Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities

Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal
Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and politics
Tun Lin Moe
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To cite this document:
Tun Lin Moe, (2010),"Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and
politics", Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 19 Iss 3 pp. 314 - 332
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09653561011052493
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Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis
on policy, process, priorities,
problems, and politics
314
Tun Lin Moe
Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA
Abstract
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Purpose – Following a natural disaster the cleanup process usually takes place before reconstruction
or rebuild can actually be implemented. Effectiveness of cleanup process determines the possible level
of speed for implementing rebuild and reconstruction process. This paper aims to focus on providing
guidelines to help plan for future natural disaster management.
Design/methodology/approach – This study analyses a cleanup process after Hurricane Katrina
in terms of governing policy, implementing process, problems associated with process, priorities for
cleanup, and politics.
Findings – The study finds policies governing the cleanup process, problems associated with the
cleanup process, priorities areas in the cleanup work and politics of the disasters.
Research limitations/implications – The research focuses only on three states where Hurricane
Katrina hit, namely Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
Practical implications – This paper explains policies governing the cleanup, the process, the
prioritized work areas, associated problems, and politics of disasters. The analyses of the study
provide lessons which can be learned. They also provide grounds on which guidelines for effectively
managing the cleanup process for future similar events can be generated and set.
Originality/value – This paper provides guidelines on the process and politics of cleanup, which
can be applied to future comprehensive plans for cleanup process.
Keywords Natural disasters, United States of America, Storms
Paper type Research paper
Disaster Prevention and Management
Vol. 19 No. 3, 2010
pp. 314-332
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/09653561011052493
Introduction
In US history, Hurricane Katrina was well known for its most destructive and
catastrophic impacts which killed more than 1,300 people and left heartbreaking
rampage and human suffering. Hurricane Katrina was initially formed as a tropical
storm off the cost of Bahamas on August 23, 2005. It later developed into a severe
hurricane before landfall in Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama in seven
days. Before it reached the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, it forced more than 75
percent of the Gulf’s 819 manned oil platforms to evacuate which resulted in reduction
of one third in the Gulf of Mexico’s oil production level (FEMA, 2007).
An analysis conducted on data published by FEMA shows that 75 percent of
hurricanes with similar strength of Katrina of category 3 hits mainland US since 1851.
Based on the historical records of hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina was regarded as
normal in terms of its strength and development. However, it produced winds reaching
The author would like to thank Professor Beverly A. Cigler, School of Public Affairs,
Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg, for her comments on this paper.
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103 miles from its center with strong surge whereas Hurricane Camille, the strongest
hurricane of category 5 extended 75 miles from its center. Hurricane Katrina formed a
27ft high winds and storm surge that blew homes, business, and property and
destroyed levees in the lowest areas of Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. New
Orleans, which was geographically situated below sea level, was left 80 percent of the
city under flood. Overall, Hurricane Katrina affected a total of 93,000 sq. miles covering
138 parishes and counties.
According to FEMA, it was estimated that Hurricane Katrina caused a total of $97
billion damage on housing, consumer durable goods, business property and
government property (see Table I) whereas the federal government provided more
than $114 billion in resources to the Gulf region.
In addition to damages and lost of property, Maguire (2005) claimed that due to lost
of economic activities, it was estimated that state tax revenue losses were $38 million,
$175 million and $108 million in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi respectively.
Hurricane Katrina resulted in disaster debris from vegetation and man-made
structures. The estimated amount of debris was 110 million of cubic yards, which is
much greater than the greatest record of 40 million of cubic yards of disaster-related
debris produced by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Clean up activities must be carried out
before rebuilding can actually take place in the Hurricane Katrina’s impacted area.
According to Esworthy and Schierow (2005), major activities of cleanup include:
.
activating disaster response plans of federal, state, and local governments;
.
delegating authorities; and
.
carrying out debris assessment.
Cleanup after
Katrina
315
Debris management activities include:
.
removing, reducing volume, designating areas for separation, temporary storage,
and transportation;
.
oil and hazardous materials are assessed, contained, and managed;
.
existing Superfund sites were assessed and contained;
.
non-receding floodwaters in New Orleans were un-watered and potential
contaminated soil and sediment are managed;
.
infrastructure systems including water were cleaned up and repaired;
.
debris and hazardous materials were reduced, diversified, and disposed; and
.
potential public health and environmental risks are identified, monitored,
sampled, and analyzed.
Description
Housing
Consumer durable goods
Business property
Government property
Total
Source: FEMA (2007)
Damage ($ billion)
67
7
20
3
97
Table I.
