Response to Active Violence
Events
Arlington County
 Corporal Scott Wanek
 Arlington County Police Department
 Captain II John Delaney
 Arlington County Fire Department

What is an Active Shooter?
“One or more subjects who participate in a
random or systematic shooting spree,
demonstrating their intent to continuously
harm others. The overriding objective of an
active shooter appears to be mass murder.
The situation is not contained and very
dynamic in nature.”*
* ACPD Directive Manual section 538.06
The Active Violence Dilemma
 The frequency of ASEs is
increasing.
 Threat is ubiquitous
 Attackers are wounding
people faster than ever
before.
 Traditional response
delays medical care.
The ‘Stopwatch of Death’
Ron Borsch estimates that 32 people were killed
and 25 wounded in the span of 7 minutes at
Virginia Tech. The effective murder rate was
over 8 per minute — four times that of
Columbine at 2.1. In other words, at Virginia
Tech, the worst mass-murder by a solo active
shooter to date, one shooter committed 32
murders in less than half the time it took the
two Columbine shooters to kill 13.
The ‘Stopwatch of Death’
August 25, 2013 at the Navy Yard – 12 killed and 3
wounded in 7 minutes (2.1/min)
 December 14, 2012 in Newtown, CT – 26 killed in
5 minutes (5.2/min)
 August 5, 2012 in Oak Creek, WI – 6 killed and 4
wounded in 3 minutes (3.3/min)
 July 20, 2012 in Aurora, CO – 12 killed and 24
wounded in 6 minutes (6/min)
The ‘Stopwatch of Death’
 January 8, 2011 in Casas Adobes, AZ – 6 killed
and 12 wounded in 2 minutes (9/min)
 November 5, 2009 at Fort Hood, TX – 13 killed
and 32 wounded in 14 minutes (3.2/min)
 April 3, 2009 in Birmingham, NY – 13 killed and 4
wounded in 3 minutes (5.6/min)
 April 16, 2007 at Virginia Tech – 32 killed and 25
wounded in 7 minutes (8.1/min)
Columbine 1998
 Review of Columbine as a response change
Police Response Prior to
Columbine
 Prior to Columbine: Active shooter response was
based on the 5 C’s





Contain
Control
Call SWAT
Communicate with perpetrator
Come up with Tentative plan
 Response based on concept that bad guy wanted
something specific and did not want to die
 By the tactical standards at that time, Columbine was
a successful operation.
Consequential Changes
 Police heavily criticized
after Columbine
 “The 46 minute
rampage… during that
period, to the
Commission’s knowledge,
no efforts were made to
engage, contain, or
capture the perpetrators.”
Consequential Changes
 Results of the Commission
 “Law enforcement policy and
training should emphasize
that the highest priority of
law enforcement officers,
after arriving at the scene of
a crises, is to STOP any
ongoing assault.”
 “All officers… should be
trained in concept and skills
of RAPID emergency
deployment….”
Consequential Changes
 Changes in police response
 Police science research demonstrated immediate
need for initial police responders to immediately
pursue and establish contact with the shooter
 Results in fewer casualties
 Limiting “trigger time”
The Law Enforcement Response
Contact Teams / Rapid Reaction Teams
The Initial Law Enforcement
Response to Active Violence
Events
 New Paradigm: Contact Team/ Rapid reaction
teams
 First arriving officers team up in 4-officer T/Y
formation, but can be 3-, 2- or even solo, to move
quickly and quietly to the sound of gunfire.
 Initial police units will locate, contact and
eliminate the threat, moving through unsecured
areas, bypassing dead, wounded and panicked
victims.
Part 2
What about Fire/EMS response?
 Responding
Fire/Rescue personnel
forced to stage away
from the scene in safe
areas
What about Fire/EMS response?
 Traditional fire and EMS approach to AVE has
been non-committal and risk adverse:
 “Stage out of line of site until scene cleared”
 “Scene safety is paramount”
 “Only tactical medics can work in that area”
Fire/EMS response?
 Fire/EMS resources have been slow to
address the need for a new response
 What we do know:
 “The fate of the injured often lies in the hands of
the one who provides the first care to the
casualty”
Time Counts!
 Majority of fatal combat injuries die within 30
minutes of wounding
Every minute with uncontrolled injury decreases
chance of survival!!!
Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness
Team (WDMET) Study*
 Greatest opportunity for life saving intervention is
early on….
 90% of deaths in combat occurred prior to definitive care
 42% died immediately
 26% within 5 minutes
 16% within 5 and 30 minutes
 8-10% within 30 minutes and 2 hours
 Remainder survived between 2 and 6 hours during prolonged
extrication to care
 Only 10% of combat deaths occur after care initiated

* Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team. The WDMET study [1970 original
data are inthe possession of the Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences, Bethesda, MD]
Wound Data and Munitions
Effectiveness Team (WDMET) study
 Summary
 “The greatest benefit will be achieved through a
configuration that puts the caregiver at the
patient’s side within a few seconds to minutes of
wounding.”
Causes of Death in
Conventional Land Warfare
 Summary:
 15% of fatalities in combat are from readily treatable
causes:
 9% Exsanguination from peripheral hemorrhage
 5% Open/Tension pneumothorax
 1% Airway obstruction
Causes of Death in
Conventional Land Warfare
 58,151 deaths in Vietnam
9% = 5,233 lives from Exsanguination
5% = 2,907 lives from Open/Tension pneumothorax
1% = 581 lives from Airway Obstruction
Total: 8,721
The New EMS/Fire Response
 Initial EMS/Fire medical responders should work
with Law Enforcement assets to rapidly deploy
into areas that have been cleared but not
secured to initiate treatment and rescue of
injured victims
 Details




NOT tactical medics but first arriving EMS assets
Security provided by LE teams
Requires appropriate equipment and PPE
Should utilize TECC medical principles
Arguments Against Rapid
Deployment of EMS and Fire
 “Operating in an unsecured environment is too
much risk for us to assume!”
Too much risk??
Too much risk??
The Acceptance of Risk
 2013
 106 FF died on duty
 55 at fire scene
 36 from heart attacks
 14 to and from incident
Operating in an Unsecured
Environment is too much risk
 RTF personnel are outfitted with ballistic
protective equipment
 Operate under the protection of LE
 The immediate threat is rapidly mitigated in
almost all incidents prior to RTF deployment
Arguments against rapid
deployment of EMS/Fire
 “There could be another shooter who is
hiding and could attack us!”
There could be another
Shooter
 This is a possibility – all be it a small one
 Operating with ballistic protection and with
four law enforcement officers providing
protection
 If done correctly, we will have officers staged
throughout
 Rather shoot at RTF than innocent victims
Arguments against rapid
deployment of EMS/Fire
 “Police can bring us the victims.”
“Police can bring us the
victims”
 LE resources need to be doing tactical police
work
 Poor use of a limited resource
 Searching, clearing, and securing the area requires
multiple LE assets
 Need personnel to secure key real estate
 Hallway intersections, stairwells, large open areas
 Outer perimeter control
 Trained to move to shooter not to initiate
medical care
“Police can bring us the
victims.”
 No care initiated by
extracting LE teams
 Can be trained but may
create role confusion
 Requires constant
maintenance of
additional equipment
and skill set
Arguments against rapid
deployment of EMS/Fire
 “That is why we have tactical
medics”
“That is why we have tactical
medics”
 Are extremely useful if immediately available
 Virginia Tech: Male student shot twice in leg
 BUT are not always readily available
 Few teams are full time
 Typically respond with SWAT team
 Delay in SWAT on-scene time is what caused police
response paradigm shift
“That is why we have tactical
medics”
 Have a different dedicated job to do
 Certainly can provide some aid but as a whole are
dedicated to care for SWAT officers and SWAT
mission
 Limited resource
 How many medics on team??
Arguments against rapid
deployment of EMS/Fire
 “It is not our incident, and we’ve
just never done it that way.”
“It is not our incident, and we’ve
just never done it that way.”
 Fire and EMS largely “learned behavior” from
our superiors –evidenced based?
 Leaders who recognize the threat
 Training and Education
 Sound tactics, procedures and equipment
 Dedicated commitment
“We have never done it that
way”
 Some people think that the World is flat,
regardless of what the data and science say….
“We have never done it that way”
1960’s and 70’s
“We have never done it that way”
1980’s
“We have never done it that way”
1990’s
“We have never done it that way”
2000’s
Let’s Not Wait
1958 Our Lady of Angels School
Fire
2003 Station Night Club
Part 3
German Coast Guard
Rescue Task Force
Rescue Task Force Concept
 4 patrol officers for
front and rear security
 Readily available
resource
 Do NOT assist medics in
care
 Responsible for security
only
 2 back-step fire fighters
in ballistic gear with
TECC supplies
 Readily available
resource
 Able to initiate TECC care
and rapidly evacuate
Rescue Task Force Concept
Rescue Task Force Concept
 Dual communications
 Police communicate with Tactical Police
Command
 Listen for information on
description/location/direction of shooter(s)
 Transmit above info or upon direct contact
 Fire fighters communicate with Fire/EMS
Command
 Location of injured and team
 Casualty information
Unified Command
 Must be established to deploy RTF
RTF Operations
 Contact Teams should communicate need for
RTF
 Initial RTF team formed and quickly moves
into area down the corridor cleared by the
contact teams
 Will not move into un-cleared areas or get in front
of contact teams
RTF Operations
 Goal of initial RTF team is to stabilize as
many victims as possible using TECC
principles
 Will penetrate into building as far as possible until
they run out of accessible victims or out of
supplies
 “Stabilize, position, and move on”
RTF Operations
RTF Operations
 Once RTF operational, Fire Command may
establish:
 RTF re-supply near point of entry
 External casualty collection point
RTF Operations
 Once the first RTF runs out of supplies or all
accessible patients have been treated, they
grab a victim and evacuate out
RTF Operations
 RTF teams continue to operate in the
corridors cleared by the contact teams until
all patients evacuated
Personal Protective
Equipment
Plate Carrier
 S&S Precision Plate Frame
 LTC Level III Single Curve




