SMEP No. 22
22 August 2016
SingaporeMiddleEastPapers
TheIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM);
UnderstandingtheForeignandSecurityPolicyofIdeologically
DrivenAuthoritarianStates:TheCaseStudyofIran
byHamoonKhelghat-Doost
1.Introduction
In a post 9/11 and ‘Arab Spring’ setting, Iran’s foreign and security policies are shifting.
Iraq,asIran’sprimaryneighboringnationalsecurityconcernofIranwasweakenedatno
cost to Iran by the United States. Iran has now seized the opportunity to strengthen its
influenceinIraq.TheestablishmentofamajorityShiastateinIraqhasturnedthiscountry
intoakeystrategicallyofIranintheMiddleEast.Ontheotherhand,SyriahasbeenIran’s
soleArabpartnersincethe1979IslamicRevolutionofIran,andinadditiontothereligious
ties between the Alawites of Syria and the Shias of Iran, Assad’s Syria has long been a
strategic hub for the Iran to channel assistance toward the radical groups in Lebanon
(Hezbollah)andPalestine(Hamas).
IransupportstheexistingpoliticalstructureswithinIraqandSyriaastheyhelpIran
to meet its national security goals to maintain Iran’s hegemony over the majority Sunni
population of the Middle East “by establishing a Shia crescent, …to expand its regional
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power and influence” (Barzegar, 2008) while also bolstering Iran’s security relative to
IsraelandtheUnitedStates.
However,inthecurrentcrisesinIraqandSyria,Iranhasdemonstratedinconsistencyin
itsnationalsecuritygoals.WhileithasremainedaprominentsupporterofPresidentAssad
in Syria, it has facilitated the fall of Prime Minister Maliki – Iran’s main ally in Iraq. To
explain Iran’s inconsistent foreign and security policy objectives in relation to Iraq and
Syria,thispaperwilladdressthequestionof:
•
WhyhasIransupportedPresidentAssadthroughouttheSyriancrisisbuthaltedits
supportofPMMalikiinIraq?
Toanswertheabovequestion,thispaperproposesamodeltounderstandandanalyzethe
foreignandsecuritypolicyofideologicallydrivenauthoritarianstatesbyusingthecaseof
Iran’s foreign and security policy towards Iraq and Syria. An authoritarian ideologically
drivenstateisdefinedasastate“inwhichideologyandstatepowerworkstosupporteach
otherinsuchawayastomakeitalmostindestructible”(Wilkinson,2008).Inthesestates,
nationalinterestsaresubordinatetotheconceptofseeingtheworldfromautopianlens
craftedbythefoundersofthestate(Muellerson,2009).Theproposedmodeliscalledthe
Ideo-PragmaticModel(IPM)basedonthesurvivalofthestate.Inthismodel,thesurvivalof
the state is referred to as the “stability of the system and the guarantee of its long term
prosperityandrule”(CusackandStoll,1994:34)againstbothinternalandexternalthreats.
Thismodelasloexplainsthat,dependingontheseverityandproximityofthethreattothe
survivalofthestate,ideologicallydrivenauthoritarianstatessuchasIranchoosetofollow
either pragmatic or ideological approaches. Ideology for the purpose of this paper is
definedasa“systemofthoughtthatorientspoliciestowardsabstractprinciplesandgoals
andawayfrompracticalandhistoricalcircumstances”(Heywood,2000:23).Basedonthis
definition, an ideological foreign policy therefore emphasizes “principles and doctrinaire
solutions over adaptability and the practical consequences of assertions and actions”
(Gardini,2011:17).
On the other hand, a pragmatic foreign policy is defined as a policy based on “the
principle that the usefulness, workability and practicality of ideas, policies and proposals
arethecriteriaoftheirmerit”(Gardini,2011:17).Thisarticlerecognizesthefactthatall
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politicalpoliciesareideologicalinnatureandthereforedoesnotviewideologicallybased
policies negatively. While an ideological foreign policy favors principles and normative
approaches,apragmaticforeignpolicyseekspracticalanddescriptiveapproaches.
The security doctrine and foreign policy of Iran are rooted in a specific narration of Shia
ideology (Mozaffari, 2009). However, this ideologically-based policy occasionally comes
intoconflictwiththenationalinterestsofIran.Insuchcases,despitethepropagandaover
loyalty to the ideological roots of the revolution, Iran often chooses a rational approach
over the ideologically-based approach. This can go as far as cooperating with nontraditionalpartnerssuchastheUnitedStates.ThecurrentcrisisinIraqexemplifiesIran’s
rationalapproach.Yet,neithertherationalactormodelnortheideologically-basedforeign
andsecuritypolicytheoreticalframeworkscanfullyexplainIran’sapparentlyinconsistent
policiestowardsitsstrategicallies.ThisSingaporeMiddleEastPaperarguesthatthebasis
of Iran’s security and foreign policy in fact is not an inconsistent choice between the
rational actor model and the ideologically-based model but rather the Ideo-Pragmatic
Modelbasedonthesurvivalofthestate.
Here, we therefore demonstrate the usefulness of the Ideo-Pragmatic Model in
explaining Iran’s security and foreign policy by applying the congruence method which
“focusesondrawinginferencestotherelevanceoftheoriesfromthe(non-)congruenceof
concrete observations with predictions deduced from these theories” (Annamalai, 2009).
For this reason, Iran’s security and foreign approach towards Iraq and Syria as its key
strategicpartnersintheMiddleEastwillbestudiedfromtheIdeo-PragmaticModel’spoint
ofview.TheIPMcanbealsousedinexplainingtheforeign andsecuritypoliciesofother
ideologically driven states such as North Korea or Cuba or several Latin American
countries,includingVenezuela.
