Leibniz's Interpretation of Neo-Confucianism
David E. Mungello
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 3-22.
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David E. Nungello Leibniz's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism
From his early youth, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) developed
an interest in China. In approximately 1666, at the age of twenty, he read
G. Spizel's De Re Litteraria Sinensium Commentarius (Leiden, 1660), and
soon afterwards, Fr. Athanasius Kircher's China Monumentis Illustrata (1667).
H e discovered Andreas Miiller's attempt to construct a Key to Chinese in
1679.' He apparently read Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687) in the year
of its p~blication.~
The latter constituted a Jesuit attempt to translate excerpts
from several of the Chinese classics such as the Great Learning, the Doctrine
of the Mean, and the Analects, and to summarize Confucius's teachings. However, the reports from the missionaries in China were carefully edited by
Du Halde and other Jesuits in Paris to cast Confucianism into a form more
amenable to the belief in God and the immortality of the soul.
E. R. Hughes postulates the existence of some close resemblances in
Leibniz's own theories and in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus and thereby
suggests that Leibniz was directly influenced by the book. Though admitting
the difficulty of specifying the influence, Hughes notes that the LeibnizArnauld correspondence shows Leibniz's concepts of "simple substance" and
"preestablished harmony" (or "the hypothesis of concomitance") in the universe to have been formed between 1686 and 1690; that is, during the time
when he was reading Confucius Sinarum Philosophus. In particular, Hughes
calls attention to several classical phrases translated from the Chinese into
Latin, such as the opening sentence of the Great Learning: " 'The rational
nature of man imposed by Heaven is conformed to nature' (i.e. the nature of
men and the nature of things.)" Such statements, Hughes contends, appealed
to deist-leaning minds of seventeenth century E ~ r o p e . ~
The years 1686-90 actually represent the period of the correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld, a disciple of Descartes, through an intermediary,
Ernst, Landgrave of Hessen-Rheinfels. The Landgrave, himself a former
Protestant, saw the possibility of a prize conversion in winning Leibniz to
Catholicism and sought the aid of the somewhat reluctant and aged Arnauld.
The influence of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus upon Leibniz's thought that
David E. Mungello is a graduate sfudent at the University of California, Berkeley. AUTHOR'SN OTE:P ortions of the following paper were read as part of a panel on Nee-
Confucianism at the A S P A C (Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast) Conference held dtiring June 1970 at Oaztepec, Mexico. I am indebted to Jay Bishop, Jr. for his many hours of effort i reproducing the drawing of the Former Heaven hexagram order. 1 Donald F. Lach, "Leibniz and China," Journal of the History of Ideas VI, no. 4 (Oct. 1945), 437. 2 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 4 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1956), XI, 497. 3 See E
. R. Hughes, The Great Learning and the Mean in Action (New York: E. p. Dutton & Co., 1943), pp. 12-18. 4 Mungello
Hughes postulates must, at least in terms of this correspondence, be tempered
by the fact that concepts such as simple substance and the hypothesis of
concomitance are frequently discussed in letters dated 1686; that is, a year
prior to the publication of this Jesuit compilation on Chinese thought. Therefore, the germs for the development of many of the key terms in Leibniz's
system-apart from the monads, which were to await elaboration in the
Monadology (1714)-were present prior to Leibniz's reading Confucius
Sinarum Philo~ophus.~
Leibniz's formal treatises in the area of his interests are both restricted in
number and limited in length. The dearth of his public-in contrast to his
private-writings contributed to an initial misunderstanding of his concepts
which persisted until significant portions of his private correspondence had
been published posthumously. This limitation is probably due to several causes,
two of which may have been his diversity of interests and the burdens of
official duties which kept his time divided. Another cause may have been the
hesitation of the diplomat toward publishing controversial ideas. Andreas
Miiller's interest and persistence in producing a Key to Chinese had brought
on accusations of heresy and his dismissal from the court of the Great Elector
in 168SV6The example may have pressed firmly on Leibniz's mind. Another
motivating factor is suggested by W. H. Barber, who points to Leibniz's
severe disappointment over Arnauld's negative reaction to article 13 of his
summarized Discourse on Metaphysics, which had been forwarded to Arnauld
from the Landgrave in 1686.6 T o Leibniz's chagrin, Arnauld considered the
proposition to be fatalistic-a criticism not without its controversial overtones.
T o Barber, Leibniz's reaction embodied a turning point in that afterward he
would defer the possibility of being an influential thinker in order to increase
the chances for success in his quest for religious reunion. Toward this end, he
limited his published writings and omitted many of the logical proofs which
might have aroused antagonism instead of con~onance.~
I n short, Leibniz
turned to ecumenicalism.
His interest in China intensified in 1685 when Louis XIV entered France
The Leibniz-Amauld Correspondence, ed. and trans. H. T. Mason (New York: Barnes
and Noble, 1967), pp. xi-xiii.
6 Donald F. Lach, "The Chinese Studies of Andreas Miiller," Journal of the American
Oriental Society 60, no. 4 (Dec. 1940), 564-565.
OArticle 13 of the summarized Discourse on Metaphysics states: "Since the individual
concept of each person contains once for all everything that will ever happen to him,
one sees in it the a priori proofs or reasons for the truth of each event, or why one
event has occurred rather than another. But these truths, though certain, are nevertheless
contingent, being based on the freewill of God and of creatures. I t is true that there are
always reasons for their choice, but they incline without necessitating!' (Quoted and
translated in Mason, The Leibnix-Arnauld Correspondence, p. 5.)
7 W. H. Barber, Leibniz in France: From A m u l d to Voltaire (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1955), pp. 13-17.
4
into the missionary effort by dispatching to China six French Jesuits, some
of whom were to become the primary European interpreters of Chinese culture. In 1697 Leibniz published the first edition of Novissima Sinica [The
Latest News from China], which represents his only public statement on
China.8 All else must be gleaned from correspondence and such private documents as his marginalia in books on China.
Between 1610 and 1742, a controversy arose over how Christianity should
interpret the ancient rites practiced in China, particularly those involving
ancestor worship and Confucius. The success of the Jesuit policies in seeking
compromise through a looser interpretation of Catholic dogma had not only
aroused the envious wrath of the other orders, but was accompanied by the
growth of anti-Jesuit feeling among the Jansenists, Ultramontanists, and later,
the philosophes in eighteenth century France.
Essentially, the Rites issue resolved itself into a question of how adaptable
the Chinese, particularly Confucian, religious practices were to Christianity.
