousand two hundred men ; ^
and with that body of raw militia, a part of whom had
been routed at Bladensburg only a fortnight before,
General Strieker attempted to fight a battle with five
thousand old soldiers. On the morning of September 12 he formed his troops in three lines three hundred yards apart, apparently in close order, without
cover or protection of any kind, standing in fields
more or less open, and with an exposed flank.^ Of
all his arrangements, the only one which showed ordinary caution was to send a detachment of cavalry
and riflemen a mile or two in his front. As the Brit^ Report of General Strieker, Sept. 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 26.
* Drawing of line of battle ; Lossing, p. 953. Report of Col-
onel Brooke, Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 71.
170 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATED Ch.6.
ish advance approached, the American outposts fell
back, and General Strieker sent forward some four
hundred men, partly rifles, as skirmishers. The British advanced guard coming up, the skirmishing party
fired, but was soon driven back. Boss and Cockburn
were walking together with the advance, and after the
firing ceased, Boss turned back alone to order up the
light companies in anticipation of more serious resistance. On his way he was shot through the breast
from the wood, and fell in the road, where he lay till
he was found by the light companies hurrymg forward to the scene of the firing. He barely spoke
afterward.^
The loss of their commanding general was the
second heavy penalty paid by the British for their contempt of militia. Colonel Brooke immediately took
command, and the advance was not checked ; but the
loss was not the less serious. When Brooke saw
Strieker's line stretching across the field, he did not
dash at them at once with the light brigade as Thornton had attacked the larger force and stronger position at Bladensburg, but deployed the whole army and
formed a regular order of battle. Although his force
easily overlapped and outflanked the American, the
engagement that followed was sharp, and the Americans were not routed without considerable loss to the
British, who reported forty-six killed and two hundred
and seventy-three wounded, — or more than they rej^crted at Bladensburg. The Americans, though routed,
^ James, ii. 315.
1814. BALTIMORE. 171
suffered less, losing only twenty-four lolled, one hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and fifty prisoners, with
two field-pieces.
This spirited little battle detained the British so>
long that they bivouacked on the field, and passed the
night in a drenching rain, resuming their march the
next morning, September 13, when they found the
roads obstructed, and were obliged to move so slowly
that evening arrived before they came in sight of
Baltimore.^ When at last they saw on the distant
heights the long line of intrenchments that surrounded Baltimore on the side of their approach^
they stopped short. Colonel Brooke had gone forward with the advance, and was engaged all day,
at about a mile and a half distance, in studying
the American lines. He made arrangements for
a night attack, hoping to avoid the effects of the
American artillery,^ and then waited for the fleet to
support him.
The fleet all day bombarded the forts and batteries
that covered the entrance to the harbor, and continued the bombardment till past midnight. Unlike
most naval engagements during the war, this battle
was harmless to either party. The heavier British
ships feared to approach within range, owing to a
barrier of sunken vessels, covered by the guns on
shore and by gunboats. Without the heavy ships, the
^ Qleig's Campaigns, p. 102.
' Brooke's Report of Sept 17, 1814 ; James, ii. Appendix
no. 71, p. 608.
172 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.«.
lighter vessels could not maintain a position. The
fort sustained no great injury, and only four men
were killed and twenty-four wounded.^ The fleet as
far as was reported sustained no injury whatever.
The firing ceased toward midnight, and Admiral
Cochrane sent word to Colonel Brooke that he could
do no more.^
*' Under these circumstances," reported Colonel Brooke,
*' and keeping in view your Lordship's instructions, it was
agreed between the Vice-admiral and myself that the capture of the town would not have been a sufficient equivalent to the loss which might probably be sustained in
storming the heights."
Sir George Prevost at Plattsburg only two days before, with three times the number of troops and a
much smaller number of opponents, came to the' same
conclusion. That both officers were probably wise
was shown by the experience of Lieutenant-Greneral
Drummond, a month earlier, in attempting to storm
the lines of Fort Erie. Brooke and Prevost followed
the same course in another respect, for Brooke withdrew his army so rapidly that at noon of September 14 it had already passed the battle-field of two
days before, and in another day the whole force was
re-embarked.*
As soon as the wind allowed, the fleet returned to
the lower Chesapeake ; and September .19 Admiral
* Armistead's Report, Sept 24, 1814 j Niles, vii. 40.
* Cochrane's Report of Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. 514.
* Subaltern, chap. xiii.
1814 BALTIMORE. IT J
Cochrane sailed for Halifax to prepare for a new expedition. The troops remained till October 14 in
their transports in the baj, and then set sail for
Jamaica, leaving Virginia and Maryland to a long
repose, which the vexed shores sorely needed.
CHAPTER Vn.
After balancing gains and losses, the result of the
campaign favored Great Britain by the amount of
plunder which the navy obtained in Alexandria, and
by the posts which Governor Sherbrooke occupied
between the Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy in
Maine. Considering the effort made and the waste
of money, the result was a total disappointment to
the British people; but even these advantages on
land could not be regarded as secure until the British
navy and mercantile marine had summed up their
profits and losses on the ocean.
At the beginning of the year 1814 the American
navy had almost disappeared. Porter in the " Essex "
still annoyed British interests in the Pacific ; but of
the five large frigates only the "President" was at
sea. January 1 the " Constitution," Captain Charles
Stewart, left Boston and cruised southward, making
a few prizes and destroying a British fourteen-gun
schooner, but fighting no battle and effecting no object equivalent to her cost. In returning to Boston,
April 3, she narrowly escaped capture by the two
British frigates blockading the port, and with difficulty got into Marblehead harbor. The "Constitu-
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEEBS. 175
Hon" did not again go to sea until December 17..
During her cruise of three months, from January 1 to
April 8, she made four prizes. '
The " President " regained New York February
18, and was blockaded during the rest of the yean
The " United States " and " Macedonian " remained
blockaded at New London. The " Constellation " remained blockaded at Norfolk. The corvette " Adams,"
twenty-eight guns, ran the blockade of Chesapeake
Bay January 18, and cruised until August 17, making
nine prizes and several narrow escapes before striking on the Isle of Haut and taking refuge in the
Penobscot as the British forces occupied Castine.
The story of her destruction has been told. Her
fate was the same she would have met had she
remained in Washington, where a week earlier the
new forty-four-gun frigate " Columbia " and the new
twenty-two-gun sloop-of-war "Argus" were burned
to prevent them from falling prize to the British
army.
This short abstract accounted for all the frigates
€xcept the "Essex," whose fortune was no happier
than that of the larger ships. October 27, 1812, the
^* Essex," Captain David Porter, left the Delaware,
intending to meet Bainbridge and form part of a
squadron under his command. Failing to meet Bainbridge, though constantly near him. Porter at last
decided to sail southward; and when Bainbridge in
the " Constitution " reached Boston February 27,
1813, the " Essex " had already passed Cape Horn,
176 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7.
and was ninning up the western coast of South
America to Valparaiso.
At Valparaiso Porter arrived March 14, 1818, to
the consternation of commerce. Chili had recently
asserted independence of Spain, and as yet no English war-vessels were stationed in the Pacific. The
chief British interest was the whale fishery which
centred in the Galapagos Islands, — a group lying under the equator, about a thousand miles from Panama.
Although the influence of England was supreme, on
account of her naval power, her commerce, and her
political alliance with the Spanish people, and although Porter had neither a harbor of his own, nor
the support of a diplomatic officer on the Pacific, he
had nothing to fear. He was well received at Valparaiso, where since 1811 J. R. Poinsett had held the
post of United States Consul-General for Buenos
Ayres, Chili, and Peru ; but the " Essex " tarried
only for supplies, and soon sailed for the Oalapagos
Islands. There she arrived in April, 1818, and in
the course of the summer captured all the British
whalers known to be in those seas. These were
twelve in number, and after sending some of them
away. Porter still had a fleet of five armed ships
besides his own, and nothing more to do.
The "Essex" had then been a year at sea, and
needed repairs. Porter determined to take his entire
fleet of six vessels about three thousand nules to
the Marquesas Islands, — as though to make a voyage
of discovery, or to emulate the mutineers of the
1814. 6L00Pg-0F-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 177
"Bounty." The squadron sailed three weeks over
the southern seas, until, October 23, the Marquesas
Islands were sighted. There Porter remained seven
weeks, amusing himself and his crew by interven-
tion in native Marquesan politics, ending in his conquest of the principal tribes, and taking possession
of the chief island in the name of his Government.
That he should have brought away his whole crew
after such relaxation, without desertion, was surprising. The men were for a time in a state of mutiny
on being ordered to sea ; but they did not desert, and
the squadron sailed, Dec. 12, 1818, for Valparaiso.
Porter would have done better to sail for the China
seas or the Indian Ocean. He knew that British
war-vessels were searching for him, and that Valparaiso was the spot where he would be directly in their
way. He arrived February 3, and five days afterward two British vessels of war sailed into the
harbor, making directly for the " Essex " with the
appearance of intending to attack and board her.
The crew of the " Essex " stood at quarters ready to
fire as the larger ship ran close alongside, until her
yards crossed those of the " Essex," and Porter
probably regretted to the end of his life that he did
not seize the opportunity his enemy gave him; but
the British captain, from his quarter-deck only a few
feet awaj, protested that the closeness of his approach
was an accident, and that he intended no attack.
The moment quickly passed, and then Porter found
himself overmatched.
VOL. VIII. — 12
178 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATESL Ch.7.
The British frigate " Phoebe/f thirty-gix guns, had
sailed from England in March, 1813, under secret
orders to break up the United States fur-establishment on the Columbia River.^ At Rio Janeiro the
^' Phoebe" was joined by the "Cherub," a sloop-of-war
rated at eighteen guns, and both sailed in search
of the " Essex." The " Phoebe " was one hundred
and forty-three and three quarters feet in length, by
thirty-eight and a quarter in breadth ; the " Essex "
was one hundred and thirty-eight and a half feet
in length, and thirty-seven and a quarter in breadth.
The " Phoebe " carried a crew of three hundred men
and boys ; the " Essex " carried two hundred and
fifty-five. The "Essex" was the better sailer, and
the result of an action depended on her ability to use
this advantage. The broadside of the " Essex " consisted of seventeen thirty-two-pound carronades and
six long twelve-pounders ; the " Phoebe " showed only
eight carronades, but had thirteen long eighteenpounders, one long twelve-pounder, and one long
nine-pounder. At close range. Porter's battery
would overpower the " Phoebe's " long guns, but the
*' Phoebe's " thirteen long-range eighteen-pounders
•could destroy her enemy without receiving a shot
in return. Porter knew all this, and knew also
that he could not depend on Chilian protection.
No British captain in such a situation could afford
to be delicate in regard to the neutrality of Chili,
which was not even a recognized nation. At most
^ James, p. 305.
1814 SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 179
Porter could hope for immunity only in the port of
Valparaiso.
Captain Hillyar of the " Phoebe " made no mistakes.
During an entire month he blockaded the "Essex"
with his two vessels, acting with extreme caution.
At last Porter determined to run out, trusting to
a chase to separate the blockading cruisers; and
March 28, 1814, with a strong southerly wind, he got
under way. As he rounded the outermost point a
violent squall carried away his maintopmast. The
loss threw on Porter a sudden emergency and a difficult, instantaneous decision. He decided to return
to harbor. A young midshipman, David Farragut,
who made his first cruise in the "Essex," gave his
high aulliority in after years to the opinion that Porter's decision was wrong. "Being greatly superior
in sailing powers," said Farragut, "we should have
borne up, and run before the wind." The chance
of outsailing the " Phoebe," or separating her from
her consort, was better than that of regaining the
anchorage.
The wind did not allow of a return to port, and
the " Essex " was run into a small bay three miles
from Valparaiso, and anchored within pistol-shot
of the shore. There Hillyar had her wholly at his
mercy. At first he attacked somewhat timidly. Although Porter could bring only three long twelvepounders to bear, he damaged the " Phoebe's " rigging
until Hillyar, in half an hour, hauled off to repair
the injury, — or, according to Hillyar's account, the
180 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
"Phoebe" was prevented by the freshness of the
wind from holding a position.^ Finally the " Phoebe '*
anchored, and began firing her broadsides of long
eighteen-pounders into the " Essex's " quarter. The
" Cherub " kept under way, using only her bow guns.
Reply was impossible. The crew of the " Essex '*
fired what guns would bear, and got the ship under
way ; but the " Phoebe " kept her distance, throwing
thirteen eighteen-pound shot into the " Essex " every
five or ten minutes, until the "Essex" was cut to
pieces and her decks were shambles.
The last attack continued, according to Captain
Hillyar, from 5.35 till 6.20 P. M., when the " Essex "
struck. The entire battle lasted from four o'clock
imtil the surrender. The carnage was frightful and
useless. Porter declared that fifty-eight of his crew
were killed. Hillyar claimed one hundred and nine*
teen unwoimded prisoners, while Porter declared the
number of unwounded prisoners to be seventy-five.
The British ships, with five hundred men, lost only
fifteen killed and wounded.
The loss of the "Essex," like the loss of the "Chesapeake" and "Argus," was unnecessary. Porter need
not have gone to Valparaiso, or might have tried to
run out at night, or might have fought, even after
the loss of his maintopmast, under less disadvantage. The disaster completed the unfortunate record
of the frigates for the year. They made some six^ Report of Captain Hillyar; James, ii. Appendix no. 71*
Naval History, vi. 163.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 181
teen prizes and busied many British cruisers, but won
no victories and suffered one bloody defeat.
The sloops told a different story. Early in 1814
three of the new sloops-of-war were ready for sea, —
the " Frolic," the " Peacock,'' and the " Wasp.'^
They were heavy vessels of their class, about one
hundred and twenty feet long on the main-deck, and
thirty-two feet in extreme breadth ; carrying crews
of about one hundred and sixty men, with an armament of twenty thirty-two-pound carronades and two
long eighteen-pounders. Although only one third the
tonnage of the forty-four-gun frigates, and carrying
only one third the crew, the new sloops-of-war threw
nearly half the weight of metal, — for the broadside
of the " Constitution " commonly exceeded but little
the weight of seven hundred pounds, while the sloops
threw three himdred and thirty-eight. The difference was due not to the weight, but to the range.
The frigates carried thirty long twenty-four-pounders ;
the sloops carried only two long eighteen-pounders.
The sloops were rigged as ships, and built with the
usual solidity of war-vessels, costing about seventyfive thousand dollars each.
The first to sail was the "Frolic," from Boston,
in February. She captured only two prizes before
she was herself taken, April 20, off Matanzas, after a
chase by the thirty-six-gun British frigate "Orpheus,"
assisted by a twelve-gun schooner.
The second sloop-of-war, the "Peacock," commanded by Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York
182 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch.7.
in March. Warrington was a Virginian, thirty-two
years old and fourteen years in the service, with
the rank of master-commandant in 1813. Cruising
down the coast, the "Peacock" first ran in to St.
Mary's on the Florida frontier; and then continuing southward, on the morning of April 29, off the
Indian River Inlet, she discovered a small convoy
on its way from Havana to Bermuda, under charge
of the British eighteen-gun brig " Epervier." The
British brig was no match for the American ship.
She was smaller, and carried only sixteen thirty-two
And two eighteen-pound carronades, with a crew of
one hundred and three men and fifteen boys.^ The
inferiority was something like four to three ; but
Captain Wales of the "Epervier" gallantly brought
liis vessel into action at the usual close-range of these
murderous combats.
Captain Wales told the result in an official report,
•dated May 8, to Vice-Admiral Coqhrane.^ The report
was not published, the British Admiralty having beKjome sensitive to the popular outcry against their
naval management.
" At eight A. M.," reported Captain Wales, " the wind
heing about east-south-east, I saw a strange sail in the
430uthwest apparently in chase of us ; at nine, perceiving
her to near very fast and to be a square-rigged vessel-ofwar, I shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the lar^ Commander R. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8,
1814 ; MSS. British Archives.
' Commander B. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8,
1814 ; MSS. British Archives.
1814. SLOOPS-OP-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 185
board tack to be between her and the convoy, being rather
ahead of them. The wind at this time' veering round to
the southward enabled the stranger to lay up for us. . . .
At 9.50 A. M. we weathered her and exchanged broadsides; having passed her beam, we tacked, shortened
sail, and continued in close action until eleven a. m.,
when — five of our larboard guns being disabled by the
breeching-bolts giving way, and three others by shot,
and unable to manoeuvre so as to get the starboard guns
to bear in consequenpe of the rigging and sails being cut
to pieces in the early part of the action by star-shot, the
main boom shot away, the foremast wounded in several
places, and several shot between wind and water, with
four-and-a-half feet of water in the hold, and the enemy
seemingly in a state to continue the action — I deemed it
prudent to surrender."
The giving way of the breeching-bolts did not
wholly disable the guns, for Captain Wales specially
commended "Mr. Lawrence Kennedy the Purser,
who rendered much service in his exertions at the
after-guns by getting them in a fighting state again
when unshipped by the fighting-bolts coming out of
their places."
At the close of the battle the "Peacock's" hull
had not been touched ; aloft, her foreyard was disabled and a few upper stays were cut away ; of her
crew, two men were slightly wounded, — but this
was all the injury sustained in running for three
quarters of an hour under the close fire of nine
heavy guns.^ The " Epervier " was reported by Cap^ James's Naval History, vi. 160.
184 mSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
tain Warrington aa showing forty-five shot-holea in
her hull ; masts and rigging much cut up, and twentythree men killed or wounded in a crew of one hundred and twenty-eight. The difference between the
force of the two vessels amply accounted for the
capture ; but the Admiralty might well show unwillingness to admit the bad condition of the vesselsof-war to which it intrusted the duty of convoying
British mercantile shipping.^ So complete was the
*' Epervier's " disaster that no excuse was offered for
it, except the plea that she was in almost every respect inferior to the standard that British vessels of
her class were supposed to maintain.
Captain Warrington saved the " Epervier *' and
brought her into Savannah in spite of two British
frigates encountered on the way. He sailed again
early in June, and passed the months of July and
August in British waters or in the track of British
commerce from the Faroe Islands to the Canaries.
He burned or sunk twelve prizes, besides making
cartels of two more, and brought his ship through
the blockade into New York harbor, October 30, without injury, with only one man lost and the crew in
fine health.^
The third new sloop was named the " Wasp ** after
the famous victor over the " Hornet.*' The new
" Wasp " sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire,
May 1, under command of Johnston Blakeley. Bom
^ James, pp. 342-347.
' Report of Captain Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814; Niles, vii. 155.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR ANJ) PRIVATEERS. 185
in Ireland in 1781, Blakeley was from infancy a
North Carolinian. He became in 1800 an officer in
the navy. Blakeley and the " Wasp " of 1814, like
Jones and the "Wasp" of 1818, ran a career in
which tragedy gave a deeper tinge than usual to the
bloody colors they won; but their success was on
the whole greater than that of any other national
cruiser from the beginning to the end of the war.
