'Immovable property” – the
Humpty Dumpty principle
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
SARS Watch
A monthly journal, published by
PwC South Africa, that gives
informed commentary on current
developments in the tax arena,
both locally and internationally.
Synopsis
Through analysis and comment
on new laws and judicial
decisions of interest, Synopsis
helps executives to identify
developments and trends in tax
law and revenue practice that
may affect their business.
Tax today
July 2016
Editor: Al-Marie Chaffey
Contributors to this issue:
RC (Bob) Williams
Al-Marie Chaffey
Ian Wilson
Linda Mathatho
property' -–The
'Immovable property”
the
Humpty Dumpty principle
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
‘Immovable property’ – the Humpty Dumpty principle
In Lewis Carroll’s celebrated
children’s story, Alice in
Wonderland, Alice engaged in a
conversation with Humpty
Dumpty and found him obsessed
with the meaning of words.
However, he proved liberal in
his approach to interpretation:
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty
Dumpty said in rather a scornful
tone, ‘it means just what I choose
it to mean — neither more nor
less.’
It seems that this selective
approach may still be alive and
well in our tax administration
today.
The term ‘immovable property’ is found in
section 9H(4)(a) of the Income Tax Act (‘the
Act’) within the phrase ‘immovable property
situated in the Republic’. It is also found in
articles 6.1 and 13.1 of the double taxation
agreement between South Africa and the
Netherlands, albeit in a slightly different guise
(‘immovable property situated in the …
Contracting State’). One would expect the term
to be interpreted the same way for all purposes.
However, this view is apparently not shared by
SARS.
potential exposure to capital gains tax arises in
relation to such property.
• Any asset effectively connected with a
permanent establishment of that nonresident person in the Republic.
The double taxation agreement (DTA)
Clarification is provided in paragraph 2(2) by
defining the term ‘interest’ as it appears in
‘interest in immovable property situated in the
Republic’ to include ownership of shares in a
company or an interest in a partnership or
other entity or a vested interest in a trust of at
least 20% where 80% or more of the value of
the company, entity or trust is attributable to
immovable property situated in the Republic.
Background
The Income Tax Act (the Act)
Section 9H
The disposal of an asset by a person who is tax
resident in South Africa gives rise to a potential
liability to capital gains tax. In the case of a
person who is not tax resident in South Africa,
such disposal will only give rise to a potential
liability to capital gains tax if the asset is within
the scope of our capital gains tax legislation.
Section 9H of the Act deals with the situation
where a person ceases to be a resident. In that
event, the person is deemed to have disposed of
all of their assets on the day prior to ceasing to
be a resident and therefore faces a potential
liability to capital gains tax.
Section 9H(4) lists circumstances in which the
provisions of section 9H do not apply.
Paragraph (a) of section 9H(4) states that the
provisions do not apply in respect of
‘immovable property situated in the Republic
that is held by that person’. This means that the
person is not deemed to have disposed of such
property for purposes of section 9H, and no
The Eighth Schedule
In the case of non-resident persons, in terms of
paragraph 2(1)(b) of the Eighth Schedule to the
Act, disposals of assets of three descriptions
may lead to the taxation of capital gains:
• Immovable property situated in the
Republic;
PwC
• Any interest or right in immovable property
situated in the Republic; and
2
Article 13.1 of the DTA provides that capital
gains derived by a resident of one of the
contracting states from the disposal of
immovable property referred to in Article 6.1
and situated in the other contracting state may
be taxed in that other contracting state.
Article 6.1 of the DTA deals with income
derived from ‘immovable property … situated
in the other contracting state’. The nature of
this property is defined in Article 6.2.
Article 13.4 states that gains from the
alienation of any asset other than as described
in paragraph 1 shall be taxable only in the state
in which the alienator is resident.
Placed in context, if a resident of the
Netherlands (a contracting state) disposes of an
asset that is not immovable property situated
in South Africa (the other contracting state),
Article 13.4 reserves the sole right to tax any
capital gain for the Netherlands and denies any
such right to South Africa.
