March, 2017
Journal of Resources and Ecology
Vol. 8 No.2
J. Resour. Ecol. 2017 8(2) 129-140
DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2017.02.003
www.jorae.cn
Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological
Compensation Mechanisms for Transboundary Rivers
HAN Ze1,2, SONG Wei1,*, DENG Xiangzheng1,3
1. Key Laboratory of Land Surface Pattern and Simulation, Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;
2. School of Information Engineering, China University of Geosciences, Beijing 100083, China;
3. Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China
Abstract: Transboundary rivers have important geopolitical and geo-economic connotations, but riparian states of
transboundary rivers are often driven by their own rapid population growth and economic development to become
involved in regional conflicts about the development and use of water resources. Therefore, finding a balance between the need for fair and reasonable development of water resources and the effective protection of environment
from an ecological perspective has become a major problem faced by the international community. This paper begins with consideration of international water laws related to transboundary rivers and then reviews advances in the
research on benefit-sharing, ecological compensation mechanisms, and adaptive management systems. We believe that existing international water laws form a complete legal system and that more attention needs to be paid to
transboundary cooperation and sustainable water resource use. With respect to how transboundary water conflicts
are resolved, there is a trend to move away from single water resource allocation (a zero-sum game) to benefit-sharing in order to achieve a win-win situation for riparian states, but there are still some difficulties in transboundary ecological compensation. In China, the central government has paid attention to horizontal ecological
compensation between upstream and downstream, offering guidance to promote establishment of inter-province
ecological compensation. Based on existing practice, horizontal ecological compensations are still in their infancy,
small in scale, supported by a weak legal system, lacking market mechanisms to encourage their use and relying
on fiscal transfers as the method of payment. In the future, China will need to intensify its research on legal system
development, international cooperation, and benefit-sharing as these impact transboundary water resources. Because government can be seen as a management department with multiple identities (enabler, regulator and buyer),
to improve adaptive transboundary ecological compensation mechanisms, government must develop as soon as
possible data sharing platforms, standards of water consumption behaviors and intergovernmental policies (or ordinances).
Key words: transboundary rivers; water resources; ecological compensation; benefit sharing
1
Introduction
Water is the source of all life and the core of the sustainable
development of resources. Explosive population growth,
rapid economic development, and urbanization (Song and
Deng, 2015; Song et al., 2015a; Song et al., 2015b; Tan et al.,
2008) have led to a number of environmental problems such
as water pollution, water shortages, and groundwater recession. These problems not only threaten the sustainable
development of water resources (Deng et al., 2016; Deng
and Zhao, 2015; Du and Lu, 2012; Fang et al., 2016; Wang
Received: 2016-11-02 Accepted: 2107-01-22
Foundation: The Projects of National Natural Science Foundation of China (71561137002, 41671177 and 41501192), National Key Basic Research and
Development Plan of China (2015CB452702) and National Key Research and Development Plan of China (2016YFA0602402).
*Corresponding author: SONG Wei, E-mail: [email protected]
Citation: HAN Ze, SONG Wei, DENG Xiangzheng. 2017. Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological Compensation Mechanisms for
Transboundary Rivers. Journal of Resources and Ecology. 8(2): 129–140.
130
et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2012), but also the
survival of mankind (Kong, 2014; Wu et al., 2016). According to estimates in the United Nations World Water Resources Development Report (2015), the number of people
living in regions and countries with extreme water scarcity
will reach 1.8 billion by 2025, and in some arid and
semi-arid regions, water shortages will compel 24 to 700
million people to leave their homes. It is therefore obvious
that water shortages have become a global challenge and
require the development of effective countermeasures.
Transboundary rivers flow through or form the boundaries between two or more countries. From a legal point of
view, riparian countries through which an international river
flows do not have the authority to manage the river
throughout its length (Kliot et al., 2001). Hence, people are
often concerned about whether the water resources can be
shared fairly (Sneddon and Fox, 2006) to avoid conflicts.
However, special geopolitical and economic connotations of
transboundary rivers imply challenges in terms of management (Sun and He, 2011). First, transboundary rivers have
many stakeholders with different management scopes, and
subject to different policy regimes, development levels and
economic standards. Second, to ensure that management
mechanisms are practical, the management of transboundary
rivers should also consider resource sovereignty, international relations, border management, and development and
stability of transboundary ethnic communities. In addition,
transboundary rivers usually provide a wide range of ecological services and functions, such as the supply of irrigation and drinking water, fishing areas and shipping channels,
hydroelectric power generation potential, landscape aesthetic, and opportunities to develop tourism (Jagerskog et al.,
2007; Jo et al., 1997). However, it is usually difficult to
consider the variety of ecological services and functions
when setting management goals.
