Joint Crisis
Vietnam Divided
st
21 July 1954
South Vietnam
Introduction
Welcome, esteemed delegates. This committee has been convened on the 21 st day of
July, 1954, in order to determine the most appropriate future for your respective sides.
On this day, the Geneva Accords have been signed by all parties, and are being
implemented. The details of these agreements are provided below. Delegates are,
therefore, provided with the opportunity to solve this brutal conflict that has cost so
much in terms of lives, history, and kinship.
While both sides certainly consider themselves to be the rightful rulers of a unified
Vietnam, all present must remember one thing: their mission is to do what is best for the
people of their country. All sides must realize that the costs of this war are outweighed
by nothing, and that a unified, peaceful Vietnam is the ultimate goal. One must,
however, be realistic. In a time when propaganda messages, assassination attempts,
and political dissention are a regular fact of life, delegates cannot expect that this
committee will be easy. Nor will it be safe. Delegates must exercise constant vigilance,
and walk the fine line between trusting those in your room, and suspecting their
motives; for, no single delegate can create a unified Vietnam. Delegates must also bear
in mind that a true resolution to the crisis may, in fact, come from the other side of the
17th parallel. However, again, be vigilant. External pressures and civil paranoia may
cause members of both governments to act illogically.
You are tasked with creating a future for Vietnam. Protect your people. Weigh external
pressures against your own opinions. Fight the enemy, and prove to their people that
their leaders are misguided. But always remember: the one that plots your
assassination can be a General in the other room, or your own leader.
PART I: VIETNAM FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE
1.1 The Colonial Project
On the morning of September 1st, 1858, a French military officer landed on the
shore of the Port of Tourane, modern-day Da Nang, Vietnam, and laid a paper at the
entrance to the Fort de l’Aiguade. The paper contained a summons demanding that the
Vietnamese within the fort surrender themselves to a French naval flotilla assembled in
the bay outside the city. No response was received. Diplomacy having failed, the
French opened fire, and the fort—and the city—fell in short order.
The Siege of Tourane, as it became known, was the opening engagement in
what proved to be a nearly half-century long process of colonization and consolidation.
During the period from 1858 to 1895, France
slowly conquered, consolidated and subjugated
the territories of modern Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos, bringing an end to the independent rule of
the Vietnamese Nguyen dynasty and creating a
new colonial project known as French Indochina.
This process, which proceeded in a fragmented,
disjointed manner, produced an equally
fragmented, disjointed colony. These divisions
would find startling parallels in the breakup of the
country in the aftermath of the Second World
War.
The 1858 French attack on Vietnamese
soil did not lead to immediate colonial gains, but
a treaty affirming the rights of Vietnamese
Catholics. European missionaries had been
coming to the country for centuries, but rising
persecution by the Nguyen rulers chafed with the
imperial ambitions of French Emperor Napoleon
III. These ambitions were not checked by the
treaty of 1858: in 1862 the French demanded,
The progression of the French conquest of
and received, three provinces in the south of
Vietnam, with dates
Vietnam and access to ports in the central and
northern areas of the country. In 1867 the French established a “Protectorate” over
Cambodia, and between 1883 and 1888 they progressively annexed the remainder of
Vietnam, although the Nguyen remained as puppet rulers of Annam and Tonkin, the
central and northern regions. Cochinchina, formed chiefly from the three provinces
originally acquired in 1862, remained under direct French rule. Together, they
constituted French Indochina.
French rule in Vietnam, although undisputed internationally, faced early
challenges internally from the very beginning. The Vietnamese organized uprisings and
attacks on the colonial authorities from the start of colonial rule, and it was not until
1895 that the last defenders of independent Nguyen rule were defeated by French
forces. From that point on, anti-colonial movements conceived of an independent
Vietnam in ways that differed entirely from what had come before.
Nonetheless, the colonial project was
not endlessly disturbed by the spectre of
rebellion: the French embarked on an
ambitious project of modernization and
Francization. Known semi-officially as the
“Mission Civilizatrice,” it aimed to make
Vietnam essentially “French,” by introducing the
Latin alphabet in the place of Chinese
characters, educating in the French language,
spreading Catholicism and creating a modern