Estimated damage
caused by Katrina and
the New Orleans flood
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316
Their estimated cost associated with clean up activities accounts as much as 40 percent
of total disaster-related costs.
With its main focus on cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, the study attempts to
provide answers to the central theme of inquiry – how the removal and cleaning up
disaster-related debris after Hurricane Katrina in the affected area of 93,000 sq. miles
was carried out by federal, state, and local governments. This study intends to search
specific answers to the following five research questions:
RQ1.
What are policies related to debris removal in disaster management
process?
RQ2.
What is the process of debris removal?
RQ3.
What are priorities in cleanup activities?
RQ4.
What are problems associated with the cleanup process?
RQ5.
What is the politics of disaster management and debris removal?
Hurricane background
According to FEMA, “hurricane” is defined as a type of tropical cyclone which
generally forms in the tropics. Such tropical cyclone or hurricane is usually
accompanied by thunderstorms in Northern Hemisphere where a counter-clockwise
circulation of winds near the earth’s surface normally follows. Gulf of Mexico and all
Atlantic coastal areas are prone to either hurricanes or tropical storms. Southwest
United States and the Pacific Coast face floods from heavy rains and hurricanes every
year. Five categories of hurricanes in terms of their wind speed, central pressure, and
damage potential indicate the level of impacts and severity. Categories from 3 to 5 are
always regarded as major threats whereas one and two are considered still extremely
dangerous. Any category of the hurricane draws full alerted attentions.
Unlike other natural disasters, hurricanes calling for declarations of major disasters
are not uncommon in the USA. Having rampaged at least 201 times that called for
major disaster declarations between 1953 and 2005, they have taken place and hard-hit
32 states out of 50 in the country. Among them, 25 states experienced at least two
hurricane and tropical storm related events during the past five decades whereas the
other five states experienced only once during the past period. Florida, Louisiana,
Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi are included in the list of most
frequently hard-hit places with a range of occurrences between ten and 29 times during
the past 50 years (see Table II).
A further analysis based on available data at FEMA reveals that major disaster
declarations related to hurricane or tropical storms accounted for 12 percent of the
1,732 total major disaster declarations made for the past five decades. Between 1956
and 2005, there were 203 events of hurricanes and tropical storm related disasters
which called for President’s declaration of major disasters in the 32 states. Florida,
Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi are among top ranking
lists with 29, 18, 17, 16, ten and ten major disaster declarations respectively during the
past over 50 years (see Table III). About 20 percent of the total events out of 203 took
place in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama states.
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Year
Hurricane/tropical storm
1956
1957
1964
1965
1969
1971
1974
1979
1985
1985
1989
1992
1994
1995
1998
1998
2001
2002
2002
2002
2004
2005
2005
2005
2005
Hurricane
Hurricane Floods
Hurricane Hilda
Hurricane Betsy
Hurricane Camille
Hurricane Edith
Hurricane Carmen
Hurricane Frederic
Hurricane Elena
Hurricane Juan
Tropical Storm Allison
Hurricane Andrew
Tropical Storm Alberto
Hurricane Opal
Hurricane Georges
Hurricane Frances and Hurricane Georges
Tropical Storm Allison
Tropical Storm Isidore
Hurricane Lili
Hurricane Isidore
Hurricane Ivan
Hurricane Dennis
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Rita
Tropical Storm Cindy
Total
Alabama
Mississippi
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
Louisiana
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
Cleanup after
Katrina
317
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
11
9
£
£
£
£
£
£
19
Source: FEMA
The three Hurricane Katrina hard-hit states, namely Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana are not excluded from the historical list of hurricanes-hit areas during the
past 50 years. They are, in fact, even ranked in the most frequently hit areas among
affected areas. Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas states are the most
frequently hit places in the nation. The three states were damaged by Hurricane Ivan in
2004 a year before Hurricane Katrina hard-hit them (see Table II).
Hurricanes usually destroy houses, buildings, roads, infrastructures, and facilities
and result in debris. Debris produced by natural disasters can be classified into five,
namely:
(1) Damaged buildings.
(2) Sediments.
(3) Green waste.
(4) Personal property.
(5) Ash and charred wood (FEMA) (see Table IV).
In hurricane events, all categories of debris except ash and charred wood are normally
resulted in. Hurricane Katrina destroyed 300,000 homes, left an estimated 118 million
cubic yards of debris in the affected 93,000 square miles. Debris removal from
Table II.
Major Disaster
Declarations in Alabama,
Mississippi, and
Louisiana between 1956
and 2005
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318
Table III.
Number of major disaster
declarations based on
hurricane or tropical
storm in US between 1953
and 2005
No.
