J. OF PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 17(1), 94-119
SPRING 2005
A CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND
GAMBLING POLICY: HAS ECONOMICS TRUMPED
MORALISTIC POLITICS?
William N. Thompson, Carl Lutrin,
R. Fred Wacker and Elizabeth Vercher*
ABSTRACT. Elazar’s typology of political cultures is examined. From his
categorization of jurisdictions with aspects of 'moralistic' political cultures, five are
selected: Wisconsin, Michigan, New York, Connecticut, and France. Their recent
political history is examined and it is demonstrated that these 'moralistic' type
polities have abandoned policies which formerly condemned or at least contained
legalized gambling. Instead each has responded to commercial pressures for
expanded gambling. The reasons why ‘moralistic’ values in making decisions in
this arena have been cast aside are examined. The reasons include an international
cross-polity homogenization of political cultures, a blurring of the meaning of
‘moralistic’ in today’s politics, and above all, severe economic crises that take
precedence over other values.
INTRODUCTION
Just a few decades ago the notion of legalized gambling was anathema
for many political jurisdictions. Leaders who espoused ideals of public
service saw the enterprise as detrimental to a higher public good. This
------------------------------* William N. Thompson, Ph.D., is a Professor, Department of Public
Administration, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His research interests are
state politics, public policy and gambling. Carl Lutrin, Ph.D., is a Professor,
Department of Political Science, California Polytechnic State University. His
research interests are public administration and state politics. R. Fred Wacker,
Ph.D., is a Professor, Department of History, Wayne State University. His
research interests are urban history and American culture. Elizabeth Vercher,
Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor, Jean Monnet College, St Etienne, France. Her
research interests include tourism, gambling and its social impacts.
Copyright © 2005 by PrAcademics Press
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public service ideal was most apparent in political jurisdictions that were
encompassed with moralistic political cultures. Things have changed. Or
have they? We now seem to see leaders in states and countries that had
previously embraced the notions of a higher good succumb to pressures to
permit an expanding array of legalized gambling. In this paper we will seek
to answer the simple questions: Is this so? And if it is, why? Specifically we
will look at four states that had been identified in their history with strains of
political moralism and reform. We highlight how the reform ideologies fell
as endorsement of gambling emerged to be an acceptable public policy. We
also take a look at casino development in France.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE GAMBLING ISSUE
Gambling enterprise has emerged as one of the fastest growing
industries in the nation and the world. Before 1978 only Nevada offered
players 'a wide open' form of gambling although many states had initiated
some form of lotteries, and others had horse race betting or charity
gambling. Casino gambling outside of the United States hardly had the
qualities of Las Vegas style gambling. Most facilities were very small and
featured only table games, along with restrictions such as policies to exclude
local players, dress codes, advertising restrictions, and severe limits on times
facilities could be open.
As the 1980s were ending, (“Specific Report,” 1978) called gambling
'the newest growth industry' in America and state after state embraced
lotteries, charitable gambling, and even casinos either run commercially or
by Native American tribes. Tribal casinos now collectively take in over $7
billion in revenues each year (more than all the casinos of the Las Vegas
Strip). Now forty-eight states provide for some form of gambling and forty
seven actually have legalized gambling. Thirty-eight states plus the District
of Columbia have government-run lotteries, over forty states have parimutuel gambling on horse and/or dog races or jai alai games, and over half
the states permit casinos. Eleven sates have legalized commercial gambling,
while over twenty five have authorized casino type gambling on Native
American reservations. The legalized gambling industry produces in excess
of $55 billion a year, sustaining annual growth near 10% over the last
decade of the twentieth century (Thompson, 2001). The spread of gambling
has been even more dramatic in some jurisdictions beyond United States.
Most of the Canadian provinces now have casinos, some
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operating on the Las Vegas model. That model also seems to be the model
for emulation by casinos of Europe and Asia.
Americans now spend more on gambling than on theme parks, video
games, spectator sports, and movie tickets combined. The demand for
gambling goes beyond its legal forms as unauthorized Internet gambling and
illegal sports gambling, prevalent in all American jurisdictions may
command another ten billion dollars in revenues (player losses) for
operators. If all the gambling activities were placed in one commercial
concern, that company would be among the top ten revenue producers in the
nation (Thompson, 2001).
Nevada casinos win over $9 billion from players, Las Vegas taking
two-thirds of this money. Las Vegas draws more than 35 million visitors a
year. Statistically, they spend on average four days and four nights, and they
spend as much money on non- gambling activities as they do on gambling.
Directly or indirectly gambling sustains about 60% of the state's
employment. Gaming activities provide over one half of the state's public
revenues. Las Vegas offers a model of gambling operations that other
jurisdictions would like to duplicate.
Despite some of the economic benefits generated by gambling
activities, not all states and communities have always been eager to embrace
gambling. One factor which may help explain a polity's receptivity to
gambling is its political culture.
THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE
The concept of political culture has been implicit in some of the most
important studies of politics. Especially important were the works produced
by the ancient Greeks and Romans. However, use of the concept to orient
the understandings of political culture did not come to the fore until the
1960s. Especially important were two pioneering works: Daniel Elazar's
American Federalism: A View from the States and Almond and Verba's five
nation study, The Civic Culture.
Both studies are now viewed as classics. Elazar's work, as the title
suggests, is most helpful for explorations in American politics as his
typology is drawn from American experience. However his concepts may
have universal appeal for persons seeking to understand policy development
in this arena. In our future work we intend to explore a wide range of
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theories derived from the basic concept of political culture. However, in
this essay we will focus upon the typology developed by Elazar, and indeed,
upon one particular style of political culture that he identified--namely the
'moralistic' political culture (Elazar, 1972; Almond & Verba, 1963)
Elazar argues that within the United States there were three dominant
political cultures: individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic. As a whole,
Elazar asserts that the United States shares a common political culture. Its
roots can be traced to two conceptions of the American colonial experience.