The dominant position of the Jesuits, first developed by Matteo Ricci (15521610), deemphasized the exegetical writings of Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming,
and others. Instead, it emphasized the original Confucian canon which originated ca. the sixth to fourth centuries B.C. and, going back to the third
millenium B.c., stressed legendary Chinese such as Pan Ku (the creator),
F u Hsi (the inventor of civilized society), Shen Nung (father of agriculture),
Huang-ti (the first legendary emperor), Yao, Shun, and Yii. Based upon
classical references to these legendary figures and upon the Confucian canon,
the Jesuit position concluded that a monotheism similar to that of Jehovah's
time had emerged in ancient China.9
A more extreme interpretation of the Jesuit view was put forth by the
Figurists, who included among the Jesuits in China Frs. Bouvet, Focquet, and
Premare. Their view, which they associated with the I Ching [Book of
Changes], held that Fu Hsi was not a Chinese, but the original Lawgiver of
all mankind.1° This Lawgiver set forth all knowledge, that is, the Ancient
8 Leibniz himself wrote only the preface to the Novissima Sinica. The text consists of
contributions almost exclusively from Jesuits in China, including Suarez, Verbiest,
Grimaldi, Thomas, Gerbillon, and-in the second edition (1699)-Bouvet. See Donald F.
La&, The Preface to Leibnia' Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation, and Text
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1957), pp. 3-4.
9 Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarh: The Jesuits at the Court of China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), p. 121.
10The Figurists maintained that this same Lawgiver is recognized by many different
societies, though with differing names. These include Fu Hsi (Chinese), H e m e s
Trismegistus (Egyptians and Greeks), Hennoch or Enoch (Hebrews) and Zoroaster
Law, whose remnants were passed down in the geometrical representations of
the pa kuaa (eight trigrams). Leibniz's correspondence with Bouvet indicates
that he was not only familiar with the Figurist view, but may in fact have been
a formative influence in shaping the theory.ll
One might say that the essential Jesuit position on the Rites, defended both
from China and in Europe, was less extreme than that of the Figurists and
yet did assert a belief in the existence of the Ancient Law, that is, monotheism,
in ancient China which had since been debased by Taoist and Buddhist sects.
Confucianism then represented the corpus of monotheistic remnants. The worship of ancestors did not conflict with Christian doctrine in that the Chinese
ceremony-and in this Leibniz specifically agreed-was essentially of a political
and social, not religious, significance. It was therefore not idolatry. Such was
the basic position developed by Ricci and maintained essentially intact by the
Jesuits in the face of some internal dissent throughout more than a century of
debate. The opposition pointed to the objectionable contribution of English
and French deism toward Jesuit liberalism and maintained the strict position
whereby the Chinese unawareness of revelation and redemption made them
heathens. For a number of reasons, including strong anti-Jesuit pressures,
Rome conclusively rejected the Jesuit position in 1742.
A second aspect of the Rites controversy concerned the possibility of deriving
Chinese equivalents for key Christian concepts. Basing his conclusions on the
classical Chinese texts, Ricci derived the controversial position that the Chinese
did have a concept equivalent to the Christian God in the form of shang-tP
(literally, "the above ruler"). Opposition to the 'shang-ti = God' equation
came from a subordinate of Ricci's by the name of Fr. Nicholas Longobardi.
Basing his opinion for the most part on Neo-Confucian commentaries,
Longobardi maintained the absence of any true conception of God in either
modern or ancient China.12 As with the Rites question, the dominant Jesuit
position-that of Ricci-was rejected in the papal ruling of 1742.
(Persians). Actually, Hennes Trismegistus was invented by certain second or third
century A.D. Romans who identified him with the Egyptian god Thoth, scribe to the gods,
measurer of time, inventor of number and language, and god of learning and magic.
Consequently, Hermes Trismegistus became known as the founder of alchemy and other
occult sciences and the inventor of talismans. He was also associated with the early
Judaic prophets such as Moses. See Francis A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hemzefic
Tradition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 1-19.
11See section IVB of this paper. Cf. also Lach, "Leibniz and China," pp. 443-444, and
Rowbotham, p. 123.
12 Though initially condemned by the Jesuit leadership, Longobardi's views were eventually
rendered into French and published in 1701 under the title of Traite szlr Quelques Points
de la Religion des Chinois. Soon afterwards another voice, Franciscan Father A. de
Sainte-Marie, joined the dissent and, utilizing the commentaries and emphasizing Chinese
ceremonial usage rather than doctrine, as did Longobardi, came essentially to the same
conclusions as the latter. His findings were eventually also published in French in 1710
One of the difficulties in understanding Leibniz's interpretation of the Rites
question stems from what appears to be a contradictory element. T o begin with,
Leibniz agrees with Ricci's conclusion on the Rites question and rejects the
Longobardi view.13 Then, however, he proceeds to reverse, or at the very least,
mix the order of the literature from which the respective positions were drawn.
Whereas Ricci had drawn his conclusions from limiting himself to the classical
texts, Leibniz seems to lean toward the employment of terminology and concepts taken from both the classical texts and the Neo-Confucian commentaries,
but with a slight emphasis on the latter; that is, precisely the area which Ricci
rejected and Longobardi stressed. Such terms as t'ai chic, lid, and to a lesser
extent, ch'ie, which Leibniz employs in discussing the shang-ti translation problem, are distinctly products of eleventh and twelfth century Neo-Confucian
development. It is doubtful that any of these terms were employed by the
legendary rulers. Confucius used them rarely, if at all, and in no case would
they have then carried the semantic resonance which they had acquired by the
eleventh and twelfth centuries.14 On the other hand, by the eleventh century a
term like shang-ti had evolved to a point where most of the anthropomorphictheistic qualities had been lost and the term had become more of a figurative
equivalent for the Neo-Confucian li.
The degree to which Leibniz mixes the Neo-Confucian terminology with
what seems to be the earlier theistic conception of shang-ti is evident in the
following passage. Leibniz states :
Li, K i [ch'i] and Taikie [t'ai-chi] are only modes of the ultimate substance
which is called (Xangti) Schangti [shang-ti], that is to say, the King from on
high, or else, the Spirit governing Heaven. . . So, if Xangti and L i are the
same thing, we have every reason to give to God the name of Xangti. And
Father M. Ricci was not wrong in maintaining that the ancient Sages of China
recognized and honored a Supreme Being called Xangti, King on High, and
Spirits below Him as High Ministers, so that they did have knowledge of the
true God. . . .15
.
as Traite sur quelques points importans de la Mission de la Chine. See Rowbotham,
pp. 132 and 31811, and Needham 11, 501.
