Charles William Smedley
Criminology and Psychology
Is there a correlational relationship between a person's
perceived level of adaptive unconscious and the rate
of accuracy in the detection of deception?
Tutor: Charlotte Coleman
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Declarations
Abstract
Introduction
Literature Review
Methodology
Results
Discussion
References
Appendices
"I Charles Smedley confirm that this is my own work
and that all sources used have been fully
acknowledged and referenced in the prescribed
manner."
Student Signature:
“He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no
mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips;
betrayal oozes out of every pore.”- (Sigmund Freud)
Acknowledgements
My gratitude must go fore mostly to my tutor Charlotte Coleman for her time, effort and
input, along with her friend Spikey Mikey. I would also hope that she received the blank
cheque I posted (wink wink).
And finally I would also like to say how appreciative I am and thank my Dad (Billy) for
giving me so many opportunities that he wasn’t fortunate to have.
Abstract
Through opportunity and snowball sampling 22 participants were correlated against one
another to test the relationship between perceived adaptive unconscious and accuracy in
the detection of deception. Additionally the participants were divided in to the
demographic groups of police officers, poker players and laypersons. Furthermore to the
individual differences, a link based on previous literature proposed different learning
structures that vary between the demographic groups ultimately lead to varying
environmental interaction and feedback that leads to increased intuitive ability and
therefore accuracy in the detection of deception. Using a multivariate ANOVA analysis of
data suggested that a significant correlatory link between the perceived adaptive
unconscious ability and the identification of deceptive behaviour. Furthermore a pattern
amongst the data appeared and though not significant suggested that learning in a
deceptively interactive environment is positive for the detection of deception. Findings
strengthen the results of previous literature in relation to the benefits of learning
environmental structures and add knowledge to the concept of the adaptive unconscious
and its role in the detection of deception.
Introduction
Whether we like it or not deception, lies and deceit are everywhere underpinning the core
of our cultural heritage, from the birth of man when Eve said to God, “the serpent deceived
me and I ate”, right through to the devious wolf in Little Red Riding Hood. Deception in
one way or another is a fundamental ingredient in humanity and has evolved through
species and time to leave us in our current condition in comparison to our evolutionary
ancestors who were fundamentally less enhanced cognitively and lesser social interaction
skills. This papers aims to explore whether or not certain demographics within society
posses an increased ability to access their adaptive unconscious, therefore leading to an
increased ability to detect deception through the analysis of non verbal behaviour.
The adaptive unconscious is the ability in which we as individuals have to access our inner
consciousness and access our intuitions, or hunches. This paper aims to correlate a
significant relationship between certain demographic backgrounds and the perceived
adaptive unconscious ability within these groups and the actual detection of deception
ability within these groups. The paper is interested in improving the ability of detecting
deception in investigative interviewing by suggesting that accuracy in detection may be
arbitrated by adaptive unconscious ability.
To what extent can we trust our gut feeling? There is an ongoing debate not necessarily
rooted in psychology that divides people into sceptical pessimists and passionate optimists.
Freud (1905) once said that it is “an illusion to expect anything from intuition,” and a
number of contemporary psychologists assault intuition as being systematically flawed as
it ignores information and primarily disobeys the laws of logic (Gigerenzer, 2007).
Philosophers have argued intuitions are mysterious and inexplicable. No scientific measure
may ever be able to grasp the cognitions and unconscious levels that unearth the secret of
the intuitions or gut feelings. Intuitions may in fact elude the grasp of humans ability to
measure its significance altogether. However deceit is everywhere and has played and still
does play an integral element in mans’ survival in contemporary society (Serban, 2001).
Psychologists such as Kerr (1990) have suggested that lying and deception make up an
integral part of life. Modern academic and education systems ignore the art of intuition
altogether, sticking to a system based on rational, logical and consistent information. The
Western world has been monopolized with the philosophy of rational thinking and logic
for too long. The questions that this paper raises are: Is there are correlational relationship
between the perceived level of adaptive unconscious (intuition) and the accuracy of the
detection of deception. And if there is such a correlational relationship can this contribute
to the training or recruitment of police interviewers in the future.
Literature Review
The Role of Cognition and Emotion
Darwinian Evolutionary theory (1892) suggests that species have evolved overtime to gain
an evolutionary advantage over competitors. Whether it be as simple as the stripes of a
zebra, the ability chimpanzees have to comprehend and empathise with the perceptual state
of other chimps, right through to the cognitive abilities humans have to deceive and hide
emotions that leak out deceit. Deception can be observed in many species in many
different forms ever more present today than ever before in history.
When it comes to human cognition and deception in humans Paul Ekman is a key founder
in the area. Ekman (1985) suggested that certain non verbal cues occur in humans vying to
deceive occur due to the cognitions and emotions involved in such a task (Such cues
include the decrease in hand and finger movement and the decrease in speech rate).
Social Psychological theory provides explanation for certain behaviours in various models:
The control approach (DePaulo, 1988; Ekman, 1989) suggests that liars tend to control
their behaviour, through the fear that their behaviour may leak out the truth. Research has
revealed that some communication channels are more difficult to control than others
(Ekman & Friesen, 1974) resulting in an unusual degree of rigidity and inhibition. In
addition cross cultural studies have found highly similar misconceptions of what is thought
to be deceptive behaviour.
In addition to the control theory social psychological literature outlines two other
theoretical approaches concerning the correlation between nonverbal behaviour and
deception: The emotional approach (Davis, 1961; Kohnken, 1989) emphasizes the
correlation of physiological arousal and deception. The emotions correlated with deception
are the consequence of stress, which in turn leads to the presence of nervous behaviour in
the form of pitch of voice, increase in speech disturbances and liveliness (Siegman, 1985)
The cognitive approach (Burgoon et al, 1989; Kohnken, 1989) suggests that deception is a
cognitive complexity. It is more difficult to fabricate a plausible and convincing lie that is
consistent with everything the observer already knows or could potentially find out. The
cognitive approach suggests that those that fabricate lies make increased speech
disturbances and decrease in bodily movement because of the greater cognitive load results
in the abandonment of body language, which in turn decreases overall animation (Ekman
& Friesen, 1972)
Cognitive load proposed by Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal (1981) suggests that the
increased cognitive load within the brain means that when fabricating a lie, other functions
that would usually be operating efficiently under normal circumstances are slowed down
because the cognitions are focussed on the fabrication of the lie.
Like the social psychological theory above Ekman (1992) concurs that certain emotions
produce varying nonverbal clues. For example fear of being caught has been correlated
with faster & louder speech and pauses. On the contrary guilt leads softer, slower speech,
with a lower pitch and failure to hold a gaze. As we can see from this, varying emotions
produce contradictory behaviour. Granhag and Strowell (2001) have found that liars do not
perform gaze aversion anymore than truth tellers. Akehurst et al (1996) – demonstrated
that pauses did increase in liars' speech. However in the same study Akehurst found that
speech errors did not occur in liar's dialogue.