Merely as a story of adventure Blakeley's career
was exciting, but romance was its smallest interest.
For several reasons the sloop battles and cruises afforded one of the best relative tests of American
character and skill among all that were furnished
in the early period of the national history ; and
among the sloops, Blakeley's " Wasp '' was the most
distinguished.
Blakeley ran directly across the ocean into soundings at the mouth of the British Channel. There he
remained during the month of June, searching every
vessel that passed. The number of neutrals constantly diverting his attention kept him actively employed, and led him farther into the Channel than
was intended ; but although three British frigates
and fourteen sloops were at sea for the protection of
British waters, the "Wasp" continued to burn and
sink such British merchantmen as she met, — the first,
June 2, and subsequently June 18, 18, 28, and 26, —
mitil on the morning of June 28 a man-of-war brig
appeared to windward, and bore down on the American ship.
186 HISTORY OF THE UNTTED STATE& Ch.t.
The day was warm and oyercast. During the
whole morning the two vessels approached each other
80 slowly that each had more than time to study his
opponent. Once more the foresight of the American ship-builders secured a decisive advantage. The
British brig, the " Reindeer," was altogether unequal
to the contest. In tonnage she resembled the ^^ Epervier," and her armament was even lighter. Captain
Manners, her commander, had substituted twenty-four*
pound carronades for the usual thirty-two-pounders,
and his broadside of ten guns threw only two hundred and ten pounds of metal,^ while the " Wasp's '*
eleven guns threw three hundred and thirty-eight
pounds. The American crew numbered one hundred
and seventy-three men; the British numbered one
hundred and eighteen. Contest under such condi*
tions was a forlorn hope, but the " Reindeer's " crew
were the pride of Portsmouth, and Manners was the
idol of his men. They might cripple the " Wasp " if
they could not capture her; and probably the fate
of the " Argus,'* a year before, encouraged the hope
that the " Reindeer '* could do at least as well as
the « Pelican."
Each captain manoeuvred for the weather-gauge,
but the Englishman gained it, and coming up on
the " Wasp's " weather-quarter, repeatedly fired his
light twelve-pound bow-carronade, filled with round
and grape shot, into liie American ship. Blakeley,
" finding the enemy did not get sufficiently on the
1 Blakele/a Report of July 8, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 114.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 187
beam to enable us to bring our guns to bear, put the
helm a-lee/* and fired as his guns bore. The firing
began at 3.26 p. m. and lasted imtil 3.40, fourteen
minutes, at close range. In that space of time each
gun in the broadside could be fired at the utmost
three times. Apparently Manners felt that he had
no chance with his guns, for he brought his vessel's
bow against the ** Wasp's '* quarter and repeatedly
attempted boarding. Early in the action the calves
of his legs were shot away ; then a shot passed
through both his thighs; yet he still climbed into
the rigging to lead his boarders, when two balls
at the same moment struck him in the head. His
fall ended the battle; and such had been the lessees
of his company that the highest officer remaining
unhurt on the British brig to surrender the vessel
was said to be the captain's clerk. At 3.46 the
"Reindeer's'' flag was struck, — the whole action,
from the " Wasp's " first gun, having lasted nineteen
minutes.
Had every British vessel fought like the " Reindeer," Englishmen would have been less sensitive to
defeat. In this desperate action the "Wasp" suffered severely. Her foremast was shot through ; her
rigging and spars were much injured ; her hull was
struck by six round shot and much grape; eleven
men were killed and fifteen wounded, or nearly
one man in six, " chiefly in repelling boarders," reported Blakeley. The " Reindeer " was a wreck, and
was blown up as soon as the wounded could be
188 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
removed. Of her crew, numbering one hmidred
and eighteen, thirty-three lost their lives ; thirtyfour were wounded, — in all, sixty-seven, or more
than half the brig's complement.
Ten days afterward Blakeley ran into Lorient,
where his ship was well received by the French,
whose British antipathies were increased rather than
lessened by their enforced submission. After refitting, the "Wasp*' sailed again August 27, and
four days later cut out a valuable ship from a convoy
under the eyes of a seventy-four. The same evening, September 1, at half-past six, Blakeley sighted
four vessels, two on either bow, and hauled up for
the one most to windward. At 9.26 at night the
chase, a brig, was directly under the " Wdfep's ''
lee-bow, and Blakeley began firing a twelve-pound
bow-carronade, which he must have taken from
the " Reindeer," for no such gun made part of his
regular armament.
The battle in the dark which followed has been
always deeply interesting to students of naval history,
the more because the British Admiralty suppressed
the official reports, and left an air of mystery over
the defeat which rather magnified than diminished its
proportions. The British brig was the sloop-of-war
"Avon," commanded by Captain James Arbuthnot,
and carrying the usual armament of sixteen thirtytwo-pound carronades with two long six-pounders.
Her crew was reported as numbering one hundred
and four men and thirteen boys. Captain Arbuth-
1S14. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 189
not's official report ^ said that the " Avon " had been
cruising in company with the sloop-of-war " Castilian," when at daylight, September 1, he " discovered
an enemy's schooner in the rear of the Kangaroo
convoy," and gave chase. The " Castilian " also
gave chase, and at seven o'clock the twenty-gun ship
"Tartarus" was signalled, also in chased All day
the three British sloops-of-war chased the privateer
schooner, until at half-past six o'clock in the evening
the " Castilian's " superiority in sailing free left the
" Avon " out of sight, nine miles astern. The position of the "Tartarus" was not mentioned in the
reports, but she could hardly have been ahead of the
" Castilian." The three British sloops were then
within ten miles of each other, under full sail, with
a ten-knot wind. The weather was hazy, and neither
the " Castilian " nor the " Tartarus " could see that
the " Avon " was signalling the " Castilian " a recall.
The " Avon " saw at four o'clock a large sail on her
weather-beam standing directly for her, and knowing that the " Wasp " was cruising in these waters.
Captain Arbuthnot felt natural anxiety to rejoin his
consort.
Captain Arbuthnot's report continued: —
" The stranger closing with us fast, I kept away and
set the weather studding-sails In hopes of nearing the
^ Report of Captain James Arbuthnot, Sept. 1, 1814; MSS.
British Archives.
' Report of Lieutenant George Lloyd of the " Castilian/' Sept.
2, 1814 ; MSS. British Archives.
190 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
* Castilian ' or ' Tartarus/ the latter of which I had only
lost sight of at 3 p. m. At 7.30 p. m. the stranger had
approached within hail, and being unable to get a satisfactory answer I had not a doubt of her being an enemy's
corvette. At 8.30 he fired a shot over us which was instantly returned with a broadside. He then bore up and
endeavored to rake us, but was prevented. The action
then became general within half pistol-shot, and continued without intermission until 10.30 p. m., when — having
seven feet of water in the hold, the magazine drowned ;
tiller, foreyard, main-boom, and every shroud shot away,
and the other standing and the running rigging cut to
pieces ; the brig quite unmanageable, and the leak gaining fast on the pumps ; with forty killed and wounded,
and five of the starboard guns dismounted ; and conceiving further resistance only would cause a useless
sacrifice of lives — I was under the painful necessity
of ordering the colors to be struck to the American corvette ^Wasp,' the mainmast, almost immediately after^
going over the side."
Lieutenant George Lloyd, commanding the " Castilian," reported September 2 the circumstances at*
tending the loss of the " Avon," as far as they concerned his share in the matter.^ At nine o'clock the
" Castilian " heard a very heavy firing in the northnortheast, and immediately wore and made all possible sail in that direction, burning blue lights. At
quarter past ten the firing ceased, " and on coming
up I had the mortification to observe the *Avon' a
^ lieutenant Lloyd to Yice-Admiral Sawyer, Sept 2, 1814;
MSS. British Archives.
1814, SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 191
totally dismantled and ungovernable wreck, with her
mainmast gone, — the enemy, apparently a large ship
corvette, lying to, to leeward of her, who on my
closing made all sail, and evinced every wish to avoid
a contest with us."
^^ I immediately used means to enable me to bring her
to close action ; and from our superior sailing I had in a
few minutes the gratification to be within half a cable's
length on her weather quarter. But I lament to state at
this anxious crisis the 'Avon's' situation became most
alarming; she had commenced firing minute guns, and
making every other signal of distress and of being in
want of immediate assistance. I must here (as my pen
can but Inadequately describe) leave you, sir, to judge
the feelings of myself, officers, and crew, as, from the
confusion which evidently prevailed on board the enemy,
the damage she had sustained, and her bad steerage, together with the cool and steady conduct of the officers
and men I have the honor to command, I had no doubt of
her falling an easy prey could we have persisted in attacking her, but which was not to be done without sacrificing
the lives of the surviving gallant crew of our consort.
Thus situated ... I was obliged ... to leave the fiying enemy to escape ; but I feel somewhat gratified the
situation of the ' Castilian ' enabled me to give him a raking, and I doubt not from the closeness of the vessels a
most destructive broadside, which he did not return even
with a single gun, — a circumstance that, I trust, cannot
fail to prove how destructive the ' Avon's ' fire must have
been."
Lieutenant Lloyd did not explain how his enemy
was to bring gims to bear under the circumstances.
192 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7.
the "Castilian" tacking under the "Wasp's" stem
at half a cable's length distance, and immediately
standing in the opposite direction, nor did he say
what had become of the " Tartarus." Doubtless the
" Wasp " steered badly, her rigging being much damaged ; and Blakeley was chiefly intent on keeping off
till he could reeve new braces. The " Castilian's "
broadside cut the " Wasp's " rigging and sails, and
shot away a lower main cross-tree, but did no other
serious damage.
The "Avon" lost ten men killed and thirty-two
wounded, besides being reduced to a sinking condition in an hour of night action in a ten-knot wind,
with two more ships-of-war in sight and hearing.
The " Wasp " lost two men killed and one wounded,
four round shot in the hull, and the " rigging and
sails suffered a great deal." ^
Blakeley had done enough, and could hardly do
more. Besides two eighteen-gun brigs, he made ia
his cruise fourteen prizes, which he destroyed, several
of great value. In that year all the frigates in the
United States service had not done as much. With
a single-decked ship of five hundred tons, armed with
carronades, Blakeley blockaded the British Channel
for two months, capturing vessels in sight of shipsof-the-line, and destroying two sloops -of-war in rapid
succession, without serious injury to himself, and to
the consternation of the British marine.
After sinking the " Avon," September 1, Blakeley
1 Blakeley's Keport, Sept 11, 1814; Niles, viL 191.
1«14. SLOOPS-OF^WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 193
held on his course toward Madeu'a, and there, September 21, captured the brig "Atlanta," which he sent
to Savannah. Still later, October 9, near the Cape
de Verde Islands, he spoke a Swedish brig, which reported him. After that day no word of tidings was
ever received from the "Wasp." Somewhere under
the waters of the Atlantic, ship and crew found an
unknown grave.
Besides the large sloops-of-war, three smaller vessels — the "Syren," "Enterprise," and "Rattlesnake"
— went to sea in 1814. The " Syren" was captured
after a chase of eleven hours, nearly on a wind, by
the " Medway," seventy-four ; her sixteen guns, and
everything else that could be spared, were thrown
overboard during the chase. The " Rattlesnake " and
" Enterprise " cruised in company toward the West
Indies, and made some prizes. The "Rattlesnake"
was fast, the "Enterprise" a very dull sailer; but
after repeated hairbreadth escapes, the " Rattlesnake "
was caught, July 11, by the frigate " Leander," with
Cape Sable to windward, and was obliged to surrender.^ The " Enterprise," with her usual good fortune,
was never taken, but became a guardship.
After November 1 the United States government
had not a ship at sea. In port, three seventy-fours
were building, and five forty-fours were building or
blockaded. Three thirty-six-gun frigates were laid up
or blockaded. Four sloops-of-war were also in port,
the " Peacock " having just returned from her long
* Letter from the Purser, July 29, 1814 ; Niles, vi. 391.
VOL. VIII. — 18
194 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
cruise. Such a result could not be called satisfactory.
The few war-vessels that existed proved rather what
the government might have done than what the British had to fear from any actual or probable American navy. The result of private enterprise showed
also how much more might easily have been done
by government.
»
The year 1814 was marked by only one great and
perhaps decisive success on either side, except Macdonough's victory. This single success was privateering. Owners, captains, and crews had then learned to
build and sail their vessels, and to hunt their prey with
extraordinary skill. A few rich prizes stimulated the
building of new vessels as the old were captured, and
the ship-yards turned them out as rapidly as they were
wanted. In the neighborhood of Boston, in the summer of 1814, three companion ships were built, — the
" Reindeer," " Avon," and " Blakeley ; " and of these
the " Reindeer " was said to have been finished in
thirty-five working days, and all three vessels were
at sea in the following winter. No blockade short
of actual siege could prevent such craft from running out and in. Scores of them were constantly
Qn the ocean.
On the Atlantic privateers swarmed. British merchantmen were captured, recaptured, and captured
again, until they despaired of ever reaching port. One
British master who was three times taken and as
often retaken, reported that he had seen ten American
privateers crossing his course. A letter from Halifax
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 196
printed in the London " Times " of December 19 said :
** There are privateers o£E this harbor which plunder
every vessel coming in or going out, notwithstanding
we have three line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and
four sloops here." The West Indies and the Canaries
were haunted by privateers. The " Rambler," " Hyder
Ali," and " Jacob Jones " of Boston penetrated even
the Chinese seas, and carried prize-goods into Macao
and Canton. Had these pests confined their ravages
to the colonies or the ocean, the London clubs and
the lobbies of Parliament would have thought little about them ; but the privateer had discovered the
weakness of Great Britain, and frequented by preference the narrow seas which England regarded as her
own. The quasi-blockade of the British coasts which
American cruisers maintained in 1813 became a real
and serious blockade in 1814. Few days passed without bringing news of some inroad into British waters,
until the Thames itself seemed hardly safe.
The list of privateers that hung about Great Britain
and Ireland might be made long if the number were
necessary to the story, but the character of the blockade was proved by other evidence than that of numbers. A few details were enough to satisfy even the
English. The " Siren," a schooner of less than two
hundred tons, with seven guns and seventy-five men,^
had an engagement with her Majesty's cutter " Landrail " of four guns, as the cutter was crossing the
British Channel with despatches. The "Landrail"
^ James, p. 361*
196 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.7.
was captured after a somewhat sharp action, and sent
to America, but was recaptured on the way. The
victory was not remarkable, but the place of capture
was very significant ; and it happened July 12, only
a fortnight after Blakeley captured the "Reindeer"
farther westward. The " Siren " was but one of
many privateers in those waters. The " Governor
Tompkins" burned fourteen vessels successively in
the British Channel. The " Young Wasp " of Philadelphia cruised nearly six months about the coasts
of England and Spain and in the course of West
India commerce. The " Harpy " of Baltimore, another large vessel of some three hundred and fifty
tons and fourteen guns, cruised nearly three months
off the coast of Ireland, in the British Channel and
in the Bay of Biscay, and returned safely to Boston
filled with plunder, including, as was said, upward
of £100,000 in British Treasury notes and bills of
exchange. The " Leo," a Boston schooner of about
two hundred tons, was famous for its exploits in
these waters, but was captured at last by the frigate
" Tiber " after a chase of eleven hours. The " Mammoth," a Baltimore schooner of nearly four hundred
tons, was seventeen days off Cape Clear, the southernmost point of Ireland. The most mischievous of
all was the " Prince of Neufchatel " of New York,
which chose the Irish Channel as its favorite haunt,
where during the summer it made ordinary coasting
traffic impossible. The most impudent was probably
the " Chasseur," commanded by Captain Boyle, who
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 197
cruised three months, and amused himself, when off
the British coast, by sending to be posted at Lloyd's
a " Proclamation of Blockade " of " all the ports,
harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands,
and sea-coast of the United Kingdom." The jest at
that moment was too sardonic to amuse the British
public.
As the announcement of these annoyances, recurring day after day, became a practice of the press, the
public began to grumble in louder and louder tones.
" That the whole coast of Ireland, from Wexford round
by Cape Clear to Carrickfergus," said the " Morning
Chronicle" of August 31, "should have been for
above a month under the unresisted dominion of a
few petty ' fly-by-nights ' from the blockaded ports of
the United States, is a grievance equally intolerable
and disgraceful." The Administration mouthpiece,
the " Courier," admitted, August 22, that five brigs
had been taken in two days between the Smalls and
the Tuskar, and that insurance on vessels trading between Ireland and England had practically ceased.
The "Annual Register" for 1814 recorded as "a
most mortifying reflection," that with a navy of nearly
a thousand ships of various sizes, and while at peace
with all Europe, " it was not safe for a vessel to sail
without convoy from one part of the English or Irish
Channel to another." Such insecurity had not been
known in the recent wars.
As early as August 12, the London Assurance Corporations urged the government to provide fi naval
198 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Cat
force competent to cope with the privateers. In
September the .merchants of Glasgow, Liverpool, and
Bristol held meetings, and addressed warm remonstrances to government on the want of protection
given to British commerce. The situation was serious, and the British merchants did not yet know
all. Till that time the East India and China trade
had suffered little, but at last the American privateers had penetrated even the Chinese seas ; and while
they were driving the British flag into port there, they
attacked the East India Company's ships, which were
really men-of-war, on their regular voyages. In August the " Countess of Harcourt " of more than five
hundred tons, carrying six heavy guns and ninety
men, was captured in the British Channel by the
privateer " Sabine " of Baltimore, and sent safely to
America. The number and value of the prizes stimulated new energy in seeking them, and British commerce must soon yield to that of neutral nations if
the war continued.
The merchants showed that a great change had
come over their minds since they incited or permitted
the Tories to issue the Impressment Proclamation
and the Orders in Council seven years before. More
than any other class of persons, the ship-owners and
West India merchants were responsible for the temper
which caused the war, and they were first to admit
their punishment. At the Liverpool meeting, where
Mr. Gladstone, who took the chair, began by declaring that some ports, particularly Milford, were under
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 199
actual blockade,^ a strong address was voted ; and at
a very numerous meeting of merchants, manufacturers, ship-owners, and underwriters at Glasgow, September 7, the Lord Provost presiding, resolutions were
unanimously passed —
" That the number of American privateers with which
our channels have been infested, the audacity with which
they have approached our coasts, and the success with
which their enterprise has been attended, have proved
injurious to our commerce, humbling to our pride, and
discreditable to the directors of the naval power of the
British nation, whose flag till of late waved over every
sea and triumphed over every rival.