13 The sources for deriving Leibniz's opinions on the matter include (a) his marginal
notations regarding Longobardi and de Sainte-Marie in the Kortholt edition of his
miscellaneous papers published in 1735 and (b) a long letter sent in 1716 to M. Nicholas
de Remond, an official associated with the Duke of Orleans. The letter appears in its
entirety in Ludovia Dutens, ed., Leibniz Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1741), IV, 161. Part of
the letter is translated by Lach in "Leibniz and China," p. 450, and its title page is
reproduced in Needham 11, Fig. 49. See also Needham 11, 500-502, for discussion of the
letter.
14 The term li is a partial, though not complete, exception to this lack of usage. Certain
of Confucius's near-contemporaries such as Mencius, Hsiin-tzu, Mo-tsu, and Chuang-tzu
did employ li, but its meaning carried only the substructur~speciallyin terms of
metaphysics-upon which its later development was built. Ch'i was employed in a different
meaning by certain of Confucius's contemporaries and later in Taoist thought.
16 Leibniz (to Bouvet?), in R. F. Merkel, Leibniz und China (Berlin: Walter de Gruyther,
The problem arises when one considers that Ricci's conclusions are far more
valid, though not necessarily totally solla if limited to the pre-Confucian-in
opposition to including both the pre-Confucian and Confucian--classical texts.
On the other hand, Longobardi's seem also validly drawn if limited to the NeoConfucian commentaries. Where then does this leave Leibniz, who considers
both groups of texts, though with definite emphasis upon the commentaries,
and yet arrives at a conclusion which seems justified only for the earlier texts?
Was Leibniz in error or was his conception of God at variance with that of the
Jesuits whose position he supported?
The Jesuits had, as stated, themselves been accused of being unduly influenced by British and French deism, but the influence was probably incorporated
more into the methods of the Jesuits than into their conception of God, which
seems to have remained rather orthodoxly theistic. Leibniz's system seems to
exhibit a movement toward a less theistic conception in which God tends to
become a creator of the world who has arranged things on mechanical principles
which relate to the whole, of which they are a part, on an organic basis. Because
of the organic element, the world becomes more than an unwinding clock, that
is, more than a world which is able to be reduced totally to a series of discrete
elements, individually and separately responding to one another. Rather, these
elements are interrelated in a whole which points toward a plan Divinely inspired. Gone is the conception of an intervening God as Father to whom one
may appeal in prayer. However, the superficial similarity to the deist conception
of a nonintervening God must be tempered by considering the greater complexities of Leibniz's system. In considering Leibniz's failure to emphasize the
differences between his conception of God and the more anthropomorphictheistic conception of the Jesuits-and most of the rest of European Christianity-one might ask whether Leibniz was again allowing a basic dissimilarity to
pass for the sake of the higher goal of ecumenicalism.
I n addition to the questions over the translation of shang-ti and whether
Christians should be permitted to participate in the Chinese ancestor ceremonies, a debate evolved about the term li and its relationship to Christian
theology. Since the term did not become greatly significant in Confucianism
until the rise of the Sung dynasty (960-1280), li would not present a semantic
1952), p. 27; quoted and translated in Philip P. Wiener, "G. W. F. Leibniz On Philosophical Synthesis," Philosofihy East and West 12, no. 2 (Oct. 1%2), 200. (This writer
was unable to secure the Merkel text and consequently cannot unambiguously cite the
specific Leibniz correspondence involved.)
1%
Most modern scholars have treated Confucius as agnostic; however, the opposing view
deserves consideration. For the latter, see Herrlee G. Creel, "Was Confucius Agnostic?",
T'oung Pao XXIX, no. 1-3 (1932), 55-99.
problem to those Jesuits who stressed the classical texts. However, interest in
the term was not limited to men like Longobardi, for Leibniz, who tended to
support the opposition position, also found the term of key importance to the
point of stressing its equation with his own conception of God.
Leibniz, however, evidences certain misconceptions in regard to the relationship between li and ch'i. There is, to begin with, what appears to be another
misleading treatment of chronology. In his discussion of li and ch'i, he refers
to "the ancient writers of China."17 If Leibniz is consistent with previous usage,
the reference to "ancient" would be to those Chinese thinkers of the time of
Confucius or earlier. If so, a misplacement is involved in that even though
Confucius's contemporaries and near-contemporaries-though not Confucius
himself-may have employed the term li, it had few metaphysical connotations
during the late Chou. Such connotations were to await development by certain
Neo-Taoists and Chinese Buddhists.ls But perhaps more telling was the absence of a li-ch'i relationship until its development in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries by Ch'eng Hao, and particularly, Ch'eng Yi (1033-1108) and Chu
Hsi (1130-1200).
In addition to the chronological problem there is a more basic misconception
in the relationship between li and ch'i. Leibniz states that ". . . the ancient
writers of China attributed to Li, or the first principle, the very existence of
Ch'i, or matter. . . ."lo I n this statement and in the context of the passage,
Leibniz implies a mind-matter dualism quite familiar to Western thought. But
a mind-matter characterization does not accurately describe the li-ch'i relationship. First of all, ch'i is not simply matter, but is more akin to ether or the
conception of breath contained in the Greek pneiinza, particularly as applied
by the
Leibniz misconstrues it when he attempts to distinguish li from
ch'i by stating: "Now it is not possible to comprehend that L i is a purely
passive, brutal, universally indifferent, and lawless concept as is matter."21
Ch'i is not "purely passive," nor is it simply an amalgam of the opposing
categories of matter and energy, though it does resolve characteristics of both
into the single element of fineiima or the breath which infuses all aspects of
the world associated with life or motion. By referring to ch'i as lawless, and,
17 Leibniz to Nicholas Remond, 27 March 1716, quoted and trans. in Lach, "Leibniz and
China," p. 450.
1s These developers of li include Neo-Taoists such as Wang Pi (226-49)and Kuo Hsiang
(d. 312) and Buddhists such as Chih Tun (314-66), Hui-yiian (334-416), Seng-chao (384-414), Tao-sheng (d. 434) and Fa-tsang (643-712). 19 Leibniz to Remond, 27 March 1716, in Lach, "Leibniz and China," p. 450. 20 I am indebted for the suggestion to render ch'i as the stoic 'pnerima' to Professor Nathan Sivin. In addition, Professor Peter A. Boodberg has proposed rendering ch'i with breath-like implications. For a description of pnerima see S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 22 passim. 21 Leibniz to Remond, 27 March 1716, in Lach, "Leibniz and China," p. 450. by contrast, li as law, Leibniz seems to come closer to accuracy. By rendering
li as "first principle," Leibniz seems to have been one of the first employers of
a translation in which knowledgeable sinologists have followed.
