Corruption as a Political Issue
in Modern Societies:
France, Great Britain and
the United States in the
Long 19th Century
Jens Ivo Engels
The so-called “long 19th century,” from the French Revolution to the First World War, ranks as
the crucial phase in the genesis of the modern world.1 In the Western countries this period was
characterized by the differentiation of the public and the private spheres, the birth of the modern
bureaucratic state and the delegitimation of early modern practices such as clientelism and patronage.2 All these fundamental changes are, among other things, usually considered important
preconditions for the modern perception of corruption.
This paper will concentrate on this crucial phase by means of a comparative analysis of debates
in France, Great Britain and the United States, with the aim to elucidate the motives for major anticorruption movements. The questions are: who fights against corruption? and what are the reasons for doing so? I will argue that these concerns were often very different and sometimes
accidental. Furthermore, an analysis of political corruption may reveal differences between the
political cultures in the countries in question. Thus, the history of corruption serves as a sensor
which enables a specific perspective on politics. By taking this question as a starting point, the
focus is narrowed to political corruption and the debates about corruption, while petty bribery on
the part of minor civil servants, as well as the actual practice in the case of extensive political corruption, is left aside.
The term “corruption” is strongly normative. It is impossible to use it without implying criticism
on the problem in question. Moreover, it implies many meanings besides bribery and venality –
which is true above all for the historical period in question. In fact, it denotes decay, particularly
in the French and English usage. It implies physical decay, notably of organisms, meaning decomposition and rottenness. Moreover, corruption stands for moral decadence: The Grand
Larousse (1866) defines corruption as actions against conscience and sense of duty. Speaking of
1
2
Bayly, 2004.
Cf. Introduction in Karsten/ Thiessen, 2006: 7-17.
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corruption implies an entire array of physical, moral, and political decadence or impurity.3 Thus,
when used in political contexts, the term carries a notion of decline which tends to make it a dangerous discursive weapon.
However, academic research on corruption has developed a sort of standard definition for the actual practice: “corruption” is the obtaining of personal benefit by means of the abuse of public
office.4 The apparent clarity of this definition, however, obscures the problematic content of the
term, which will presumably never be defined satisfactorily. Although it implies universal validity, it only makes sense in specific historical and cultural contexts, i.e., Western societies since the
late 18th century. In fact, the standard definition implies the opposition of the private and the public as distinctive spheres. What is understood by these two domains may differ significantly depending on cultures and societies.
Surprisingly, historical literature on corruption is comparatively scarce.5 Whereas there are many
studies on the topic in sociology, political science and law, historians have been reluctant to address
the phenomenon. The absence of the topic of corruption is most striking in German historical literature on the 19th century – only very recently has a discussion on this matter developed.6 British historians, however, have shown more interest in corruption history, focusing on electoral corruption
and the debate on the so-called “Old Corruption” at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries.7 French
historiography has produced some studies on political scandals and the close relationship between
business and politics, but there is no systematic account of the phenomenon.8 The most marked tradition of historical corruption research regards the history of the United States, highlighting the
structural importance of bribery and “machine politics” in the political system during the 19th century on federal and city levels.9 But even here a single comprehensive monograph on the 19th century is still missing. International comparisons, on the other hand, are also yet to appear.
Corruption in Early Modern and Modern Contexts
This special caution regarding the term “corruption” is not least motivated by the problems and
misunderstandings early modern historians have been facing in recent decades. Put simply, for a
Cf. Gembicki, 1994: 7-54; Génaux, 2002: 513-530.
Engels, 2006.
5
A more detailed overview can be found in the Introduction to Engels/ Fahrmeir/ Nützenadel, 2008.
6
Engels, 2006; Bösch, 2005; Engels/ Fahrmeir/ Nützenadel, 2008.
7
Rubinstein, 1983; Harling, 1995/ 1996; Seymour, 1915; Burn, 1951; O’Leary, 1962; Gwyn, 1962; Whitehead,
1984; Hoppen, 1996.
8
Engels, 2008; Blanc, 1992; Bruguière, 1986; Dansette, 1936; Chabannes, 1972; Guilleminault/ Singer-Lecocq,
1975; Mollier, 1991; Thiveaud, 1997; Jankowski, 2000; Fortescue, 2002; Garrigues, 2003.
