PATTERNS OF REGIONAL AUTHORITY
Gary Marks
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
VU, Amsterdam
[email protected]
Liesbet Hooghe
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
VU, Amsterdam
[email protected]
Arjan Schakel
VU, Amsterdam
[email protected]
Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Montreal, May 17-19, 2007
Draft – please do not quote – comments welcome
2
This paper summarizes some fundamental characteristics of regional authority in
42 democracies over the period 1950 to 2006 as evidenced in a new index. 1
The index covers countries in the OECD, the EU, and former communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess regional authority for these
countries on an annual basis from 1950, or since the introduction of democracy. So, for
example, we evaluate Canada and Denmark from 1950, Portugal from 1976, Spain from
1978, and Hungary from 1990. 2 An appendix to this paper summarizes the coding
scheme and presents numerical estimates for all levels of regional governance
aggregated to the country level.
Arjan Schakel (2007) cross-validates the Regional Authority Index with prior measures, including
Brancati (2006), Hooghe and Marks (2001), Lane and Ersson (1999), Lijphart (1999), Treisman (2002), and
Woldendorp et al. (2000).
2 We encompass democratic regimes for pragmatic reasons having to do with the quality and availability
of data, and limitations in our expertise. We also hypothesize that formal rules—the phenomena we
code—are more effective constraints on structures of power in democracies than in non-democracies.
However, there is no a priori reason why our coding scheme could not be extended to regimes in which
rulers violate the letter or the spirit of the law.
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are a case in point. Formal decentralization
was undermined by the hegemony of the communist party. As James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and
Claire Gordon observe: “Given that ‘democratic centralism’ was a common underlying organizational
principle, the actual configuration of local government structures was relatively homogenous across
Eastern Europe during the communist period. A vertical pyramidal system of ‘elected soviets’ (councils)
extended down from the national structures at the centre to the regional, district and local levels. . . .
These organizational structures provided a façade of popular legitimacy for the regimes while real power
was highly centralized to communist party structures . . . Regional administrations became essential
outposts of central government for implementing the ‘leading and guiding role’ of the party in the
country” (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 33-34, and 35.) It is no surprise, then, that, after the collapse of
communism postcommunist governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe made it a priority to
abolish regional government (O’Dwyer 2006: 219). In most countries, regionalization came only back on
the political agenda after the consolidation of democracy.
Communist regimes provide a stark illustration of William Riker’s insight that the degree of
centralization in federal systems is linked to the degree of political party centralization (1964; Volden
2004). While Riker confined his analysis to federal systems, the logic applies rather well to
decentralization and regionalization more generally. Communist democratic centralism was not equally
successful in hollowing out formal territorial decentralization. It failed where the communist party was
regionally divided or federalized, as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and, after 1969, Czechoslovakia, and
it encountered serious opposition where regional party bosses were able to water down central
authorities, as in Poland until the mid-1970s, and in Russia.
1
3
We follow Daniel Elazar (1991) in distinguishing between self-rule and shared
rule. Self rule consists of a) the scope of policy for which a regional government is
responsible (policy scope); b) the extent to which the region controls its financial
envelope (tax authority); c) the extent to which a region is endowed with representative
institutions (representation). We evaluate shared rule as the extent to which a region codetermines the authoritative decisions of the central government (role in central
government). Our coding focuses on formal rules—formal norms, legislation,
constitutional provisions—relating to these components. 3
We caste a wide net in determining whether a level of government is regional.
We include what the European Union designates at NUTS 1, NUTS 2, and NUTS 3
levels, that is, all levels of government that lie between local and national government.
Of the 42 democracies in our dataset, 8 countries have no regional tier, 22 have one
regional tier, and 12 countries have two. The country scores we refer to below are
calculated by aggregating the scores for each regional level. Because there is no
theoretical limit to the number of regional levels in a country, the Regional Authority
Index (RAI) has no mathematical upper limit. Among the countries we evaluate, the
highest scores are for Bosnia-Herzegovina (35.8 in 2006), Germany (33.0), and Belgium
(30.5). The mean RAI in 2006 is 11.9. The spread is wide: the standard deviation is 10.7.
Here we summarize some distinctive patterns that emerge from the data.
The question of how formal rules constrain, or do not constrain, structures of party control, etc, is an
empirical, not a definitional issue. We therefore do not include such phenomena in our index.
3
4
A pronounced, secular, uneven increase in regional authority
Of the 42 countries that we evaluate, 20 saw an aggregate increase in regional authority
over the period that we evaluate them, 18 saw no change, and four show a decline in
regional authority. Let us take a closer look at the countries in these categories.
No country has become appreciably more centralized. Sweden has experienced
the greatest decline in regional authority; its Regional Authority Index decreased from
11.5 to 10.0 from 1950 to 2006 as a result of the abolition of the upper chamber of the
Riksdag in 1970 which was composed of regional (Län) representatives. SerbiaMontenegro drops just over one point on the Regional Authority Index because in 2003
it shifted from a federation to a confederation which all but dissolved the center,
rendering power sharing with central government meaningless. The RAI for BosniaHerzegovina dropped a fraction in 2000 when the capital district Brčko was granted
special autonomy. Brčko has somewhat less say in central government decision making
than the two main regions, and this affects the country score. Finally, Canada dropped a
fraction in 1999 because the partition of the Northern Territories into two territories
slightly reduces the weight of regional governments in the country score.
Eighteen, or almost half of the countries that we examine, saw no change. The
reasons for this are self-evident, and they point to fundamental constraints on
regionalization. The first constraint is country size. A country with a small population
has little space to squeeze an intermediate level of government between local
authorities and the national government. On functional grounds, there may be little
reason to pay the costs of having an additional level of government if local authorities
5
cover populations up to, say 150,000, and national government serves a national
population below three million. The jurisdictional challenge for these countries lies in
creating governance above the national state, not below it (Hooghe, Marks, de Vries
2006).
Eight of the 18 countries that experience no change in regional governance begin
our time series with a Regional Authority Index of zero and finish in 2006 with zero. All
have a population of 2.5 million or less, and the median population for the eight is 1.09
million. 4
A second constraint on regionalization is that countries with very high levels of
regionalization face a ceiling effect. Our measurement instrument does not impose a
mathematical upper limit on regionalization because it is always logically possible to
create and empower an additional level of regional governance. Large countries tend to
have two levels of regional governance, not one, and it would be possible for them to
create a third or fourth level. But this is a logical, rather than a practical, possibility. On
average, the most regionalized countries, which have tend to have federal constitutions,
inch up much more slowly than non-federal countries: on our index, average annual
change (since 1950 or since democratization) is 0.14 for non-federal and 0.0015 for
federal countries. Three federal countries (Germany, Switzerland, and the United
States) experienced no change.
Bulgaria, with a population of just under eight million, is the one larger country in our dataset whose
regional tier in 2006 is merely deconcentrated administration (a score of 1).
4
6
That leaves five countries which are not covered by the functional constraints of
small population and the ceiling effect. These are Bulgaria (RAI = 1.0), Japan (8.0), the
Netherlands (11.5), Portugal (2.5), and Turkey (5.0). The Netherlands was already quite
decentralized in 1950 with stronger regional governance than all but three Western
European countries, a historical residual of its confederal past. 5 The remaining
countries that saw no change are highly centralized given their population size.
Bulgaria (with a population of 7.8 million) is the most centralized country in our dataset
with a population greater than 2.5 million; Portugal (population 10.5 million) is the
most centralized country in our dataset with a population greater than 7.8 million;
Turkey (population 71.7 million) is the most centralized with a population greater than
10.5 million, and Japan (population 127.8 million) is the most centralized with a
population greater than 71.7 million. Centralization and institutional stasis appear to be
related. Each of these countries has a different story. 6 However, in this essay we must
try to contain our eagerness to chase after individual cases, but instead restrict
ourselves to the general pattern.