'^ That there is reason to believe, in the short space of
twenty-four months, above eight hundred vessels have
been captured by the Power whose maritime strength we
have hitherto impolitically held in contempt.*'
The war was nearly at an end, and had effected
every possible purpose for the United States, when
such language was adopted by the chief commercial
interests of Great Britain. Yet the Glasgow meeting
expressed only a part of the common feeling. The
rates of insurance told the whole story. The press
averred that in August a^d September underwriters
at Lloyd's could scarcely be induced to insure at
any rate of premium, and that for the first time in
history a rate of thirteen per cent had been paid on
risks to cross the Irish Channel. Lloyd's list then
showed eight hundred and twenty-five prizes lost to
1 Morning Chronicle, Sept. 6, 1814.
200 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.T.
the Americans, and their value seemed to increase
rather than diminish.
Weary as the merchants and shipowners were of
the war, their disgust was not so intense as that of
the navy. John Wilson Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty Board, whose feelings toward America were
at best unkind, showed a temper that passed the limits of his duties. When the London underwriters
made their remonstrance of August 12, Croker assured them, in a letter dated August 19,^ that at the
time referred to " there was a force adequate to the
purpose of protecting the trade both in St. Gteorge's
Channel and the Northern Sea." The news that
arrived during the next two weeks threw ridicule
on this assertion ; and Croker was obliged to reply
to a memorial from Bristol, September 16, in a different tone.^ He admitted that the navy had not
protected trade, and could not protect it ; but he
charged that the merchants were to blame for losing
their own ships. His letter was a valuable evidence
of the change in British sentiment: —
^' Their Lordships take this opportunity of stating to
you, for the information of the memorialists, that from
the accounts which their Lordships have received of the
description of vessels which had formed the largest proportion of the captures in the Irish and Bristol channels,
it appears that if their masters had availed themselves
of the convoys appointed for their protection from for* Niles, vii. 174.
* Croker to the Mayor of Bristol, Sept. 16, 1814; Niles, vilL
Supplement, p. 186.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 201
eign ports, or had not in other instances deserted from
the convoys under whose protection they had sailed, before the final conclusion of the voyage, many of the captures would not have been made. It is their Lordships'
determination, as far as they may be enabled, to bring
the parties to punishment who may have been guilty
of such illegal acts, and which are attended with such
injurious consequences to the trade of the country."
Little by little the Americans had repaid every
item of the debt of insult they owed, and after Croker's letter the account could be considered settled.
Even the " Times " was not likely to repeat its sneer
of 1807, that the Americans could hardly cross to
Staten Island without British permission. Croker's
official avowal that no vessel could safely enter or
leave one port in the British Islands for another except under guard of a man-of-war, was published on
the same page with the memorialists' assertion that
the rate of insurance had gradually risen till it exceeded twofold the usual rates prevailing during the
wars on the Continent.
The spirit of exasperation shown by Croker extended through the navy, The conduct of Cochrane
and Cockbum has been already told. That of Captain HiUyar at Valparaiso was equally significant. Under the annoyance of their mortifications the British
conmianders broke through ordinary rules. Captain
Lloyd of the " Plantagenet," seventy-four, on arriving
in the harbor of Fayal, September 26, saw a large
brig in the roads, which he must have known to
202 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.7.
be an American privateer. He was so informed bj
his pilot. It was the ^ General Armstrong/' Captain
Samuel G. Beid, a brig which for two years had
fretted and escaped the British navy. The **Plantagenet," with two other ships-of-war, appeared at
sunset. Beid dared not run out to sea, and the want
of wind would in any case have prevented success.
A little after dusk, Beid, seeing the suspicious movements of the enemy, began to warp his vessel close
under the guns of the castle. While doing so, at
about eight o'clock four boats filled with men left
the ships and approached him. As they came near
he repeatedly hailed and warned them off, and at last
fired. His fire was returned, but the boats withdrew
with the loss of a number of men.^
Captain Lloyd, in a somewhat elaborate report to
explain the propriety of his conduct, enclosed affi-
davits to prove that the Americans had violated the
neutrality of the port. The affidavits proved that,
knowing the character of the vessel, he sent two
boats from his own ship to assist the boats of the
" Carnation " to " watch " the privateer. His report
told the story as he wished it to be understood : *
^^ On the evening of the 26th instant I put into this
port for refreshments, previous to my return to Jamaica.
In shore was discovered a suspicious vessel at anchor. I
ordered Captain Bentham of the ^ Carnation ' to watch
1 Letter of Consul Dabney, Oct. 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 253.
* Robert Lloyd to Rear-Admiral Brown, Sept. 28, 1814; MSS.
British Archives.
1814. SLOOPS-OF~WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 208
her moyements, and sent the pinnace and cutter of this
ship to assist him on that service ; but on his perceiving
her under way, he sent Lieut Robert Faussett in the
pinnace, about eight o'clock, to observe her proceedings.
On his approaching the schooner, he was ordered to keep
off or they would fire into him, upon which the boat was
immediately backed off ; but to his astonishment he received a broadside of round, grape, and musketry, which
did considerable damage. He then repeatedly requested
them to leave off firing, as he was not come to molest
them ; but the enemy still continued his destructive fire
until they had killed two men and wounded seven, without a musket being returned by the boat."
Lieutenant Paussett's affidavit threw more light on
this curious story of British naval management. He
deposed —
^^ That on Monday, the 26th instant, about eight
o'clock in the evening, he was ordered to go in the pin-
nace as guard-boat unarmed on board her Majesty's brig
^ Carnation,' to know what armed vessel was at anchor in
the bay, when Captain Bentham of said brig ordered him
to go and inquire of said vessel (which by information
was said to be a privateer). When said boat came
near the privateer, they hailed (to say, the Americans),
and desired the English boat to keep off or they would
fire into her ; upon which said Mr. Faussett ordered his
men to back astern, and with a boat-hook was in the
act of so doing, when the Americans in the most wanton manner fired into said English boat, killed two
men and wounded seven, some of them mortally, — and
this notwithstanding said Faussett frequently called out
not to murder them, that they struck and called for
204 HISTORY OF THE UNITED 8TATB& Cte.r.
quarter. Said Faussett solemnly declares tiiat no resistance of any kind was made, nor coold (2iey do it,
not having any arms, nor of course sent to attack said
vessel."
Lieutenant Faussett's affidavit proved that the
'^ General Armstrong " had good reason for firing
into the British boats. The ^Carnation" had anchored within pistol-shot of the privateer ; fonr boats
of the " Plantagenet " and "Carnation,'* filled with
men, were on the water watching her in the moonlight ; every act of the British squadron pointed to
an attack, when Captain Bentham ordered the pinnace " to go and inquire " of the vessel, known to be
an American privateer, what armed vessel it was. If
Captain Bentham did not intend to provoke a shot
from the privateer, his order was wanting in intelligence. Lieutenant Faussett accordingly approached
in the pinnace, the other boats being not far behind.
That his men were unarmed was highly improbable
to the privateer, which affirmed that their fire kiUed
one of the American crew and wounded the first lieutenant ; ^ but their armament had little to do with the
matter. They approached as enemies, in the night,
with a large armed force immediately behind them.
The privateer repeatedly warned them off. Instead of
obeying the order, Lieutenant Faussett came alongside. When he was fired on, he was so near that by
his own account he shoved off with the boat4iook.
1 Letter of Captain Beid, Oct 4, 1814 ; Niles, vii. Snpplenient, p. 167.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 206
Considering who and where he was, he had reason to
be thankful that any of his boat's-crew escaped.
Captain Lloyd's report continued : —
^^ This conduct, in violating the neutrality of this port,
I conceive left me no alternative but that of destroying
her. I therefore repeatedly ordered Captain Bentham to
tow in the bng and take that step immediately. All the
boats of this ship and the ' Rota ' were sent under his
orders to tow him alongside or assist him in the attack,
as circumstances might require ; but from continued light
baffling winds and a lee tide he was not able, as he informed me, with his utmost exertions to put my orders
in execution.**
Meanwhile Captain Reid of the " General Armstrong" warped his vessel close to the beach, under
the fort, and made all his preparations for the attack
which he knew must come. The people of the town,
with the governor among them, lined the shore, and
witnessed the affair. Captain Lloyd's report told the
result : —
** Finding the privateer was warping under the fort
very fast. Captain Bentham Judged it prudent to lose no
time, and about twelve o'clock ordered the boats to make
the attack. A more gallant, determined one never was
made, led on by Lieutenants Matterface of the ' Rota '
and Bowerbank of this ship ; and every officer and man
displayed the greatest courage in the face of a heavy
discharge of great guns and musketry. But from her
side being on the rocks (which was not known at the
time), and every American in Fayal, exclusive of part of
the crew, being armed and concealed in these rocks, which
206 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATED Cb.7.
were immediately over the privateer, it unfortunately
happened when these brave men gained the deck they
were under the painful necessity of returning to their
boats, from the very destructive fire kept up by those
above them from the shore, who were in complete
security, — and I am grieved to add, not before many
lives were lost exclusive of the wounded."
As far as the accounts ^ agree, the boats were twelve
in number, with about two hundred men. The privateersmen numbered ninety. As the boats approached,
the guns opened on them ; and when they came alongside the privateer they found the boarding-nettings
up, with a desperate crew behind. So vigorously did
the British seamen attack, that they gained the forecastle for a time. All three American lieutenants
were killed or disabled, and Captain Reid fought his
brig alone ; but the deck was at last cleared, and the
surviving assailants dropped into their boats or into
the water.
Proverbially, an unsuccessful boat-attack was the
most fatal of all services. The British loss was
excessive. According to their report at the time,
"Lieutenants Bowerbank, Coswell, and Rogers of the
* Rota ' were killed, as well as thirty-eight seamen,
and eighty-three wounded ; the first, fourth, and fifth
lieutenants of the * Plantagenet ' were wounded, and
twenty-two seamen killed, and twenty-four wounded.^'*
^ Niles, vii 255. James's Naval History, vL 509. Cf. Letter
from Fayal, Oct. 16, 1814. Cobbett's "Weekly Eegister," reprinted in Niles, vii. Supplement, p. 171.
• Kilea^ vii. 255.
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 207
According to the oflScial report, thiriy-f our were killed
and eighty-six were wounded. The "Guerriere" in
her battle with the " Constitution " lost only seventyeight men altogether. The ^' Macedonian " lost only
one hundred and four. The attack on the ^^ General
Armstrong" was one of the bloodiest defeats suffered by the British navy in the war. Not only was
the privateer untaken, but she lost few of her crew,
-—nine in all, killed and wounded.
Captain Lloyd then declared that he would destroy
the privateer if he had to destroy Fayal in doing it,
and ordered Captain Bentham of the " Carnation "
to attack her with his ^uns. Reid abandoned and
scuttled the " General Armstrong," taking his men
on shore. The " Carnation's " shot inflicted some injury on the town, before the privateer was set on fire
by the "Carnation's" boats.^
If the British navy cared to pay such a price for
the shell of an old privateer brig, which had abeady
cost British commerce, as Captain Lloyd believed, a
million dollars,^ the privateers were willing to gratify
the wish, as was shown a few days afterward when
the " Endymion " tried to carry the " Prince of Neuf-
chatel " by boarding. This privateer had made itself
peculiarly obnoxious to the British navy by the boldness of its V ravages in British waters. It was coming
^ Dabney's Letter; Niles, vii. 254. Reid's Letter of Oct. 4,
1814 ; State Papers, Naval Affairs, p. 495.
s Report of Captain Lloyd, Oct. 4, 1814 ; MSS. British
Archives.
208 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.7to America filled with plunder, and with a prize in
company, when off Gay Head the " Endymion " was
sighted, October 11, and gave chase.
Captain Hope of the '^ Endymion " made an official
report, explaining with much detail that he chased
the privateer till evening, when the wind failed, and
he then sent out his boats : ^ —
^^ I sent all the boats under command of Lieutenants
Hawkins, Ormond, and Fanshaw. In approaching the
ship an alarm was fired. The boats had been previously
rowing up under a shoal, and had not felt the effects of
a rapid tide which they almost instantaneously became
exposed to. The second barge in taking the station assigned by Lieutenant Hawkins on the schooner's starboard
bow, having her larboard oars shot away, unfortunately
was swept by the stream athwart the first barge ; thereby
all the boats became entangled ; and it is with extreme
concern I acquaint you that the attack was in consequence
at this moment only partially made. Notwithstanding
this disadvantage at the first onset, every exertion that
human skill could devise was resorted to to renew the
contest ; and they succeeded in again getting alongside,
but not in the position intended. Their failure, therefore, is to be ascribed in the first instance to the velocity
of the tide, the height of the vessel's side, not having
channel plates to assist the men in getting on her deck,
and her very superior force (a schooner of the largest
dimensions, the 'Prince of Neufchatel,' three hundred
and twenty tons, eighteen guns, long-nine and twelve*
pounders, with a complement of one hundred and forty
^ Captain Hope to Bear Admiral Hotham, Oct 11, .1814 ;
MSS. British Archives.
1814. SLOOPS-OP-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 209
men of all nations, commanded by Mons. Jean Ordronauz). The boats' painters being now shot away, they
again fell astern without ever being able to repeat the
attack, and with great difficulty regained the ship, with
the exception of the second barge."
Captain Ordronaux of the privateer had a crew of
less than forty men then at quarters, and they suffered severely, only nine men escaping injury. The
boarders gained the deck, but were killed as fast as
they mounted ; and at last more than half the British party were killed or captured. According to
the British accoimt, twenty-eight men, including the
first lieutenant of the " Endymion," were killed ; and
thirty-seven men, including the second lieutenant,
were wounded.^ This report did not quite agree
with that of the privateer, which claimed also twentyeight prisoners, including the second lieutenant, who
was unhurt. In any case, more than seventy men
of the " Endymion's " crew, besides her first and second lieutenant, were killed, wounded, or captured ;
and the "Prince of Neufchatel" arrived in safety
in Boston.
In the want of adjacent rocks lined with armed
Americans, such as Captain Lloyd alleged at Fayal,
Captain Hope was reduced to plead the tides as the
cause of his defeat. These reports, better than any
other evidence, showed the feelings of the British
naval service in admitting discomfiture in the last
resort of its pride. Successively obliged to plead
^ James's Naval History, vi. 527«
VOL. VIII. — 14
210 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CaT.
•
inferiority at the guns, inferiority in sailing qualities,
inferiority in equipment, the British service saw itself
compelled by these repeated and bloody repulses to
admit that its supposed pre-eminence in hand-to-hand
fighting was a delusion. Within a single fortnight
two petty privateers, with crews whose united force
did not amount to one hundred and fifty men, succeeded in repulsing attacks made by twice their number of the best British seamen, inflicting a loss, in
killed and wounded, officially reported at one hundred
and eighty-five.
Such mortifying and bloody experiences made even
the British navy weary of the war. Valuable prizes
were few, and the service, especially in winter, was
severe. Undoubtedly the British cruisers caught
privateers by dozens, and were as successful in the
performance of their duties as ever they had been
in any war in Europe. Their blockade of American
ports was real and ruinous, and nothing pretended
to resist them. Yet after catching scores of swift
cruisers, they saw scores of faster and better vessels
issue from the blockaded ports and harry British
commerce in every sea. Scolded by the press, worried by the Admiralty, and mortified by their own
want of success, the British navy was obliged to hear
language altogether strange to its experience.
^^The American cruisers daily enter in among our
convoys," said the "Times" of February 11, 1815,
<^ seize prizes in sight of those that should afford protection, and if pursued ^ put on their sea-wings ' and
1814. SLOOPS-OF-WAR AND PRIVATEERS. 211
*
langh at the clumsy English pursuers. To what is this
owing? Cannot we build ships? ... It must indeed
be encouraging to Mr. Madison to read the logs of his
cruisers. If they fight, they are sure to conquer ; if they
fly, they are sure to escape.''
CHAPTER Vm.
In the tempest of war that raged over land and
ocean during the months of August and September,
1814, bystanders could not trust their own judgment
of the future; yet shrewd observers, little affected
either by emotion or by interest, inclined to the belief
that the United States government was near exhaustion. The immediate military danger on Lake Cham*
plain was escaped, and Baltimore was saved ; but the
symptoms of approaching failure in government were
not to be mistaken, and the capture of Washington,
which was intended to hurry the collapse, produced
its intended effect.
From the first day of the war the two instruments
necessary for military success were wanting to Madison, — money and men. After three campaigns, the
time came when both these wants must be supplied,
or the national government must devolve its duties
on the States. When the President, preparing his
Annual Message, asked his Cabinet officers what
were the prospects of supplying money and men for
another campaign, he received answers discouraging
in the extreme.
U14 EXHAUSTION. 218
•
First, in regard to money. In July, Secretary
Campbell advertised a second loan, of only six million dollars. He obtained but two and a half millions at eighty. His acceptance of this trifling sum
obliged him to give the same terms to the contractors who had taken the nine millions subscribed in
the spring at eighty-eight. Barker found difficulty
in making his payments, and from both loans the
Treasury could expect to obtain only $10,400,000,
owing to the contractors' failures.^ The authorized
loan was twenty-five millions. The secretary could
suggest no expedient, except Treasury notes, for
filling the deficit.
Bad as this failure was, — though it showed Secretary Campbell's incapacity so clearly as to compel his
retirement, and obliged the President to call a special
session of Congress, — the Treasury might regard it
as the least of its embarrassments. Commonly governments had begun their most desperate efforts only
after ordinary resources failed ; but the United States
government in 1814 had so inextricably involved its
finances that without dictatorial powers of seizing
property its functions could not much longer be
continued. The general bankruptcy, long foreseen,
at length occurred.
The panic caused by the capture of Washington,
August 24, obliged the tottering banks of Philadelphia and Baltimore to suspend specie payments. The
> Report of Secretaiy Campbell, Sept. 26, 1814 ; State Papers,
Fmance, IL 840.
214 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
banks of Philadelphia formally announced their suspension, August 31, by a circular explaining the causes
and necessity of their decision.* The banks of New
York immediately followed, September 1; and thenceforward no bank between New Orleans and Albany
paid its obligations except in notes. Only the banks
of New England maintained specie payments, with
the exception of those in least credit, which took the
opportunity to pay or not pay as they pleased. The
suspension was admitted to be permanent. Until
the blockade should be raised and domestic produce
could find a foreign market, the course of exchange
was fixed, and specie payments could not be resumed. The British navy and the Boston Federalists held the country firmly bound, and peace alone
could bring relief.
Suspension mattered little, and had the National
Bank been in existence the failure might have been
an advantage to the government ; but without a central authority the currency instantly fell into confusion. No medium of exchange existed outside of
New England. Boston gave the specie standard, and
soon the exchanges showed wide differences. New
York money stood at twenty per cent discount,
Philadelphia at twenty-four per cent, Baltimore at
thirty per cent. Treasury notes were sold in Boston
at twenty-five per cent discount, and United States
six-per-cents stood at sixty in coin.* The Treasury
^ Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.
' Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.
