Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-2 (1997)
The Soviet-Yugoslav Detente,
Belgrade-Budapest Relations,
and the Hungarian Revolution (1955-56)1
Johanna Granville
Just over four decades ago the first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern
Europe — the revolution in Hungary — took place. Most scholars have focused
on Soviet-Hungarian relations to discern causes of the conflict, 2 while underemphasizing the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in
the months preceding the Hungarian revolt and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role
in the conflict/ Many have assumed that oncc Soviet-Yugoslav relations were
"normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other
"peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of
Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium
meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and
motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and informationproviders, and on the events of 1956 generally. 4 The article will explain that the
Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous,
particularly between May 1955 and February 1956.'' Having initiated the rift
with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in
Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily
induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own
trip to Belgrade in May 1955. As explained below, this foot-dragging by the
Hungarian dictator Matyas Rakosi (the most obsequious "Stalinist" to exit the
stage) and the lingering bitterness of Tito and his subordinates confused the
Soviet leaders somewhat about the true causes of the Hungarian revolt. 6 The
"Nagy affair," which developed in the two weeks following the Soviet invasion,
chilled relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc nations once again. 7
Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations after July, 1955
The process of forging a detente between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was
first set in motion when Khrushchev took the initiative to visit Tito in Belgrade
in July 1955. At first the rapprochement looked as if it would continue uninterrupted, and that all the bloc members — including Rakosi's Hungary — would
play their part. In addition to Khrushchev's Belgrade trip and the disbandment of
the Cominform,* Khrushchev's speeches at the Twentieth Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress in February 1956 further paved the way toward
warmer relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Khrushchev acknowledged
the existence of "many national roads to socialism" and foresaw "peaceful
transitions to communism" for capitalist and colonial states alike. He also
claimed that war between capitalist and communist systems was no longer
"fatalistically inevitable," despite Lenin's prediction that war would continue
indefinitely between the two camps. In the closed session (the "Secret Speech"),
on February 24-25, 1956, Khrushchev clearly stated that the Soviet rift with
Yugoslavia had been an "unnecessary" and "shameful" mistake."
The speech, with its denunciation of Joseph Stalin's brutality, "cult of
personality," and acute paranoia, clearly delighted Tito, who received a copy of
the secrct text and published it in the Yugoslav party paper Borba [Struggle] on
March 20, 1956. In Tito's mind, the decisions of the Twentieth Congress were
merely the "continuation of a new trend within communist parties that began in
Yugoslavia." 10 Moreover, Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence with the
West fit niccly with Tito's own ideas about "the principles of coexistence" and
the evil of separate blocs and spheres of influence. These principles — Tito told
the student body at Rangoon University (Burma) in January 1955 — arc the only
way to resolve international political conflicts. Furthermore, the division of the
world into spheres of influence and blocs, Tito told the Indian Parliament in
December 1954, is "one of the four basic elements which lie at the root of so
much evil." Countries and states with different systems will not disappear
overnight, Tito said, and thus cocxistence is not only possible but necessary if a
new world war is to be avoided."
Khrushchev's rhetoric about "peaceful coexistence" between the two
socioeconomic systems also helped Tito rationalize his acceptance of economic
aid f r o m both the Soviet bloc and the United States. From Tito's break with
Moscow in 1948 until 1956, the United States provided an estimated $1 billion
in military and economic aid to Yugoslavia.
After the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in 1955, which launched the process
of normalization, Tito and other Yugoslav officials were determined to exact
reparations from Soviet bloc countries without jeopardizing the aid from the
United States, The 1948 rift — when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Comin
form and boycotted by all members of the communist bloc — had caused great
economic disruption, and Tito wanted to make sure his country would be compensated for damages. Most communist bloc countries complied, but Hungary
was reluctant. 13 The Soviet Union agreed to help Yugoslavia by extending $250
million in economic credit 14 and by developing Yugoslavia's atomic energy
program. 1 5 Czechoslovakia agreed to pay $50 million in reparations over a tenyear period at a 2 percent interest rate. 16 Romania permitted several thousand
Serbian prisoners to return to the Banat region. 17 According to Stuart H. Van
Dyke, European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the Soviet bloc as a whole made nearly $300 million of easy credit
available to Yugoslavia.
Yugoslav relations with Hungary, however, remained at an impasse.
Several problems persisted — the most obvious one being the fact that Tito
detested Rakosi, the Hungarian leader — "the Last Mohican of the Stalinist Era"
and "Stalin's Best Disciple" — who had clung to power long after the deaths of
the other Stalinist leaders in the East European countries. 18 Rakosi had conducted the 1948 anti-Titoist campaign more zealously than the other communist
party leaders in the "peoples' democracies." 19 Thousands of Hungarian communist officials and intellectuals were sentenced to death or years of imprisonment,
while tens of thousands were dismissed from their posts and the party — and an
even larger group of non-communists was sent to the gallows, to prisons or to
concentration camps. Among the victims were Foreign Minister Laszlo Rajk and
other prominent figures of the country's communist leadership. 20 Most of them
had been accused of being agents for Tito, the "chained dog of Western imperialists." As Tito exclaimed in a speech in 1949: "[Olver there, in Hungary, the
leaders are the most corrupted souls, the biggest perverts!" 21 Later, in the
summer of 1956, Tito described his enemy to the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki: "I
know Rakosi; he's an insensitive, merciless, stubborn, and heartless person."
Kurimszki noted that Tito "gripped the edge of the table" as he spoke. 22
Because Rakosi had played such a prominent role in denouncing Tito, the
process of normalizing Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in 1955-56 entailed a direct
threat to his own power and legitimacy. Rakosi clung to power as long as he
could by resorting to half-measures. He expressed his regret for the rupture in
Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in 1948, but blamed a conveniently dead Lavrenti
Beria. 23 However, Tito insisted in 1955 that several issues had to be resolved
before Yugoslav relations with Hungary could be normalized: for example, the
rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in
Hungary, 24 fair treatment of the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary, 25 and the
payment of reparations to Yugoslavia.
Rajk was eventually rehabilitated on March 28 and honorably reburied on
October 6, 1956. However, in his announcement of the rehabilitation — published in Szabad Nep on March 29 — Rakosi never actually accepted full
responsibility for Rajk's death. He blamed everyone from Beria, Victor Abakumov, 26 Mihaly Farkas, 27 and Gabor Peter 2S instead. 29 On May 18 Rakosi admitted
a degree of responsibility for the mass repression in the 1949-1952 period,
although not for the Rajk case.
After some procrastination, Rakosi also freed all the Yugoslav prisoners
in Hungary (197 people). On December 9, 1955, the Rakosi government allowed
them either to return to Yugoslavia or remain in Hungary. 30 (Rakosi had h a r a s sed the Yugoslavs living in Hungary, arresting many of them, 11 soon after the
Rajk trial in 1949.)
As for the Hungarians' treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary,
the situation also improved somewhat, once travel restrictions on Yugoslav
diplomats and journalists •— the information-providers — were removed/ 2 After
1948, all schools in Hungary offering instruction in Serbo-Croatian had apparently been shut down, particularly in the town of Mohacs in southern Hungary.
Yugoslav children in Hungary were thus forced to learn the Magyar tongue. By
1956 only several hundred Yugoslavs in Mohacs even remembered their native
tongue. This situation was little known because Yugoslav diplomats were
apparently unable to visit the town, which had become part of a "forbidden
border zone" after the Tito-Stalin schism. 33 Rumours also abounded that in the
late fall of 1955 the Hungarian authorities had arrested a large number of Serbs
living in southern Hungary. 34 Once the so-called forbidden zone was opened in
early 1956, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists made a point of attending
cultural events there, and of denouncing Rakosi's "policy of magyarization," a
practice which irritated Hungarian and Soviet officials no end, judging from
these officials' documented conversations. The war of words was often very
bitter. At one point Yugoslav attache Radenovic apparently accused the Hungarians of treating the arrested Yugoslavs the way Italian fascist authorities had
treated Yugoslav partizans during World War II for the latters' violence against
suspectcd Nazi collaborators. 35 We should note, of course, that Tito himself had
been responsible for the presence of many Yugoslavs in Hungary as he had
forced thousands of Yugoslav citizens loyal to the Cominform (branded "Stalinists," "Cominformists," or iheovci)36 to flee their country after the 1948 schism. 37
(The less fortunate iheovci were sent to the infamous "Goli Otok" concentration
c a m p in Yugoslavia.) According to Belgrade sources, the entire Cominformist
emigration amounted to 4,928 individuals. 38
Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of the most persistent sources of
tension between the two countries was the issue of financial reparations, the
negotiations on which repeatedly stalled, unlike the negotiations with the other
bloc members. Tito wanted not only to be compensated for the ruptured trade
ties with Hungary, but also to be repaid for the economic credits Yugoslavia had
extended to Hungary between 1946 and 1948.19 Delegates from the two countries first met on September 7, but the talks ended in a stalemate on September
24, 1955.40 Another round of secret negotiations began on January 17, 1956.41
The Yugoslavs insisted on a sum of $150 million, to be paid in the course of
seven years, while the Hungarians would not budge from their offer of $71-72
million worth of commodities over a period of 10 years. 42 Again, the negotiations broke down. In mid-March the Hungarian Politburo decided to increase the
proposed sum by $10 million. 43 Talks resumed on April 19, 1956, and on May
29, 1956, a draft agreement on reparations was reached. 44 By June 26, Rakosi
was able to report to Voroshilov in Moscow that "mutual financial claims
fpretenziia] with Yugoslavia have been completely resolved." Rakosi confided in
Voroshilov, however, that the Yugoslav delegation behaved so "arrogantly," that
he had to keep his fellow Hungarians from reciprocating, in order to prevent the
talks from breaking down yet again.45 The Yugoslav negotiators' attitudes — if
we can trust Rakosi's report — indicate their feelings toward the Hungarian
leaders, while Rakosi's report seems illustrative of the resentment he continued to
feel toward the regime in Belgrade.
Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the rehabilitation of
Laszlo Rajk, the amnesty granted to Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary,
improved treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary, and the agreement
about reparations payment, were apparently not enough to ensure good relations
between Budapest and Belgrade. This fact underlines the failure of Khrushchev's
"pilgrimage" to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June
1956 to bring lasting improvement to intra-bloc relations through eliminating —
or, at least, greatly reducing — the mutual distrust that had existed between the
Yugoslav and Hungarian leaderships ever since 1948.
Conflicting Views of Developments in Hungary
Khrushchev and his associates apparently assumed that "destalinizalion" in
Hungary could take place as soon as new leaders were installed in the peoples'
democracies. In Hungary Rakosi was at long last replaced in July as the Party's
First Secretary with Erno Gero. However, the destalinizalion policy unleashed
forces beyond Khrushchev's power to control. A number of authors have clearly
showed that Moscow had been unprepared for the Hungarian crisis. 46 Soviet
leaders were unable to defuse the situation as they had in the case of Poland. 4 '
The changes they made were always too late, outpaced by the wave of popular
unrest. The masses themselves — not just the party elite or intelligentsia — were
dissatisfied. The Soviet leaders mistakenly believed that by putting pressure on
Tito, the popular movement in Hungary could be stopped. 48 To understand
better why and how the Soviet leaders miscalculated — and why the HungarianYugoslav rapprochement was so slow — we must assess the nature of the
information upon which Soviet leaders' perceptions were based.
The reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest were often biased and
alarmist. The embassy's staff construed the Yugoslav representatives' eagerness
to strengthen ties with the Hungarians as interference in Hungary's internal
affairs and a threat to the USSR. 49 At the same time the Yugoslavs perceived
the Hungarians' tardiness in responding to Tito's stated preconditions for normalization as evidence of their unwillingness to admit their mistakes committed in
the 1949-1952 period.
Why were the reports by information providers not more objective?
Perhaps it would be useful to consider the actual motivations of these people in
order to answer this question. Although Khrushchev had, after much delay,
replaced Rakosi with Gero (and eventually with Imre Nagy and then Janos
Kadar), mid-level state and diplomatic officials in Hungary (just as in Yugoslavia and the USSR) — that is, the people actually in charge of the day-to-day
running of diplomatic relations — remained at their posts. 50 These were officials
whose attitudes had been most shaped by the events of 1948-49, and who could
not easily abandon their resentments.
Indeed, mid-level diplomats and journalists —- whether in Hungary,
Yugoslavia or the USSR — played an important role in the events of 1955-56,
but their perspectives often differed from those of their superiors (i.e., the state
and party leaders). The archives reveal a steady stream of negative diplomatic
reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest to the Central Committee of the
Soviet Presidium or the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Although he had lost
credibility after July 1956, Rakosi also sent letters to the CPSU Central Committee — by this time from his residence in the Soviet Union — warning that
"Hungarians [were] lavishing attention on Yugoslavia." 51 Some of these reports,
as well as those of the Soviet diplomats, contained unconfirmed rumours. Those
filed by Yugoslav diplomats were no different. Tito himself complaincd about
the "disinformation from our diplomatic personnel" during the secret meeting in
the Crimea in late September 1956. v The dissemination of this kind of disinformation had helped to prevent full reconciliation between Hungary and Yugoslavia, and between Yugoslavia and the USSR.
Perhaps it would be useful to consider the motivations of these three
groups of information-providers: the hard-line pro-Soviet Hungarian officials, the
Soviet diplomats in Budapest, and the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists.
The pro-Soviet Hungarian officials were inclined to give alarmist reports
to the Soviet diplomats at the Budapest embassy, because it was they who felt
most threatened by the rising popular discontent. Their jobs depended on Soviet
power propping up the regime. They knew only too well that they — branded
"Muscovites" and "Stalinists" — were hated even more than Soviet diplomatic
and military personnel, because they were Magyars betraying fellow Magyars.
Thus, they had a tendency to exaggerate the "danger" and to report every real or
perceived rebuff (from the Yugoslavs) to the Soviet embassy personnel, in the
hope that the Russians would take strong action. These alarmist reports, they
hoped, served to "prove" their loyalty to Moscow, 53
The Soviet diplomats in Budapest also felt threatened by the rising
discontent long suppressed during the Stalin era. The fact that they were in a
foreign country for protracted periods of time made them suspect to the Kremlin
leaders. Indeed, only a very few members of the Soviet elite were ever trusted to
be sent abroad. Once given such an assignment, Soviet diplomats were constantly aware of the need to prove they had not "gone native." This way of
thinking is revealed in their characterization of other diplomats. For example, in
a collectively written biographical reference (spravka), Soviet diplomats described both Ferenc Miinnich, 54 and Lajos CsebP 5 to be partial to Yugoslavia,
simply because both Hungarian officials had once served as ambassadors to
Yugoslavia. This tendency of the Soviet diplomats to take a hard-line position in
order to prove their loyalty to Moscow probably became even more intense when
they were stationed in a country that was perceived to be in rebellion against the
Soviet Union. The fact that an "anti-Soviet movement" was growing in Hungary
increased the danger that they, the diplomats, would be deemed, at the least, as
not having been "strict" or "vigilant" enough, or at the most, as having encouraged anti-Soviet feelings. Being especially "vigilant," however, could improve
one's chances for promotion in the Soviet hierarchy. It is noteworthy, for
example, that Ambassador Yuri Andropov, who took a very strict approach to
the 1956 revolution, was promoted in 1957 to the post of director of the CPSU
Central Committee's department for ties with communist parties in the Soviet
bloc. 56 Janos Kadar's government also presented him with a special award. 57
Clearly, Andropov's "vigilance" was richly rewarded.