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Florida
Louisiana
Texas
North Carolina
Alabama
Mississippi
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
New York
Puerto Rico
US Virgin Islands
Virginia
Connecticut
Georgia
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Rhode Island
American Samoa
Delaware
Maine
West Virginia
Hawaii
Marshall Islands
New Hampshire
California
District of Columbia
Federated States of Micronesia
Guam
Northern Mariana Islands
Ohio
Vermont
Most recent event
29
18
17
16
10
10
9
9
8
8
8
8
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
24 October 2005
24 September 2005
2 October 2007
7 October 2005
29 August 2005
29 August 2005
19 September 2004
7 October 2004
1 October 2004
17 September 2004
7 October 2004
22 September 2006
23 September 1999
24 September 2004
19 September 2003
26 August 1991
1 October 2004
26 August 1991
13 December 1991
23 September 2003
18 November 1999
23 September 2003
12 September 1992
7 February 1992
18 October 1999
21 September 1976
20 September 2003
11 July 2002
29 July 2004
18 August 1978
19 July 1972
12 November 1999
Total declarations
201
Source: FEMA
Damaged
buildings
Table IV.
Major categories of
disaster debris
Number of major
disasters declared
Hurricanes
Earthquakes
Tornadoes
Floods
Fires
Source: FEMA
£
£
£
£
£
Sediments
£
£
£
Green
waste
Personal
property
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
£
Ash and charred
wood
£
£
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disaster-affected areas is responsible by federal, state, and local governments. Luther
(2006) noted that a total of 71 million cubic yards of debris have been removed from
three states – Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in five months whereas six months
of removal time is required for the estimated 20 million cubic yards of debris resulted
by Hurricane Andrew.
In America’s hurricane history, there were four hurricanes which severely
rampaged houses and property were recorded as Katrina in 2005, Ivan in 2004, Andrew
in 1992, and Camille (see Figure 1). Among them, the damage record of Hurricane
Katrina left far away all other records of the three hurricanes including the record of
Hurricane Camille with the strongest category of five (Luther, 2006).
Cleanup after
Katrina
319
Policies
After a natural disaster affected specific areas in the nation, the President, who is
authorized by the Stafford Act, can make a decision on designation of an incident either
as an emergency or a major disaster. Under the Stafford Act, the President directs the
federal agencies to provide needed assistance including cleanup and disposal of waste
and debris. The President’s declaration then authorizes the federal government to
provide necessary assistance for both kinds of disaster declarations. The difference
between the two kinds of declaration is that the President may declare an event as
“emergency” whereas with the request of a governor certifying the state and affected
local governments, major disaster declaration can be made by the president. In terms of
support, the emergency declaration may be accompanied by not exceeding 5 millions
USD with the President’s approval without requesting the congress whereas major
disaster declaration is entitled with the full complement of Stafford Act programs
including long term public infrastructure recovery assistance as well as consequence
management (FEMA, 2007).
An analysis on the available records of major disaster declarations between 1954
and 2007 at FEMA reveals that in the past five decades, there were more than 200
major disaster declarations, which were made based on hurricane or tropical storm. On
Figure 1.
A comparison of hard-hit
hurricanes in US history
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320
Figure 2.
Number of major disaster
declarations between 1954
and 2007 in the USA
average, at least four major disaster declarations were made in a year. The frequency
of higher declarations made in a year is found once in every decade on average.
However, the interval of higher number of major disaster declarations is shortening in
more recent decades. Since 1989, more and more frequent major disaster declarations
have been made. The year 2004 was recorded with 22 major disaster declarations, the
highest number of declarations made based on hurricane and tropical storm during the
past 50 years (see Figure 2).
In addition, the seasonal nature of hurricanes and tropical storm should be noticed.
Between June and December of the year, most of the major disaster declarations were
made. The month of September is observed as the largest number of major disaster
declarations related to hurricanes and tropical storm being made during the past five
decades (see Figure 3). This seasonal and cyclical nature of hurricanes allows
authorities including federal, state and local governments to get prepared for potential
disaster impacts before in a year.
Declaring a major disaster needs to follow certain steps in the declaration process:
(1) Immediately after a disaster impact, local government is responsible to respond
with the supplements of neighboring communities and volunteer agencies.
(2) The state in which affected area is situated provides resources such as National
Guards and state agencies.
(3) Initial damage assessments are conducted by federal, state, and local
governments.
(4) Based on evaluation, the governor requests the president to declare major
disaster.
Cleanup after
Katrina
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321
Figure 3.
Number of major disaster
declarations based on
hurricane or tropical
storms made throughout
months during 1957
and 2007
(5) Based on evaluation on assessments and ability and capacity of State and local
governments to deal with the, FEMA recommends and requests the White
House.