One sees the government as a market place for citizens--individually and
through groups--to advance their own self interest, especially economic self
interest. The other conceptualization sees government as an entity where
citizens cooperate with leaders in an attempt to achieve policies that will
implement shared moral principles which rise above self interest. These two
conceptualizations have found expression in political actions throughout the
nation. However, Elazar has a third conceptualization by which Americans
express a way of maintaining an on-going political power structure. But this
third concept has enduring popularity in only one part of the country. These
three notions are the essence of Elazar's trilogy of political cultures.
The Individualistic (I) Culture. The I culture probably had its origins
among the American settlers who came from Britain and Germany. They
initially settled in the Middle Atlantic States. This culture feels that the
democratic order is expressed through a market place of issues. Government
does not exist to create a 'good society' but rather to respond to demands of
citizens on economic and other issues. Mass politics is not encouraged, and
politics is an activity reserved for 'professionals,' not amateurs. Politics is a
means by which people can improve themselves economically and socially,
and policy making is a bargaining process between self-interested groups
and individuals. Moreover, in this cultural milieu, people who seek political
office do so as a means of controlling the distribution of rewards of
government, and not to pursue programs and/or ideology. Politics is seen as
being corrupt and/or dirty (Elazar, 1972).
The Moralistic (M) Culture. The moralistic (M) culture is markedly
different from the I culture. Elazar says that the M culture was brought to
the New World by the Pilgrims, and then the Puritans who set up religious
colonies in New England. While the I culture stresses commerce and
material gain, the M culture emphasizes the commonwealth as the basis for
democratic government. Politics is considered a lofty pursuit in mankind's
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search for the 'good society.' It is accepted that politics is a struggle for the
pursuit of power; it is also an attempt to exercise that power for the
betterment of all. Government is a positive instrument and has the
responsibility to promote the general welfare. It is accepted that the
definition of what is a positive role varies from one era to another.
Government is active, and intervenes in the economic and social life of the
community. Although citizen participation is not encouraged in the I
culture, it is an essential part of the M culture. In as much as the goal of
politics is the coming to grips with public issues in a civil society, politics is
the concern of every citizen. Citizens have a civic duty to participate. Those
who serve in government and politics bear high moral obligations, and there
is very little tolerance among citizens for corruption by those in public
service (Elazar, 1972).
The Traditionalistic Political Culture (T). The Traditionalistic political
culture (T) had its roots in British royalty. It persisted in the years after the
American Revolution in the southern plantation owners who were seeking
economic opportunity through their agricultural system. That system relied,
to a considerable degree, on the institution of slavery. The descendants of
the first settlers moved into the border-states and then into the Southwest.
According to Elazar, the T culture is based on an ambivalent attitude toward
the market place, coupled with an elitist conception of society. The T
political culture reflects an older, pre-commercial attitude that accepts a
largely hierarchical society and expects those at the top of the social order to
take special and dominant roles in government. Like the M culture, it
accepts the role of government as being a positive actor in society. But that
role is defined as keeping the existing social order. Government functions to
keep real political power confined to a comparatively small and selfperpetuating elite who often inherit their ‘right’ to govern through family or
social ties.
‘Good government,’ involves the maintenance and
encouragement of traditional patterns; adjustments may have to be made, in
order to meet changing conditions, but these should consist of the smallest
possible alteration in policy. As for political participation, those who do not
have a definitive role to play in the political system are not expected to be
active in politics. Bureaucracy is viewed with distrust because it interferes
with personal relationships in the societal power structure.
STUDIES CRITICAL OF THE ELAZAR TYPOLOGY
Not all political scientists have been enamored with the Elazar trilogy of
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political cultures. Nonetheless it remains a frame of reference for many, and
it is worthwhile to expose students to it. The concepts have proven to be
durable, while still a matter for commentary and criticism. Gray and Jacob
91996) have examined the typology and concluded that Elazar's (1972)
theory has a great deal of intuitive appeal to many scholars of state politics.
It is consistent with general impressions about state differences in political
values, style, and tone. It also provides historical explanation for
differences. Many researchers, therefore, have subjected his predictions
about political and policy differences between the three subcultures and
found some support for them (Gray & Jacob, 1996).
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) pooled 122 C.B.S. and New York
Times polls from 1976 to 1988 which measured ideology and party
identification. In their major study of public opinion, they devoted an entire
chapter to Elazar’s trilogy of cultures. They concluded that there was strong
data to show that Elazar's typology of state cultures did separate the states in
regards to representational factors. It was strong support for the Elazar
analytical scheme. In almost all cases they examined regarding state
subcultures, their conclusions were in line with what they had expected to
find based upon the Elazar model.
Elazar's work has been utilized by scholars to explore the relationship of
political culture to public expenditures. Studies by Johnson using data from
the 1960s (Johnson, 1976; Luttbeg, 1971) and the 1980s (Miller, 1991)
found significant correlations, using a range of methods, including multiple
regression analysis. In an innovative recent study, Koven and Mausolf
(2002) examined the relationship of political culture and public expenditures
in 49 of the 50 United States over a five-year period 1992-1996. The authors
concluded that the data indicate that political culture exerted an independent
impact on total state and local spending in the 1990s, even after controlling
for commonly cited economic, political, and demographic variables.
Although other variables undoubtedly influence policy outputs, this study
suggests that the role of political culture should not be ignored and may be
very useful for explaining policy variations that exist between jurisdictions.