Both Soviet diplomats and the Hungarian loyalists, described earlier,
believed that "interference in Hungary's internal affairs" in the period before
mid-October included the Yugoslavs visiting factories and preaching "the
Yugoslav way" to the workers there, as well as publishing long articles about
Imre Nagy's activities in major Yugoslav newspapers while abridging or virtually
ignoring the speeches of Gero. For these Soviet and Hungarian informationproviders, the Yugoslavs' support of Nagy was especially vexing, since Nagy had
not even been readmitted to the communist party until October 14, 1956.
To some extent the Soviet and Hungarian officials were correct: the
Yugoslavs were interfering in Hungary's internal affairs. According to international law, a diplomatic envoy should remain politically neutral and not become
involved in the local politics of the host country. But at times these officials
appear to have confused "interference in the internal affairs" of Hungary with
freedom of the Yugoslav press. They complained that the Yugoslav newspapers,
especially the major ones, like Borba and Politika, were giving excessive
coverage to the "counterrevolutionary events" in Hungary, while virtually
ignoring major events in the USSR or in the People's Republic of China. These
critics tended to forget that it was the Yugoslav journalists' professional duty to
collect as much information as possible, especially about a country on their own
border. By merely reporting, these journalists did not violate the sovereignty of
Hungary. Accusations of interference by Yugoslavia bccamc especially ludicrous
after the November 4 invasion. Who were the Russians — who sent tanks
crashing into Budapest —- to talk about "interference in the internal affairs of
Hungary?" 5 *
Perhaps the reason why the proliferation of Titoist ideas so
exasperated both Hungarian and Soviet officials is that they could not openly
protest this influence: Khrushchev had publicly "made up" with Tito, so the
latter had been certified respectable again.
For many Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the 1948-1949 events in
Hungary had been formative experiences in their carecrs. Well-acquainted with
the hardships Yugoslavia's population had endured as a result of the humiliating
dismissal from the Cominform and economic boycott by the Soviet bloc countries, it was hard for some of them to change their thinking about Rakosi and his
Stalinist colleagues. Like Tito, they were pleased with Khrushchev's speeches at
the Twentieth Party Congress, which they considered "a qualitative leap," but
they expected much more direct criticism of Stalin at future party congresses. 59
Their hatred of Rakosi only intensified after he admitted in March 1956 that
Rajk had been innocent, because it further discredited their own colleague Lazar
Brankov. In 1948 Rakosi had ignored Brankov's diplomatic immunity, arrested
him and got him to testify against Rajk and Tito during the September 1949
trial. 60 (Brankov had been consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest at the
time and was charge d'affaires in the absence of Ambassador Mrazovic.) 61
The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that
many of the Yugoslav diplomats had "built their careers on" the 1948 rift and
now had difficulty readjusting/" For example, Marko Zsigmond, second secretary of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the
Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee and thus "knew the history of the
Soviet-Yugoslav rift well."63 Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency
to harp on the 1948 events in conversations. 64
For many Yugoslav diplomats the temptation to say "I told you so" was
overwhelming. Many had traveled throughout Hungary, visiting factories and
cultural events put on by the Yugoslavs, telling Hungarian workers that the 1948
rift had been the "Stalinists' fault." After the verbal abuse they had endured just
a few years earlier, they must have been tempted to gloat over Rakosi's setbacks
and boast about Yugoslavia's accomplishments. The ultimate repercussions of
their encouragement of lmre Nagy's supporters do not seem to have troubled
(hem. For them the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was so
slow was simple: it was all Rakosi's fault. Many Yugoslav journalists attended
the Petofi Club's discussions, 65 and attributed the complaints by the students and
writers to the fact that Rakosi had not fully recanted his mistakes. 66 For these
Yugoslav diplomats and journalists the measure of Khrushchev's sincerity was
his willingness to whip Rakosi into line or to dismiss him.
The Yugoslav diplomats also spread the rhetoric about the "third camp"
and how there could be "alternative roads to socialism," which was in some
ways reminiscent of the earlier ideological quarrel of the 1940s between Stalin's
"popular front from above" and Tito's "popular front from below." In contrast to
Soviet and Hungarian officials' claims of excessive coverage of the Hungarian
"counterrevolution" in the Yugoslav media, the Yugoslav journalists complained
about the scanty coverage of Yugoslav events and speeches by Yugoslav
officials in Hungarian newspapers. Several speeches, they claimed, were "printed
in such an abridged form that the information was distorted," while unimportant
events in the other socialist countries were covered extensively. 6 '
It should be noted that the Yugoslavs were not the only proselytizers.
Some of the attempts to improve ties (especially at the non-governmental level)
between the two East European countries came at the initiative of the antiStalinist (or even anti-Soviet) Hungarian intellectuals themselves. As an anecdotal example, the Hungarians wanted to resurrect the Hungarian-Yugoslav
cultural society, which had been banned in 1949.68 Ambassador Andropov
immediately notified Moscow with alarm. "Pay attention to the fact that, despite
the liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the
enclosed document shows," he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian
intelligentsia seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against accusations of
"interference." As Tito wrote in one of his post-invasion letters to the CPSU, in
essence: it is not Yugoslavia's fault if Hungarians look to Yugoslavia as a model
to emulate. 69
Tito's Attitudes
Tito's own perspectives serve as further explanation why initiatives like Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955 and Tito's visit to Moscow in May-June
1956 did not quickly dispel the mistrust between the Yugoslavs and Hungarians.
To Tito destalinization entailed much more than simply the replacement of
Stalinist leaders with national communists in the East European communist
countries, or simply the resolution of the concrete issues outlined above —
although all these matters were important to him. Rather, Tito sought a fundamental recognition that Yugoslavia was just as important as the Soviet Union in
the international communist movement. Thus, while in many respects, Tito's
individual perspective resembled that of the Yugoslav information-providers, the
slowness of the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement stemmed also from Tito's
own memories and values. His vivid recollection of Rakosi's ruthless anti-Tito
campaign, beginning with the Rajk trial in 1949, made it difficult for Tito to
forgive and forget.
Furthermore, Tito greatly valued Yugoslavia's unique brand of national
communism which had emerged from Yugoslav soil and the experiences of
World War IT. From Tito's perspective, Yugoslavia's historical achievements
were hard-earned and thus needed to be cherished. It was the "twofold character
of the National Liberation Struggle" — against both fascist aggressors and
internal traitors — that made Yugoslavia unique. In an article written in Octobcr
1946, Tito had written:
ITJhc people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders
but also against their allies, the local traitors — the gangs of Pavelic,
Nedic, Rupnik, and Draza Mihailovic. Despite the fact that the invaders
and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in their great
struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation struggle of the
nations of Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No other occupied
country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and our people have a
right to be proud of it.70
It should also be kept in mind that Tito's Partisans had defeated the Nazi
occupiers without the help of the Soviet Red army. True, Stalin sent security
guards for Tito, but this was after the war and intended more as a means of
Soviet control than of protection for Yugoslavia." Then, in June 1948, Stalin
banished Tito from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), just nine
months after its founding congress in Szklarska Poreba (Poland). The Cominform
resolution calling for Yugoslavia's expulsion accused the country of "pursuing an
incorrect line" in foreign policy, representing a "departure from MarxismLeninism." It also stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party had spread "slanderous propaganda about the "degeneration of the CPSU," thus borrowing "from
the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism." 72 At the heart of the SovietYugoslav dispute was Tito's refusal to obey Stalin. Stalin first became angry at
Tito already during the final phases of the war for supporting the Greek communists as well as for claiming the city of Trieste, thus complicating Stalin's
wartime alliance with the British and Americans. 73 When all the communist bloc
countries broke off trade with Yugoslavia, Tito's Communist party managed to
stay in power, despite the sudden economic boycott. To the Soviet leaders'
dismay, Tito succcedcd in receiving economic and military assistance from the
Americans while still remaining communist. Both Tito and his representatives in
Budapest were fond of reminding Hungarian and Soviet officials of the fact that
they had not "surrendered to the imperialists," despite their ostracism from the
socialist camp. 74 Tito ccrtainly had not disappeared when Stalin had "shaken his
little finger." 7> Indeed the Stalin-Tito feud was so intense that Tito expected the
Russians to intervene while the West was distracted by the war in Korea. 76
Stalin may also have authorized an assassination of Tito in (he fall of 1952,
which was aborted only bccause of Stalin's own unexpected death in March
1953.77 Having fought and won independence from both the Nazis (militarily)
and from the Russians (economically and ideologically), Tito vowed never to
relinquish Yugoslavia's new status, never to capitulate to Moscow.
Tito's peddling of the third-path model evidently worried Soviet and
Hungarian officials for both ideological and political reasons. The concept
frightened Moscow because it was providing communists with an ideological
sanction for disobedience. Even after the disbanding of the Cominform in 1956,
the Soviet leaders insisted that their Party should play a leading role in the world
communist movement. (One of the "twenty-one conditions" for admission of a
communist party to the Comintern, one might recall, had been rigid allegiance to
the Bolshevik party line in Moscow.) As Khrushchev explained to Tito, apparently in earnest: "we didn't seek a leading role; historical conditions have given
us this special responsibility, and now we need to fulfill it." 78
In the context of politics, Tito's advocacy of a "third path" bespoke
possible intentions to form a separate alliance between Yugoslavia and some of
the other communist countries, excluding the Soviet Union — a new regional
federation of states, this time including Hungary. 79 The notion of intrabloc ties
independent of Moscow repelled Soviet leaders — and the Hungarian leaders
dependent on Soviet hegemony — becausc it reminded them of the Titoist threat
back in the mid-1940s, when Tito strove to form independent ties with other
East European countries without Moscow's participation. Tito's Balkan Pact with
Grccce and Turkey, established in 1954, was bad enough. Having ties with these
two countries was tantamount to joining NATO, the Soviet leaders felt. 80 But
an alliance of communist countries, or small countries with sizable communist
parties, that excluded the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. To the Soviets
Tito seemed intent on forming one, or at the very least, driving a wedge between
the USSR and the other bloc countries. 81 They could not understand the concept
of neutralism; any alliance excluding them would ipso facto be an anti-Soviet
alliance.
Even if a separate bloc or federation were not formed, what the Soviet
authorities and Hungarian Stalinists feared was the "spillover effect," or ideological contamination of the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media. 82
As
mentioned earlier, the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists to
some extent caused the Soviet leaders to misinterpret the origins of the discontent in Hungary. The Soviet leaders tended to think that only a small coterie of
writers and intellectuals was causing the trouble, not the "toiling masses" of
Hungary. This mentality was especially true of Soviet party stalwart Mikhail
Suslov, w7ho was sent to Budapest in mid-June 1956, and wrote back to Moscow,
assuring the Kremlin that "...the mood of the workers and peasants is healthy....
[AJmong them, as well as in the lower industrial parly organizations, there are
no conversations about a 'crisis' in the party leadership or about distrust toward
the leaders." 83
Meanwhile Moscow also received numerous reports from Andropov,
Gero, and others, complaining about Yugoslav influence on the Hungarian
intelligentsia. 84 Thus the Soviet and Hungarian leaders tried several times in the
months preceding the crisis to get Tito to exert pressure on his diplomats and
journalists. For example, when the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki visited Tito at
his retreat on Brioni Island on July 21, 1956 to deliver the official note about
Rakosi's resignation, he also "reminded Tito about the commentaries on the
Yugoslav radio and articles that appeared in the newspapers Borba and Politika.... [Hie compared the roles of Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos with the
activities of Milovan Djilas." 85 Tito evidently ignored him.86 T h e issue was
raised again, both when CPSU Presidium member Anastas Mikoyan visited Tito
on the same day, 8 ' and also when Khaishchev, Tito, Gero, Kadar and others
convened in the Crimea (Yalta) in September-October, 1956.88 (Earlier, on
September 3, the CPSU had warned all the East European communist parties in
a secret letter not to "take the Yugoslav example" too seriously; the purpose of
the Crimea meeting was, in part, for Khrushchev and Tito to iron out their
differences). "The Yugoslav mission in Budapest openly maintains ties with
people in opposition to the CC HWP,,. [and] the Yugoslav newspapers shield the
opportunists banished from the communist party... for example, Imre Nagy in
Hungary," 89 Khrushchev claimed.
The Soviet leaders believed the Hungarian intellectuals were being
"infected" by the Yugoslavs. 90 If only Tito would clamp down on them, they
thought, the situation in Hungary would calm down. It is significant that during
the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting, according to the recently declassified Malin notes, Khrushchev thought he could use the Yugoslavs' influence on
Hungary to Soviet advantage. He asked his colleagues: Would it not be appropriate if the Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians? 91 Moreover, during this same
meeting, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov acknowledged
that "the influence of the [Hungarian Communist] party on the masses [was]
weak," despite the initial reassuring messages from Comrades Mikoyan and
Suslov that the Hungarian government was strong.92 Despite Molotov's sober
assessment, Khrushchev, as late as November 2-3, during his meeting with Tito
on Brioni Island, apparently believed that at least some Hungarian workers could
be mobilized against Nagy:
the workers in the Miskolc region, where Hungarian miners had remained loyal though reactionaries were in power. The Czechs had given the
miners some arms and it might be possible to try some political action
against Nagy with the help of those Hungarian miners or jointly with
them."
Since Tito's death in 1980 numerous biographies of him have appeared,
reappraising his character and policies. They challenge the orthodox view of his
official biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, and describe Tito's skills of Realpolitik. 94
Undoubtedly Tito — like the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists — sincerely
believed in the superiority of the "Yugoslav way" and the equality of all communist countries. Yet, as an experienced politician, he must have realized the
usefulness of the third-path rhetoric. Permitting his subordinates freedom of
expression won the approval of American policymakers, especially of Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles.
At the same time, much like Dulles's own "Liberation" rhetoric, it created
the illusion of being on the offensive, of encouraging Nagy and his supporters.
("Liberation," it will be recalled, was coined by Dulles during the 1952 presidential campaign to present the American people with an alternative to the more
passive-sounding "containment" strategy of Truman and the Democrats, whom
Dulles accused of being "soft on communism.") 95 To some degree, Tito's call
for "alternative roads to communism" served to mask his own secret fears about
the Hungarian rebellion.