9
Eisenstadt/ Hoogenboom/ Trefousse, 1978; Nelli, 1970; Allswang, 1986; Summers, 1987/ 2003/ 2004; Lindberg,
1991; Eisenstadt, 1990; Lammersdorf, 1995; Morrison, 2000; Harter, 2002; Grossmann, 2003; White, 2003;
Hohenstein, 2004.
3
4
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long time two theories about corruption between 1500 and 1800 prevailed. First, Jacob van Klaveren, in his seminal article, claimed that early modern societies had been thoroughly corrupt, because there had been no separation between the public sphere and private interest, public offices
having been exploited in the same way as private enterprise.10 Second, James Scott stated that,
because of this situation, the term “corruption” (resulting from “modern” conceptions of society)
did not apply at all to the early modern world.11
Recent historiography, however, has pointed out the enormous importance of corruption debates,
which did address transgressions of public office holders. Early modern conceptions of public and
private interest were obviously much more complicated than hitherto assumed. On the one hand,
there was a sense of the anonymous general interest that had to be secured by monarchs, princes
and office holders. At the same time, protection of one’s family, or nepotism, was a Christian’s duty
in earthly life. Both the gift-giving society and the ideal of incorruptibility in public office existed
side by side, influencing practices as well as norms. Contemporaries were well aware of this complicated situation and reflected upon it. Therefore, recent historiography has proposed to view
early modern practice and normative thinking as characterized by an open rivalry between conflicting value systems.12 The validity of a certain norm was never without ambiguity, and which
norm prevailed depended on the circumstances of specific situations. In early modern towns in
southwest Germany a gift to public servants could be legitimate if handed over openly; in case of
a clandestine handing-over the same procedure might have appeared as corrupt, as Valentin Groebner points out.13 So, we can identify three main characteristics of early modern corruption:
•
The criteria for a verdict of “corruption” were not clear yet, and they were not clearly
linked to specific practices.
•
The idea of the common good as a norm of action did exist. But the common good was
not yet exclusively connected to the idea of the state or public office. There was an
other “common good” linked to family or patronage interests. We can distinguish
between the anonymous version of the common good (referring to mankind in general
or the state) and a particular common good (referring to clientele or family). There
fore, aspiring to profits by means of a public office could not simply be classified as
self-interest.
•
As the anonymous and the particular conceptions of the common good were both
legitimate (and displayed in public), the rivalry between the two value systems was
apparent. This open and public jarring of conflicting norms decreased during the
process of modernisation.
Klaveren, 1957.
Scott, 1972: 7-8.
12
Thiessen, 2008; Engels, 2006.
13
Groebner, 2003.
10
11
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Starting from this, modernizing societies of the late 18th and early 19th centuries tended to re-organize their value systems, trying to establish sharp lines between factually different matters and social spheres. According to theories on modern societies developed by authors such as Zygmunt
Bauman and Bruno Latour, modern societies are inclined to reduce ambiguities and to establish
clear categories, whether social or intellectual.14 The vast distinction between the private and the public spheres is but one example. With respect to corruption, modern societies were trying to develop
“hard” criteria which help to classify certain actions as unambiguously “corrupt” or “non-corrupt.”
Clientelage, patronage, the pursuit of private goals in public office, the sale of offices, bribery, etc.,
now seemed to become unequivocal signs of the illicit transgression of the boundary between private and public, they became signs of corruption. By 1850, it had become difficult to justify these
practices in public (as had been possible in early modern times). However, the mechanisms of power
and day-to-day business did not change as radically as the normative world. So, most of the forbidden practices continued to exist; on top of that new illicit strategies came into practice (cf. infra).
Yet, the rivalry between general norms and a certain set of practices did exist but had to be concealed.
Most contemporaries did not (and still do not in present times) consider their behavior illicit but
would argue that, though in conflict with “official” norms, it served a higher good. In this way they
did not simply act against the rules but invoked a hidden norm system which has been called “Tiefenschicht der Moral” (hidden moral standards) by Karl Otto Hondrich.15
As modern society no longer accepted the former ambiguities, it had to live continually with the
permanent conflict between public morals and hidden practices. This “machinery” provided endless opportunities for political disputes, disclosures and polemics; a huge number of modern debates was, and still is, based on this conflict. In the following sections I will take a look at some
important moments in the political corruption debates in France, Great Britain and the US on the
eve of the 19th century and around its end.
Corruption Debates around 1800
Typically, corruption debates around 1800 were about the various reform processes taking place
in this period. The most notable reform debate connected with the notion of corruption occurred
in Great Britain.