Ballistic Plate X2
Nylon Pouch x2:
Made from ballistic nylon
Top pouch hold 4 MET
Tourniquets
Bottom pouch holds 2 of the
following:








• Celox gauze
• H-Bandage
• 3.5in. 14ga. Needle
• Elastic bandage
• Halo chest seal
• NP airway
• Chem Lights, Blue
• Compressed gauze
Helmet
 Weight is 2.3 to 2.7
pounds.
 One large and one
medium in each bag.
 Meets or exceeds the
NIJ Level IIIA
RTF Bag










5 tourniquets
5 Chest Seals
5 H-bandages
5 Celox
5 Compressed gauze
5 14ga. Needles
5 Ace Bandages
5 NP airways
5 Chemlights
1 GrabStrap
GrabStrap
Equipment and Supplies
High Threat Response Program
High Threat
Response
Active Shooter /
Rescue Task
Force
Fire as a
Weapon
Explosive
HTF Program Director
Deputy Chief
Snider
Medical Director
Dr. Smith
HTR Program Manager
Captain II Delaney
Training
Lt. Dreher
Equipment /Inventory
FF Iselin
Research
FF Stamps
Outreach and Intelligence
FF Hiner
Research
EVENT LOCATION
Education
17%
Hospital
1%
Mercantile
20%
Business Office
18%
Residential
26%
Place of Worship
3%
Government
12%
Various Locations
3%
22-Jan-73
8-Jul-03
NUMBER KILLED
14-Feb-08
WOUNDED
22-Jul-15
1-Jan-15
1-Dec-14
24-Oct-14
18-Sep-14
28-Aug-14
25-Aug-14
29-Jul-14
9-Jul-14
17-Jan-14
Colum
16-Sep-13
20-Jun-13
21-Apr-13
Ft.
13-Mar-13
San
Ysidro
15-Dec-12
60
27-Sep-12
20-Jul-12
22-Feb-12
6-Sep-11
3-Aug-10
Va.
29-Nov-09
1-Jun-09
3-Apr-09
10-Mar-09
Thurst
5-Dec-07
16-Apr-07
2-Oct-06
25-Mar-06
21-Mar-05
24-Feb-05
20
5-Feb-01
Fairchi
30-Dec-99
29-Jul-99
21-May-98
6-Mar-98
15-Sep-97
3-Apr-95
Lubys
14-Dec-93
6-Aug-93
8-Jan-93
11-May-92
30
1-Nov-91
18-Jun-90
17-Jan-89
40
23-Apr-87
50
18-Jul-84
20-Aug-82
70
Trending Casualty Data
Auror
Stockt
New
Navy
10
0
Average Casualty per Event
5.57 Wounded
6.63 Killed…
High Threat Bulletins
With Our Powers Combined
Lessons Learned
 LE--Concentrate on boots on the ground
 FD – Concentrate at the Command level
 Understand that it will not be perfect over
night
 Use familiar equipment
 Use and learn from others
 Train with other jurisdictions and agencies
Key Variable
 Leadership and Leading up
Questions and Informational
Requests
 Corporal Scott Wanek
 Captain II John Delaney
 Arlington Police
Department
 Arlington Fire
Department
 Swanek@arlingtonva.
us
 [email protected]