What we can say is that it is easier to identify the characteristics of countries that
did not regionalize than to identify the characteristics of countries that did regionalize.
This is actually a revealing statement, for it suggests that the causes of regionalization
are diverse. Regionalization has taken place in small countries and large countries
The Netherlands is an interesting case for examining Riker’s hypothesis concerning the interplay
between party centralization and constitutional rules. While the provinces have extensive formal power
over central government policy by means of their presence in the upper chamber, in reality upper
chamber representatives sit and vote according to party affiliation rather than provincial loyalty.
6 Perhaps a common thread is an ideological attachment to national unity that reaches across the political
spectrum to parties of the left as on the right.
5
7
(measured by population and territorial size), ethnically diverse societies and ethnically
homogenous societies, countries that were centralized in 1950 and countries that were
decentralized in 1950, established democracies and recent democracies.
This pattern is consistent with a postfunctionalist account of multilevel
governance that assumes that the provision of governance is subject to functional
pressures, but that the extent to which these pressures lead to reform depends on their
distributional effects and their identity effects (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Functional
pressures arise because some collective problems (such as town planning; fire
protection, nursery schooling and kindergarten) are best handled at a population scale
of tens of thousands, some (such as vocational and technical education; secondary
education; and hospitals) are best handled at a scale of hundred of thousands, some
(such as tourism promotion; environmental protection; and transport infrastructure) are
best handled at a scale of millions, while yet other problems demand jurisdictions that
are vastly larger. 7 This functional approach presumes considerable dynamism, not
stasis, if the policy portfolio of a polity changes. If conventional war-making dominates
policy, as it did in the first half of the twentieth century, then one would expect
functional pressure for concentrating decision making at the most centralized level
available, i.e. the central state. War-making and extracting resources necessary for war
was instrumental in the development of national systems of education, national systems
of taxation, conscription, national ownership or control of mineral extraction, transport,
and munitions. In the years immediately following World War II, central states were
7
This list is derived from our (as yet unpublished) expert survey of efficient jurisdictional design.
8
also called upon to distribute extreme scarcity and to mobilize resources, human and
financial, to begin rebuilding battered economies.
The period since 1950 has seen unparalleled diversification in the policy portfolio
of national states to welfare, environmental, educational, infrastructural, and
microeconomic policies. Unlike conventional war-making, these policies do not press
authority towards the central state. The functional logic of regional governance requires
simply that the policy portfolio of national states has come to include policies that are
most efficiently delivered at diverse jurisdictional scales, including a regional level
between the local and national.
Countries that did not experience regionalization in the post-1950 period are,
therefore, likely to be those that were not subject to this functional pressure—very small
countries or countries that already had strong regional governments. Predicting the
positive side of the equation is more difficult because one cannot assume that functional
pressure leads to jurisdictional reform. This is not just because institutions are sticky,
and correspondingly, that institutional reform is inherently difficult to point-predict.
More importantly, political choice intervenes between functional pressures and
institutional outcomes. The level of authoritative decision making has consequences for
the distribution of power, for the distribution of income, and for self-governance. As we
look further into the data we have gathered, the causal force of these intervening
political factors will become apparent.
Figure 1 summarizes regionalization in the 21 democracies which we measure
continuously from 1950 to 2006. The ratchet-like character of the process is evident. As
9
noted above, we are evidently dealing with a process that is nearly uni-directional and
one that has taken place over an extended period of time. But there is another salient
feature: a sharp discontinuity in the rate of change around 1970. Before 1970, the series
is almost flat; after 1970, there is a sharp, sustained, upward trend.
[Figure 1 about here]
This discontinuity coincides with a cultural shock that swept across the globe in
the late 1960s, and which in the West took the form of youth rebellion and new forms of
self-expression that questioned or, more usually, confronted, conventional norms.
Norms that were taken for granted—including materialism, cultural progress, and short
hair—were explicitly challenged as were political norms, including deference to
political leaders and centralized decision making. In 1973, E. F. Schumacher wrote a
book entitled “Small is Beautiful” which fiercely questioned the virtues of a materialist
culture based on ever larger organizations that were out of touch with human need.
Preferences for greater self-determination and popular democracy were most likely to
mobilize demands for change in centralized democracies, particularly where there were
territorially concentrated ethnic minorities. 8
The first moves in the early 1970s relaxed centralization in formerly highly
centralized states—creating regions and communities in Belgium (1970); direct elections
for Amter in Denmark (1970), a level of regional governance in France (1972); longpromised regionalization (including directly elected regional assemblies) in Italy (1972);
We do not have a very good measure for territorially concentrated ethnic minorities, but two proxies—
ethnic fragmentation (the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic
group) and linguistic fragmentation (based on linguistic proximities)—are weakly associated with the
level of regional authority (controlling for population size): 0.34 and 0.33 respectively.
8
10
regional councils in New Zealand (1974), directly elected Fylke in Norway (1975) and
creation of comunidades autonomas in Spain (1978). These were followed by reforms that
put guts in newly created territorial tiers—regions and communities in Belgium (1980),
directly elected regional councils in New Zealand (1989)—or that deepened existing
regional tiers—constitutional power sharing in Austria (1984), broader competencies for
Italian (1976, 1989) and Spanish (1979-1994) regions, and competencies and direct
elections for French regions (1982, 1986). This was also an era in which special
autonomy was granted on an ad hoc basis to anomalous, often outlying, territories such
as Greenland (from Denmark in 1979), the Northern Territory (Australia 1974), Corsica
(1982), Canberra (Australia 1989), and Scotland and Wales (United Kingdom 1999).
The composition of regionalization
Figure 1 charts regionalization and its four main components for 21 democracies that
we evaluate continuously since 1950. The pattern is revealing.
The greatest change has been in the institutionalization of directly elected
regional assemblies. Elected institutions at the regional level have always been a facet of
federal polities, but the idea has spread. The mean score on our 8-point scale is 2.3 for
1950; rising to 4.0 in 2006. 9 Across the entire dataset of 42 countries, 23 countries had
directly elected regional assemblies in 1950 or when they became democratic. In 2006,
33 countries had adopted the principle.
9
The scale has a ceiling greater than eight because some countries have two regional levels.
11
Interestingly, this is a reform that cannot be laid at the door of functional
pressures. The provision of elected assemblies appears more in line with the cultural
changes of the post-sixties era than with an efficiency argument based on the territorial
scope of externalities and economies of scale.
The second major change has been in the policy portfolio of regional
governments. In 1950, the mean score was 4.3, rising to 5.8 in 2006. Again, the
development is uneven: ten countries saw an increase in regional competencies; eleven
(including all but one federal country, Australia) saw no change. The greatest increases
were in Belgium (+8), Italy (+6.4), Greece (+5), and France (+4), and in several special
autonomous regions: Greenland (+8), Scotland and Northern Ireland (+7), Wales (+4),
and the Greater London Authority (+4).
Regional power over taxation has grown, but on our 8-point scale the absolute
change has been a modest increase from 2.2 in 1950 to 3.0 in 2006. 10 The role of regions
in central government decision making has risen only slightly, from 2.1 in 1950 to 2.4 in
2006. 11
These components of regional authority appear to be quite tightly coupled.
Countries that saw an increase in one component tended to see an increase across the
board. A principal components factor analysis of the four change variables (for 2006
10 Among the 21 established democracies, one finds the greatest tax authority in 2006 in five federal
countries: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the United States (8) and Belgium (6); Germany, where
extensive power sharing offsets relatively weak tax autonomy for the Länder, has a score of 5 on our
index. Among the later democracies, only Bosnia & Herzegovina (10.6), Serbia & Montenegro (8.9), and
Spain (6) join this group.