Many international rivers on the Asian continent have
their sources in China; the country shares about 40 transboundary rivers with 14 adjacent countries. The development, use, and protection of transboundary water resources
accounts for the welfare of more than 3 billion people, as
well as creating opportunities for both economic development and problems for the environment and health (Arjoon
et al., 2016; He et al., 2014). In recent years, China, as an
upstream country, has been using water resources in cooperation with downstream countries, such as Vietnam, Laos
and Burma etc. (Chen et al., 2013; Lee, 2015; Wouters,
2014; Wouters and Chen, 2013) and has signed a number of
water use agreements for many international rivers (Li,
2014). These agreements include the Cooperation Agreement on the Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers
and the Water Quality Protection Agreement on Transboundary Rivers signed by China and Kazakhstan, the
Agreement on the Protection and Utilization of Transboundary Waters signed by China and Mongolia, and the
Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol. 8 No. 2, 2017
Agreement on the Rational Utilization and Protection of
Transboundary Waters signed by China and Russia. However, the development level and political and economic
strengths of different countries are not balanced, thus making transboundary management more complex than that
within the same administrative system and jurisdiction. Besides, there is still considerable competition for the use of
resources and this aggravates conflicts between neighboring
countries. Therefore, using the “natural link”, that is, the
rivers themselves, to solve the “unfair” profit and loss of
transboundary ecology is a necessary way to realize interregional ecological security and alleviate water resource conflicts.
Ecosystem services will be at the core of benefit-sharing
in the future for the riparian countries of transboundary rivers. On the one hand, ecosystem services are the foundation
of cooperation and benefit-sharing between riparian countries (Jagerskog et al., 2007). In order to meet the growing
demand for water, the United Nations Water Channel
(UNWC) conference clearly pointed out that riparian states
of transboundary rivers shall have the obligation of ecological protection in the process of developing and using
water resources (McIntyre, 2015). On the other hand, the
environmental benefits resulting from cooperation and
benefit-sharing may promote regional sustainable development. Therefore, solving the imbalance between the fair and
reasonable development of water resources and the effective
protection of ecological environment have become major
problems facing the international community. Currently,
China has accumulated a certain amount of ecological compensation cases concerning the protection of river ecosystems. However, in terms of study areas, these cases are mainly focused on longitudinal ecological compensation and
lack relevant research on benefit-sharing of horizontal transboundary rivers and adaptive ecological compensation
mechanisms. In this paper, after taking into consideration
international water laws related to transboundary rivers, we
review the advances in benefit-sharing, ecological compensation mechanisms, and adaptive management systems for
transboundary rivers, with the aim to provide a reference for
ecological compensation mechanisms for transboundary
rivers.
2
Related international laws for
transboundary rivers
As an awareness of the relationship between humans and
the environment has increased, the development and use of
rivers have gone through three successive stages. These are
the primary use of living/non-living resources, the development of water resources, and development with restrictions imposed to protect the environment. International laws,
rules, regulations, and institutions can help to coordinate the
relationships of various countries with respect to the development, use, and protection of international water bodies
HAN Ze, et al.: Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological Compensation Mechanisms for Transboundary Rivers
(Gao, 2008). A study of the historical record shows that,
since the 19th century, 286 international conventions on
transboundary water resources use have been established
and most of these are concentrated in Europe and North
America (Kliot et al., 2001). Among these, the Helsinki
Rules, drafted by the International Law Association in 1996
(ILA, 1966), and the Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, approved
by the United Nations in 1997 (McCaffrey, 1998), are two
important examples (Kliot, 2001).
From the early 19th century to the middle of the 20th
century, international water laws were based mainly on the
freedom of navigation principle and the harmless use law
(Gao, 2008). For example, in 1815, the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna specified a freedom of navigation regime for the Rhine River from the navigable starting point
to the estuary. Since then, the Freedom of Navigation Principles in 1887, the International Convention and Statute
Concerning the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern in 1921, the Regulation Governing Navigation on International Rivers in 1934, and the Convention
Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube in 1948
all have clauses concerning the freedom of navigation. In
terms of environmental protection, rapid industrialization
after the Second World War has resulted in a set of problems
such as water pollution and inter-basin water diversion (Gao,
2008). As a consequence, some conventions have begun to
pay close attention to problems related to water resource use
of international rivers as well as ecological profit and loss,
with additional clauses about harmless use.