(6) The president under the Stafford Act makes a decision on approval or denial.
The process normally takes from a few hours and several weeks depending on the
nature of disaster (FEMA, 2007) (see Figure 4).
Authorities for cleanup activities center at the Stafford Act, the December 2004
National Response Plan, presidential directives and direction to federal agencies
responding to incidents of national significance. On November 23, 1988, the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288 was amended and Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707 was signed into law. The Act statutes disaster
response activities conducted by FEMA and FEMA programs. Under the Stafford Act,
Figure 4.
Steps in major disaster
declaration process
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322
the President is authorized to establish a program of disaster preparedness and utilizes
services of all appropriate agencies while Congress appropriates budgets to the
Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) (FEMA, 2007) (see Figure 5).
Under the Home Land Security Act, the Department of Homeland Security is
authorized to consolidate federal emergency response plans into the National Response
Plan (NRP), which establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach for federal
interventions and coordinated activities. The NRP’s primary goals are achieved
through coordination among 27 federal agencies. The NRP includes 15 Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs) to which federal departments and agencies and the
American Red Cross are assigned according to their specialization and capabilities (see
Table V). Among them, ESF numbers 3, 8, and 10 are mainly concerned with cleanup
activities. The three functions are primarily responsible by three federal departments
and three agencies, namely:
.
Department of Defense.
.
Department of Homeland Security.
.
Department of Human and Health Services.
.
Environmental Protection Agency.
.
US Army Crops of Engineers.
.
US Coast Guards.
In addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), namely HSPD-5 of
Management of Domestic Incidents and HSPD-8 of National Preparedness also shape
the cleanup activities of federal, state and local governments. The Solid Waste
Association of North America (SWANA) provides its resources to state and local waste
managers for deposing the wastes (Luther, 2006).
When dealing with oil and hazardous substances, EPA and US Coast Guards are
provided with special statuaries by the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (Superfund; CERCLA) and
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) in assisting the state in
releasing hazardous materials, contaminants, or pollutants, regardless of cause. Under
the CERCLA, the National Response Team (NRT) headed by EPA includes 16 federal
agencies and representatives of state and local governments. In addition, the act also
Figure 5.
Authorities in general
disaster and debris
management process
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ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
ESF
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
ESF 15
ESF
Primary department or agency
Transportation
Communications
Public works and engineering
Firefighting
Emergency management
Mass care, housing, and human services
Resource support
Public health and medical services
Urban search and rescue
Oil and hazardous materials response
Agriculture and natural resources
Energy
Public safety and security
Long-term community recovery and
mitigation
External affairs
DOT
DHS (IAIP/NCS)
DOD (USACE) and DHS (FEMA)
USDA (Forest Service)
DHS (FEMA)
DHS (FEMA) and American Red Cross
GSA
HHS
DHS (FEMA)
EPA and DHS (US coast guard)
USDA and DOI
DOE
DHS and DOJ
USDA, DOC, DHS (FEMA), HUD, Treas, and
SBA
DHS (FEMA)
Notes: DOT ¼ Department of Transportation; DHS ¼ Department of Homeland Security;
NRC ¼ Nuclear Regulatory Commission; DOD ¼ Department of Defense; USACE ¼ US Army
Crops of Engineers; FEMA ¼ Federal Emergency Management Agency; USDA ¼ Department;
GSA ¼ General Services Administration; DHHS ¼ Department of Human and Health Services;
EPA ¼ Environmental Protection Agency; USCG ¼ US Cost Guard; DOI ¼ Department of the
Interior; DOE ¼ Department of Energy; DOJ ¼ Department of Justice; DOC ¼ Department of
Commerce; HUD ¼ Department of Housing and Urban Development; SBA ¼ Small Business
Administration
Source: FEMA
requires establishment of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to coordinate responses
to releasing and deposing hazardous substances. Under the NCP, the On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC) is assigned and authorized as exclusive manager of releases of oil
and hazardous substances (Luther, 2006).
The Congress appropriated $62.5 billion for immediate relief and response needs in
FY2005 and another $6 billion for disaster relief expenses in FY2006. As of September
6, 2006, FEMA’s has allocated $585 million for debris removal in New Orleans. FEMA
reimburses state and local governments 100 percent of the cost of debris removal until
June 30, 2006. After July 1, 2006, the reimbursement would go down to 90 percent.
However on June 29, 2006, the President announced an extension of the 100 percent
reimbursement for Orleans, St Bernard, St Tammany, Washington, and Plaquemines
Parishes in Louisiana until December 31, 2006. For Alabama, 100 percent
reimbursement is applied until October 27, 2005 and after that the costs sharing will
be 75 and 25 percent for federal and local governments respectively (Luther, 2006).