Not all studies have found Elazar's work to be valuable. For instance,
Lowery and Sigelman (1982) sought to determine if the distinctive attitudes
towards mass participation in politics and the desirable scope of government
held sway among the three cultures, as Elazar assumed. The authors applied
sophisticated methods to data drawn from several elections studies. They
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concluded that these results provide only weak empirical support for the
first assumption contained in the linkage between political culture and
public choice. The three political cultures designated by Elazar are simply
not very distinctive in terms of the characteristic attitudes their public
expresses concerning the legitimacy of mass political participation and the
acceptable scope government policy making. This lack of distinctiveness
renders moot any subsequent attempt to isolate the mechanism by which
culturally defined mass attitudes are translated into public policy. A later
study by Nardulli (1990) argues that while Elazar may have identified some
key aspects of political culture, his cultural groupings have little empirical
foundation.
Notwithstanding the debate about political culture and Elazar's
typology, it has proven to be an enduring work. The model may be of
particular value because the nature of gambling arouses notions of morality
whenever it arises in policy debates. For instance, a recent study by Kara
Lindaman (2003, p. 3) offers these comments, “the morality policy
framework is useful in explaining the local politics of gambling when
political measures such as directional salience and organized groups in
opposition and support are considered.” Further she offers that “gambling
has become a highly salient moral issue which challenges existing values of
good and bad behaviour...the politics surrounding morality policy is not a
battle over who gets what but who believes what” (Lindaman, 2003, p. 5).
The constructs contained within the Elazar trilogy should therefore be
useful for testing research hypotheses regarding policies of legalization and
regulation of gambling (Lindaman, 2003). The notion that gambling policy
can be examined in the context of 'culture' is now well established in the
literature of gambling studies. The 1996 volume Gambling Cultures:
Studies in History and Interpretation, edited by Jan McMillen, presented a
valuable collection of essays that explored the cultural variable in a variety
of world jurisdictions. This study uses her work as a platform for going a
next step. That step is basically an organizational one. Here we are seeking
to use a single model of political culture--essentially Elazar's typology, with
a focus on one part of the typology ('moralistic' cultures)--to
look at a specific aspect of gambling policy, namely, the endorsement of
major gambling expansion by public authorities.
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SCOPE OF STUDY
In this work we propose to use the Elazar categorization to select
several American states and one foreign country in order to examine a
paradox: how has the gambling enterprise been able to establish a firm hold
onto the policy making apparatus of jurisdictions considered to be
'moralistic,' or at least reform oriented, or oriented to principles above those
upon which politicians operate in the Individualistic and Traditionalistic
polities. We choose for examination the midwestern states of Wisconsin,
Michigan, and the eastern Atlantic states of New York and Connecticut.
We also choose to examine gambling policy development in France.
MORAL CLIMATES: GAMBLING ‘NO’ AND GAMBLING ‘YES’
Wisconsin, the ‘Moralistic’ Land of La Follette, Open Meetings and
Government for the People
Elazar categorizes Wisconsin as a 'Moralistic' state. There is little doubt
but that Wisconsin has been a reform minded state. Early among all the
states, Wisconsin adopted open government laws asserting that “the denial
of access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in exceptional
cases may access be denied.” An essential part and parcel of ‘Fighting
Bob’ La Follette's ‘Wisconsin Idea’ was the simple concept of democracy
and the public’s right to exercise control over public events and policies that
affect their lives. In his autobiography he wrote that “the only way to beat
boss and ring rule was to keep the people thoroughly informed...Democracy
is based upon knowledge. It is of first importance that the people shall
know about their government and the work of their public servants” (La
Follette, 1960, p. 29).
The state rejected gambling legalizations for more than 100 years, as an
early clause in its constitution forbade lotteries. However as the wave of
lottery interest swept the Midwest and most states bordering Wisconsin
installed lotteries, the voters of the state approved the games. The
constitution was changed. Yet still the political leaders steadfastly said "no"
to casinos.
When the notion of having Native American casinos in Wisconsin
arose, the governor was Tommy Thompson. He refused to negotiate with
the tribes who wanted 'compact' agreements. They took the governor to
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federal court under the provisions of the National Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA). The federal courts ruled that since the
definition of "lottery" in Wisconsin included 'any game of chance,' and
casinos games fit the same definition, the state had to negotiate compacts for
Native American casinos.
The Wisconsin casinos were established in 1992. The tribes won
compact agreements with the state that permitted them to operate for five
years. They did not pay state taxes as these are clearly prohibited by the
IGRA. They did pay reasonable regulatory fees. Thompson agreed to let
the tribal gaming halls have casino games of Blackjack as well as slot
machines because the IGRA said they should be able to negotiate for games
that could be offered by other parties according to state law.
But then the voters of the state in 1993 very clearly--by a vote of 59%
to 41%--changed the lottery provision and definitively set down new state
law: no casino games at all were permitted. Nonetheless at the end of five
years, in new negotiations (secret negotiations) with Governor Tommy
Thompson, the tribes were able to renew their compacts. But the new
compacts contained other provisions that were even more offensive to the
letter of the federal law. The second round of compacts provided for
arbitrarily set fees, not to pay for regulatory services, but rather fees to go
into the general state treasury. There is no way around it: Governor
Thompson traded provisions for illegal taxes for the right of tribes to keep
questionable games operating. The integrity of the casino gaming processes
in Wisconsin had been breached. Governor Thompson had engaged in an
old practice--illegal trading with native tribes.