Tito's Secrcl Fears
Like Khrushchev, Tito was caught off guard by the October-Novembcr, 1956
events in Hungary, specifically when the Hungarians' anti-Stalinist mood shifted
to an anti-communist mood. Publicly Tito was propounding the third-path
rhetoric, "different roads to socialism," and non-interference in the internal
affairs of sovereign countries. It was known that Nagy, like Tito, was also
attracted to the Five Principles (Pancha Shila) propounded at the 1955 Bandung
Conference. In early 1956 Imre Nagy was writing his book, In Defense of the
New Course, the third chaptcr of which is devoted to these principles. 96 Nagy
argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the
capitalist system, but also "to the relations between the countries within the
democratic and socialist camp." 9 ' (Interestingly, according to the Malin notes,
the Pancha Shila was mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on
October 30, 1956 by Lazar Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they should
propose that wc build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.") 98
Despite his outward support of Nagy, inwardly Tito felt threatened by
Nagy's movement. With the opening of the communist party archives, it can be
seen that Tito's perspective changed as discontent turned into violence in
Hungary. 99 Tito realized the potential of nationalist (non-communist) "spillover"
into multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. He had always been careful to conceal the fact that
he was born into a peasant family from north Croatia and actually fought on the
Austrian-Hungarian side against Serbia in I914,'<X! It was much easier to
encourage faraway Poland, than nearby Hungary. Between October 31 and
November 1, the leading Yugoslav newspaper Borha stopped supporting the
Nagy government and began denouncing its connection to "right-wing elements."
Indeed, as his own fears of spillover intensified, Tito probably began to empathize somewhat with the Russians concerning their fear of the possible
spillover of Yugoslav ideas into other communist bloc countries.
Recently opened archives provide some detail about Tito's fears. 101 In his
letter of November 8 to Khrushchev (and later on November II in his speech at
Pula), Tito stated clearly that he had agreed with Khrushchev on the need to
intervene. 102 In fact, Khrushchev himself apparently was surprised at how
readily Tito agreed with him on the need to intervene. 104 Moreover, Tito was
quoted often by the Soviet Presidium as having asked rhetorically: "What kind of
a revolutionary, what kind of communist, could Nagy be, if with his knowledge
they hanged and shot leading workers, communists and public figures?" 104 Two
months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head [podnial golovuj, especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited the employees of
the Yugoslav security organs to violence." After Firiubin told him that his speech
in Pula, and the speech of Yugoslav Vicc-Prcsidcnt Eduard Kardelj later, made a
bad impression in Moscow, Tito said, "1 did not want to complicate in any way
Soviet-Yugoslav relations." 105 The Soviet Presidium also claimed that Tito
himself had plans to intervene militarily in Hungary. 10 " Tito, in his talk with the
Soviet military delegation on Brioni Island on November 18, 1956, allegedly
declared, "If the Soviet troops were not used to put down the insurrection, then
Yugoslav troops, which were by that time braced [podtianutyi] on the YugoslavHungarian border, would have been sent in for that purpose." 107 (Khrushchev
himself may have thought about a possible Yugoslav intervention when he said
during the October 31 CC CPSU Presidium meeting "We should negotiate with
Tito... There will be no large-scale war.") 108 In a conversation with Andropov,
Kadar said, "The Yugoslavs apparently are trying to save Nagy not bccause they
need him, but because they fear he can cause some undesirable things for
them." 109
Tito's fears about spillover c o m e into focus when one considers the larger
historical context of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. Tt is worth remembering that
the state of Yugoslavia was created by incorporating large parts of southern
Hungary after World War One. In November 1918 the autonomous Kingdom of
Croatia severed its ties with the Kingdom of Hungary and the Serbs took control
of the Bacska, the Baranya, and the western Banal, presenting the Hungarians
with a fait accompli. The Treaty of Trianon (4 June 1920), sanctioned these
territorial changes. In fact, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its pre-war
territory. The territory ceded to Rumania alone — Transylvania and half of the
Banat — was larger than the area left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia gained
Slovakia and Ruthcnia, while other, much smaller areas were awarded to Austria,
Italy, and Poland. Whereas in 1914 approximately 21 million people lived in
Hungary, by 1920 Hungary had under 8 million inhabitants. Not surprisingly,
many Hungarians — including those living in Vojvodina and elsewhere in
Yugoslavia — clamored in the interwar years to have the Trianon Treaty revised. 110
Later, during World War II, Hungary became increasingly dependent on
Hitler's Germany. T h e Hungarian prime minister Laszlo Bardossy (who took
over in 1941 when his predecessor, Pal Tclcki, committed suicide) ordered the
Hungarian army to follow in the steps of the German Wehrmacht on 1 I April
1941 by invading Yugoslavia and occupying parts of the Vojvodina. Thanks to
German support, Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometers with 5
million inhabitants, including over 2 million Magyars. 111
During the war a strong Serbian partisan movement under Communist
leadership developed in occupied Yugoslavia, particularly in the Vojvodina. The
Hungarian military command there responded by anti-partisan raids and summary
executions. The largest anti-partisan campaign took place in Novi Sad (the main
city in the Vojvodina) late in January 1942, when units of the Hungarian military
and gendarmerie executed a great many suspected partizans — estimates range
f r o m several hundred to a few thousand — mainly Serbs and Jews. At the end of
1944, the Serbs reoccupied Vojvodina. Between 1941 and 1944 Serbian propagandists had exaggerated the size and extent of the massacre in Novi Sad. Not
surprisingly, a far more bloody Serbian vendetta was carried out against the
Hungarian population. Tito, the commander-in-chief of the partisan army at the
time, condoned the campaign of violence and apparently issued verbal orders to
his partisans to avenge all "injustices" suffered by partisans and Serbs during the
four years of the war. 112
During the following years, bitter emotions abounded on both the
Hungarian and Yugoslav sides. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift gave the Hungarian
Stalinists like Rakosi and Gero the opportunity to vilify all "Titoists" and the
Yugoslav minority in Hungary generally. Thus, given the history of YugoslavHungarian relations, Tito no doubt feared that the ethnic Hungarian minority in
northern Yugoslavia, consisting of over half-a-million people, would help spread
the ideas of the Hungarian Revolution inside his own country.
On the question of exactly who Tito had in mind to succeed Rakosi as
Hungary's leader the evidence is unclear. While some scholars have asserted
that Tito wholeheartedly favored Nagy as a replacement for Rakosi, there is
surprisingly little evidence in the Soviet archives to prove this. 113 On the contrary, Soviet sources indicate that Tito seemed willing — although unenthusiastically -— to tolerate the Stalinist Gero, but would have preferred Janos Kadar 114 or
Zoltan Szanto to head the new post-Rakosi regime."' When Tito was informed
by Kurimszki that "Rakosi had resigned," he never mentioned Nagy's name. 116
Of course, this may be because Nagy was not readmitted to the Hungarian
communist party until October 14, 1956. However, it appears that Tito did not
regard Nagy as highly as did the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in the
summer of 1956.
Indeed, as much as he detested Rakosi, perhaps he was willing to tolerate
Rakosi in the interest of maintaining calm relations between the Yugoslav and
Hungarian communist parties. 11 ' As he said in July 1956 to the envoy Kurimszki:
Whomever the Hungarian people choose and recognize as their leader is
their business... I also said in Moscow that 1 do not support Rakosi, but
if the Hungarian people want him, then let him be. It is their business.
We thought and still do think...that the settling of the issues between the
two parties should not cause shocks to the Hungarian Workers' Party." 8
This is not to say that Tito did not denounce Rakosi during the 1955 Belgrade
and 1956 Moscow meetings. However, even these negative comments would not
have persuaded the Khrushchev leadership to dismiss Rakosi in 1955." y The
contemporary Western press speculated that reparations payments from Hungary
— which were finally negotiated in May 1956 — may have persuaded Tito to
end his overt opposition to Rdkosi's incumbency. 120
Moscow finally insisted that Rakosi resign, because the situation in
Hungary was getting worse. Even the Hungarian Politburo did not want him, but
they were too afraid to tell Moscow; they were waiting for Moscow to take the
initiative. 121 Of course, Erno Gero, who took Rakosi's place, was no different.
Hungarians quipped: "In place of a fat Rakosi, we got a thin one." Even Khrushchev during the November 3 Presidium meeting remarked candidly: "It is my
fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gero rather than Kadar." 122
Given his wariness of Imre Nagy, why did Tito offer the latter political
asylum in his Budapest embassy? Scholars have been puzzled about Tito's
motives. This event is worth examining in detail, both because Tito's act of
granting Nagy asylum epitomizes his political philosophy, and because his
reticence in handing Nagy over to the USSR contributed to a new cold phase in
Yugoslav relations with both the USSR and Hungary.
Until the November 4 invasion, most of the Soviet and Hungarian
remarks were directed against the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in
Hungary, and against the pro-Nagy reporting of the Hungarian situation by the
Yugoslav journalists. Even at the Crimea meeting when Khrushchev discussed
this problem with Tito, he approached it in a delicate way that would enable Tito
to save face. Tt is plausible that Khrushchev, until the November 4 invasion, had
been willing to give Tito the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Yugoslav
journalists and diplomats were simply acting on their own and not on Tito's
orders. 123 But after November 4, when Nagy and forty-one others received
political refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the Soviet leader attacked
Tito: How dare Tito shelter this leader of the counterrevolution? Khrushchev was
enraged.
The coursc of events is well-known. At 5:20 a.m. Nagy made his last
appeal on Radio Budapest and then went to the Yugoslav embassy with Zoltan
Szanto and eleven other party leaders and intellectuals with their families. 124 In
the Yugoslav embassy, Nagy remained safe from the invading Soviet army until
his final departure from the embassy compound on November 22, 1956. What is
less known, however, is how exactly Nagy's group ended up in the Yugoslav
embassy and what Tito's motives were in giving him asylum. From the newly
available correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito, the following scenario
emerges. On November 1, Szanto spoke with the Yugoslav ambassador to
Hungary, Dalibor Soldatic, about the possible need for political asylum. He was
afraid of possible violence against Hungarian government members by the anticommunist insurgents. Soldatic gave a preliminary affirmative answer, and
Szanto was supposed to tell him exactly when he and others would be coming to
the embassy. Soldatic also informed Tito of this request.
The "Agreement" at Brioni
The next day Tito, Rankovic, 125 Kardelj, and Veljko Micunovic (the Yugoslav
Ambassador to the USSR) met with Khrushchev and Malcnkov at Tito's retreat
on Brioni Island and discussed the Hungarian situation from seven o'clock in the
evening to five o'clock the next morning. Khrushchev and Malcnkov informed
the Yugoslav leaders of Moscow's plans for invading Hungary, but not the actual
date. As mentioned earlier, by November 3 Tito had agreed with Khrushchev
both on the need to intervene militarily and on the wisdom of selecting Kadar as
the new leader. Tito also agreed to try to persuade Nagy to issue a declaration
announcing his own resignation, admit his inability to stop the violence in the
country, and proclaim his support for the new Kadar government. 126 During the
course of the conversation, according to Micunovic, Tito informed Khrushchev
about Szanto's request for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy:
They [Khrushchev and Malenkov] again asked what possibilities we had
of trying to do something about Nagy. Apart from Losonczy we
mentioned Zoltan Szantd, who has already asked for asylum in our
embassy because of the danger of reprisals. It seems to us that such
people are not to be distrusted, because they are decent folk with good
127
intentions.
The question arises: if Khrushchev objected so much to Nagy's refuge in the
Yugoslav embassy, why did he not protest this possible scenario when it was
first broachcd during the meeting at Brioni? Several answers can be deduced.
First, Tito apparently mentioned only Szanto, and not Nagy, so perhaps Khrushchev did not realize that Nagy himself might also seek asylum in the Yugoslav
embassy. Second, the most pressing conccrn for Khrushchev and Malenkov at
the time was getting Tito's support for the intervention and his promise to try to
persuade Nagy to resign and announce publicly his support for the Kadar
government. It was clcar to the Yugoslavs thai Khrushchev had already decided
to intervene, and that he merely wanted Tito's ex post facto approval — not his
advice or permission. Khrushchev needed Tito's help in making the Soviet
invasion look more legitimate to the international community, which would then
facilitate the "normalization" in Hungary.
In addition, since Tito had been surprisingly supportive of the Soviet
invasion plan, Khrushchev evidently assumed that, even if Nagy sought asylum
in the Yugoslav embassy, Tito would quickly turn Nagy over to the Soviet
authorities. This is indicated in the telegram of November 4, in which Khrushchev instructed Soviet Ambassador Firiubin to tell Eduard Kardelj, Deputy Head
of the Yugoslav Government, that
as far as the further sojourn of Nagy and his group in the embassy,
excesses could occur with them, not only by the reaction but also by the
revolutionary elements. Thus, bearing in mind that the Hungarian
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government [headed by Kadar] does not
have security organs at present, it would be expedient to deliver Nagy
and his group to our troops for transport to the Revolutionary WorkerPeasant government in Szolnok.12*
Despite Tito's assent to "work on Nagy," what complicated matters was Khrushchev's silence about when the invasion would begin. Micunovic writes:
The Russians still said nothing about when their troops would intervene.
Wc can't ask them, and they don't want to say. For that reason the time
factor remains unclear: We don't know what opportunity we may have
to influence Nagy and try to reduce the number of casualties and the
amount of unnecessary bloodshed. But we agreed that wc would try and
influence Nagy.124
Before Szanto could reply to Soldatic about when he would seek asylum,
the actual invasion had begun, on November 4. Soldatic called Nagy at 1;00 a.m.
on the same day in the Hungarian Parliament building and invited him to the
Yugoslav embassy. Thus, on the basis of the first tentative conversation on
November 1, the Nagy group fled to the embassy. 130
Since Tito had mentioned Szanto's request during the Brioni meeting, he
apparently concluded that Khrushchev condoned the possible offer of asylum to
the Hungarian leaders. This is indicated in the November 4 telegram in which
Firiubin wrote:
Kardelj reported that on the night of November 4 they called Imre
Nagy, as it had been agreed with comrade Khrushchev... It is still not
clear, said Kardelj, whether or not Imre Nagy made his last declaration
in the name of the government in Budapest. If he did make this declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs will try to get him to state that he made
it under pressure from the reactionaries. They also intend to persuade
Imre Nagy to make a declaration of support for the government headed
by Kadar in Szolnok. In Kardelj's words such a declaration will facilitate
discussion of the Hungarian question in the Security Council and
[facilitate diplomatic] recognition of Kadar's government as the legitimate government.131
This means that Nagy's group was already in the embassy before the Yugoslavs
knew that Nagy had declared Hungary's neutrality. 132
Later, in explaining to Khrushchev why he had granted asylum to Nagy,
Tito cited the sheer "speed of events" and "absence of detailed information." 133
"This problem... in the final analysis... is a result of our conversation on Brioni,
although because of the events in Hungary, things developed differently than we
expected," he wrote. The conversation between Szanto and Soldatic had already
taken place before the Brioni meeting, and Tito did inform Khrushchev of it.