11 The greatest increases occurred in Belgium (+4), Austria (+2), and Australia (+1.1); in Sweden, power
sharing declined by 3.5 on an 8-point scale triggered by the abolition of the upper chamber.
12
minus 1950 for 21 democracies) produces a single factor explaining 66.7 percent of the
variance. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83. 12
Five generalizations
We suggest the following five generalizations about the level of regional authority and
the process of regionalization:
•
A ceiling effect, in which the greater the level of regional authority in a country,
the smaller its increase. We expect the effect to be an increasing, not linear, function
of the level of regional authority. It can be modeled as the inverse of the square of
the regional authority (R).
↑R=
1
R2
To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis (Richard Feynman [1965] would call it
a “guess”) requires multivariate analysis, a project beyond this essay. Here we must
be content to present a figure which provides some prima facie evidence for a
negative association between the level of regional authority and its rate of increase. 13
The Cronbach’s alpha for absolute levels of the four components across 42 countries in 2006 is 0.89.
This formulation of the ceiling effect applies to our current era of emergent multilevel governance, but
there is nothing intrinsic about rising levels of regionalization (or rising levels of Europeanization). The
logic of our argument is that multilevel governance could be reversed because the policy portfolio
changes (compressing competencies to a single authoritative level, e.g., in response to war); for
distributional reasons (for example, when a dictator identifies his own interest with that of compressing
12
13
13
[Figure 2 about here]
An S-curve effect, where the association of country size (measured in population and
in territory) on regional authority depends on the absolute size of a country. Across
countries below a certain size, there is little functional benefit in regional authority.
At some point (between two and three million population) the benefits of regional
authority emerge, and increase rapidly until the population reaches between twenty
and thirty million, at which point the benefits of regionalization in relation to
population level off. No country in our dataset with a population of less than two
million has regional governance. No country with a population of more than 20
million lacks regional governance.
•
A diversity effect, in which countries with territorially distinct ethno-cultural
minorities have higher levels of regional authority than more than homogenous
countries. The diversity effect arises because individuals have preferences over
policy and preferences over self-rule. The policy argument hypothesizes that
authority in his own hands); or on account of the mobilization of an exclusive identity (e.g. nationalism).
Such scenarios entice us to theorize the decline of regional authority as well as its rise, and so we
hypothesize a more general association:
ΔR =
1
R2
The rationale for this is that regional authority in federal polities (which tend to have high levels of
regional authority) is more difficult to reverse (i.e. stickier) than regional authority in non-federal
systems. However, an evaluation of the validity of this hypothesis will have to wait for the current era of
rising multilevel governance to end.
14
individuals with different ethno-cultural traditions desire heterogeneous mixes of
public goods, such as education, welfare, and economic policy (Alesina and
Spolaore 2001). The self-rule argument hypothesizes that individuals sharing ethnocultural norms desire some self-rule, that is, a capacity to project institutionalized
power into the future (Keating 1997; Loughlin 2001).
Figure 3 plots the level of regional authority against the natural logarithm of
population for 2006 for the 42 countries in our dataset. As we expect, more populous
countries are more regionalized. What is of interest here, however, is that countries
that have unusually high regional scores tend to be those with ethnic minorities,
which we identify with dark circles in the figure.
[Figure 3]
•
A democracy effect, in which democracies have a higher level of regional authority
than non-democracies. As noted above, this assertion is rooted in a strong prior:
democracies allocate authority not in terms of a ruler’s ability to amass power in his
own hands and eliminate that of challengers (or simply eliminate challengers), but
in terms of winning votes in competitive elections. Monocracy suffocates multilevel
governance, democracy is agnostic.
We cannot evaluate the validity of this hypothesis in a dataset where the case
selection is heavily biased to democratic polities, but the evidence that we have
about change is in line with this expectation. The logical implication of the democracy
effect is that a country that shifts from autocracy to democracy will be newly subject
15
to the pressures discussed above. Figure 4 charts average increases in regional
authority in three groups of countries, and reveals that the post-communist regimes
of Eastern Europe have high rates of change.
[Figure 4]
•
A trade insulation effect, in which regionalization is stimulated when it has no
effect on trade and hindered when it disrupts trade. If reform to create regional
political autonomy does not harm a region’s participation in the international
division of labor, then we can speak of regional authority as a decomposable good.
A region can have its cake and eat it, so to speak. If economic autarky is part of the
package, then the economic cost of regionalization will be significant, and perhaps
prohibitive.
So when might political autonomy be detachable from economic autarky? Most
obviously, when rules concerning trade and economic exchange are already
detached from the national state, i.e. when there is an overarching set of
international rules that will be insulated from authoritative reform within a member
state. This is not the only circumstance in which regional authority is a
decomposable good, but it is one that we see very clearly in figure 4, above.
16
Conclusion
Regional governance appears to have an explicable set of logics that derive from
its functional and political sources. In this paper we set some of these out with the help
of a measure of regional authority covering 42 democracies since 1950.
The structure of jurisdictional design is distinctive in two respects. First, the
direction of change appears to be highly uniform. Where we see jurisdictional change in
the last 56 years it is almost exclusively in one direction. We detect 60 cases of
jurisdictional reform of which 51 empowered regions. The average increase in
regionalization as measured on the index is 2.95. The average regional decline across
the nine contrary cases is −0.94. 14 So we detect five times as many instances of
regionalization as anti-regionalization, and their mean individual value is three times as
great.
We suspect that homogeneity of change is not unique to the post World War II
period. The previous era, which may have lasted for considerably more than a century,
was characterized by similar uniformity in the direction of change, but with the
opposite sign. An era of centralization has been followed by an era of regionalization.
We have suggested some reasons why this might have happened, but we have not
mentioned several plausible alternative explanations, including international diffusion.
Second, there is very wide variation across countries in the level of regional
authority (and by implication, in the level of central state authority). Seven of the 42
Three of these are in the UK, and arise from the changing status of Northern Ireland and the
reorganization of local authorities in Scotland and Wales prior to devolution.
14
17
countries we examine had no regional level of government, even after more than half a
century of regionalization. Twelve countries have regions that exert considerable
authority, scoring more than 20 on the Regional Authority Index. The standard
deviation in the RAI, at 10.7 is almost as great as its mean level, 11.9. We suspect that
this variation is also historically robust. Although many polities in the nineteenth
century and first half of the twentieth century became more centralized, federal polities
continued to co-exist with highly centralized polities.
The jurisdictional ar chitecture of polities is in equal parts puzzling and
fascinating. The measure we have created helps to reveal not simply the course of
jurisdictional reform, but also some basic questions that remain unanswered.
18
Figure 1:
Evolution of Regional Authority in Established Democracies
(1950-2006)
Policy scope
Representation
Tax authority
Power sharing
Average Regional Authority
16
12
8
0
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
4
Note: Yearly average for 21 democracies since 1950.
Policy scope = breadth of regional policy responsibility (0-8);
Representation = existence and role of regional legislature (0-4);
Tax authority = extent to which the region controls its revenue (0-8);
Power sharing = extent to which the region affects central government decisions (0-8).
Full coding described in Appendix.
19
Figure 2:
The Ceiling Effect
27
Lower than 20
on RAI
20 or higher on
RAI
Average regional authority
24
21
18
15
12
9
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
6
Note: 21 democracies continuously evaluated 1950-2006. The RAI ≥ 20 category consists of
Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States.
20
Figure 3:
Population, Ethnicity, and Regional Authority
BAH
36
Low ethnic
diversity
High ethnic
diversity
Fit line for Total
GER
BEL
SPA
30
Regional authority index
CAN
24
SWI
USA
ITA
AUS
RUS
AUT SAM
FRA
18
12
NOR
GRENET
CRO NZ SWE
SK
CZE
LIT FIN
6
ICE
0
ROM
HUN
DK
LUX CYP
MAL EST
6
IRE
MAC
SL
ALB
LAT
UK
JAP
POL
TUR
POR
BUL
8
10
12
Natural log of population
Note: 42 countries.