In 1966, the International Law Association issued the
Helsinki Rules, which set the first comprehensive international standard to regulate the use of transboundary rivers
and their underground aquifers (Cooley et al., 2009; Salman,
2007). The Helsinki Rules not only include relevant clauses
about freedom of navigation and harmless use, but also add
some new clauses concerning fair and reasonable use and
general cooperation obligations. These rules have helped to
set global guidelines and have been very influential; however, since they are not legally binding, there are no specific
enforcement mechanisms. The appearance of the Helsinki
Rules set the stage for other agreements to follow, including
the Treaty of the River Plate Basin (1969), the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement (1972), and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (1978). Since the 1990s, rapid population growth
and urbanization have led to environmental problems such
as water shortages and water pollution, arousing the concern
of the international community. During this period, rules
governing the sustainable use of water resources have been
incorporated into the provisions of a number of international
agreements concerning water, including the Convention on
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes (1992), Convention on Cooperation for
131
the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River
(1995), and Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (1995).
In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (hereinafter the Watercourses
Convention). This sets out comprehensive principles, mechanisms, and management systems for the non-navigational
use of international waterways and is considered a multilateral framework for regulating the use of transboundary
freshwater resources. However, the convention has some
shortcomings. For example, there are internal conflicts between the clauses concerning “reasonable and fair use of
water resources “and” the obligations of not causing obvious damage to others” (Cooley et al., 2009). In 2004 the
Berlin Rules on Water Resources further developed rules for
the utilization of transboundary rivers with respect to individual water use rights, environment flows, and impact assessments. The Berlin Rules are based on the Helsinki Rules
and the Watercourses Convention. After being promoted by
the international community for 17 years, in 2014 the Watercourses Convention entered into force and attained binding treaty status (Li, 2014).
The development of international water law over a number of years has resulted in the gradual establishment of a
basic framework for the distribution of transboundary river
water resources. Included in this framework are items concerning freedom of navigation, fair and reasonable use, obligations to avoid significant harm, obligations for general
cooperation, obligations to exchange information and data,
and obligations to maintain and protect water resources and
the ecological system (Feng et al., 2006; Kliot et al., 2001).
Kliot et al. (2001) summarized the theoretical principles of
international laws for the allocation of water resources from
the perspective of the transboundary water resources utilization theories, of which there are four types: Haman’s absolute territorial sovereignty theory, absolute territorial integrity theory, limited territorial sovereignty theory, and coastal
state community theory. With respect to the allocation of
transboundary water resources, upstream and downstream
countries often have different ideas and adhere to different
principles. Upstream countries generally advocate the absolute territorial sovereignty theory. They consider that they
have absolute rights to dominate the river crossing their
territory and that other countries have no right to interfere.
By contrast, the downstream countries advocate the absolute
territorial integrity theory. They consider that water resources are an integral part of their territory and that any
form of damage to those resources is an infringement of
their sovereignty (Gao, 2009; Kliot et al., 2001). At the end
of the 18th century, the emergence of the limited territorial
sovereignty theory reconciled these two completely opposite
theories. It emphasized that riparian states have equal rights
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Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol. 8 No. 2, 2017
Table 1 Basic principles of some important water laws
Year
Laws and Regulations
Navigation
freedom
No significant
harm
1815
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna
✔
1887
Freedom of Navigation Principles
✔
1911
International Regulations regarding the
Use of International Watercourses for
Purposes other than Navigation
1921
International Convention and Statute
Concerning the Regime of Navigable
Waterways of International Concern
1923
The Convention relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting
More than One State
✔
1933
Declaration on the Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers
✔
1934
Regulation governing Navigation on International Rivers
✔
1948
Convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube
✔
1961
Resolution on the Use of International
Non-Maritime Water
1963
Act regarding the navigation and economic co-operation between the States
of the River Niger basin
✔
✔
1966
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
Waters of International Rivers
✔
✔
1969
Treaty of the River Plate Basin
1972
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
1992
The Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes
1994
Equitable and
reasonable utilization
✔
General obligation
to cooperation
Sustainable
development
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
Convention on Cooperation for the
Protection and Sustainable Use of the
Danube River
✔
✔
1995
Agreement on the Cooperation for the
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin
✔
✔
1997
Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses
✔
✔
✔
1998
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine
✔
2004
The Berlin Rules on Water Resources
✔
with respect to the utilization of water resources and proposed that one riparian country should avoid significant
damage to relevant rights of other countries when it used and
developed transboundary rivers in order to realize a positivesum result instead of engaging in a zero-sum game. In the early 20th century, the riparian state community theory appeared, arguing that riparian states should form economic communities and cooperate to exploit and use of transboundary water resources (Bai, 2013). The basic principles of international water laws and the evolution ideas concerning
water resources sovereignty illustrate that sustainable development and international cooperation are important trends.
✔
3
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
Benefit-sharing of transboundary rivers
and international cooperation
Water rights are an important part of national sovereignty
and are often at the heart of conflicts and disputes. The allocation of water rights between riparian countries has always raised complex and difficult questions and thinking
about these questions has moved from early absolute sovereignty principles (including the absolute territorial sovereignty theory and the absolute territorial integrity theory) to
the limited territorial sovereignty theory and to the riparian
state community theory (Yang and Shen, 2009). The tradi-
HAN Ze, et al.: Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological Compensation Mechanisms for Transboundary Rivers
tional allocation of water resources ensures that water rights
of transboundary rivers are assigned based on hydrology,
climate and ecological characteristics, actual water demand,
and social development factors such as basin population and
economic level. However, cases of existing practices indicate that this allocation mode has certain limitations (Palesa
and Mokorosi, 2007).