Synopsis | July 2016
property' –
- The
'Immovable property’
the
Humpty Dumpty principle
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
What is the problem?
SARS recently issued the fifth edition of its
Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (the
Guide). In the Guide it interprets the term
‘immovable property’, as it appears in
‘immovable property situated in the Republic’, in
the context of both section 9H of the Act and
Article 13.1 of the DTA.
One would expect the interpretation to be the
same in both instances. Unfortunately, and
paradoxically, though, this expectation is not
met.
General interpretation
The Guide includes a classification of assets as
movable or immovable in Chapter 4: parts 4.1.2.3
and 4.1.2.4.
In 4.1.2.3, the Guide examines the legal
classification of things as immovable and
concludes that immovable property
encompasses:
• Land;
• Buildings with foundations in the soil;
• Trees;
• Growing crops;
• Real rights over immovable property (e.g.
usufructs, registered long-term leases and
servitudes);
• Life rights in a retirement complex; and
In 4.1.2.4, in a discussion of the nature of
movable assets, the Guide states:
A member’s interest in a close corporation is
deemed to be movable property under s 30 of the
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. Section 35(1) of
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 confirms that a share
issued by a company is movable property.
The Guide therefore apparently recognises that a
share in a company is movable property.
Section 9H(4) of the Act
The application of section 9H(4)(a) is dealt with
in Chapter 6 of the Guide under part 6.2.2.4. In
interpreting the phrase ‘immovable property
situated in the Republic’ the following
interpretation is provided:
Under para 2(1)(b)(i) a non-resident must account
for any capital gain or loss on disposal of
immovable property situated in South Africa or any
interest or right of whatever nature to or in such
property. Paragraph 2(2) deems certain indirect
interests in immovable property to constitute an
interest in immovable property for the purposes of
para 2(1)(b)(i). For example, a person who holds at
least 20% of the equity shares in a company when
80% or more of the market value of those shares is
directly or indirectly attributable to immovable
property in South Africa would fall within para
2(2). However, the exclusion of immovable property
from the ambit of s 9H does not extend to these
indirect interests. (Emphasis added)
• Mineral and prospecting rights.
PwC
3
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' –- The
the
Humpty Dumpty principle
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
Certain of the DTAs that South Africa has concluded and that remain in force were based on the 1997 version of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital issued
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
In other words, SARS’ interpretation is that, for
the purposes of section 9H(4), shares in a
company that owns property are not
‘immovable property’, regardless of whether or
not they are equivalent to an ‘interest in
immovable property’ contemplated in
paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the
Act.
Article 13.1 of the DTA
This interpretation has a history. Certain of the
DTAs that South Africa has concluded and that
remain in force were based on the 1997 version
of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital issued by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). Issue 4 of the Guide discussed the
application of treaty provisions identical to
Article 13.1 of the Model Tax Convention as
follows:
Treaties such as those with Luxembourg,
Mauritius and the Netherlands (Article 13(4) of
the treaties with Luxembourg and Mauritius and
Article 14(4) [sic] of the treaty with the
Netherlands) provide that sales of assets other
than immovable property are only taxable in the
country of residence. Since shares are not
‘immovable property’ under South Africa’s
domestic law it follows that the provisions of these
tax treaties will override para 2(1)(b).
PwC
SARS’ conclusions at that time were consistent
with the views of the OECD. In its 1997
commentary on Article 13 in its Model Tax
Convention on Income and Capital (which
Article 13 of the Netherlands DTA is identical
to), the OECD concluded:
Interpretation of terms in the DTA must first be
by reference to any definition in the DTA.
Where the DTA does not define the terms,
Article 3.2 of the DTA explains the process to
be applied:
As regards the application of the provisions of the
Convention at any time by a Contracting State,
any term not defined therein shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, have the meaning that
it has at that time under the law of that State for
the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention
applies, any meaning under the applicable tax
laws of that State prevailing over a meaning
given to the term under other laws of that State.
Certain tax laws assimilate the alienation of all or
part of the shares in a company, the exclusive or
main aim of which is to hold immovable property,
to the alienation of such immovable property. In
itself paragraph 1 does not allow that practice: a
special provision in the bilateral convention can
alone provide for such an assimilation.