As is apparent from the evidence above it is easy to understand why not just laypersons but
professionals whose job it is to detect deception have such difficulties in defining whether
or not someone is being deceptive or not, and why findings from psychological studies
very rarely fluctuate significantly above the level of chance. In several studies professional
lie catchers have been exposed to videotaped footage of liars and truth tellers and their
ability to detect lies has been tested (e.g. Vrij & Mann 2001). Several findings emerged
from these studies, first, most total accuracy rates were similar to those found in studies
with college students as observers, falling in the 45% - 60% range. DePaulo and Pfeifer
(1986), Meissner & Kassin (2002) and Vrij and Graham (1997) found that police officers
were about as successful as university students in detecting deception (accuracy rates
around 50%). In addition Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found that police officers and
polygraph examiners obtained similar accuracy rates to university students with accuracy
rates around 55%.
Common Misconceptions and Correlated Cues to Deception
This chapter examines the problems faced with the detection of deception and examines
the differences between actual correlated cues linked to deception, and believed indicators
that people associate with deception, in ignorance of whether or not such behaviours
actually are a manifestation of actual deception.
In Table 1 are the most commonly misconceived non-verbal cues to deception. The
behaviours listed are ones that are associated with nervousness. People believe liars are
more nervous and therefore common misconceptions are inferred from the idea that liars
will portray more nervous behaviours and act accordingly. According to Anderson et al.
(1999) when asked about the cues they believe to be indicative of deception people do little
more than relay the accepted cultural wisdom of such matters. This research finding
suggests that there seems to be a set of inaccurate stereotypical beliefs that seem to be
internalised on a personal and cultural level.
TABLE 1: The most commonly misconceived non-verbal cues to deception
•
Liars are more gaze aversive
•
Liars shift positions more often
Liars blink more often
Liars have a higher pitched
voice
•
Liars make more illustrators
Liars make more speech
disturbances
•
Liars make more self manipulations
Liars have a slower speech
rate
•
Liars make more hand/finger movements
Liars have a longer latency
period
•
Liars make more leg/feet movements
Stromwall, Granhag, and Hartwig (2004)
Research has suggested the opposite to the common misconception of nervousness and
DePaulo et al (2003) and Vrij (2000) have both reported that a liar will present themselves
as the opposite of a stereotypical liar. Liars therefore make fewer illustrators and body
movements. The control approach suggests that liars are aware of their actions that imply
and leak out deceit. This is supported by Freud (1905) definition of the Ego which he
describes as an emotional force protecting the individual, striving to achieve deception.
Particular behaviours are avoided to maintain a barrier against the discovery of deceit,
through the use of antithetic techniques, such as biting the lip to hide smiles.
The beliefs presented in table 2; have been unanimously observed in various studies;
Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal (1981) and Vrij (2000) who have found that liars
decrease in many behaviours much to the contradiction of common beliefs that suggest the
opposite.
TABLE 2: The most reliable and objectively correlated non-verbal cues to deception
•
Liars speak in a higher pitch
•
Liars make fewer arm/hand and finger movements
•
Liars make fewer illustrators
•
Liars take longer pauses (latency period)
•
Liars smile more
Stromwall, Granhag, and Hartwig (2004)
Much research in the area of deception has focussed its sample on students with no specific
experience in the area of deceit. Akehurst, Kohnken, Vrij and Bull (1996) examined the
beliefs of both verbal and non-verbal cues held by police officers and laypersons (not
students). Results suggested that there was no difference in the beliefs held between the
two demographic backgrounds. Vrij and Semin (1996) examined common beliefs held by
professional lie-catchers (police officers, custom officers, prison guards and patrol police
officers) laypersons and prisoners about the non-verbal cues of deceit. Results suggested
similar findings in the beliefs held by both the professionals and the laypersons. However
the findings presented that prisoners were the best at detecting deception. This is due to the
fact that criminal culture is more deceptive than normal culture and explainins their
increased ability at detecting nonverbal deception and suggesting the importance of
experience and interaction with relevant stimuli which is mentioned later. Additionally,
feedback on whether the person was telling a lie or not further increases the ability for
future detection (Depaulo & Pfeifer, 1986).
Stromwall and Granhag (2003) found that police officers in Sweden valued the use of non
verbal cues to deceit higher than other professional lie-catcher demographics. The research
also pronounced that police officers were convinced that liars were more gaze aversive and
increased in other bodily movements. Rather than the actual decrease correlated with
deception. Similar results were reported by Masip and Garrido (2001) who pronounced
that Spanish experienced officers held beliefs in an increase in bodily movement was
indicative of deception. This suggests that misconceptions do not just lie within one
country or culture but stems in to the cultural heritage of many countries of whom all share
similar beliefs about deception.
Vrij (2000) using meta analysis found that federal law enforcement officers, secret service
agents and federal polygraph analysts and police detectives had an average of only 54%
(4% over the level of chance for detecting deception).
Vrij (2000) also found that just like laypersons, professionals generally presumed that
behaviours that are caused by nervousness indicate deception. In addition DePaulo et al.
(2003) found the primary indicator that both laypersons and professionals relied most upon
was gaze aversion.
Origins of false beliefs by Professional Lie-catchers
TABLE 3: The most common subjective beliefs of law enforcement practitioners' nonverbal cues to deception
•
Liars are more gaze aversive
•
Liars make more self manipulations
•
Liars make head more (nods)
Liars fidget more
Liars shift position more
Liars make more
general body movements
•
Liars speech is less fluent
Liars make more
leg/feet movements
•
Liars make more arm/hand movements
Stromwall, Granhag, and Hartwig (2004)
The Criminal and Interrogations Confessions Manual (CICM) developed by Inbau, Reid
&Buckley (1986) which was recently updated in 2001 was constructed to help police
officers with the non verbal cues to detect deceit. However the cues in the manual are
based on contrasting evidence. The manual recommends relying on the cues that research
has not identified as correlating with deception (Vrij, 2003).
DePaulo et al (2003)and Vrij (2003) both report evidence that gaze aversion is not
indicative of a lie. However this does not run in accordance with the manual.
Using such cues from the manual that are not based on psychological evidence has meant
that police officers using the manual are no more accurate at detecting deception than
laypersons (Vrij and Mann, 2001). Kassin and Fong (1999) tested officers who were
trained using the manual and reported that the manual actually decreased the police
officers ability below the level of chance.
The manuals are supported on no empirical evidence to support the claims made within it.
Akenhurst et al (1996) and Stromwall and Granhag (2003) suggest the cues reported in the
manual reflect the common misconceptions of the link between demeanour and deception.
The passing down and transference of beliefs from one generation of police officers to the
next has also been suggested by Ainsworth (1995). Through the inter-individual
inheritance, beliefs of the stereotypical behaviours of deceit can remain within the police
cultures. Fraser and Gaskell (1990) suggest that the widespread beliefs such as those
stereotypes of deceptive cues have diffused and stabilised themselves in to police culture.
The existing evidence present a problem not only for professional lie catchers but for a
society that depends on the ability of such professionals to apply justice and find the truth.