1S14. EXHAUSTION. 216
had no means of transferring its bank deposits from
one part of the comitry to another. Unless it paid
its debts in Treasury notes, it was unable to pay
them at all. No other money than the notes of suspended banks came into the Treasury. Even in
New England, taxes, customs-duties, and loans were
paid in Treasury notes, and rarely in local currency.
Thus, while the government collected in the Middle
and Southern States millions in bank-notes, it was
obliged to leave them in deposit at the local banks
where the collection was made, while its debts in
Boston and New York remained unpaid. The source
of revenue was destroyed. The whole South and
West, and the Middle States as far north as New
York, could contribute in no considerable degree to
the support of government.
The situation was unusual. The government might
possess immense resources in one State and be to*
tally bankrupt in another ; it might levy taxes to the
amount of the whole circulating medium, and yet
have only its own notes available for payment of
debt ; it might borrow hundreds of millions and be
none the better for the loan. All the private banknotes of Pennsylvania and the Southern country were
useless in New York and New England where they
must chiefly be used. An attempt to transfer such
deposits in any quantity would have made them quite
worthless. The Treasury already admitted bank-
ruptcy. The interest on the national obligations
could not be paid.
216 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATE& Ch.8.
The President's second inquiry r^arded men. The
. lew Secretary of War, Monroe, gave him such inforiaation as the Department possessed on the numbers
oi the army. A comparative account showed that in
June, 1813, the regular troops numbered 27,609 ; in
December, 34,325. In January, 1814, the number
was nominally 33,822;^ in July the aggregate was
31,603, the effectives bemg 27,010.« Since July the
recruits had declined in numbers. The three months
of March, April, and May produced 6,996 recruits;
the three months of July, August, and September
were reported as furnishing 4,477.^ The general return of September 30 reported the strength of the
army at 34,029 men.* The government was not able
to provide the money necessary to pay bounties due
for the last three months' recruiting.* The Secretary of War admitted the failure of the recruiting service, and attributed it to the high bounties given for
substitutes in the militia detached for United States
service.®
^ Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94. See anUf
vol. vii. p. 381.
* Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 535.
* Return of Enlistments, Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 521. Letter of Assistant Inspector-G^eral, Oct. 22,
1814 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 518.
^ The Inspector-Qeneral's Letter of Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers,
Military Affairs, p. 520.
* Report of the Paymaster, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affedrs, p. 519.
* Monroe to Giles, Oct 26, 1814 ; State PapetSy Military
ABam, p. 618.
MU. EXHAUSTION. 217
The smallness of the armies in the field showed
worse results than were indicated by the returns.
Macomb at Plattsburg claimed to have onlj fifteen
hundred effectives. Izard carried with him to Buffalo only four thousand men. Brown's effectives at
Fort Erie numbered two thousand. Apparently these
three corps included the entire force in the field on
the Canada frontier, and their combined effective
strength did not exceed eight thousand men. The
year before, Wilkinson and Hampton commanded
fully eleven thousand effectives in their movements
against Montreal. Nothing showed that the victories at Niagara and Plattsburg had stimulated enlistm^ts, or that the army could be raised above thirty
thousand effectives even if the finances were in a
condition to meet the expense.
Much was said of the zeal shown by the State militia in hastening to the defence of their soil, and the
New England Federalists were as loud as the Kentucky and Tennessee Democrats in praise of the
energy with which the militia rose to resist invasion; but in reality this symptom was the most
alarming of the time. Both in the military and in
the political point of view, the persistence in depending on militia threatened to ruin the national
government.
The military experience of 1814 satisfied the
gtanchest war Democrats that the militia must not
be their dependence. In Maine the militia allowed
themselves with hardly a show of resistance to be
218 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATE& Cb.9.
made subjects of Oreat Britain. At Plattsburg volun*
teers collected in considerable numbers, but the victory was won by the sailors and the engineers. At
Niagara, Brown never could induce more than a thou^
sand volunteers to support him in his utmost straits*
Porter's efforts failed to create a brigade respectable
in numbers, and at Ghippawa his Indians outnumbered his whites. Four days after the repulse of
Drummond's assault on Fort Erie, at the most anx*
ious moment of the Niagara campaign, Major-Qeneral
Brown wrote to Secretary Armstrong,^ —
^^ I very much doubt if a parallel can be found for the
state of things existing on this frontier. A gallant little
army struggling with the enemies of their country, and
devoting their lives for its honor and its safety, left by
that country to struggle alone, and that within sight and
within hearing."
A month afterward Brown succeeded in obtaining
a thousand volunteers, and by some quality of his
own made them assault and carry works that old
soldiers feared to touch. The feat was the most
extraordinary that was performed on either side in
the remarkably varied experience of the war ; but it
proved Brown's personal energy rather than the merits of a militia system. At Washington the militia
were thoroughly tested ; their rout proved chiefly
the incompetence of their general, but the system
was shown, before the battle, to be more defective
1 Brown to Armstrong, July [August] 19, 1814; MSS. War
Department Archives.
1814. EXHAUSTION. 219
than the army it produced. At Baltimore the militia
were again routed, and the town was saved chiefly by
the engineers and sailors. In Virginia, where more
than forty thousand militia were in the field, they pro*
tected nothing, and their service was^more fatal to
themselves than though they had fought severe battles. Nearly all the Virginia militia summoned for
the defence of Norfolk suffered from sickness, and
the mortality when compared with that of the regular service was enormous; five militia-men sickened
and died where one regular soldier suffered.^ In
Tennessee and Georgia the experience was equally
unfortunate ; the Georgia militia could do nothing
with the Creeks, and Andrew Jackson himself was
helpless until he obtained one small regiment of
regulars.
Besides its military disadvantages the militia service was tainted with fraud. Habitually and notori- '
ously in New England and New York, the militia-men
when called out attended muster, served a few days
in order to get their names on the pay-roll, and then
went home. The United States government wasted
millions of dollars in pay and pensions for such men.
Another source of waste was in the time required to*
place them in the field. The government struggled
to avoid a call of militia, even though risking great
disasters by the neglect.
The worst of all evils lay still further in the background. The militia began by rendering a proper
* Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 188.
220 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa CH.a.
army impossible, and ended by making government
a form. The object of Massachusetts in praising the
conduct of militia, and in maintaining its own at a
high state of eflSciency, was notorious. The Federalists knew that the national government must sooner
or later abandon the attempt to support an army.
When that time should come, the only resource
of the government would lie in State armies, and
Massachusetts was the best equipped State for that
object. Her militia, seventy thousand strong, wellarmed, well-drilled, and as yet untouched by war,
could dictate to the Union. Whenever Massachusetts should say the word, the war must stop ; and
Massachusetts meant to say the word when the
government fairly ceased to possess either money
or arms.
That moment, in the belief of the Massachusetts
"■ Federalists, had come. Their course in the summer
and autumn of 1814 left no doubt of their intentions.
No act of open rebellion could be more significant
than their conduct when Sherbrooke's expedition oc<5upied Castine. Then at last Governor Strong conBented to call out the militia, which he refused to do
two years before, because, he asserted, Castine and
the other coast towns were suflSciently defended;^
but the governor was careful to avoid the suspicion
that these troops were in the national service. He
acted independently of the national government in
^ Strong to Eustisy Aug. 5^ 1812 ; State Papers, Militaiy
AfEiEuiSy i 6ia
mL EXHAUSTION. 221
the terms of his general order of September, 1814,^
placing his militia mider the command of a majorgeneral of their own, and making only a bare inquiry
of the Secretary of War whether their expenses would
be reimbursed,^ — an inquiry which Monroe at once
answered in the negative.^ The force was a State
army, and could not fail to cause the President more
anxiety than it was likely ever to cause the Prince
Regent.
At the same time the governor of Connecticut
withdrew from the command of Brigadier-General
Cushing the brigade of State militia then in the
national service, and placed it under a major-general of State militia, with injunctions to obey no
orders except such as were issued by State authority.* The evil of these measures was greatly aggravated by coinciding with the crisis which stopped the
course of national government. Connecticut withdrew
her militia, August 24 ; Washington was captured
the same day ; the Philadelphia banks suspended
payment August 29 ; Castine was taken August 81 ;
and Governor Strong called out the Massachusetts
militia September 6. The government was prostrate,
^ Qeneial Orders, Sept. 6, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs,
p. 613.
• Strong to the Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1814 ; State Papers,
Military Affairs, p. 613.
• Monroe to Strong, Sept. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affioirs, p. 614.
4 Cashing to the Secretary of War, Sept. 12, 1814; State
Papers, Military Affairs, p. 620.
222 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATSa GH.a
and New England was practicaUy independent when
Sir George Prevost crossed the frontier, September 8.
So complete was the paralysis that Governor Chittenden of Vermont, on receiving official notice ^ that
the British army and navy were advancing on Lake
Ghamplain, refused to call out the militia, because
neither the Constitution nor the laws gave him authority to order the militia out of the State.* He
could only recommend that individuals should volun^
teer to assist in the defence of Plattsburg. Chitten*
den's conduct was the more suggestive because of
his undoubted honesty and the absence of factious
motive for his refusal.
The full meaning of Governor Strong's course was
avowed a few days afterward. Having called a special meeting of the State legislature for October 5,
be addressed to it a message narrating the steps he
had taken, and the refusal of the President to assume
the expenses of the militia called into service for the
defence of the State.
^^ The situation of this State is peculiarly dangerous
and perplexing," said Governor Strong ; • "we have
been led by the terms of the Constitution to rely on the
government of the Union to provide for our defence.
We have resigned to that government the revenues of
the State with the expectation that this object would
not be neglected. • • . Let us then, relying on the sup^ Macomb to Chittenden, Sept. 4, 1814; Niles, vii. 102.
< Chittenden to General Newell, Sept 5, 1814; Nilea, viL 108.
• Meesage of Oct 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 113.
Wi. EXHAUSTION. 223
port and direction of Providence, unite in each measures for our safety as the times demand and tiie principles of justice and the law of self-preservation will
justify."
The sense which this invitation was intended to
bear could be best understood by appreciating the
temper of the body thus addressed and the time
when the appeal was made. The national goyemment had for practical purposes ceased. The Boston
" Oentinel," a newspaper of large circulation, said
to reach six thousand copies, announced September
10, 1814, that the Union was already practically
dissolved, and that the people must rise in their
majesty, protect themselves, and compel their unworthy servants to obey their will. Governor Strong
knew that the legislature was controlled by extreme
partisans of the Pickering type, who wished, to use
his phrase, to "let the ship run aground." Even
Josiah Quincy, one of the most vehement Federalists, was aware that the members of the General
Court stood in danger of doing too much rather than
too little.^
Strong's message of October 5 was echoed by Pickering from Washington, October 12, in a letter which
closed with the exhortation to seize the national
revenues : —
^^As, abandoned by the general government except
for taxing us, we must defend ourselves, so we ought to
secure and hold fast the revenues indispensable to main* Quincy's Life of Quincy, p. 367.
224 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATED Ch.8.
tain the force necessary for our protection against the
foreign enemy and the still greater evil in prospect,—
domestic tyranny."*
The Massachusetts legislature could not fail to
understand Governor Strong's message as an invitation to resume the powers with which the State had
parted in adopting the Constitution.
The legislature referred the message to a committee, which reported only three days afterward
through its chairman, Harrison Gray Otis : * —
^^ The state of the national Treasury as exhibited by
the proper officer requires an augmentation of existing
taxes ; and if in addition to these the people of Massachusetts, deprived of their commerce and harassed by
a formidable enemy, are compelled to provide for the
indispensable duty of self-defence, it must soon become
impossible for them to sustain this burden. There
remains to them therefore no alternative but submission
to the enemy, or the control of their own resources to
repel his aggressions. It is impossible to hesitate in
making the election. This people are not ready for
conquest or submission ; but being ready and determined
to defend themselves, tiiey have the greatest need of
those resources derivable from themselves which the
national government has hitherto thought proper to
employ elsewhere."
The report further showed that the United States
Constitution had failed to secure to New England
* Pickering to Strong, Oct. 12, 1814; New England Fed*
eralism, p. 394.
* Report of Oct. 8, 1814; Niles, vii. 149.
1814. EXHAUSTION. 225
the rights and benefits expected from it, and required
immediate change. The prescribed mode of amendment was insufficient: —
^^Wben this deficiency becomes apparent, no reason
can preclude the right of the whole people who were
parties to it to adopt another. . . . But as a proposition
for such a convention from a single State would probably
be unsuccessful, and our danger admits not of delay, it
is recommended by the committee that in the first in«
stance a conference should be invited between those
States the affinity of whose interests is closest.'^
Thus, after ten years' delay, the project of a New
England Convention was brought forward by State
authority, through the process of war with England,
which George Cabot from the first declared to be
the only means of producing it.^ As Otis's committee
presented the subject, the conference was in the
first place to devise some mode of common defence ;
and, in the second, "to lay the foundation for a
radic-al reform in the national compact by inviting ta
a future convention a deputation from all the States
in the Union." The report closed by offering seven
Resolutions, recommending the enlistment of a State
army of ten thousand men, a loan of a million dollars at six per cent, and the appointment of delegates
" to meet and confer with delegates from the States
of New England or any of them " on the defence of
those States and the redress of their grievances.
» Cabot to Pickering, Feb. 14, 1804 ; Lodge's Cabot, p. 341.
See cmte^ voL ii. p. 166.
VOL. vui.— 16
226 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. C&a.
The Senate committee also made a strenuous argument against the President's decision that State mili*
tia were in State service unless called for by a United
States officer and placed under his direction,^ and
recommended that the subject should be referred to
the next session. To the proposition for a conference
of the New England States, and to Otis's other Besolutions, the Senate and House assented, October 13,
by large majorities, varying in numbers, but amounting to two hundred and sixty against ninety in the
case of the proposed convention. The minority in
both Houses presented protests, charging the majority
with intending more than was avowed. "The reasoning of the report," said the Protest signed by
seventy-six members of the House,^ " is supported by
the alarming assumption that the Constitution has
failed in its objects, and the people of Massachusetts
are absolved from their aUegiance, and at Uberly to
adopt another. In debate it has been reiterated that
the Constitution is no longer to be respected, and that
revolution is not to be deprecated." The House
refused to receive the Protest, as disrespectful. The
minority withdrew from further share in these proceedings; and the majority then, October 19, chose
twelve delegates "to meet and confer on the 15th
December next with such as may be chosen by any or
all of the other New England States upon our public
grievances and concerns." The choice was marked
1 Senate Report of Oct. 18, 1814; Kiles, viL 151.
* NileSf vii 164.
1814. EXHAUSTIO]^. 227
by a conservative spirit not altogether pleasing to
Timothy Pickering. George Cabot and Harrison
Gray Otis stood at the head of the delegation.
The remonstrances and threats of the minority
made the majority cautious, but did not check them.
The legislature of Connecticut immediately appointed
seven delegates to meet those of Massachusetts at
Hartford, December 15, for the purpose of recommending ** such measures for the safety and welfare
of these States as may consist with our obligations as
members of the national Union." ^ In this clause the
legislature intended to draw a distinction between obligations to the Union and obligations to the Constitution. To the former the people avowed no hostility ;
to the latter they thought the war had put an end.
On that point the committee's report was clear.^
Besides Massachusetts and Connecticut the legislature of Bhode Island, by a vote of thirty-nine to
twenty-three, appointed, November 5, four delegates
to confer at Hartford upon the measures which
might be in their power to adopt to restore their
rights under the Constitution, " consistently with
their obligations."^ These three States alone chose
delegates. The governor and legislature of New
Hampshire would probably have joined them had not
the Republican council stood in the way. The legislature of Vermont, including its Federalist minority,
unanimously declined the invitation.
» Niles, vii. 166. « Report; Niles, vii. 164.
• Niles, vii. 181.
228 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. GB.a.
Immediately after these steps were taken, the
autumn elections occurred. Members of Congress
were to be chosen, and the people were obliged to
vote for or against the Hartford Convention as the
issue expressly avowed. President Madison might
safely assume that no man voted for Federalist
Congressmen in November, 1814, unless he favored
the project of a New England Convention. The result was emphatic. Massachusetts chose eighteen
Federalists and two Republicans ; Vermont, New
Hampshire, Bhode Island, and Connecticut chose only
Federalists. In all. New England chose thirty-nine
Federalist Congressmen and two Republicans^ for
the Fourteenth Congress. In the Thirteenth Congress, chosen in 1812, when the feeling against the
war was supposed to be strongest, the Federalist
members from New England nimibered thirty, the
Republicans eleven.^
Beyond New England the autumn elections were
less significant, but were still imsatisfactory to the
Administration. New Jersey returned to her true
sympathies, and as far as her Congressmen expressed
her opinions gave unanimous support to the war;
but Pennsylvania, owing to local quarrels, elected
five Federalist members; and Maryland elected five
Federalists and four Republicans. In spite of the
great loss in Federalist members which had occurred in the spring elections in New York, the
Federalists numbered sixty-five in the Fourteenth
18U. EXHAUSTION. 22&
Congress ; in the Thirteenth they numbered sixtyeight. The Administration had hoped, and freely
asserted, that a strong reaction in favor of the war
had followed the burning of Washington and the
avowal of England's designs against Maine and the
Northwestern territory. The elections showed no
such reaction. The war was no more popular than
before.
The public apathy was the more alarming becausCy
whatever was the true object of the Hartford Convention, all Republicans believed it to . be intended b& Bt
step to dissolve the Union, and they supported the
Administration chiefly because Madison represented
the Union. Federalists might deceive themselves*.
Probably the men who voted for the Hartford Convention saw its necessary consequences less clearly
than they were seen by the men who voted against
it. The Republican vote represented the strength
of Union sentiment more closely than the disunion
sentiment was represented by the Federalist vote.
Yet the States from Maryland to Maine chose a majority of Congressmen who were not Republicans.
The New England States, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland returned much
more than haM the members of Congress, — one hundred and eight in one hundred and eighty-two ; and
of these fifty-seven were Federalists, while only fiftyone were Republicans. The unpopularity of the
Administration was not easily overestimated when
Madison could win no more support than this, at a
230 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. G&8.
time when the public believed a vote for Federalism
to be a vote for disunion.
^^ I give you tiie most serious assurance/' wrote Randolph in an open letter to James Lloyd, of Massachusetts,^ remonstrating against the Convention, '^ that
nothing less than the shameful conduct of the enemy and
the complection of certain occurrences to the eastward
could have sustained Mr. Madison after the disgraceful
affair at Washington. The public indignation would
have overwhelmed In one common ruin himself and his
hireling newspapers.**
Randolph's political judgments were commonly
mistaken, but in this instance he proved himself to
be at least partially right ; for at the next election,
six months later, when the current had turned decidedly in Madison's favor, Randolph after a sharp
contest defeated Eppes and recovered control of his
district. Virginia could hardly have chosen a representative less calculated to please Madison.