2.InSearchofaTheoreticalFrameworkforUnderstandingIran’sForeignand
SecurityPolicy
There is no theory that properly explains or predicts the direction of Iran’s foreign and
security policy. Iran’s foreign policy, just like its revolution, is still a mystery to many
researchers as it is difficult to find a holistic theoretical framework for it. Revolution and
how revolutionary states such as China and Cuba view the world and build their foreign
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relations with other nations have been long discussed in works of prominent scholars
including Van Ness (1970), Armstrong (1993), Walt (1996), Halliday (2002) and DomaNguez(2009).However,whatmakestheforeignpolicyofrevolutionaryIrandifferentfrom
other revolutionary states (mostly Marxist revolutions) and therefore more difficult to
studyisitsShiaIslamicnature(Nia,2011).ThepositionandimpactofShiarevolutionary
ideology has been the main source of dispute among scholars interested in Iran’s foreign
andsecuritypolicies.
The inconsistent nature of Iran’s foreign and security policies has left academic
scholarswithoutatooltoaccessandpredictthestate’sbehavioraccurately.Withrespect
to this division, this article proposes the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM) of foreign and
security policy for authoritarian ideologically driven states, including Iran, with the
survival of the state as its core. Foreign and security policy of ideologically driven
authoritarian states is best understood through the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM) where,
depending on the severity and proximity of the threat to the survival of the state, the
countrychoosestofolloweitherrationalorideologicalapproaches.
TheIdeo-PragmaticModelpositsthatuntilthesurvivalofthestateisundersevere
threat, an ideologically driven authoritarian state will base its initial foreign and security
policiesonidealistobjectivesinsteadofpragmaticones.Whensuchathreatmaterializes,
the state retreats from its initial ideological objectives in favor of adopting pragmatic
approachesbasedonnationalinterests,atwhichpointitispreparedtoeithercovertlyor
overtly negotiate its idealist objectives – sometimes abandoning them altogether.
Following negotiations at the international level, the state’s retreat from its initial
ideological objectives must be ideologically justifiable to the state’s domestic idealist
politicalfactionsanditssupporters.Itisvitalthereforethattheauthoritarianstateprojects
an ideologically cohesive image of itself to its domestic stakeholders and supporters
reassures the ability of a stable ideological rule – despite its ideological retreat at the
internationallevel.Thisprojectionofthestate’sideologicalsoundnesstoitsstakeholdersis
a crucial step in preventing and reducing confrontations with popular state opposition
groups,asthesurvivaloftherulingregimeisinitselftheregime’sfundamentalobjective.
Chart1explainstheIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM)conceptually.
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The proposed Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM) is designed and developed by combining
North’s(1990)institutionalchangetheoryandPutnam’s(1988)modeloftwo-levelgames
for diplomacy and domestic politics. In his theory, North argues that institutions contain
the three dimensions of formal rules, informal constraints, and enforcement mechanisms
(ideological state apparatus). Putnam (1988: 427) explains that “domestic politics and
international relations are often somehow entangled” and one influences the other.In
explaining the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM), this article argues that ideologically driven
authoritarianstatesaresuitableexamplesofthethree-dimensionalinstitutions.
IdeologicallyDriven
State’sForeignand
SecurityPolicies
Survivalofthestate
underthreat
Yes
No
Continuepursuing
ideologicalpolicies
Adaptingpragmatic
policies
Justifyingtheideological
retreattothedomestic
audiences
Continuejustifyingthe
ideologicalpoliciesto
thedomesticaudiences
Chart1:TheConceptualFrameworkoftheIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM)
As long as these states do not confront threats to survival at the international level, they
continuetopursuetheirrespectiveideologicallyboundforeignandsecuritypolicies.Inthis
phase, the ruling elites – consisting of the ruling political administration as well as the
military and security apparatus are primarily responsible for achieving the state’s
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ideological foreign and security policies. However, when faced with conditions that
threatenthesurvivalofthestate,thestateadoptsamoreflexibleattitude;itsforeignand
security policy decisions becoming more pragmatic in nature. The degree of the state’s
flexibilityisthusdirectlyrelatedtotheseverityandproximityofthethreattoitssurvival.
Tothisend,thethreedimensionsofthestatemustworkconcurrentlyatthedomesticlevel
toideologicallyjustifytoboththestate’sidealistpoliticalfactionsandtheirsupporters,as
to the reason for its ideological retreat at the international level – a particularly crucial
endeavor as hardcore supporters of the state’s ideology form the core of its defense
strategyagainstdomesticandinternationalthreats.
Withregardtoformalgovernance,theIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM)placesemphasis
ontheroleofthehegemonicstructureofthestate,thestate’sstrengthandautonomy,and
the role of leadership (charismatic or institutional strength) in the state’s ability in
ensuring a smooth transition from ideologically driven foreign and security policies
towardsgreaterpragmaticandrationalones.Thestrongerthehegemonicstructureofthe
stateandthemoreitsautonomy,theeasieritisforthestatetoshiftitsforeignandsecurity
policies while simultaneously justifying any change (ideologically) to its domestic
supporters.The economic structure of the state is an important element in the IdeoPragmatic Model. Possessing a rentier or centralized economic system also increases the
state’s autonomy from the public and thus the ability of the state to shift its foreign and
securitypolicieswhilejustifyingthechangestoitsdomesticsupporters.
The opinions of hardliner supporters of the authoritarian state’s ideology play a
vital role in terms of informal constraints. These hardcore supporters “believe that the
perpetuationofauthoritarianruleispossibleanddesirable,andarecomposedmainlyofa
coreofunconditionalauthoritarianswhoareradicallyopposedtoanysignsofdemocracy,
aswellasmereopportunists”(O’DonnellandSchmitter2013;19).Thussupportersmust
beideologicallyconvincedbythestate’sreasonsforretreatingfromitsidealistforeignand
securitypoliciesattheinternationallevel.Thisisparticularlyimportantastheyformthe
backbone of the authoritarian ideological state’s defense in confronting domestic threats
from political rivals or an dissatisfied public. Subsequently, the state must ensure that
thesegroupsareconvincedofthestate’sideologicalcohesivenessinordertosecuretheir
continuedsupportforthestate.