If the abilities and the beliefs of such individuals are wrong then maybe rather than
watching for the explicit behaviours of suspects and individual should pay more attention
on the implicit lie detection techniques such as intuition.
The Adaptive Unconscious and Intuition
Due to the mass of contradictory evidence in the area of detecting deception and the
individual differences in detection ability it is clear to see that individuals are unique in
their experience, emotions, cognitions and abilities in detecting deception. Therefore a new
approach that centres on the impact of human intuition and implicit cues may be beneficial
in the detection of deception.
Mann, Vrij & Bull (2004) investigated 99 U.K. non-specialised police officers' ability to
detect deception through an experimental set up whereby the participants were required to
view video clips of real life high stake interviews and state whether or not the interviewee
was lying.
An interesting finding of the study was that 11% of the accurate lie detectors reported they
had and relied upon a 'gut feeling', whereas none of the poor lie detectors reported using
such technique. Such findings therefore questions the need to focus on explicit lie detection
techniques, when non-explicit human intuition has for some been utilised to accurately pinpoint a liar. However, a criticism is the "gut feeling" phenomenon cannot reliably be
measured.
Gladwell (2005) proposed that when faced with a situation that it is within human nature
that we make an initial snap judgment within 2 seconds. This rapid thought process occurs
in a peculiar alternative way in comparison to that of a consciously made decision.
Gladwell argues that emphasis is too readily placed on the need to investigate, find
evidence and gather information regarding a problem before a decision is made, and
instead argues that particularly in high pressure situations, it is often better and just as
accurate to rely on the spontaneous decisions that initially arises, one’s 'gut feeling'.
What Gladwell describes is consistent with others definitions of human intuition. Myers
and (2002) Hogarth (2001) suggest that human intuition is something that is immediate and
effortless. Hammond (2000) defines intuition as cognitive activities that somehow produce
an answer, solution, or idea without the use of a conscious, logically defensible, step-bystep process. Intuition occurs automatically, happens quickly, yet weighs multiple pieces of
information in a wholistic manner.
Although Gladwell encourages the impact of acting on intuition there is problems when
trying to access, investigate and objectively measure such a phenomenon.
Gigerenzer (2007 suggests two stimuli that impact on our ability to activate our intuitive
abilities. The current state of the evolved human brain through the evolution over
thousands of years and an individuals previous interaction with relevant external stimuli.
Gigerenzer suggests that intuition is triggered by a stimulus in our immediate environment.
This stimulus activates our unconscious intelligence, which works with the pattern
recognition within the brain rapidly processes and evaluates the external stimuli and in turn
leads to gut feeling. This is what Gladwell (2005) referred to as thinking without thinking.
Gut feelings according to Gigerenzer (2007) are adaptive, in that they can only trigger our
unconscious intelligence if they have experienced similar interaction with an environment
or external stimulus such as a lie previously. There is no empirical evidence to support the
idea of intuition though it is thought that intuitive judgements are based on recall memory
from the unconscious. However it is thought that unconscious recall goes far beyond mere
conscious recognition, but into the retrieval of episodes, facts, and reasons from the
unconscious. The ability in how much and how accurately our gut feelings are is suggested
to be primarily dominated by our previous experiences (Gigerenzer, 2007).
Wizard’s of Deception
In Ekman, O’Sullivan and Frank’s 1999 study a pattern in the recognition of deception was
correlated in certain demographic professional groups and in three areas of intellectual
importance in relation to the detection of deception. These three areas were derived from
previous research on deception and tested whether someone was lying about a crime, their
opinion or their emotions. Participants witnessed a group of men and women on video tape
discussing a topic area in which they help a high opinion on. Five of the ten men lied about
the subject. The content of each of the interviews included both verbal and behavioural
clues to deception and honesty.
Statistically each participant should score 50% out of the 10 items on each of the three
tasks based on chance. However those that scored 90% on the opinion deception judgment
task and those that scored 80% on both the crime and the emotion deception judgment
tasks were considered to be “Wizard” in the detection of deception.
Scoring 80% in such a task has the probability of occurring in 5 out of 100 people;
however the probability of scoring 90% is only probable in 1 out of 100 people.
Within the population of “wizards” a noticeable pattern was occurring in the people and
the professional population. The Highly accurate lie detectors included people from
professions including therapists, law enforcement personnel, judges, arbitrators and artists.
The probabilities of participants scoring such scores are almost nonexistent. The
probability that an individual will score 90% on the first test and then 80% on the other
two tests is 25 in 1,000,000 (0.0025%).
Such staggering results raise questions as to why do certain professions seem to have an
overall higher representation in the increased ability in the detection of deception than
others and poses a further question about these people as individuals. Could these
“Wizards” have an increased adaptive unconscious ability?
THE ANTERIOR FRONTOMEDIAN CORTEX
It is believed that the Anterior Frontal Median Cortex (AFC) is the control centre of Gut
Feelings and intuition. Gigerenzer, Volz, Schooler, Schubotz, Raab (2006) showed using
the Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) that there is specific neural activity
within the AFC to correlate a relationship with gut feelings.
The location of the activity suggested that gut feelings are not impulsive but highly
complex cognitions. The area of the brain where the AFC is located accommodates the
problem solving and reasoning abilities, this therefore makes sense logically that gut
feeling are also enclosed in this area. The location of the activity suggests that gut feelings
are not impulsive but highly complex. Rather the process consists of a form of rapid
evaluation within our unconscious that produces gut feelings.
It is known that the AFC area serves evaluative functions, controls errors and handles
response conflicts. There is however controversy in that it is unknown how influential the
AFC is in gut feelings. There is however reason to be optimistic with the activity reported
in the research; that suggests a neural correlatory relationship in the evaluative processes
within the AFC and gut instincts.
Why Wizards are Wizards; the importance of experience
In concurrence with Hogarth (2001), Granhag (2006) supposes that the quality of liecatchers’ intuitive judgments are very much dependent on interaction with the environment.
Accuracy of judgments are increased significantly if environmental learning structures
have given clear immediate feedback on the accuracy of past judgments. Compared to that
if environment offers no such feedback. Granhag (2006) suggests for a lie-catcher to
develop a valid intuitive judgment they need to have had sufficient interaction with the
environment.
Narvaez and Lapsley (2005) suggest that a phenomenon they term the "sophisticated
unconscious" that guides perceptual processing that ultimately guides the meaning and the
effect of the stimuli present within the external environment.
Experts or wizards according to Hogarth (2001) differ from novices in several systematic
ways. Firstly it is proposed experts have a different set of representations built through the
interaction and experience with specific stimuli. According to Sternberg (1998), experts
posses rich, organized networks of representations (schemas) containing a great deal of
declarative knowledge about the domain, and well-organized, higher interconnected units
of knowledge in the domain due to experience. Novices, in contrast have smaller, less
organized, shallower knowledge networks primarily leading to lower detection rates.
Second, experts see the world differently (Johnson and Mervis, 1997; Myles-Worsley,
Johnston, and Simons 1988). Experts perceive things differently than do novices.