The President himself betrayed unusual signs of
distress. Nothing in Madison's character was more
remarkable than the placidity with which he commonly met anxieties that would have crushed a
sensitive man ; but the shock of defeat at Bladensburg, the flight from Washington, and the anxieties that followed broke him down. William Wirt
visited Washington October 14, before the action
of the Massachusetts legislature was yet completed.
After viewing the ruins of the White House, a
1 Randolph's Letter to Lloyd, Dec 15, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 268.
M14. EXHAUSTION. 231
^ monmfal monument of American imbecility and improvidence,'' he called upon the President at Colonel
Tayloe's Octagon House, which Serurier had occupied, but which Madison took for his residence after
his return.
*« p and I called on the President," wrote Wirt in
a private letter.^ ^^He looks miserably shattered and
woe-begone. In short, he looked heart-broken. His
mind is full of the New England sedition. He introduced
the subject and continued to press it, painful as it obviously was to him. I denied the probability, even the
possibility, that the yeomanry of the North could be in-
duced to place themselves under the power and protection
of England, and diverted the conversation to another
topic ; but he took the first opportunity to return to it,
and convinced me that his heart and mind were painfully
full of the subject."
No misconduct of New England alone would have
80 unmanned a Virginia President. Madison's worst
troubles lay nearer home; Massachusetts made only
the last straw in his burden. Jefferson, with his usual
kindliness, tried to console and encourage him; but
Jefferson's consolations proved only the diflSculty of
finding words or arguments to warrant satisfaction
with the past or hope for the future.
" In the late events at Washington,** wrote Jefferson,
September 24,* " I have felt so much for you that I cannot withhold the expression of my sympathies. For
1 Kennedy's Life of Wirt, i. 339.
* Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 24, 1814 ; Works, vi. 385.
-232 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
although every reasonable man must be sensible that all
jou can do is to order, — that execution must depend on
others, and failures be imputed to them alone, — yet I
know that when such failures happen they affect even
those who have done everything they could to prevent
them. Had 6enei*al Washington himself been now at
the head of our affairs, the same event would probably
have happened."
Jefferson's estimate of Washington's abilities was
lower than that commonly accepted; and his rule that
B, President's responsibility ceased after giving an
order, besides ignoring the President's responsibility
for the selection of agents, seemed to destroy the
foundation of the public service. "I never doubted
that the plans of the President were wise and suflB-cient," wrote Jefferson to Monroe.* "Their failure
we all impute, (1) to the insubordinate temper of Armstrong, and (2) to the indecision of Winder." The
rule that an administrator might select any agent,
however incompetent, without incurring responsibility
for the agent's acts, was one which in private affairs
Jefferson would hardly have accepted.
Yet Jefferson's opinions probably expressed Republican sentiment in Virginia, and showed better than
any other evidence the course of thought among
Madison's friends. In that respect his expressions
retained permanent value. The Virginians were
willing to throw off responsibility for public disaster ;
a,nd they naturally threw it on New England, since
1 Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 1, 1816 ; Works, vi. 407.
1814. EXHAUSTION. 283
New England challenged it. Writing to his friend
William Short, Jefferson spoke of the threatening
attitude of Massachusetts:^ —
^^ Some apprehend danger from the defection of Massachusetts. It is a disagreeable circumstance, but not a
dangerous one. If they become neutral, we are sufficient
for one enemy without them, and in fact we get no aid
from tiiem now."
Probably most Virginians shared this belief, at least
so far as concerned the aid rendered by Massachusetts
to the war. In truth, Massachusetts gave little aid,
and made a profession of her wish to give none at all;
but the difficulty did not end there. Massachusetts
and Virginia were States of the first class. The
census of 1810 allotted to Massachusetts, including
Maine, a population of about seven hundred thousand ;
to Virginia, a white population of five hundred and
fifty-one thousand, and a colored population of four
hundred and twenty-three thousand, — nine hundred
and seventy-four thousand in all. In the ratio of representation Massachusetts counted for twenty, Virginia for twenty-three. The quota of Massachusetts
in the direct tax was $316,000 ; that of Virginia was
$369,000. On the scale furnished by these data, Virginia should have contributed in support of the war
about one eighth or one seventh more men and money
than were required from Massachusetts. The actual
result was different.
^ Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28, 1814 ; Works, vi. 398.
284 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.8.
The amount of money contributed by Massachusetts
could not be compared with that contributed by Virginia, partly because of the severe blockade which
closed the Virginian ports. The net revenue from
customs derived from Virginia in 1814 was f4,000 ;
that from Massachusetts was |il,600,000.^ Unlike the
customs revenue, the receipts from internal revenue
were supposed to be reasonably equalized, so that each
State should contribute in due proportion. According to the official return, dated Nov. 24, 1815, the
total internal duties which had then been paid to the
collectors for the year 1814 in Massachusetts was
1198,400 ; in Virginia it was 1193,500. The total
amount then paid to the Treasury was $178,400 in
Massachusetts, and $157,300 in Virginia.* The direct
tax was fixed by Congress and was assumed by the
State in Virginia, but regularly assessed in Massachusetts. One paid $316,000 ; the other, $369,000. The
total revenue derived from Massachusetts was therefore $2,114,400 in the year 1814 ; that from Virginia,
$566,500. Of the loans effected in the same year,
Massachusetts took a small part considering her
means, — hardly a million dollars. Virginia took
still less, — only two hundred thousand.^
In money, Massachusetts contributed four times
as much as Virginia to support the war, and her
contributions were paid in Treasury notes or paper
1 Seybert, p. 436 ; Pitkin, p. 416.
^ Statement, etc. ; State Papers, Finance, iii. 44-48«
* State Papers ; Finance, ii. 846, 847.
1814 EXHAUSTION. 285
equivalent to coin, — not in the notes of banks
worthless beyond the State. In men, the estimate
was affected by the inquiry whether the militia were
to be considered as protecting the national government or the State. Owing to the presence of the
British in the Chesapeake, Virginia kept a large force
of militia on foot, some of which were in garrison
at Norfolk, and a few were on the field of Bladensburg. Massachusetts also was obliged to call out a
considerable force of militia to protect or garrison
national posts.
The relative numbers of regular troops were also
somewhat doubtful ; but the paymaster of the army
reported Oct. 26, 1814, that he had distributed in bounties during the year $237,400 for Massachusetts, and
$160,962 for Virginia.^ During the year, six regular regiments — the Ninth, Twenty-first, Thirty-third,
Thirty-fourth, Fortieth, and Forty-fifth — recruited in
Massachusetts. Three — the Twelfth, Twentieth, and
Thirty-fifth — recruited in Virginia. Perhaps the
military aid furnished by the different sections of
the seaboard could be better understood by following the familiar divisions. New England furnished thirteen regiments. New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania furnished fifteen. The Southern
States, from Delaware to South Carolina inclusive,
furnished ten. Of all the States in the Union New
York alone supplied more regular soldiers than Mas^ Letter of Paymaster Brent, Oct. 26, 1814 ; State papers, Milltaiy AffiaiiB, L 519.
286 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8.
fiachusetts, and Massachusetts supplied as many as
were furnished by Virginia and the two Carolinas
together.
Judged by these standards, either Massachusetts
had done more than her share, or Virginia had done
less than hers. The tests were material, and took no
moral element in account ; but in moral support the
relative failure of Massachusetts was not beyond dispute. Public opinion in* New England was almost
equally divided, and the pronounced opposition to the
war was much greater in the Eastern States than in
the Southern; but in the serious work of fighting.
New England claimed a share of credit. In the little
army at Niagara New York supplied the Major-Gteneral, Virginia and Massachusetts the two brigadiers ;
but Winfield Scott's brigade was chiefly composed of
New England men ; and when, nearly half a century
afterward, Scott in his old age was obliged to choose
between his allegiance to his State and allegiance to
the Union, the memory of the New England troops
who had won for him his first renown had its influ-
ence in raising his mind above the local sympathies
which controlled other Virginia officers. Without reflecting on Virginia courage or patriotism, the New
England Republicans were warranted in claiming
that not the Virginia regiments, but the Massachusetts Ninth, the Vermont Eleventh, the Massachusetts
Twenty-first, and the Connecticut Twenty-fifth routed
the Royal Scots at Chippawa, and bayoneted the
British artillerymen at Lundy's Lane, and stormed
1814. EXHAUSTION. 237
Drummond's intrenchments at Fort Erie. They could
add that without their sailors the war might have
been less successful than it was ; and they would have
been justified had they asked Jefferson to glance at
his latest newspaper as he wrote that Massachusetts
gave no aid to the war, and read the despatch of
Johnston Blakeley reporting that the New England
crew of the " Wasp " had sunk the " Avon " in the
middle of a British fleet«^ Virginians did not take
kindly to the ocean ; and on land, owing to the accidents of war, no Virginia regiment was offered a
chance to win distinction.
These comparisons were of little weight to prove
that New England was either better or worse than
other parts of the Union, but they showed that the
difficulties that depressed Madison's mind were not
merely local. He might have disregarded the conduct
of the State governments of Massachusetts and Connecticut had he enjoyed the full support of his own
^eat Republican States, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
North Carolina. Except New York, Kentucky, Tennessee, and perhaps Ohio, no State gave to the war
the full and earnest co-operation it needed. Again
and again, from the beginning of the troubles with
England, Madison had acted on the conviction that at
last the people were aroused ; but in every instance
he had been disappointed. After the burning of
Washington, he was more than ever convinced that
the moment had come when the entire people would
1 Niles's Register, Nov. 26, 1814.
288 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.8.
rally in their self-respect; but he was met by the
Hartford Convention and the November elections. If
the ^ople would not come to the aid of their government at such a moment, Madison felt that nothing
could move them. Peace was his last hope.
CHAPTER IX.
t
CoNGBESS was summoned to meet in extra session
September 19, by a proclamation issued August 8,
before the capture of Washington. On the appointed
day the members appeared, but fomid their building
in ashes, and met like vagrants, without a shelter
they could call their own. The President caused the
only public office that had been spared, to be fitted
for their use. Partly owing to the exertions of Dr.
Thornton, the head of the Bureau of Patents, partly
owing to the tornado of August 25, the building used
as Post and Patent Office was not burned. There
Congress was obliged to hold its sessions, ill such
discomfort as it had never before known.
The President sent his Annual Message September 20, which informed Congress that it had been
specially summoned to supply "any inadequacy in
the existing provision for the wants of the Treasury,"
as well as to be ready for whatever result might be
reached by the negotiation at Ghent. Two thirds of
the Message related to the operations of war, and the
President seemed rather disposed to suppress than to
avow his difficulties, but the little he said of them
240 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATEa Ch.9.
was heavy with anxiety. He announced that July 1
five million dollars remained in the Treasury, and
that " large sums " must be provided ; but he did
not add that the loan had failed, or that the banks
and Treasury had suspended specie payments. He
did not say that the regular army and the militia
system were inadequate to national defence ; but
he declared '^the necessity of immediate measures
for filling the ranks of the regular army," and of
giving "the requisite energy and eflficiency" to the
miUtia : —
^^ From this view of the natioual affairs CongresB will
be urged to take up, without delay, as well the subject
of pecuniary supplies as that of military force, and on
a scale commensurate with the extent and the character
which the war has assumed. It is not to be disguised
that the situation of our country calls for its greatest
efforts. • • . From such an adversary, hostility in its
greatest force and in its worst forms may be looked
for.'*
The President threw on the Secretaries of the
Treasury and of War the ungrateful task of announcing the details of their need. Secretary Campbell
was first to address Congress, and the tone of his
report on the state of the finances received emphasis
from the resignation which he sent at the same
time to the President. Campbell's annual report of
September 23 was an admission of incompetence.
He had paid, he said, nearly twenty millions from
the Treasury between January and July; twenty-
mi. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 241
seven millions more were payable between July and
the following January. For the year 1816 the
Treasury would require at least as much as for 1814.
Congress must therefore speedily provide at least
seventy-four millions for the service between July 1^
1814, and Dec. 31, 1815. He ventured to suggest
no means of obtaining this sum, or any amount approaching it.
July 1 the Treasury contained $4,722,000. From its
various sources of revenue it could expect $4,840,000
during the remainder of the year ; from loans already
contracted, $4,820,000. In all, $13,822,000 might be
considered as in hand, which was one half the sum
immediately required. For the year 1816 the revenue
in all its branches might produce $8,200,000, leaving $39,000,000 to be provided. Twenty-two millions
were the extent of Campbell's resources, but fifty-twa
mUUon dollars more must be raised merely to carry
on the government as it had been administered in
the past year.
The plan of finance adopted by Gallatin at the
outset of the war assumed that all deficits could h&
covered by loans.
" The experience of the present year," said Campbell,
" furnishes ground to doubt whether this be practicable,
at least in the shape in which loans have hitherto been
attempted. Nor is it even certain that the establishing and pledging of revenues adequate to the punctual
payment of the intei:est and eventual reimbursement
of the principal of the sums which will be required for
VOL. VIII. — 16
242 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
the year 1815, would enable the Treasury to obtain
them through the medium of loans effected in the ordl*
nary way."
Loans being impracticable, CampbeU discussed the
possibility of using Treasury notes. Eight millions
were already in issue, and of these more than
four millions would fall due before December 81.
Campbell considered that six millions in Treasury
notes was about as large a sum as could easily
be circulated, but by issuing notes of small denominations he hoped to raise the amount to ten
millions.
From all sources Campbell hoped to obtain about
twenty-four million dollars of the seventy-four millions required. For the remaining fifty millions he
had no suggestion to offer. The means for new and
extraordinary exertions, he said, " ought to be provided." He declared that the resources of the nation were ample, — which was true, but was also the
most discouraging symptom of the time; for if the
people, with ample resources, as he asserted, refused
to come to the support of their own government on
any terms, their decision must be accepted as final.
Besides throwing upon Congress all these difficulties,
without a suggestion of his own, Campbell added that
Congress would be required to exert its powers to
remedy the evils of the currency and the suspension
of specie payments.
Congress on hearing this financial statement re-
garded the situation as desperate. ^^Tell Dr. Madi-
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 248
son/' Senator Lacock was reported ^ to have said to
the President's privia,te secretary, " that we are now
willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head
of the Treasury. The public patient is so very sick
that we must swallow anything, however nauseous."
Dallas was nominated October 5, and confirmed the
next day without opposition, as Secretary of the
Treasury. No stronger proof could have been given
of the helplessness of Congress, for Dallas was a man
who under no other circimistances could have obtained a ray of popular favor.
Dallas's character was high, his abilities undoubted,
his experience large ; but for ten years he had been
one of the least popular men in Pennsylvania, the
target of newspaper abuse and the champion of political independence. The people reasonably required
that their leaders should more or less resemble some
popular type, and if the result was monotonous the
fault was in the society, not in its politics or its
politicians ; but Dallas was like no ordinary type in
any people. His tone of intellectual and social
superiority, his powdered hair, old-fashioned dress
and refined manners, his free habits of expense, and
the insubordination even more than the vivacity of
his temper irritated the prejudices of his party .^ He
had little respect for Presidents, and none for Congress. For Jefferson and Virginia doctrines he felt
distrust, which was returned. Earnest in temper and
* IngersolFs History, ii. 253.
s Ingeisoll's History, ii. 254, 257.
244 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch.».
emphatic in tone, even to the point of tears and tropical excitability, Dallas came to Washington as though
to lead a forlorn hope, — caring little for parties and
less for ambition, but bent upon restoring to the
government the powers that his friend Gallatin, too
easily as he thought, had allowed to slip from its
grasp.
The difficulties of the Treasury when Dallas took
charge of it were not easily exaggerated. His own
description,^ given some six weeks afterward, made
no disguise of them. " The Treasury," he said, " was
suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The
demands upon it were great in amount, while the
means to satisfy them were comparatively small,
precarious in collection, and difficult in their application. . • • The means consisted, first, of the fragment of an authority to borrow money when nobody
was disposed to lend, and to issue Treasury notes
which none but necessitous creditors or contractors
in distress ... seemed willing to accept;" second, of
bank-credits, chiefly in the South and West, rendered
largely useless by the suspension of specie payments ;
third, of the current receipts of taxes, also useless
because paid chiefly in Treasury notes. The Trea^
sury was bankrupt. The formal stoppage of payments
in interest on the debt was announced, November 9,
by an official letter from the secretary, notifying
holders of government securities in Boston that the
^ Dallas to William Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814 ; State Papers,
Finance^ ii 872
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCYo 245
Treasury could not meet its obligations, and that
"the government was unable to avert or to control
this course of events." ^ After that date the Trear
sury made no further pretence of solvency.
From this situation the government could be rescued only by a great effort ; and obviously the currency must be first restored, for until some system
of exchange could be established, every increase of
taxation would merely increase unavailable bank deposits. Fifty millions of Southern bank-notes, locked
in the vaults of Southern banks, would not pay the
over-due interest on government bonds at Boston.
To this subject every one turned, but the schemes
that seemed to have a chance of adoption were only
two. The first came from President Jefferson, and
was strongly pressed by the South. As Jefferson
explained it, the plan seemed as simple as his plans
were apt to be ; he proposed to issue twenty millions
in promissory notes every year as long as might be
necessary. " Our experience," he told the President,^
" has proved it [a paper currency] may be run up
to two or three hundred millions without more than
doubling what would be the prices of things imder
a sufficient medium, or say a metallic one." His
plan included an increase of taxation by two million
dollars every year to redeem the same amount of
Treasury issues.
^ Dallas to the Commissioner of Loans at Boston, Nov. 9, 1814;
Niles, vii. 270.
* Jefferson to Madison, Oct. 15, 1814; Works, yi. 391.
246 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
Obviously the insuperable obstacle to this plan was
the paper money of the State banks, which already
stood at discounts varjdng from ten to fifty per cent
in specie, and in any large quantity could not be
discounted at all. Until private paper should be
«,bolished, public or government paper could not be
brought into common use. Jefferson's views on this,
as on the whole subject, were interesting.
^'The banks have discontinued themselves," he explained.^ *'We are now without any medium; and
necessity, as well as patriotism and confidence, will make
us all eager to receive Treasury notes if founded on
specific taxes. Congress may now borrow of the public,
«ad without interest, all the money they may want, to
the amount of a competent circulation, by merely issuing
their own promissory notes of proper denominations for
the larger purposes of circulation, but not for the small.
Leave that door open for the entrance of metallic money.
• . . The State legislatures should be immediately urged
to relinquish the right of establishing banks of discount.