On the British Isles, the reform debate was caused by, among other reasons, side effects of the parliamentary system. Since the early 18th century governance without the approval of the parliament had
no longer been possible. The cohesion of the political groups in Parliament, however, was extremely
limited. The Crown was forced to guarantee the stability of government by an extensive system of
patronage. Patronage was intended to secure the majority of the parliament and to make politics calculable, and included the granting of offices, peerages, life annuities, sinecures, and public contracts.
14
15
Bauman, 1991; Latour, 1993.
Hondrich, 2002: 19f.
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These practices had been criticized since the early 18th century, while government representatives
blatantly justified them.16 By the 1780s, however, the nature of the debate changed, as the general acceptance of these practices quickly diminished and the opposition held government patronage responsible for the state deficit. By criticizing the so-called “Old Corruption,” which reached its peak
between 1790 and 1820, parts of the landed gentry, as well as middle-class Radicals and Puritans, opposed these practices. The critics pointed out that the political elite peculated tax money for personal
enrichment. As a result, the political elite’s conception of public office changed during the decades
concerned: patronage as an openly declared political instrument was replaced by a new ethics of politics. The notion of “general interest” was placed in the centre of the political value system, as well
as the ideal of cheap government and the declared selflessness of the ruling class. Privileges were successively abolished and state activity noticeably restrained. However, the traditional political elite
managed to secure its role by being in the vanguard of the renewal.17
Whereas corruption had been a subject for discussion in English political history since the late 16th
century, Frenchmen did not discover the political impact of corruption debates until the end of the
18th century.18 The first wave of corruption debates took place at the end of the Ancien Régime,
combining Rousseauean cultural pessimism with the tradition of the British corruption debate.
One of the most noticeable effects was produced by underground pamphlets during the pre-revolutionary decades. In these writings it was especially the court of Versailles that appeared as the
centre of moral corruption. In this context the charges against Queen Marie-Antoinette of both
sexual depravity and extravagance played a particular role. These voices expressed a judgment
which was increasingly applied to the entire social order of the Ancien Régime.
From 1789 onward, the accusations of corruption eventually became part of the arsenal of revolutionary slogans directed against the old order. In the debates of the National Assembly and in
articles in revolutionary newspapers the “corruption” of the Ancien Régime became a familiar
topos. Besides the moral decline at Court, the accusations also mentioned the sale of offices. In
the further course of the Revolution, criticism of corruption retained its importance. It was especially the Jacobins who employed the concept of corruption in order to secure their claim to power
and to enforce the radicalisation of the Revolution. In February 1794, Saint Just claimed that, in
contrast to the monarchy, the Republic was the one form of government preventing the corruption of morals and laws – provided that adequate institutions existed.19 Most notably, this was
meant to legitimize the persecution of political opponents by the Committee of Public Safety.
The charge of corruption often led directly to the guillotine. Subsequently, after the end of the Terreur, accusations of corruption lost its status as a big political issue. However, corrupt practices
increased, rather than decreased, under the Directoire regime.20
Wellenreuther 1982.
See Harling, 1996.
18
On this paragraph see Engels, 2008.
19
Saint-Just, 1957: 135f.
20
Brown, 1990.
16
17
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During the North American colonies’ struggle for independence, the alleged corruption of the
Westminster Government and Parliament was one of the common arguments against British rule.