Khrushchev appears to be the one to blame for the initial presence of Nagy's
group in the Yugoslav embassy, since he did not tell Tito at Brioni that the offer
of political asylum to Nagy was unacceptable. He also did not give Tito a
reasonable amount of time in which to persuade Nagy to make the declaration
supporting Kadar. Soviet troops went into action less than twenty-four hours
after Khrushchev and Malenkov left Tito at Brioni.
The quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders developed later
when Khrushchcv realized that Tito would not easily relinquish Nagy and his
group. It was simply incomprehensible to Khrushchev that Tito could continue to
harbour Nagy, the "leader of the counterrevolution," when Tito had been so
understanding during the Brioni meeting.
The Soviets then, in all likelihood, decided to intimidate the Yugoslavs in
another, non-verbal, way. By explicitly mentioning in the November 4 telegram
that "excesses" could occur, the Soviets seem to have been preparing a cover for
a little-known event that took place on November 5 at 3:30 p.m. 133 On this day
a Soviet tank fired on the Yugoslav embassy. The cultural attache Milcnko
Milovanov was killed in the gunfire, the building was damaged, and all the
windows were shattered. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Ko£a Popovic, accused
the Soviet authorities of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy, know
ing that it was indeed the Yugoslav embassy and that Imre Nagy and his
supporters were inside. 135 To reinforce Popovic's complaint, the Yugoslav
ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Micunovic, visited the Soviet minister of
foreign affairs, Dmitri Shepilov, the next day. 136 Dalibor Soldatic, the Yugoslav
ambassador in Budapest, also complained about the incident to Andropov.
Soldatic requested that Soviet tanks near the Yugoslav embassy be moved.
Andropov relayed this message to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet deputy foreign
minister, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit
from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature." 13 '
As we know from Malin's notes, these messages were discussed at the
Presidium meeting by Khrushchev, Zhukov and Shepilov. A cable was prepared
for the Yugoslav government and transmitted via Firyubin to Popovic. 138 On
November 9, 1956 a commission composed of Major-General K.E. Grebennik,' 3y
Colonel K.V. Boskoboinik, and Major A. B. Lukin conducted an investigation of
the circumstances. 140 The Yugoslav government later presented a claim of
$84,446 to Hungary for the death of Milovanov. 141
Although the Soviet officials claimed that it was an accident, the attack
on the Yugoslav mission could very well have been deliberate (although this
cannot be verified until other documents from the Soviet military archives are
declassified). The Soviet leaders resented Tito for giving the Nagy group
political refuge, and this would have been an easy way to take revenge. They
had both the motive and the opportunity, and the incident could be readily
explained. After all, Tito himself had earlier asked the Soviet government to
"take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it." 142
From the Yugoslav point of view, once Nagy's presence in the embassy
became known throughout the world, the situation changed; Tito was caught in a
dilemma. As Micunovic aptly articulated it: "[the Soviets] have decided to sling
mud at Yugoslavia as the organizer of the counterrevolution if we don't hand
Imre Nagy and the others over to them. But if we do hand them over, they will
then point to us as a country which does not keep its word and which nobody
should depend on." 143
Tito concluded that he might as well take advantage of this opportunity to
persuade Nagy to resign — something he had promised Khrushchev he would
do. As Tito wrote in his letter to Khrushchev, the act of granting asylum to
Nagy "did not contradict the Brioni agreement." 144 The Yugoslavs, Tito assured
Khrushchev, wanted the same thing Khrushchev and Kadar wanted: a strong
communist government in Hungary. They had sincerely tried to persuade Nagy
to declare his support for Kadar.' 4 " The fact that Nagy turned out to be stubbom, Tito noted, should not be blamed on the Yugoslav Communist Party. 146
Furthermore, as he tried to explain to Khrushchev, not all of the members of
Nagy's group were "anti-Soviet"; some were "honest communists" who would be
great assets to Kadar's new government. What was wrong with offering them
asylum? 147 Zoltan Szanto, for example, was one of the original leaders of the
underground Hungarian communist party; he helped recruit Hungarians into the
communist party while at a P O W camp near Suzdal in the USSR in 1943.148 He
had also once been the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia, and was highly
regarded by the Yugoslavs. Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders also evidently
believed that, once Nagy and his group left the embassy and "confronted the
actual situation," they would eventually "abandon their quixotic attitude" and
"realize that they have to contribute to the building of socialism." 149
When Tito refused to turn in the Nagy group, Khrushchev began to
accuse him of protecting Nagy, the very man Tito had described at the Brioni
meeting as having "cleared the path for counterrevolution." From the Soviet
viewpoint, offering Nagy political asylum was a supreme example of "interference in the internal affairs of Hungary." 150 The longer Tito kept Nagy, the more
convincing became the reports filed by the Soviet diplomats and Hungarian
officials in Budapest in 1955 and in the early months of 1956. As time passed,
the accusations became more shrill. Tito, the Soviet leaders said, had "warned
Nagy of the upcoming invasion." 1 M This "Titoist perfidy" no doubt strengthened
the clout of Molotov's Stalinist faction in the Soviet government. Molotov had
opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Tito, and was later ousted in 1957 for his
"erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question." (He apparently believed that even
Kadar was too much of a "Titoist;" during the November 4 CC CPSU Presidium
meeting Molotov urged his colleagues to exert more pressure on Kadar "so that
Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia. ")1SJ
Tt is true that the Yugoslavs did "warn" Nagy about the invasion; Soldatic
called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on November 4 and told him. 15 ' But by then probably
everyone could see that an invasion was imminent. Also, Soldatic could not have
known exactly when the Soviet invasion would begin, so if he had warned the
Hungarians, it was only in a very general way.
Given Tito's wariness of Nagy, his agreement with Khrushchcv on the
need to intervene, IS4 and his desire for harmonious relations with the USSR, one
must ask: why did Tito not quickly hand Nagy and his associates over to the
Soviets? Why did he object to sending them to Romania, Khrushchev's chosen
destination for the group?
The answer lies, again, with Tito's values and fears. He valued Yugoslavia's reputation as a responsible, sovereign state, and was convinced that
Yugoslavia should honor the principles of international law as befits such a state.
It is noteworthy that Tito kept the Brioni meeting with Khrushchev secret from
the Yugoslav public for several days, to avoid tarnishing Yugoslavia's reputation.'" Once Nagy's presence in his embassy became widely known, Tito took
the concept of political asylum seriously. In his February 1957 letter to the
CPSU's Central Committee, Tito maintained that he could not "violate his word
and simply give up these people," citing the Yugoslav constitution on the issue
of political asylum. 156
Apart from this reason, one must also remember Tito's considerable skills
in realpolitik. Just as the "third-path" rhctoric served a dual purpose (winning the
approval of both the Yugoslav people and U.S. policymakers), so sheltering
Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy served both to incarcerate Nagy (thereby defusing the uprising), and also to win the approval of the international community
for "protecting" Nagy from the Soviet aggressors. As Micunovic wrote: "[i]t
could not be disputed that the fact that the Nagy government had in effect
disappeared from the moment it entered the Yugoslav embassy had proved useful
and had helped both Kadar and the Russians." 157
Tito could then take advantage of Nagy's presence in the embassy to coax
him to cooperate with the Kadar government. If he could discredit Nagy, perhaps
he could reduce the chances of anti-communist "spillover" into Yugoslavia. Tito
was so sure he could get Nagy to support the Kadar regime that he believed the
Yugoslav embassy might be attacked "when the reaction finds out that Nagy,
who is in the embassy, supports the Kadar government." 158
Tito understood the political advantage of seeming (to the West) as if he
were protecting Nagy. Although Tito himself may not have fully supported
Nagy's movement when it turned anti-communist, some observers in the West
thought that he did. To simply hand Nagy's group over to Kadar and the Russians would destroy Yugoslavia's reputation as an independent sovereign country
with respect for human rights. Meanwhile, those domestic opponents who knew
how Yugoslav prisoners at Goli Otok were treated did not dare to contradict Tito
and his followers.
During the rift of 1948-55, Tito had discovered the advantages of being
neutral, even before the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser did. U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been eager to extend economic aid to
Yugoslavia, confident that the Yugoslav example would encourage Hungary and
the other Soviet satellites to fight for independence. In a speech to the Four-H
Club in Chicago in 1954, Dulles said:
In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international communism and reasserted its own nationalism. Now, the Soviet Union treats
Yugoslavia with deference while it continues to treat with contempt the
puppet governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. That may
embolden the satellites to demand a measure of independence. 1 ' 9
When Dulles visited Tito in May 1955, Tito ostensibly told him what he
wanted to hear, speaking about "independence," rather than about "national
communism." He told Dulles that the "transformation in the satellite countries"
would take place faster than Dulles could even imagine, and that he, Tito, was
trying to accclcratc this process, so the satellites would become independent,
which Tito wanted very much. 160 In the tightly bipolar world of the 1950s, both
superpowers vied for client states among the neutral countries. Tito could
pretend to do the bidding of each superpower, but neither would know his real
intentions.
Moreover, if Tito had simply handed Nagy over to Kadar's government,
Khrushchev might have been encouraged to see Yugoslavia as just another
obedient Soviet satellite. Tito feared the prospect of Yugoslavia once again
getting pulled back into the Soviet camp. He had swallowed his pride enough at
the Crimea meeting, when he assured Khrushchev that he had "no fundamental
disagreements," and that in Yugoslavia "only a different method of building
socialism [was] being applied." Khrushchev had replied, "The methods and
forms can differ, but there must be a single principled line." Tito had agreed:
socialism can never be divided into various sorts; it is a "single revolutionary
doctrine, which we, communists, should adhere to."161
Thus, respecting Nagy's political asylum was a useful way of reminding
Khrushchev that he, Tito — despite the official normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations — would still act independently, even if that displeased the
Kremlin. His concern for Nagy's physical safety probably stemmed more from
his determination to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation than from
any desire to encourage Nagy and his plans for a multiparty system in Hungary. 162
As if to retaliate for Tito's stubbornness in holding on to Nagy, the Soviet
leaders made a deliberate decision on November 17 to kidnap the Nagy group as
soon as it left the Yugoslav embassy. 161 On November 22 a bus was driven up
to the embassy's doorsteps, supposedly to transport Nagy and the other asylum
seekers to their apartments. While the Hungarians were climbing into the bus, a
Soviet military official also entered the bus, despite the Yugoslavs' vehement
protests. (The bus driver was also a Russian.) To make sure that the Hungarians
were taken to their homes, the diplomat Milan Georgievic and military attache
Milan Drosa were ordered to accompany the group. The bus proceeded just
around the corner from the embassy when the Soviet officer forced Georgievic
and Drosa to get off. The bus took the Nagy group first to the closest Soviet
military headquarters and then continued on to Romania where the group was
imprisoned, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the
Yugoslavs. 164
What angered Tito so much about the kidnapping was the blatant
deception. Nothing quite stings the ego as outright betrayal after lengthy negotiations in good faith.165 In an official letter to the CC CPSU on November 24,
Tito wrote:
The Yugoslav government
violation of the agreement
The [actions taken by the
sistent with the agreement.
version that Nagy and the
regards the abovementioned action a crude
negotiated with the Hungarian government.
K&d£r government]... are completely inconThe Yugoslav government cannot accept the
others voluntarily went to Romania, since it
was known... — while they were still here in the Yugoslav embassy —
that they wanted to stay in their own country. The Yugoslav government
expresses an energetic protest to the Hungarian government, and demands that the agreement be followed immediately. [Failure to do so]
will damage Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [Tjhe... violation of the agreement is in complete contradiction of widely recognized international
legal norms.166
Tito's indignation probably equalled or surpassed the outrage Nagy felt
when he had realized that the negotiations on November 3 for Soviet troop
withdrawal had been a complete hoax. Until November 22, the discussions
concerning the Nagy group's departure from the Yugoslav embassy had been
conductcd between Dobrivoje Vidic, Tito's delegate, and representatives of the
Kadar government. The document that had emerged from these talks "guarant e e ^ ] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the
Yugoslavs responsible" for past events. 167
Both of these pledges were broken: Nagy and several others were abducted, and Yugoslavia was blamed for fostering the "counterrevolution" in
Hungary. This deception, Tito felt, had made Yugoslavia a laughingstock in the
international community. Characteristically enough, the Romanian (and probably
Soviet) officials were surprised that Tito was so angry about the abduction; they
thought he might even raise the issue at the United Nations. 168 During the
November 27 meeting of the CPSU's Presidium, Khrushchev expressed his regret
about Soviet involvement in the kidnapping. "It was a mistake for our officer to
go into the bus," he said, according to notes taken by Malin's deputy Vladimir
Chernukha. He thought the matter should have been left up to the Hungarians.
For the Yugoslavs it felt like a "return to 1948." 170
Tito's disappointment extended to Kadar. As early as the summer of
1956, Tito had favored Kadar as a possible replacement for Rakosi. 1 "' At the
November meeting on Brioni Island, the Yugoslavs persuaded Khrushchev and
Malenkov to choose Kadar rather than Miinnich to head Hungary's new Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, since Kadar had been in prison while
Stalin and Rakosi had been in power, whereas Miinnich had been Hungarian
ambassador to the USSR. 172 (This was clearly a wise choice, sincc Miinnich was
evidently involved in the plans to abduct the Nagy group.) 171 Kadar had given
his word concerning the Nagy group; now he had turned out to be almost as
deceitful as Rakosi.