industrial economy. These ambitions, however
civilized in principle, were nevertheless pursued
in a classically colonial spirit, and amounted to
little more than the creation of a veneer of
The Opera House in colonial Saigon, one of
modern accoutrements—modern railways and
many manifestations of the French presence
bridges, monumental European architecture
that still exist today in the “Paris of the East”
and industrial plantations—overtop a
ramshackle regime of brutal exploitation and
racist inequality.
One of the many Vietnamese with whom this state of affairs sat none too kindly
would later be remembered as the face of the independence movement, and more
specifically of communist Vietnam. In 1919, when he famously tried to petition
American President Woodrow Wilson for the rights of the Vietnamese and colonized
peoples at the Paris Peace Conference, he was known as Nguyen Ai Quoc. Today, he
is better known as Ho Chi Minh. In the 1920s, Ho was one of many educated
Vietnamese at the forefront of a new anti-colonial movement, one that had more in
common with modern nationalism than the old, Confucian-inspired anti-colonialists who
had come before them. In the aftermath of the First World War, having fought for the
French empire abroad, many Vietnamese questioned their continued subjugation after
having shed blood for their colonial oppressors. Over the course of the 1920s, new
movements adopted radical platforms calling for the violent overthrow of the colonial
state, and the establishment of a new country. These movements were divided
between competing visions of what that new country would look like, most either taking
inspiration from the Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary principles as embodied by the
Nationalist movement of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, or from Vladimir Lenin’s philosophy
as manifested in the Soviet Union of Joseph Stalin. Some Vietnamese remained
content with the French, and others saw possibilities in working to reform the colonial
state from within, but they were an increasingly marginalized minority.
These moderate voices were steadily silenced by the turmoil of the 1930s, which
saw the outbreak of violence on a scale unmatched in preceding times. In 1929 and
1930, Nationalist Party-inspired revolutionaries tried to use the colonial militia to begin a
full-scale rebellion against the colonial state. The attempt failed spectacularly, and
prompted a bloody French crackdown that nearly eliminated the modern non-communist
nationalist movement. In 1930, a second, larger rebellion broke out in the peasant
villages of Vietnam. The communists quickly asserted leadership of the movement, and
the French once again moved swiftly and brutally to suppress the rebellion. They
bombed villages and arrested, tortured and executed scores of suspected and real
revolutionaries. These outbreaks of violence nearly destroyed even Ho Chi Minh’s
newly created Indochinese Community Party, and the man himself spent some time in a
Chinese prison.
However, although the most active remaining nationalists spent muc h of the rest
of the decade in prison, in exile or in silent protest, the embers of rebellion smouldered
on. It would not be long before they once again burst into flame.
1.2 The Coming of Independence
In September 1939, France and its colonial empire once again found themselves
entwined in war. Indochina was largely removed from the initial stages of the war, and
when France fell in June 1940 the local authorities quickly and quietly switched their
allegiance to the new Vichy government. This did little to deter the ambitions of another
imperial power, for when Japanese forces reached the northern border of Indochina
their nominal alliance with Vichy did not stop them from occupying the whole of the
colony. However, they left the French colonial government in place, which the
Vietnamese found out to their peril when a hastily-organized rebellion was put down
exactly as their predecessors had been.
Despite the repeated setbacks they had faced, the communist movement—led
by Ho Chi Minh—remained determined to realize independence. Realizing that the
Japanese were just as hostile to the idea of an independent Vietnam as the French, Ho
Chi Minh and his allies pushed for the adoption of a new anti-colonial strategy. In 1941,
they succeeded in convincing the remaining party members to found the Viet-Minh, an
ostensibly non-ideological movement dedicated to armed rebellion. Although the
movement had little success in fighting the Japanese, it swiftly built a wider popular
base than the Communist Party had ever done on its own, and asserted Ho Chi Minh’s
position as the leader of the dominant anti-colonial movement.
The end of the war provided the opportunity that the nationalists had been
looking for: in March 1945, with France liberated, the Japanese decided to do away with
the colonial government, dismantling the Vichy regime in Indochina and imprisoning its
police, soldiers and officials. When Japan surrendered in turn in August 1945, Vietnam