The third round of negotiations began in 2003. Any concept of
integrity had now been totally thrown out of the window. Tribes that should
be loudly protesting that they are being illegally taxed willingly trade away
their legal rights to have commercial operations without fiscal interference
from state governments. This was done in order to expand the games, in
order to win agreements that will last forever, and in order to have
agreements give to the tribes the exclusive right to have casinos games,
games all other interests are denied. What is more challenging to the
integrity of the entire process is that all this bargaining was done in secret,
not by the representatives of the people, but by the people's chief executive.
Some somber reflections about American constitutional principles and the
Wisconsin political culture are in order--like, maybe it is time to mention a
little word to the governor, a word that is probably a dirty word in his
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dictionary: ‘LaFollette!’
The gambling industry must be built upon the notion of integrity.
However, when the legal basis of casinos is flawed, when their very
existence may be adverse to the law, when the taxes imposed upon their
operations violate the laws, there are problems. If the citizens of Wisconsin
cannot have confidence that a commercial establishment that takes in well
over a billion dollars a year from Wisconsin citizens is legal and above
board, how can they have confidence that the games being played in the
casinos are honest. If the tribes and a governor can get away with rigging
state policy on such important questions, why can't they get away with
rigging a simple slot machine or two or two thousand or twenty thousand?
Why can’t they get away with rigging a few decks of cards here and there?
Integrity starts at the top with state officials and tribal leaders. It seems not
to be part of the equation in Wisconsin today. Bye Bye to Moralistic
Politics.
Michigan: High Wages and the Quality of Life
In Elazar’s typology, Michigan appears to be a ‘Moralistic’ state. His
assessment finds confirmation in John Fenton's book, Midwest Politics.
Fenton considered Michigan, along with Wisconsin and Minnesota, to be an
issue oriented political state. In the other midwestern states, politicians
focused more of their energies upon party dominance with the goal of
political jobs and power at the forefront. Michigan political parties
advanced programmatic platforms that were idealistic but also filled with
realistic proposals that were acted upon when the party achieved
government power. The state had strong interests that were involved in
party affairs. A manufacturing interest led by automobile companies
engaged in active party politics, as did strong labor union interests. Both
sought advantages in the law, but they also advocated measures designed to
improve the general quality of life. Accordingly, unions went to Lansing
not only for policies promoting their role in collective bargaining, but also
for support of public education and universities, recreation and state parks,
and good medical services.
Fenton suggests that the Moralistic orientation was strengthened when
in 1914 Henry Ford offered his workers the five-dollar day. Ford reasoned
that his factories would be more productive with workers who aspired to
better living with high paying skilled jobs. Leaders such as Walter Reuther,
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a man who never sought personal wealth, but only a social good that came
from better wages and a higher quality of life for workers and their children,
led union fights in later decades. Governors (G. Mennen Williams, George
Romney, Bill Milliken, and James Blanchard) as well as Mayors of Detroit
(Albert Cobo, and Jerry Cavanaugh) took the high road in politics by
advancing causes for the entire public as well as causes favoring special
interests. The state was reform minded.
In this milieu, gambling was not a major factor. To be sure, horseracing
won approval in the 1930s, and a lottery as well as charitable gambling
came to the state in the early 1970s, but casinos were taboo.
The 1970s saw the economy of Michigan take a decided turn for the
worse, a turn that never has been reversed in a major way. First a major
auto workers strike hit the state in 1970, and this was followed by the
national gasoline shortage, and then by the influx of competing Japanese
automobiles. By 1975, state representative Casmer Ogonowski was pushing
his solution--casino gambling. In 1976 the first of many advisory questions
on casinos was put in front of Detroit voters. A new Mayor Coleman
Young, Detroit’s first African American mayor, set his agenda on achieving
fair representation in policy making for minorities. He was quite willing to
turn away from notions of higher moral purpose and the public interest if
they stood in the way of this noble purpose and his sense of the public
interest. He supported casinos, but he was sensitive that the votes were not
in place, and he did not campaign strongly for his position. The governor of
the sate was firmly opposed to casinos anywhere, and the Detroit
proposition failed. Repeated efforts by Ogonowski to get legislation passed
favoring casinos also failed. As the decline of Detroit persisted into the
1980s, Coleman Young tried again. He sponsored a city ordinance creating
a study commission. The commission in turn recommended having as
many as 12 large casinos and another advisory vote. Again state leaders
opposed the idea, and Detroit voters said ‘no.’ Coleman Young backed off
(Dombrink & Thompson, 1990).
Casinos returned however, as Native American tribes began games.
After the passage of the IGRA the tribes sought compacts with the state.
Governor John Engler indicated that he was totally opposed to the idea, and
the tribes sued the state to force negotiations. In 1993, before the suit
reached federal courts for a decision, Engler retreated. He approved both
table games and slot machines if the tribes gave the state 8% of their
machine wins (an extra 2% went to local governments). The tribes were
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promised the exclusive right to have machines. Still Detroit interests were
active. New advisory votes were defeated in 1993 and 1994. However, the
political climate began to change as the Ontario government established a
casino in Windsor, just a mile across the Detroit River from the city's
downtown. In 1995, city voters expressed favor with the idea of having
facilities that could compete with the Canadian casino. Holding the results
of the 1995 election in their hands, casino proponents won enough petition
signatures to force a statewide vote in 1996. By a narrow 51% majority,
casinos were approved. Governor Engler had opposed the casinos, but he
found it convenient not to become involved in the campaign. In 1995, he
freely negotiated to allow four new tribes to have Native American casinos.
While the 1996 proposition had many questionable, even potentially
constitutionally defective, provisions, the governor quickly organized
administrative structures to facilitate the opening of three major casinos in
the Motor City. By the end of 1999, they were in operation as Michigan
became the 11th American state to endorse commercial casino gambling
(Wacker & Thompson, 1999).