A simple or single division of water resources may result
in a zero-sum result. In contrast, benefit-sharing deals for
the utilization of water resources that take into consideration
economic, policy and environmental concerns, and are focused on the efficient use of water resources by the riparian
states of transboundary rivers can bypass the complex problems produced by water rights disputes and achieve positive-sum results (Arjoon et al., 2016; He et al., 2014; Lee,
2015; Qaddumi, 2008; Skinner et al., 2009; Suhardiman et
al., 2014). Sadoff and Grey (2002) defined benefit-sharing
as a kind of bilateral cooperation behavior to alter the allocation of costs and benefits. From the perspective of environmental economy externalities, the utilization of water
resources in the river basin (such as hydroelectric developments, water source protection, etc.) is bound to produce
positive or negative externalities. If this external economy
has not been internalized in the basin, it will reduce the
benefits and output of the whole basin (Qaddumi, 2008).
Therefore, benefit-sharing is not only an effective way of
relieving the conflicts over the use of transboundary water
resources (Bhaduri and Liebe, 2013; Lee, 2015; McIntyre,
2015; Qaddumi, 2008; Skinner et al., 2009; Suhardiman et
al., 2014), it is also a basic principle of water resources cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2005).
The main goals of building a benefit-sharing mechanism
are to endow the regions with monetary or non-monetary
means to provide welfare to various groups and thus reduce
poverty through sustainable development (Institute and Euroconsult, 2000), and also to strengthen the relationship
between the social economy and the ecological environment.
Many scholars have analyzed the possible benefits of water
resources cooperation, including environmental benefits,
economic benefits, benefits to regional integration, increased trade, reductions in military spending, and so on
(Klaphake, 2005; Sadoff and Grey, 2005; Suhardiman et al.,
2014; Teasley and McKinney, 2011; Tilmant and Kinzelbach, 2012). Sadoff and Grey (2002) classified the possible
benefits into three types: safety benefits, environmental
benefits, and economic benefits. For example, the cooperation and benefit-sharing between riparian countries of
transboundary rivers can directly affect the hydrological
characteristics of a river, including reducing the risk of
flooding, increasing surface runoff, etc., and thus promotes
the construction of hydroelectric projects. All of these
changes significantly affect the development of regional
economies (Qaddumi, 2008). Using static game and numerical analysis methodologies, Bhaduri and Liebe (2013)
133
analyzed the case of water resources sharing in the Walter
River basin, located between Burkina Faso and Ghana in
Africa, and determined that Burkina Faso could limit water
consumption of upstream hydropower stations by using
discounted hydropower as compensation, thereby increasing
water resources for agricultural use in Ghana.
In terms of efficiency analysis, current studies focus maInly on economic benefits by using the hydrologic-economic
model (Arjoon et al., 2014; Arjoon et al., 2016; Jeuland et
al., 2014; Teasley and McKinney, 2011; Tilmant and Kinzelbach, 2012). For example, in order to understand how net
benefits from the eastern Nile valley are maximized, Arjoon
et al. (2016) evaluated the hydrological and economic risks
faced by agricultural and hydropower sectors of Sudan and
Egypt, using the stochastic dual dynamic programming
(SDDP) model. Similarly, Jeuland et al. (2014) assessed the
economic benefits brought by infrastructure development
and operations, using hydro-economic optimization models.
Benefit-sharing mechanisms can take many forms, including monetary and non-monetary forms, and can consist of
revenue sharing, development funds, interest sharing, tax
preferences, and so on (Fan, 2010).
Refining the understanding of “fairness” and precisely
defining “benefit allocation” for riparian states are major
challenges for establishing benefit-sharing mechanisms in
the future (Klaphake, 2005). Benefit-sharing mechanisms
for transboundary rivers should also consider factors such as
policy, economics, and systems; for example, regulations
from international conventions, maintenance of human wellbeing in upstream and downstream countries, protection of
land productivity, migration of ecological products in land
and aquatic ecosystems, and the recoverability of ecological
systems from natural or manmade disturbances (Palesa and
Mokorosi, 2007).