Most of them will comply on patriotic principles, under
the convictions of the moment; and the non-complying
may be crowded into concurrence by legitimate devices.*'
Instead of " banks of discount," Jefferson probably
meant to say banks of issue, although the Virginia
school was hostile to all banks, and possibly he wished
to destroy the whole system. If the scheme were
adopted, twenty million dollars in paper money would
not supply the wants of the Treasury, which required
* Jeflferson to Thomas Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814; Works, vi. 375.
mL CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 247
at least fifty millions within a year. The resource
was limited, even if the States could be compelled
to stop the issue of private notes, — which was ex-
tremely doubtful in the temper of Massachusetts and
with the leanings of Chief-Justice Marshall. Jefferson did not touch upon legal tender ; but the assumption of power implied in the issue of paper moneys
seemed to require that the government should exercise the right of obliging its creditors to accept it*
The actual interest-bearing Treasury notes stood then
at a discount of about twenty per cent. The proposed
paper money could hardly circulate at a better rate,
and coin was not to be obtained. Under such conditions the notes must be a forced currency if they
were to circulate at all.
The scheme was reported to the House by the
Committee of Ways and Means through its chairman,
John W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law.^ For the report Eppes was alone responsible, and the plan in
his hands varied in some points from that of Jefferson. Starting from the admitted premise that loans
were not to be obtained, and that money could not
be transferred from one point to another in any existing medium at the disposition of government, Eppes
proposed to issue Treasury notes " in sums sufficiently small for the ordinary purposes of society,"
which were not to be made payable on demand in
coin, but might at any time be exchanged for eight
per cent bonds, and were to be received " in all pay^ Report of Oct 10, 1814; State Papers^ Finance, ii. 854.
248 HISTORY OF THE UNITED 8TATE& Ch-».
ments for public lands and taxes." Nothing was
said of legal tender, or of driving bank-notes from
circulation; but Eppes proposed to double the taxes
at one stroke.
Eppes's scheme lost the advantages of Jefferson's
without gaining any of its own. It abandoned the
hope of abolishing bank paper ; and m want of such
a restraint on private issues, the proposed government paper would merely add one more element of
confusion to the chaos already existing. Eppes further altered Jefferson's plan by adding some ten
millions instead of two millions to the burden of
taxation ; but even Jefferson protested that this part
of the scheme was impracticable.
" This is a dashing proposition," he wrote to Monroe ; ^
*^but if Congress pass it, I shall consider it sufficient
evidence that their constituents generally can pay the
tax. No man has greater confidence than I have in the
spirit of the people to a rational extent. Whatever they
can, they will. But without either market or medium, I
know not how it is to be done. All markets abroad and
all at home are shut to us, so that we have been feeding
our horses on wheat. Before the day of collection, bank*
notes will be but as oak-leaves; and of specie there is
not within all the United States one half of the proposed
amount of the taxes."
This was the situation of the Virginia scheme
when Dallas took the matter in hand. Immediately
after entering into office, Dallas wrote to Eppes an
^ Jefferson to Monroe, Oct 16, 1814; Works, vi. 394.
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 249
official letter, dated October 17, expressing views
wholly at variance with the Virgmia plan.
^' Under favorable circumstances and to a limited extent," he said,^ " an emission of Treasury notes would
probably afford relief; but Treasury notes are an expensive and precarious substitute either for coin or for
bank-notes, charged as they are with a growing interest,
productive of no countervailing profit or emolument, and
exposed to every breath of popular prejudice or alarm.
The establishment of a national institution operating
upon credit combined with capital, and regulated by
prudence and good faith, is after all the only efficient
remedy for the disordered condition of our circulating
medium. While accomplishing that object, too, there
will be found under the auspices of such an institution
a safe depository for the public treasure and a constant
auxiliary to the public credit. But whether the issues
of a paper currency proceed from the national Treasury
or from a national Bank, the acceptance of the paper
in a course of payments and receipts must be forever
optional with the citizens. The extremity of that day
cannot be anticipated when any houest and enlightened
statesman will again venture upon the desperate expedient of a tender-law."
Without a tender-law the Virginia scheme would
hardly answer the purposes required, since the government must restrain the issue of paper within a limit
too narrow for usefulness. Dallas did not press this
point, but developed his own scheme, which required,
^ Dallas to Eppes, Oct. 17, 1814 ; State Papers, Fmance^
iL866.
250 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.'
like that of Eppes', a dnplication of taxes to pro^
duce twenty-one million dollars, and the creation of a
national Bank with a capital of fifty million dollars.
Either Eppes's or Dallas's plan might answer the
immediate object of providing a currency, and both
required the exercise of implied powers by Congress.
Apparently Congress had only to choose, but in truth
choice was most difficult. The House readily adopted
Dallas's recommendation in principle, and voted, October 24, by sixty-six to forty, that it was expedient
to establish a national Bank; but the problem of
establishing a specie-paying bank without specie
passed its powers. Dallas abandoned the attempt
at the outset. He proposed a bank of fifty millions
capital, of which forty-four millions might be subscribed in government bonds and Treasury notes^
and six millions in coin. The bank was at once to
lend to government thirty millions, — of course in
bank-notes, -^ and no one denied that an immediate
suspension of specie payments must follow such an
issue. To any bank, strong or weak, the old Virginia influence represented by Eppes was hostile ;
and to a bank insolvent from the start the Federalists also were opposed.
When the bill, reported November 7, was printed,
it was found to contain a provision authorizing the
suspension of specie payments at the President's discretion. The discussion began November 14, and
every successive day revealed objections and increased
the opposition. Calhoun complicated the subject
1814, CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 251
still further by bringing forward, November 16, a
plan of his own, requiring the capital to consist 'Vone
tenth in specie, and the remainder in specie or in
Treasury notes to be hereafter issued,'^ and taking
away all government control. Ingham of Pennsylvania, representing Dallas, combated Calhoun with
force, but could not make his own measure agreeablp
to the House. His phrase in regard to the suspension of specie payments was significant Congress,
he said, would be to blame for ^' frantic enthusiasm "
if it did not provide for the case. " It may happen,
and probably will happen, that their specie payments
cannot be continued, and what will then be the situation of the bank? Failing to fulfil the purposes
designed, its credit is blighted, its operations are
stopped, and its charter violated ; and if this should
take place before your Treasury notes are sold, the
government will scarce obtain a moment's relief.'*
That the new bank could not pay specie was obvious. The Bank of England itself could not pay
specie, and had not attempted to do so for nearly
twenty years.
The House in committee adopted Calhoun's amendment by a majority of about sixty, in ^pite of Ingham's opposition; and thus substituted for Dallas's
scheme a large private bank, over which the government was to exercise no control, with a capital of fifty
millions, nine tenths of which were to be Treasury
notes. The House then discovered so many unforeseen difficulties, that November 25 it recommitted
262 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
the bill to a select committee, of which Lowndes,
Calhoun, Ingham, Forsyth, and two Federalists were
members.
Dallas was obliged openly to enter the lists against
Calhomi, and wrote to the committee a letter, dated
November 27,^ sounding like a defiance : " The dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually
paid ; a large amount of Treasury notes has already
been dishonored ; and the hope of preventing further
injury and reproach in transacting business with the
Treasury is too visionary to afford a moment's consolation." Calhoun's scheme, he plainly intimated,
was impracticable and mischievous.
The next day, November 28, Lowndes brought back
Calhoun's bill to the House, together with Dallas's
letter, and told the House that the committee could
come to no agreement. Upon this admission of
helplessness, Hanson addressed the House in a speech
which seemed to carry Federalist exultation to the
extremest point. Protesting his anxiety to defend
the country, Hanson uttered a cry of triumph over
the destruction of the government: —
^' Not only had government bills been dishonored and
the interest of the public debt remained unpaid, but
• • • so completely empty was the Treasury and destitute of credit, that funds could not be obtained to defray
the current ordinary expenses of the different Departments. Disgraceful, humiliating as the fact was, it
ought not to be concealed from the nation, and he felt
^ Dallas to Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814 ; State Papers, ii. 872.
1814. , CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 258
it his duty to state to the House that the Department
of State was so bare of money as to be unable to pay
even its stationery bill. The government was subsisting upon the (trainings of unchartered banks in the District, which felt themselves compelled to contribute their
means lest the rod in terrorem which was held over
them should be applied, and an Act of incorporation
refused."
No one contradicted or answered Hanson. The
House wavered in incapacity that suggested dissolution. At last Richard M. Johnson, in order to
force a decision right or wrong, moved the previous
question and brought the House to a vote. Then
the majority turned against Calhoun, as they had before turned against Dallas, and rejected the bill by
a vote of one hundred and four to forty-nine.
The Southern preference for government paper currency lay at the bottom of Calhoun's scheme as oL
Jefferson's, and seemed to Dallas to combine ignorance with dishonesty. Treasury notes bearing interest could not be made to serve as a currency, and
were useless as a foundation for government paper.
"What use is there," asked IngersoU,^ "in such a
mass of banking machinery to give circulation to
some millions of Treasury notes ? Why not issue
them at once without this unwieldy, this unnecessary
medium ? " Yet when Boiling Hall of Georgia, in
pursuance of Macon's aphorism that "paper money
never was beat," moved, November 12, Resolutions
^ Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, p. 606.
264 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATEa Ctt.9.
authorizing the issue of Treasury notes as legal tender, the House refused to consider it by a vote of
ninety-five to forty-two. Eppes did not vote; Calhoun voted against it, and of the twenty-five Southem members who supported it Macon and Stanford
were the most prominent.
Nothing could be plainer than that the House must
ultimately come to inconvertible government paper,
whether issued by the Treasury or by a Bank. Dallas, Eppes, and Calhoun were all agreed on that
point, if on no other; but after Congress had sat
two months and a half, the House was no nearer a
decision than when it met. The Federalists, voting
at one time with Calhoun, at another with Dallas,
were able to paralyze action. Eppes wrote to Dallas,
December 2, inviting further mf ormation ; and Dallas wrote back the same day, recounting the needs
of the Treasury for the current month, merely oh
account of the national debt. Dallas reported that
$5,726,000 in Treasury notes and dividends were due,
or would fall due by January 1 ; and that including
unavailable bank-credits, and subject to possible con- '
tingencies, the Treasury might contain resources to
meet these demands to the amount of $8,972,000.^
Eppes could do no more for immediate relief than
report a bill for the issue of some ten millions more
of interest-bearing Treasury notes, ^hich was passed
without debate and became law, December 26, with^
but improving the situation.
^ Dallas to Eppes, Dec 2, ^814; State Papeis, Finance, ii. 877.
1^14. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 256
The House also passed the heavy tax-bills without
much opposition except from Federalists who wished
to stop military operations on the part of the government. Between thirty and forty members, or about
one half of the Federalists, carried their opposition
to that point. The bill raising the direct tax to six
million dollars passed the House, December 22, by
a vote of one hundred and six to fifty-three, and
passed the Senate, January 5, 1815, by twenty-three
to seven. Dallas and Eppes hoped to raise about
twenty million dollars through the new taxation, or
twice what had been previously attempted. Jefferson
held that these taxes could not be paid, and expressed
his opinion without reserve.
^^ If anything could revolt our citizens against the
war," wrote Jefferson, November 28,^ " it would be the
extravagance with which they are about to be taxed.
• • . The taxes proposed cannot be paid. How can a
people who cannot get fifty cents a bushel for their
wheat, while they pay twelve dollars a bushel for their
salt, pay five times the amount of taxes they ever paid
before ? Yet this will be the case in all the States south
of the Potomac."
If any conclusion was intended to be drawn from
the official return ^ sent to Congress, October 18, of
internal taxes received to that date in each State,
the evil predicted by Jefferson seemed already to
exist. In Massachusetts, of taxes to the amount of
* Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28. 1814 ; Works, vi. 398.
' Statement, etc. ; State Papers, Finance, ii. 861.
266 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Cb.9.
$200,000, accrued for the first two quarters of the
year, $170,000 had been received before October 10.
In New York $898,000 had accrued, and $808,000 had
been received ; thus New York was nearly one fourth
in arrears. Pennsylvania was worse; of $470,000
accrued the government had received $280,000, —
leaving two fifths in arrears. Virginia was in somewhat worse condition than Pennsylvania; of $247,000
accrued $186,000 had been paid, — leaving four ninths
in arrears.
Yet Pennsylvania and Virginia paid taxes in their
own depreciated bank paper, while New York and
New England paid chiefly in Treasury notes. The
new taxes were still to be paid in the same medium, although the laws gave no express authority
for it. In the next Congress, when the subject
was discussed, Wright of Maryland said : ^ " When
Congress passed the revenue laws and imposed the
six million and three million land tax, did they
contemplate the payment of specie ? No ! they knew
the people had it not, and of course could not
pay it. . . . Does any man doubt that Congress intended these taxes being paid in bank paper ? Nay,
has not the Secretary of the Treasury . . . sealed
this construction of the law by taking the bank
paper in discharge for these taxes?" That the
bank paper was worth less than Treasury notes was
shown by the Southern States paying their taxes in
such paper, when they might equally well have paid
t Annals of Congress, 1815-1816, p. 1436.
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 267
them in Treasury notes except for the difference
in value.
The medium of depreciated and depreciating bank
paper in which the taxes were to be paid, secured
the States outside of New England from intolerable pressure by giving the means of indefinite depreciation; but to the government such a resource
meant merely a larger variety of bank-credits, which
were of no certain value even in the towns where
the banks existed, and were of no value at all elsewhere. The burden of taxation would be thrown
chiefly on New England; and if the Hartford Convention did nothing else, it was sure to take measures for sequestering the proceeds of taxation in New
England for military purposes. The hope of restoring the finances by taxation was faint. Until the
currency could be established and exchanges made
secure, the government was helpless.
The House having broken down November 28, the
Senate next took the matter in hand. Bufus King
reported, December 2, a bill to incorporate a bank,
which was in effect the bill recommended by Dallas.
After a week's consideration the Senate passed the
bill, December 9, by the vote of seventeen to fourteen, — King and the Federalists, with four Republi-
can senators, voting against it. The House referred
it to the Committee of Ways and Means, which reported it, December 14, with amendments. The debate began December 28, and was cut short December
27 by C. J. IngersoU, who by the close vote of seventyVOL. VIII. — 17
258 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 9.
two to seventy obliged the House to call for the previous question, and order the bill to its third reading. This energy was followed by a reaction ; the
bill was recommitted for amendment, again reported,
and vehemently attacked.
Never had the House shown itself more feeble.
The Federalists took the lead in debate ; and January 2 Daniel Webster, in a speech that placed him
at the head of the orators of the time, dictated the
action of Congress : —
^'What sort of an institution, sir, is this? It looks
less like a bank than like a department of government.
It will be properly the paper-money department. Its
capital is government debts ; the amount of issues will
depend on government necessities ; government in effect
absolves itself from its own debts to the bank, and by
way of compensation absolves the bank from its own
contracts with others. This is indeed a wonderful scheme
of finance. The government is to grow rich because it
is to borrow without the obligation of repaying, and is
to borrow of a bank which issues paper without the
liability to redeem it. • • • They provide for an unlimited issue of paper in an entire exemption from
payment. They found their bank in the first place on
the discredit of government, and then hope to enrich
government out of the insolvency of the bank."
Webster was a master of antithesis, and the proposed bank was in effect what he described ; but had
he been a member of the British Parliament he might
have made the same objections, with little alteration,
to the Bank of England. The Hartford Convention
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 259
was in session while he spoke. Every word of his
speech was a shock to the government and the Union,
for his only suggestion was equivalent to doing nothing. He moved to instruct the committee to report
a bill creating a bank with thirty millions of capital,
composed one fourth of specie and three fourths of
government securities ; without power to suspend
specie payments, and without obligation to lend three
fifths of its capital to the government. To such a
bank he would give his support, " not as a measure
of temporary policy, or an ^expedient to find means
of relief from the present poverty of the Treasury,"
but as an institution most useful in times of peace.
The House came to a vote the same day, and divided eighty-one to eighty. Then the Speaker, Langdon Cheves, rose, and after denouncing the proposed
bank as " a dangerous, unexampled, and he might
almost say a desperate resort," gave his casting vote
against the bill.
No sooner had the House struck this blow at
Dallas than it shrank back. The next day, amid
complaints and objections, it reconsidered its matured
decision by the sudden majority of one hundred and
seven to fifty-four. Once more the bill was recommitted, and once more reported, January 6, in the
form that Webster proposed. Weary of their own
instability, the majority hastened to vote. Most of
the Federalists supported the bill ; but Grosvenor of
New York, one of the ablest, frankly said what every
one felt, that the proposed institution could not be
260 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch.9.
a specie bank, or get a million of its notes into circulation. "The government relying on it would be
disappointed, and ruin soon stare them in the face."
With this understanding the House passed the bill,
January 7, by a vote of one hundred and twenty to
thirty-eight ; and the Senate, after a struggle with the
House, accepted it, January 20, by a vote of twenty
to fourteen.
Dallas was not a man to be easily daunted even in
so desperate a situation. After ten days deliberation,
the President sent to Congress a veto message.
^^ The most the bank could effect," said Madison,
^' and the most it could be expected to aim at, would
be to keep the institution alive by limited and local
transactions • , • until a change from war to peace
should enable it, by a flow of specie into its vaults and
a removal of the external demand for it, to derive its
contemplated emoluments from a safe and full extension
of its operations."
" I hope this will satisfy oipr friends,** wrote Webster to his brother,^ "that it was not a bank likely
to favor the Administration.** Either with or without such a bank, the Administration was equally
helpless. The veto left the Treasury, February 1,
without a resource in prospect. The unsatisfied demands reached nearly twenty millions. The cash
balance, chiefly in bank-credits, was little more than
six millions. A further deficit of forty millions re-
^ Letter to E. Webster, Jan. 30, 1814 ; Webster's Correspon*
dence, i. 250, 251.
1814. CONGRESS AND CURRENCY. 261
mained to be provided above the estimated revenue
of 1815. United States six-per-cents commanded
only a nominal price, between fifty and sixty cents
on the dollar,^ and were quoted in Boston at a
discount of forty cents.^ Treasury notes being in
demand for taxes, were worth about seventy-five
cents in the dollar. Dallas had no serious hope of
carrying on the government. In a letter to the
Committee of Ways and Means, dated January 17,
he could only propose to add six millions more to
the taxes, issue fifteen millions in Treasury notes,
and borrow twenty-five millions on any terms that
could be obtained. In making these recommendations he avowed in grave words his want of confidence
in their result : ^ —
'^ In making the present communication I feel, sir«
that I have performed my duty to the Legislature and
to the country; but when I perceive that more than
forty millions of dollars must be raised for the service
of the year 1815, by an appeal to public credit through
the medium of the Treasury notes and loans, I am not
without sensations of extreme solicitude."
Young George Ticknor of Boston happened to be
in the gallery of the House of Representatives when
Eppes read this letter, January 21, and the next day
he wrote,* —
* Review of Dallas's Report; Boston " Advertiser," Dec. 1816.
* Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.
* Dallas to Eppes, Jan. 17, 1817 ; State Papers, Finance,
ii. 885.
« Life of Oeoige Ticknor, i. 31.