New York, the Land of Political Innovation and Reform, Civil Service
Excellence and the Administrative 'Good'
The mix of peoples and political issues produces a natural arena for
activity within the bounds of what Elazar would call a mixed ‘Moralistic’
and ‘Individualistic Culture.’ The former designation rings out in a history
of reform, the latter in the strong party machinery present in the milieu
called New York politics. We could easily use the Almond and Verba
category of ‘participant’ politics to describe the political activity of the state.
A history of leaders who reached above the clash of competing groups to
seize policy initiatives on behalf of the common good is found in the names
of governors--Theodore Roosevelt, champion of civil service reform, Al
Smith, champion of workers’ rights and work place safety, Franklin
Roosevelt, architect of ‘the New Deal,’ Thomas Dewey, fighter against
organized crime and illegal gambling, Nelson Rockefeller, builder of a state
public university system, and we could add Harriman and Cuomo to the list.
The state also produced judges, attorneys general and local officials
who quested for the better life for the people. So while the halls of Albany
were always filled with those reaching for self interest, the state had leaders
of vision as well. The vision of the public good at many times was
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manifested in the fight against gambling--against illegal gambling, and
against proposals for legalized gambling.
While the state did turn to both horse-race gambling, charity games, and
the lottery in times of fiscal stress--the Depression years and the late 1960s-the leaders resisted cries for casinos that could meet fiscal needs and also the
competition of casinos in Atlantic City, Connecticut, and Ontario. (A nonslot machine casino and bingo halls were approved for tribal gaming in the
early 1990s. They had minor impacts on the economy and provided no net
revenues for the state.)
Following 1978, a concerted effort led to an attempt to amend the state
constitution to permit commercial casino in several locations. The measure
needed to have passing votes in two separate legislative sessions and then a
vote of the people. It passed one session in 1980; actually eight separate
bills passed with the idea that the most feasible one would be passed again
in the next session in 1981. At first the governor (Hugh Carey) indicated he
could support casinos, but then the issue was struck dead in its tracks by an
official report from state Attorney General Robert Abrams. In his report he
cited three reasons for his opposition: increases in street crime that came
with New Jersey casinos, organized crime, and political corruption. He
stated that “legalized casino gambling poses a danger to the integrity and
credibility of government institutions and public officials” (Dombrink &
Thompson, 1990, p. 104).
The issue was crippled for the rest of the decade, but then returned to
the agenda after first an Indian tribe in Connecticut, and then the Ontario
government opened casinos near the New York borders, which were
marketing heavily to New York players. Resistance remained, as the state's
leaders maintained that casino gambling however lucrative for the public
treasury would hurt the people. The chance for constitutional changes was
almost nil.
However, with the defeat of Mario Cuomo, a new outlook came to
Albany in the persona of Governor George Pataki. A moderate business
oriented Republican, Pataki was adverse to taxes. Yet he felt the need for
additional state revenues in a state that provided a high level of public
services. He was not about to slash services to the public. Unlike his
predecessors, his answer was casinos. But this time, he plotted a way
around the state constitutional prohibition. He negotiated an agreement with
a Native American tribe.
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The tribe would be able to purchase land in downtown Buffalo, very
near the bridge to an Ontario race track that had slot machines. The tribe
would also purchase the Niagara Falls, New York, Convention center,
which was a mile away from the government casino just over the Rainbow
Bridge in Niagara Falls, Canada. The tribe was given permission to have
casinos on the property which would now be considered part of the
reservation. They also were permitted to have a casino on their existing
reservation.
The agreement had to be ratified by the state legislature. Initially, in
early 2001, it appeared that the votes were not available for approving the
measure. This time the forces of the Moralistic Political Culture had voices
in the legislature. But this time ended abruptly on September 11, 2001.
The whole world changed on September 11, 2001. But the change was
felt more brutally in some places: New York City, of course, but also
Albany, New York, seat of the state government. The terrorist attack had a
dramatic effect on the state's sources of public funds. Without a doubt, state
revenues were reduced by several billion dollars. Where could the state go
to replace the money lost? The easy answer is casino type gambling. By
November, the legislature approved a plan for six major casinos to be
owned and operated by Native American tribes of the State. The governor
and leaders of the Seneca Tribe in accordance with the provisions of the
IGRA had negotiated the plan. Not authorized by the IGRA was a part of
the agreement that provided that the casinos would give the state
government 25% of their machine revenues. The legislature also provided
that race tracks could install gaming machines at their facilities. It was
projected that these revenues would amount to at least four hundred million
dollars a year (Pataki, 2001). The legislators approved the agreement even
though the state constitution of New York State prohibits casino gambling.
The fiscal hole was now too deep, Moralistic politics found its voice
was too weak to be heard. The legislative leaders heard other voices cry
out, “and why not me too,” the ever present claim of the Individualistic
Culture. So the ‘me too’ers’ won approval for six Native American casinos,
the three to be run by the Senecas, and three more in the eastern part of the
state to be run by the other tribes of the state. These three would be near the
Catskill Mountain resorts, within a two hours drive of New York City-closer to the City than the Native American casinos of Connecticut, and the
casinos of Atlantic City. What had just six weeks earlier been considered a
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very close matter won approval in the state senate by a 52-8 vote and in the
assembly by a 92-41 vote. On October 31, Governor Pataki signed the
legislation. In May 2002, the Seneca tribe approved the compact presented
to them by the state, however, lands had not yet been set aside for the
Buffalo and Niagara casinos. Nonetheless, the public was assured that
sometime in 2002 or 2003 the first public revenue producing wide open
casino gambling in New York would begin (Perez-Pena & McKinley,
2001).