4
Ecological compensation mechanism for
transboundary rivers
Ecological environmental services are the core of benefitsharing for the riparian states of transboundary rivers. Ecological compensation, which is considered in international
water agreements such as the Helsinki Rules and the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses is an important method of alleviating
water resources conflicts and protecting transboundary river
ecosystems. The rules contained in these conventions provide guidelines for the riparian states of transboundary rivers to establish ecological compensation mechanisms. As an
institutional arrangement, ecological compensation is mainly a transparent system that offers conditional payments to
resource providers for their environmental gain services and
focuses on achieving the goal of ecological environmental
protection by incentives (Yuan and Zhou, 2014). Therefore,
the use of ecological compensation to stimulate ecological
134
Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol. 8 No. 2, 2017
Fig.1 Basic framework of ecological compensation
environmental protection behaviors for the use of transboundary river resources can well make up for the unfairness between the rights and obligations of the riparian states
(Huang and Zheng, 2012). In general, the establishment of
ecological compensation mechanisms consists of stakeholder analysis, formulation of ecological compensation standards, and confirmation of ecological compensation modes.
4.1
Stakeholder identification and interest analysis
The term “stakeholder” first appeared in the book Strategic
Management: A Stakeholder Approach, first published by
Freeman in 1984 (Freeman, 2010). He considers stakeholders to be any group or individuals that can affect or be
affected by the realization of organizational goals. With respect to transboundary ecological compensation, internalizing the externalities of the ecosystem environment and further realizing the coordinated development of the ecological
environment and the social economy are the core goals of
compensation mechanism construction. In the process of
compensation mechanism construction, riparian governments, environmental saboteurs and polluters, downstream
beneficiaries and victims, and other direct or indirect stakeholders will all affect the realization of the goal. Meissner
(2005) stated that the role of different interest groups in the
formulation of transboundary water policy should not be
ignored. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and define the
interested subjects at different levels in ecological compensation and differentiate their respective interest relationships
(Hua et al., 2016; Huffman, 2009). Previous studies have
shown that unreasonable definitions of stakeholder subjects
can cause a variety of problems, such as unitary ecological
compensation subjects and incomplete compensation objects, and thus encourage “free rider” behavior and “government failure” phenomena, finally leading to an imbalanced allocation of rights and obligations that is not conducive to the realization of environmental justice (Sun and He,
2011).
Stakeholders that participate in an ecological compensation process are rational entities that can rationally make
choices regarding their behaviors by judging their own interest goals and welfare situations in order to maximize their
interests (Wang et al., 2015). From the perspective of the
relationship between ecological environmental protection
behavior and characteristics of its effect on the environment,
ecological compensation includes not only those who protect and those who benefit from the ecological environment,
but also environmental saboteurs and victims (Ma and Chen,
2014) (Figure 2). For transboundary rivers, consideration of
the entire basin should be used to identify stakeholders.
Meissner (2005) used an assessment of organizational forms
to divide the stakeholders in transboundary river basins into
several categories: disorganized individuals, ethnic groups,
consumer groups, social organizations, and government departments. The China Council for International Co-operation on Environment and Development (Jia and Gao, 2015)
considers that the objects of ecological compensation should
be the regions that contribute to the sustainable use of water
resources, e.g. by implementing ecological protections for
water resources. These are usually the upstream regions of
the basin. Wang et al. (2007a) argued that the subjects of
ecological compensation should be downstream water-consuming residents, all enterprises and institutions, tourists,
and all districts in the basin, while the objects should be
migrant farmers and the shut-down enterprises that have
sacrificed their interests to protect and restore the ecological
environment.
Currently, the methods used to identify stakeholders are
not fixed for transboundary river watersheds. Zhang et.al
(2010) think that there are three kinds of river basin ecological compensation stakeholders: (1) owners of river basin
resources, (2) developers and users of river basin resources,
and (3) managers of river basin resources. Zhang and Michael (2011) supposed that clearly delineated administrative
rights and responsibilities should be anticipated, and the
identification of stakeholders needs to be done outside the
eco-compensation regulatory framework. There are some
cases in which regions have chosen the flux of pollutants as
a tool to identify the stakeholders (Jiang and Ke, 2016).
4.2
Ecological compensation standard
The beneficiaries of ecological compensation in transbou-
Fig.2 Relationship between ecological compensation stakeholders and environmental protection behaviors
HAN Ze, et al.: Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological Compensation Mechanisms for Transboundary Rivers
ndary river cases generally have demands of one of two types: first, for good water quality and quantity and second,
for water-related ecosystem services. Moreover, transboundary ecological compensation patterns can be divided into
pollution-based compensation and protection-based compensation (Yu, 2011). On the whole, the methods for determining transboundary river ecological compensation standards are as follows:
(1) An accounting method based on the flux of pollutants.