Perception is highly influenced by the amount of experience and direct interaction that one
has with similar situations (for example a poker game where players bluff and deceive one
another).
Whereas a novice is overwhelmed by the information displayed, an expert quickly and
automatically apprehends information that facilitates the goal at hand this running in
accordance with Gladwell’s concept of the adaptive unconscious. Thus, the level that one
perceives depends on one’s level of experience or level of expertise in a domain. Neisser
(1976) suggests experts possess more relevant schemas because they have more
experience, which ultimately permit detection and encoding of more domain-relevant
information.
Wizard's expertise is comprised of more and enhanced content and processes built from
extensive experience in the field Narvaez and Lapsley (2005), who suggest an expert tries
to match a current problem with appropriate solutions held in memory. Problem solving is
driven by schemas and is goal oriented. Unlike novices, experts know what knowledge to
access, which procedures to apply, how to apply them, and when it is appropriate
unconsciously. In other words, experts have a greater amount of conditional knowledge
that they can apply complex rules and heuristics in solving a problem and use mechanical
routines that already exist. Narvaez and Lapsley suggest experts' implicit knowledge or
intuition is well tuned and complements their explicit their explicit perceptive knowledge.
This runs in accordance with findings of Mann, Vrij and Bull (2004) who found a
significant relationship between police officers with more interviewing experience and the
accuracy in detecting deception, suggesting the importance of experience. In contrast, nonexpert decision making is shallow and superficial, value-driven and opportunistic rather
than by existing schemas. Narvaez and Lapsley (2005) suppose experts often make
decisions rapidly and automatically, whereas novices proceed deliberately and slowly.
Experts in comparison use automatic, goal-dependent processing and observe meaningful
information where novices fail to do so. An expert who is faced with a problem can come
up with an effective solution relatively quickly by accessing appropriate knowledge and by
applying appropriate procedures. A novice on the other hand will likely come up with a
solution that is superficial and ineffective, based on an incorrect understanding of the
problem and/or a misapplication of procedures (Gijselaers and Woltjer 1997; Novick
1988). Vicente and Wang (1998) point out that the memory of experts is facilitated by
prior knowledge in part because it constrains what they look for, and limits the complexity
of what they see. The “constraint attunement hypothesis” suggests that experts ignore
information that is deemed irrelevant to the current goal using automatic, goal-dependent
processing focussing entirely on the objective. Experts demonstrate how all humans can
understand patterns of repeated behaviours that subsequently operate beneath
consciousness. Ericcson and Smith (1991) surmise that through much practice, experts
become more automatic and less aware of the processes used in their decision making .
In the words of Hogarth (2001), the environment provides “learning structures” (the
characteristics of a task in which we learn from experience), which shape our intuitions.
For example, our social environment provides feedback, coaching, mentoring, and zone-ofproximal development interactions. From outcomes, an individual develops expectancies
(Kirsch 1999; Mowrer 1960) and assumptions about the world that mould memories,
perceptions, and judgments (Bransford, Brown, and Cocking 1999). From interactions with
the environment, individuals form action and reaction schemas that are triggered by
contextual cues (Hogarth 2001). Research evidence such as this presents enough
confirmation to present a directional hypothesis that poker players due to their relevant
interactions with and around deceptive culture will mean that they should potentially
produce the best rate of deception detection. This is because DePaulo & Pfiefer (1986)
found that those who received feedback whether a lie was authentic or not were better at
detecting deception just like bluffing in poker.
Poker players learn in environments where Narvaez and Lapsely (2005) have identified
specific characteristics needed in an interactive environment that enables intuition to be
educated and to enhance the accuracy and capability. Initially experts learn explicit theory
constructing implicit knowledge through increased experience and extensive, focused
practice (Hogarth 2001).
Additionally, experts become expert through focused practice in the domain. Experts have
spent countless hours of interaction with relevant stimulus within their environments
developing solutions. Ericsson and Smith (1991) suggest that after lengthy practice these
intuitive skills can become automated (Ericsson and Smith 1991).
By completing this research, it is hoped that it will raise awareness not only within
psychological circles but also relevant professional circles that not only is the current
police training methods for detecting deceit not accurate enough. It is also hoped the
research will raise additional awareness into the ability that by training the adaptive
unconscious or testing a persons adaptive unconscious it may be possible to more
appropriately and successfully accommodate for the employment of professional roles that
require an increased detection of deception ability. The ultimate goal for the research is to
highlight the importance role of the adaptive unconscious and gut instinct and highlight the
fact it should be integrated even only slightly or at least considered in the interview process
within the current judicial system.
The research design for this experiment is one that has been utilized successfully in similar
studies (Sromwall, HartWig & Granhag, 1993) through the use of videotaped interviews,
whereby actors simulate both authentic cues of deception that have been correlated with
lying behaviour, and behaviours that are widely accepted but falsified cues of deception
(DePaulo et al, 1985). This type of method allows for higher control in a standardised
situation. In addition research has demonstrated that watching an event on video or actually
taking part produce similar results (Vrij, Edward, Roberts &Bull 2000).
Because there is no research into the area of detecting deceit and its relationship with the
adaptive unconscious the present research experiment aims to correlate a relationship
between the rate of detecting detection through nonverbal behaviour and the level of
adaptive unconscious ability the participants believe they have. The participants will be
split into three groups (police officers, laypersons, and poker players) and will look to
determine correlatory evidence of increased adaptive unconscious ability and accuracy in
detection.
Through the inclusion of the adaptive unconscious the research hopes to raise awareness
for police officers to follow their gut instincts (Zajonc, 1989), not necessarily totally, but
give insight into the adaptive unconscious ability not just as a phenomenon but as a fact
present within human nature.
From analysis of previous literature the hypothesis for this study is that those that score
higher on the identification of behaviours in the video section should presumably rate
themselves higher for the adaptive unconscious. Thus, proposing a link between the
adaptive unconscious and the ability of evaluating nonverbal behaviour and detecting
deception. In addition we would expect the police to score similar results to the general
public and the poker players to score higher than the police based on secondary research
findings.
The hypothesis for the research is deductive in that based on previous research data it is
believed that the police officers will score on average very similarly to that of the general
population. Paradoxically the input of poker players is all new to the research area of
detection of deceit. It is believed that the poker players will score both higher on the
detection of deception through analyzing deceitful behaviour through video analysis, and
on the adaptive unconscious rating scale.
Through the inclusion of the adaptive unconscious the research hopes to raise awareness
for police officers to follow their gut instincts (Zajonc, 1989), not necessarily totally, but
give insight into the adaptive unconscious ability not just as a phenomenon but as an
advantageous reality present within human nature and further pronounce the importance of
experience and interaction of relevant stimuli in the ability in which individuals detect
deception.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 proposes that increased perceived adaptive unconscious leads to increased
accuracy in the detection of deception.
Hypothesis 2 proposes that increased perceived adaptive unconscious leads to greater
identification of deceitful behaviours.