In addition to the voices of economic reason, the governor and
legislators heard the voice of political money. The New York Times (PerezPena & McKinley, 2001) called the lobbying effort for the agreement and
the legislative bill “one of the most expensive lobbying campaigns in the
state's history.” Dozens of interests spent "well over two million dollars" to
influence the policy members. The Seneca’s spent $400,000. Money won
over the clash of issues in an arena of an 'Individualistic' political culture.
New York's premier developer and Atlantic City casino owner Donald
Trump had made concerted efforts to block the expansion of Native
American gambling, with a modicum of success, before the events of
September 11. He remained at the ready threatening lawsuits if the casinos
were approved (Perez-Pena, 2001). Two towers fell, Native American
casinos came to New York, and the Donald was ‘trumped’ by a new culture
of politics.
Connecticut: Where Parties Stood for Something, and Leaders quested
for a Higher Purpose
Duane Lockard (1959) highlights the fact that parties in Connecticut
politics meant something. They were strong, and when they won elections,
they won the rewards of controlling the bureaucracy, but also the
opportunity to put their ideas into practice. For this reason, Elazar put the
'Moralistic' label on most of the state, while he recognized that the
compromise of 'Individualistic' politics also were present. In the modern era
the state had produced its share of leaders who served with the public
interest as a guiding hand. Two presidents descended from Senator Prescott
Bush, and the senator's legacy was continued on the state and national level
by Chester Bowles, Abraham Ribbicof, Thomas Dodd, and Joseph
Liberman. A self-designated 'maverick' came to hold a U.S. Senate seat in
the 1970s and later to serve two terms as governor. Lowell Weicker fit the
mood of state politics as the chief Republican critic of President Nixon
A CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND GAMBLING POLICY
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during the Watergate hearings of 1973. His independent voice was taken
from the senate when he was defeated by Joseph Liberman, but Weicker
was able to retain his political standing as he was elected governor, both as a
Republican and as an independent (Lockard, 1959).
Governor Weicker's moral compass stood on course as he adamantly
opposed the expansion of gambling in his state. Modern gambling had
come to Connecticut swiftly and almost completely in 1971. A lottery, offtrack betting, and horse track betting all became legal at the same time. In
1972 dog racing and jai alai betting were legalized. Only casinos and sports
betting remained, and efforts to bring about legalization started in the 1970s
(Dombrink & Thompson, 1990). Governor Ella Grasso led the charge
against casinos after voices in favor of repeating the Atlantic City
'experiment' were heard in the mid 1970s. She said she would be happy
only if there were no more gambling in Connecticut.
In 1981 Governor O'Neill did not speak with a strong voice as a
proposal was brought up in the legislature for a casino in the depressed
community of Bridgeport. However, it was soundly defeated as the General
Assembly accompanied their defeat of casinos with a bill declaring a
moratorium on all new gambling until 1985 (Dombrink & Thompson,
1990).
When Weicker became governor he was content that the state would
have no more gambling. However, because Connecticut permitted casino
games for charities, they could hold ‘Las Vegas Nights.’ And Connecticut
had Native American tribes. The one organized reservation belonged to the
Mashantucket Pequots. They started bingo games, and then the requested
negotiations for casino gaming. After several court battles in which
Weicker was staunch in his opposition to tribal gambling, the federal courts
ruled that he had to negotiate to allow the tribe to have a casino. He did so
allowing only table games. He commented on his distaste for gambling by
stating that he would not even ‘take his dog to Atlantic City’ (Benedict,
2000).
Soon after Foxwood's Casino opened, other interests approached the
legislature trying to win approval of private casino gambling. Weicker was
at a loss for a response. However, he realized that his state had monumental
fiscal problems, and the notion of casino taxes was appealing to some
legislators. The managers of the Foxwood concern approached Weicker
directly, and they boldly asked to have slot machines, a matter outside of
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prior negotiations, as clearly slot machines were illegal throughout
Connecticut. There was no way a court could order the state to allow the
Native Americans to have slot machines ─ a form of gambling most
detested by the moralist Weicker. Foxwoods offered a simple proposal: Let
the tribe have slot machines without any competition from any commercial
casinos, and the tribe will give Connecticut a minimum of “$100 million a
year”─ or “25% of winnings. Whatever is greater” (Benedict, 2000, p. 245).
Weicker realized that if he accepted the deal, which clearly violated
both state and federal law in several ways, he would accomplish two goals:
1. There would be no campaign for commercial casinos, and
2. His revenues woes would be over--at least temporarily.
He sold his soul. He secretly made the deal and the attorney general of
Connecticut gave his blessings and ruled that the state legislature could not
render its judgment on the matter. The state's moral compass went spinning
out of control. It is interesting that Weicker expounds for pages in his book,
Maverick, about how he led the moral crusade against the evil President
Richard Nixon, but he does not put a single work in the book about the
Foxwoods Casinos (Weicker & Sussman, 1995).
Foxwoods is located near the town of Ledyard. The casino is the
largest in the world with 284,000 square feet of gambling space, a bingo
hall, 4,585 machines, and 312 tables. It produces gambling winnings well
over one billion dollars a year. Most of the money comes out of the pockets
of the working people of Connecticut. Casino revenue goes to a tribe of less
than 300 members and, of course, to the politicians (Eisler, 2001; Benedict,
2000). In subsequent years a second tribe was granted permission to open a
casino with the same 'revenue sharing' formula.
The
wins of the 'Mohegan Sun' casino now equal of even surpass those of
Foxwoods.