This method has been used in some ecological compensation pilot projects for trans-provincial watersheds (Chen,
2012; Yu, 2011), such as Taihu Lake basin of Jiangsu Province, Ziya River of Hebei Province, Liaohe River basin of
Liaoning Province, and the Shayinghe River basin of Henan
Province. To calculate the amount of compensation by this
method, a data acquisition platform that has real-time monitoring and can simulate the flow and concentration of major
pollutants of the transboundary section or the transboundary
drainage basin is necessary. The main idea of this method is
to combine the monitoring data with the cost of controlling
water pollution in order to fulfill a clear water environmental responsibility.
(2) An accounting method based on the value of ecological system services and the cost of ecological protection. At
present, there are two ideas concerning the assessment of
value: one is to assess the value of ecosystem service functions and the other is to assess the loss of ecological and
environmental value. The former determines an ecological
compensation standard based on the original or corrected
values of ecosystem service functions. By contrast, the latter
includes such methods as the opportunity cost method, the
willingness-to-pay method, the contingent valuation method,
and Pareto optimality; and thus is more practicable than the
former. In theory, the standard of ecological compensation
should between in the value of the ecological service function and opportunity cost for ecological conservation.
However, the result obtained by the algorithm is close to the
opportunity cost, thus leading to inadequate compensation.
Van Hecken et al. (2012) evaluated the willingness-to-pay
(WTP) of downstream users when land owners of the upstream watershed improved water quality. As demonstrated
by the comparison results, the WTP method is significantly
affected by regional differences in the calculation process,
which can lead to large differences in the compensation results arrived at by upstream and downstream entities. In
contrast, the contingent valuation method integrates factors
such as the ability of stakeholders to pay and the cost together on the basis of the WTP method and therefore obtains
more reliable compensation standards, which usually appears as the lower limit of the compensation standard.
Compared with formulating standards for ordinary rivers,
the formulation of ecological compensation standards for
transboundary rivers (or trans-provincial boundary rivers)
involves more influencing factors, especially political crite-
135
ria, that complicate the formulation of ecological compensation standards. In practice, ecological compensation is calculated through negotiations and game playing based on
estimates from the valuation methods noted above (Bennett
et al., 2010).
4.3
Ecological compensation mode
Ecological compensation forms are becoming more and
more diversified. They include fund compensation, material
compensation, policy compensation, and intellectual compensation (Bennett et al., 2010). There are many different
classifications based on their defining characteristics (Xie et
al., 2012). According to the implementing body or operating
mechanism used, ecological compensation is generally
categorized as either government compensation or as market-based compensation (Table 2). Government compensation can be broken down into vertical and horizontal forms
of compensation. The typical market-based compensation
mechanism includes the trading of water rights, and development in different places that can encourage the individuals to develop economy in other suitable places by means of
compensation (Jiang and Ke, 2016; Bennett et al., 2010).
Concerning ecological compensation in transboundary
river cases, the choice of the form of ecological compensation is not only the result of the negotiations and gameplaying between the governments on the upper and lower
reaches of the river, the characteristics of the different compensation forms also need to be considered. Financial transfers use administrative actions by government to force beneficiaries to pay compensation (Zhang, 2012). Vertical transfer payments are often used for small and independent
watersheds that belong to the higher administrative level
(Wang, 2013). Currently, many trans-provincial boundary
rivers in China, such as the Dongjiang River basin of Jiangxi Province, have chosen national fiscal transfers as their
main source of compensation. In contrast, horizontal ecocompensation is more suitable for governments that are at
the same administrative level. The ecological compensation
scheme for the Elbe River watershed in Germany is a good
example. In addition, in the case of some special ecological
protection watersheds, multi-party financing led by government and special compensation funds are also an important funding source and play an important role in some cases;
the Quito Water Fund (FONAG) in Ecuador is an example
of this.
In most ecological compensation cases, the implementing
bodies are usually a mixture of both government and market-based entities. Therefore, market-based transactions are
essential. For instance, ecological compensation in New
York’s Catskill/Delaware watershed chose public payment
led by government as the funding source. There are three
parts to this funding: additional taxes imposed on water users by the government, New York municipal bonds, and
trust fund (Gao and Yang, 2006). In recent years, China has
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Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol. 8 No. 2, 2017
Table 2 The main forms of eco-compensation for cross-boundary rivers (or watersheds)
Operating
mechanism used
Government
modes
The characterizes of
applicable objects
Cases
Horizontal
eco-compensation
Governments at the same level
Germany: the Elbe river ecological compensation policy
Guangdong and Jiangxi Province: ecological compensation in
Dongjiang river basin
Vertical
eco-compensation
Government(s) in a superiorsubordinate relationship
Jiangxi Province: ecological compensation in Dongjiang river
basin (Fiscal transfer payment)
Special funds
Special ecological protection in
River Basin
Ecuador: The Quito Water Fund (FONAG);
Fujian: ecological compensation in Minjiang, nine Longjiang and
Jinjiang basin
Ecological tax/Sewage
charges
Market
Germany and Australia: using ecological taxes, environmental
taxes and other measures to control the excessive utilization of
natural resources;
Germany: the Elbe river ecological compensation policy;
U.S.: New York's Catskill/Delaware watershed;
Trading water rights
development in different places
Zhejiang: Dongyang, Yiwu cities water right transfer;
The economic level of the indemnified party is relatively low
developed some innovate measures, such as water rights
trading and development in different places to implement
pilot projects for transboundary ecological compensation.