Hypothesis 3 proposes that increased accuracy in the detection of deception leads to
improved identification of deceptive behaviour.
METHODOLOGY
Participants:
Twenty two participants took part in the study selected from three demographic clusters
(police officers, poker players, laypersons) on a mutually exclusive basis. Group one
represented the lay population 4 female and 4 male. The age range in the first group ranged
from 18-84 years, with an average age of 37. The lay participants were recruited by a
stratified representative sampling method. This type of method enables the various factions
of society to be represented in the study. (i.e class, age, gender, ethnicity).
Group two represented the police force and represented various ranks within it. In total
there were 5 male and 3 female. Two of the participants were from other agencies other
than the police force: One was a former SAS officer who served five years in the Royal
Marines before joining the SAS for a further four years. The other participant is currently
working for the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and previously served 21 years
in the police force before joining SOCA 3 years ago. Group two had an age range between
24-49 years, with an average age of 38. Within the group, experience ranged from 2 to 25
years service, averaging 13 years.
Group three comprised of the poker players (5 male and 1 female). Within the group the
age range was between 35-44 years of age, averaging an age of 38. Within the group there
was a varied array of poker experience ranging from 5-25 years of playing. The average
playing experience within the group was 14 years. In contrast to the lay participants, the
police officers and the poker players were selected via a snowball sample.
Design:
This research utilised a 3x2x2 mixed design. The between group variable (Background)
consists of 3 levels, Police officers, Poker players, and laypersons. The within group
variable (deception) consisted of 2 levels, Deceptive video clip or non-deceptive video clip.
Two Dependent Variables were utilised, self-reported adaptive unconscious ability, and
ability to detect deception in the video clip. A further correlational DV consisted of a
participant self rating of deceptive behaviours identified in the video clip.
Due to the nature of the proposed rationales and the literature already reviewed within the
chosen topic area of the correlation between the adaptive unconscious and nonverbal
behaviour and the accuracy of detecting deception, the method chosen is a primary
experimental design, through the use of correlational data analysis.
Materials
A questionnaire was constructed to objectively measure the adaptive unconscious (AU).
The questionnaire was made up of 12 questions based on characteristics of (AU) outlined
by Gladwell (2006) requiring Likert Scale responses.
In the table are the characteristics proposed by Gladwell (2005)
•
Rapid decision making
Rapid evaluation of body language
•
Initial interactions with new people
Judging of personality instantaneously
•
Interaction between others
An example of the likert scale and sample question:
E.g. I sometimes know something without knowing how or why I know.
(See Appendix appendices 1.)
Included in the questionnaire were demographic details of age, gender and background
Group were recorded.
The video was set to look like a police interview in a white room with the suspect sitting
behind a table. The camera was fixed on the suspect's upper body and face as he was seated
at a table across from the camera. When the subject was talking he spoke directly at the
camera lens. The purpose of which was to give the impression that the suspect was talking
directly to the participant watching the video as if they were in the room. Ecological
validity was therefore improved by creating an authentic environment that was as similar
as could get to a police interview. The quality of the picture was good enough to code the
behaviours that were happening on screen. Sound quality was good, though was placed at a
volume whereby it remained audible but not distracting from the non verbal behaviour.
The duration of each clip was between fifteen to twenty seconds. Each clip began with the
interviewer asking the suspect a question, to which the suspect would reply. This
conversational pattern repeated throughout each clip. Within the suspect's response one of
the ten nonverbal behaviours were incorporated. (See Appendix *7: For the order and list
of behaviours that they appeared in the video.) The video consisted of twelve clips in total.
Five of the behaviours were scientifically correlated with deception and five behaviours
that are common misconceptions of deceptive behaviours. These ten behaviours are based
on research findings of Stromwall, Granhag and Hartwig (2004).
TABLE 2: The most reliable and objectively correlated non-verbal cues to deception
•
Liars speak in a higher pitch
•
Liars make fewer arm/hand and finger movements
•
Liars make fewer illustrators
•
Liars take longer pauses (latency period)
•
Liars smile more
Stromwall, Granhag, and Hartwig (2004)
TABLE 1: The most commonly misconceived non-verbal cues to deception
•
Liars are more gaze aversive
Liars shift positions more
often
•
Liars have a higher pitched voice
Liars make more speech
disturbances
•
Liars have a slower speech rate
•
Liars have a longer latency period
Stromwall, Granhag, and Hartwig (2004)
Potential extraneous variables such as participants concentration levels, these were
controlled by ensuring the uniformity of the suspect, his clothing, posture and non
deceptive behaviours.
Porter, Campbell and Stapleton (2001) reported that judges of lies were significantly more
accurate at determining credibility of a story when the target being judged was unattractive
rather than attractive. Therefore the suspect used in the study was of "neutral"
attractiveness.
The suspect in the video was a male aged 21, though potentially his age could range from
18 to 23. 16 to 25 being the age that male adolescent are most likely to commit offences
according to Home Office Statistics. The suspect was depicted as a lower to middle class
social status. This is due to the fact that Campbell (1999) found that having a suspect of
lower social status means that participants are more likely to label the suspect guilty and
increasingly deceptive.
In addition to the other materials was a Consent form (Appendix 4), a contact sheet of the
researchers details (Appendix 5)
Apparatus:
A DVD player was required so that the participants could watch the video on and a pen to
fill in the questionnaire.
Procedure:
Participants undertook the experiment individually. The experiment took place in a similar
room in a number of various locations. This was due to the geographic distribution of
participants. The room that the participants undertook the experiment were all quiet and
plain in decor, therefore not distracting the participants from the task. The experimental
sequence remained the same for all participants.
Each participant was given a summary of the instructions before they carried out the task
and reminded of their rights to withdraw.
Participants in the study were asked to complete the two separate tasks which were then
correlated against one another:
Before the tasks, participants filled out a questionnaire. This included details such as age,
gender, length of service where necessary. Participants were first asked to complete a
questionnaire that related to various mechanisms of the adaptive unconscious. This was a
completely original questionnaire based on literature from Gladwell (2006) that was
constructed to objectively measure the adaptive unconscious for the first time. Questions
were comprised from previous literature in relation to certain components that could be
objectively analysed to correlate with the adaptive unconscious. The questionnaire was
made up of 12 questions. (list AU characteristics)
First participants carried out the adaptive unconscious questionnaire. Participants then had
to rate how strongly they feel about the statement of the question by indicating whether
they strongly disagreed or strongly agreed on a five point likert scale.
After the completion of the questionnaire the participants then read through the instructions
of the video questionnaire. The participants were then asked if they had any questions
about anything. The video was then started that comprised of twelve clips. Participants
were asked to evaluate each clip that portrayed a different deceptive behaviour. Five of the
clips portrayed the most commonly misconceived non verbal behaviours of deception
(Granhag and Stromwall, 2004). Five other clips represented those behaviours most
commonly perceived and objectively correlated with deception (Granhag and Stromwall,
2004). Two of the twelve clips were control clips.