Consequently, high moral standards and politics without corrupt practices can be regarded as the
very raison d’être of the early Union. Nevertheless, or exactly because of this, the allegations of
corruption directed against political adversaries soon became an important feature of North American political life.21 The first notable crisis took place in the decade between 1790 and 1800, when
Federalists and Anti-Federalists had a dispute about the future relationship between the central
government and the individual states. Being in opposition to the centralists, the so-called AntiFederalists accused the government of being corrupt. The Anti-Federalist concept of a decentralised state corresponded to the ideas of the landowning elite and the farmers. These ideas were
inspired by an ascetic ideal of republican virtues, as opposed to the rather urban concepts of the
Federalists. With respect to corruption, Anti-Federalists invoked the civic ideals which had spread
in England and North America during the 18th century—i.e., the so-called “Machiavellian moment.”22 In particular, Anti-Federalists criticised the issuing of government bonds as well as the
expansion of public administration. The establishment of an official national debt was considered
to make the government dependent on bankers and their corruptive influence on the morals of
politicians. Moreover, the critics referred to the British Old Corruption debate. Old Corruption was
considered to have made the British Parliament totally dependent on the government. Arguing that
this could also occur in the United States, they claimed that, just as in England, a large administration would enable the government to corrupt the people’s representatives, which could lead to
a new form of despotism.23
Corruption Debates around 1900
From the 1830s onwards, electoral corruption became an intensely debated issue in all three countries. As a rule, electoral corruption was not so much criticised by the electors as by the elected,
i.e., the parliamentarians. Typically, electors regarded the exchange of votes against money, small
jobs or other favours as advantageous deals. In the case of Great Britain we are well informed
about the electors’ motives, as these were recorded by several select committees or royal commissions during investigations on the local level. They regarded the sale of their votes as their
good right, the franchise being thought of as a privilege and a sort of private property.24 In France,
all political regimes after the revolutionary period included (different) sorts of elected bodies. In
the rural constituencies candidates manipulated the votes by traditional patronage as well as open
bribery. At the same time, sophisticated relations of gift-giving were developed, involving civil
service agents on the departmental level, the government and their “official” candidates, and the
electors. Under the centralist regime of the Second Empire, however, intimidation and coercion
Murrin, 1994; Keller, 1978.
Pocock, 1975; Greene, 1994; Savage, 1994.
23
Burrows, 1978.
24
Cf. Engels, 2006.
21
22
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prevailed, as exercised by the imperial government’s agents.25 With respect to the United States,
the term “party games” aptly characterises the activities of voters and political organisations during the time just before elections. In North America, too, voters received a variety of facilities from
the hands of the candidates, and the parties organised amusements and festivities which induced
the citizens to give their votes away without political considerations.26
Actually, the political elite in Europe fought more intensely against electoral corruption than the
electors did. This is true for Britain and for French Republicans (who formed the opposition before becoming, at the end of the 1870s, the country’s unquestioned majority until the end of the
Third Republic in 1940). Surprisingly, the political elite ascribed the practice of electoral corruption to the electors’ bad morals rather than their own questionable behavior.
However, it was not morals that formed the central motive in the fight against corruption but the
struggle for power (in France) and, additionally, the cost argument (in Britain). In England, bribery
plainly became too expensive for the candidates and the developing political parties at the end of
the 19th century. During the French July Monarchy and the Second Empire, the opposition tried
to declare the authoritarian regimes illegal by accusing them of bribery, whereas in the Third Republic the Republicans increasingly succeeded in manipulating the votes of individual constituencies in their favour by annulling certain individual results on the pretext of electoral
corruption.
However, by 1900 electoral corruption had lost its dominant position in public debates. Instead,
a series of corruption scandals shook all three countries during the decades before and after the
turn of the century. Compared with the debates of 1800, the crucial role of the modern mass press
can be noted as a new element.
The crises in the French Third Republic between 1870 and 1940 may be written as a history of
corruption scandals (excepting the Dreyfus affair): The rise of the anti-parliamentary Boulangism
during the 1880s was a reaction to social developments but had been triggered by the so-called
“scandale des décorations” (honours scandal). Henry Wilson, the son-in-law of the first truly
republican president Jules Grévy, did considerable business on the basis of his unrestricted access
to the head of state. Besides insider deals on the stock market, his activities also comprised selling Grévy’s goodwill. For instance, medals of the Legion of Honour could be purchased at a certain price.27 These deals were discovered at the end of 1887 and, since even the president had
benefited from them, Grévy finally had to resign. This episode increased the people’s hopes of
General Boulanger, who appeared as the unblemished saviour of the country. In 1889 he almost
made it to the Elysee, and in case of success would presumably have established an authoritarian regime.
Engels, 2008; Charnay, 1964; Garrigou, 1992; Huard, 2001.
Summers, 2004. See also the overview on party financing in Troy, 1997.
27
Dansette, 1936; Mollier/ George, 1994.
25
26
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Forty years later, during the so-called Stavisky affair in 1934, France was on the verge of a coup
d’état by right-wing mass organisations. On February 6th, right-wing leagues and a communist organisation marched towards the parliament in the Palais Bourbon, shouting “down with the
thieves,” upon which they nearly broke up the National Assembly. With state officials, politicians and even the police turning a blind eye, the financier Stavisky had peculated public money
and had duped a huge number of small investors.28 In combination with many other financial
scandals, the Stavisky affair cemented the conviction held by many contemporaries that the Republic was a greenhouse for illicit relationships and trafficking between finance jugglers and the
political elite.