France: Notions of Cultural Superiority and Grandeur Transcended
Mundane Political Concerns--Then There Is Gambling
French political culture has not been closely defined within the Elazar
typology, nor has the Almond and Verba model been used to analyze
politics. Nonetheless we can see elements of the ‘Moralistic’ style in
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political activity derivative from centuries past. The image of Joan ‘d Arc
rings through a patriotism that today is felt in an independence from
European politics, from N.A.T.O., and from the dominance of any other
country in world politics, e.g. the United States.
This feeling of national autonomy is tied to a feeling that the French
have a special culture that rises above mundane political bargaining. The
Napoleonic era also brought a strong dose of centralization to political
organization and decision making. Labor and Socialist interests have been
prototypical as politicians of the Left have felt a special obligation to have
the state serve as the protectorate of the people--especially the poor and
those in the working class. In a sense they have adopted the notion of
'noblesse oblige,' with the new ‘noble’ class being the government.
Concomitant with the Left's advocacy of the 'downtrodden' they have also
opposed major gambling activities that would entice the working class into
play that would exploit both their time and money. Casinos have been an
almost constant target--until recently.
The history of gambling in France gives us an idea of why casinos once
had such a bad reputation: they were immoral places of entertainment for
the aristocrats and the idle rich. Three important periods are to be
distinguished: l’Ancien Régime (before the Revolution), the 19th century
and the 20th century.
In the days of the Monarchy, all the kings tried to regulate gambling
either by forbidding it or by restricting it to the rich. Under the reign of
Philippe-Auguste, gambling was prohibited, except for the nobles, and the
stakes were limited. Under the reign of Louis XIV, the tolerance for money
games was not the same for all the social groups of people who gambled. At
that time, the Palais Royal was the most famous place where gamblers
gathered. That was the time when the practice of gambling grew most
significantly. The concentration of wealthy nobles at the king’s court was
the first reason of that expansion. Under the reign of Louis XV, the nobles
commonly went to take the waters in famous places like Wiesbaden or Aixla-Chapelle. Gambling was the main distraction for them.
There are several important legislative landmarks over the past two
centuries. In 1806, casinos were only permitted in spas, places frequented
by the nobility. Women, children, servants and local officials of the treasury
were not allowed into the casinos. In 1907 new regulations were imposed
upon casinos, and in 1920, casinos were prohibited from operating within
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100 km around Paris. This law was intended to prevent the Paris lower
classes from gambling, as it would have been almost impossible at that time
to combine a gambling session and the return journey in a single day.
Later, in 1959, yet another important law gave a new definition to the
legal framework of casinos. A casino is the place where you can find three
separate types of activity brought together: catering, shows and money
games. In 1959, the games authorized were those known in France as
traditional games: boule, French roulette, trente-quatre, black-jack, and
baccara. Then American roulette was added. No other changes were made
until 1987. The government of France in that year was divided between
Socialists and a Center Right party. Pressure for a change in the law of
casinos came from casino owners and local governments, which received
much of their public funds from casinos.
For a long time, French casinos had been the most splendid in Europe,
but by 1987, they were becoming decrepit, and were unable to modernize
because of very strict regulations. Until that year they were not permitted to
have machine gambling. They were doomed to go under. The French
casinos contribution to total earnings from gambling (2%) was derisory
compared to that of German casinos (9%). France took first place in Europe
in terms of its total number of casinos, but only sixth place in casino
revenues. Casino earnings per resident were less than one-half the earnings
of Holland casinos, three times less than in Germany and the UK, and six
time less than in Spain. While casino revenues in all other European
countries were doubling in the early years of the decade, the revenues in
French casinos were falling. The other countries permitted casinos to have
slot machines (Porte, 1986; Vercher &Thompson, 1999).
In 1986 co-author William Thompson visited the Trouville Casino on a
Thursday evening in July--tourist season. He was told that he could not be
shown to the gambling room, as on this evening there were no players in the
house. The casino association records showed that this was the ninth most
prosperous casino in France (Vercher & Thompson, 2001).
The discussions in the National Assembly in 1987 were quite animated,
but in the end, economic interests won the day, given that around 10,000
jobs in casinos were at stake, as well as considerable tax revenues both for
the State and, more important still, for those municipalities which possessed
a casino. Jean-Pierre Michel, a left-wing deputy in the assembly argued that
permitting machines to be operated by the poorer members of the
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population was adverse to the public interest as these people needed that
money in order to live. He also worried about pathological gambling and
control of machines by the Mafia. Those on the right voted for the
authorization of slot machines, and the interior minister, Charles Pasqua,
signed the decree in 1987, just before leaving the government. Pierre Jox,
who took over from him in a government of the Left, however, imposed a
limit of 16 on the number of casinos that were permitted to have machines.
There were 138 casinos (Lichtman, 1987; Porte, 1986).
Later in 1991, after bankruptcies had reduced the number of casinos to
only 83, the Left acquiesced in a plan to allow all casinos to have machines.
The appearance of the machines marked a decisive turnaround point for
these casinos. It gave them a new lease on life. The changes were profound
for the manner in which the casinos operated and for their clientele. While
confined to only a small number of the casinos, the overall casino revenues
increased almost 60% in one year.
Today there are 184 casinos.
Collectively they have 14,000 machines. Machine gambling represents
91.5% of the casino revenue in France, bringing in $2.249 billion
(Eurodollars), versus $206 million from table games. Overall revenues have
increased tenfold since machines came into the casinos.