However, while roughly equivalent, the translation "principle" is misleading
in part because of the extensive application this term has received in the West,
to the point that its meaning has become ambiguous. In contrast, the early
Chinese application of li was not ambiguous. One etymology of the term involves a sense of 'patterning'. Another related etymology which the Sung (i.e.,
Neo-Confucian school associated with Chu Hsi) scholars adopted analyzes
the character in terms of yii' as a semantic and lig as both phonetic and semantic.
The latter has implications of 'inner,' as in 12% "clothing," while the yii refers
to jade. Juxtaposed into the single character of lid, they supposedly represent
the inside of jade in the sense of natural grain within jade, or a system of
veins, or venation. Jade, which was a term applied to a wide variety of stone
in ancient China, was a highly valued substance, and knowledge of how to cut
jade, that is, the ascertaining of the venation in order to make an effective
break, became rather important. A Han dynasty juxtaposition of li with wen
throws additional light on the meaning of li in that while wen referred to
surface markings, hence surface structure, and by extension, superstnicture,
li by contrast would imply inner structure or i n f r a s t r ~ c t u r eWhile
. ~ ~ any given
thing could be analyzed in terms of its infrastructure, so too can the term be
extended to the universe at large. The sense of infrastructure associated with
the idea of patterning becomes a great deal more meaningful when juxtaposed
with pnecma or ch'i. The latter, which is chaotic, as Leibniz accurately detected,
is organized according to the patterns of infrastructure implied in li. In such a
relationship, ch'i and li are complementary to one another and their existence
is mutually dependent upon one another. Yet, while the two in one sense have
coequal status, in its Neo-Confucian treatment li acquires an element of priority
which Leibniz seems also to have recognized.
An explanation of this priority is a rather difficult problem and perhaps a
less than totally resolved problem even in Chu Hsi's synthesis. Certainly it is
a question which troubled Chu Hsi's disciples, as the following quotation from
the Hsing-li ta chuan, a work introduced to Europe via Fr. Longobardi's commentaries in Traite sur Quelques Points de la Religion des Chinois, attests:
Someone asked, Does li [the organizing principle(^)^^] exist first or does ch'i
[pneiima] 7 (Chu Hsi) answered: The organizing principle has never in the
22 The
"superstructure-infrastructure" rendering of wen-li is derived from Professor Boodberg. 23 The translation of li as "organizing principle(s)" is my derivati~nfrom Needham'$ "principle of organization." (See Needham 11, 472 f.) The transformation of 'organiza- tion' from a noun to the participle 'organizing' was made in order to give a more balanced emphasis to the active, as opposed to static, aspect of li. past been far separated from pneuma. Certainly the organizing principle is
before form and pneuma is after form. Everything (Both?) emerges as either
before or after form. How then can one speak of lacking a first and a last (i.e.
lacking temporal sequence) ? If the organizing principle lacked form, the
pneuma would seek out its existence in the dregs (i.e. chaos). The organizing
principle and pneuma basically lack a 'before' and 'after' of which one can
speak. But if one insists on inferring that which was previous, then we must
say that first there existed this organizing principle. But the organizing principle may also not be divided so as to act as one thing. Accordingly it is located
in the midst of (this) pneurna. If the situation lacks this pneuma, then this
organizing principle lacks a place in which it is suspended. Pneuma consequently acts as metal, wood, water and fire (i.e. four of the five elements of
nature). The organizing principle acts as humanity, group loyalty, ritual and
wisdom (i.e. modes of behavior) .24
In dealing with Chu Hsi's metaphysics, it is deceptively easy for the Western
mind to lose sight of the behavioral aspects within Chu Hsi's system. Social
philosophy in the Western tradition has commonly been treated separately from
metaphysics. In addition, the KO-zvui ("investigation of things") emphasis in
Chu Hsi's thought lends itself to misinterpreting "things" as objects rather
than social phenomena when in fact "things" refers to both. Just as li would
apply to a given bamboo plant, so too would it apply to social relations. As it
becomes absurd to treat any standard of social relations with excessive rigidity,
the li of behavior would be somewhat fluid, perhaps with the same fluidity which
made the bamboo such a favorite metaphor among eleventh and twelfth century
Chinese. And yet, though fluid, the li loses none of its value as a constant ordering principle which stabilizes both nature and society; that is, the inherently
chaotic ch'i is li-ed. Interpreted in this light, li emerges as the continuation of a
Chinese tradition which employs metaphysical concepts for the purpose of
ordering society. What distinguishes li from previous terms in this tradition
such as t'ien mingj ("Heavenly Decree") or Taok ("the Way") is its relatively
greater degree of metaphysical elaboration and the unique historical circumstances in which it was applied.
In terms of li and the natural world, might the priority lie within the thinking
mind and not within nature itself? T o understand li, one must consider its
particular-universal aspect. In this, there is the li (designated in the lower
case) of any given particular which relates to the L i (upper case) of the supreme form which embraces all particulars. For example, just as any pear has
its own infrastructure, so too does that single pear relate to the infrastructure
of the entire universe which created it, enables it to exist, and even now-for
the cycle is never arrested-is reabsorbing it. One might view the situation in
terms of patterns of ch'i which on one hand exist in every entity, and on the
other hand, may be combined not merely as one gigantic grouping of disparate
24 Hsing-li fa
ch'iian zhuv 1415, chap. 26:337.
12
Mungello
patterns, but rather as a grouping of interrelated patterns which form an
organic whole, namely, the universe or reality.
Especially in view of the particular li-universal L i aspect, it seems clear that
li is a metaphysical principle and that the thinking mind of men would contain
li which would relate to the L i of the universe in the same way that the li of a
given bamboo or social situation would relate to the universal L i Z 5Therefore,
it would seem that the concept of li pervades both the thinking mind and the
natural world. (Confucian thought had traditionally considered reality to lie
within the natural world, not beyond it.) Li would consequently transcend any
attempt to separate the thinking mind from ultimate reality or to distinguish
between a Kantian phenomenal and noumenal realm. One comes into contact
with Li by embracing reality, not by merely perceiving li through the filters of
the mind.