Without doubt, the best known among these affairs was the Panama scandal in 1892/93. In 1888,
the operators of the construction project for the Panama Canal in Central America had bribed
more than a hundred members of the French Parliament, as well as at least one minister, in order
to obtain a concession for the issue of public bonds. The criticism mainly focused on the role of
the general agent of the company, Cornelius Herz. He was Jewish, holder of an American passport, and of German background. This provided the anti-parliamentary and increasingly anti-Semitic Boulangist movement with an opportunity for propaganda. Especially the accusation of a
Jewish conspiracy evoked a strong response. Georges Clemenceau, reputed republican orator in
parliament and openly feared “tombeur de ministères,” had to stand up to the accusation of high
treason, because one of his newspapers had been financed by Herz. In the eyes of the Boulangist
press this contributed to an overall picture of corruption as well as Jewish-foreign influence.
Clemenceau was assumed to serve malevolent powers via Herz. The frequent changes of government, for which the Third Republic was notorious, were considered the result of conspiracies
instigated by foreign forces in order to weaken France.29
In Britain, too, several corruption scandals emerged around 1900.30 One of the most debated affairs was the Marconi scandal in 1912/13. High-ranking politicians in the liberal government had
invested in stocks of a foreign subsidiary of the Marconi telegraph company shortly before the
government itself had placed a lucrative order with Marconi. Chancellor of the Exchequer David
Lloyd George was among those involved. However, the accusation of insider dealing seemed illfounded, as the public contract with the telegraph company was already generally known by the
time the stocks were purchased. With respect to the course of the affair, it seems much more essential that in a House of Commons debate the persons involved denied ever having bought Marconi stocks—and thus lied to the House. The Marconi scandal marks the end of British
gentleman-politics and the beginning of a phase in which personal attacks became current features
of political disputes. As a social climber and aggressive debater, Lloyd George himself had contributed to that, not least because he had several times held the prosecutor’s role. In the Boer War
he had accused the conservative Colonial Secretary of having personally profited from arms deals.
Jankowski, 2000.
Blic, 2005; Mollier, 1991; Bouvier, 1964.
30
Bösch, 2008; Gilbert, 1989.
28
29
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The personalization of criticism of corruption was promoted especially by the press. This damaged the reputation of politicians both in France and in Great Britain. Embodying a too-powerful Parliament, Clemenceau was attacked, as was Lloyd George, who was seen as an immoral
moralist. In France, however, the corruption debates called the whole political system into question—as represented by, for example, Clemenceau and Stavisky—whereas the Marconi scandal
in Britain mainly addressed the problem of personal integrity.31 In either case, the affairs amounted
to an articulation of unease about the intertwining of modern capitalism and politics, an apprehension that was increasingly paired with anti-Semitism.
During the United States’ Gilded Age, between the end of the Civil War and the early 20th century,
an important reform movement emerged in reaction to the corruption scandals. Scandals, such as
that around Crédit Mobilier in 1872, had triggered the resistance against widespread political corruption. Crédit Mobilier was a holding dominated by the Union Pacific Railroad company. The manager of the company allowed members of Congress to purchase shares at prices far below market
value. His aim was to obtain a majority in Congress for a license permitting the construction of a new
railway line; furthermore, he wanted to obtain federal subsidies for the construction project. The
story leaked out during the presidential election campaign and triggered considerable criticism in the
public debate. However, the direct effects were minor, since members of all political camps had profited from these dealings. Henceforth, Crédit Mobilier became a symbol for those practices in political life that an increasing group of reformers, often called “Progressives”, complained about.32
During the Gilded Age, North American politics was permeated with structures that critics perceived as corruption. At least two basic elements should be mentioned in this context. As early
as the 1830s mass parties developed in the United States. Their cohesion and their success mainly
rested upon the so-called “spoils system,” i.e., the systematic use of public resources for party
needs. Typically, after having won an election, party leaders bestowed public offices on their followers. Consequently, every new government used to dismiss as many administrative officials as
possible and replace them by members of their own party.33
From the 1870s onward, we can detect a second element of American politics that was severely
criticized, the so-called “bossism” in the large cities. Party leaders controlled their political following, which often consisted of the poorer elements of society and especially immigrants, by arranging jobs for them or by assisting them in a multitude of day-to-day situations. For this purpose
the bosses utilized the resources of the city administration. As the bosses who operated on district level sought the protection of bigger unities, political life in the cities had a pyramid structure, comprising various levels of patronage up to the city council and the mayor.34
Cf. on France Engels, 2008.