Population: Natural log of 6 = population of 0.403 million; 8 = 2.98 million; 10 = 22.0 million; 12
=162.8 million; 13 = 442.4 million.
Ethnicity: ethnic fragmentation index which represents the probability that two randomly
selected individuals belong to a different ethnic group (xxx). We dichotomize this variable at a
natural breakpoint in our dataset, where 1= index value of 0.4 or greater.
21
Figure 4:
Annual Change in Regional Authority by Decade
Average annual change in regional authority
0.3
Non-EU OECD
EU west
Postcommunist
countries
0.2
0.1
0.0
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Note: Annual change in Regional Authority Index for 35 democracies, 1950-2006, averaged by
decade.
22
Appendix: An Index of Regional Authority
The region is a rubbery concept stretching above and below the national state.
Our focus here is on subnational regions, but there is no generally accepted definition
that we can take on board that will readily produce a set of homogenous units for crossnational comparison. Our first and immediate task then is to conceptualize the region in
a way that meets, as far as possible, normal linguistic usage while providing the
researcher with a meaningful and unambiguous unit of analysis.
Our basic conceptual decisions are as follows:
First, a region refers to a given territory having by single, continuous, and nonintersecting boundary with respect to the boundaries of other regions.
Second, a political region, the object of our analysis, is distinguished by a set of
institutions responsible for binding decision making.
Third, regions are located between local governments and national governments.
For our purposes, then, a region is a coherent territorial entity situated between local
and national government which possesses institutions that engage in binding decision making.
This definition is intentionally minimal. Our purpose is to define a particular set
of objects while leaving unspecified their salient political characteristics for empirical
evaluation. These include the extent to which a region exercises authority. If the region
merely reflects the will of the central government, we describe regional governance as
deconcentrated; to the extent that a region exerts independent influence over binding
decisions, we describe it as autonomous.
Then there is the vexed issue of the possible existence of more than one level of
regional governance in a country. Local governments and national governments define
extremes within which there may be plural intermediate levels. How do we determine
which level is the regional? In previous work, we selected the most authoritative level
as the region that we measured. But this is problematic, for it is unable to account for
countries where there are two levels of autonomous regional governance. Here we take
a comprehensive approach. We measure the authority exercised by all intermediate
levels of governance specified by the NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales
Statistiques) classification of the European Union. 15 This is more demanding, but it has
the virtue of providing scores for regional governance at all appropriate levels. When
using this index, the reader may choose to examine the disaggregated scores we
provide for each regional level or aggregate scores for each country.
We estimate regional authority across 42 countries, including all 27 countries in
the European Union, the Balkan countries, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Russia,
Turkey, and several non-European countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
and the United States. We assess regional authority for each of these countries
Regional government encompasses all regional governments that meet the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3
criterion. This classification scheme is used in most European countries, including several non-EU
countries (e.g. Norway and Switzerland). For countries that do not use the NUTS classification, we apply
the population size criteria which underlie the NUTS categorization.
15
23
continuously in annual increments for the period 1950 or since the introduction of
democracy to 2006.
The index set out here builds on the Regional Governance Index in Hooghe and
Marks (2001), but there are several differences:
• The unit of analysis for the prior index was the country; here it is the region.
• The prior index evaluated only the most authoritative regional level; here we
evaluate all regional levels that meet the NUTS 1, 2, or 3 criteria.
• The prior index summarized scores by decade; here we provide scores on an
annual basis as regional authority changes.
• We now extend the index to 2006.
• The prior index covered 14 EU countries; here we extend this to an additional 28
countries in and beyond Europe.
• Finally, the new index introduces a new dimension, regional tax authority, and
significantly revises the other three dimensions.
We operationalize authority as a multi-dimensional concept. To begin with, it
varies with respect to its breadth and its depth. Breadth refers to the scope of policy for
which a region government is responsible. Depth refers to authority exercised over
policy decisions. Authoritative depth is compounded of a) the extent to which the
region controls its financial envelope; b) the extent to which a region exerts authority
independently of the central government; and c) the extent to which a region codetermines the authoritative decisions of the central government.
We summarize the constituents of regional authority as follows:
• Policy scope: How broad is the policy responsibility of regional
institutions?
• Tax authority: To what extent does the region control its revenue
• Representation: Does the region have an independent, elected,
legislature?
• Role of regions in central government: To what extent can the region
affect central government decisions?
These elements pertain to formal authority. They are explicitly mandated in
legislation and in national constitutions. This enhances the reliability of our coding. But
there is a more compelling reason for distinguishing formal authority from informal
norms. We are interested in how formal rules are empirically related to informal
sources of power arising from ideology, strategic bargaining, party (de)centralization,
and corruption. We therefore need to evaluate formal rules independently from these
factors.
Below we detail our coding for each of these dimensions.
Policy Scope
Policy scope taps the formal scope of regional governance over substantive policy
making. Here, as elsewhere in our index, sequential categories are scored on a base-2
24
logarithm. This may be unfamiliar, but it has a logic that is perfectly adapted to our
purpose. It is simple, intuitive, and substantively appropriate. The underlying idea is
that the intervals in our scoring increase with the authority of a region. That is to say,
the absolute difference in the authority exercised by a weak and a very weak region is
far smaller than that between a strong and a very strong region. As we move along our
scale, absolute differences increase while the ratio of one score to the next remains
constant.
The categories set out below are cumulative. That is to say, a region with a given
score is presumed to meet the criteria that produce a lower score. So all regions coded
one or more have a functioning regional administration; all regions coded two or more
exercise significant authority over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, and/or
welfare state policy; and so forth.
•
•
•
•
1: a functioning general-purpose regional administration;
2: exercises significant authority in one of the following areas: economic
policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy;
4: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas:
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy;
8: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas:
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy; and has
coercive or constitutive power over two or more of the following: local
government, police, regional political institutions (e.g. regional
administrative organization, the budget process, regional elections),
residual powers (i.e. powers not constitutionally specified).
Tax Authority
The capacity to collect and spend money is an vital component of regional authority.
One commonly-used measure is the amount of money a region spends. The problem
with this is that deconcentrated regions (i.e. regions with little or no autonomy from
central government) are, in some cases, big spenders. The approach we take here is to
assess the extent to which a region has discretion to tax. We revise [explain howxxx] the
criteria of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Tax Policy
Studies, 1999) to measure the degree of formal control a region has over its sources of
revenue. As with policy scope we apply a logistic scale for all positive integers to
represent the cumulative nature of the scale and the increasing intervals between our
evaluation points.
•
•
0: revenue from any tax is unilaterally determined by the central
government and/or the central government sets base and rate of regional
taxes;
1: the region sets the rate of regional taxes, but this does not encompass
income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes;
25
•
•
•
2: the region sets the base and rate of regional taxes, but this does not
encompass income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes; or the region
sets the rate of one or more of income, corporate, value added, or sales tax;
4: the region sets the base for all regional taxes; or it has a veto over the
central/regional distribution of revenue from income, corporate, value
added, or sales taxes;
8: the region sets the base and rate of one or more of income, corporate,
value added, or sales tax.
Representative Institutions
Regional executives may be accountable to the central state or to regional assemblies.
Even when representative regional institutions cannot dismiss regional executives, such
institutions increase the legitimacy, and therefore, the authority, of regional
governments. Some regions have directly elected regional assemblies; others have
indirectly elected regional assemblies; and yet others (the majority of regions in our
dataset) have no regional assemblies. Our scoring assesses a) whether the executive is
regionally elected or appointed by the central government, and b) whether the regional
legislature is popularly elected, indirectly elected, or appointed by the central
government. Our scoring here is non-cumulative, and it has a maximum score of four
(i.e. half that of policy scope or tax power).