Process
Hurricane Katrina resulted in estimated 2 million cubic yards in Alabama, 45 million
cubic yards in Mississippi, and 50 million cubic yards in Louisiana, in a total affected
area of 93,000 sq. miles. These exclude debris from demolition of buildings and
properties. Disaster related wastes are generated immediately during and after the
Cleanup after
Katrina
323
Table V.
Emergency support
functions
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324
storm and extensive flooding related to the levee failure in New Orleans (Luther, 2006).
Hurricane Katrina generated two categories of waste, namely disaster related debris
and wastes. In most cases, these two categories are overlapping and difficult to
separate (Esworthy and Schierow, 2005).
Debris management process includes:
.
collection;
.
separation;
.
deposal; and
.
diversion (see Figure 6).
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First, disaster related debris were collected in the Katrina affected areas. Second,
collected debris must be separated hazardous from non-hazardous materials. It is a
necessary step to separate hazardous from non-hazardous materials to comply with
existing federal and state laws governing waste management. The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires all States to regulate management of
solid and hazardous waste. Under the RCRA, the law defines solid waste as “any
garbage, refuse . . . and other discarded material” whereas hazardous waste, classified
as a sub-category of solid waste, refers to waste that is either specifically listed in the
regulations or meets specific criteria that make it toxic, ignitable, corrosive, or reactive.
Disaster related debris and waste include:
.
construction materials;
.
damaged or destroyed buildings;
.
sediments;
.
green waste;
.
white goods;
.
personal property; and
.
vehicles (Luther, 2006).
Disaster debris includes:
.
construction materials;
.
damaged or destroyed buildings;
Figure 6.
Debris and waste
management process
.
.
.
.
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.
sediments;
green wasters (e.g. trees, leaves, limbs, and shrubs);
white goods such as refrigerators, freezers, washers, dryers, stoves, water
heaters, dishwashers, air conditioners;
personal property; and
vehicles (Esworthy and Schierow, 2005).
Hazardous debris was separated from the collected disaster debris. The hazardous
materials include:
.
household containers of pesticides, drain cleaners, cleaning supplies, and paint;
.
asbestos-coated pipes; and
.
surface coated with lead-based paint are separated from debris materials.
As much as they can, communities prefer diverting disaster debris to deposing them.
Diversion includes:
.
salvage;
.
reuse; and
.
recycle.
Vegetation, soil, certain metals, bricks, wood, and some other building materials are
appropriate to reuse and recycle, if they are not commingled or contaminated with
hazardous waste. Some of EPA guidelines include composing and chipping into mulch
for green waste; crushing and using as sub-base in road building for concrete and
asphalt; recycling as scrap metal for metal; and reusing or grounding brick for use in
landscaping applications; and so on (Luther, 2006).
Solid wastes that cannot be reused or recycled are sent to landfill to depose them
according to the federal RCRA. Only clean debris can be burned. However burning has
disadvantages such as it pollutes air, communities nearby have to inhale smokes from
burning, etc. thus it is less preferred. To accommodate the voluminous debris produced
by Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi and Louisiana issued debris management plans
which clarify and explain types of debris and waste handling methods, whereas
Alabama used existing guidelines for handling debris.
Hurricane Katrina produced debris, which were recorded much far away from the
highest record of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (see Figure 7). As of September 7, 2006,
debris colleted in Louisiana include curbside debris, white goods, Freon removal,
electronic goods, waste containers, hazardous waste, and non-hazardous waste (see
Table VI). It is found that non-hazardous waste account for 20 percent of hazardous
waste collected. This indicates that debris management requires more work on deposal
and landfills. An amount of 585.8 million $ was reimbursed debris removal for
Louisiana. A rough estimation of costs of debris removal is calculated based on all
debris collected expect curbside debris gathered by US Army of Crop of Engineers who
directly paid by FEMA. It can be said that an average unit of debris – either a pound of
hazardous or non-hazardous waste, a unit of white goods, electronic goods and waste
container, or a Freon may cost 23 $ for removal from disaster affected areas (see
Table VI).
Cleanup after
Katrina
325
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326
Figure 7.
Debris resulted from
hurricanes in the USA (in
million cubic yards)
Type of waste
Table VI.