But there is a tension in Chu Hsi's treatment of li. The development within
li of a tendency toward priority created a tension between itself and the traditional type of Chinese thought variously described as 'coordinative', 'associative', or ' c o r r e l a t i ~ e ' .Perhaps
~~
the most common example in this type of
thinking is the yang-yin relationship. Both yang and yin are different but complementary and of equal thrust-hence the prefix 'co-'; forces which are both
necessary to the whole. Hellmut Wilhelm has contrasted Chinese coordinative
thinking with European 'subordinative' thought in which the analytic tool of
causation arranged all by subsuming effect to cause. In correlative thought
the universe consists of patterns which relate to one another not on the basis
of an externally induced stimulus, but rather out of an internal nature which
is what it is because of the relational position and function it occupies in the
total universe.27 I n addition, this coordinative type of thought is somewhat
reflected in Chinese parallel prose style which originated at the beginning of
the Han dynasty (ca. 220 B.c.) .28
The coordinative forms of thinking are also reflected in the evolution of li
and the complementary pairs-one hesitates to say 'dualisms' because of the
antagonism implied in such Western dualisms as 'good and evil' or 'spirit and
matterJ-which combined Li with another term. During the Han dynasty, as
25 For
further elaboration, one might compare the li-Li relationship to the process by
which the rhythm of any given thing relates to the supreme rhythm of the t'ai chi as
manifested in early Neo-Confucianism and wen-jen aesthetic theory. See my "NeoConfucianism and wen-jen Aesthetic Theory," Philosophy East and W e s t 19, no. 4
(Oct. 1969), 368-383. 25The descriptive terms 'coordinative,' 'associative,' and 'correlative' originate from modern scholars such as Eberhard, Granet, Jablonski, Needham, and H. Wilhelm. See Needham 11, 279 f. 27 Needham 11, 280-281. 28 E. R. Hughes, "Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy," in The Chinese Mind, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp. 88-92. previously noted, wen as 'superstructure' was paired with li as 'infrastructure'.
Certain Chinese Buddhists, specifically Fa-tsang, complemented shih as 'phe~ ~ in neither case did li assume a role
nomenon' with li as ' n o u m e n ~ n ' . But
dominant over the other element in the pair. However, with the Sung NeoConfucian complementary pair of chJi as 'pneiima' and li as 'organizing princip l e ( ~ ) 'there emerged a slightly antagonistic tendency. While ch'i and li are
on one hand correlative and equal in importance, priority, and other aspects,
li on the other hand also assumes the role of priority in a logical or rational
sense. In terms of the coordinative context in which li had previously evolved,
the tendency to cite li as prior seems to contain a contradiction to the coordinative pattern of thinking in that priority implies subordination and a causative
force as opposed to complementarity and reciprocity. The tension which resulted is clearly reflected in the repeated questions on the nature of the priority
of li over ch'i put to Chu Hsi by his disciples.
Eventually one faces the question of (a) whether Chu Hsi's system is totally
coherent and any contradiction stems from our own-not Chu Hsi's-failure to
comprehend, or (b) whether there is a tension which Chu Hsi was unable to
resolve. Several Western interpretations have treated the li and ch'i of Chu
Hsi's system as dualistic with the antagonism implied by that.30 But if we do
treat li and ch'i as on the one hand complementary or, to use a recent interpretation, as a c o n t i n ~ u m we
, ~ ~are faced on the other hand with Chu Hsi's
emphasis upon the priority of li over ch'i. The result is two divergent tendencies.
Do we explain the divergency by saying that while Chu Hsi could resolve the
contradiction in his own mind, his disciples and the modern student cannot?
O r do we say that Chu Hsi's apparent failure to clarify for his own disciples
the nature of li's priority over ch'i reflects a lack of complete clarity in his own
mind ? To choose the latter would hardly make Chu Hsi the first thinker whose
system contained an unresolved tension.
To summarize, in Chu Hsi's treatment, li pervades both the thinking mind
and the natural world. This is the level in which li and ch'i are inseparable and
Fa-tsang, Chin shih tzu chang [Essay on the Golden Lion], Taisho no. 1880.
recent interpretation by Mokusen Miyuki has attempted to overcome the dualism
and resolve any contradictions between li and ch'i. The study postulates three possible
relationships: (a) with li as prior to ch'i, (b) with ch'i as prior to li, and (c) with li
and ch'i combined into the continuum li-ch'i. Briefly, Miyuki proceeds to reject (a) and
(b) for being, unlike (c), unable to explain all aspects of Chu Hsi's system. The problem
with Miyuki's treatment lies in a misplaced emphasis, in that he treats Chu Hsi's tendency
to cast ch'i as prior to li as having equal emphasis with the tendency to cast li as prior
to chY In effect, Miyuki treats the two tendencies as canceling out one another. His logic
seems reasonable until one considers the texts involved and the far greater emphasis
which Chu Hsi placed upon the priority of li over ch'i. See Mokusen Miyuki, A n Analysis
of Buddhist Influence on the Formation of the Sung Confucian Concept of li-ch'i (ph.D.
diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1965).
31 See Mokusen Miyuki, 60 ff.
20
30A
co-equal. However, Chu Hsi, somewl~athesitantly, postulates another level in
which li is prior to ch'i. In this level, li seems essentially to be a mental concept
and, as was not the case in the previous level, outside of the natural world.
Perhaps Chu Hsi hesitated at this point because he wondered whether the locus
of reality was really so totally identifiable with the natural world as had been
maintained. Could it be that li as a mental concept was opening the door to
another level of reality which the Confucian tradition, prior to Buddhism, had
consistently refused to enter? Could this be part of what the tension in Chu
Hsi's thought indicates ?
PARALLELS
A. Leibniz's God and the Neo-Confucian li. Leibniz appears to grasp the
particular-universal aspect of li and to manifest it by means of distinct projections of his own system into his interpretation of Chinese
These
projections may partially account for both his correct and erroneous interpretations in that, whether accurate or inaccurate, one can usually find an element
paralleling Leibniz's interpretations of the Chinese in his own system. If he is
primarily projecting his own system into his conception of Chinese thought,
then Needham's contention that Leibniz was influenced by the Chinese would
be measurably d i m i n i ~ h e d . ~ ~
As an example of this projection, one might take the parallel in the relationship of particular li to the universal L i and compare it to Leibniz's Monadology
in which "spirits" (i.e., souls raised to the rank of reason) go beyond merely
mirroring the image of the universe, to which souls are limited, to mirror the
images of the Deity. In such a way each spirit represents a small deity possessing its own sphere; that is, each spirit represents a lesser duplicate of the
supreme Deity.84 Yet each spirit is connected with the supreme Deity just as
the li of the particulars both duplicate and connect with the L i of the cosmos.