Hoogenboom, 1978; on Gilded Age scandals see also LaForte, 1998/1999.
33
Arnold, 2003; Pessen, 1978.
34
Arnold, 2003; Harter, 2002; Cornwell, 1964; Muccigrosso, 1978; Homberger, 1994. See also Plunkitt, 1969; Nelli,
1970; Larsen/ Hulston, 1997.
31
32
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The progressives, who predominantly belonged to the educated middle class, disapproved of the
political culture. They put forward several arguments: first, the methods mentioned above were
seen as preventing the administration from working efficiently. Secondly, they represented the
decay of public morals. According to the progressives, politicians did not serve the common good
but worked exclusively for the retention of power or for the particular interests of their supporters. Furthermore, the importance in bossism of the lower classes as well as immigrants caused suspicion. In the eyes of progressive criticism this meant that the most unreliable of all social
elements gained political influence.
By contrast, the reformers relied on public opinion as a corrective. By revealing illicit activities
and by blowing up corruption and patronage into scandals, they aimed at shaking up their fellow
citizens. By contrast, they invoked the classical civic virtues such as selflessness, honesty, and fair
elections. Building a professional, independent administration was believed to be the only corrective; thus, appointed technical experts were presented as proper advocates and trustees of the
common good rather than elected politicians.35 In relying on experts, the reformers praised the
qualities of those social strata to which their own group largely belonged. Unlike the situation in
France, the progressives certainly never questioned the constitution; rather, they claimed to return
to the early years of independence.
Concluding Remarks
Public debates on corruption were permeated by the idea of purifying the public sphere, i.e.,
of excluding personal and profit-oriented motives from the activities of civil servants, office
holders and politicians. Common good and private interest, or even group interest, seemed increasingly incompatible. At this point the difference with early modern times is noticeable, as
there was no place any longer where the contradicting norms could be articulated. Whereas
personal motives continued to influence political action, be it elections or the boss system, they
lost their legitimacy. It became illicit to articulate the idea of particular common good. Thus,
the old contradictions between value systems and the ambivalence of the common good seemed
to have disappeared.
In reality, however, 19th century political actors did continue to transgress the lines, so that the
purification process never came to an end but had to be continued via the creation of scandals
and public debate. The stricter the lines of separation between the common and the individual
were defined, the more contemporaries had to deal with transgressions and label certain practices as “corrupt.”
The ostentatious invocation of high moral standards that underpinned the anti-corruption discourses contrasts with the very concrete, pragmatic-political objectives of the appealers them35
See for example White, 1969.
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selves. The Jacobins, for instance, concealed their dictatorial claim to power behind criticism of
corruption. Invoking the Old Corruption debate, the English landed gentry also protested against
high taxes and their perceived loss of political influence. In the North American Gilded Age, middle-class experts recommended themselves as the solution to the corruption problem, aiming at
the creation of a professional public administration in which they could play an important role.
French Boulangists tried to take the opportunity to put down the Republicans. Reforms aimed
against electoral corruption had to serve the interests of those who hitherto had practiced bribery
without hesitation. These facts confirm that the anti-corruption agents cannot be lumped together
as the supporters of one specific political project, such as liberalism or republicanism. However,
at different periods the anti-corruption movements do seem to have been consistent with specific
political orientations. This can be exemplified by two aspects, namely the concept of the state and
the attitude towards political participation.
Around 1800, the anti-corruption discourse was still dominated by a set of ideas known from
the early modern debate. Participants in the Old-Corruption debate, the French revolutionaries as well as the American opponents of centralisation, accused their adversaries of despotism. In other words, the charge of corruption was a means to criticise governments which
seemed to be too strong and/or illegitimate. However, it certainly cannot be denied that the Jacobins, for instance, aspired to an enormous concentration of power (which for a limited period they did obtain).
Around 1900, charges of corruption originated from contrasting attitudes. French Boulangists
called for increasing executive power to the disadvantage of the parliament; North American reformers called for professional administration in the cities, as well as a higher degree of state intervention on the part of the federal government. Only in Great Britain were corruption debates
not as strongly aimed at strengthening central governmental institutions. Nevertheless, there can
be no doubt about the fact that criticism of corruption, although initially anti-centralistic, increasingly called for the concentration of state power.