Debris collected in New
Orleans and average cost
of removal per item
Curbside debris (units)
White goods (units)
Freon removal (units)
Electronic goods (units)
Waste containers (containers)
Cars (units)
Vessels (units)
Hazardous waste (lb)
Non-hazardous waste (lb)
Rotten meat and food from storage (lb)
Total (excluding debris collected by the crops)
Public assistance for debris removal in New Orleans (US$ million)
Average cost of debris removal per lb, container, or unit (US$)
Amount
45,194,674a
891,996
324,595
602,711
3,739,866
350,000a
60,000a
16,114,493
3,645,023
36,000,000a
25,318,684b
585,800,000
23.14
Notes: aCollected by US Army Crop of Engineers, bcalculation is solely done by author and it may not
reflect actual expenses occurred
Source: www.dequation louisiana.gov (as of September 7, 2006)
Priorities
According to Esworthy and Schierow (2005), debris removal is mainly concerned with
five priority areas. First, cleaning and removing oil and hazardous wastes was one of
the five prioritized areas. Under the National Response Plan, EPA responses to spills
on land and in land waters in the country. Under CERCLA, EPA formulates long-term
remedies for contaminated sites in the National Response Team (NRT) and coordinates
for responding to environmental releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
contaminants in National Contingency Plan (NCP) team. NCP dispatches On-Scene
Coordinators (OSCs) of 50 out of EPA’s 250 OSCs nationwide to Hurricane Katrina
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affected areas. In southern Louisiana, EPA contained, recovered, or naturally dispersed
about 8.0 million gallons of oil from above ground storage facilities and 1-2 million
gallons of gasoline from gas stations and more than 300,000 flooded cars in New
Orleans area. In addition, underground storage tanks of gasoline and household
hazardous materials soaked in contaminated waters pose potential threats. More than
65,000 waste containers and 718,216 gallons of fuel were collected in Mississippi and
Alabama. There were 774 registered treatment, storage, and disposal facilities – 397 in
Louisiana, 235 in Alabama, and 142 in Mississippi.
Second, there were concerns and threats from releases from existing 15 contaminated
sites, which were included in the National Priorities List (NPL) in the Hurricane Katrina
affected areas – five in New Orleans, six in Alabama, and three in Mississippi. The
Agricultural Street Landfill Superfund site in New Orleans was submerged in three feet
of water and it was a particular concern to authorities. Inspection of soil sample did not
compromise the cap.
Third, responding contaminated water in New Orleans was a great challenge.
Floodwaters in New Orleans breached the levees and floodwalls causing the city,
which was below the sea level with little natural drainage system, to lie under the flood.
It was estimated that the floodwaters was 14 billion gallons. The floodwaters contained
West Nile Virus, and fecal bacteria such as coli forms and E. coli bacteria ten times in
excess of EPA’s recommended level.
Fourth, another area is contamination of drinking water sources. EPA distributed
drinking water test kit in New Orleans. Mississippi river is the main source of
distributing drinking water for New Orleans area. Therefore, the state attempts to test
contamination of the drinking water sources.
Fifth, restoring public facilities including drinking water supply and treatment
facilities and sewage treatment plants is part of overall cleanup process. The American
Water Works Association estimated that $2.25 billion is in need to repair and replace
drinking water infrastructure of 1,000 systems damaged by Hurricane Katrina (see
Figure 8).
Problems
Cleanup process after Hurricane Katrina has posed a series of challenges and problems
to the federal, state, and local governments in carrying out their duties. Referring to
Esworthy and Schierow (2005) and Luther (2006), their specified problems are
classified into: coordination; policy; and debris management as follows:
(1) Coordination problems:
.
Information sharing – it was found that lack of accurate information
including assessments and safety of the sites, data to come back to sites for
evacuation process, and so on causes confusion among participants and
stakeholders of this cleanup process leading to unnecessary delays.
.
Coordination – it was also found that the Department of Homeland Security
needs to set up more integrated plan with its local DHS offices. Cigler (2007a)
points out that there are issues on communication and coordination among
concerned authorities during both the mitigation and the response phases in
the Katrina catastrophe. Schneider (2006) argued that governmental
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Figure 8.
Priority areas
response to Hurricane Katrina was evidenced with the administrative
breakdowns after Katrina’s onslaught.
(2) Policy related problems:
.
Demolishing rules – There are unnecessary rules for removing and
demolishing debris from private property which result in delay in
demolishing and debris removal from private property.
.
Environmental policies – There is a need to correctly interpret the regulation
and enforce them in practice. Federal and state laws must have exception on
defining the construction and demolished materials as non-hazardous
wastes. For example, the C&D materials from disaster affected areas are
different from those of C&D materials from normal areas. Applying same
rules to disaster cases create unnecessary legal disputes, and delays in
expediting the cleanup process.
(3) Debris management problems:
.