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The ideological state apparatus including mass media, the state’s propaganda machinery,
judiciary and the state’s security apparatus play central roles in enforcing the state’s
justification for changing its ideological foreign and security policies at the international
level by presenting an ideologically cohesive and unshakeable image of the state to the
public.Inthisregard,thestate’sideologicalretreatshouldnotcomeacrossasaweakness
ofthestate,butinsteadbeprojectedasavictoryattheinternationallevel.Thelevelofthe
state’ssuccessinsuchanattemptisdirectlydependentonhowwellorganized,pervasive
and forceful their propaganda and security apparatus are.Table 1 summarizes the IPM
three-levelstructure:
TheIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM)
1.FormalStructureoftheState
•
HegemonicStructureoftheState
•
State’sStrengthandAutonomy
•
Leadership
•
EconomicStructureoftheState
•
DomesticIdeologicalPressureGroups
2.PublicPolitics
3.MechanismsforIdeological
Justification
•
StateSecurityApparatus
•
StateJudiciary
•
StatePropagandaMachinery
Table1:TheIdeo-PragmaticModelThreeLevelStructure
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The following sections of this article will provide a more detailed insight into the foreign
andsecuritydoctrineofIranaswellasthepositionofIraqandSyriainIran’sforeignand
securitypolicy.
3.ApplyingtheIdeo-PragramticModelinIran’sForeignandSecurityPolicy
The plausibility of the Ideo-Pragrmatic Model (IPM) can be studied in Iran’s different
foreign and security policies towards its two regional major allies; PM Maliki of Iraq and
PresidentAssadofSyria.
3.1.TheIraqCase
3.1.1.TheSurvivalThreat
ItwasonlyinJune2014whenAyatollahKhamenei,theSupremeLeaderofIran,expressed
hisfullsupportofPMMalikiandaskedtheworldtorespecttheApril2014electionwhich
was supposed to keep PM Maliki in office for a third term. However, Iran’s foreign and
securitypolicytowardsIraqseemstohaveshiftedfromideologicaltopragmatic.Thisshift
inapproachcanbetracedbacktotwoimportantevents;thewithdrawalofsupportforPM
MalikiandcooperatingwiththeUSinIraq’scrisis.Incontrasttoitstraditionalideological
valuesandsinceAugust2014,Iranchosetoremainsilentwhilepressuresweremounting
onPMMalikitoleaveofficeinIraq.Atthesametime,Irandidnottakeanopposingstand
against the US airstrikes on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) positions in
KurdistanofIraq.
Iran’swithdrawalofsupportforPMMalikiisimportantasTehranwasthemain
forcebehindPMMaliki’sremaininginpowerafterthe2010parliamentaryelection.Inthat
election,theAl-IraqiyablocledbymoderateShiapoliticianAyadAllawiwonthemostvotes
forIraqiparliamentseats.However,underdirectpressurefromIraninfavorofPMMaliki,
Ayad Allawi was unable to form his cabinet and PM Maliki instead reclaimed office. The
main reason for Iran to support Maliki can be viewed as rewarding his efforts to
consolidate “power in Shiite hands at the expense of the country’s Sunni and Kurdish
minorities”(Dreazen,2014).
Iran also continued to support PM Maliki strongly during the April 2014 Iraqi
parliament election as well. However, by mid-July 2014, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the
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SecretaryofIran’sSupremeCouncilforNationalSecurity(SCNS),visitedIraqtodiscussthe
currentcrisiswithseveralinfluentialIraqiShiaclergiesandseveralhighly-rankedShiaand
Sunni politicians. Shamkhani’s visit to Iraq was important as he “was given a green light
fromAyatollahKhamenei(theSupremeLeaderofIran)totrytoendthecrisisatanyprice”
(Hashem, 2014). A week after Shamkhani’s visit to Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, the grand Shia
clergyofIraq,demandedthatMaliki’sgovernmentdidnotinsistonstayinginofficeandto
insteadstepdown(ITSP,2014).Thereasonforthisshiftofpolicywillbefurtherdiscussed
inthefollowingsectionsofthisarticle.
Inanotherimportantshiftofpolicy,upontheappointmentofHaiderAl-Abadias
the new Prime Minister of Iraq and before Nuri Al-Maliki announced his resignation,
Admiral Shamkhani congratulated PM Al-Abadi on his new post. The announcement of
Iran’ssupportofthenewIraqiprimeministerbythemoderateAdmiralShamkhaniwasa
clearsignaltoshowthatallpoliticalfactionsofIranianpoliticswereunanimouslybehind
thedecisionoftheSupremeLeaderAyatollahAliKhameneiinshiftingthepoliciesinIraq
and“abandoningformerallyNouriAl-MalikiamidthecurrentSunnimilitantinsurgency”
(The Guardian, 2014). In a public speech on Wednesday 13 August 2014, Iran’s Supreme
LeaderalsoputthelastnailinthecoffinofNuriAl-Maliki’spoliticallifeastheIraqiPrime
Ministerbystating“Godwilling,thedeadlockwillendwiththeappointmentofIraq’snew
Prime Minister; and the government will be formed to start its work” (Conflicts Forum,
2014).
This significant shift of Iran’s policy towards PM Maliki and US military
operations in Iraq occurred only after ISIS managed to capture several dominantly Sunni
regionsinIraq,bringingitselfclosertothebordersofIranandplacingthesurvivalofthe
state in Tehran at risk. In this situation, “Iran is no longer defending its regional security
borders,butratheritsdirectborders;theIslamicState(IS)isnowlessthan40kilometers
fromtheIranianborder”(Hashem,2014).
“ISISposesagreatchallengetoIrannotonlygeopoliticallyandstrategically,but
alsoideologically”(Rafizadeh,2014).ThishasmadetheShiastateofIranabsolutelyfearful
of ISIS’ rising military strength in the Sunni areas of Iraqi borders with Iran. Most of the
SunnipopulationofIranlivesalongtheIraqiborderandTehranisworriedthat“thiscould
be utilized as a significant platform by ISIS to infiltrate several Iranian cities near the
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border and cause political instability for the Iranian leadership” (Rafizadeh, 2014).