After each clip participants had 20 seconds to decide whether they thought the suspect was
portraying deceptive or non deceptive behaviour. Where participants claimed the suspect
was deceiving them, they then had to say which behaviour in particular was deceptive.
The participants were scored in the video by correctly identifying whether the offender was
portraying deceptive behaviour. If a participant correctly identified deception the received
one mark. If the participant then went on to correctly identify the specific behaviour they
received an additional mark. However if wrongly diagnosing whether deception is
occurring then zero marks are received.
After the video ended participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed about
the purpose and the aims of the study.
Participants were then given a contact sheet so that they could contact the researcher and
were reminded of their rights to withdraw.
Results
Once all the questionnaires were complete the data was collected and was placed into a
data sheet whereby statistical testing and
analysis could be conducted to test for
relationships and significance within the data.
Results show that the Poker Players scored more highly on the accuracy(Mean=9.0), but
they also generated a lower standard deviation (SD= 0.63), showing that they were more
consistent in their correct responding. The standard deviation is higher for police(0.84) and
higher again for Lay(1.19). Suggesting that although Lay didn’t score the lowest, they were
the least consistent in their scoring, meaning some members of the group scored especially
well and some scored reasonably low.
Results also show that Poker Players scored more highly on the identification of correct
deceptive behaviours(M=4.5), followed by the police (3.88) and then lay participants'
(3.38). Standard deviation within this condition remains higher in the Police (1.13) and
Poker Players (1.05) suggesting a ranging consistency within the group answers. Lay
participants however had a significantly lower standard deviation (0.74) suggesting a
higher consistency rate within participant response.
Poker Players scored highest and rated themselves highest for Adaptive Unconscious
ability(46.17). Police Officers rated themselves second (45.13) with Laypersons rating
themselves lowest (43.5). Standard deviation suggests that Police Officers were least
consistent in their responses(2.75).
Data was normally distributed therefore data was analysed using a Multivariate Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for differences between groups of scores for the
accuracy of detection deception, the rating of Adaptive Unconscious ability and the
behaviours correctly identified.
No significant differences were found between the groups for how participants rated AU
ability (F(2,19) = 2.26, p> 0.05). However the means show that Lay Persons rated
themselves the lowest in AU ability (M = 43.5, SD = 2.2) (See Table 1), with Poker
Players rating themselves the highest (M = 46.17, SD = 2.04) and Police Officers scoring
in between (M = 45.13, SD = 2.75) (See Figure 1). Bonferroni Post Hoc analysis reveals
no between group differences.
Table 1. Adaptive Unconscious: Group Mean and Standard Deviation
Mean
Lay Persons
Standard Deviation
43.5
2.2
Police Officers
45.13
2.75
Poker Players
46.17
2.04
Figure 1. Adaptive Unconscious: Group Mean and Standard Deviation
No significant differences were found between the groups for the accuracy in the detection
of deception. (F(2,19) = 1.53, p> 0.05). However the means show that police officers were
least accurate as a group (M = 8.13, SD = 0.84) (See Table 2), with Poker Players the most
accurate (M = 9, SD = 0.63) and Lay persons scoring in between (M = 8.38, SD = 1.19)
(See Figure 2). Bonferroni Post Hoc analysis reveals no between group differences.
Table 2. Accuracy of Deception Detection: Group Means and Standard Deviation
Mean
Lay Persons
Standard Deviation
8.38
1.19
Police Officers
8.13
0.84
Poker Players
9
0.63
Figure 2. Accuracy of Deception Detection: Group Means and Standard Deviation
No significant differences were found between the groups for the accuracy in the
identification of correct behaviours in the video clips (F(2,19) = 2.26, p> 0.05). However the
means show that Lay persons were least accurate as a group (M = 3.38, SD = 0.74) (See
Table 3), with Poker Players the most accurate (M = 4.50, SD = 1.05) and police officers
scoring in between (M = 3.8, SD = 1.13) (See Figure 3). Bonferroni Post Hoc analysis
reveals no between group differences
Table 3. Correct Behaviour Identified: Group Means and Standard Deviation
Mean
Lay Persons
Standard Deviation
3.38
0.74
Police Officers
3.88
1.13
Poker Players
4.50
1.05
Figure 3. Correct Behaviour Identified: Group Means and Standard Deviation
A Pearson Correlation Coefficient was conducted to examine any relationships between
scores irrelevant of group type. Analysis revealed a strong positive correlation between the
levels of perceived Adaptive Unconscious and the behaviours correctly identified
(r(20)=0.72.p<0.01) (see Figure 4).
A
50 .0 0
A
NLAUSum
47 .5 0
45 .0 0
A
A
W
A
A
A
W
A
A
A
]
A
]
A
42 .5 0
A
A
A
40 .0 0
A
3
4
5
6
be haviour
Figure 4. Correlations: Adaptive unconscious and behaviours correctly identified
A Pearson Correlation Coefficient revealed no significant relationship between the
variables of Adaptive Unconscious and the accuracy of detection. Therefore suggesting a
very weak negative relationship between the variables (r(20)-.121, p>0.05).
Using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient no relationship was established
between behaviours identified and detection accuracy rate. Therefore suggesting a very
weak negative correlation between the variables (r(20)-.78, p<0.05).
Discussion
Findings suggest that perceived adaptive unconscious ability and accuracy in the detection
of deception present no significance. Therefore the null hypothesis must be accepted. In
relation to hypothesis two a significant positive correlation relationship was established
between the perceived levels of adaptive unconscious and the correct deceitful behaviours
identified, rejecting the null hypothesis.
Findings failed to correlate a significant relationship between the behaviours identified as
deceptive and the detecting deception accuracy rate and the null hypothesis must therefore
be accepted.
Results observe no significant relationship between demographic background and
dependent variables. However as the study predicted based on previous literature Poker
players scored the highest on all three components (perceived adaptive unconscious ability,
detecting deception accuracy rate and correct deceitful behaviour identified) and Police
officers and laypersons scored relatively similar scores on the three components.
Because the nature of this research is original and unique within the detection of deception
there is no secondary data to correlate and evaluate the non significant findings against.
However a significant correlation was observed in the data between the variables of
perceived adaptive unconscious and deceptive behaviours correctly identified. This is a
breakthrough finding within the area of deception detection, as it proposes a link between
intuitive gut feeling and accuracy in correct behaviour identification. The result expands on
the findings of Mann, Vrij and Bull (2004) who found that 11% of accurate lie detectors
reported a reliance on gut feeling. This study expands on Mann et al (2004) findings
because participants rated various factors to the relationship of intuitive gut feelings and
detection rates, rather than the reliance on one statement that suggested the use of gut
feeling.
In reference to the adaptive unconscious literature, the results observed coincide with the
importance of experience in the detection of deceptive behaviour. The results promote the
new concept of perceived ability of adaptive unconscious and intuitive reasoning/ability
seem to have a significant contribution to the behaviours observed that ultimately lead to
the detection of deception. Coinciding with Gladwell's (2005) emphasis that the
importance of key decisions (such as detecting deception) are too often placed on the need
to investigate and analyse too deeply before making a decision. The present research
findings show that those who have belief that they have increased intuitive abilities, do in
fact possess an amplified ability to identify behaviours that are deceptive. Thus suggesting
that those individuals who rely on initial, spontaneous feelings are in fact more accurate
than those individuals who perceive themselves as not as "in touch" with their intuition.