262 HISTORY OP THE UNITED STATES. Ch.9.
*^ The last remarkable event in the history of this
remarkable Congress is Dallas's report. You can imagine nothing like the dismay with which it has filled
the Democratic party. All his former commonications
were but emollients and palliations compared with this
final disclosure of the bankruptcy of the nation. Mr.
Eppes as Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Chairman of
the Committee of Ways and Means, read it in his place
yesterday, and when he had finished, threw it upon the
table with expressive violence, and turning rOund to
Mr. Gaston, asked him with a bitter levity between jest
and earnest, —
** * Well, sir ! will your party take the government if
we will give it up to them? *
" ' No, sir ! ' «aid Gaston ; . . . * No, sir I Not unless you will give it to us as we gave it to you I * "
C5HAPTER X.
While Dallas struggled with Congress to obtain
the means of establishing a currency in order to pay
the army, Monroe carried on a similar struggle in
order to obtain an army to pay. On this point, as
on the financial issue, Virginian ideas did not accord with the wishes of Government. The prejudice
against a regular army was stimulated by the evident impossibility of raising or supporting it. Once
more Jefferson expressed the common feeling of his
Virginia neighbors.^
" We must prepare for interminable war," he wrote to
Monroe, October 16. "To this end we should put our
house in order by providing men and money to an indefinite extent. The former may be done by classing
our militia, and assigning each class to the description of
duties for which it is fit. It is nonsense to talk of regulars. They are not to be had among a people so easy
and happy at home as ours. We might as well rely on
calling down an army of angels from heaven."
As Jefferson lost the habits of power and became
once more a Virginia planter, he reverted to the
opinions and prejudices of his earlier life and of the
^ Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 16^ 1814; Works^ vi. 394.
264 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Cte. 10.
society in which he lived. As Monroe grew accustomed to the exercise and the necessities of power,
he threw aside Virginian ideas and accepted the responsibilities of government. On the same day when
Jefiferson wrote to Monroe that it was nonsense to
talk of regulars, Monroe wrote to Congress that it
was nonsense to talk of militia. The divergence between Monroe and Jefferson was even greater than
between Dallas and Eppes.
" It may be stated with confidence," wrote Monroe to
Congress,^ '^ that at least three times the force in militia
has been employed at our principal cities, along the
coast and on the frontier, in marching to and returning
thence, that would have been necessary in regular troops ;
and that the expense attending it has been more than
proportionately augmented from the difficulty if not the
impossibility of preserving the same degree of system in
the militia as in the regular service."
In Monroe's opinion a regular force was an object
" of the highest importance." He told, the Senate
committee that the army, which was only thirty-four
thousand strong on the first of October, should be
raised to its legal limit of sixty-two thousand, and
that another permanent army^ of forty thousand men
should be raised for strictly defensive service. In
the face of Jef^rson's warning that he might as well
call down an army of angels from heaven, Monroe
called for one hundred thousand regular troops, when
1 Monroe to Giles, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 514
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMT. 266
no exertions had hitherto availed to keep thirty thousand effectives on the rolls.
The mere expression of such a demand carried
with it the train of consequences which the people
chiefly dreaded. One hundred thousand troops could
be raised only by draft. Monroe affirmed the power
as well as the need of drafting. " Congress have a
right by the Constitution," he said, " to* raise regjilar
armies, and no restraint is imposed on the exercise of
it. . . . It would be absurd to suppose that Congress
could not carry this power into effect otherwise than
by accepting the voluntary service of individuals.''
Absurd as it was, such had been the general impression, and Monroe was believed to have been one of
the most emphatic m maintaining it. " Ask him,"
suggested Randolph, " what he would have done,
whUe governor of Virginia and preparing to resist
Federal usurpation, had such an attempt been made
by Mr. Adams and his ministers, especially in 1800.
He can give the answer." Doubtless the silence of
the Constitution in respect to conscription was conclusive to some minds in favor of the power ; but
the people preferred the contrary view, the more because militia service seemed to give more pay for
less risk.
The chance of carrying such a measure through
Congress was not great, yet Monroe recommended it
as his first plan for raising men. He proposed to
enroll the free male population between eighteen and
forty-five years of age into classes of one hundred,
266 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. la
each to furnish four men and to keep their places
supplied.^ The second plan varied from the first only
in the classification, not in the absence of compulsion.
The militia were to be divided into three sections
according to age, with the obligation to serve, when
required, for a term of two years. A third plan
suggested the exemption from militia service of every
fiv^ militia-men who could provide one man for the
war. If none of these schemes should be approved
by Congress, additional bounties must be given imder
the actual system. Of the four plans, the secretary
preferred the first.
The Senate committee immediately summoned
Monroe to an interview. They wished an explanation of the failure in the recruiting service, and were
told by Monroe that the failure was chiefly due to
the competition of the detached militia for substitutes.* The military committee of the House then
joined with the military committee of the Senate
in sounding the members of both bodies in order to
ascertain the most rigorous measure that could be
passed. According to the report of Troup of Georgia, chairman of the House committee,^ they " found
that no efficacious measure, calculated certainly and
promptly to fill the regular army, could be effectually
^ Explanatory Obeervations, State Papers, Military Affairs,
i. 616.
* Monroe to Giles, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i 618.
* Annals of Congress, Feb. 6, 1816, p. 1130.
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 26T
resorted to. Measures were matured and proposed by
the [House] committee, but were not pressed on the
House, from the solemn conviction that there was no
dispo8iti(Hi in the Legislature to act finally on the
subject.**
Yet the issue was made at a moment of extreme
anxiety and almost despair. In October, 1814, the
result of the war was believed to depend on the
establishment of an efl&cient draft. The price of
United States six-per-cents showed better than any
other evidence the opinion of the public; but the
military situation, known to all the world, warranted
deep depression. Sir George Prevost, about to be
succeeded by an efl&cient commander, — Sir George
Murray, — was then at Kingston organizing a campaign against Sackett's Harbor, with an army of
twenty thousand regular troops and a fleet that controlled the Lake. Another great force, military and
naval, was known to be on its way to New Orleans ;
and the defences of New Orleans were no stroi^ger
than those of Washington. One half the province of
Maine, from Eastport to Castine, was already in
British possession.
To leave no doubt of England's intentions, despatches from Ghent, communicating the conditions
on which the British government offered peace, arrived from the American commissioners and were
sent, October 10, to Congress. These conditions assumed rights of conquest. The British negotiators
demanded four territorial or proprietary concessions,
268 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 10.
and all were vital to the integrity of the Union,
rirst, the whole Indian Territory of the Northwest,
including about one third of the State of Ohio, two
thirds of Indiana, and nearly the entire region from
which the States of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan
were afterward created, was to be set aside forever
as Indian country under British guaranty. Second,
the United States were to be excluded from military or naval contact with the Lakes. Third, they
had forfeited their rights in the fisheries. Fourth,
they were to cede a portion of Maine to strengthen
Canada.
These demands, following the unparalleled insult
of burning Washington, foreshadowed a war carried
to extremities, and military preparations such as the
Union had no means ready to repel. Monroe's recommendations rested on the conviction that the nation
must resort to extreme measures. Dallas's financial
plan could not have been suggested except as a desperate resource. Congress understood as well as
the Executive the impending peril, and stood in even
more fear of it.
Under these circumstances, when Troup's committee refused to act, Giles reported, on behalf of the
Senate committee, two military measures. The first,
for filling the regular army, proposed to extend the
age of enlistment from twenty-one to eighteen years ;
to double the land-bounty; and to exempt from
militia duty every militia-man who should furnish a
recruit for the regular service.
mi. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 269
The second measure, reported the same day,
November 5, purported to authorize the raising an
army of eighty thousand militia-men by draft, to
serve for two years within the limits of their own or
an adjoining State.^ The provisions of this measure
were ill-conceived, ill-digested, and unlikely to answer
their purpose. The moment the debate began, the
bill was attacked so vigorously as to destroy whatever
credit it might have otherwise possessed.
Of all the supporters of the war. Senator Vamum
of Massachusetts was one of the steadiest. He was
also the highest authority in the Senate on matters
pertaining to the militia. When Giles's bill came
under discussion November 16, Varnum began the debate by a speech vehemently hostile to the proposed
legislation. He first objected that although the bill
purported to call for an army of eighty thousand men,
" yet in some of the subsequent sections of it we find
that instead of realizing the pleasing prospect of seeing an ample force in the field, the force is to be reduced to an indefinite amount, — which contradiction
in terms, inconsistency in principle, and uncertainty
in effect, cannot fail to produce mortification and
chagrin in every breast." Vamum objected to drafting men from the militia for two years' service because the principle of nine months' service was already
established by the common law. If the nation wanted
a regular force, why not make it a part of the regular
army without a system of drafting militia " unneces» A Bill, etc.; Niles, vii. 181.
270 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
sary, uneqnal, and unjust ? '' The machinery of classification and draft was " wholly impracticable/* The
limit of service to adjoining States abandoned tKe
objects for which the Union existed. The proffered
bounties would ruin the recruiting service for the
regular army; the proffered exemptions and reductions in term of duty left no permanency to the service. The bill inflicted no penalties and charged no
ofl&cers with the duty of making the draft " I consider the whole system as resolving into ia recommendation upon the patriotism of the States and Territories and upon the patriotism of the classes."
The justice of Vamum's criticism could not fairly
be questioned. The bill authorized the President " to
issue his orders to such officers of the militia as he
may think proper," and left the classification and
draft in the hands of these militia officers. * Every
drafted man who had performed any tour of duty
in the militia since the beginning of the war was
entitled to deduct a corresponding term from his
two years of service ; and obviously the demand created for substitutes would stop recruiting for the
regular army.
Hardly had Varnum sat down when Senator Daggett of Connecticut spoke.
" The bill," said the Connecticut senator, " is incapable of being executed, as well as unconstitutional and
unjust. It proceeds entirely upon the idea that the
State governments will lend their aid td carry it into
effect. If they refuse, it becomes inoperative. N0W9
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 271
air, will the Executives, who believe it a violation of the
Constitution, assist in its execution? I tell you they
wni not,"
Every member of the Senate who heard these words
knew that they were meant to express the will of
the convention which was to meet at Hartford within
a month. The sentiment thus avowed was supported
by another New England senator, whose State was
not a party to the Convention. Jeremiah Mason of
New Hampshire was second to no one in legal ability or in personal authority, and when he followed
Daggett in the debate, he spoke with full knowledge of the effect hi3 words would have on the action of the Hartford Convention and of the State
executives.
^^ In my opinion," he said, '^ this system of military
conscription thus recommended by the Secretary of War
is not only inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of
the Constitution, but also with all the principles of civil
liberty. In atrocity it exceeds that adopted by the late
Emperor of France for the subjugation of Europe. • • •
Such a measure cannot, it ought not to be submitted to.
If it could in no other way be averted, I not only believe^
but I hope, it would be resisted."
Mason pointed to the alternative, — which Massachusetts was then adopting, as the necessary consequence of refusing power to the government, — that j
the States must resume the powers of sovereignty :
*^ Should the national defence be abandoned by the
geueral government, I trust the people, if still retaining
272 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch-IO.
a good portion of their resources, may rally under their
State governments against foreign invasion, and rely
with confidence on their own courage and virtue."
At that time the State of Massachusetts was oocupied for one hundred miles of its sea-coast by a
British force, avowedly for purposes of permanent
conquest; and the State legislature, October 18, refused to make an inquiry, or to consider any measure
for regaining possession of its territory, or to cooperate with the national government for the purpose,^ but voted to raise an army of ten thousand
men. The object of this State army was suggested
by Christopher Gore, the Federalist senator from
Massachusetts who followed Mason in the debate.
In personal and political influence Gore stood hardly
second to Mason, and his opinions were likely to
carry the utmost weight with the convention at Hartford. With this idea necessarily in his mind, Grore
told the Senate, —
^^ This [bill] is the first step on the odious ground of
conscription, — a plan, sir, which never will and never
ought to be submitted to by this country while it retains
one idea of civil freedom ; a plan, sir, which if attempted
will be resisted by many States, and at every hazard.
In my Judgment, sir, it should be resisted by all who
have any regard to public liberty or the rights of the
several States."
These denunciations were not confined to New
England. Senator Goldsborough of Maryland, also a
^ Message of Qovemor Strong, with documents, Jan. 18, 1815;
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 273
Federalist, affirmed that the sentiment of abhorrence
for military duty was almost universal : —
" Sir, you dare not — at least I hope you dare not —
attempt a conscription to fill the ranks of your regular
army. When the plan of the Secretary of War made its
appearance, it was gratifying to find that it met with the
abhorrence of almost every man in the nation ; and the
merit of the bill before you, if such a measure can be
supposed to have merit at all, is that it is little else, as
regards the militia, than a servile imitation of the secre«
tary's plan."
Nevertheless, when Goldsborough took his seat the
Senate passed the Militia Bill by a vote of nineteen
to twelve, — Anderson of Tennessee and Varnum of
Massachusetts joining the Federalists in opposition*
The Regular Army Bill, which was in effect a bill to
sacrifice the regular army, passed November 11,
without a division. Both measures then went to
the House and were committed, November 12, to the
Committee of the Whole.
Ordinarily such a measure would have been referred
to the Military Committee, but in this instance the
Military Committee would have nothing to do with
the Senate bill. Troup, the chairman, began the debate by denouncing it.^ The measure, he said, was
inadequate to its object. " It proposed to give you a
militia force when you wanted, not a militia, but a
regular force . . . You have a deficiency of twenty1 Debate of Dec. 2, 1814 ; Annals of Congress, 1814-1816,
iii. 705.
VOL. vni.— 18
274 raSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CalO.
odd thousand to supply. How will you supply it?
Assuredly the [Regular . Army] bill from the Senate
will not supply it. No, sir, the recruiting system
has failed." On the nature of the force necessary for
the next campaign Troup expressed his own opinion
and that of his committee, as well as that of the
Executive, in language as strong as he could use
at such a time and place. ^^ If, after what has happened, I could for a moment believe there could be
any doubt or hesitation on this point, I would consider everything as lost ; then indeed there would
be an end of hope and of confidence.*' Yet on precisely this point Congress showed most doubt. Nothing could induce it to accept Troup's view of the
necessity for providing a regular army. "The bill
from the Senate," remonstrated Troup, "instead of
proposing this, proposes to authorize the President
to call upon the States for eighty thousand raw militia ; and this is to be our reliance for the successful prosecution of the war! Take my word for it,
sir, that if you do rely upon it (the military power
of the enemy remaining undivided) defeat, disaster,
and disgrace, must follow."
The House refused to support Troup or the President. Calhoun was first to yield to the general unwillingness, and declared himself disposed to accept the
Senate bill as a matter of policy. Richard M. Johnson, though sympathizing with Troup, still preferred
to accept the bill as the only alternative to nothing :
** If it was rejected, they would have no dependence
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 2T5
for defence but on six months' militia/*^ On the
other hand) Thomas K. Harris of Tennessee protested that if the British government had it in their
power to control the deliberations of Congress, they
could not devise the adoption of a measure of a
military character better calculated to ' serve their
purposes. The people, he said, were in his part of
the country prepared to make every sacrifice, and
expected Congress, after the news from Ghent, to
do its share ; but Congress was about to adopt a
measure of all others the best calculated to prolong
the war.2
While the friends of the government spoke in terpas
of open discouragement and almost despair of the
strongest military measure which Congress would consent to consider, the Federalists made no concealment
of their wishes and intentions. Daniel Webster used
similar arguments to those of his friend Jeremiah
Mason in the Senate, affirming that the same principle which authorized the enlistment of apprentices
would equally authorize the freeing of slaves,^ and
echoing pathetic threats of disunion.* Othfer Federalists made no professions of sadness over the approaching dissolution of government. Artemas Ward
of Massachusetts spoke December 14, the day before
1 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 974.
« Annals of Congress, 1814-1816, iii. 891, 896.
• Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 734.
* Speech of C. J. IngeisoU, Dec. 9, 1814 ; Annals^ 1814-1816^
iii. 809.
276 HISTORY OF THE UNITEP STATES. Ch. 10.
the Hartford Convention was to meet, and announced
the course which events were to take : ^ —
^^ That the Treasury is empty I admit ; that the ranks
of the regular army are thin I believe to be true; and
that our country must be defended in all events, I not
only admit but affirm. But, sir, if all the parts of the
United States are defended, of course the whole will be
defended. If every State in the Union, with such aid
as she can obtain from her neighbors, defends herself,
our whole country will be defended. In my mind the
resources of the States will be applied with more economy
and with greater effect in defence of the country under
the State governments than under the government of the
United States."
Such avowals of the intent to throw aside Constitutional duties were not limited to members from New
England. Morris S. Miller of New York made a vehement speech on the failure of national defence, and
declared the inevitable result to be ^^ that the States
must and will take care of themselves ; and they will
preserve the resources of the States for the defence
of the States."^ He also declared that conscription
would be resisted, and echoed the well-remembered
declamation of Edward Livingston against the Alien
Bill in 1798, when the Republican orator prayed to
Gk)d that the States would never acquiesce in obedience to the law.
**This House,** replied Duvall of Kentucky, "has
^ AimalB of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 907.
t Annals of Cosgiess, 1814-1816, in. 790, 791.
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY, 277
heard discord and rebellion encouraged and avowed
from more than one quarter." Indeed, from fully one
fourth of its members the House heard little else.
TJnder the shadow of the Hartford Convention the
Federalist members talked with entire frankness.
"This great fabric seems nodding and tottering to
its fall," said Z. E. Shipherd of New York, December 9;^ " and Heaven only knows how long before the
mighty ruin will take place." J. 0. Moseley of Connecticut " meant no improper menace " by predicting to the House, " if they were determined to prosecute the war by a recourse to such measures as are
provided in the present bill, that they would have no
occasion for future committees of investigation into
the causes of the failure of their arms." * The latest
committee of investigation had recently made a long
report on the capture of Washington, carefully abstaining from expressing opinions of its own, or
imputing blame to any one, and Moseley's remark
involved a double sneer. None of these utterances
were resented. Richard Stockton of New Jersey
was allowed imanswered to denounce in measured
terms the mild Militia Bill then under debate, from
which the committee had already struck the term
of two years' service by substituting one year; and
Stockton concluded his fine-drawn arguments by
equally studied menace : ^ —
1 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 829.
« Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 833.
• Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii 848.
278 HISTORY OF THE UNTIED STATES. Ch.10.
^^ This bill also attacks the right and sovereignty of the
State governments. Congress is about to usurp their undoubted rights, — to take from them their militia. By this
bill we proclaim that we will have their men, as many as
we please, when and where and for as long a time as we
see fit, and for any service we see proper. Do gentlemen
of the majority seriously believe that the people and the
State governments will submit to this claim? Do they
believe that all the States of this Union will submit to
this usurpation? Have you attended to the solemn and
almost unanimous declaration of the legislature of Connecticut? Have you examined the cloud arising in the
East? Do you perceive that it is black, alarming,
portentous?"
