Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and politics Tun Lin Moe Article information: Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) To cite this document: Tun Lin Moe, (2010),"Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and politics", Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 19 Iss 3 pp. 314 - 332 Permanent link to this document: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09653561011052493 Downloaded on: 24 August 2014, At: 00:52 (PT) References: this document contains references to 12 other documents. To copy this document: [email protected] The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 835 times since 2010* Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by 352589 [] For Authors If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services. Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. *Related content and download information correct at time of download. The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm DPM 19,3 Cleanup after Katrina: an analysis on policy, process, priorities, problems, and politics 314 Tun Lin Moe Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA Abstract Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) Purpose – Following a natural disaster the cleanup process usually takes place before reconstruction or rebuild can actually be implemented. Effectiveness of cleanup process determines the possible level of speed for implementing rebuild and reconstruction process. This paper aims to focus on providing guidelines to help plan for future natural disaster management. Design/methodology/approach – This study analyses a cleanup process after Hurricane Katrina in terms of governing policy, implementing process, problems associated with process, priorities for cleanup, and politics. Findings – The study finds policies governing the cleanup process, problems associated with the cleanup process, priorities areas in the cleanup work and politics of the disasters. Research limitations/implications – The research focuses only on three states where Hurricane Katrina hit, namely Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Practical implications – This paper explains policies governing the cleanup, the process, the prioritized work areas, associated problems, and politics of disasters. The analyses of the study provide lessons which can be learned. They also provide grounds on which guidelines for effectively managing the cleanup process for future similar events can be generated and set. Originality/value – This paper provides guidelines on the process and politics of cleanup, which can be applied to future comprehensive plans for cleanup process. Keywords Natural disasters, United States of America, Storms Paper type Research paper Disaster Prevention and Management Vol. 19 No. 3, 2010 pp. 314-332 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0965-3562 DOI 10.1108/09653561011052493 Introduction In US history, Hurricane Katrina was well known for its most destructive and catastrophic impacts which killed more than 1,300 people and left heartbreaking rampage and human suffering. Hurricane Katrina was initially formed as a tropical storm off the cost of Bahamas on August 23, 2005. It later developed into a severe hurricane before landfall in Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama in seven days. Before it reached the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, it forced more than 75 percent of the Gulf’s 819 manned oil platforms to evacuate which resulted in reduction of one third in the Gulf of Mexico’s oil production level (FEMA, 2007). An analysis conducted on data published by FEMA shows that 75 percent of hurricanes with similar strength of Katrina of category 3 hits mainland US since 1851. Based on the historical records of hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina was regarded as normal in terms of its strength and development. However, it produced winds reaching The author would like to thank Professor Beverly A. Cigler, School of Public Affairs, Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg, for her comments on this paper. Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 103 miles from its center with strong surge whereas Hurricane Camille, the strongest hurricane of category 5 extended 75 miles from its center. Hurricane Katrina formed a 27ft high winds and storm surge that blew homes, business, and property and destroyed levees in the lowest areas of Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. New Orleans, which was geographically situated below sea level, was left 80 percent of the city under flood. Overall, Hurricane Katrina affected a total of 93,000 sq. miles covering 138 parishes and counties. According to FEMA, it was estimated that Hurricane Katrina caused a total of $97 billion damage on housing, consumer durable goods, business property and government property (see Table I) whereas the federal government provided more than $114 billion in resources to the Gulf region. In addition to damages and lost of property, Maguire (2005) claimed that due to lost of economic activities, it was estimated that state tax revenue losses were $38 million, $175 million and $108 million in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi respectively. Hurricane Katrina resulted in disaster debris from vegetation and man-made structures. The estimated amount of debris was 110 million of cubic yards, which is much greater than the greatest record of 40 million of cubic yards of disaster-related debris produced by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Clean up activities must be carried out before rebuilding can actually take place in the Hurricane Katrina’s impacted area. According to Esworthy and Schierow (2005), major activities of cleanup include: . activating disaster response plans of