Contracting States are of course free either to
include in their bilateral conventions such special
provision, or to confirm expressly that the
alienation of shares cannot be assimilated to the
alienation of the immovable property.
(Emphasis added)
SARS reiterates that section 35(1) of the
Companies Act states that a share in a company
is movable property. However, says the Guide,
Paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule deems
shares, in the circumstances there described, to
be an interest in immovable property.
No amendments have been made to paragraphs
2(1)(b) or 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule between
the publication of Issue 4 and Issue 5 of the
Guide. The provisions of Article 13 of the DTA
were not renegotiated. No decision of a
competent court indicated that the
interpretation in Issue 4 was incorrect.
Next, the Guide accepts that there is a
definition of immovable property in Article 6.2
of the DTA which provides:
The term 'immovable property' shall have the
meaning which it has under the law of the
Contracting State in which the property in
question is situated. The term shall in any case
include property accessory to immovable
property, livestock and equipment used in
Despite this, in Issue 5 of the Guide SARS
inexplicably changed the interpretation of the
application of Article 13.1 in the treaties
referred to.
4
agriculture and forestry, rights to which the
provisions of general law respecting landed
property apply, usufruct of immovable property
and rights to variable or fixed payments as
consideration for the working of, or the right to
work, mineral deposits, sources and other natural
resources. Ships, boats and aircraft shall not be
regarded as immovable property.
Having regard to Article 6.2, SARS contends
that, in applying the law, it must assign the
meaning given to the term under the tax law:
The definition of ‘immovable property’ in article
6(2) is not restricted to corporeal immovable
property such as that held under freehold or
sectional title. It includes
‘rights to which the provisions of general law
respecting landed property apply, usufruct of
immovable property and rights to variable or
fixed payments as consideration for the
working of, or the right to work, mineral
deposits, sources and other natural resources’.
Thus under para (b) of the definition of
‘immovable property’ in s 102(1) of the Deeds
Registries Act 47 of 1937 a registered lease of not
less than 10 years is ‘immovable property’. A
usufruct, being an incorporeal real right, is also
an interest in immovable property... (Emphasis
added)
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' –- The
the
Humpty Dumpty principle
Then comes the logical masterstroke:
… Having established that article 6(2) includes
interests which would be regarded as immovable
property under the law of South Africa it must
follow that an interest in immovable property
referred to in para 2(2) should also fall within
article 6(2). (Emphasis added)
There are two strong arguments that this
conclusion is not supportable:
• The first is that one accepts that the term
‘immovable property’ should have the
meaning assigned to it in law, and for that
purpose the first source of reference is to look
to a definition in the tax law. SARS cannot
point to a definition of the term that applies
for all purposes of the Act, yet it seeks to
manufacture one.
• The second is that Article 6.2 then continues
to state that, whatever the definition may be
in the law, the term for purposes of the DTA
will include ‘rights to which the general law
respecting landed property apply’. In
PwC
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
interpreting this requirement, SARS does not
look to the provisions of the general law
which it has so ably and accurately
summarised in 4.1.2.3. It takes a different
approach in which it ignores the general law,
transposes the term ‘interests’ found in
paragraph 2(1)(b) for the term ‘rights’ found
in Article 6.2, and comes up with a
conclusion that shares in a property company
are ‘immovable property’ for tax purposes.
Which interpretation is correct?
There is a clear conflict that requires resolution.
The meaning of a term cannot be selected by
SARS to suit itself.
This is best illustrated by reference to section
9H of the Act. When a person ceases to be a
resident, that person is deemed to have
disposed of shares at their market value as
movable property on the day prior to ceasing
to be a resident and to have reacquired the
same shares as immovable property on the day
after having ceased to be a resident. SARS
would have us believe that the shares, without
changing hands and without any registration
process that affects their status under general
law relating to immovable property,
metamorphose into immovable property by
logical alchemy.