The Resolution of the Connecticut legislature to
which Stockton referred was adopted in October, and
authorized the governor in case of the passage of the
Militia Bill to convoke the General Assembly forth*
with, to consider measures " to secure and preserve
the rights and liberties of the people of this State,
and the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the
flame.*' ^ Stockton^s speech was made December 10,
and ^^ the cloud arising in the East," as he figured the
Hartford Convention, was to take form December 15.
The Republican speakers almost as earnestly used
the full influence of these national fears to rouse the
energies of the House. They neither denied nor disguised the helplessness of government. All admitted
dread of approaching disaster. Perhaps C. J. IngerfloU was the only member who declared that the war
^ Resolution} Niles^ vlL; Supplement, p. 107.
Ifili. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 279
had been successful, and that Americans need no
longer blush to be Americans ; but Ingersoll disliked
the Militia Bill as cordially as it was disliked by
Troup or Varnum, and voted for it only because
"something must be done."^
" When our anny," said Samuel Hopkins of Kentucky,
in closing the debate, ^' is composed of a mere handful of
men, and our treasury empty so that it cannot provide for
this gallant handful ; when an enemy, powerful and ao*
tive, is beating against our shores like the strong wave of
the ocean; when everything is at stake, — . . . surely
such is not the moment for parsimonious feelings in raising taxes, or for forced constructions to defeat the means
for raising men."
Notwithstanding every effort of the war-leaders,
the opposition steadily won control over the House.
Daniel Webster during his entire lifetime remembered
with satisfaction that he shared with Eppes the credit
of overthrowing what he called Monroe's conscription «
December 10, at Eppes's motion, the House voted by
a majority of sixty-two to fifty-seven to reduce the
term of service from two years to one.^ A motion
made by Daniel Webster to reduce the term to six
months was lost by only one voice, the vote standing
seventy-eight to seventy-nine.* The bill passed at
last, December 14, by a vote of eighty-four to seventytwo, in a House where the true war majority was
^ Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 808.
* Curtis's Life of Webster, i. 139.
* Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 869.
* Annals of Congress, 1814-1815^ iii. 882.
280 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.10.
forty-six. When the Senate insisted on its provision
of two years* service, Troup, in conference committee,
compromised on eighteen months. Then the House,
December 27, by a vote of seventy-three to sixty-four,
rejected the report of its conference committee. The
next day, December 28, in the Senate, Bufus King
made an impremeditated motion for indefinite postponement. Some members were absent; no debate
occurred. The question was immediately put, and
carried by a vote of fourteen to thirteen.^ The effect
of this action was to destroy the bill.
With this failure the attempt to supply an army
was abandoned, and Congress left the government
to conduct the war in 1815, as in 1814, with thirty
thousand regular troops and six months' militia.
Monroe's effort to fill the ranks of the army ended
in doubling the land-bounty ; in authorizing the enlistment of minors, who had till then been enlisted
without authorization ; and in exempting from militia
duty such persons as should furnish a recruit for the
regular army.'^ The prospect was remote that such
inducements could do more than repair the waste of
the actual force ; but the government was unable to
pay a larger number even if the force could be raised,
and Monroe was obliged to prepare for the next campaign with such slight means of defence as remained
to him. The last effort to induce the House to consider a serious method of raising troops was made
^ CurtiB's Life of Webster, L 139 note.
* Act of Dec 10, 1814; Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, p. 1837.
1815. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 281
February 6, and was referred to the Committee of
the Whole, with a tacit understanding that the ordinary process of recruiting was not to be disturbed.^
According to the returns in the adjutant-general's
office, the whole number of men — non-commissioned
officers, privates, musicians, and artificers, present or
absent, sick or well — in the regular army Feb. 16,
1815, was thirty-two thousand one hundred and sixty.
During the previous two months it had remained
stationary, the returns of December, 1814, reporting
thirty-two thousand three hundred and sixty men.
Nothing showed a possibility of greatly increasing
the force by the means prescribed by Congress.
The navy requiring little new legislation, readily
obtained the little it asked. Almost the first Act of
the session, approved Nov. 15, 1814, authorized the
purchasing or building of twenty sixteen-gun sloopsof-war. Another Act of Feb. 7, 1815, created a
Board of Commissioners for the navy to discharge
all the ministerial duties of the secretary, imder
his superintendence.
This legislation, with the various tax-bills, comprised all that was accomplished by Congress between the months of September and February toward
a vigorous prosecution of the war. For the navy
the prospect of success in the coming year was sufficiently fair, and privateering promised to be more
active than ever ; but the army was threatened with
many perils. The most serious of all dangers to
^ AnnaU of Congress, 1814-1815, pp. 1125-1130.
282 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. C5h.10.
the military service of the Union weua supposed by
Federalists to be the establishment of armies by the
separate States. The attempt to establish such an
army by Massachusetts in time of peace had been
one of the causes which led to the Constitution of
1789 ; ^ and at the close of 1814, when Massachusetts
voted to raise an army of ten thousand men, the significance of the step was more clearly evident than
in the time of the Confederation.
The State of Massachusetts might be supposed to
act in a spirit of hostility to the Constitution; but
no such motive actuated States outside of New England. If they followed the same course, they did so
because the national government was believed to be
incompetent to the general defence. Of all the States
Massachusetts alone possessed considerable resources,
and could command both credit and specie; yet the
creation of a State army of ten thousand men overburdened her finances, and obliged her to claim her
share of the national revenues. No other State could
expect to support an army without immediate financial trouble. Yet Governor Tompkins of New York
recommended to the legislature in September the
establishment of a State army of twenty thousand
men,* and the legislature passed Acts for the purpose.
The legislature of Pennsylvania took a similar measure into consideration. The legislature of Maryland
passed an Act for raising five thousand State troops.
^ Madison's Debates, ii. 712.
« Message of Sept. 30, 1814 ; Naes, viL 97.
181i. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 288
Yirginia decided also to create a State army, with two
major-generals. South Carolina passed a law for
raising a brigade of State troops, and appointed the
officers. Kentucky took measures for raising a State
army of ten thousand men.
The national government, unable to create an
efficient army of its own, yielded to necessity, and
looked already to the State armies as levies to be
taken into the national service in case of need. The
States, on their side, unable to bear the expense of
separate armies, expected to be relieved of the burden
by the national government. Yet for the moment
the States, however deficient their means might be^
seemed better able than the general government not
only to raise men but to support them. In January^
1815, the financial resources of the government were
exhausted, so that the Treasury could not meet the
drafts drawn by Major-Oeneral Jackson and the pressing demands of the paymaster at New Orleans. The
Secretary of War was obliged to go from bank to
bank of Washington and Georgetown asking, as a
personal favor, loans of their bank-notes already depreciated about fifty per cent. So desperate, according to Monroe's account, was the situation that his
success depended on adding his own guaranty to that
of the government.^ At no time of his life were
Monroe's means sufficient to supply his private needs,
and nothing could express so strongly his sense of
^ Monroe's Memoir ; Deposition of Tench Ringgold, Feb. 14^
1826» pp. 13, 68.
284 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 10.
national bankruptcy as the assertion that his credit
was required to support that of the United States.^
The State armies were the natural result of such
a situation. Congress could not resist the movement,
and passed an Act, approved Jan. 27, 1815, authorizing the President to receive into the national service
a certain proportion of the State troops, not exceeding forty thousand men in the aggregate. Little was
said in debate on the bearings of the Act, which
seemed to concede the demand of Massachusetts that
the States should be allowed to raise troops at the
expense of the United States. The Hartford Convention had then met, deliberated, and adjourned.
Its report had been published, and among its demands
was one that " these States might be allowed to assume their own defence." The Federalists considered
the Act of Jan. 27, 1815, as a "full and ample"
concession of the demand.* Senator Gore wrote to
Governor Strong, January 22, while the measure
was before the President, commenting on the financial and military expedients of Dallas and Monroe : ^
^^ These appear to me the spasms of a dying government. . • • The bill authorizing the raising of State
troops by the States, and at the expense of the United
States, according to the plan sent you some tinre since,
has passed both Houses. Thus one part of the recom^ Eulogy of James Monroe by J. Q. Adams, p. 75.
' H. G. Otis's Letters in Defence of the Hartford Convention,
1S24, pp. 38, 39.
• Lodge's Cabot^ p. 661.
1814. CONGRESS AND ARMY. 285
mendalion of the Hartford Convention seems to be
adopted. The other, — that to authorize the States to
receive the taxes, — will probably be more difficult to be
attained. The accession to this seems not to accord with
Mr. Monroe's intimation in your letter, or rather in his
letter to you. Indeed, if they have fears of the State
governments, one can hardly account for this government's authorizing the States to raise and keep in pay,
at the expense of the United States, troops which may
be used for purposes hostile to, or not conformable with,
the views of the paymaster.'*
The accession to the principle of State armies
which surprised Gore could be explained only by the
government's consciousness of helplessness. Gore
was somewhat careful to express no opinion of the
probable consequences, but other Federalists spoke
with entire candor. Timothy Pickering expected
a division of the Union.^ Less extreme partisans
looked only to a dissolution of government. A year
afterward, in the calmer light of peace and union,
Joseph Hopkinson, a very distinguished Federalist of
Philadelphia, not deluded like the New Englanders
by local pride or prejudice, declared publicly in Congress the common conviction of his party on the
probable consequences of another year of war:*
*^The federal government was at the last gasp of
existence. But six months longer and it was no more.
^ Pickering to John Lowell, Jan. 24, 1815; New England
Fedeialismt p. 425.
* Debate of Jan. 29^ 1S16; Annals of Congreaa, 1815-181(^
p. 795.
286 mSTOBY OF THE mnXED STATES. Ch.io.
• • • The general goyemment would haye diBsolyed into
its original elements; its powers would haye retamed
to the States from which they were deriyed; and they
doubtless would haye been fully competent to their defence against any enemy. Does not eyerybody remember
that all the great States, and I belieye the small ones
too, were preparing for this state of things, and organizing their own means for their owq defence? *'
Calhoun contradicted Hopkinson and denied his
assertions ; but on that subject Hopkinson was at
least an equal authority. Calhoun knew well his own
State, but he knew little of New England; and he
had yet to learn, perhaps to his own surprise, how
easily a section of the Union could be wrought to
treason.
CHAPTER XT.
The Massachusetts legislature issued, October 17,
its invitation to the New England States for a conference,^ and on the same day the newspapers published
the despatches from Ghent, to August 20, containing
British conditions of peace, — which required, among
greater sacrifices, a cession of Massachusetts territory, and an abandonment of fisheries and fishing
rights conceded with American independence. Two
counties of the State beyond the Penobscot were
then in British mUitary possession, and a third,
Nantucket, was a British naval station. Yet even
under these circumstances the British demands did
not shock the Federalist leaders. Governor Strong,
after reading the Ghent documents October 17, wrote
to Pickering at Washington,^ —
^^ If Great Britain had discovered a haughty or grasping spirit, it might naturally have excited irritation ; but
I am persuaded that in the present case there is not a
member of Congress who, if he was a member of Parliament, would have thought that more moderate terms
ought in the first instance to have been offered."
» Letter of Invitation, Oct. 17, 1814; Niles, vii. 179.
' Lodge's Memoir of Strong; Proceedings of Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1879.
288 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11.
The argument seemed to prove only that members
of Congress could also be haughty and grasping ; but
Governor Strong thought the British demands reasonable, and began at once to sound his friends in
regard to the proposed concessions. The following
day he wrote ^ that the Essex people expected to lose
the fisheries, but were ready to give up a portion of
Maine to retain them.
Pickering wrote in reply, acquiescing in the proposed barter of territory for fisheries, and also in
the more extravagant British demands for the Indians and the Lakes. " I was gratified," said Pickering,* " to find my own sentiments corresponding
with yours." The leading Federalists united with
Pickering and Strong in blaming the American
negotiators and the government for rejecting the
British offers. The same view was taken by the
chief Federalist newspaper of the State, the Boston
« Centmel." »
Thus in the November election, a few weeks later,
two issues were impressed on the people of New England. In regard to neither issue did the Federalist
leaders attempt concealment. The people were invited, as far as the press of both parties could decide
the points of dispute, to express their opinion, —
first, whether the British conditions of peace should
^ Lodge's Memoit of Strong; Proceedings of Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1879.
* Pickering to Strong, Oct. 29, 1814; Lodge's Cabot, p. 535.
• Boston Centinely Oct. 19, 1814.
18U. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 289
have been taken into consideration ; second, whether
the States should be represented at the Hartford
Convention. The popular response was emphatic.
Everywhere in New England the Republican candi-
dates were defeated ; and the Federalists, encouraged
by the result, — believing the Hartford Convention to
be the most popular action taken by Massachusetts
since the State adopted the Federal Constitution,^ —
prepared to support measures, looking to the restoration of peace and to the establishment of a new
Federal compact comprising either the whole or a
portion of the actual Union.
However varied the wishes of the majority might
be, they agreed in requiring a radical change in the
organic law. This intention was their chief claim
to popularity. The Boston " Centinel," announcing
November 9 the adhesion of Connecticut and Rhode
Island to the Hartford Convention, placed over the
announcement the head-line, " Second and third
Pillars of a new Federal Edifice reared." During
November and December, almost every day, the newspapers discussed the question what the convention
should do; and the chief divergence of opinion seemed
to regard rather the immediate than the ultimate resort to forcible means of stopping the war. The
extremists, represented in the press by John Lowell,
asked for immediate action.
" Throwing off all connection with this wasteful war,"
— wrote " A New England Man " in the " Centinel " of
^ Otis'a Letters in Defence of the Uartford Convention, p. 10.
VOL. VIII.— 19
290 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. U.
December 17, — '' making peace with our enemy and opening once more our commerce with the world, would be a
wise and manly course. The occasion demands it of us,
and the people at large are ready to meet it."
Apparently Lowell was right. The people showed
no sign of unwillingness to meet any decision that
might be recommended by the convention. As the
moment approached, the country waited with increasing anxiety for the result. The Republican press —
the "National Intelligencer" as well as the Boston
*' Patriot " — at first ridiculed the convention, then
grew irritable, and at last betrayed signs of despair.
On both sides threats were openly made and openly
defied ; but in Massachusetts the United States government had not five hundred effective troops, and
if the convention chose to recommend that the State
should declare itself neutral and open its ports, no
one pretended that any national power existed in
Massachusetts capable of preventing the legislature
from carrying the recommendation into effect if it
pleased.
From immediate extravagance Massachusetts was
saved by the leaders who, knowing the popular excitement, feared lest the convention should be carried
too fast into disorder, and for that reason selected
representatives who could be trusted to resist emotion. When George Cabot was chosen as the head
of the StatJB delegation, the character of the body was
fixed. The selection of Cabot did not please the
advocates of action. Pickering wrote to Lowell sug-
1814. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 291
gesting doubts whether Cabot was the fittest choice.^
Lowell replied that he shared these doubts, and that
in consequence he had been led to oppose the convention altogether, because it would not withdraw
the State resources from the general government.*
Cabot, he said, was " most reluctantly dragged in like
a conscript to the duty of a delegate ;" he had always
been despondent as to the course of public affairs,
and felt no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people to their true disease, — which was not
the war or the Union, but democracy. Lowell did
not know ^^a single bold and ardent man" among
the Massachusetts or Connecticut delegates. Li the
" Centinel " of December 7 he described Cabot's tendencies in language evidently intended as a warning
to Cabot himself : —
^^ There are men who know that our troubles are not
the offspring of this war alone, and will not die with it.
But they despair of relief, and think resistance unavailing.
They consider the people in their very nature democratic,
and that nothing but the severity of their sufferings has
driven them from those men and that system out of
which have grown all our evils ; that should they be
restored to that state of prosperity which they once enjoyed, the same passions and opinions would diffuse
themselves through the country, and the same course
of conduct be again followed out."
Cabot shocked Pickering by expressing all his
favorite political views in one brief question : " Why
^ Pickering to Lowell, Nov. 7, 1814; Lodge's Cabot, p. 541.
* Lowell to Pickering, Dec. 3, 1814 ; Lodge's Cabot, p. 546.
292 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 11.
can't you and I let the world ruin itself its own
way ? " ^ Such a turn of mind was commonly the
mark of a sceptical spirit, which doubted whether
the world at best was worth the trouble of saving;
and against this inert and indifferent view of human
affairs New England offered a constant protest. Yet
the Massachusetts delegation to Hartford was in sym*
pathy with Cabot, while the Massachusetts legislature
seemed to sympathize with Pickering. William Prescott, another member of the delegation, was chiefly
remarkable for prudence and caution; Nathan Dane
bore the same stamp ; Harrison Gray Otis took character and color from his surroundings. The Connecticut delegation — James Hillhouse, Chauncey
Goodrich, Roger M. Sherman, and others — were little likely to recommend " effectual measures." The
convention consisted of men supposed to be inclined
to resist popular pressure, and Cabot was probably
serious in replying to a young friend who asked
him what he was to do at Hartford : " We are going to keep you young hot-heads from getting into
mischief." ^
In the Council Chamber of the State House at
Hartford the delegates assembled, December 15, and
gave instant evidence of their intention to discourage
appeals to popular emotion. Their earliest steps decided their whole course. They chose George Cabot
as their President, and they made their sessions se^ Lodge's Cabot, p. 541.
' Lodge's Cabot, p. 519.
18U. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. 293
cret. Under no circumstances could the convention
have regarded itself as a popular body, for the dele-gates numbered only twenty-three persons, mostly
cautious and elderly men, who detested democracy*
but disliked enthusiasm almost as much. Two new
members, appointed by popular meetings in New
Hampshire, were next admitted ; and toward the
close of the sessions another member, representing^
the county of Windham in Vermont, was given a
seat. Thus enlarged, the convention over which
George Cabot presided numbered twenty-six mem*
bers besides the secretary, Theodore Dwight.
Excess of caution helped to give the convention an
air of conspiracy, which warned future conspirators
to prefer acting, or appearing to act, in public. The
secrecy of the Hartford conference was chiefly intended to secure freedom for the exchange of opinion, and also in some degree to prevent premature
excitement and intrusion of popular feeling ; but the
secrecy created a belief that the debates would not
bear publicity. Possibly much was said which verged
on treasonable conspiracy ; but the members were
not men of a class likely to act beyond their instructions, and they adhered strictly to the practical task
imposed on them. Some years afterward, Harrison
Gray Otis, laboring to clear his political reputation
from the stigma of membership, caused the official
journal of the convention to be published; and the
record, though revealing nothing of what was said,
proved that nothing was formally done or proposed
294 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.U.
which contradicted the grave and restrained attitude
maintained in its public expressions.
On the first day of its meeting the conven