federal, state, and local governments; . delegating authorities; and . carrying out debris assessment. Cleanup after Katrina 315 Debris management activities include: . removing, reducing volume, designating areas for separation, temporary storage, and transportation; . oil and hazardous materials are assessed, contained, and managed; . existing Superfund sites were assessed and contained; . non-receding floodwaters in New Orleans were un-watered and potential contaminated soil and sediment are managed; . infrastructure systems including water were cleaned up and repaired; . debris and hazardous materials were reduced, diversified, and disposed; and . potential public health and environmental risks are identified, monitored, sampled, and analyzed. Description Housing Consumer durable goods Business property Government property Total Source: FEMA (2007) Damage ($ billion) 67 7 20 3 97 Table I. Estimated damage caused by Katrina and the New Orleans flood DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 316 Their estimated cost associated with clean up activities accounts as much as 40 percent of total disaster-related costs. With its main focus on cleanup after Hurricane Katrina, the study attempts to provide answers to the central theme of inquiry – how the removal and cleaning up disaster-related debris after Hurricane Katrina in the affected area of 93,000 sq. miles was carried out by federal, state, and local governments. This study intends to search specific answers to the following five research questions: RQ1. What are policies related to debris removal in disaster management process? RQ2. What is the process of debris removal? RQ3. What are priorities in cleanup activities? RQ4. What are problems associated with the cleanup process? RQ5. What is the politics of disaster management and debris removal? Hurricane background According to FEMA, “hurricane” is defined as a type of tropical cyclone which generally forms in the tropics. Such tropical cyclone or hurricane is usually accompanied by thunderstorms in Northern Hemisphere where a counter-clockwise circulation of winds near the earth’s surface normally follows. Gulf of Mexico and all Atlantic coastal areas are prone to either hurricanes or tropical storms. Southwest United States and the Pacific Coast face floods from heavy rains and hurricanes every year. Five categories of hurricanes in terms of their wind speed, central pressure, and damage potential indicate the level of impacts and severity. Categories from 3 to 5 are always regarded as major threats whereas one and two are considered still extremely dangerous. Any category of the hurricane draws full alerted attentions. Unlike other natural disasters, hurricanes calling for declarations of major disasters are not uncommon in the USA. Having rampaged at least 201 times that called for major disaster declarations between 1953 and 2005, they have taken place and hard-hit 32 states out of 50 in the country. Among them, 25 states experienced at least two hurricane and tropical storm related events during the past five decades whereas the other five states experienced only once during the past period. Florida, Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi are included in the list of most frequently hard-hit places with a range of occurrences between ten and 29 times during the past 50 years (see Table II). A further analysis based on available data at FEMA reveals that major disaster declarations related to hurricane or tropical storms accounted for 12 percent of the 1,732 total major disaster declarations made for the past five decades. Between 1956 and 2005, there were 203 events of hurricanes and tropical storm related disasters which called for President’s declaration of major disasters in the 32 states. Florida, Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi are among top ranking lists with 29, 18, 17, 16, ten and ten major disaster declarations respectively during the past over 50 years (see Table III). About 20 percent of the total events out of 203 took place in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama states. Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) Year Hurricane/tropical storm 1956 1957 1964 1965 1969 1971 1974 1979 1985 1985 1989 1992 1994 1995 1998 1998 2001 2002 2002 2002 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 Hurricane Hurricane Floods Hurricane Hilda Hurricane Betsy Hurricane Camille Hurricane Edith Hurricane Carmen Hurricane Frederic Hurricane Elena Hurricane Juan Tropical Storm Allison Hurricane Andrew Tropical Storm Alberto Hurricane Opal Hurricane Georges Hurricane Frances and Hurricane Georges Tropical Storm Allison Tropical Storm Isidore Hurricane Lili Hurricane Isidore Hurricane Ivan Hurricane Dennis Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Rita Tropical Storm Cindy Total Alabama Mississippi £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ Louisiana £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ Cleanup after Katrina 317 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 11 9 £ £ £ £ £ £ 19 Source: FEMA The three Hurricane Katrina hard-hit states, namely Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are not excluded from the historical list of hurricanes-hit areas during the past 50 years. They are, in fact, even ranked in the most frequently hit areas among affected areas. Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas states are the most frequently hit places in the nation. The three states were damaged by Hurricane Ivan in 2004 a year before Hurricane Katrina hard-hit them (see Table II). Hurricanes usually destroy houses, buildings, roads, infrastructures, and facilities and result in debris. Debris produced by natural disasters can be classified into five, namely: (1) Damaged buildings. (2) Sediments. (3) Green waste. (4) Personal property. (5) Ash and charred wood (FEMA) (see Table IV). In hurricane events, all categories of debris except ash and charred wood are normally resulted in. Hurricane Katrina destroyed 300,000 homes, left an estimated 118 million cubic yards of debris in the affected 93,000 square miles. Debris removal from Table II. Major Disaster Declarations in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana between 1956 and 2005 DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 318 Table III. Number of major disaster declarations based on hurricane or tropical storm in US between 1953 and 2005 No. State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Florida Louisiana Texas North Carolina Alabama Mississippi Pennsylvania South Carolina New York Puerto Rico US Virgin Islands Virginia Connecticut Georgia Maryland Massachusetts New Jersey Rhode Island American Samoa Delaware Maine West Virginia Hawaii Marshall Islands New Hampshire California District of Columbia Federated States of Micronesia Guam Northern Mariana Islands Ohio Vermont Most recent event 29 18 17 16 10 10 9 9 8 8 8 8 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 24 October 2005 24 September 2005 2 October 2007 7 October 2005 29 August 2005 29 August 2005 19 September 2004 7 October 2004 1 October 2004 17 September 2004 7 October 2004 22 September 2006 23 September 1999 24 September 2004 19 September 2003 26 August 1991 1 October 2004 26 August 1991 13 December 1991 23 September 2003 18 November 1999 23 September 2003 12 September 1992 7 February 1992 18 October 1999 21 September 1976 20 September 2003 11 July 2002 29 July 2004 18 August 1978 19 July 1972 12 November 1999 Total declarations 201 Source: FEMA Damaged buildings Table IV. Major categories of disaster debris Number of major disasters declared Hurricanes Earthquakes Tornadoes Floods Fires Source: FEMA £ £ £ £ £ Sediments £ £ £ Green waste Personal property £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ Ash and charred wood £ £ Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) disaster-affected areas is responsible by federal, state, and local governments. Luther (2006) noted that a total of 71 million cubic yards of debris have been removed from three states – Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in five months whereas six months of removal time is required for the estimated 20 million cubic yards of debris resulted by Hurricane Andrew. In America’s hurricane history, there were four hurricanes which severely rampaged houses and property were recorded as Katrina in 2005, Ivan in 2004, Andrew in 1992, and Camille (see Figure 1). Among them, the damage record of Hurricane Katrina left far away all other records of the three hurricanes including the record of Hurricane Camille with the strongest category of five (Luther, 2006). Cleanup after Katrina 319 Policies After a natural disaster affected specific areas in the nation, the President, who is authorized by the Stafford Act, can make a decision on designation of an incident either as an emergency or a major disaster. Under the Stafford Act, the President directs the federal agencies to provide needed assistance including cleanup and disposal of waste and debris. The President’s declaration then authorizes the federal government to provide necessary assistance for both kinds of disaster declarations. The difference between the two kinds of declaration is that the President may declare an event as “emergency” whereas with the request of a governor certifying the state and affected local governments, major disaster declaration can be made by the president. In terms of support, the emergency declaration may be accompanied by not exceeding 5 millions USD with the President’s approval without requesting the congress whereas major disaster declaration is entitled with the full complement of Stafford Act programs including long term public infrastructure recovery assistance as well as consequence management (FEMA, 2007). An analysis on the available records of major disaster declarations between 1954 and 2007 at FEMA reveals that in the past five decades, there were more than 200 major disaster declarations, which were made based on hurricane or tropical storm. On Figure 1. A comparison of hard-hit hurricanes in US history DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 320 Figure 2. Number of major disaster declarations between 1954 and 2007 in the USA average, at least four major disaster declarations were made in a year. The frequency of higher declarations made in a year is found once in every decade on average. However, the interval of higher number of major disaster declarations is shortening in more recent decades. Since 1989, more and more frequent major disaster declarations have been made. The year 2004 was recorded with 22 major disaster declarations, the highest number of declarations made based on hurricane and tropical storm during the past 50 years (see Figure 2). In addition, the seasonal nature of hurricanes and tropical storm should be noticed. Between June and December of the year, most of the major disaster declarations were made. The month of September is observed as the largest number of major disaster declarations related to hurricanes and tropical storm being made during the past five decades (see Figure 3). This seasonal and cyclical nature of hurricanes allows authorities including federal, state and local governments to get prepared for potential disaster impacts before in a year. Declaring a major disaster needs to follow certain steps in the declaration process: (1) Immediately after a disaster impact, local government is responsible to respond with the supplements of neighboring communities and volunteer agencies. (2) The state in which affected area is situated provides resources such as National Guards and state agencies. (3) Initial damage assessments are conducted