For example, water-rich Dongyang City permanently transferred its use of Hengjin reservoir to the water-poor Yiwu
City (Shen, 2005).
4.4
Adaptive management countermeasures
Adaptive management is a powerful tool to manage dynamic systems characterized by uncertainty (Stankey et al.,
2005). The tool achieves an optimal management effect by
utilizing scientific identification management to reduce the
uncertainty caused by factors such as natural change, random behavior of systems, lack of data, and impacts of human society changes on natural resources (Gunderson, 1999;
Walters, 1986). Operating in the context of dynamic and
complex social–ecological systems, adaptive decisionmaking for sustainable resource management needs to be
carried out in a PES program (Salafsky et al. 2002). The
adaptive management of ecological compensation draws on
knowledge and experience from past failures and successes
and then applies these to a management process aimed at
developing a tight feedback loop between ecosystem change
and decision makers (Allen et al. 2011, Westgate et al. 2013).
Folke et al. (1998) think that successful adaptive approaches
for ecosystem management in conditions of uncertainty
need to (1) build knowledge and understanding of resource
and ecosystem dynamics, (2) develop practices that interpret
and respond to ecological feedback, and (3) support flexible
institutions and organizations and adaptive management processes. On the whole, in terms of policy choices generated
by an adaptive management process, the standards for and
modes of ecological compensation are dynamic, requiring a
continuous loop for program design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and redesign in response to real-world
Zhejiang: Ecological compensation in Jinhua River Basin;
events and stakeholder feedback (Sims et al., 2014).
Phughes et al. (2007) developed an adaptive system for
the management of ecological conditions in the Great Barrier Reef and in Colorado. Their efforts involved multi-level
government-public cooperation that made important contributions to solving environmental problems and restoring
regional ecological stability. Targeting a series of downstream ecological problems caused by the establishment of
the Colorado Canyon Dam, the United States conducted
adaptive management research on ecological restoration and
made great progress in terms of improving water quality,
wetland restoration, and reasonable water resource use
(Williams, 2011). Considering the high complexity and unpredictability of ecological systems and the limitations of
human cognition, Ge (2013) proposed an adaptive management mode for ecological protection of the downstream dam
based on the ecology-hydrology response mechanism and
carried out an onsite analysis at the Xiaolangdi Reservoir,
finally developing an adaptive management theory and a
system for ecological protection of the downstream dam
suitable for the situation in China. Wang et al. (2007b) proposed the basic concepts for adaptive regional ecological system management, built the theoretical framework, and put
forward the specific adaptive management methods and modes.
When designing an adaptive management system for
ecological compensation, there are several key questions
that need to be answered. These include what the aims of
the adaptive management are, what has been achieved, what
has been learnt, how has the learning taken place and what
modes of learning have been used (Fabricius and Cundill,
2014). Furthermore, several key positive factors can facilitate the implementation of adaptive management (Sims
et al., 2014), such as the policy environment, the availability
of high quality data, adequate technical capacity, and stakeholder participation in the design and implementation proc-
HAN Ze, et al.: Progress in the Research on Benefit-sharing and Ecological Compensation Mechanisms for Transboundary Rivers
ess. A number of factors can present obstacles to adaptive
management, including situations in which there is high
organizational resistance, system boundaries are unclear,
and the stakeholders are many (Allen et al., 2010; Fabricius
and Cundill, 2014).
5
Prospect
In order to alleviate conflicts over the use of water resources
of transboundary rivers, considerable research has been
conducted all over the world. Legislation, international cooperation, and benefit-sharing have been explored as means
to address conflicts. As water resource agreements and customary law have developed over time, clauses concerning
theories of sustainable development and benefit compensation principles have been incorporated into these agreements
and laws. At the same time, there has been an increased focus on international cooperation. In the case of China, the
concept of legislation concerning the use of transboundary
water resources is relatively weak, and there have few instances of international cooperation. In the future, China
will need to pay more attention to international cooperation
and formulate or sign bilateral or multilateral treaties/agreements based on principles including those of fair and reasonable use, the obligation to avoid significant harm, the
obligation for general cooperation, the obligation to exchange information and data, the obligation to maintain and
protect water resources and ecological systems, and benefit
compensation. These treaties or agreements can, on the one
hand, standardize the development and utilization of water
resources and, on the other hand, provide a basis for regional ecological compensation and benefit-sharing.