SARS, on this questionable basis, concludes
that, for the purposes of the tax law, the term
‘immovable property’ includes an interest in
immovable property as defined in paragraph
2(2) of the Eighth Schedule. It makes no
attempt to explain or reconcile the fact that it
also interpreted the same term in relation to
section 9H(4) and concluded that an interest
contemplated in paragraph 2(2) is not
immovable property.
interpreted in the same way for all purposes of
the Act.
There is no ground for finding that the contexts
require different interpretations. Both
interpretations take cognizance of the fact that
paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule defines
the term as it appears in ‘interest in immovable
property’ and does not define the term
‘immovable property’ itself.
The interpretation of the term ‘immovable
property’ suggested by SARS in the context of
Article 13.1 of a DTA is untenable not only
because it is not supported in logic or by
authority, but more importantly because SARS
itself applies conflicting interpretations in the
same public document.
SARS is a regulatory agency whose duty is to
interpret the law consistently and fairly.
This raises a serious question: which of these
interpretations is correct?
SARS can only place reliance on the
interpretation of a term if that term is
5
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' - The
Humpty Dumpty principle
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the transitional provisions of the TAA against
an assessment for (now-repealed) 'additional tax'
The decision of the Tax Court in
ITC 1882 (2016) 78 SATC 165,
delivered on 27 January 2016,
although not a binding precedent,
provides guidance on the process
of appealing against the
imposition of additional tax under
now-repealed provisions of the
Income Tax Act.
The decision also usefully discusses
whether an accountant’s error in
drawing up a tax return provides
an excuse to the taxpayer for an
under-declaration of income.
The facts
The complicating factor in this case was that
the tax return in issue, and the objection and
appeal lodged against the additional tax, predated the coming into force of the Tax
Administration Act, and the appeal was being
determined in the Tax Court after that Act came
into force.
In this case, the taxpayer, a 73-year-old lady,
was the trustee and beneficiary of four inter
vivos trusts.
Her accountant had prepared and filed her
personal tax returns; but it seems (see para
[26]) that he was not involved in preparing the
trusts’ tax returns and that he merely extracted
figures from the trusts’ financial statements.
Transitional provisions in terms of the
Tax Administration Act
The Tax Administration Act came into force on
1 October 2012 and repealed many provisions
of Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, including those
relating to objection and appeal and the
associated onus of proof, and relocated these
provisions, in an amended form, in the Tax
Administration Act.
The taxpayer’s return for the 2009 tax year had
been submitted (see para [24]) at a time when
the financial statements for the trusts were not
yet available, and the return the accountant
lodged on her behalf under-declared her
income from the trusts by some R27 million.
Where a disputed assessment arose under the
Income Tax Act prior to the coming into force
of the Tax Administration Act, and had not
been resolved when the latter Act came into
force, the transitional provisions of the Tax
Administration Act must be applied in the
determination of the dispute.
At issue was the quantum of additional
tax imposed under now-repealed
provisions of the Income Tax Act
The only issue in dispute in the Tax Court
hearing was the quantum of the additional tax
levied by the Commissioner in respect of that
understatement. The Commissioner had
originally imposed a 100% penalty, which the
SARS Objection Committee had reduced to
50%.
This follows from section 270(2)(d) of the Tax
Administration Act, which provides as follows:
(a) – (c) . . .
(d) an objection, appeal to the tax board, tax
court or higher court, alternative dispute
resolution, settlement discussions or other
related High Court application’
Consequently, in this particular matter, the
provisions of the Tax Administration Act
governed the objection and appeal against the
additional tax that had been imposed in terms
of a now-repealed provision of the Income Tax.
The onus of proof in terms of the Income
Tax Act and the Tax Administration Act,
respectively
Section 82 of the Income Tax Act, which
imposed on the taxpayer a wide-ranging
burden of proof in relation to disputed
assessments, has been repealed.
‘270. Application of Act to prior or
continuing action.
The taxpayer sought to have the additional tax
reduced still further, and lodged the requisite
objection and appeal against the assessment.
PwC
(2) The following actions or proceedings taken or
instituted under the provisions of a tax Act
repealed by this Act but not completed by the
commencement date of the comparable provisions
of this Act, must be continued and concluded
under the provisions of this Act as if taken or
instituted under this Act –
(1) . . . [T]his Act applies to an act, omission or
proceeding taken, occurring or instituted before
the commencement date of this Act . .