In short, Leibniz has supplanted a Christian view which saw the supreme force
of the universe as in part anthropomorphically cast after the image of man,
that is, patriarchal, with both benevolence and wrath, and certainly a force who
interferes in human activities on the basis of a response which is basically
human, even though human writ tremendously large. In contrast, Leibniz
discards the anthropomorphic-theistic image to present a supreme force which
Leibniz seems to reflect his comprehension of the li-Li aspect when he states: "He
[Chu Hsi] seems to indicate that the particular Li [i.e., li] is an emanation from the great Li [i.e., Li]
R. F. Merkel, 451, quoted and trans. in Wiener, p. 201. 88 See Needham 11, 496-505. 84G. W. F. von Leibniz, The Monadology (1714), trans. George Montgomery with revisions by Albert R. Chandler, in The Rationalists (Garden City, N.Y.: Dolphin Books, n.d.), p. 469, #83. 82
. . ."
is first of all mechanical in that the universe operates by processes which have a
mathematical regularity. However, Leibniz does not stop here, as Descartes
and, in a different way, Spinoza did, but goes on to transcend the mechanical
basis by combining what would be individual and unrelated mechanical processes through the medium of an all-embracing scheme. In the case of Leibniz,
the scheme is provided through the Divine plan implied in his conception of a
preestablished harmony. In the case of Chu Hsi, the scheme is provided by the
universal L i which embraces all the particular li. In both cases a given entity,
whether represented as a monad or a particular li, acts not simply in mechanical
response to an external stimulation, but out of an inner prompting. The
prompting is dictated by a nature which both connects with and reflects the
whole of which it is a part. Consequently, the resulting system assumes a united
viability symptomatic of an organism; hence the term 'organi~ism'.~s
B. Leibniz's binary system and the I Ching. Leibniz's treatment of the I Ching
presents an instance of where the projection of his own system may actually
be an overprojection that leads to a nonexistent parallel. Leibniz's introduction
to the I Ching came through his correspondence with the Jesuit Bouvet, which
was carried on between 1697 and 1707, though there is some disagreement
over exactly when Leibniz learned of the I Ching. Hellmut Wilhelm contends
that it was not until Leibniz sent an explanation of his binary mathematics to
Bouvet on 15 February 1701 that the direct link with the I Ching was made
by Bouvet, who soon thereafter detected correspondences between LeibnizJs
binary system and the hexagram progression, particularly in that of the Former
Heaven order hsien-t'ien tzu-hsii' (see diagram) attributed to Fu Hsi. In a
letter dated November, 1701, Bouvet communicated his discovery to Leibniz,
along with the Former Heaven and another hexagram order.38 Consequently,
3 5 Another
parallel in Leibniz's treatment of Neo-Confucian China might be found in
the similarities in historical setting and motivation out of which both Chu Hsi and Leibniz
worked. Leibniz was born two years before the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) brought to
an end the Thirty Years War. For the Chinese counterpart, one might read eleventh
century factiousness in the midst of intense concern and debate over finances, bandits,
rebellion, and, eventually, barbarian invasion which led to the abdication in 1127 of northern
China by the Sung royal house. Into such contentious climates Leibniz and Chu Hsi
were born and matured as minor, sometimes unemployed officials in search of a healing
medium of cultural unity. Perhaps part of their solutions is reflected in the tendencies
toward stability found in both systems. The deemphasis of the I Ching as a philosophic,
as opposed to divination text, and the revival of the Mencian position on the inherent
tendencies of human nature toward goodness, along with the tendency to emphasize the
prior and stable aspect of the concept li, may be indicative of the trend toward stability
on the Chinese end of things. The stable elements on Leibniz's end are discussed within
the text of the paper.
38 Needham maintains that the letter which Wilhelm holds was dated 15 February 1701
was actually dated April of that year. See Needham 11, 341 and Hellmut Wilhelm,
"Leibniz and the I-Ching:," Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis in Sinis (1948)' pp, 1 4
16 Mungello
The Former Heaven
hexagram order
Leibniz became convinced that the hexagram progression found in this classic
originated in Fu Hsi as a binary system-precisely the type of system Leibniz
had discovered several years earlier in his experimentation with numbers. To
Leibniz the discovery represented (a) confirmation at the other end of the
world for his own work in the binary system and (b) a further basis on which
to build a natural religion foundation of understanding among different peoples.
Actually, one wonders if Bouvet's contact with Leibniz and his binary system
could have shaped the Figurist position, which seems to have blossomed in the
first and second decades of the eighteenth century. As an active proponent of
the Figurist wing of the dominant Jesuit position on the Rites, Bouvet stressed
the importance of Fu Hsi's contribution not only to the Chinese, but to all of
mankind. If Leibniz's binary mathematics could provide confirmation for the
207-209. (This rather inaccessible paper seems to provide the basis for much of what
Needham maintains on the subject.) See also Lach, "Leibniz and Chi," p. 444.
universality of F u Hsi's natural religion teachings, then the Jesuit tendency
toward a looser interpretation of doctrine might be vindicated in the eyes of
critics in both China and Europe.
Employing the Former Heaven arrangement, Bouvet and Leibniz drew correspondences between its order and the binary progression by letting a divided
line in the hexagram represent 0 and an undivided line represent 1. Conse-quently, a binary progression may be derived. For example, k'trnm E B , the
first hexagram in the upper left-hand corner of the rectangular Former Heaven
order would represent 0 in the denary system and 000 000 in the binary system.
The second hexagram, Pon es , would be 1 and 000 001, respectively.
(Bouvet and Leibniz diverged from the traditional transformation of the
diagrams which alters from the bottom upward; for example, using the tradi-- instead of Po.)
tional transformation, 000 001 would be rendered as flrO
The third hexagram, pP
zz
,would be 2 and 000 010 ; kttanq =would
be 3 and 000 011, and so on up to clz'ienr
, the sixty-fourth hexagram,
which would be 63 in the denary progression and 111 111 in the binary.37
-
-
-
37Apparently out of the scientific stimulus he had received in his Paris and London
visits (1672-76)' Leibniz developed his analysis of the binary or dyadic (i.e., base of 2)
arithmetical progression and in 1679 presented his findings in a paper, "De Progressione
Dyadica." In contrast to the binary base, Europeans had been employing a denary (i.e.,
base of 10) progression along with the 'place value' characteristic which they had learned
in the sixteenth century from the Arabs who in turn traced it back to sixth century
A.D. Hindus. Leibniz based his analysis upon the recognition that certain properties of
numerical systems are common to all numbers and that, while 10 is the base most familiar
to Europe, actually the selection of a base number is rather arbitrary and need not be 10,
but could instead be 2 or 12 or any number.
'Place value' or 'value by position' would refer, for example, in the number 5620 to the
first figure on the left as representing 103 (ten to the third power). (Ten is used since
a denary system is involved.) Computed, 103 would be 10 X 10 X 10 = 1000 or a four
digit number, i.e., the number of digits in 5620.