Numerous changes have taken place in the world of the casino since the
advent of machines. The decor of the casinos has changed as have opening
hours, the ages of players, the amounts of money wagered, and the
winnings. The access to the slot machine rooms in the casinos is free, while
the traditional games areas require admission charges, typically 50 FFr. The
slot areas can be entered without showing identification cards, except to
demonstrate one was at least 18 years old. Some casinos had operated only
seasonally before, now all are open year round, and they are now open for
extended hours. Dress codes have changed, and in some cases they have
been eliminated. The gambling rooms no longer require that players remain
subdued and quiet even when engaged in large winning or losing
experiences. Neon lights have invaded the gambling space as well, along
with the sounds of changing coins. Slot rooms have even introduced rock
music. One concession to the former restrictive gambling regime is the rule
that specific jackpot amounts for machines can not be publicly advertised.
Other advertising restrictions have been removed.
As a result the French casinos are pulling in more people than they used
to. At peak periods players have to wait to get at the machines. Players can
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engage in activity with a minimum of resources--one FFr for a play-compared to high minimum bets at table games. The possibilities of big
wins are more apparent as well, as machines have linked jackpots. The
socio-economic make-up of players has changed; casinos are no longer the
private reserve of the affluent. Casinos have become increasingly popular
with the largest ones receiving as many as 10,000 people a week, where
before a crowd of several hundred on any evening would be considered
large. The new clientele is not only more numerous, but also more
representative of society as a whole. Women have also begun to make their
appearance in the casinos, providing 30% of the business, whereas before
1987, they were a minuscule portion of the patronage. Immigrants now
flock to the casinos as well as older people (Vercher & Thompson, 2001).
EXPLANATIONS
Why have “moralistic” or formerly “moralistic” political cultures
succumbed to forces promoting legalized gambling and its expansion? It is
not a simple question with one answer, but perhaps we can identify several
reasons that may contribute to a change of mind in the area of gambling
policy.
Mixed Messages on Morality: The Morality Equation is Not Always
Clear
One person's sin can help another's good causes. For instance, gambling
provides taxes for education, children's programs, seniors' programs,
recreation and the environment. Moreover, as was emphasized in a
California campaign, gambling offers funds that may in part be considered
reparations for past wrongs done to Native Americans. Gambling also can
be promoted as a source for jobs for the unemployed. The existence of
legalized gambling also is seen by promoters as a means to eliminate crime
tied to illegal gambling.
Gambling opportunities enhance personal freedoms. Free-Will religions
allow people to make choices. The ability to choose is a God-given aspect
of humanity. People are allowed to select a pathway--people decide if they
wish to go to heaven or hell. Accordingly it can be offered as a moral
position that people should have freedom to expend their own resources as
they see fit (for the most part). Governments should not stop God-given
opportunities for choice.
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Gambling may build people skills. Game playing is as “American as
Apple Pie” because it teaches interpersonal skills. Children are introduced to
games in pre-schools and in kindergarten, because qualities of games are
seen as essential to personal development. Gambling games are but an
extension of other games, and as such offer qualities such as fair
competition, trust, acceptance of adversity, humility in victory.
Gambling is implicitly endorsed in Bill Bennett’s Book of Virtues as an
element of ‘courage’ in Kipling’s Poem If. One who can put all he owns on
the turn of a card, lose it all, not speak a word to anyone, but instead get
onto his feet and start all over again--he “shall be a man!”
Legal Barriers (e.g. ‘Blue Laws’) Have Been Removed--or They Can Be
Subverted
People have changed state constitutions to permit lotteries, opening the
door to other gambling. Some lottery provisions were written in a manner
authorizing all games even though that was not the intent. Native American
gaming is authorized by Congress and may be established in states that have
prohibitions against commercial gaming.
The Public Has Adjusted to the Presence of Gambling (They Have Not
Felt 'Lightning Bolts' When They Put Coins into Machines)
Gambling fills an increasing amount of idle time, especially for seniors.
The time would otherwise be wasted in isolation, while the gambling
experience can be socially rewarding. People have other fears that seem
greater than gambling fears (crime, terrorism, higher taxes). Gambling in
the context of world affairs and the problems of society is not seen as the
evil it once was considered to be.
The “Individualistic” Political Culture Has Subverted the Moralistic
Nationwide--Perhaps World Wide
Communications, travel and migrations have lessened the hold of
regional subcultures in America. The notion of self-interest is universal-indeed, in the context of Adam Smith it even takes on an aura of moralism.
If all individualistic interests are promoted, the overall good may be served.
The individualistic culture captures the flow of news media that hits us each
day, nations jockeying for favorable positions in world politics, groups
seeking tax advantages, congressional budget compromises. Why should
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gambling policies be viewed in another context? This then leads to the
major reason that ‘moralistic’ political cultures have waned.
The Economic Equation is Overwhelming
Politicians have exhausted almost every other source of public
revenues--at least every politically acceptable source. The public has loudly
proclaimed that new taxes mean political defeat for leaders. The forces of
federalism which once provided state governments with funds for programs,
now seem reversed. Programs are mandated by a national government, but
they must be paid for by state governments. This has generated an
atmosphere of fiscal crisis in a majority of American states. In France, the
national government did not reap benefits from gambling operations, but
local governments became dependent upon casino taxes. There, as in many
of the American states, the force of competition from gambling in nearby
jurisdictions propelled decisions to duplicate what was being done
elsewhere. A new atmosphere of fiscal emergency has led to a domino
effect with gambling policy.
CONCLUSION
This study has used Daniel Elazar’s typology of “political cultures” to
examine political venues which have demonstrated a high degree of
“moralistic politics” in their histories. It has been found that all these
venues have been vulnerable to new economic pressures and new
attitudes which transcend their borders. Indeed, it has been found that a
new economic imperative has generated support for expanded legalized
gambling, trumping “moralistic” approaches to policy making in its
wake. This overwhelming economic equation will very likely find
legalized gambling activity spread even more in the foreseeable future.
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