by federal, state, and local governments. (4) Based on evaluation, the governor requests the president to declare major disaster. Cleanup after Katrina Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 321 Figure 3. Number of major disaster declarations based on hurricane or tropical storms made throughout months during 1957 and 2007 (5) Based on evaluation on assessments and ability and capacity of State and local governments to deal with the, FEMA recommends and requests the White House. (6) The president under the Stafford Act makes a decision on approval or denial. The process normally takes from a few hours and several weeks depending on the nature of disaster (FEMA, 2007) (see Figure 4). Authorities for cleanup activities center at the Stafford Act, the December 2004 National Response Plan, presidential directives and direction to federal agencies responding to incidents of national significance. On November 23, 1988, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288 was amended and Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707 was signed into law. The Act statutes disaster response activities conducted by FEMA and FEMA programs. Under the Stafford Act, Figure 4. Steps in major disaster declaration process DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 322 the President is authorized to establish a program of disaster preparedness and utilizes services of all appropriate agencies while Congress appropriates budgets to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) (FEMA, 2007) (see Figure 5). Under the Home Land Security Act, the Department of Homeland Security is authorized to consolidate federal emergency response plans into the National Response Plan (NRP), which establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach for federal interventions and coordinated activities. The NRP’s primary goals are achieved through coordination among 27 federal agencies. The NRP includes 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to which federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross are assigned according to their specialization and capabilities (see Table V). Among them, ESF numbers 3, 8, and 10 are mainly concerned with cleanup activities. The three functions are primarily responsible by three federal departments and three agencies, namely: . Department of Defense. . Department of Homeland Security. . Department of Human and Health Services. . Environmental Protection Agency. . US Army Crops of Engineers. . US Coast Guards. In addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), namely HSPD-5 of Management of Domestic Incidents and HSPD-8 of National Preparedness also shape the cleanup activities of federal, state and local governments. The Solid Waste Association of North America (SWANA) provides its resources to state and local waste managers for deposing the wastes (Luther, 2006). When dealing with oil and hazardous substances, EPA and US Coast Guards are provided with special statuaries by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (Superfund; CERCLA) and Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) in assisting the state in releasing hazardous materials, contaminants, or pollutants, regardless of cause. Under the CERCLA, the National Response Team (NRT) headed by EPA includes 16 federal agencies and representatives of state and local governments. In addition, the act also Figure 5. Authorities in general disaster and debris management process Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF ESF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 ESF 15 ESF Primary department or agency Transportation Communications Public works and engineering Firefighting Emergency management Mass care, housing, and human services Resource support Public health and medical services Urban search and rescue Oil and hazardous materials response Agriculture and natural resources Energy Public safety and security Long-term community recovery and mitigation External affairs DOT DHS (IAIP/NCS) DOD (USACE) and DHS (FEMA) USDA (Forest Service) DHS (FEMA) DHS (FEMA) and American Red Cross GSA HHS DHS (FEMA) EPA and DHS (US coast guard) USDA and DOI DOE DHS and DOJ USDA, DOC, DHS (FEMA), HUD, Treas, and SBA DHS (FEMA) Notes: DOT ¼ Department of Transportation; DHS ¼ Department of Homeland Security; NRC ¼ Nuclear Regulatory Commission; DOD ¼ Department of Defense; USACE ¼ US Army Crops of Engineers; FEMA ¼ Federal Emergency Management Agency; USDA ¼ Department; GSA ¼ General Services Administration; DHHS ¼ Department of Human and Health Services; EPA ¼ Environmental Protection Agency; USCG ¼ US Cost Guard; DOI ¼ Department of the Interior; DOE ¼ Department of Energy; DOJ ¼ Department of Justice; DOC ¼ Department of Commerce; HUD ¼ Department of Housing and Urban Development; SBA ¼ Small Business Administration Source: FEMA requires establishment of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to coordinate responses to releasing and deposing hazardous substances. Under the NCP, the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is assigned and authorized as exclusive manager of releases of oil and hazardous substances (Luther, 2006). The Congress appropriated $62.5 billion for immediate relief and response needs in FY2005 and another $6 billion for disaster relief expenses in FY2006. As of September 6, 2006, FEMA’s has allocated $585 million for debris removal in New Orleans. FEMA reimburses state and local governments 100 percent of the cost of debris removal until June 30, 2006. After July 1, 2006, the reimbursement would go down to 90 percent. However on June 29, 2006, the President announced an extension of the 100 percent reimbursement for Orleans, St Bernard, St Tammany, Washington, and Plaquemines Parishes in Louisiana until December 31, 2006. For Alabama, 100 percent reimbursement is applied until