•
•
•
•
0: no regional legislative assembly;
1: regional legislative assembly is popularly elected or indirectly elected
(i.e. composed of elected local government representatives), but the head
of the regional executive is a national appointee;
2: regional assembly is indirectly elected (i.e. composed of elected local
government representatives), and the executive head is elected by the
assembly or is popularly elected;
4: regional assembly is popularly elected, and the executive head is elected
by the assembly or is popularly elected.
Role in Central Government
Regions may exercise authority on account of their role in national decision making. We
distinguish three avenues. First, regions may participate directly in making national
laws. This requires that they are represented in the national legislature, usually in an
upper chamber that is (partially or wholly) devoted to subnational interests. Second,
regional governments may share executive responsibility with the national government
for implementing policy in the region and in the country as a whole. Finally, and most
importantly, regions may play a role in decisions about which level of government does
what, how, and with what resources. Regions may, in short, co-determine the allocation
of authority in a polity. The first and second avenues of power-sharing concern the role
that regions play in national decision making and we score each a maximum of two
26
points; the final avenue concerns the extent to which regions write the rules of the
game, and we score this up to four points.
Regional authority in power sharing varies considerably. Mere representation
does not imply decisional power. By the same token, regional executives may convene
regularly with the central government in intergovernmental conferences, but such
meetings may not bind the central government. We therefore need to distinguish
between the share of regional representation in a legislature (often an upper chamber)
or executive, and the power of these bodies.
Constitutional power sharing
• 1: the upper house is popularly elected and a majority or supermajority of
representatives must approve constitutional change;
• 2: regional governments/ parliaments—or their representatives in the upper
house—must be consulted on constitutional change and have the power to
postpone decision, introduce amendments, increase the decision hurdle in
the lower chamber, require a second vote in the lower chamber, or require
approval by a popular referendum; or: a majority of regional
governments/ parliaments—or their representatives in the upper house—
must approve constitutional change;
• 4: a supermajority of regional governments/ parliaments—or their
representatives in the upper house—must approve constitutional change.
Legislative power sharing
We score 0.5 point for each of the following characteristics:
• Regions are the unit of representation in the upper chamber, i.e. the
distribution of representation in the legislature is determined by regional
weights, rather than “one citizen, one vote” in the country as a whole.
• Regional governments/legislatures designate representatives to represent
their interests in the upper chamber.
• Regions at a given level have a majority of representation in the upper
chamber.
• The upper chamber has wide-ranging authority, that is to say, it has
extensive legislative power, wields a veto on some important issues, or
has the power to increase the decision hurdle (e.g. to a two-thirds majority
in another legislature).
Executive power sharing
• 1: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
regional governments without authority to reach binding decisions;
• 2: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
regional governments with authority to reach binding decisions.
27
Asymmetrical and Special Autonomous Regions
We apply the same coding scheme for asymmetrical and special autonomous regions,
though we make minor adjustments for the latter to take into account the special
character of these regions. We speak of an asymmetrical arrangement when a region
falls under a country-wide constitutional structure, but enjoys more (or sometimes less)
extensive powers in terms of policy scope, representation, tax power or power sharing
than other regions relative to the central government. Asymmetry is frequently
proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when a perception of significant
ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences set a region apart from others. Asymmetrical
arrangements may be temporary, as e.g. for the historical regions in Spain, or indefinite,
as for example, for the territories in Canada or Australia. Special autonomous regions
differ from asymmetrical or typical regions in that their statute is sui generis: they are
exempt from the country-wide jurisdictional framework, and they receive special
treatment in the constitution or equivalent formal statutory laws. 16 So while
asymmetrical regions could be described as “+/- typical regions,” special autonomous
regions are more aptly conceived as opt-outs.
The peculiar situation of special autonomous regions makes it more difficult for
them to claim shared rule. If there is an upper chamber that reflects regional interests,
special autonomous regions are always in the minority; if there are intergovernmental
meetings, they usually influence only the particular effects of a policy in the
autonomous region; if the autonomous region has constitutional power, it is usually
limited to its bilateral relation with the host country—not the constitutional architecture
of the country as a whole. 17 Shared rule, then, tends to be confined to shaping central
policy with respect to the territory—rather than shaping policy for the country as a
whole. The flipside is that special autonomous regions, unlike other regions, usually
have considerable input in—sometimes ultimate authority over—central government
policy in their territory.
Most special autonomous regions would normally classify as a Local Authority Units (LAU) if one
were to apply the formal population criteria of the NUTS categorization. But in reality, special
autonomous regions usually fall under one of the upper NUTS categories. The Åland islands (Finland),
for example, fall under the EU’s NUTS 1. Ceuta and Mellila (Spain) have been NUTS 3 since Spain became
a member of the EU, and were upgraded to NUTS 2 in 1995 when they became full-fledged communidades.
Corse (France) and Açores and Madeira (Portugal) are NUTS 2 even though their population size would
warrant a NUTS 3 classification.
17 Our notion of special autonomous region combines three special arrangements which Daniel Elazar
defines as associated state, federacy, and home-rule territory—in order of declining autonomy. An
associated state is an asymmetrical arrangement whereby a larger power and smaller polity are linked
asymmetrically in a federal relationship in which the latter has substantial autonomy and in return has a
minimal role in the governance of the larger power; like a confederation, it can be dissolved unilaterally
by either of the parties under pre-arranged terms. A federacy is similar to an associated state in terms of
internal autonomy, except that, like in a federation, the relationship between them can be dissolved only
by mutual agreement. Finally, home rule territories have significant powers of self-government, but unlike
the federacy and associated state relationships, the central government of the state typically plays an
active role in some areas of the home-rule territory’s internal government, such as internal security,
judicial matters, and economic and monetary matters (Elazar 1997: 398).
16
28
We apply the same criteria for measuring the authority of asymmetrical regions
as we do for other regions. For special autonomous regions, we use the same criteria for
policy scope, representation and tax power, and we tailor the criteria of power sharing
to their special situation in the following way:
Constitutional power sharing (0-4):
• 1: the regional government/legislature is consulted by the central
government/ parliament on constitutional amendments that affect its
position in the national state, but the consultation is not binding;
• 2: the regional government/legislature and central government/
parliament co-decide constitutional amendments that affect the region’s
position in the national state: both have veto power;
• 4: the regional government/legislature can unilaterally accept or reject
constitutional amendments that affect the region’s position in the national
state.
Legislative power sharing (0-2):
We score each of the following characteristics in the following way:
• 0.5: the region is the unit of representation in the upper and lower
chambers;
• 0.5: the regional government/legislature designates representatives in the
upper chamber;
• 0.5: the regional government/ parliament/ regional representation in the
upper chamber is consulted on national legislation affecting the region;
• 0.5: the regional government/ parliament/ regional representation in the
upper chamber has veto power over national legislation affecting the
region.
Executive power sharing (0-2):
• 1: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
the regional government for consultation on executive matters affecting
the region; no binding authority;
• 2: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and
the regional government for consultation and arbitration on executive
matters affecting the region; binding authority.
Country Scores
We obtain country scores by aggregating the scores of constituent regions. Where a
country has a special autonomous region, we weigh the score of the region by its
population.