The diagrams found in the I Ching exhibit the same characteristic of 'place value!
For instance, in a given hexagram, the top line might represent 25. Computed, 25 would
be 2 X 2 x 2 X 2 X 2 = 32, which when translated into the binary progression yields
100 000 or a six digit number, the total number of lines in the hexagram. The line down
from the top of the hexagram might represent 24, which when computed would be
2 x 2 X 2~ 2 = 16, which when translated into the binary system equals 10000 or a five
digit number, i.e., the number of lines remaining in the hexagram after the first line is
subtracted. The bottom line in the hexagram might represent 20. When computed, 20
would yield 1 or a single digit number, which is what the place value of the bottom line
could represent. Theoretically, one could also reverse this order and treat the bottom
line of the hexagram as representing 25 and progressing up to the top line as 20. The
order depends upon the direction in which one counts the lines of the hexagrams. While
the traditional method followed the former order, Bouvet and Leibniz seem to have
employed the latter.
For more complete explanations of the binary system and its applications to the hexagrams, see Arthur Waley, "Leibniz and Fu Hsi," Bulletin of the School of Oriental
Studies I1 (1921-23), 165-167; Needham 11, 340-345; and Lach, "Leibniz and China,"
pp. 444-446.
Actually, the correspondences which Bouvet perceived between Leibniz's
binary system and the Former ~ e a b e narrangement of the hexagrams are
somewhat arbitrary. For example, the Former Heaven order permits several
possible readings. The rectangular-shaped arrangement within the circle might
be read (a) horizontally beginning with k'ztn from left to right and top to
bottom, as Bouvet seems to have done, or (b) horizontally beginning with
ch'ien from right to left and from bottom to top as Shao Yung '(1011-1077)'
seems to have done. The circular order presents similar alternatives, with a
binary progression made possible by moving counterclockwise from k'un at
the bottom up through "uok
,then leaving off and picking up with fu at
the bottom and completing the circle by moving clockwise through ch'ien.
If one disregards the alternative methods of reading the hexagram order and
the fact that the trigrams and hexagrams seem to have traditionally transformed
in the reverse direction, that is, from the bottom upward, then the binary
interpretation of Bouvet and Leibniz seems possible. This appears to have
been what was done. The hexagrams, however, unlike Leibniz's binary system,
offer little evidence of having been used in counting. Considering this, along
with the probability that the Neo-Confucian Shao Yung, and not Fu Hsi,
originated the Former Heaven order, the possibility of binary origins of the
hexagrams is cast into considerable doubt. Furthermore, when one considers
the other various arrangements of the hexagrams, including the famous order
ascribed to King Wen (ca. 1150 B.c.), and their lesser adaptability to the
binary progression, one is led toward the conclusion that Bouvet based his
claim upon insufficient evidence and that Leibniz determined a similarity between East and West by unjustifiably projecting an element of his own system
into the Chinese.
Leibniz was highly pleased that his discovery of the binary system should
receive what seemed to be confirmation in the three thousand-plus year old
arrangement of "this old Fohi (Fu Hsi)," as Leibniz called him.38 Again,
Leibniz's joy was not simply that of intellectual understanding, but the joy of
anticipating the potential unity for East and West which such a discovery might
bring. In Leibniz's view, what he perceived as degeneration in the understanding of the binary nature of the hexagrams that had set in among Chinese since
Fu Hsi's time did not negate the basis for unity. I n his eyes, this medium of
unity might be reactivated by a confirmation of the shared principles of natural
religion such as the binary system confirmed to be existing in both Europe
and China.
Leibniz felt that all relationships and elements in the universe could be
derived from a Pythagorean-like method of mathematical values. By using the
numbers 0 and 1, the bnly figures available in the binary system, it would be
-
38 Leibniz
to Peter the Great, 1716, quoted and translated in Wiener, 202.
possible to generate all mathematical values, which would then be convertible
into all values in the universe. ( I n the most basic elements of the system, 0 =
the void and 1 = God.)
Leibniz's aim was to impress the Chinese, and particularly the K'ang-hsi
Emperor (r. 1662-1723) with his and Bouvet's discoveries that China and
Europe shared this binary system of progression, which for Leibniz had religious overtones. With this impression established, he would next attempt to
convince the emperor that the essentials of Christianity and Chinese thought
and religious practices are commonly held in both cultures in the form of the
basic principles of natural religion. Such an aim was no wild speculation on
Leibniz's part, for he was probably already informed of the interest K'ang-hsi
had taken in European mathematics and of the Jesuits' ability in this area.
(Within the decade, Bouvet would be assigned to tutor the emperor in
geometry.) Therefore, Leibniz's attempt to reach the emperor through the
universal language of mathematics reflects, as do so many of Leibniz's projects,
a philosopher's aim based upon a diplomat's familiarity with the situation.
Leibniz's optimism toward the possibility of reaching K'ang-hsi through his
binary discoveries is recorded in the following excerpt from a letter sent to
Bouvet on 15 February 1701 :
The new numerical calculus that I have invented .. . gives an admirable representation (or model) of creation. . . . My principal aim is to furnish a new
confirmation of the Christian Religion with respect to the sublime article of
the Creation through a ground which will, in my opinion, carry great weight
with the Chinese philosophers, and perhaps with the Emperor K'ang-hsi himself, for he loves and understands the science of numbers. Simply to say that
all numbers are formed by the combinations of 1 with 0 binary system, and
that the 0 is sufficient to diversify them, appears to be as to say that God
created everything from nothing without using any primitive matter; and that
there exists nothing more than these two first principles, God and Nothing:
God of all things perfect, and the Non-being of the imperfections of things,
devoid of essence.ss
It is worth noting that this letter was written before Leibniz had any knowledge of the correspondences between his binary progression and that of the
hexagrams. The letter merely represents his introduction to Bouvet of his
binary system along with his hopes for ecumenicalism that such a discovery
might bring. By November 4 of the same year, Bouvet would respond with
his discovery of the correspondences. In effect, Leibniz's conclusion (i.e., that
a potential for world unity based upon the principle of natural religion was
inherent in the nature of the world) derived from his mathematical and logical
premises (i.e., that the binary system exists and that this system reflects the
operations of the Creator and hence, the principles of natural religion) rather
than from empirical observation of data (i.e., that the binary progression is
39 Leibniz
to Bouvet, 15 February 1701, quoted and translated in Wiener, 199.
present in the I Ching hexagrams and therefore in China, hence, the system
has a universal historical basis). Instead, the observation of data merely confirms rather than acts as the basis for his conclusion.