It should be pointed out here, however, that Kadar was not as hawkish
during the October-November 1956 events as most books published in the West
have portrayed him. In fact — as the Malin notes reveal — Kadctr did not at first
advocate a massive Soviet military intervention. At the CC CPSU Presidium
meeting on November 2, Kadar warned the Soviet leaders that "the use of
military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed" and would "erode the
authority of the socialist countries," causing "the morale of the Communists [in
Hungary] to be reduced to zero." 174
Ironically Kadar was deceitful in the one area where Western accounts
have been more forgiving of him: the abduction of the Nagy group. Most writers
have expressed the view that Kadar had not known about the kidnapping plan
and had disapproved of the Soviet treatment of Imre Nagy. 175 But recently
declassified documents indicate that Kadar knew and approved of the secret
KGB plan to arrest Nagy and the others the minute they stepped outside the
Yugoslav embassy. 176 If Nagy remained in Hungary, Kadar worried, he would
inspire the Hungarian "reactionaries." Rumours about an American intervention
vexed him as well.177 Sporadic gunfire in Budapest could be heard until December and widespread passive resistance continued into 1957. To gain the peoples'
cooperation, Kadar had to resort to lies, namely, that he would share power with
Nagy as soon as Nagy returned from the Yugoslav embassy. Clearly, Kadar
wanted Nagy taken out of Hungary — not to Yugoslavia (technically a neutral
country), but to Romania (at the time a loyal Soviet satellite). He knew that if
Nagy went to Yugoslavia, "there would be two existing Hungarian governments:
one there, and one here in Budapest." 178
Not surprisingly, given Tito's disappointment with Kadar, HungarianYugoslav relations cooled after the "Nagy affair." Hungarian diplomats snubbed
their Yugoslav colleagues by rejecting the latters' invitations to social events, and
by declining to invite the Yugoslavs to their own social events." 4
Thus,
Yugoslav-Hungarian relations had coine full circle. This clear ease of betrayal
began a brief new cold war between Hungary and Yugoslavia. In preparation for
the Nagy trial, the judicial proceedings of which were initiated in February
1957,180 the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries went to great lengths to
gather data on Yugoslavia's "role in the Hungarian counterrevolution." in
November 1957 the Yugoslav delegation alone refused to attend the celebration
of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow and sign a
declaration affirming the Soviet Union's leading role in the communist movement. In late April 1958 the Soviet leaders then refused to send a delegation (o
the Yugoslavs' Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana, where a documenl was
signed that rejected the USSR's claim to any leading role in the communist
movement. Evidently at this time Khrushchev also decided to act on an earlier
decision to punish Imre Nagy. On June 16, 1958 Imre Nagy was hanged. The
Hungarian authorities warned the Yugoslavs not to make a fuss about the
execution, or they would publish more "evidence" of Yugoslav involvement in
the Hungarian events. Jovo Kapicic, the new Yugoslav ambassador replied that
the Nagy trial was just "another link in the chain of the new anti-Yugoslav
campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other bloc countries." 181 The
Yugoslavs were keenly aware of the similarities between the Nagy trial and the
Rajk trial nine years earlier. 182
Conclusions
This article has attempted to show that, despite Moscow's rapprochement with
Tito's Yugoslavia in 1955, tensions between Hungary and Yugoslavia remained.
Rdkosi's Hungary had played a leading role in the anti-Tito campaign in the late
1940s, and Tito wanted a full apology. The Hungarian government's reluctance
promptly to redress other Yugoslav grievances also helped to prevent the
achievement of a full reconciliation between Belgrade and Budapest. These
outstanding issues included: the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, amnesty to all
Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, fair treatment of Hungary's Yugoslav
minority, and the payment of reparations to Yugoslavia. At the same time,
Hungary's communist leaders also had complaints: they — as well as Soviet
officials — resented the uncensored, pro-Nagy coverage manifest in the Yugoslav media. It should also be mentioned in this connection that reports by
Yugoslav journalists and diplomats contributed to a Soviet misinterpretation of
the Hungarian revolutionary movement's origins: the Soviet leaders came to
believe that only a small core of intellectuals — not the masses of workers and
peasants — was causing problems. Thus if only Tito would use his influence to
help silence the "troublemakers," they thought, the conflict in Hungary could be
resolved.
The newly-surfaced documentary evidence offers glimpses of the attitudes
that prevailed at the time in Belgrade. There it was realized that while reconciliation with Hungary (and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially, it also
brought a risk of renewed domination by the Soviet bloc. Tito in particular
valued Yugoslavia's status as a neutral, nonaligned country that could stand up to
Joseph Stalin. At the same time, the Yugoslav leader was also wary of the
nationalist ferment of the Hungarian revolution, and in early November worked
with Khrushchcv behind the scenes to prevent it from spreading to Yugoslavia.
The history of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations, from World War I and the 1920
Trianon Treaty to World War II and the Serbian partisans' revenge against the
Hungarians in the Vojvodina, provided a basis for Tito's fears of a spillover.
Indeed, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has demonstrated that Tito
certainly had good reasons to fear ethnic conflicts in his own country.
Tito's willingness to shelter Imre Nagy after the Soviet crackdown in
Hungary, and Kadar's collusion in his abduction, served to open all the old
wounds in Yugoslav relations with Hungary — as well as with the USSR.
Ironically, Khrushchev was just as chagrined as Tito about the new rift between
Hungary and Yugoslavia. Yet, had it not been for the Sino-Soviet dispute of the
early 1960s, the events of November 1956 might have led to another complete
break between Yugoslavia and the bloc countries closest to the USSR.
ABBREVIATIONS
Explanations of Hungarian, Yugoslav and Russian abbreviations and terms:
AVH
AVO
AVP RF
CPSU
CPY
CC
GARF
HSWP
HWP
KGB
MOL
RTsKhlDNI
SZKP KB
TsAMO
TsKhSD
TsK KPSS
F
O
Por.
P.
Per.
D
Dok,
L
Rolik
Allamvedelmi Hatosag [State Security Authority] (name of the
Hungarian secret police agency after 1949)
Allamvedelmi Osztaly [State Security Department] (name of the
Hungarian secret police agency until 1949)
Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of Foreign
Policy, Russian Federation], Moscow
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Communist Party of Yugoslavia
Central Committee
Gosudarstvcnnyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of
the Russian Federation]
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Hungarian Workers' Party (under Rakosi's leadership)
Committee for State Security of the USSR
Magyar Orsz&gos Leveltar (Budapest)
Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of
Contemporary History
Szovjet Kommunista Part Kozponti Bizottsaga [the Central
Committee of the Communist Pary of the Soviet Union)
Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation]
Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii [Center for the
Storage of Contemporary Documentation], Moscow
Tsentral'nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soyuza
[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
Fond [Fund]
Opis' [Inventory]
Portfel' [Portfolio]
Papka [Folder]
Perechen' [List]
Delo [File]
[Document]
[Page]
Reel
NOTES
1. In this paper we tried to provide diacritical marks for Hungarian and SerboCroatian names in the text and the endnotes, but not in the quotations where these had
been omitted originally. I would like to thank Alexander Stykalin, Vyacheslav Sereda,
Tofik Muslimovich Islamov, Janos Reiner, Csaba Bekes, Istvan Deak, Raymond
Garthoff, Mark Kramer, and the anonymous reviewers for earlier assistance and
comments. Research for this article was supported in part by a Fulbright Scholarship,
Kennan Institute grant, and ACTR scholarship. Responsibility for views presented here
is mine alone. Portions of this work were presented at the AAASS Convention (Seattle,
1997), International Conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956" (Budapest, Sept.
1996), and V World Congress of Central and European Studies (Warsaw, 1995).
2. Since the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary many studies have
been published in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian
Revolution and the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. (See
notes #4 and #7 below). In the 1956-1989 period, however, reliable Hungarian-language
accounts were relatively few in number. Countless books and articles about the
Hungarian revolution were produced in the West during that period. See, for example,
Ferenc A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961): Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London:
Allison & Busby, 1976), esp. pp. 106-123; Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc
(Durham. NC: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 127-155; Paul E. Zinner, Revolution
in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); and Paul Kecskemeti, The
Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1961).
3. This study will attempt to synthesize the latest reassessments of Tito as
ambitious opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djuretic,
Saveznici i Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Dramaj
(Belgrade: Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Paviowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's
Great Dictator: A Reassessment (London: C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito —
Tehnologija Vlasti [Tito: The Technology of Power] (Belgrade: Dosije, 1991); Michael
Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943-44, 1st ed.
(San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed
Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West Since J939 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985);
David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st ed. (San
Diego, Calif.: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
4. These are: the former top-secret archive of the Communist Party's Central
Committee called the Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents [TsKhSD], the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry [AYP RF], the Russian Center for the
Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History [RTsKhlDNT], and the
State Archive of the Russian Federation [GARF]. Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU
CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all
Presidium meetings, although verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not
kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the Malin notes pertaining to the
Hungarian uprising (October-November 1956) crisis in mid-1995 to a Russian historian,
Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who
had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were
published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds.,
Domes a Kremlhen, 1956: A szovjet pdrtelndkseg vitdi Magyarorszdgrol (Budapest:
1956-os Int6zet, 1996). The Russian version was published in the summer and fall of
1996. See "Kak reshalis voprosy Vengrii: Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK
KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.," lstorichcskii arkhiv (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp.
73-104 and 87-121, respectively. Malm's handwritten notes are now available to all
researchers in TsKhSD. See F 3, O 12, D 1005-6.
5. Yugoslav relations with Albania also remained tense. See AVP RF, Fond
Referentura po Vengrii, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L. 4, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin,
"Notes of a Conversation with the Advisor of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Osman
Dikic," June 2, 1956, June 18, 1956.
6. AVP RF, Fond 077, Opis 37, Por. 8, Papka 187, List 29, From the Diary of
V.V. Astafiev, "Note of a Conversation with the Chairman of the State Assembly of
Hungary Sandor Ronai," March 27, 1956. "Ronai reported that... at present, of all the
peoples democracies, Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary are the very worse."
7. Below I will explain the hitherto unknown circumstances surrounding Tito's
decision to grant Nagy political refuge in his Budapest embassy on the day of the
invasion (November 4, 1956). Tito's reluctance to surrender Nagy — and the later Soviet
abduction of him — led to a second, albeit temporary, Soviet-Yugoslav split. Most of
the secondary literature makes little or no mention of the circumstances behind Nagy's
political asylum in the Yugoslav embassy. Khrushchev omits this sequence of events in
his memoirs. See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). More recently several useful collections of documents
pertaining to the Soviet decision making process and Hungarian-Yugoslav relations in
1956 have been published in Hungarian. See, for example, Magyar-Jugoszldv Kapcsolatok 1956 Dokumenlumok [Documents on Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, 1956] (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutato Bizottsag, 1995); Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumenlumok 1956rol (The Yeltsin File: Soviet Documents on 1956] (Budapest: Szazadveg — 1956-os
Intczet, 1993); Hidnyzo Ijxpok: 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumenlumok a volt SZKP KB
Leveltarabol [Missing Pages from the History of 1956: Documents from the Archives of
the Central Committee of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union] (Budapest:
Zenit Konyvek, 1993); and the above listed Dontes a Kremlben, 1956 (see note # 4).
8. The Cominform was disbanded on April 17, 1956.
9. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to
the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session,
February 24-5, 1956," annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky, in The New Leader (New York,
1956): p. S48.
The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons
for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role
which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems
which could not have been solved through party discussions among
comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this
"affair;" it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of
relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the
Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings.
But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous
manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations- with a friendly
country (emphasis added).
10. Tito's Address to a Meeting of League Members, Pula, November 11, 1956,
cited in Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern
Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 535.
11. Josip Broz Tito, "Speech in Indian Parliament," December 1954, cited in
President Tito on the Most Important International Problems (Beograd: Jugoslavia, May
1992), pp. 18f.
12. See John D. Morris, "Soviet Bloc Help to Tito is Huge," New York Times,
April 29, 1956, p. 1, col. 7. In 1955 the United States provided Yugoslavia with $153
million in new economic assistance, two-thirds of which came from the grant or dinar
sales of American grain and cotton. See John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 269.
13. One exception to this might be Albania, with which Yugoslav relations were
also at an impasse.
14. According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the
International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the USSR promised Yugoslavia a tenyear loan of $30,000,000 in gold and convertible currencies at a two percent interest
rate. The U.S.S.R also offered a ten-year line of credit of $110,000,000, also at a two
percent interest rate, for specific investment projects, mostly in the field of mining. See
John D. Morns, "Soviet Bloc Help to Tito is Huge," New York Times, April 29, 1956, p.
I, col. 7.
15. "The financial and technical help given to Yugoslavia by the USSR,
especially in the sphere of atomic energy, is highly valued by the Yugoslavs." AVP RF,
F, 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From'the Diary of Y. P. Sanzhak, Second
Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First
Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievid," February 17, 1956.
16. AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 146-147, From the Diary of
Sanzhak. "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in
Budapest Milan Georgievic," February 17, 1956. (The agreement was reached on (he day
of this conversation). According to Van Dyke, Czechoslovakia also offered $75 million
in credit to Yugoslavia. See Morris, p. 1, col. 7.
17. New York Times, October 6, 1956, p. 11, col. 2.
18. The other Stalinist leaders include: Bierut (Poland), Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), and Dmitrov (Bulgaria). As R&kosi complained to Voroshilov in June, 1956:
"They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in
Hungary about how Rakosi was... 'the faithful student of Stalin,' and that after the deaths
of Dmitrov, Gottwald, and Beirut, Rakosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and
thus... he doesn't fit the spirit of the times." TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 2, "Note
by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rakosi," June 26, 1956.
19. Tibor Meray, a noted Hungarian Communist writer who after 1954 supported Imre Nagy, wrote: "Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was
conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is
equally certain that Rakosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors,
since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian colleagues. Intent on
gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a
complete success of this spectacle.... [T]he methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved
to be the best of all because they were the simplest." Tibor Meray, That Day in
Budapest: October 23, 1956 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), 114. See also
Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62. "It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged
trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended
to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come."
(emphases added)
20. Laszlo Rajk (1909-1949) was a leading functionary of the underground
communist party before 1944. He was Rakosi's Hungarian Minister of the Interior from
1946 to 1948 and then Foreign Minister. He was sentenced to death in a show trial in
September-October 1949, which marked the beginning of the anti-Titoist campaign. The
three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 were Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor
Szonyi, and Andras Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 19481956 period was approximately 350,000. This figure includes those accused of being
"class enemies" (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), those accused of being "Zionist
agents" (Jews), and those accused of having "infiltrated the party" ("Titoists," "Trotskyists," "cosmopolitans," etc.). See Gyorgy Litvan, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956:
Reform. Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London: Longman, 1996), 19.
21. Josip Broz Tito, "Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations
between Socialist Countries," October 1, 1949, cited in Military Thought and Work:
Selected Writings I of Josip Broz Tito] (1936-1979), ed. Boro Pejcinovic (Belgrade:
Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982), 302.
22. AVP RF, Fond 77, O 37, P 191, Delo 39, 11.38-42, To Shepilov from
Andropov, Aug. 14, 1956, About the Hungarian Envoy to Yugoslavia Kurimszki's visit
with Tito on Brioni on July 21, 1956, Informing him of Rakosi's Demotion. The HWP
Politburo first demoted Rakosi as First Secretary on July 13 and then a plenum endorsed
it on July 18. He fled to the USSR on July 26, The Soviet leaders forbade him to return
to Hungary. He died in 1971. For a recent account of Rakosi's years in exile, based on
new archival documents, see V. L. Musatov, "Istoriya odnoi ssylki: 'Zhitie' Matiasa
Rakoshi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg)," Kentavr (Moscow), no. 6 (November-December
1993), pp. 72-81.
23. Lavrentii Beria was KGB Chief under Stalin.
24. See AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 9, February 8, 1956, "About
the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, a Short Reference," by N. Skachcv, Advisor
of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
25. Ibid, Por. 7, P. 187, L. 54, From the Diary of V. V. Astafiev, Advisor of
the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Former Director of
the Balkan Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Karoly Erdei," January 19,
1956.
26. Victor S. Abakumov was Soviet Minister of State Security, 1947-51. He was
executed in December 1954, in connection with the plot against Beria. The basis of the
accusation was the repressive measures Abakumov took against Zhdanov's closest aides
in the "Leningrad case." After Beria's arrest, Abakumov, along with Ryumin (deputy of
Minister of State Security Ignatiev, winter 1952-53), was arrested and tried in public.