29
Appendix: Regional Authority Index in 42 Democracies, 1950-2006, Country Scores
Country
Year
Self-rule
Policy
scope
Tax
power
Representative
institutions
Sharedrule
Constitutional
power
sharing
Legislative
power
sharing
Executive
power
sharing
RAI
Albania
1992-1999
2000-2006
1950-1973
1974-1988
1989-2006
1950-1983
1984-2006
1950-1969
1970-1979
1980
1981-1988
1989-1992
1993-1994
1995-2006
1995-1999
2000-2006
1991-2006
1950-1998
1999-2006
1993-2006
1960-2006
1993-1999
2000-2006
1950-1969
1970-1978
1979-2006
1992-2006
0
2.0
15.3
16.6
19.0
16.0
16.0
7.0
9.0
13.0
17.0
21.0
21.0
23.0
30.0
29.8
1.0
20.8
20.5
9.0
0
0
8.0
5.1
10.1
10.2
0
0
1.0
6.3
6.6
7.0
8.0
8.0
4.0
5.0
8.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
11.9
1.0
8.3
8.0
4.0
0
0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.1
0
0
0
6.0
6.5
8.0
4.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
12.0
11.9
0
8.0
8.0
1.0
0
0
0
0.1
2.1
2.1
0
0
1.0
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
6.0
6.0
0
4.5
4.5
4.0
0
0
4.0
1.0
4.0
4.0
0
0
0
3.4
4.0
4.5
4.0
6.0
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
5.5
7.5
7.5
6.0
6.0
0
6.0
6.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
0
0
0.8
0.9
1.0
2.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
0
4.0
4.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.04
0
0
0
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.0
2.0
0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
1.5
1.8
2.0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
2.0
2.0
2.0
0
0
0
2.0
2.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
2.0
18.6
20.6
23.5
20.0
22.0
10.5
12.5
16.5
20.5
26.5
28.5
30.5
36.0
35.8
1.0
26.8
26.5
10.0
0
0
8..0
5.2
10.1
10.3
0
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Estonia
30
Country
Year
Self-rule
Policy
scope
Tax
power
Representative
institutions
Sharedrule
Constitutional
power
sharing
Legislative
power
sharing
Executive
power
sharing
RAI
Finland
1950-1993
1994-2006
1950-1958
1959-1971
1972-1981
1982-1985
1986-1990
1991-2006
1950-2006
1950-1985
1986-1993
1994-2006
1990-1998
1999-2006
1950-2006
1950-1986
1987-1993
1994-2006
1950-1963
1964-1971
1972-1975
1976-1988
1989-1992
1993-1997
1998-2000
2001-2006
1950-2006
1990-2006
1.1
5.1
6.0
8.0
10.0
16.1
18.0
18.0
25.0
1.0
3.0
11.0
9.0
12.0
0
0
1.0
3.0
10.4
11.0
15.5
17.0
17.0
19.0
19.3
23.0
8.0
0
1.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
12.0
1.0
2.0
6.0
4.0
6.0
0
0
1.0
1.0
5.6
6.0
7.5
9.0
9.0
9.0
9.0
12.0
4.0
0
0
0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
5.0
0
0
0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.0
2.3
3.0
0
0
0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
6.1
8.0
8.0
8.0
0
1.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
0
0
0
2.0
4.8
5.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
4.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05
0.05
0
8.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.2
1.3
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.2
0.3
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05
0.05
0
2.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0
0
1.1
5.1
6.0
8.0
10.0
16.2
18.1
18.0
33.0
1.0
3.0
11.0
9.0
12.0
0
0
1.0
3.0
11.6
12.3
17.5
19.0
20.0
22.0
22.3
26.0
8.0
0
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
31
Country
Year
Self-rule
Policy
scope
Tax
power
Representative
institutions
Sharedrule
Constitutional
power
sharing
Legislative
power
sharing
Executive
power
sharing
RAI
Lithuania
1992-1994
1995-2006
1950-2006
1991-2006
1964-2006
1950-2006
1950-1973
1974-1988
1989-2006
1950-1974
1975-2006
1990-1998
1999-2006
1976-2006
1991-1993
1994-1995
1996-1997
1998-2006
1993-1995
1996-2004
2005-2006
1992-2002
2003-2006
1992-1995
1996-2001
2002-2006
1991-2006
0
4.0
0
0
0
6.0
0
6.0
8.0
6.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
2.4
6.0
8.0
10.0
13.0
13.0
16.0
13.0
18.8
18.8
0
1.0
8.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.0
0
2.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
1.1
4.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.3
8.3
0
0
4.0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
1.0
0
2.0
2.0
0
2.0
0
0
0.1
0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
6.5
6.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.0
0
2.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
1.1
2.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
1.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
4.0
0
0
4.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0
0
0
0
8.0
8.0
8.0
4.5
3.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05
0
0
0
0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.25
3.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.05
0
0
0
0
2.0
2.0
2.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5.0
0
0
0
11.5
0
6.0
8.0
6.0
10.0
2.0
8.0
2.5
6.0
8.0
10.0
13.0
21.0
24.0
21.0
23.3
22.1
0
1.0
8.0
0
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian
Federation
Serbia and
Montenegro
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
32
Country
Year
Self-rule
Policy
scope
Tax
power
Representative
institutions
Sharedrule
Constitutional
power
sharing
Legislative
power
sharing
Executive
power
sharing
RAI
Spain
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982-1993
1994-2006
1950-1970
1971-2006
1950-2006
1950-2006
1950-1963
1964-1971
1972-1993
1994-1996
1997-1998
1999
2000
2001-2002
2003-2006
1950-2006
8.0
9.4
13.6
20.2
24.0
24.0
8.0
10.0
20.0
5.0
9.4
9.5
8.9
9.8
8.6
12.0
12.5
12.6
12.3
20.0
4.0
4.9
6.8
10.1
12.0
12.0
4.0
4.0
8.0
4.0
4.3
4.4
4.0
4.9
4.3
6.1
6.3
6.3
6.1
8.0
2.0
2.5
3.4
5.0
6.0
6.0
2.0
2.0
8.0
0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
8.0
2.0
2.0
3.4
5.1
6.0
6.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
1.0
4.1
4.1
3.9
3.9
3.3
4.8
5.1
5.2
5.0
4.0
2.0
2.3
2.9
3.9
5.5
6.5
3.5
0
2.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
6.5
1.0
1.2
1.7
2.5
3.0
3.0
2.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
4.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
0
1.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.5
0
0
0
0
1.0
2.0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0
10.0
11.7
16.5
24.1
29.5
30.5
11.5
10.0
22.5
5.0
9.4
9.5
8.9
9.8
8.6
12.5
13.0
13.1
12.7
26.5
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United
Kingdom
United States
33
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39
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Europe (2000); Elazar (1991, p. 30-36); Filippov et al. (2004); Harloff (1987, p. 12-16); Hooghe and
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p. 76-95); OECD (1997, p. 93-106); OECD (1999, p. 19-21) ; Griffiths (2002, p. 44-57); Swenden (2006);
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(1997, p. 41-55); Griffiths (2002, p. 58-73); Mény and Wright (1985, p. 273-299); OECD (1997, p. 107121); OECD (1999, p. 22-26); OECD (2002); Porier(2002); Swenden (2005 and 2006); Engel and Van
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p. 25-162); OECD (2002)
Canada: Baier (2005); Griffiths (2002, p. 105-119); Elazar (1991, p. 57-70); Filippov et al. (2004); Hesse (1991,
p. 45-76); Hueglin and Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 329-335); Chandler (1993, p. 159-187);
Ter-Minassian (1997, p. 201-225); OECD (1997, p. 123-145); Watts (1999)
40
Croatia: Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Council of Europe (1998); Elazar (1991, p. 349-355); Harloff (1987,
p. 161-166); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 633-637); Kandeva (2001, p. 179-24); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
(2001, p. 75-104); UNDP (2005, p. 62-91)
Cyprus: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998); Elazar (1991, p. 80-87); Harloff (1987,
p. 27-30); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 519-522)
Czech Republic: Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 89-105); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of
Europe (2004); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Bennet (1993, p. 259-277); Elazar (1991, p. 88-92); Ferry
and Mcmaster (2005); Harloff (1987, p. 31-34); Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 78-79); Hughes et al. (2004,
p. 30-60); Kimball (1998, p. 7-42); Bennet (1993, p. 246-258); Horváth (2000, p. 255-296); Högye (2000, p.