October 27, 2005 and after that the costs sharing will be 75 and 25 percent for federal and local governments respectively (Luther, 2006). Process Hurricane Katrina resulted in estimated 2 million cubic yards in Alabama, 45 million cubic yards in Mississippi, and 50 million cubic yards in Louisiana, in a total affected area of 93,000 sq. miles. These exclude debris from demolition of buildings and properties. Disaster related wastes are generated immediately during and after the Cleanup after Katrina 323 Table V. Emergency support functions DPM 19,3 324 storm and extensive flooding related to the levee failure in New Orleans (Luther, 2006). Hurricane Katrina generated two categories of waste, namely disaster related debris and wastes. In most cases, these two categories are overlapping and difficult to separate (Esworthy and Schierow, 2005). Debris management process includes: . collection; . separation; . deposal; and . diversion (see Figure 6). Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) First, disaster related debris were collected in the Katrina affected areas. Second, collected debris must be separated hazardous from non-hazardous materials. It is a necessary step to separate hazardous from non-hazardous materials to comply with existing federal and state laws governing waste management. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires all States to regulate management of solid and hazardous waste. Under the RCRA, the law defines solid waste as “any garbage, refuse . . . and other discarded material” whereas hazardous waste, classified as a sub-category of solid waste, refers to waste that is either specifically listed in the regulations or meets specific criteria that make it toxic, ignitable, corrosive, or reactive. Disaster related debris and waste include: . construction materials; . damaged or destroyed buildings; . sediments; . green waste; . white goods; . personal property; and . vehicles (Luther, 2006). Disaster debris includes: . construction materials; . damaged or destroyed buildings; Figure 6. Debris and waste management process . . . . Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) . sediments; green wasters (e.g. trees, leaves, limbs, and shrubs); white goods such as refrigerators, freezers, washers, dryers, stoves, water heaters, dishwashers, air conditioners; personal property; and vehicles (Esworthy and Schierow, 2005). Hazardous debris was separated from the collected disaster debris. The hazardous materials include: . household containers of pesticides, drain cleaners, cleaning supplies, and paint; . asbestos-coated pipes; and . surface coated with lead-based paint are separated from debris materials. As much as they can, communities prefer diverting disaster debris to deposing them. Diversion includes: . salvage; . reuse; and . recycle. Vegetation, soil, certain metals, bricks, wood, and some other building materials are appropriate to reuse and recycle, if they are not commingled or contaminated with hazardous waste. Some of EPA guidelines include composing and chipping into mulch for green waste; crushing and using as sub-base in road building for concrete and asphalt; recycling as scrap metal for metal; and reusing or grounding brick for use in landscaping applications; and so on (Luther, 2006). Solid wastes that cannot be reused or recycled are sent to landfill to depose them according to the federal RCRA. Only clean debris can be burned. However burning has disadvantages such as it pollutes air, communities nearby have to inhale smokes from burning, etc. thus it is less preferred. To accommodate the voluminous debris produced by Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi and Louisiana issued debris management plans which clarify and explain types of debris and waste handling methods, whereas Alabama used existing guidelines for handling debris. Hurricane Katrina produced debris, which were recorded much far away from the highest record of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (see Figure 7). As of September 7, 2006, debris colleted in Louisiana include curbside debris, white goods, Freon removal, electronic goods, waste containers, hazardous waste, and non-hazardous waste (see Table VI). It is found that non-hazardous waste account for 20 percent of hazardous waste collected. This indicates that debris management requires more work on deposal and landfills. An amount of 585.8 million $ was reimbursed debris removal for Louisiana. A rough estimation of costs of debris removal is calculated based on all debris collected expect curbside debris gathered by US Army of Crop of Engineers who directly paid by FEMA. It can be said that an average unit of debris – either a pound of hazardous or non-hazardous waste, a unit of white goods, electronic goods and waste container, or a Freon may cost 23 $ for removal from disaster affected areas (see Table VI). Cleanup after Katrina 325 DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 326 Figure 7. Debris resulted from hurricanes in the USA (in million cubic yards) Type of waste Table VI. Debris collected in New Orleans and average cost of removal per item Curbside debris (units) White goods (units) Freon removal (units) Electronic goods (units) Waste containers (containers) Cars (units) Vessels (units) Hazardous waste (lb) Non-hazardous waste (lb) Rotten meat and food from storage (lb) Total (excluding debris collected by the crops) Public assistance for debris removal in New Orleans (US$ million) Average cost of debris removal per lb, container, or unit (US$) Amount 45,194,674a 891,996 324,595 602,711 3,739,866 350,000a 60,000a 16,114,493 3,645,023 36,000,000a 25,318,684b 585,800,000 23.14 Notes: aCollected by US Army Crop of Engineers, bcalculation is solely done by author and it may not reflect actual expenses occurred Source: www.dequation louisiana.gov (as of September 