27. Mih&ly Farkas (1904-1965) was a member of the Politburo of the Hungarian
Communist Party, and from 1948 to 1953 served as Minister of Defense. He carried a
large share of the responsibility for the mass repressions from the late 1940s-1950s, in
part as one of the main organizers of Rajk's trial. The decision to reexamine the role of
Farkas in the repressions was made by the Hungarian Politburo in April 1956. In July
1956 he was expelled from the Hungarian Workers' Party [HWP"). In 1957 he was
sentenced to sixteen years in prison, but three years later, he was given amnesty.
28. General Gabor Peter was for eight years the director of Hungarian State
Security [AVH] during the trials of Rajk and Janos Kadar. He was a member of the
Hungarian Communist Party and also of the party's Central Committee. In January 1953,
he was arrested along with other A v h officers. Rakosi had heard that Peter had
complained about him to Beria.
29. It should be noted that, while Stalin was alive, Rakosi did imply that he was
responsible for Rajk's death. "Do not think that my decision in the Rajk case was so
easily arrived at: I spent long sleepless nights before I dccided to strike. But in the end
we got that gang of criminals firmly into our grip." In 1955 and 1956, however, Rakosi
sought scapcgoats. Sec Meray, op. cit., 112.
30. AVP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L. 9, Feb. 8, 1956, "About the State
of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, a Short Reference," by N. Skachev, Advisor of the
Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. See also vague reference to
Yugoslav prisoners in Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 179.
31. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary. 176-77.
32. The term "information-providers" will be used in this article to refer to
diplomats and journalists collectively.
33. AVP RF, F. 077, Q.37, Por. 7, P. 187, L 148, From the Diary of V.N.
Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy
Marko Zsigmond and Attache Novak Radenovic, March 5, 1956. Of course, from the
Hungarians' point of view, the discrimination against the Yugoslavs was minimal
compared to that inflicted on the large Hungarian community (420,000) in Vojvodina at
the time. Furthermore, eight years (1948-1956) is probably not a long enough period of
time for 6-7,000 Yugoslavs to become entirely "magyarized." However, this was the
Yugoslavs' perception.
34. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 37, P. 190, L. 1, From Andropov in the Soviet
Embassy in Hungary to V. S. Scmenov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
January 1, 1956.
35. Ibid., Por 7, P. 187, L. 151, From the Diary of V.N. Kazimirov "Notes of a
Conversation with the Sccond Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission Marko Zsigmond and
the Attache Novak Radcnovic," March 5, 1956.
36. The term comes from the initials "I.B." for lnformburo or Cominform
(Communist Information Bureau).
37. AVP RF, F. 077, 0.37, Por. 10, P. 188, L. 301. Soviet diplomat Timofeev
recounts his conversation with Gojko Petrovic, a Hungarian citizen but "Yugoslav by
nationality" who was sentenced to death in absentia for supporting the 1948 Cominform
decision to expel Yugoslavia. According to Timofeev, Gojko was afraid to return to
Yugoslavia in 1956, because those Yugoslav political emigres who did were "arrested
and sentenced to 10 or 15 years in prison." See also New York Times (August 16, 1948),
p. 3, col. 8, regarding purges of Cominform sympathizers within Yugoslavia. One
Yugoslav (Colonel General Jovanovic) was apparently killed while trying to flee to
Romania with two other high officers. See New York Times (August 19, 1948), p. 1, col.
6.
38. See Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav
Communism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 223.
39. A VP RF, F. 077, O. 37, P. 191, D. 39, L 8., "About the State of HungarianYugoslav Relations, a Short Reference," by N. Skachev, Advisor of the Fifth European
Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, August 23, 1956.
40. Ibid., L 9.
41. Ibid., Por. 7, P. 187, L. 54. From the Diary of V. V. Astafiev, Advisor of
the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Former Director of
the Balkan Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Karoly Erdei," January 19,
1956. This winter round of meetings was not reported in the local press.
42. Ibid., Por. 39, P. 191, L. 12, Protocol of the Secret Session with the
Yugoslav Financial Delegation, Jan. 17, 1956, trans, from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov.
43. Ibid., Por. 8, P. 187, L. 35. From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Note of a
Conversation with the Chief of the First Political Administration of the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," March 30, 1956.
44. Ibid., P 191, D 37, L 25-35, June 7, 1956. "About the Hungarian-Yugoslav
Financial Negotiations," by Karoly Olt, trans, from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov.
45. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, LI 1-4, From K. Voroshilov to CC CPSU
Presidium, "About a Conversation with Matyas Rakosi," June 26, 1956.
46. See note #2 supra.
47. In Poland workers from heavy industrial plants in Poznan staged a large
protest rally on June 28, which turned violent. The Polish army and security forces
suppressed the protest, but the two days of clashes left 53 dead and many hundreds
wounded. After a tense deadlock with the Polish government headed by Ochab, the
CPSU Presidium decided not to intervene militarily but to seek a political compromise
instead. Archival documents reveal that some Polish officers tried to resist the decision
to shoot the demonstators, but they were outnumbered by others in the security forces
who were willing to carry out the orders. Also Soviet commanders (and their Polish
allies) still dominated the Polish military establishment. See the collection of declassified
documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w
Czerwca 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych [Pacification of a
Rebellious City: the Polish Army in Poznan in the Light of New Documents] (Warsaw:
Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992).
48. During various meetings with Tito, Soviet and pro-Soviet Hungarian
officials had repeatedly discussed the issue of the Yugoslavs' media coverage of the
Hungarian events, requesting that Tito reign in his journalists. For example, Presidium
member Anastas Mikoyan, as well as the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki, both visited
Tito's country around July 21, 1956. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L. 81.
Erno Gero, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from Sofia, Bulgaria,
and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in
the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."
49. "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in
Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions
which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR." See AVP RF, F. 077,
O. 37, P. 191, D. 39, LI. 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Actvities of the Workers of
the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav
Relations, from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," (signature is illegible). See also AVP
RF, F 077, O 37, P. 191, D. 39, List 8-10. "O Sostoyanii Vengersko-Yugoslavskikh
Otnosheni' — Kratkaya Spravka, 8-ogo fevralya, ot N. Skacheva, sovyetnik V Evropei-
skogo Otdela MID SSSR." It is instructive to note that both of these reports were written
about the "problems" the Yugoslavs were causing as early as August 1956 — long
before the second Soviet-Yugoslav split over the "Nagy affair" developed. AVP RF, F
077, O 37, P 191, D 39, LI. 68-73. By V. Kazunirov, "About the State of HungarianYugoslav Relations," August 23, 1956. Other reports earlier in May alleged that Dalibor
Soldatic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, had "very good ties" with American envoy Ravendal and "even passes on military and political information." AVP RF, F. 077,
O. 37, P. 191, Por. 39, L. 22. "Soobsheniye ob otnosheniyakh yugoslavskogo poslannika
Soldaticha s rukovoditelyami amerikanskoi missii, Budapesht, 9 maya 1956 g."
50. These include, on the Yugoslav side, Dalibor Soldatic (Yugoslav envoy in
Budapest), Novak Radenovic (attache of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest from 1955
until June 1956), Osman Dikic (advisor in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest during
the October-November, 1956 events), Milan Georgievic (first secretary of the Yugoslav
Embassy in Budapest), Marko Zsigmond (second secretary of the Yugoslav embassy in
Budapest), etc. On the Hungarian side, these include Janos Boldoczki (Hungarian
Ambassador to USSR), V.V. Altomar (Minister of Food Industry of Hungary and
member of the Central Leadership of the HWP in 1956), and many others. On the
Soviet side, these includc B.V. Gorbachev (second secretary in the Soviet Embassy in
Budapest, 1956-57), Kazimirov (attache of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary in 1956),
Vladimir Kriuchhkov, (Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, October
1956-1957), and others.
51. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 70, L. 3, Protocol #90 of the CC CPSU
Presidium on April 18, 1957, "About the Request of the Hungarian Central Committee
regarding Rakosi, Gero, and Other Hungarian Comrades Located in the USSR, and
about the Letter from Comrade Rakosi of March 25, 1957 to the CC CPSU." Also
TsKhSD. F 89. Per 45, Dok 54, L. 5, From the Diary of Zamchevskii, Director of the
Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Notes of a Conversation
with Janos Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR," November 28, 1956. Emo
Gero, Andras Hegediis (Hungary's Prime Minister before Nagy), Lajos Piros (Hungarian
minister of internal affairs from 1954 to October 27, 1956), Istvan Bala (Hungarian
defense minister until October 24, 1956), together with their families, were flown
secretly to Moscow in a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of October 28. Hegediis
and Piros remained in Moscow until September 1958, and Gero stayed there until 1960.
Originally there may have been some plan to send these officials to Bulgaria. See
TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin. Working Notes
from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on October 28, 1956.
52. Ibid., Roiik 5173, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 403, L 7. By I. Vinogradov, to
Comrade M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N, S. Khrushchev with
Comrade Tito and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the
Crimea in September-October, 1956." "Comrade Tito stated that relations between us
have become colder than they were before his trip to the USSR, and that the necessary
trust toward him is absent on the part of the CPSU leaders [and] on the part of the
communist and workers' parties of the peoples democracies. These doubts arose among
them as a consequence of the disinformation, which they received mainly from their
diplomatic workers, and also as a result of great confusion which they have in issues of
ideology." (emphasis added)
53. Indeed, during the normalization period, even when the economy began to
improve and the majority of workers returned to the factories, these pro-Soviet Hungarians were surreptitiously squeezed out of jobs, or at least harassed, as late as July, 1957.
The novelist and playwright Bela Illes, for example, had a talk with Soviet diplomat L.
F. llichev, in which Illes warned: "there is still a very strong anti-Soviet mood in
Hungary among all types of people: intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even in the
Kadar government." Illes recounted his experience of arriving at a Hungarian radio
station, ready to expound on Soviet literature and asked instead to extemporize on
French literature. TsKhSD, O 28, Rolik 5195, Delo 479, L. 1-2, From the Diary of K.
A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sail, the Charg6 DAffaires of Hungary in
the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1956.
54. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 39, P 195, L 21-23, "Characteristics of the
Political Statesmen: Information on the Members of the Party Delegation of Hungary,"
January 17, 1957—August 8, 1957. "In August 1956 Miinnich was appointed Hungarian
ambassador to Yugoslavia... Several Hungarian comrades in chats with the embassy
officials noted that upon his assignment as ambassador to Belgrade,... Miinnich has
made statements approving the [Yugoslav] path of socialist construction and the forms
and methods of administration in that country. [TJhis is confirmed by Miinnich's
speeches after his appointment, especially during the reburial of Rajk, Palffy, and others
in October 1956... In months after the crushing of the counterrevolution, several
Hungarian comrades expressed a dissatisfaction toward Miinnich, and his... Yugoslav
orientation..." Miinnich's term as ambassador to Yugoslavia ended on October 25, 1956.
55. Ibid., L 20, From the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, "Short
Reference on Lajos Csebi, the new Hungarian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, January 14,
1957." "...Csebi participated in the Hungarian Revolution [1919], after its failure, he
emigrated to Yugoslavia, and then to the USSR.... In 1949 in connection with the Rajk
affair he was arrested and imprisoned until 1954.... In January 1957 he was appointed
Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia. According to data received from the employees of
the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, Csebi is an embittered [ozloblennyi], anti-Soviet
person. He criticises the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist camp [and]...
praises the... "Yugoslav path"... The Yugoslavs think they will establish very close
relations with him when he arrives in their country." On allegations about Csebi's ties
with Yugoslavia, see also TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 67, L 5. Letter of Matyas Rakosi
in Moscow to Khrushchev, February 15, 1957.
56. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 75, L 3, "Notes of Yuri Andropov to the CC
CPSU of August 29, 1957." This document is signed "Andropov, Head of the Department of the CC CPSU for ties with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist
Countries."
57. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 3, P 192, L 11, From the Diary of P. S.
Dedushkin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow
Boldoczki," December 4„ 1957. "[TJhe Presidium of Hungary issued a decree on Sept.
28 awarding Andropov the 'Order of the Banner of Hungary' as a token of gratitude for
his fruitful activity in deepening Hungarian-Soviet friendship."
58. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L 7, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About
the Letter to the CC CPY, Tito, January 10, 1957. "Tito is always saying that one must
not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, but that's what he did in his
speech [at Pula]..."
59. A VP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 7, P 187, L. 148. From the Diary of V. N.
Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav
Mission, Marko Zsigrnund, and the Attache Novak Radenovic," March 5, 1956.
60. Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at the rigged trial of Rajk
in September 1949. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and
Rankovic instructed Rajk about "overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary." It is
unclear whether or not Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. See
Banac, With Stalin against Tito, 225, and Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 62.
61. Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech made on October 1, 1949 at the
end of maneuvers by the Yugoslav People' Army in Serbia. "[I]t is interesting that
Brankov, who is also one of the accuscd, immediately, from the very beginning, came
out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is wellknown who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him
earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of
all likeirunded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it
possible that he was put on trial in such a role?" Josip Broz Tito, "Power Shall Not Be
a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist Countries," in Pejcinovic, ed. Josip
Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works, 302.
62. A VP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 7, P 187, L 94, From the Diary of Y. V.
Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Scction of the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said it is still
difficult to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia. The diplomats of the Budapest
mission are a big obstacle. The majority of them, in Marjai's words, "had built their
careers on the rupture of relations with the democratic camp, on slander and lies, and
now it is difficult for them to start on a new basis." (emphasis added). Ponomarev
agreed: "I said [to Marjai] that in reality the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is littered with
people who are hostilely disposed [zasoren] toward the normalization of relations
between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as between Yugoslavia and the other
democratic countries. But we must work with these people."
63. Ibid., L 148, From the Diary of V. N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation
with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond and the Attache
Novak Radenovic," March 5, 1956. At a film presentation at the Czech embassy,
Zsigrnund "tried to again begin a conversation about the events of 1948-1949, saying
that he knows well the history of the rift of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, since he worked
in the archive of the CC CPY and is acquainted with the correspondence of that period.
Then he tried to lay the blame for the rift completely on the USSR."
64. Ibid.. L 95, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation
with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jozsef
Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said 'with a person like Zsigrnund, it is hardly likely
that anything can be done.'" In a footnote to his report, Ponomarev wrote: "The second
secretary of the Yugoslav mission [Zsigrnund] is indeed different from the other
Yugoslav diplomats in his reactionary views. In a number of conversations with our
comrades he asks provocative questions about the normalization of relations and
responds in a wholly unfriendly way about Hungary."
65. The Petofi Circle, named after the Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi, was a club
organized by Hungarian communist intellectuals, which served as a forum for antiRakosi speeches in the spring and summer of 1956.
66. A VP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S.
Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation
with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievic," July 2, 1956.