81-140); OECD (1997, p. 147-163); OECD (1999, p. 27-30) ; OECD (2001); OECD (2002)
Denmark: Agranoff (2004); Page and Goldsmith (1987, p. 46-67); Hesse (1991, p. 13-44); Committee of the
Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998); Elazar (1991, p. 93-97); Sharpe (1993, p. 312-315); Harloff
(1987, p. 35-39); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 523-526); John
(2001); Loughlin (2001, p. 343-363); Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 190-197); OECD (1997, p. 165-177);
OECD (1999, p. 31-34) ; OECD (2002); Barry and Keating (1995, p. 281-288); Engel and Van
Ginderachter (1993, p. 56-59)
Estonia: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1999); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002);
Elazar (1991, p. 263-281); Harloff (1987, p. 147-151); Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 79-80); Hughes et al.
(2004, p. 30-60); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 628-632); Humes (1991, p. 81-93); Horváth (2000, p. 61114); Kettunen and Kungla (2005); OECD (2001); OECD (2002); Smith (2002); Högye (2000); Soós (2006,
p. 163-350); Bennet (1993, p. 292-306)
Finland: Arter (2001); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998); Elazar (1991, p. 98-101);
Harloff (1987, p. 47-51); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 527-530);
John (2001); Kettunen and Kungla (2005); Loughlin (2001, p. 365-384); Loughlin and Daftary (1999);
OECD (1997, p. 179-195); OECD (1999, p. 35-36); Rotkirch (1986)
France: Jones and Keating (1995, p. 166-188); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998a,
p. 57-81); Council of Europe (1998b); Mény and Wright (1985, p. 79-103); Hesse (1991, p. 429-462);
Elazar (1991, p. 8-11. 76-79 and 166-167); Harloff (1987, p. 52-61); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212);
Humes and Martin (1969, p. 531-541); Humes (1991, p. 17-30); Chandler (1993, p. 53-72); John (2001);
Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 89-109); Mény and Wright (1985, p. 207-235); Loughlin and Daftary (1999);
Loughlin (2001, p.187-210); Sharpe (1993, p. 61-89); Bennet (1993, p. 144-1540; Keating and Jones (1985,
p. 191-203); Page and Goldsmith (1987, p. 88-106); OECD (1997, p. 195-212); OECD (2002); Jeffery
(1997, p. 117-130); Swenden (2006, p. 16-17); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 75-79)
Germany: Adelberger (2001); Börzel (2005, p. 245-257); Loughlin (2001, p.83-116); Committee of the
Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998, p. 83-98); Council of Europe (1999); Elazar (1991, p. 102-109);
Filippov et al. (2004); Keating and Jones (1985, p. 173-190); Jones and Keating (1995, p. 189-213); Batley
and Stoker (1991, p. 73-88); Harloff (1987, p. 40-46 and 62-65); Hesse (1991, p. 353-386); Hooghe and
Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Griffiths (2002, p. 148-160); Hueglin and Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin
(1969, p. 542-546); Humes (1991, p. 56-66); Jeffery (1997, p. 56-75); John (2001); OECD (1997, p. 213227); OECD (1999, p. 37-39); Chandler (1993, p. 99-117); Mény and Wright (1985, p. 104-124); TerMinassian (1997, p. 226-248); Swenden (2006); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 60-65); Watts
(1999)
Greece: Hesse (1991, p. 551-578); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (2001); Jones and
Keating (1995, p. 247-266); Getimis and Demetropoulou (2004); Harloff (1987, p. 66-71); Hooghe and
Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 547-550); John (2001); Loughlin, John (2001, p.
271-287); OECD (1997, p. 229-242); Engel and Jef Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 66-69)
Hungary: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2001, p. 37-74); Committee of the Regions (2003) ; Council of Europe
(1998, p. 99-117); Council of Europe (2004); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Fowle (2002); Bennet (1993,
p. 208-224); Harloff (1987, p. 72-75); Högye (2001, p. 213-288); Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 80-81);
Hughes et al. (2004, p. 30-60 and 120-128); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 551-554); Kimball (1998, p. 742); Marcou (2002, p. 29-63); Bennet (1993, p. 225-245); Ter-Minassian (1997, p. 660-679); OECD (1999,
41
p. 40-41) ; OECD (2001); OECD (2002); Pálné Kovács et al. (2004); Soós et al. (2002, p. 15-106); Horváth
(2000, p. 343-384)
Iceland: Council of Europe (1998); Council of Europe (2006); Harloff (1987, p. 76-79); Humes and Martin
(1969, p. 555-556); OECD (1997, p. 243-255); OECD (1999, p. 42)
Ireland: Hesse (1991, p. 141-166); Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 155-169); Committee of the Regions (2003);
Council of Europe (1999); Harloff and Martin (1987, p. 80-85); Keating and Jones (1985, p. 204-233);
Jones and Michael Keating (1995, p. 231-246); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and
Martin (1969, p. 557-562); John (2001); Loughlin, John (2001, p. 61-80); Chandler (1993, p. 28-52); OECD
(1997, p. 255-278); Rees et al. (2004); Engel and Jef Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 80-82)
Italy: Sharpe (1993, p. 91-116); Ciaffi (2001); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (2000);
Mény and Wright (1985, p. 125-148); Hesse (1991, p. 517-550); Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 110-122);
Jones and Keating (1995, p. 65-87); Jeffery (1997, p. 96-116); Ter-Minassian (1997, p. 249-284); Fabrini
and Brunazzo (2003); Harloff (1987, p. 86-91); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and
Martin (1969, p. 563-568.); John (2001); Loughlin (2001, p. 211-228); Keating and Jones (1985, p. 160172); OECD (1997, p. 279-290); OECD (2002); Putnam (1993); Page and Goldsmith (1987, p. 107-129);
Chandler (1993, p. 73-98); Swenden (2006, p. 15-16); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 83-88)
Japan: Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (2002); Elazar (1991, p. 134-137); Humes
and Martin (1969, p. 450-454); Humes (1991, p. 66-76); Hesse (1991, p. 109-140); Ter-Minassian (1997, p.
285-323); OECD (1997, p. 291-304); OECD (1999, p. 43-45)
Latvia: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1999 and 2006); Dabla-Norris and Wade
(2002); Elazar (1991, p. 263-281); Harloff (1987, p. 147-151); Hughes et al. (2004); Humes and Martin
(1969, p. 628-632); Humes (1991, p. 81-93); OECD (2001); OECD (2002); Bennet (1993, p. 292-306);
Horváth (2000, p. 115-164); Soós et al. (2002, p. 107-180)
Lithuania: Horváth (2000, p. 165-216); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1997 and
2006); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Elazar (1991, p. 263-281); Harloff (1987, p. 147-151); Hughes et al.