Wastes – In the cleanup process, it is difficult to separate wastes from
disaster-related debris. This task is regarded as time consuming because
waste and debris are mostly commingled. For example, separation of waste
from floodwaters in New Orleans is either difficult or essentially impossible
because they are commingled.
.
Deposal in landfills – Deposal of hazardous materials in landfills become
obstructive and concerns because of deposal of construction and demolished
materials in landfills, namely Gentilly Landfill and Chef Menteur Landfill
which were closed out in August 2006. The federal law defines C&D
materials as non-hazardous materials and landfill preparation for them does
.
.
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.
.
.
.
.
.
.
not need protective liners. However, the C&D materials are mingled with
hazardous wastes and they are deposed in the landfills which are not
prepared for accepting hazardous waste materials.
Law suit – The Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN) opposed
and filed a lawsuit against Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
(LDEQ) related to Gentilly landfill. This resulted in the limits of 19,000 CY
per day to depose in the site.
Health risk for community – Chef Menteur site has a maximum capacity of
7.2 million CY of debris. When a landfill is used up to its maximum capacity,
the debris pie will be as high as 80 feet above the landscape elevations. This
caused nearby communities concerned about health risks.
Stakeholders’ return – Due to lack of information on assessments, safety and
date to come back shared by the Department of Homeland Security,
stakeholders including residents slowly returned to their residents.
Demolition of private properties – Due to unnecessary rules, demolishing of
private properties and collection of debris became time consuming and
complex process which hampered the cleanup process.
Asbestos – Both federal and state law requires to follow special instructions
and guidelines on demolishing of a home with asbestos materials due to its
toxicity to human health. It adds complexity and times in demolishing,
separation, and removal process. Without accurate information on buildings
and structures with asbestos, the time required for demolishing buildings is
difficult to estimate.
Release of oil and hazardous substances – Underground tanks of gasoline in
New Orleans posed threats to health risk. All oil and hazardous substance
releases throughout the Hurricane Katrina area was not fully assessed and
determined yet.
Contaminated floodwaters – The floodwaters contained West Nile Virus,
and fecal bacteria such as coli forms and E. coli bacteria ten times in excess of
EPA’s recommended level. This poses not only threats to residents but also
workers cleaning up the debris and oil and hazardous materials in the
affected areas.
Drinking water sources – Underground wells for drinking water are regulated
by the state and EPA does not control them. The number of underground
wells that are contaminated in the Katrina-affected areas are unknown. This
poses threats to health of residents and there were no long-term and
sustainable remedies formulated in such highly disaster prone regions.
Drinking water facilities – The status of facilities that provide and drinking
water and wastewater for more than 200,000 customers are unknown. It was
estimated that $ 2.25 billion will be required for repairing and replacing more
than 1,000 drinking facilities affected by Hurricane Katrina. No time frame,
and solutions, were sought by authorities for drinking water facilities, and it
was not known when they could be restored back to pre-disaster situations.
Copeland (2005) pointed out that a bill, intended to provide funds to repair
storm-damaged sewage treatment and drinking water plants was passed by
Senate, but no further action was carried out during the 109th Congress.
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.
Contracting opportunities – Most of the disaster debris removal was done
through contracting outside operators. Government web sites including the
General Services Administration (GSA), the Small Business Administration
(SBA), and Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) web sites provided
information on contracting opportunities. All the web sites should be
monitored and tracked on contracting opportunities related to Hurricane
Katrina recovery and reconstruction efforts (Halchin, 2005).
Politics
Roberts (2006) argues that disasters are political events. He found that FEMA has
improved reorganization after 1993, but it ignored other responsibilities such as
combating the emerging terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001. More disaster
declarations were made by the president after 1993, unlike previous administration,
which refused to provide aid. It is obvious that more disasters funds will be injected
into regions where the President or members of FEMA’s oversight committee faced a
competitive election. In the past there was a case of politically motivated disaster aid
injection. In 1994, Illinois, the south side of Chicago was affected by disaster and
estimated damage was $6.7 million. Similarly in 1995, New Orleans faced a flood that
caused $10 million in damage. President Clinton refused to provide aid to Illinois,
which was considered as Democratic state while New Orleans received aid as it was
deemed as a competitive state. Federal money was mostly spent on rebuilding process
rather than preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. Above all, Roberts (2006) asserts
that reorganization of FEMA reveals that politicians take advantage of the effective
natural-disasters agency that was supported by citizens for providing services mainly
in rebuilding process.