Simultaneously,ISIS’approachtowardsIranianbordershasstartedtoheavilyburdenthe
already troubled economy of Iran, prompting the need for controlling and patrolling the
1500kilometer-longIran-Iraqiborderathighfinancialcost.Forsuchreasons,thegrowing
power of ISIS has forced Iran to consider this group an immediate threat to its state’s
survivalandstability.ThethreatfromISIShasthereforemadeIranadoptamorepragmatic
security and foreign policy towards Iraq by halting its support of PM Maliki, who was
increasinglyunderpressurebydifferentIraqipoliticalactorstoresign.
Inaddition,Iranstartedcooperatingwithitsmaininternationalrival,theUS,in
fighting against ISIS in another pragmatic step. In a surprising shift from its ideological
viewpoints,Iran’sSupremeLeaderAyatollahKhamenei“authorizedhistopcommanderto
co-ordinatemilitaryoperationswiththeUS,IraqiandKurdishforces”(BBC,September5,
2015) against ISIS in Iraq. Contrary to its ideological approach, Iran found itself
pragmaticallyinlinewiththeUSobjectivesinIraq,including“protectingIraq’sterritorial
integrity; preventing a sectarian civil war that could easily metastasize into the entire
region;anddefeatingISIS”(Milani,2014).Therefore,inashiftofpolicy,Iranabandonedits
ideologicalvaluesinfavorofpragmatism.
Iran has already retreated from its ideologically driven foreign and security
policyinconfrontingthreatstothesurvivalofthestateonseveraloccasionsinthepast.In
theaftermathof9/11andtheinvasionofAfghanistanandIraq,Iranonceagainfounditself
underthreat:thenextUStargetintheregion.“Americantroopswerebythendeployedto
their north in Central Asia, to their east in Afghanistan, to their south in the Persian Gulf
andtotheirwestinIraq.Iranwasvirtuallysurrounded”(Dobbins,2012).Inthissituation
and against its ideological values, in June 2003, Iran covertly contacted the US to open a
channelforabroaddialogueoveralldisputingissuesincluding“fullcooperationonnuclear
programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian
militantgroups”(Kessler,2006).Fearfulforitssurvivalandfacingincreasinginternational
pressure,Iranhalteditsnuclearweaponsprograminthesameyear(Mazzetti,2007).The
current nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 are another example of Iran giving up its
ideologically driven objectives in favour of pragmatic approaches. Only under crippling
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economic and financial sanctions (threatening the state’s survival) did Iran decide to
engageinmeaningfulnegotiationsoveritsnuclearprogramwiththeworldpowers.
Looking at how Iran’s foreign and security policy has responded based on immediate
survival threats, the process of shifting ideological policies to pragmatic policies can be
explainedbytheIdeo-PragmaticModel.
3.1.2.TheFormalStructureoftheState
ReferringtothecomponentsoftheIdeo-PragmaticModel,intermsoftheformalstructure
ofgovernance,IranisanIslamictheocracywiththehegemonyofpoweraccumulatedinthe
handsofitssupremeleaderAyatollahAliKhamenei,whoisboththereligiousandpolitical
leader of the country. His power includes outlining directions for political, economic and
socialpoliciesofIranonbothdomesticandinternationallevels.AyatollahKameneiisalso
the commander in chief of the Iranian armed forces and controls Iran’s security and
intelligence services. The supreme leader is further in charge of appointing the head of
judiciary and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB; the state radio television).
The supreme leader has expanded his supremacy over other elected sectors of the state
throughmorethan2000ofhisrepresentativeswho“havetheauthoritytointerveneinany
matter of state on the Supreme Leader's behalf” (PBS Frontline, 2013). Although the
presidentandthemembersoftheparliamentaredirectlyelectedbythepublic,theirroles
and abilities are heavily restricted by the legal duties of the supreme leader and his
appointees. For this reason, Ayatollah Khamenei is officially referred to as “the Final
Arbiter(Faslol-Khetab)andspeaksthelastword”(Moslem,2002;116)inIranianpolitics.
No opposition to Ayatollah Khamenei’s opinion is tolerated. The following chart
demonstratesthepowerstructureinIran.
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Chart2:IranianPoliticalPowerStructure
Source:StratforGlobalIntelligence(2014)
ThecentralizedstructureoftheIranianstateandhispositionasFinalArbiterhaveenabled
AyatollahKhameneitoshiftIran’sforeignandsecuritypoliciesinIraqdrasticallywithout
facing any serious opposition within different political factions in Iran. Although he was
stronglyandpubliclysupportingPMMalikiupuntilJuly2014,upontheemergenceofthe
threattothesurvivaloftheIranianstate,heabandonedIran’smainallyinIraqinAugust
2014 and instead, shifted to cooperate with the US, going against Iran’s “main foreign
policy priorities, including resistance against the United States and Israel” (Sadjadpour,
2012).
3.1.3DomesticPolitics
As for domestic politics, rentierism has enhanced “state autonomy by eliminating
economically motivated pressure groups and by making a segment of the society
dependentonthestate”(Shambayati,1994;307).Therefore,rentierismhasleftIranwith
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onlyatiny“businessclassbasedondifferentsectors,nocompetinganddiverseinterests,
andnofoundationfordemocracythatfitswithintheconfinesofcapitalism”(Sha’er,2013).
ThishasmadeiteasierforIrantodemonstratedrasticshiftsofpoliciesattimes.