To reduce tension that can develop between water resources usage and socio-economic development, and to promote the coordinated development of the upper and lower
reaches of rivers, the use horizontal ecological compensation is imperative. Since 2012, the Chinese government
has introduced a series of policy initiatives. It has proposed
establishing horizontal ecological compensation between
upstream and downstream. Owing to the national policy,
some inter-provincial ecological compensation practices and
pilot projects have been undertaken, such as project for the
Xin’An River basin, the Dingjiang-Hanjiang River basin,
and the Jiuzhou River basin. It is obvious that the Chinese
government is paying considerable attention to horizontal
ecological compensation between upstream and downstream
and is offering guidance to promote the establishment of
inter-province ecological compensation. However, transboundary ecological compensation involves political, institutional, policy and economic issues, and it employs different
compensation types, targets, contents, and methods. Currently, for a number of reasons China’s use of transboundary
ecological compensation is still in its infancy. First, although quantitative research methods have been widely applied
to formulate compensation standards for ecological com-
137
pensation, comprehensive systems and compensation standards for transboundary problems are still lacking. This is
the case because the environmental background of transboundary resources is often not known nor are the environmental conditions of the whole river basin, especially the
outside part of his own country, known. Second, government compensation mechanisms are the most important
form of ecological compensation for trans-provincial watersheds in China, but in other countries, the role of public
payments is more important. Last, transboundary ecological
compensation needs a strategic, comprehensive, and longterm framework. Decision makers need an adaptive management scheme in place to ensure there is constant feedback from dynamic and complex social–ecological systems.
At present, the theoretical development of adaptive management concepts is well ahead of the application of adaptive
management practices to ecological compensation schemes.
As Scherr and Bennett (2011) tell us, the government
plays multiple roles in ecological compensation. The government should play an important role in schemes for watershed ecological conservation for the future, especially
schemes for transboundary rivers. First, as an enabler, the
government not only needs to consider the balance between
local economic development and ecological conservation,
but also the fairness of economic and ecological welfare
distribution between countries and regions on the upper and
lower reaches of the river. Sharing data that has consistent
quality and spatial-temporal matching is fundamental. Therefore, the government must expeditiously establish an inter-jurisdictional water environment dynamics monitoring
system that can help to effectively calculate compensation
amounts and evaluate the effects of ecological compensation.
Moreover, to meet and encourage market development, intergovernmental policies and ordinances concerning ecological compensation need to be formulated. Second, as a
buyer, government compensation mechanisms are the principal means of payments at the present time; however, relying on this financial channel alone puts added pressure on
the government. Based on the results of intergovernmental
negotiations and game-playing, multichannel financial mechanisms such as special watershed funds should also be set
up. Finally, as a regulator, government needs to establish
inter-regional standards of water consumption behavior. By
comparing water consumption behaviors with the inter-regional standards, the government can not only supervise the
protective and damaging behaviors of individuals but also
identify stakeholders effectively. This will help to effectivity
implement a transboundary ecological compensation.
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跨境河流的利益共享及生态补偿机制研究进展
韩赜 1,2，宋伟 1，邓祥征 1,3
1. 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，北京 100101；
2. 中国地质大学 信息工程学院，北京 100083；
3. 中国科学院农业政策研究中心，北京 100101
摘
要: 跨境河流具有重要的地缘政治和地缘经济内涵，但由于人口与经济的快速发展，跨境河流沿岸国常围绕水资源的开
发和利用引发地区矛盾。因此，如何从生态的视角解决水资源的公平合理地开发与有效保护生态环境之间的不平衡性成为国际社
会面临的主要问题。本文从跨境河流的相关国际水法出发，综述了利益共享、生态补偿机制以及适应性管理体系的研究进展。并
发现在法律制度上，国际水法已经形成了一套完整体系，并更加注重水资源的跨境合作与可持续利用；在解决跨境水资源冲突的
实践上，呈现从单一的水资源分配（零和结果）向利益共享转变的趋势，以期达到沿岸国多赢的目的，但跨境的生态补偿仍然存
在一定困难。在中国，上下游间的横向生态补偿已被中央政府高度重视，为建立省际之间的生态补偿机制提供了指导。从现有实
践来看，横向的生态补偿机制仍处于起步阶段，所实施范围小，法律制度薄弱，缺乏市场机制的动力并且依赖财政转移支付。未
来，中国应加强跨境水资源在法律制度、国际合作与利益共享方面的研究。由于政府在生态补偿的实践中兼具的多重身份（如推
动者，监管机构和买方），为了构建具有适应性管理的跨境生态补偿机制，政府应尽快完善在数据共享平台，水资源消耗标准及
相关政策和标准（或条例）等方面的建设。
关键词: 跨境河流；水资源；生态补偿；利益共享