In fact, the cost of debris removal takes up about 40 percent of total disaster-related
costs. Total escape from impacts of disasters is completely impossible. However, the
impacts can be minimized, by effective planning on preparedness, prevention, and
mitigation. This really needs serious attentions from politicians who seem lacking
interests and motives in effective planning for natural disaster management.
Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has produced approximately 110 million cubic yards of
debris, which far exceeds the highest amount of record 40 million cubic yards debris
generated by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. It was seen as the most destructive disaster
the country ever had in its history. It has provided a litmus test for federal, state, and
local governments’ effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in managing disasters,
especially the cleanup stage with enormous amount of debris ever recorded in the
history.
Since August 2005, the major disaster declarations based on Hurricane Katrina have
been active in three states Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, which were hard-hit by the
catastrophic event. The works and assistance from the federal government are still
pouring into cleanup and rebuilding process. Cleanup was seen as essential and
necessary step before rebuilding actually can take place. And the cleanup itself is
complex and problematic for all authorities concerned in undertaking.
The lessons, problems and challenges faced in the cleanup process should be
learned. They should be integrated into future planning for disaster management.
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Cigler (2007b) noted that the lesson should be learned and not merely noted. Problems
and issues seem remaining as unsolved and they are not readily getting sustainable
long-term solutions. Hurricane and tropical storm related disasters are not uncommon
to the three regions, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana hit hard by Hurricane
Katrina in the past five decades. So far, there seems to be still lack of sustainable
long-term solutions even in the phase of cleanup after disasters. This may indicate that
lessons are not learned and merely noted.
Hurricanes are seasonal in nature. The months of August, September, and
November appear as most of the major disaster declarations were made whereas
March has no record of disaster declaration based on hurricane or tropical storm in the
past 50 years. Therefore, March seems to be a good month for conducting training and
drawing plans for disaster management whereas all authorities concerned should be
fully alert in August, September, and November for preparedness, prevention, and
mitigation programs.
Above all, to expedite the cleanup process, the entire disaster management process
– preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response and rebuilding must begin with
effective planning. Instead of spending 40 percent of disaster-related costs for debris
removal activities, or bearing a cost of $23 for removal of every piece of debris
generated by Hurricane Katrina, politicians should consider paying smart and serious
attentions to more effective and integrated planning. The main objective of natural
disaster management, which is to minimize the negative impacts, and to rebuild, and
restore pre-disaster conditions in a shortest possible timeframe, could be achieved, if
and only if the disaster events do not become political events.
References
Cigler, B.A. (2007a), “Hurricane Katrina: two intergovernmental challenges”, Public Manager,
Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 3-7.
Cigler, B. (2007b), “The ‘big questions’ of Katrina and the 2005 great flood of New Orleans”,
Public Administration Review, special issue, pp. 64-76.
Copeland, C. (2005), Hurricane-Damaged Drinking Water and Wastewater Facilities: Impacts,
Needs, and Response, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC.
Esworthy, R. and Schierow, L.J. (2005), Cleanup after Hurricane Katrina: Environmental
Consideration, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2007), Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), FEMA, Hyattsville, MD, available at: www.fema.gov
FEMA (2007), Federal Disaster Declarations, FEMA, Hyattsville, MD, available at: www.fema.
gov/news/disasters.fema#sev1
Halchin, E.L. (2005), Hurricane Katrina Recovery: Contracting Opportunities, CRS Report for
Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
Luther, L. (2006), Disaster Debris Removal After Hurricane Katrina: Status and Associated
Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.
Maguire, S. (2005), The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the State Budgets of Alabama, Louisiana,
and Mississippi, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC.
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Roberts, P. (2006), “FEMA after Katrina”, Policy Review, Vol. 137, pp. 15-33.
Schneider, S.K. (2006), “Administrative breakdowns in the governmental response to Hurricane
Katrina”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 65 No. 5, pp. 515-794.
Further reading
Banipal, K. (2006), “Strategic approach to disaster management: lessons learned from Hurricane
Katrina”, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 484-94.
About the author
Tun Lin Moe has been studying in a doctoral degree program in geography specializing in
geographical information sciences and their application to natural disaster management,
sustainable development and international development at Arizona State University since
August 2009. He received MPA Public Policy from Pennsylvania State University in 2008 and
MPS International Development from Cornell University in 2009. Previously he also received a
MA in business communication and management from the University of the Thai Chamber of
Commerce in 1992 and a PhD in development administration from National Institute
of Development Administration, Thailand in 2003. He was appointed as post-doctoral fellow at
Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand, in 2005 as well as Karlsruhe University, Germany
in 2006. He has more than seven years of teaching and research experience in universities in
Thailand. Tun Lin Moe can be contacted at: [email protected] or [email protected]
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