RootedintheIslamistideologicalnatureoftheIranianstate,thestatedependent
segmentofthesocietyisculturallyandideologicallydevotedtotheShiareligiouscauseof
thestateandisformallyorganizedintoseveralgroupscollectivelyknownasthe“pressure
groups.” These pressure groups use “violence, intimidation, and assassination as tools to
affectgovernmentpolicywhentheymaynothavethenumericalstrengthorthepowerto
dosothroughlegalorlegislativemeans”(Rubin,2001).Someoftheseultra-Shiapolitical
groups include Ansar-e Hezbollah, Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Leader and
Tehran Militant Clergy Association. These pressure groups are fully supported by radical
factions of the Iranian state which traditionally call themselves the custodians of Islamic
revolutionary values. A small yet influential conservative section of Iranian society also
favorssupportingsuchgroupsagainstmoremoderateorreformistfactionsofthesociety.
ThepressuregroupsandtheconservativefactionofIraniansocietyformthebackboneof
the state in confronting domestic and international crises. They collectively advocate “an
ideologythatstressesloyaltytothevaluesoftheearlyrevolutionaryyears,unquestioning
allegiance to the supreme leader, strict religious observance, austerity, and xenophobic
nationalism” (Rubin, 2001; 46). Therefore, any drastic foreign and security policy change
whichcanbeinterpretedasdivertingfromthecoreradicalIslamistrevolutionaryvaluesof
the state at the international level should be ideologically justified for these groups and
theirsupporters.
Failure in ideologically convincing them can make the state lose its legitimacy
among its most reliable hardcore supporters and ultimately strengthen the opposition
forces and take the state into domestic political crisis. The state has confronted several
social crises created by these hardliner groups in the time of the reformist President
Khatami (1997-2005). President Khatami was constantly accused by these groups of
betraying the revolutionary and ideological values of the state through his reformist
policies.
OneofthestrategiesthatisextensivelyusedbytheIranianregimesince1979to
ideologically convince its hardcore supporters to shift from ideological policies to
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pragmatic ones is to create equivalence between Iran’s current situation and historic
Islamic events. For this purpose, religious vocabulary and rhetoric are broadly used in
everyday political and social discourses. Ayatollah Khamenei is often called by his first
name, Ali, in state produced slogans which resembles Ali the first Imam of the Shi’as. By
doing so, he creates a religiously legitimate image among his hard-core supporters and
devotees. The same rhetorical approach was put in practice by the state in justifying the
shiftofpoliciesinIraqtowardsPMMalikiandcooperatingwiththeUSinIraqandalsoin
advancing nuclear talks. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei announced a new
phenomenon in one of his recent speeches called ‘Heroic Leniency’ (Narmesh-e
Ghahramananeh).
TheideaofheroicleniencyisbasedontheShiainterpretationofImamHassan’s
(thesecondImamofShias)peaceagreementwithMuawiyahbinAbuSufyan,theCaliphof
the time in the seventh century. Based on this interpretation, Imam Hassan chose not to
fight the stronger Muawiyah and become a martyr and instead made peace with him
despite Muawiyah’s illegitimacy. The peace treaty is justified by Shia clergies as
“safeguarding the blood of the Muslims and the strength of Islam, and preventing the
externalandinternalenemiesfromtakingundueadvantageofthesituation”(Ayati,2010).
The same justification has been made by the Iranian Supreme Leader for using the term
“heroicleniency’todefendIran’schangeofpolicies.ThiswasseeninAyatollahKhamenei’s
“efforts to prepare hardliners, especially the most radical, for the potential innovations,
readconcessions”,ofthenewpolicies”(Haghighat-Nejad,2013).
Apartfromthethreattothestate’ssurvivalfromISISatitsborders,thecrippling
economic sanctions on Iran seem to have worked well in putting Iranian leaders in a
weakerpositionthanever.Astheresultofthesesanctions,“Iran’soilexportsandrevenues
plummeted, the value of its currency eroded, trade disruptions shuttered businesses and
exacerbated inflation” (Maloney, 2014). This situation has alarmed the Iranian leaders
aboutthepossibilityofsocialunrestandpopularuprising.Thereforeaneedforchanging
policiestomorepragmaticoneswasdeeplyfeltinTehran.‘HeroicLeniency’wasthusused
asameanstojustifytheshiftofpoliciesforthehardlinersofIranianpolitics.
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3.1.4MechanismsforIdeologicalJustification
According to Price (2004; 32) “states have an interest in political stability and require
citizensto‘buyin’totheirmessagesinordertomaintaincontrol”(Price,2004;32).Iranian
securityservices(includingbothintelligenceandenforcementservices)togetherwiththe
IRIB(thestaterunradiotelevision)arethemainarmsofthestateinconvincingthepublic
ofitsideologicalobjectivestheyusesystematicandoftenforciblepressure.TheSupreme
Council for National Security (SCNS) and Ministry of Intelligence (MI) are the main
intelligence service entities of the state. There are also several other parallel intelligence
servicesincludingthoserunbytheofficeoftheSupremeLeader,theIslamicRevolutionary
GuardsCorps(IRGC)andtheArmy.TheSupremeLeaderisinfullcontrolofallintelligence
services.
Thedutytoenforceanddefendthestate’sideologicalvaluesintimeofdomestic
crisis lies with the IRGC and its paramilitary wing; Basij. The IRGC and Basij of Iran are
armedforceswithasymmetricdefense1astheirmainmilitarydoctrine.BoththeIRGCand
Basijemphasizetheroleofideologyto“provideconcretetacticalandstrategicadvantages”
(Parsa,2000)fortheirforces.
TheIslamicRepublicofIranBroadcasting(IRIB)isthemainpropagandatoolof
the state for exercising its soft power over society. According to the Supreme Leader
AyatollahAliKhameneiwhoappointstheheadoftheIRIB,thisorganization“hasthevital
mission of transmitting Islamic values through television, which is crucial in the fight
againstthemediaaggressionfromIran’senemies”(IranMediaProgram,2014).TheIRIB
has the monopoly on broadcasting ownership in Iran and according to article 44 of the
Iranianconstitution,noprivatetelevisionorradiostationsareallowedtooperateinIran.
Atthesametime,theIRIBworkscloselywiththeIRGCandBasijtotheextentthatitis“led
and staffed by former IRGC officers and its training outlets are explicitly sympathetic to
IRGC institutional interests and worldview” (Wehrey, 2009; 37). The IRGC, Basij and the
IRIBcollectivelycontrolandenforcethestate’sideologyinallaspectsofIraniansociety.