One wonders how much of a pattern Leibniz's tendency toward projection
of his own system might represent ? Was Leibniz's interpretation of China and
the correspondences he found based more on the development of his own analysis in Europe (using certain abstract subject matter such as mathematics)
and the projection of this analysis to the world and to China? Needham's thesis
that Leibniz seems to have derived his organicism largely from Chu Hsi's NeoConfucianism and to have thereby introduced it into Europe appears to contradict a 'projection' thesis. Needham seems to infer that Leibniz's interpretation
of China was based more upon a study of China itself and a derivation of ideas
therefrom, rather than upon a projection of his own system into China.
C. Nature and morality conjoined in the Monadology and li. T o view another
example of where the projection seems to lead to a valid parallel, one might
consider the combination of nature and morality within li. The organizing of
the pneiima is according to principles which accord not merely with natural,
but also with ethical laws. The dual reference was taken by Chu Hsi from the
Ch'eng brothers' distinction between so-yi-jant, or the reason why a thing is
as it is, and so-tang-janu, or what a thing should be.40 The former refers to the
productive aspect of li while the latter refers to the ethical aspect. The parallel
in Leibniz's system is found in the Monadology's "moral world within a natural
world."41 As such, the object of man's investigation is a world which God
created and set before man and which operates on laws of both nature and
morality that conjoin in such a way as to make them inseparable. I n short, one
cannot consider the laws of nature apart from those of morality. I n this,
Leibniz strikes a note which has been operative in China since before NeoConfucianism. Both systems would present an inherent opposition to the amoral
type of propositions which certain seventeenth century thinkers such as Galileo
were beginning to address to the universe, and which would later become associated with the type of question put forth by the scientific method.
I n addition, the combining of ethical with natural laws seems to engender
the notion that since the given world of nature is viewed as ethical, therefore
good, the harmonious continuity of such a world is equally good and its converse, discord, is evil.*= I n such a context of harmony, where laws of nature
simultaneously bear a moral force, any attempts to change such laws would
Cerinterrupt this harmony along with violating both nature and moralit~.~s
Cf. A. C. Graham, T w o Chinese Philosophers: Ch'eng Ming-tao and Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan
(London: Percy Lund, Humphries & Co., 1958), p. 8 f.
41 Leibniz, The Monadology, pp. 469-470, #86. 42 Ibid. 43As used here, and in contrast to an earlier usage where nature was identified with 40
tainly such a conception would hardly condone revolution with its concomitant
discord and proposed alterations to nature and morality. The historical reactions toward both systems tend to confirm these implications.
ordering the social
The solutions offered by Leibniz and Chu ~ s toward
i
chaos of their respective ages consisted of an attempt to revise man's view of
the world, rather than attempting to revise the world itself or man's manipulation of it. In addition, there may have been an identification of the desired goal,
stability, with the method employed and the world view conceived. While
change was accounted for in Leibniz's unfolding of the monads and in Chu
Hsi's cyclical transformation of the li, in both cases it was also deemphasized
or considered secondary to the essential nature of the supreme concept. For
Leibniz, attempts to change the world were not only rendered futile by the
preestablished harmony of things, but also misguided in that, given a true
understanding of the nature of the world, one would find change undesirable.
I n addition, the monads do not interact, but merely seem to do so while actually
playing out the dictates of their inherent nature. For Chu Hsi, ch'i is the
medium of change which manifests the li as patterns; however, the change is
cyclical and not evolutionary. The li themselves do not alter.
Coincident with the deemphasis of change is the deemphasis of the importance of time. For those intent on altering the world, time-whether quantitative or qualitative-is perhaps the essential tool. Hegel clearly offered a tool
for change in his dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, and its significance was
not lost on revolutionary-minded thinkers who followed. While Hegel wrote
in the century after the death of Leibniz, the impetus for investing time with
greater significance was beginning to build even in Leibniz's own time. While
certainly aware of many of the changing currents about him, Leibniz attempted
to offer a defense for a type of timelessness.
I n China, the timelessness of Chu Hsi lasted far longer, though not so long
as a creative stimulus to thought as part of the official government orthodoxy.
When the Manchus came to power in 1644, their lack of security as a nonChinese people and their need to obliterate-or perhaps more precisely, elevate-their barbarian heritage led them to embrace the Chinese orthodoxy and
thereby probably to perpetuate its influence into the twentieth century, longer
than probably would otherwise have been possible. The Jesuits, by being so
closely associated with government circles, were in the midst of this reinvigoration, which they conveyed to Europe and to Leibniz.
Viewed in terms of the foregoing presentation, the main basis of the validultimate reality in the Neo-Confucian view, "natural law" refers not to the way nature
actually operates, but to the way man postulates it to operate. As such, a change would
not refer to altering the way nature operates so much as altering man's conception of
that operation.
22 Mungello
ity-and invalidity--of Leibniz's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism does not
stem from the point of view of the student who investigates China with a
minimal set of preconceptions. Rather, Leibniz's interpretation seems to have
been prompted by a certain amount of historical coincidence : the relatively
mature thought of Leibniz met Neo-Confucianism, mainly that of Chu Hsi,
at a juncture provided around 1700 primarily by the European missionary
effort. But the juncture did not make the interpretation possible by simply
opening China to Leibniz's view. The Jesuits, through direct contact, seem to
have actively forged several of the specific lines of interpretation which Leibniz
followed by providing so complementary an interpretation of Neo-Confucianism
that Leibniz was led to project many of his own ideas and apparently confirm a
large number of them. Consequently, confirmation, not derivation, of his key
principles seems to have been what Leibniz sought in China. And this coincidental juncture of history seems to have united with Leibniz's own acumen to
have produced a surprising amount of validity in the attempt.
East and West seem to have met, then, briefly in the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries. However, even as they were meeting, the creative
tide in China had long before repudiated the thought of Chu Hsi, while in
Europe, the front of empirically minded thinkers associated with the Enlightenment began rejecting the tutor of Candide.
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Leibniz's Interpretation of Neo-Confucianism
David E. Mungello
Philosophy East and West, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 3-22.
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[Footnotes]
1
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
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5
The Chinese Studies of Andreas Müller
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 60, No. 4. (Dec., 1940), pp. 564-575.
Stable URL:
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11
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
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13
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
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17
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28194510%296%3A4%3C436%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
19
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28194510%296%3A4%3C436%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
21
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28194510%296%3A4%3C436%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
36
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28194510%296%3A4%3C436%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
37
Leibniz and China
Donald F. Lach
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 6, No. 4. (Oct., 1945), pp. 436-455.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28194510%296%3A4%3C436%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N
NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.