(2004, p. 30-60); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 628-632); Humes (1991, p. 81-93); OECD (2001); OECD
(2002); Marcou (2002, p. 65-101); Bennet (1993, p. 292-306)
Luxembourg: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1997); Elazar (1991, p. 150-152);
Harloff (1987, p. 92-95); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 559-572); Loughlin (2001, p. 163-181); OECD
(1997, p. 305-314); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 89)
Macedonia: Council of Europe (1999); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Elazar (1991, p. 349-355); Harloff
(1987, p. 161-166); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 633-637); UNDP (2005, p. 127-165); Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung (2001, p. 172-193); Kandeva (2001, p. 241-288)
Malta: Council of Europe (1998 and 2006); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 573-575)
Netherlands: Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 123-133); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe
(1999); Elazar (1991, p. 173-176); Harloff (1987, p. 96-102); Jones and Keating (1995, p. 214-230);
Loughlin (2001, p. 143-172); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 576582); John (2001); OECD (1997, p. 333-349); OECD (1999, p. 49-51); OECD (2002); Engel and Van
Ginderachter (1993, p. 90-92); Hesse (1991, p. 291-332); Sharpe (1993, p. 117-153)
New Zealand: Symons (1984, p. 126-132); Elazar (1991, p. 177-181); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 645-648);
OECD (1997, p. 349-361); OECD (1999, p. 52-56)
Norway: Arter (2001); Council of Europe (1998); Page and Goldsmith (1987, p. 29-45); Hesse (1991, p. 211240); Sharpe (1993, p. 154-181); Harloff (1987, p. 103-107); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 583-587); John
(2001) ; Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 198-229); OECD (1997, p. 363-374); OECD (1999, p. 57-60)
Poland: Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 121-145); Bialasiewicz (2002); Committee of the Regions (2003);
Council of Europe (1998 and 2000); Czernielewska et al. (2004, p. 461-495); Dabla-Norris and Wade
(2002); Ferry and Mcmaster (2005); Marcou (2002, p. 103-140); Harloff (1987, p. 108-112); Keating and
Hughes (2002, p. 82-83); Hughes et al. (2004, p. 30-60 and 129-138); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 588593); Kimball (1998, p. 7-42); Horváth (2000, p. 216-254); Sharpe (1993, p. 182-209); OECD (1999, p. 6162) ; OECD (2001); OECD (2002); Soós et al. (2002, p. 181-204); Bennet (1993, p. 197-207)
Portugal: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998a, p. 133-148, 1998b and 2006); Elazar
(1991, p. 8-11); Harloff (1987, p. 113-119); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin
42
(1969, p. 594-599); John (2001); Loughlin, John (2001, p. 255-270); Nanetti et al. (2004); OECD (1997, p.
375-386); OECD (1999, p. 63-64); Hesse (1991, p. 497-516); Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 134-145); Jones
and Keating (1995, p. 267-280); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 93-96)
Romania: Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 161-181); Kandeva (2001, p. 351-416); Committee of the Regions
(2003); Council of Europe (1999); Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); Högye (2000, p. 289-248); Harloff
(1987, p. 120-123); Keating and James Hughes (2002, p. 83-84); Hughes et al. (2004, p. 30-60); Humes
and Martin (1969, p. 600-601); OECD (2002); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2001, p. 225-248); Soós et al.
(2002, p. 285-369)
Russian Federation: Ter-Minassian (1997, p. 680-701); Council of Europe (2000); Dabla-Norris and Wade
(2002); Elazar (1991, p. 263-281); Filippov et al. (2004); Harloff (1987, p. 147-151); Hughes (2001); Humes
and Martin (1969, p. 628-632); Humes (1991, p. 81-93); Jackson and Lynn (2002); Munteanu and Popa
(2001, p. 161-264); Bennet (1993, p. 278-291); Pinnick (2005); Söderlund (2005); Bennet (1993, p. 292306); Griffiths (2002, p. 249-269)
Serbia and Montenegro: Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 161-181); Griffiths (2002, p. 372-386); Dabla-Norris
andWade (2002); Elazar (1991, p. 349-355); Harloff (1987, p. 161-166); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 633637); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2001, , p. 128-171); Kandeva (2001, p. 417-470); UNDP (2005, p. 166-194)
Slovak Republic: Bitušíková (2002); Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 85-105 and p. 147-160); Marcou (2002,
p. 141-177); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1999) ; Bennet (1993, p. 259-277);
Elazar (1991, p. 88-92); Harloff (1987, p. 31-34); Hughes et al. (2004, p. 30-60); Bennet (1993, p. 246-258);
Horváth (2000, p. 297-342); OECD (2002); Soós (2006, p. 351-472)
Slovenia: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2001, p. 936); Elazar (1991, p. 349-355); Harloff (1987, p. 161-166); Keating and Hughes (2002, p. 86-87); Hughes
et al. (2004, p. 30-60); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 633-637); OECD (2002); Horváth (2000, p. 385-421)
Spain: Agranoff (2004); Loughlin (2001, p. 229-253); Hesse (1991, p. 463-498); Page and Goldsmith (1987,
p. 130-155); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1997); Council of Europe (1998, p.
149-172); Sharpe (1993, p. 210-246); Elazar (1991, p. 8-11 and p. 227-240); Filippov et al. (2004); Harloff
(1987, p. 124-129); Griffiths (2002, p. 296-313); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Hueglin and
Fenna (2006); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 602-607); John (2001) ; Mény and Wright (1985, p. 236-272);
Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 146-154); Jones and Keating (1995, p. 114-133); OECD (1997, p. 387-402);
OECD (1999, p. 65-69) ; OECD (2002); Swenden (2006) ; Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 70-74);
Watts (1999)
Sweden: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1997); Council of Europe (1998, p. 173-194);
Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 170-189); Hesse (1991, p. 241-260); Hadenius (1999); Sharpe (1993, p. 315318); Harloff (1987, p. 130-135); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 608611); John (2001); Chandler (1993, p. 118-137); Page and Goldsmith (1987, p. 12-28); Loughlin (2001, p.
319-342); OECD (1997, p. 403-419); OECD (1999, p. 70-71) ; OECD (2002); Högye (2000, p. 401-428);
Svensson and Östhol (2001)
Switzerland: Church and Dardanelli (2005); Council of Europe (1998a, p. 195-215, 1998b); Elazar (1991, p.
250-257); Filippov et al. (2004); Harloff (1987, p. 136-139); Hueglin and Fenna (20060; Humes and
Martin (1969, p. 612-616); John (2001); Hesse (1991, p. 409-428); OECD (1997, p. 421-442); OECD (1999,
p. 72-81); Ter-Minassian (1997, p. 324-341); Griffiths (2002, p. 314-328); Swenden (2006); Vatter (2005);
Watts (1999)
Turkey: Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1999); Harloff (1987, p. 140-146); Hesse
(1991, p. 579-600); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 494-502); OECD (1997, p. 443-461)
United Kingdom: Agranoff (2004); Ayres and Pearce (2004); Mény and Wright (1985, p. 171-206); Casey
(2002); Cole (2001); Committee of the Regions (2003); Council of Europe (1998, p. 217-237 and 2000) ;
Bennet (1993, p. 80-94); Elazar (1991, p. 286-303); Goldsmith and Page (1987, p. 68-87); Keating and
Jones (1985, p. 109-132); Harloff (1987, p. 152-160); Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 189-212); Horgan
(2004); Humes and Martin (1969, p. 617-627); Humes (1991, p. 104-120); Batley and Stoker (1991, p. 5872); Jeffery (1997, p. 131-144 and 2004); John (2001); Keating and Jones (1985, p. 89-108 and p. 133-159);
Hesse (1991, p. 167-210); Keating and Jones (1985, p. 60-88); Jones and Keating (1995, p. 88-113);
Chandler (1993, p. 7-27); Loughlin, John (2001, p. 37-60); McCall (2001); OECD (1997, p. 461-479);
43
OECD (1999, p. 82) ; OECD (2002); Paterson (2002); Ter-Minassian (1997); Mény and Wright (1985, p.
33-78); Sharpe (1993, p. 247-295); Swenden (2006); Engel and Van Ginderachter (1993, p. 97-101);
Wilford et al. (2003)
United States: Chandler (1993, p. 138-158); Elazar (1991, p. 304-338); Fabrini and Sicurelli (2004, p. 232254); Filippov et al. (2004); Hesse (1991, p. 77-108); Hueglin and Alan (2006); Humes and Martin (1969,
p. 356-364); Humes (1991, p. 121-131); OECD (1997, p. 481-498); Griffiths (2002, p. 342-357); TerMinassian (1997, p. 359-386); Watts (1999)
44