"Georgievic said that, unlike in Yugoslavia, there are many people in Hungary who are
not satisfied with the present situation [in Hungary"!. He mentioned the resolution of the
CC HWP of June 30, 1956, as well as information received from a Yugoslav journalist
who attended the June 27 Petfifi Circle discussion. 'In Yugoslavia,' Georgievic said,
'party members and famous social figures do not openly denounce the policies of the
party and government as they are doing here. In my opinion a large part of the
Hungarian population is displease with the fact that the HWP leaders are unwilling to
correct their serious mistakes.'"
67. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 75, August 23, 1956, "About the Actvities of the
Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of
Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest." "On December 6,
1955, in a conversation with the Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in
Budapest, Georgievic (First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission) complaincd that the
Hungarian press is giving very scanty information about Yugoslavia, and that several
speeches of Yugoslav leaders are printed in such an abridged form that it amounts to
unobjective information. The same goes for the Soviet press, Georgievic claimed, but he
gave no details." (The signature on this document is illegible.)
68. Ibid., Por 39, P 191, L.43-47, From Yuri Andropov to the Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev. "About the Rehabilitation of the
Hungarian-Yugoslav Society," trans, from Hungarian by V. Kazimirov. (One of the
society members was Geza Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter who died in prison even
before Nagy was executed).
69. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 15, From the CC CPY, Briom, to the
First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "We reject the hint
about our close ties with the Petofi Circle. Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its revolutionary past and experience...If separate people in Hungary speak about Yugoslavia, that
does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as being responsible for
the internal events [of Hungary J."
70. Josip Broz Tito, "Features Peculiar to the Liberation Struggle and Revolutionary Transformation of the New Yugoslavia," Kommunist [Organ of the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia] no. 1 (October, 1946), quoted in Pejcinovic, ed. Military Thought
and Work: Selected Writings, 294.
71. GARF, F 9401, Special Folder [Osobaia PapkaJ of Stalin, D. 97, L. 351-352,
July 13, 1945, To Stalin from L. Beria, "about the Guard on Tito and Security Measures
in the City of Belgrade." Also F 9401, Opis 2, D 97, L. 69-70, June 29, 1945, To Stalin
and Molotov From Beria, "About the Measures for Strengthening the Guard of Marshal
Tito. A total of "509 cadres" were sent to serve in Tito's personal group of bodyguards
or to keep order in the city.
72. For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! [the Cominform's newspaper], I July 1948, p. 1. Note: the Cominform communique announcing the expulsion of
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was first made public on 28 June 1948 in Rude
Pravo, organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.
73. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, 72.
74. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L 112, From the Diary of S. S.
Satuchin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungaiy, "Notes of a Conversation
with the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievic," July 2, 1956.
"Georgievic said 'Despite the unfair accusations, as well as the difficulties, arising as a
result of the rupture in relations, Yugoslavia continued to proceed along the path and did
not surrender to the pressure of the imperialist states.'"
75. Expression used by Khrushchev. See N, S. Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the
Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, Closed Session, February 24-5, 1956," annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky in The
New Leader (New York, 1956): p. S48. Also cited in New York Times (March 15; June
4, 1956), p. 1, col. 8.
76. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 2, L. 3, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a
Conversation with Rakosi," June 26, 1956. Rakosi informed Voroshilov that the
Yugoslav official Vukomanovic-Tempo told him that in the beginning of the war in
Korea "guerrilla bases were created" in Yugoslavia "in case of attack by the Soviet
Army." N.B. Yugoslavia's election to the U.N. Security Council in 1950-51 probably
increased the chance of UN intervention if the USSR did attempt to intervene. A desire
for such assistance may have been a motivating factor in Tito's decision to vote in
favour of the UN "police action" against North Korea in 1950.
77. Sec Dmitri Volkogonov, "Nesostoyavsheesya Pokushenye: Kak Sovetskii
Agent Maks Gotovilsya k Terroristicheskomu Aktu Protiv Tito [The Assassination that
Didn't Take Place: How the Soviet Agent Max Prepared for a Terrorist Act Against
Tito] Izvestia, June 11, 1993, p. 7, No. 109 (23964). Ironically the appointed "hit man"
(Joseph Romual'dovich Grigulevich, alias "Max") was also involved in one of the
assassination attempts on Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost
Tapes, 72. "[Stalin] was ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he
was thinking about this, although I never heard any conversation mentioning military
action. Stalin, however, began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon
as the break with Tito occurred."
78. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 2, By 1. Vinogradov, to Comrade
M. A. Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade
Tito and the Other Leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in
September-October, 1956." "Comrade Khrushchev stated that we do not lay claim to any
special leadership, but we understand our responsibility before the peoples' democracies
on the strength of historical conditions, which developed in the struggle for socialism."
79. A "little entente" had been formed during the intcrwar period consisted of
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. This should not be confused with Stalin's
plan — when relations with Tito were good — for the formation of a Balkan Federation
consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Khrushchcv, Glasnost Tapes, 105.
80. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L. 10, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About
the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text,"
January 10, 1957. "What also does not help is the position of the Yugoslav comrades in
the issue of the two world camps. You repeatedly speak out against military blocs,
include the Warsaw Pact, and declare that Yugoslavia does not belong to any blocs and
pacts. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Yugo belongs to the Balkan Pact, and
the Yugoslav military organs cooperate with the military circles of Greece and Turkey.
Via these partners in the Balkan alliance, you are simultaneously members of NATO...
We cannot ignore the inconsistencies in the offical Yugoslav position regarding blocs
and pacts."
81. See, for example, the anti-Yugoslav report prepared just after the invasion.
A VP RF, F. 077, O. 37, Por. 39, P. 191, L. 90. From L Zamchevskii, Director of the
Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the CC- CPSU, "About the
Issue of the Yugoslav Leaders' Support of Imre Nagy and His Politics: A Reference,"
December 4, 1956. "According to a report by Italian comrades, one of the leading
workers of the Yugoslav Union of Communists, Mordic, who is now the director of the
Institute of Party History in Zagreb, insinuated during a conversation with them that the
USSR no longer reflects the interests of the workers of the smail countries like Italy and
Yugoslavia, and he even suggested that they 'unite the organizations of the small
countries into their own International, without the USSR.'"
82. However, scholars have not been able to ascertain just how much influence
Tito's "third-path" idea had on the Hungarian population as a whole. Soviet fears may
have been unwarranted, given the historic animosity between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
Hungarians massacred about 3,300 Yugoslavs in Novi Sad in January, 1942. In retaliation, Yugoslavs killed about 30,000-40,000 Hungarians in October 1944. These events
marred relations between the two countries. Hungarians may have looked more to
Poland — which had never been a military adversary — as a model. See Zinner,
Revolution in Hungary, 179n.
83. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 2, L. I. "Information of Mikhail Suslov from
Budapest, June 13, 1956." Many other documents state that the majority of Hungarian
people were not involved in the uprising. See, for instance, TsKhSD F 5 O 28 Rolik
5195, Delo 479, List 14. "Report of the Delegation of the World Federation of Unions
About its Trip to Hungary," November 23-27, 1956. "The overwhelming majority of the
population tried to hide from the battle. A portion of the population demoastrated
against the counterrevolutionaries and supported the new Revolutionary Workers' and
Peasants' Government in order to end the fascist terror. A third group supported the
counterrevolution." The author of this document went on to explain that, of the members
of this third group, a half of them simply didn't understand that the Soviet troops had
come to help Hungary put an end to the "white terror." The other half actively fought
against the Soviet army and socialist forces of Hungary. Also, Tito hinted at this
misperception later in his Pula speech, November 11, 1956, when he stated: "Their [the
Soviet leaders'] eyes have now been opened and they realize that not only are the
Horthyites fighting, but also workers in factories and mines, that the whole nation is
fighting, (emphasis added)" Cited in Zinner, National Communism, 529.
84. See A VP RF, F 77, O 37, Por 9, P 187, D 036, L. 55-56. From the Diary of
V. N. Kelin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Employee of the Newspaper Nepszava,
Lorant, and the Editor of the Journal Csillag, Kiraly," June 17, 1956. "Lately the
Hungarian intelligentsia is very strongly attracted to the Yugoslav question. The fact that
Tito went to Moscow through Romania, and not by the more natural route — through
Budapest — is seen as an open demonstration against Hungary. In Hungary Dedijer's
biography of Tito is passed from hand to hand. It was published in the Hungarian
language for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. The book is enjoying exceptional
success..."
85. Ibid., P 191, D 39, L 41, To Shepilov from Andropov, "About the Visit of
Kurimszki, the Hungarian Envoy, with Tito in Yugoslavia (Brioni)," July 21, 1956.
Milovan Djilas was a high official under Tito, at first a zealous communist, but later a
harsh critic of communism. Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos were veteran Hungarian
communist writers who later turned against the Rakosi regime.
86. Ibid., L. 41. "Tito didn't answer this question; he was only interested in what
kinds of elements participated in the Petofi Circle discussions. 'I've been informed that
the majority of those present were workers and only comrades who didn't oppose what
was being said there.'"
87. Ibid., L. 81. Gero, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him
from Sofia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had "agreed to try not to support
the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they did not give firm assurances."
88. TsKhSD, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L. 9, I. Vinogradov, to M. A.
Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito
and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in September-October, 1956."
89. Ibid.
90. AVP RF, Fond 077, O 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 75. August 23, 1956,
"About the Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering
the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in
Budapest." "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in
Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions
which have an obviously hostile charactcr regarding the USSR. Also sec TsKhSD, F 89,
Per 45, Dok 5, Sept. 17. 1956. Gromyko wrote that "the reactionary part of the intelligentsia and the opportunist elements in the party are conducting a policy to try to rip
Hungary away from the Warsaw Pact and replace USSR influence with Yugoslav
influence." (emphasis added)
91. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LI. 54-63, "Working Notes from the CPSU
CC Presidium Session on October 28, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. (Hereafter cited
as Malin, "Working Notes".) The other bloc countries — China, Bulgaria, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia — were also mentioned in the same sentence. As a result of this
decision, the CPSLI Presidium sent a cable to Tito expressing support for Nagy's new
government and for the statement Nagy issued on October 28. The following day,
October 29, the Yugoslav government published a message to the HWP, in Politika (the
main Belgrade daily), which urged "an end to the fratricidal struggle" and warned that
"further bloodshed wouid only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and
socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries."
92. Malin, "Working Notes," October 28, 1956.
93. Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary (New York: Garden City, 1980), 134. Of
course, Khrushchev apparently did understand that some workers were "supporting the
uprising," judging from Malin's notes of the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting.
Malin, "Working Notes," October 28, 1956.
94. Cf. note 2 supra.
95. On August 21, 1952 in a television debate with Averell Harriman, Dulles
said: "The first thing I would do would be to shift from a purely defensive policy to a
psychological offensive, a liberation policy, which will try to give hope and a resistance
mood inside the Soviet empire." Transcript of television program "Pick the Winner,"
August 21, 1952, Dulles Papers, cited in Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster
Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 131. The liberation policy was quietly dropped
early in the Eisenhower presidency; it was primarily for domestic consumption, and
lacked operational content. Of course, Dulles' liberation rhetoric also helped to stimulate
the Hungarian revolution and to encourage the "freedom fighters" to continue their
resistance.
96. These are: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in each other's internal
affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. See Imre Nagy, On
Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York: Praeger, 1957), 22-23. Chinese
prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed
these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on June 28, 1954. The principles were
intended to "guide relations between the two countries" as well as "relations with other
countries in Asia and in other parts of the world." For the full text of the statement, see
G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China's Relations with South
and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.
97. Ibid.
98. Malin, "Working Notes ," 30 October 1956.
99. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 99. From the First Secretary of the
European Department of the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary
of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Information about the Position of the Yugoslavs
toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. "[T]he display of revanchist
aspirations by counterrevolutionary elements, uttering the slogan 'Great Hungary,'
noticeably influenced the Yugoslavs' position. If before this the Yugoslav press praised
the actions of the Nagy government, so after the counterrevolutionary nationalist
demonstrations, the press and various Yugoslav representatives spoke with alarm about
the growth of the anarchic, counterrevoutionary forces in Hungary. This anxiety was
noticeable in Tito's letter to the CC of the HWP on October 30." (This quote merely
reflects Tito's subjective fears, based on effective Soviet disinformation. It does not
reflect the conditions in Hungary, since no one among the Hungarian revolutionaries
expressed "revanchist aspirations" or uttered the slogan "Great Hungary." The issue
probably weighed on Tito's mind, given the fact that, after the Trianon Treaty (1920),
Yugoslavia received significant Hungarian territory, amounting to 20,956 square
kilometers.
100. See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator (London: C.
Hurst & Co, 1992), 43.
101. See, for example, V£li, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 350-51. It should be
noted that many of these statements were reported by Soviet and Hungarian officials,
and thus could be considered "hearsay." Given the numerous references, however, we
have good reason to believe Tito actually did make these remarks.
102. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L.l-2, From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev,
November 8, 1956. "It is true that during our conversation on Brioni we agreed with
your assessment, that the weakness of the Nagy government and its actions led to the
danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievments in Hungary. We agreed
that the Hungarian communists should not remain in such a government, and that they
should... decisively resist the reaction. There is no need to remind you that we expressed
our doubts about the consequences of open assistance from the Soviet army from the
very beginning, as well as during all conversations. But... such help became unavoid-
able." Also see Tito's speech delivered in Pula, November 11, 1956, as reported in
Burba, November 16, 1956, or cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 516-541.
103. "I expected even more strenuous objections from Tito than the ones we had
encountered during our discussions with the Polish comrades. But we were pleasantly
surprised. Tito said we were absolutely right and that we should send our soldiers into
action as quickly as possible." Strobe Talbott, ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1970), 421.
104. AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Pupka 191, Por 39, List 100. From the First Secretary of the European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov and
Second Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Reference about the Position
of the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. Also TsKhSD, F
89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 3, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the CC of
the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957.
105. TsKhSD, F. 89, O 2, D 4, L 43, Information of Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, "Notes from a Conversation with the President of the Yugoslavia
(Josip Broz Tito)," January 11, 1957.
106. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About
the Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. Ivan Gosnjak,
the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defense Matters, allegedly said something similar at
the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on November 23 in honor of the Soviet
military delegation. AVP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191 Por 39, List 82-93, "About the
Issue of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, Reference," December 4,
1956, by I. Zamchevskii, the Director of the Fifth European Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, USSR. Some speculate that Tito, and other prominent Yugoslavofficials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive intervention, both to keep
the Soviet army out, and to prop up the communist government in Hungary. See Richard
Lowenthal, "Tito's Affair with Khrushchev," The New Leader, v. 41 (October 6, 1958),
14. Also Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 351.
107. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About
the Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with enclosed Text,
January 10, 1957."
108. Malin, "Working Notes," October 31, 1956.
109. TsKhSD. F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 34, L. 3. "Draft of the Telegram to the
Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov, from the CC CPSU, November 9,
1956.