1Asymmetricwarfarecanbedefinedas“warprosecutedbyaweakerpoweragainstastrongerpowerthat
hassuchforcesandresourcesthataconventionalwarisimpossible”(Bell,2010).
2TheShi’aIranconsidersAlawitesofSyria(therulingreligiousminority)asanoffshootofShi’ismand
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Simultaneously,withtheintroductionofthe‘HeroicLeniency’concept,thehardlinersand
“the institutions they control — the Revolutionary Guards, the nationwide Friday Prayer
venues, the judiciary and the state broadcaster (IRIB) — have all been ordered by
Ayatollah Khamenei not to sabotage” the new policies “with criticism or controversial
remarks” (Erdbrink, 2013). The announcement of the ‘Heroic Leniency’ concept by the
Supreme Leader was followed by several hours of IRIB nationwide programs explaining
andjustifyingthisnewtermfortheIranianmasseswhileseekingtoassurethemthatthe
essential values of the Islamic Republic and the 1979 revolution had not been
compromisedanditwasonlyatacticalmovefromthepositionofpower.
3.2.TheSyriaCase
3.2.1.TheSurvivalThreat
Contrary to its position toward PM Maliki in Iraq, Iran has been the main supporter of
PresidentAssadinSyriasincethestartofthecrisisin2011.IranandSyriasignedadefense
agreement in 2006 to cooperate against common threats. The military pact has enabled
Iran to supply the Syrian army with needed weapons and training. Since the start of the
uprising in Syria in 2011, Iran has never recognized the legitimacy of Syrians’ protests
against Assad. On the contrary, Iran’s first reaction in supporting Assad’s regime was to
providemilitaryequipmentandlogisticssupport.
SuchsupporthasstabilizedPresidentAssad’sregimeinSyria.TheriseofISISand
the current crisis in Iraq have also lessened the pressure on Syria’s Assad and provided
IranwithbetternegotiationleveragewiththeWestandespeciallywiththeUS.Thereare
already strong voices in the US suggesting that “if Assad falls, Al Qaeda, ISIS and other
extremist groups would flourish in Syria, just as they have in post-regime Iraq” (Carter,
2014),thereforenecessitatingthenegotiationofasettlementwithPresidentAssad.Being
far from the Iranian borders, (unlike the crisis in Iraq), the crisis in Syria cannot posit a
threat to survival for Iran. This has allowed Iran to pursue its ideological2 and military
supportofSyriadespiteheavypressuresfromtheworldcommunityoverPresidentAssad
tostepdown.
2TheShi’aIranconsidersAlawitesofSyria(therulingreligiousminority)asanoffshootofShi’ismand
thereforesupportstheAlawitesideologyagainstthecompetingSunnisminSyria.
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3.2.2.TheFormalStructureoftheState
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22 August 2016
TheformalstructureofthestateinIranwithAyatollahAliKhameneiastheFinalArbiter
has enabled Iran to stand cohesively against international pressures to stop supporting
President Assad. Ayatollah Khamenei has the final say in Iran’s foreign policy and he has
“huge stakes in the survival of Mr. Assad, his only real ally in the region” (Sanger and
Rudoren,2013).Onseveraloccasions,AyatollahKhameneihaswarnedtheArabcountries
oftheMiddleEasttostopsupportinganti-Assadrebellionsandtounderstandtherealityof
Assad’s Syria. In 2013, a personal message from Ayatollah Khamenei was delivered to
President Assad emphasizing “solidarity and full and unlimited support from Iran,
politically, militarily, and economically, to the Syrian leadership and people, against the
takfiris,terrorists,Israel,theUS,andallwhodareattackthiscountry”(Chalhoub,2013).
3.2.3DomesticPolitics
The full support of Iran for President Assad was not uncontested in Iran. The depth of
human tragedy and destruction in Syria has raised serious questions among ordinary
Iraniansandthestate’shardliners.Thecentralthemesofthesecriticismsrevolvearound
Iran’ssupportof“adictatorhatedbymostSyriansandthewastingofeconomicresources
desperatelyneededbyIraniansathome”(Naameshaam,2014).Tostrengthenthesupport
of the hardliners for the current ideologically driven policies in Syria, Iran once again
turnedtoreligiousrhetoric.TheIslamictermtakfiriwasintroducedtothepublicdiscourse
todescribeallanti-Assadforcesdespitetheirdiverseideologicalbackgrounds.Takfiriisan
“Arabic word for those who accuse others of apostasy” (Blanchard, 2009). In such
discourse, all anti-Assad forces were demonized as hardliner Sunni terrorists willing to
massacre Shias and destroy all their holy shrines in Syria. On the other hand, the forces
loyal to President Assad are framed as heroes fighting against Sunni terrorists to defend
Shi’ismandtherefore,Iran’ssupportofthemwasjustified..ThedirectionofIran’sforeign
policyinSyriawasoutlinedforthepublicbyGeneralNaghdi(CommanderinChiefofthe
Basijmilitia)as“SyriantakfirisandprotestorsareseekingSyria’sdestructionwithZionist
support therefore, there is no opinion among the Islamic Republic of Iran's people and
governmentotherthansupportforPresidentAssad”(Fultonetal,2013).