This finding is significantly important as it suggests the value of perceived adaptive
unconscious ability to accurately correlate deceptive behaviours. This poses the question
that maybe professions, such as the police force, where it is important to distinguish
between a lie and a truth that it may be potentially beneficial for accuracy reasons that an
adaptive unconscious rating be taken to determine who has the intuitive skills capable for
correctly identifying deceitful behaviour.
Results detect no significant correlation was observed in the data between the perceived
adaptive unconscious ability and accuracy in deceptive detection. This Suggests the link
between the two is statistically inconsequential and that the adaptive unconscious plays
little part in the ability in which individuals have in detecting non verbal deceitful
behaviour. There was however a distinct pattern within the data that does propose a link
between the two. Although not significant the pattern that emerged stating overall poker
players rated themselves on average higher for adaptive unconscious than both police
officers and, laypersons. This finding although not significant provides justification of
Gigerenzer's (2007) work suggesting, experience with relative stimuli suggest plays an
important factor in the recognition and accuracy of gut feelings. This furthermore
coincides with the findings of Vrij et al (2004) who found that interview experience of
police officers improved levels of detection accuracy. Unlike Ekman’s (1999) study the
present research cannot determine a correlational relationship to certain demographic
professional groups or backgrounds with increased detection ability. However although not
significant a pattern did emerge among the data of the study that suggested the poker
player demographic possessed an increased perceived adaptive unconscious ability and
accuracy of detecting deception. This could potentially be linked to the work of Hogarth
(2001) and Granhag (2006) who stressed the importance of experience and learning
environments that lead to this increased ability. This is also closely linked to the research
of Sternberg (1998) and DePaulo and Pfiefer (1986) who found prison culture is
substantially more deceiving than typical lay person culture and therefore led to increased
interaction with deceptive stimuli, which ultimately leads to an increased perceptual
detection accuracy rate. The findings of DePaulo and Pfiefer (1986) are comparable to that
of results found in this study because just like criminal culture, poker culture too is full of
deception and interaction with deceptive stimuli. The data also coincides the importance of
the interaction and experience found in Johnson and Mervis, (1997); Myles-Worsley,
Johnston, and Simons (1988) that enable an increased accuracy rate. This potentially
explains the link between the poker players perceived adaptive unconscious scores and the
increased accuracy in identifying the deceptive behaviour.
The fact that police officers and lay participants scored lower on detection accuracy and
the adaptive unconscious in relation to poker players, points to the importance of
applicable schemas constructed through relevant experience with appropriate stimuli
(Narvaezand and Lapsley, 2005; Neisser, 1976). Results suggest the schemas allow those
individuals with increased adaptive unconscious ability to rapidly apprehend information
supporting Gladwell's underlying concept of the adaptive unconscious. Results support
previous theory (Narvaez and Lapsley, 2005) suggesting that those who scored higher on
the rating of the adaptive unconscious have sufficient schemas through the construction of
complex heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2007) that compliment and analyse explicit external
environmental factors that lead to the increased ability in identifying correct deceptive
behaviours.
The fact that no differences were established between groups and the variance in standard
deviation is so wide spread between the groups in relation to adaptive unconscious rating
this coincides with
findings of Mann, Vrij and Bull (2004) who related significant
relationship between police officers experience of suspect interviewing and accuracy rate
in comparison to those less experienced, therefore explaining the widespread standard
deviations within the police group specifically.
The correlation between perceived adaptive unconscious and behaviours correctly
identified maintain Hogarth's (2001) concept of the environment as a learning structure.
Findings point to the suggestion poker players as a group scored higher in the adaptive
unconscious rating, ultimately leading to increased behaviour identification because their
interactive environment
provides feedback and coaching through zone of proximal
development interactions (Vygotsky, 1978; Narvaez and Lapsley, 2005).
In unity with many studies (DePaulo and Pfeifer., 1986, Meissner & Kassin., 2002 and Vrij
and Graham., 1997). The present study found that police officers as a group were similarly
as unsuccessful as lay participants in detecting deception.
In accordance with Anderson et al. (1999) the research findings suggest that both police
officers and lay participants supposed similar conclusions and simply reinstated the
integrated cultural norms associated with deception leading to lesser accuracy scores.
Suggesting that there are in fact a set of inaccurate stereotypical beliefs that permeate into
our lives both personally and culturally that is suggested by Anderson. Research findings
suggest that both lay participants and police officers tended to follow the misconceived
non verbal cues to the detection of deception as proposed by Granhag et al (2004), which
in turn lead to their lower average in the detecting of deception accuracy in the present
studies findings. This can be related to the findings of DePaulo (2003) and Vrij (2000)
who correlated that bad lie detectors supported the stereotypical idea that liars are nervous
and therefore portray what is thought to be nervous behaviour.
One reason to that explains the reason why police officers scored similarly to lay
participants in the present study is that although police officers are trained in the detection
of deception, the information that they ultimately rely on is based on uncorrelated cues to
deception. The Inbau Criminal and Interrogations Confessions Manual promotes officers
to rely on cues that are based on misconceptions of deception rather than scientific testing
this can therefore explain the similar averages found in the present study between the
police officers and the lay participants in the detection of deception. Support comes from
Akenhurst et al (1996) and Stromwall and Granhag (2003) who suggest the cues reported
in the manual reflect the common misconceptions of the link between demeanour and
deception explaining the similar averages distinguished in the present study. Furthermore
the similar results for police officers and lay participant’s supports the concept of Fraser
and Gaskell (1990) who suggested that the widespread beliefs of deceptive cues have
diffused and stabilized themselves in to police culture. Eighteen years on the findings of
the present research has realized that this is still the case. The primary reason for the
similarity in police officers and lay persons scores on the three variables is that police
officers learn in environments whereby although they interact with deception they do not
necessarily receive feedback on the validity of behaviours. Laypersons in comparison have
an even worse feedback when deceitful behaviour arises and therefore must rely on social
stereotypical rumours.
Limitations of the study:
A limitation of the study is that the content of the questionnaire rating adaptive
unconscious is very subjective and measuring something such as the adaptive unconscious
is difficult because there is no empirical evidence for its existence. Although the lie
detection task in the study was comparatively realistic, it very much differs in some
features from real lie detection in police interviews. For example, in general police officers
would conduct the interview, and not just watch it. However, research has shown that
conducting the interview is not necessarily advantageous in lie detection. Several
researchers compared the accuracy scores of observers who actually interviewed potential
liars with those who passively observed the interviews but did not actually interview the
potential liars (Feeley & deTurck, 1998; Granhag & Stromwall, 2001). In these studies,
researchers found that passive observers were more accurate in detecting truths and lies
than were interviewers. Findings from such research suggests that merely observing is
actually a benefit, rather than a disadvantage, in detecting deceit.