found itself without the means to enforce foreign rule for the first time in nearly 100
years. The Viet Minh stepped into the void, and quickly persuaded the nominal Nguyen
emperor, Bao Dai, to abdicate. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh read a statement
from the balcony of the Opera House in Saigon (pictured above) declaring Vietnam
independent.
This declaration, although momentous
in itself, did not signal anything lasting. British
forces, supporting the wishes of the newly-reestablished Paris government, arrived in turn
to occupy southern Vietnam in the name of
colonialism, while Chinese forces soon arrived
to occupy the north. As 1945 turned into 1946,
French forces and administrators arrived to try
to re-establish their own rule and to begin the
process of negotiating with the Viet Minh. The
discussions were uneasy from the start, and a
conference organized at Fontainebleau in
France in mid-1946 ended in failure. By the
end of 1946 both sides had largely abandoned
all pretense of negotiating, and full-fledged war
between the French and the Viet Minh seemed
inevitable.
Ho Chi Minh (centre) arriving in France for the
Fontainebleau Conference, July 1946.
Part II: The South
2.1 Political Disagreement Within South Vietnam
Politics in South Vietnam were
extremely fractured following the partition
of the North and the South on the 21st of
July, 1954. Even the partition itself was an
extremely divisive issue in the South, with
many supporters of former Emperor Bao
Dai (currently head of state) believing that
a partition and troop withdrawal strategy
was necessary, and supporters of Ngo
Dinh Diem [right] believing that a strong
military presence should remain a key part
of the state’s strategy to unify Vietnam
under Southern control.
This stark contrast of ideas played
itself out over many years in the south, and
Ngo Dinh Diem
only got worse as the government of Dai became less and
less functional. As the crisis continued, it seemed as though every citizen of South
Vietnam had a different idea about how the South should go about reunifying the
country. Political groups vying for power became increasingly common after the split of
the country, with policies and ideals varying wildly. Generally, citizens either supported
the government of Bao Dai, with its less aggressive stance towards retaking the north,
or Ngo Dinh Diem, with his very aggressive and militaristic strategy. These were by no
means, however, the only two schools of thought.
Particularly members of government, including those
present today, had strong views on how the South
should retake its lost land, who should lead the
government that carries out this strategy, and how a
new government of joint Vietnam should be
established.
Unfortunately, these differing views resulted
in extreme tactics and dissention within the State of
Vietnam. Citizens, especially government officials,
believed so strongly in their own ideas that coups,
assassination attempts, and indecisiveness were an
omnipresent reality. In many ways, these contrasting
views presented a greater challenge to the security
Bao Dai on the cover of TIME
magazine on the week of May 29 th,
1950.
of South Vietnam that any number of bullets from North Vietnamese guns. Power
struggles meant that the government of the State of Vietnam was cumbersome and
indecisive. For years government officials were too concerned with their own titles and
influence to even realize that such distractions were preventing South Vietnam from
realizing its full potential, and implementing strategies that would truly have chance of
reunifying Vietnam. For this was both governments’ (North and South) ultimate goal:
reunify the country under their control.
With the 21st of July presenting both governments with a very new opportunity for
reunification, delegates will have to play a very dangerous and difficult game. They must
try to the best of their ability to convince the others in the room that their strategies are
the best, while ensuring that others do not find them threatening or potentially
misguided, all while bearing in mind one thing: The unification of Vietnam under the
Southern flag is the ultimate goal, and nothing should get in the way of that.
2.2 Foreign Pressures
France
French occupation of Indochina has a long and tumultuous history. After the “Fall
of France” in World War II, there were strong sentiments within the country to bring
France back to its pre-World War glory. French leadership decided that this would be
best done by recapturing many colonies that were held but had since been lost – one of
which was Vietnam, or as it was then called, French Indochina [left]. However, when
France returned to its former colonies in Indochina, it was met with massive resistance
from Ho Chi Minh and the
Vietminh. Fighting for both
nationalistic
and
anticapitalist
reasons,
the
Vietminh were a ruthless and
extremely effective force
against the battered and warweary French troops.
By 1949 it was clear to