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3.2.4MechanismsforIdeologicalJustification
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IntheabsenceoffreemediaandthefreecirculationofinformationinIran,thenarrativeof
theIRIBhasfullyutilizeditsmonopolistcoveragetodistorttheSyriancrisisinfavorofthe
official Iranian state. The IRIB “presents a counter-narrative to Western media coverage,
emphasizing the Syrian state's legitimacy and unquestionable gains on the battlefield”
(Sreo, 2014).The crisis in Syria was framed to provoke Iranians’ religious sentiments by
overgeneralizing all anti-Assad forces as anti-Shia groups. As the state propaganda
machine,IRIB’scoverageofanti-Assadforceshavebecome“louderandshriller—withthe
specter of the dreaded takfiri, suddenly appearing alongside the well-known foreignbacked(andprobablyZionist)terrorist”(Lucas,2013).ThisapproachhasenabledIRIBto
create “a narrative in which any other outcome but Assad’s victory against the rebels is
unthinkable, while grounding Assad’s legitimacy in the close relationship between Syria
and Iran” (Sreo, 2014). Any news on the brutality of the Syrian army against civilians is
entirelycensoredfromtheIranianmainstreammediaandinstead.thetakfiris’brutalityis
exaggerated. Graphic scenes and epic music are widely used by IRIB to emphasize the
narrative of victory for President Assad by provoking public religious and emotional
sentiments.ThehegemonyofthestateovertheinternetinIranhasalsoallowedthestate
to dominate the cyber space and advocate its narrative of the Syrian crisis through
numerouswebsitesandblogs.
4.ComparativeCaseStudyAnalysis
Iran has traditionally been the strongest ally in the region of both PM Maliki of Iraq and
PresidentAssadofSyria.WithbothSyriaandIraqincrisis,itwasexpectedthatIranwould
equallysupportbothitsmainregionalallies.However,againstexpectations,Iranhaltedits
supportforPMMalikiandfacilitatedhisfallyetcontinuedtofullysupportPresidentAssad.
To explore and understand Iran’s logic behind such a drastic shift of policy, the IdeoPragmaticModel(IPM)wasappliedinbothcases.
As was argued earlier, the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM) posits that until the
survivalofthestateisunderthreat,anideologicallydrivenauthoritarianstatewillbaseits
initialforeignandsecuritypoliciesonidealistobjectivesinsteadofpragmaticones.When
suchathreatmaterializes,thestateretreatsfromitsinitialideologicalobjectivesinfavorof
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adoptingpragmaticapproaches.ThecaseinIraqvalidatesthishypothesis.ThefearofISIS’s
growing ideological and military strength, its rapid advancement towards Iraq’s long
borderswithIran,asignificantnumberoftheIranianSunnipopulationalongthisborder
andthefinancialburdenofpatrollingtheborders,createdanimmediatesurvivalthreatto
thestateinTehran.Hence,Iranwaspushedtogiveupitsideologicalforeignandsecurity
policiesinfavorofamorepragmaticonebyhaltingitssupportofPMMalikiandentering
into direct negotiations with the US in Iraq. Going against 35 years of ideological clashes
withtheUS,AyatollahKhamenei,evenauthorizedmilitarycooperationwiththeUSagainst
ISISinIraq.
Contrarytothisapproachandintheabsenceofanydirectsurvivalthreattothe
statefromthecrisisinSyria,Iranisstillstronglypursuingitsideologicallydrivensupport
ofPresidentAssadinSyriadespiteinternationalpressurestoabandonit..Thegeographical
distancebetweenIranandthecoreofthecrisisinSyriaprovidesenoughofabufferzone
thatIrandoesnotseetheSyriancrisisasanexistentialissue.Forthatreason,Iranseesno
purposeinreconsideringitsideologicallydrivenforeignandsecuritypolicyinSyria.
Following the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM), the state’s retreat from its initial ideological
policies or its insistence on those policies must be ideologically justified to the state’s
domestic hardliner political factions and their supporters. The three-level IPM model
(Formal Structure of Governance, Public Politics and Ideological Public Diplomacy)
explains this process for both Iraq and Syria. In the case of Iraq, the centralized decision
making political system of Iran has paved the way for the state to shift its foreign and
security policy drastically in time without facing any feasible obstacles from internal
factionsofthestate.
WiththeSupremeLeaderastheFinalArbiterandthecommanderinchiefofthe
armedforcesatthesametime,thestatefacednodifficultiesinshiftingthedirectionofits
policies in Iraq by halting its support of PM Maliki and later on cooperating with the US.
The shift of Iran’s policy in Iraq was also acknowledged by the US; in October 2014,
PresidentObamasentasecretlettertoIran’sSupremeLeader“discussinganddescribinga
shared interest in fighting Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria” (The Wall Street
Journal, 2014). The same argument is also valid for Iran’s consistency in supporting
President Assad in Syria. The Supreme Leader of Iran has repeatedly expressed his full
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supportofPresidentAssadinDamascusandwarnedbothdomesticandforeignsupporters
of anti-Assad forces about the “high price they would eventually pay for supporting
extremist Sunni Muslim groups” (i24News, 2014). The centralized system of the Iranian
politicalsystemandthepositionofitsleaderhasenabledthestatetoactcohesivelyatboth
nationalandinternationallevels.
The second level of IPM outlines that drastic changes in ideological policies
should be justified for the state’s hardcore supporters. These ideologically devoted
supporters need to be always convinced that the state is loyal to the values outlined by
AyatollahKhomeini,thefounderoftheIranianRevolutionof1979.Thefailuretodosowill
force the state to confront domestic crises such as those in the reformist President
Khatami’stime.ToideologicallyjustifytheradicalshiftofpoliciesinIraqin2014,thestate
used the religiously and ideologically rooted rhetoric of heroic leniency to assure its
hardcore supporters of its commitment to Shia Islamic ideologies. The concept of heroic
leniency was derived from the peace treaty made by Imam Hassan (625-670 AD, the
secondImamofShias)tojustifytheneedfornegotiationsandsofterapproachestowards
thecrisisinIraq,especiallyinitscooperationwiththeUS.Atthesametime,tojustifythe
need to continue the current policies in Syria despite the massive number of civilian
casualties, the Iranian state introduced the religious terminology of takfiri to uniformly
describeallanti-AssadforcesinvolvedintheSyriancrisis.Thenegativeimplicationofthe
terminology in Islamic tradition has provoked religious sentiments among the state’s
hardcore supporters and united them to support President Assad against all other
oppositionforces.