7, 2006) Priorities According to Esworthy and Schierow (2005), debris removal is mainly concerned with five priority areas. First, cleaning and removing oil and hazardous wastes was one of the five prioritized areas. Under the National Response Plan, EPA responses to spills on land and in land waters in the country. Under CERCLA, EPA formulates long-term remedies for contaminated sites in the National Response Team (NRT) and coordinates for responding to environmental releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants in National Contingency Plan (NCP) team. NCP dispatches On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) of 50 out of EPA’s 250 OSCs nationwide to Hurricane Katrina Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) affected areas. In southern Louisiana, EPA contained, recovered, or naturally dispersed about 8.0 million gallons of oil from above ground storage facilities and 1-2 million gallons of gasoline from gas stations and more than 300,000 flooded cars in New Orleans area. In addition, underground storage tanks of gasoline and household hazardous materials soaked in contaminated waters pose potential threats. More than 65,000 waste containers and 718,216 gallons of fuel were collected in Mississippi and Alabama. There were 774 registered treatment, storage, and disposal facilities – 397 in Louisiana, 235 in Alabama, and 142 in Mississippi. Second, there were concerns and threats from releases from existing 15 contaminated sites, which were included in the National Priorities List (NPL) in the Hurricane Katrina affected areas – five in New Orleans, six in Alabama, and three in Mississippi. The Agricultural Street Landfill Superfund site in New Orleans was submerged in three feet of water and it was a particular concern to authorities. Inspection of soil sample did not compromise the cap. Third, responding contaminated water in New Orleans was a great challenge. Floodwaters in New Orleans breached the levees and floodwalls causing the city, which was below the sea level with little natural drainage system, to lie under the flood. It was estimated that the floodwaters was 14 billion gallons. The floodwaters contained West Nile Virus, and fecal bacteria such as coli forms and E. coli bacteria ten times in excess of EPA’s recommended level. Fourth, another area is contamination of drinking water sources. EPA distributed drinking water test kit in New Orleans. Mississippi river is the main source of distributing drinking water for New Orleans area. Therefore, the state attempts to test contamination of the drinking water sources. Fifth, restoring public facilities including drinking water supply and treatment facilities and sewage treatment plants is part of overall cleanup process. The American Water Works Association estimated that $2.25 billion is in need to repair and replace drinking water infrastructure of 1,000 systems damaged by Hurricane Katrina (see Figure 8). Problems Cleanup process after Hurricane Katrina has posed a series of challenges and problems to the federal, state, and local governments in carrying out their duties. Referring to Esworthy and Schierow (2005) and Luther (2006), their specified problems are classified into: coordination; policy; and debris management as follows: (1) Coordination problems: . Information sharing – it was found that lack of accurate information including assessments and safety of the sites, data to come back to sites for evacuation process, and so on causes confusion among participants and stakeholders of this cleanup process leading to unnecessary delays. . Coordination – it was also found that the Department of Homeland Security needs to set up more integrated plan with its local DHS offices. Cigler (2007a) points out that there are issues on communication and coordination among concerned authorities during both the mitigation and the response phases in the Katrina catastrophe. Schneider (2006) argued that governmental Cleanup after Katrina 327 DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 328 Figure 8. Priority areas response to Hurricane Katrina was evidenced with the administrative breakdowns after Katrina’s onslaught. (2) Policy related problems: . Demolishing rules – There are unnecessary rules for removing and demolishing debris from private property which result in delay in demolishing and debris removal from private property. . Environmental policies – There is a need to correctly interpret the regulation and enforce them in practice. Federal and state laws must have exception on defining the construction and demolished materials as non-hazardous wastes. For example, the C&D materials from disaster affected areas are different from those of C&D materials from normal areas. Applying same rules to disaster cases create unnecessary legal disputes, and delays in expediting the cleanup process. (3) Debris management problems: . Wastes – In the cleanup process, it is difficult to separate wastes from disaster-related debris. This task is regarded as time consuming because waste and debris are mostly commingled. For example, separation of waste from floodwaters in New Orleans is either difficult or essentially impossible because they are commingled. . Deposal in landfills – Deposal of hazardous materials in landfills become obstructive and concerns because of deposal of construction and demolished materials in landfills, namely Gentilly Landfill and Chef Menteur Landfill which were closed out in August 2006. The federal law defines C&D materials as non-hazardous materials and landfill preparation for them does . . Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) . . . . . . . not need protective liners. However, the C&D materials are mingled with hazardous wastes and they are deposed in the landfills which are not prepared for accepting hazardous waste materials. Law suit – The Louisiana Environmental Action Network (LEAN) opposed and filed a lawsuit against Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) related to Gentilly landfill. This resulted in the limits of 19,000 CY per day to depose in the site. Health risk for community – Chef Menteur site has a maximum capacity of 7.2 million CY of debris. When a landfill is used up to its maximum capacity, the debris pie will be as high as 80 feet above the landscape elevations. This caused nearby communities concerned about health risks. Stakeholders’ return – Due to lack of information on assessments, safety and date to come back shared by the Department of Homeland Security, stakeholders including residents slowly returned to their residents. Demolition of private properties – Due to unnecessary rules, demolishing of private properties and collection of debris became time consuming and complex process which hampered the cleanup process. Asbestos – Both federal and state law requires to follow special instructions and guidelines on demolishing of a home with asbestos materials due to its toxicity to human health. It adds complexity and times in demolishing, separation, and removal process. Without accurate information on buildings and structures with asbestos, the time required for demolishing buildings is difficult to estimate. Release of oil and hazardous substances – Underground tanks of gasoline in New Orleans posed threats to health risk. All oil and hazardous substance releases throughout the Hurricane Katrina area was not fully assessed and determined yet. Contaminated floodwaters – The floodwaters contained West Nile Virus, and fecal bacteria such as coli forms and E. coli bacteria ten times in excess of EPA’s recommended level. This poses not only threats to residents but also workers cleaning up the debris and oil and hazardous materials in the affected areas. Drinking water sources – Underground wells for drinking water are regulated by the state and EPA does not control them. The number of underground wells that are contaminated in the Katrina-affected areas are unknown. This poses threats to health of residents and there were no long-term and sustainable remedies formulated in such highly disaster prone regions. Drinking water facilities – The status of facilities that provide and drinking water and wastewater for more than 200,000 customers are unknown. It was estimated that $ 2.25 billion will be required for repairing and replacing more than 1,000 drinking facilities affected by Hurricane Katrina. No time frame, and solutions, were sought by authorities for drinking water facilities, and it was not known when they could be restored back to pre-disaster situations. Copeland (2005) pointed out that a bill, intended to provide funds to repair storm-damaged sewage treatment and drinking water plants was passed by Senate, but no further action was carried out during the 109th Congress. Cleanup after Katrina 329 DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 330 . Contracting opportunities – Most of the disaster debris removal was done through contracting outside operators. Government web sites including the General Services Administration (GSA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) web sites provided information on contracting opportunities. All the web sites should be monitored and tracked on contracting opportunities related to Hurricane Katrina recovery and reconstruction efforts (Halchin, 2005). Politics Roberts (2006) argues that disasters are political events. He found that FEMA has improved reorganization after 1993, but it ignored other responsibilities such as combating the emerging terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001. More disaster declarations were made by the president after 1993, unlike previous administration, which refused to provide aid. It is obvious that more disasters funds will be injected into regions where the President or members of FEMA’s oversight committee faced a competitive election. In the past there was a case of politically motivated disaster aid injection. In 1994, Illinois, the south side of Chicago was affected by disaster and estimated damage was $6.7 million. Similarly in 1995, New Orleans faced a flood that caused $10 million in damage. President Clinton refused to provide aid to Illinois, which was considered as Democratic state while New Orleans received aid as it was deemed as a competitive state. Federal money was mostly spent on rebuilding process rather than preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. Above all, Roberts (2006) asserts that reorganization of FEMA reveals that politicians take advantage of the effective natural-disasters agency that was supported by citizens for providing services mainly in rebuilding process. In fact, the cost of debris removal takes up about 40 percent of total disaster-related costs. Total escape from impacts of disasters is completely impossible. However, the impacts can be minimized, by effective planning on preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. This really needs serious attentions from politicians who seem lacking interests and motives in effective planning for natural disaster management. Conclusion Hurricane Katrina in 2005 has produced approximately 110 million cubic yards of debris, which far exceeds the highest amount of record 40 million cubic yards debris generated by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. It was seen as the most destructive disaster the country ever had in its history. It has provided a litmus test for federal, state, and local governments’ effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in managing disasters, especially the cleanup stage with enormous amount of debris ever recorded in the history. Since August 2005, the major disaster declarations based on Hurricane Katrina have been active in three states Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, which were hard-hit by the catastrophic event. The works and assistance from the federal government are still pouring into cleanup and rebuilding process. Cleanup was seen as essential and necessary step before rebuilding actually can take place. And the cleanup itself is complex and problematic for all authorities concerned in undertaking. The lessons, problems and challenges faced in the cleanup process should be learned. They should be integrated into future planning for disaster management. Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) Cigler (2007b) noted that the lesson should be learned and not merely noted. Problems and issues seem remaining as unsolved and they are not readily getting sustainable long-term solutions. Hurricane and tropical storm related disasters are not uncommon to the three regions, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana hit hard by Hurricane Katrina in the past five decades. So far, there seems to be still lack of sustainable long-term solutions even in the phase of cleanup after disasters. This may indicate that lessons are not learned and merely noted. Hurricanes are seasonal in nature. The months of August, September, and November appear as most of the major disaster declarations were made whereas March has no record of disaster declaration based on hurricane or tropical storm in the past 50 years. Therefore, March seems to be a good month for conducting training and drawing plans for disaster management whereas all authorities concerned should be fully alert in August, September, and November for preparedness, prevention, and mitigation programs. Above all, to expedite the cleanup process, the entire disaster management process – preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response and rebuilding must begin with effective planning. Instead of spending 40 percent of disaster-related costs for debris removal activities, or bearing a cost of $23 for removal of every piece of debris generated by Hurricane Katrina, politicians should consider paying smart and serious attentions to more effective and integrated planning. The main objective of natural disaster management, which is to minimize the negative impacts, and to rebuild, and restore pre-disaster conditions in a shortest possible timeframe, could be achieved, if and only if the disaster events do not become political events. References Cigler, B.A. (2007a), “Hurricane Katrina: two intergovernmental challenges”, Public Manager, Vol. 35 No. 4, pp. 3-7. Cigler, B. (2007b), “The ‘big questions’ of Katrina and the 2005 great flood of New Orleans”, Public Administration Review, special issue, pp. 64-76. Copeland, C. (2005), Hurricane-Damaged Drinking Water and Wastewater Facilities: Impacts, Needs, and Response, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Esworthy, R. and Schierow, L.J. (2005), Cleanup after Hurricane Katrina: Environmental Consideration, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2007), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA, Hyattsville, MD, available at: www.fema.gov FEMA (2007), Federal Disaster Declarations, FEMA, Hyattsville, MD, available at: www.fema. gov/news/disasters.fema#sev1 Halchin, E.L. (2005), Hurricane Katrina Recovery: Contracting Opportunities, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Luther, L. (2006), Disaster Debris Removal After Hurricane Katrina: Status and Associated Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Maguire, S. (2005), The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the State Budgets of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Cleanup after Katrina 331 DPM 19,3 Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 332 Roberts, P. (2006), “FEMA after Katrina”, Policy Review, Vol. 137, pp. 15-33. Schneider, S.K. (2006), “Administrative breakdowns in the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 65 No. 5, pp. 515-794. Further reading Banipal, K. (2006), “Strategic approach to disaster management: lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina”, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 484-94. About the author Tun Lin Moe has been studying in a doctoral degree program in geography specializing in geographical information sciences and their application to natural disaster management, sustainable development and international development at Arizona State University since August 2009. He received MPA Public Policy from Pennsylvania State University in 2008 and MPS International Development from Cornell University in 2009. Previously he also received a MA in business communication and management from the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce in 1992 and a PhD in development administration from National Institute of Development Administration, Thailand in 2003. He was appointed as post-doctoral fellow at Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand, in 2005 as well as Karlsruhe University, Germany in 2006. He has more than seven years of teaching and research experience in universities in Thailand. Tun Lin Moe can be contacted at: [email protected] or [email protected] To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: [email protected] Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints This article has been cited by: Downloaded by Arizona State University At 00:52 24 August 2014 (PT) 1. Jiuping Xu, Yi Lu. 2013. A comparative study on the national counterpart aid model for post‐disaster recovery and reconstruction. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 22:1, 75-93. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] 2. Charlotte Brown, Mark Milke, Erica Seville. 2011. Disaster waste management: A review article. Waste Management 31:6, 1085-1098. [CrossRef]
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