the French that their effort
reassert their influence was
unsuccessful,
so
they
changed gears from purely
violence to a combination of
war
and
politics. They
reinstalled Bao Dai as
Left: French Indochina , including Laos, Tonkin, Cambodia, Annam,
and Cochinchina.
Right: Modern-day South East Asia.
emperor, and recognized his reign over the entirety of Vietnam as the only legitimate
government. This was done in an attempt to show the Vietnamese citizens that the
Vietminh were nothing more than a disorganized coup, angry at capitalism, attempting
to disrupt Vietnam. After the instillation of Bao Dai, France began to institutionalize
French political processes, legal processes, and norms. By doing so, their aim was to
normalize French control over Vietnam, and further emphasize the idea that the
Vietminh wished nothing more than to disrupt life for the average, hard-working
Vietnamese citizen.
Politics, extremely heavy propaganda campaigns, and fighting continued for five
years until the battle of Dien Bien Phu on the 7th of May, 1954. One of the most famous
battles in history, Dien Bien Phu was the deciding factor for France with regards to
Vietnam. When French troops were handily defeated by the Vietminh, neither the
French government nor French citizens had any further appetite for colonies in
Indochina. Delegates cannot make the mistake; however, that France no longer has any
interest in the country. As the process of institutionalization of French norms continued,
it rooted French interests in the entirety of Indochina. While there may be fewer French
troops in Indochina after Dien Bien Phu, that is not so that there are no French interests.
Not only was this battle pivotal for France’s involvement in South-East Asia, it was also
the reason that France called for the Geneva Conference of 1954, a mere day after the
battle concluded. In many ways, it is because of this battle that all of you are here today,
in the situation that we are.
United States of America
French withdrawal from Vietnam meant one thing for President Eisenhower: it
was America’s turn. Coining his “Domino Theory”, President Eisenhower saw France’s
troop withdrawal as a chance for communism to quickly spread into the entirety of
South-East Asia. If this should happen, his concern was that this would then spread
further into Asia, then other countries around the world would see this as a sign to adopt
communism over capitalism, and so
the dominos of capitalist countries
would surely fall.
While Eisenhower’s strategy
was not fully developed until later, it
was clear even in 1954 that the
United States had an enormous
interest in preventing the spread of
capitalism. This did not mean,
however, that the South Vietnamese could call for US support on a whim. Indeed, the
US had concerns that escalating the conflict too quickly with foreign aid would result in
an equal, if not greater, reaction from the North, and therefore by the USSR.
Additionally, though Eisenhower is very keen on seeing Vietnam unified under a
southern flag, the way in which he is will to accomplish this will change in response to
what is seen on the ground. If it appears as though certain members of the committee
are acting in a way that is detrimental to the unification of Vietnam, or jeopardises
capitalism’s vie for power in the area, there may be a swift and decisive response.
Having said that, esteemed members of South Vietnam’s government cannot simply
bend to the caprices of the United States. Ultimately, it is your country, and you know it
better than any foreigner – French or American.
Part III: The Geneva Conference of 1954
3.1 Intended Purpose
By the time the Geneva Conference was officially called the war in Vietnam had
been raging for five years. After the battle of Dien Bien Phu, French leadership realized
that the chances of French control over Indochina were next to none. If France could
not take the area militarily, their next option was to try and diplomatically assert itself in
the form of negotiations. The stated purpose of the conference was to determine a
solution to the issue, and which states, groups, and ideologies will rule what allocations
of land and population. Though not pertinent to this committee, a second topic of
discussion was solving outstanding issues on the Korean Peninsula. On the 8th of May,
1954, the conference began in Geneva, Switzerland, jointly chaired by the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
3.2 During the Conference: Negotiations
Invited countries to these negotiations included the Soviet Union, United States,
France, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, State of Vietnam, Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (DRV), Laos, and Cambodia. For the French, negotiations were
made extremely difficult by their loss at Dien Bien Phu one day earlier. This significantly
weakened their negotiating position, and strengthened that of the Republic of Vietnam.
A brief summary of each country’s desired outcomes are as follows:
France