6
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' - The
Humpty Dumpty principle
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
SARS Watch
The judgment makes clear that even if the under-declaration error had been made by the accountant, this in no way relieved the taxpayer from responsibility.
Its current counterpart, section 102 of the Tax
Administration Act, preserves a general rule
that the onus of proof is on the taxpayer, but
now lays down a specific rule that SARS bears
the burden of proving the facts on which an
understatement penalty has been imposed.
This rule is buttressed by section 129(3), which
provides that –
‘In the case of an appeal against an
understatement penalty imposed by SARS under
a tax Act, the tax court must decide the matter on
the basis that the burden of proof is upon
SARS and may reduce, confirm or increase the
understatement penalty.’ (Emphasis added)
A change in the law relating to
procedure takes effect immediately
Section 270, quoted above, is silent on the
important issue of whether the rules regarding
the onus of proof to be applied in a disputed
assessment that arose under now-repealed
provisions of the Income Tax Act are the rules
laid down in the (now-repealed) section 82 of
the Income Tax Act (in terms of which the
general onus was on the taxpayer) or are the
rules as to onus laid down in section 129(3) of
the Tax Administration Act (which in certain
respects impose the onus of proof on SARS).
The Tax Court, correctly, it is submitted,
PwC
applied the legal presumption (see paras [10] –
[11]) that where a new law makes a change to
procedure, that change applies immediately,
even where litigation has already commenced
in terms of the old law or where the cause of
action arose while the old law of procedure
applied.
The accountant gamely testified (see para [24])
that he was indeed to blame for the underdeclaration, having filed the taxpayer’s tax
return reflecting the amount of her income as a
trust beneficiary at a time when the trusts’
financial statements were not yet available.
The judgment makes clear that even if the
under-declaration error had been made by the
accountant, this in no way relieved the
taxpayer from responsibility. The court said (at
[32]-[33]) that –
The Tax Court took the view that the issue of
the onus of proof is a matter of procedure, not
of substantive law, and that this presumption
therefore applied.
Accordingly, in terms of the legal presumption
outlined above, the current provisions of the
Tax Administration Act in regard to the onus of
proof had to be applied in the present case,
meaning that the onus was on SARS to prove
the facts on which the understatement penalty
(the quantum of which was the sole issue in
this case) had been applied.
‘This court must agree that Mr Z’s behaviour as
an accountant in this matter was less than
exemplary. The question is whether the appellant
should be punished for Mr Z’s dilatory behaviour,
or only because she did not make enough
enquiries as to whether the correct tax return had
been submitted timeously and making sure that
all was done to have the correct tax return
furnished to SARS timeously. . . .
The taxpayer’s reliance on an
accountant is no excuse
She had a duty not to leave all her financial
affairs in the hands of her attorney and her
accountant, without overseeing their actions and
ascertaining that all her taxes were paid
timeously. . . . She had a duty to enquire from Mr
Z whether her tax return had been submitted
correctly, which she obviously failed to do’.
In this case, the judgment records that the
taxpayer –
'placed the blame [for the under-declaration of
her income from the trusts of which she was a
beneficiary and a trustee] squarely on her
accountant’s shoulders . . . '.
‘The court has to be careful, especially in this
instance, not to punish the appellant for her
accountant’s actions, but has to consider her
actions in isolation in this regard. There is,
however, a duty on taxpayers to ensure that the
professionals they employ are diligent and not to
leave it to the tax consultants. It is ultimately the
duty of the taxpayer to ensure that the correct
amount of tax is paid timeously.’
Conclusion
In the result, the Tax Court reduced the
understatement penalty from the 100%
imposed by the Commissioner and the further
reduction decreed by the SARS Objection
Committee, to a penalty of 10%.
It needs to be borne in mind that the Tax Court
had a wide discretion to reduce an additional
penalty imposed under the now-repealed
provisions of s 76(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
By contrast, the Tax Court has a far narrower
discretion (see section 223(3) of the Tax
Administration Act) to reduce a percentagebased understatement penalty imposed in
terms of that Act.