Furthermore, police officers would ordinarily see a much larger section, if not the whole
interview than they were exposed to in this study. Showing the whole interview in one
large clip would not have worked in this study, this is because without cutting out the
majority of the interview, the footage would contain a huge amount of information that the
experimenter could not be sure was true or false.
Also, in real life police interviews officers may know some facts of the case. Although
participants were not provided with facts of the entire cases of the offender, the fact that
the uniformity of the offender remained the same throughout the twelve clips meant that
when answering questions participants did not have to readjust to a new offender in
comparison to other studies who used multiple offenders (Vrij and Mann, 2001). Finally,
although participants on the whole were very willing to participate in the task, and keen to
achieve high accuracy levels, this experiment does not have the same motivating
consequences for them that judging the honesty of suspects in real life settings. However,
DePaulo, Anderson, and Cooper (1999) demonstrated that motivation does not improve
performance in a lie detection task. Because the method used to measure the adaptive
unconscious was self evaluative, participants particularly from police and poker player
demographics may have may have been directed towards certain answers due to socially
desirable macho answers due to the imbalance of male to female participants. This
therefore may have affected the overall validity of findings. The sample size in the present
study was potentially male dominated. This is not necessarily negative due to the fact that
the presence of males in the police force is predominant in comparison to women who
according to Westmarland (2000) only 20% of the police force was female.
However the sample of the study was not very representative of the general population.
Eight laypersons is not representative of the general public, neither is the eight police
officers and six poker players representative of those particular demographics. This is in
contrast to Mann, Vrij and Bull(2004), who used a total sample of ninety-nine police
officers within similar research methodology. Participants from this demographic
background were predominantly of middle class background and although there was a
wide spectrum of ages within the study it was not representative, therefore findings cannot
be generalised to wider society.
Suggested Future Research:
Suggestions for further research in direct relation to the findings of this study would be to
repeat the study though with a larger participant sample. By increasing the participant
numbers the probability of improving significance levels within the data would also
increase and a significant correlation could therefore potentially be established and the
results could be generalised with increased validity.
A study that examined the individuals who scored higher for adaptive unconscious rating
in more depth, by using such methods as Eynsenk’s personality tests and logical thinking
tests, would allow a potentially higher insight into the minds of these gifted individuals. If
in fact certain correlations arose it would be possible to again test between perceived
adaptive unconscious ability, personality type and cognitions within the brain through the
use of functional magnetic resonance imaging to see whether any significant differences
within the anterior frontomedian cortex occurred between individuals who were
particularly successful at identifying correct deceitful behaviours and those who were least
successful.
Future research should primarily focus on the identification of personality, cognitive and
neurological aspects in relation to the adaptive unconscious and the detection of deceit. By
identifying such characteristics and the correlatory link between them it may be possible to
determine through testing which individuals are more appropriately suited to a profession
whereby lie detection is fundamental.
Through the exploration of the adaptive unconscious this study has for the first time
correlated a significant link between the adaptive unconscious and the identification of non
verbal deceitful behaviours. It was established that detective ability was not significantly
correlated to a specific demographic background, though a pattern emerged in the data
suggesting that poker players as an overall demographic were more adaptive unconsciously
aware than the other groups. From a deductive stance based on previous research literature
this study reaffirms the key to gut feeling judgement, is primarily based on the
environment in which we interact with relevant stimuli that leads to enhanced intuitive
accuracy.
The research has reaffirmed that lie detection is an ability that not everyone acquires to the
same extent. Lie detection is as difficult to detect as it is for the liar to hide effectively
supporting the findings within previous literature. This is explained by the fact detection
rates within psychological research rarely span the 45-60% accuracy range(Vrij & Mann
2001). Deceptive clues are idiosyncratic in their occurrence, varying between individuals,
this is why the correlatory relationship of the adaptive unconscious is imperative. Because
the idiosyncratic nature exists, an individual’s increased intuitive processing abilities may
increase accuracy rates in detecting deceptive behaviour when and where it really matters.
No manuals or intuitive abilities are ever going to lead to detection of deceit with 100%
accuracy. However the evidence suggested within the present study presents the adaptive
unconscious as a tool that could potentially be incorporated into the testing of lie detection
professionals’ ability to do their job and provide justice where justice is due. After all not
everyone portrays non verbal clues to deceit as visibly or obviously as Geppetto’s little
wooden boy.
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Appendix 1:
The Adaptive Unconscious- Questionnaire
Group:
Age:
Gender:
18-25 26-35
36-45
Male
Female
46-55
56-65
Please circle the statement you feel most appropriate
I feel decisions made based on snap judgements are as good as those well thought out?
I get a gut feeling when something significant will happen while watching a sport. (I.e. A
goal is about to be scored)
I get gut feelings about people I meet almost instantly (i.e. I could/ could not be friends
with them) that have turned out to be true?
In the past I have had gut feelings about other people’s relationships (i.e. they would split
up/ stay together) that have turned out to be true?
I sometimes get gut feelings that a new place I am visiting “just doesn’t feel right”?
I sometimes get the feeling that someone I don’t know is suspicious in some way by just
looking at them?
When I see someone from across a room I have known instantly I would get on with them
(these preconceptions were correct when I eventually did meet them)?
I feel I can judge a person’s mood purely on a glimpse of them based on body language
alone?
I feel I can judge someone’s personality to a good degree of accuracy from seeing them for
only a short time?
I sometimes get the sense that someone is looking at me even if they are out of you
peripheral vision, only to turn around to find I was right?
I can suspect someone of lying based on gut feeling without prior knowledge about what
they were talking about?
I sometimes know something without knowing how or why I know.
Thank you for your time and your participation.
Appendix 2:
Video Questionnaire
Group:
Age:
18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
Gender:
Male
Female
Instructions:
1. Based on the behaviours you witness in the following clips please circle whether you think that
James Harvey is trying to deceive with his non verbal behaviour or not.
2. After each clip you will receive twenty seconds, in which to state in particular which actions
impacted your decision to why the behaviour was deceptive.
Clip 1.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 2.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 3.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 4.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 5.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 6.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 7.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 8.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 9.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clip 10.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 11.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Clip 12.
Deceptive Behaviour ------------------------------------------------No Deceptive Behaviour Indicated
If deceptive what individual behaviour impacted on your decision?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you for your time and your participation.
Appendix 3:
Clips shown to participants.
Appendix 4:
SPSS data output.
Appendix 5:
Order of Clips in Video:
Clip 1: Self Touching
Clip 2: Speech Disturbances
Clip 3: Gaze Aversion
Clip 4: Increased Speech Rate
Clip 5: Neutral
Clip 6: Increased Pitch of Voice
Clip 7: Shifting of Positions
Clip 8: Smiles/smirks
Clip 9: Decrease in hand/finger movement
Clip 10: Shoulder Shrug
Clip 11: Increased Latency Period
Clip 12: Neutral