Salvage as much control over the entirety of Indochina as possible
Limit the humiliation suffered from the battle of Dien Bien Phu by strengthening
their position in other Indochina countries (Laos, and Cambodia)
Consider long-term benefits and costs of maintaining French control over
Vietnam
Upon the election of Pierre Mendes-France, France’s negotiations shifted
dramatically to support a ceasefire within one month
United States



Support any group willing to fight against the Vietminh and their communist
backers
Ensure that the Domino Theory does not come into fruition in South East Asia
Discourage the USSR and China from engaging any further in the Vietnam
conflict, such that capitalism may be promoted
United Kingdom

Lead by Anthony Eden, British aims were to truly seek a diplomatic resolution to
the conflict and see Vietnam unified under one flag, so long as that flag was
determined diplomatically
Democratic Republic of Vietnam







Lead by the political leader Pham Van Dong, the DRV sought…
A ceasefire
Separation of opposing forces
Ban on the introduction of new forces into the entirety of Indochina
Exchange of prisoners
Independence and sovereignty for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
Democratic elections in all countries
State of Vietnam


The state of Vietnam disagreed heartily with the north, and instead wanted to
see…
Unification of Vietnam under Southern control

A fast conclusion to the negotiations such that the DRV could not gain more
territory while negotiations were continuing
Soviet Union



A ceasefire, monitored by a council headed by impartial India
Opportunities to spread communism throughout the entirety of Indochina and
South East Asia
The chance to use Vietminh support as a proxy for spreading communism and
fighting against capitalism
People’s Republic of China



Believed that Indochina should be looked at from a country-to-country basis
Disliked foreign intervention (including Soviet, but especially French and
American) on continental Asia
Believed that all countries should be recognized as sovereign, and were willing to
help fight to ensure this was the case
Laos and Cambodia



Believed colonial rule was detrimental to their country, regardless of colonizer
Sought sovereignty throughout negotiations from France, America, USSR, and
China
Wanted democratic elections and proper representative governments
3.3 Results
On the 21st of July, 1954, the Geneva
Accords were signed by delegates from France,
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The provision of
greatest importance was the division of Vietnam
along the 17 th parallel, the so-called “provisional
military demarcation line” [right]. On either side of
this line, all parties will be given 300 days to fully
withdraw troops, and ensure that no troops are
present within three miles of the demarcation line.
Further, the Accords stipulated that all French and
State of Vietnam troops were to withdraw to the
south of this line, and all Soviet, Chinese, and
DRV troops were to withdraw to the north. In order
The split of Vietnam along the 17th parallel,
and the three mile demilitarized zone.
to prevent future clashes of powers, it further stated that neither side would seek any
additional international support, nor enter into a military alliance that could jeopardize
the security established by the accords.
Finally, there was one last vital aspect to the Geneva Accords. The International
Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), made up impartial countries Canada,
Poland, and India, was established in order to monitor the ceasefire. The ICSC worked
in such a way that if the parties within Vietnam were unable to resolve a crisis, it would
be sent to the ICSC for a verdict. If this body could not reach a verdict, they would send
the issue to the chairs of the Geneva Accords (the UK and USSR), at which point either
they would hand down a verdict, or they would reconvene the original members of the
Geneva Conference to find a resolution.
It is vital to point out that this commission is operational for the first time today.
Though this does sound like a truly ideal way to maintain peace in Vietnam, there are
no guarantees that it will do so. Delegates will have to wait, along with the rest of the
world, to see whether or not the ICSC will be able to carry out its mandate. It is vital to
point out, however, that the ICSC and the Geneva Accords have the support of the five
largest world powers, indeed many of the stipulations were proposed by these very
powers, and for a country like Vietnam, those powers are not to be trifled with.