The court said further (at para [36]) –
7
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' - The
Humpty Dumpty principle
SARS Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
SARS Watch 26 June to 25 July 2016
Legislation
20 July
The revised draft bills contain a revised Special Voluntary Disclosure
Programme (SVDP) in respect of offshore assets and income.
The revised draft bills contain a revised SVDP to give an opportunity to non-compliant taxpayers to voluntarily
disclose offshore assets and income before the new global standard for automatic exchange of information
between tax authorities commences in 2017. Comments are due to National Treasury and SARS by 4 Aug 2016.
8 July
Taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages policy paper, 2016
The Minister of Finance announced in his February 2016 Budget a proposal to introduce a tax on sugar-sweetened
beverages (SSBs) with effect from 1 April 2017 to help reduce excessive sugar intake. Comments are due to
Treasury by 16 August 2016.
8 July
The Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (TLAB) 2016 and the Draft Tax
Administration Laws Amendment Bill (TALAB) 2016
The draft bills contain amendments to tax Acts, to give effect to changes proposed in the Budget Speech and the
Budget Review of 2016.
8 July
Regulation for purposes of section 70(4) of the Tax Administration Act,
2011 promulgated under section 257 of the Act
Listing of the organs of state or institutions to which a senior SARS official may lawfully disclose specified
information
8 July
Rule Amendment – By the substitution in item 202.00 of the Schedule to
the rules for forms DA 260 in respect of other fermented beverages
Notice R.818 published in Government Gazette no. 40128 with an implementation date of 24 February 2016
8 July
Amendment of Part 1 of Schedule No. 1, by the insertion, substitution and
deletion of various tariff subheadings under heading 08.11
To provide for fruit not containing any added sugar or sweetening matter on a statistical level. Notice R.820,
published in Government Gazette no. 40128, with an implementation date of 8 July 2016
20 June
Draft Regulations on the Carbon Offset
The Carbon Offset Draft Regulations follow on the publication of the Carbon Offsets Paper in 2014 and the draft
Carbon Tax Bill in November 2015. The Carbon Offset Regulations were developed jointly by the National
Treasury, the Department of Energy and the Department of Environmental Affairs in terms of sections 13 and
20(b) of the Draft Carbon Tax Bill and set out the procedure for the use of carbon offsets by taxpayers to reduce
their carbon tax liability. Comments were to be submitted to National Treasury by no later than 25 July 2016.
30 June
Guide on Income Tax and the Individual (2015/16)
The purpose of this guide is to inform individuals who are South African residents of their income tax
commitments under the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act).
This guide does not attempt to reflect on every scenario that could possibly exist, but does attempt to provide
clarity on the majority of issues that are likely to arise in practice. Issues not specifically addressed may be taken
up with the South African Revenue Service (SARS) National Contact Centre, or your nearest branch office.
30 June
Guide on the Determination of Medical Tax Credits (Issue 7)
This guide provides general guidelines regarding the medical scheme fees tax credit and additional medical
expenses tax credit for income tax purposes. It does not delve into the precise technical and legal detail that is
often associated with tax, and should, therefore, not be used as a legal reference.
PwC
8
Synopsis | July 2016
'Immovable property' - The
Humpty Dumpty principle
SARS
SARS Watch
Watch
Appeals in terms of the
transitional provisions of the TAA
against an assessment for (the
now-repealed) 'additional tax'
Binding rulings
21 July
BCR 054 – Employer-provided accommodation
This ruling determines whether vacant stands to be acquired by qualifying employees from their employer will constitute
'immovable property' as contemplated in paragraph 5(3A) of the Seventh Schedule to the Act.
7 July
BPR 243 – Termination of a subcontracting agreement and
implementing of a toll manufacturing arrangement
This ruling determines whether the termination of a subcontracting agreement, including a concomitant supplies plan
between connected persons and the implementation of a toll manufacturing arrangement, will have capital gains tax
consequences.
PwC
9
Synopsis | July 2016
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