The third level of IPM describes the crucial role of the state’s propaganda
machine in winning over hardcore supporters to a softer government position. In both
cases of Iraq and Syria, IRIB has played a crucial role in monopolizing the circulation of
informationfortheeventsinbothcountriesinfavorofthestate’snarrative.Basedonthe
ideologicalterminologyofheroicleniency,theshiftofpoliciesinIraqandcooperationwith
the US were framed as Iran’s triumph in bringing Americans to the table of negotiations
andthatIran’ssupremacyintheregionwasrecognizedbytheworld’smainpowers.Inthe
case of Syria, IRIB similarly framed its coverage of the crisis toward creating a stable,
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strong image of President Assad as a fighter against takfiri terrorists and for whom his
successcouldnotberealizedwithoutIran’sdirectandfullsupport.
Together with IRIB, the intelligence services and the paramilitary forces were
alsogreatlyinvolvedinshapingandcontrollingpublicopinionoverthecrisesinIraqand
Syria. Having the hegemony over the internet, a great number of websites and blogs
criticizingIran’sinvolvementinbothIraqandSyriawerefilteredandnopermissionwas
awarded to any peaceful demonstration to condemn the war in Syria. On the other hand,
social networks such as Facebook, Google+ or Instagram were fully utilized by the state
supporterstoprovoketheemotionalandreligioussentimentsofthepublicinfavorofthe
newpoliciesinIraqandPresidentAssadinSyria.
TheshiftofIran’spoliciestowardspragmatisminIraqandthepersistenceofits
ideological policies in Syria could be therefore explained by the hypothesis of the IdeoPragmatic Model (IPM). Variables including the survival threat to the state, the formal
structure of the state, domestic policies and mechanisms for implementing the state’s
ideological justifications were demonstrated, according to the hypotheses of the IPM in
bothcasesofIraqandSyria.
5.Conclusion
InsearchoftheanswertowhyIransupportedPresidentAssadthroughouttheSyriancrisis
but halted its support of PM Maliki in Iraq. The paper proposed a new model, the IdeoPragmaticModel(IPM),toanalyzeandstudytheforeignandsecuritypolicyofideologically
driven authoritarian states. With reference to the shifting of Iran’s foreign and security
policyinIraqandthepersistenceofitsideologicalpoliciesinSyria,thispaperarguedthat
the foreign and security policy of ideologically driven authoritarian states such as Iran,
Cuba, North Korea or Venezuela is best understood through the Ideo-Pragmatic Model
(IPM),wheredependingonthenatureofthethreattothesurvivalofthestate,thecountry
choosestofolloweitherpragmaticorideologicalapproaches.InthecaseofIraq,Iranfound
itselffacingathreattoitssurvivalbyISISatitsborders,thereforeforcingittowithdraw
supportforitstraditionalally,PMMalikiandengagedinpragmaticnegotiationswiththe
US. On the other hand, since the crisis in Syria was not considered as a threat to the
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survivalofthestate,Irancontinueditsfullsupportofitsideologicalally,PresidentAssadof
Syria.
Followingtheshiftofpoliciesattheinternationallevel,thestate’sretreatfromits
initialideologicalobjectivesmustbeideologicallyjustifiabletothestate’sdomesticidealist
politicalfactionsanditssupporters.Itisvitalthereforethattheauthoritarianstateprojects
anideologicallycohesiveimageofitselftoitsdomesticsupporters,andassuresthemofits
abilityforstableideologicalruledespiteitsideologicalretreatattheinternationallevel.To
realize this goal, the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM) proposed in this paper has outlined a
three- level framework of action in which ideologically driven authoritarian states justify
theirdrasticshiftsofideologicalforeignandsecuritypoliciestopragmaticpoliciesfortheir
hardcoresupporters.
These levels include the formal structure of the state, domestic politics and
mechanismsofimplementingjustifications.IncaseofIran’spoliciesinbothIraqandSyria,
all variables performed according to the hypotheses of the Ideo-Pragmatic Model (IPM).
ThesamepatternofbehaviorcanbealsotracedinIran’sreactiontoitsnucleardisputes
with the world community. The paralyzing economic sanctions have brought Iran to the
verge of bankruptcy and therefore confronted the state with an immediate threat to its
survival. This has once again forced Iran to reconsider its ideologically driven nuclear
polices and engage in more constructive negotiations with the world community over its
nuclearprogram.
ThepaperalsosuggeststhattheIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM)basedonthesurvival
ofthestatecanbeusedasaninclusivemodeltostudyandanalyzetheforeignandsecurity
policyofotherideologicallydrivenauthoritarianstatesaroundtheworldaswell.The
implicationoftheIdeo-PragmaticModelcanbealsoexpandedtootherideologicallydriven
authoritarianstatesandfurtherstudiedincountriessuchasCuba,SaudiArabia,Syria,
CentralAsianrepublics,Venezuela,AfghanistanundertheTaliban,IraqunderSaddam
Hussein,LibyaunderMuammarGaddafiorevenNorthKorea.Inthesecountries,thestate
willbaseitsinitialforeignandsecuritypoliciesonidealistobjectivesinsteadofpragmatic
ones.Uponfacingathreattoitssurvivalhowever,thebehaviorofthesestatescanbe
analyzedthroughtheproposedIdeo-PragmaticModel(IPM).
22
Acknowledgement:
SMEP No. 22
22 August 2016
The author would like to sincerely thank Assistant Professor Nancy W. Gleason and
Associate Professor Terence Lee in the Department of Political Science at National
University of Singapore and Dr. Govindran Jegatesen at Royal Melbourne Institute of
Technologyfortheirhighlyhelpfulinputsandcomments.
HamoonKhelghat-DoostisaPhDscholarattheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceat
theNationalUniversityofSingapore.HeisalsoarecipientoftheNUSResearch
Scholarship.Hisfieldofresearchisprimarilyfocusedontheroleofgenderinthe
politicalviolenceoftheMiddleEast,terrorismstudies,anddomesticandforeign
policiesofMiddleEasternstates.
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