At the same time, at the end of the century the anti-corruption discourse was characterized by an
increasingly critical attitude towards several forms of political participation. During the late 18th
and the early 19th century, criticism of corruption had usually implied claims of participation. As
mass participation in politics had developed during the century, it was discredited by electoral corruption and (in the United States) by bossism. This usually did not imply that democratic rights
should be reduced. Instead, the critics aimed at redefining moral standards with respect to public institutions and their interactions with society.
Public outrage over electoral corruption called into question the moral reliability of the common voter, and French anti-parliamentarism sought to establish a charismatic leader instead
of the control of an allegedly bribed parliament. Criticism that denounced the spoils system
and bossism has been seen as having an anti-democratic effect, for it declared mass participation in politics illegal and aimed at reducing the influence of the lower classes in commu78
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nal settings.36 In this way we may still conclude that the anti-corruption discourse in the late
19th century often implied anti-pluralistic ideas.
Besides this anti-pluralistic tendency, corruption criticism was increasingly connected with anticapitalist as well as anti-liberal undertones, and with anti-Semitism. This last aspect is worth further research. With respect to Germany, Fritz Stern was the first to point out this connection in
his biography of Bismarck’s Jewish banker Bleichröder.37 The anti-liberal context is clear, for instance, in the progressives’ reform scheme, as it announced a period of increasing state intervention and regulation.
Besides the striking similarities in the three nations observed, there are some remarkable differences, mainly concerning the political impact of the corruption debates. In France the corruption
discourse tended to have a system-changing character,38 whereas in Great Britain, and especially
in the United States, accusations of corruption were often part of routine disputes in politics that
did not call into question the Constitution. Presumably this could be explained not only by the political stability of the two Anglo-Saxon nations in question but also by the traditional “function”
that the corruption discourse had fulfilled since early modern times.
In England, charges of corruption had been known since the early 17th century. Parliament used
the procedure of impeachment, based on alleged corruption on the part of ministers of the Crown,
in order to control governmental politics.39 Hence, corruption debates were familiar to the political players and often accompanied reform processes long before the advent of the Old Corruption debate. In Northern America the struggle against corruption in Westminster formed one of
the founding myths of the War of Independence. In this context, the charge of corruption against
a political adversary functioned as a reminder, as a public incitement to recall the morals and the
virtue of the Founding Fathers. Exactly because of this function it definitely excluded any revolution or overthrow of the government. Consequently, we may conclude that a charge of corruption in Anglo-Saxon countries was directed against individuals or against (temporary) aberrations
from the path of political virtue on the part of the political elite.
In France, by contrast, debates on political corruption were first articulated on the eve of the Revolution and were associated with revolutionary claims. The rest of 19th-century French history confirms the “revolutionary” or “system-changing” connotation of corruption charges. Towards the
end of the July Monarchy, accusations of corruption against members of the ruling elite grew
stronger again. These opened the path to the Revolution of February 1848.40 Thus, different ideas
of the state are reflected. In France, it was the constitutional system that was seen as flawed (and
For instance Arnold, 2003.
Stern, 1978.
38
This is the focus of my article (Engels, 2008), cited above.
39
Peck, 1990; cf. for the late 18th century Dirks, 2006.
40
Fortescue, 2002; Margadant, 1999.
36
37
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called into question) when corruption occurred. In the United States and Great Britain, it was
rather individual actors or groups who were accused of not meeting the due requirements of their
functions in politics. In France, we can detect a broad tendency to hold the political system responsible when political leaders seemed to betray the common good.
Finally, I would like to stress the diversity of the motives for fighting against corruption. Most
groups denouncing corruption acted for pragmatic reasons, in order to gain or to secure power.
There is definitely no positive link in 19th-century history between modernising or democratizing forces and the battle against corruption. Therefore, from a historian’s point of view, there is
little evidence to back the popular allegation that the fight against corruption is closely connected
with modernisation and democratisation.
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Dr. Jens Ivo Engels is a professor of modern and contemporary history at the Technische Universität Darmstadt/Germany. His research interests cover comparative corruption history from
the 18th to the 20th century, environmental history in the 20th century, early modern monarchy
and the history of infrastructures. Recently, he has published an introduction to the French Third
Republic; he also is co-editing a forthcoming volume on corruption history.
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