110. Jorg K. Hoensch. A History of Modern Hungary, 1867-1986 (London:
Longman, 1988), 84 and 102.
111. Ibid., 150.
112. On the subject of Hungarian Rile in Vojvodina during the war see Eniko
Sajti, Delvidek 1941-1944. A magyar kormanyok delszldv politikdja [Delvidek (i.e.
Vojvodina), 1941-1944. The South-slav Politics of the Hungarian Governments]
(Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1987).
113. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1986), 137. "Thus, with Tito as a key player now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious
choice, the Russians were increasingly interested in Nagy and the authority he could
command." (emphasis added). See also Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 249-50.
114. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 2, Protocol 54, Resolution of the CC
CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and
His Group," November 10, 1956. "[Y]ou completely shared our positive view of K&dar,
as a prominent and authoritative leading statesman of the communist movement of
Hungary, who is capable in the present difficult conditions to lead a new revolutionary
government... You were very satisfied that the CC CPSU still in the summer after the
departure of Rakosi tried to have Kadar appointed First Secretary of the CC Hungary
(HWP)." (This may suggest that Khrushchev's choice of Kadar was overruled by
Molotov and other hard-liners in favour of the Stalinist Ger8.)
115. A VP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956, "About the
Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," by V.
Kazimirov. "[0]n July 23, 1956, Gero in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan called
him from Sofia, Bulgaria... Gero stated that if he correctly understood comrade
Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Gero as unacceptable for
the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to sec Janos
Kadar or Zoltan Szanto." (emphasis added). Zoltan Szanto (1893-1977) was a revisionist
communist, a member of the moderate wing of the opposition before October 1956. He
sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on November 4 along with Nagy and his other
supporters, but was taken to Romania on November 18 as a "guest" of the Romanian
Communist Party (along with Zoltan Vas, chairman of the Government Commission on
Consumer Supplies). Later, in the Spring of 1957, proceedings were initiated against him
and the others, and the Hungarian security policc arrested him. in 1958 he was permitted
to return to Hungary.
116. Ibid., L 41, From Andropov to D. T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
August 14, 1956. "Then Tito unexpectedly started to ask [Kurimszki] about the state of
health of comrades Gero, Kadar, and Revai... Comrade Tilu did not mention Imre Nagy
even once in the course of the whole conversation, and did not even drop a hint about
him." The words in italics were underlined in the original document.
117. More evidence would be needed to substantiate this view, of course.
Prominent scholars have always believed that Tito did insist that Rakosi be dismissed
before Yugoslav relations with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for
example, Siindor Kopacsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York: Grove Press,
1986), 89. "The Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had
mounted the false trials of Rajk and Kadar in which everybody had been 'agent and spy
for Tito's clique.'" Or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
207. When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948, Tito
demanded Rakosi's ouster." And Ferenc V£li, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 223. "He
[Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rakosi and his associates removed
from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly refused."
118. A VP RF. F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 40, From Andropov, to D. T.
Shepilov. August 14. 1956.
119. See TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. To the CC CPSU from the CC
CPY, Feb. 7, 1957. "In the coursc of our conversations with comrades Khrushchev,
Bulganin, and others in May and June of 1955, we expressed our negative position
regarding the policies of Rakosi. You passed by these remarks, defended Rakosi, and
used the whole authority of the Soviet Union in defense of this person and his policies,
which he personified, right to the very last moment, that is, until the majority of the
Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party eliminated him." Also see Tito's
speech in Pula, November 11, 1956. "When we were in Moscow... we said that Rakosi's
regime and Rakosi himself had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state....
[TJhcir actions could only bring about grave consequences... /W/e were not insistent
enough with the Soviet leaders to have such a team as Rakosi and Gero eliminated."
(emphasis added) Cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, 523-4.
120. John MacCormac, "Hungary Meeting Yugoslav Claims," New York Times,
May 4, 1956, p. 6 col 3. "In return for getting his way, it is believed that Marshal Tito
will cease his active opposition to Mr. Rakosi, who is chief of the Hungarian Workers
(Communist) Party."
121. See TsKhSD F 89, O 2 D 2, L. 9. "Information of Mikoyan from Budapest," July 14, 1956. When Mikoyan flew to Budapest on July 13 he had the impression
that "the Hungarian comrades [in the Central Committee] had long ago come to the
conclusion that Rakosi must go," but that they were "too afraid" to say so openly, and
were simply waiting for the Soviet leaders to make the first move. Also see TsKhSD. F
89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. Letter of Tito of the CC CPY, Belgrade, to CC CPSU
(Khrushchev), February 7, 1957, from Belgrade. "We are forced, in the interests of truth,
although we do it unwillingly, to draw your attention to the fact that the CPSU leadership, Soviet government, and Soviet media rendered the greatest support to these people
[i.e., Rakosi et al.J and their politics, even when when it became clear that even the
Central Committee of the HWP and all the members of the HWP no longer wanted these
people to lead their party and government, not to mention the wider working masses."
(emphasis added)
122. Imre Horvath's notes of Khrushchev's speech at the November 3 Session;
Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (MOL), XIX J-l-K Horvath Imre kiilugyminiszter iratai, 55.
doboz. This document is also contained in the Hungarian document collection Dontes a
Kremlben, 1956 (pp. 92-93), cited in note #4 supra.
123. TsKhSD, F. 5, O. 28 D. 403 L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to M. A. Suslov,
"About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and the
Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October, 1956."
124. These included Julia Rajk (widow of the executed Communist leader),
Zoltan Vas, Gyorgy Lukacs (the philosopher), Geza Losonczy, Ferenc Donat, Gabor
Tancos, (president of the Petofi Circle), journalists Sandor Haraszti, Miklos Vasarhelyi,
Gyorgy Fazekas, and others. Altogether there were ten men, fifteen women, and
seventeen children in the group. Elie Abel, "Nagy Is Abducted by Soviet Police; Sent to
Romania," New York Times, November 24, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.
125. Aleksander Rankovic (1909-1983) was the second most important public
figure in Yugoslavia. He was minister of internal affairs and party secretary responsible
for cadres.
126. Tito wrote: "...,[W]hen they [the Nagy group] showed up here in our
embassy,...[we] persistently tried to prove to them the usefulness of such a resignation
for the regulation of the situation in Hungary." TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 8.
Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, February 7, 1957.
127. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, 137.
128. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.2 Telegram from the CC CPSU (Khrushchev) to Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Firiubin), November 4, 1956.
129. Micunovid, Moscow Diary, 138.
130. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 13. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev,
November 8, 1956.
131. Ibid., Dok 25, L. 2. Emphasis is in the original document.
132. Ibid., Dok 38, L. 12, "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav
Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," November 8, 1956. (Ties between Hungary and the USSR were not completely severed, since
— among other things — Ambassador Andropov remained in Budapest, and Hungarian
Ambassador to the USSR Boldoczki remained in Moscow.)
133. Ibid., 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist
Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni, November 8 1956. "If
you take all this into consideration, then it becomes clear that only the speed of events
was not anticipated and created problems that now are essential to solve. We think the
question of whether or not our embassy acted correctly in Budapest no longer has any
significance. What is important now is that we work together to solve this problem in
the spirit of friendly relations, which we already established between our countries and
parties."
134. Ibid., Dok 29, List 3, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, Soviet Minister of
Foreign Affairs, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR
Mi£unovi<5," November 7, 1956. There is a discrepancy in the time of the incident.
Micunovic and Shepilov said it occurred on November 6 at 12:45 p.m. The Soviet
investigatory commission, however, established the time of the occurrence as November
5, "around" 3:00 p.m. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, L 38, From GeneralLieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth Administration of the General Staff, to N. S.
Patoiichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, "Act."
135. See Shifrtelegramma, November 5, 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3,
Op. 64, D. 485, LI. 143-144.
136. TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, LI. 1-3. From D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU
Presidium, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR
Micunovic," November 7, 1956. Shepilov told Micunovic that the Soviet military
command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit next
to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound."
137. TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64, D. 485, L. 130. "Telefonogramma," November 5,
1956.
138. Malin, "Working Notes." See the formal protocol for this session TsKhSD,
F. 3, O. 64, D. 485, L. 141 "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK
KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g," The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovid, via the Yugoslav
ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovic. It stated that the Soviet military commander
in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. See
the following note infra.
139. Major-General Grebennik was Serov's deputy in the KGB and Soviet
commandant of Budapest after November 4, 1956.
140. AVP RF F 77, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 35, From Major General Grebennik,
Lieutenant-Colonel Kuziminov, and Gaspar (Deputy of the Hungarian Government
Assembly), November 6, 1956, "About the Accident to the Employee of the Yugoslav
Mission in Budapest on November 5, 1956." This report was later sent directly to
Colonel General N, Pavlovskii on November 9, 1956 and other superior officers in the
Soviet General Staff. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, LI 38-39, To Comrade
N S Patolichev and Bcliusov, November 9, 1956, From the Commission composed of
Grebennik, Boskoboinik and Lukin. "The Soviet soldiers said that the Soviet tanks were
being shot at from the direction of apartment buildings situated near the Yugoslav
mission. In reply to this shot, a Soviet tank opened fire on the indicated house.
Apparently because the tanks were moving, a volley of shots fell on the embassy
building, and as a result, one of the employees who was standing at the window was
killed." The Soviet authorities pledged to transport the body to Yugoslavia.
141. Ibid., F 144, O 18, Por 4, P 41, L 25, "Telephone telegram no. 185 from
V. Astafiev, Temporary Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Hungary (Budapest) to I. K.
Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry," April
14, 1957.
142. TsKhSD F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L 4, "Telegram from the CC CPSU to N.
Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade," November 4, 1956.
143. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, 146.
144. Micunovic slated that... "During the conversations on Brioni it was agreed
that Imrc Nagy and others could facilitate the situation of the new revolutionary workerpeasant government [headed by Radar] if they in some way or another declare their
intention to cooperate with the government or at least, not demonstrate against it. The
present location of Imre Nagy and others in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict
that agreement that was made with comrades Khrushchev and Malcnkov with Tito and
the other Yugoslav leaders during the Brioni meeting. TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok. 29,
L. 2, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav
Ambassador to the USSR, Micunovic," November 7, 1956.
145. TsKhSD, F 89. Per 45, Dok 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Commnist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev," Brioni,
November 8 1956. "Despite the absence of detailed information, we nevertheless thought
that such a declaration from Nagy would have been essentially useful to Kadar's
government... and could help to correct the situation in Hungary, which is what we
suggested to you."
146. }bid.. Dok 84, L. 8, To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, February 7, 1957.
"As far as the remark about the resignation of Nagy is concerned, we'd like to remind
you that we informed Nagy and his comrades of our opinion when they ended up in our
embassy and persistently tried to prove to them how useful such a resignation would be
in regulating the situation in Hungary. The fact that Nagy did not lake our advice is not
the business of the Yugoslav Union of Communists; it is his personally. We even went
too far in this, wishing to ease the situation of the Kadar government and USSR by
taking advantage of Nagy's presence in the Yugoslav embassy."
147. Ibid., Dok 25, L. 4. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia, N.
Firiubin, Belgrade, to CC CPSU, November 4, 1956. "Tito asked also for the Soviet
government to tell the Kadar government not to carry out repression against those
communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the latest events in
Hungary." Kadar also urged lenient treatment for many of the members in the Nagy
group. Since Tito supported Kadar, he was receptive to this idea. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45,
Dok 34, L. 2, Telegram from the CC CPSU to Andropov, Soviet Ambassador to
Hungary, November 9, 1956.
148. See RTsKhDNI, F 495, O 142, D 827, list 10. "Letter from Zoltan Szanto
in Hungarian POW camp near Suzdal to Matyas R&kosi," December 24, 1943.
149. MOL, XIX-J-l-j.66 D 4/J. 1956, "Magyar Jegyzokonyv Kadar JSnos es D.
Vidic Kozotti Targyalasrol" [Hungarian Minutes of the Negotiations Between Janos
Kadar and Dobrivoie Vidic], published in Tarsadalmi Szemle [Social Review], no. 12
(1989): 83.
150. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 78, L. 12, "Protocol 164 of the CC CPSU
Presidium Session," July 16, 1958.
151. Ibid., Dok 83, L 4, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter to the
CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito," January 10, 1957. [Paraphrased] Thus,
because of your contacts with Nagy, he was warned about the upcoming action of the
Soviet troops in Hungary.
152. Malin, "Working Notes," November 4, 1956," (In the November 6
Presidium meeting Khrushchev accused Molotov of thinking about "bringing back
Hegedus and Rakosi."
153. Fndre Marton, the Hungarian journalist employed by the Associated Press,
wrote: "Bela Kovacs was the first to tell me that Nagy and many Communists who
remained loyal to him went to the Yugoslav embassy after Ambassador Soldatic called
Nagy at dawn to say that Khrushchev had informed Tito about his decision to use force
to quell the revolt.... Nagy was invited to seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy at one
o'clock in the morning, November 4th, by Dalibor Soldatic." (Bela Kovacs was
secretary-general of the Smallholders Party until his arrest in February 1947, and was
appointed minister of agriculture by Imre Nagy on October 27, 1956). See Fndre
Marton, The Forbidden Sky, 197.
154. In his Pula speech (November 11, 1956), Tito said: "We are against
interference and the use of foreign armed forces... [but] if it meant saving socialism in
Hungary, then... Soviet intervention was necessary." Earlier in the speech he stated: "The
first intervention, coming at the invitation of Ger6, was absolutely wrong."
155. Aleksandr Stykalin and Elena Orekhova, "The 1956 Hungarian Events and
the Position of the Soviet Leadership" Unpublished paper presented at Cold War
History Project Conference in Moscow, January 1993, 23.
156. TsKliSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 14. Letter from CC CPY (Tito) to CC
CPSU (Khrushchev), November 8, 1956.
157. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, 150.
158. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.106. Telegram from N. Firiubin (Soviet
ambassador to Yugoslavia) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 4, 1956. Tito asked
the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from these
possible attacks.
159. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "The Captive Peoples," Four-H Club
Speech, Chicago, Illinois, November 29, 1954.
160. A VP RF, F 77, O 37 Papka 191, List 89, December 4, 1956, "On the Issue
of Imre Nagy and His Politics by the Yugoslav Leaders, A Reference," by I. Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, USSR.
161. TsKhSD, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A.
Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito
and the Other Leaders in the Crimea, Scptembcr-October 1956."
162. Although Tito did not state this bluntly, he did imply repeatedly in the
secret correspondence with Khrushchev that the reason he could not simply relinquish
the Nagy group to Kadar's government was because he needed to safeguard Yugoslavia's
international reputation. He wrote: "We understand your conclusions in your letter and
consider them logical, but... absent in your letter is a deep understanding of our situation
and especially of our readiness to solve this question in the spirit of mutual friendly
relations and not to the detriment of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a
sovereign country." TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 38, L. 10. "From the CC CPY (Tito)
to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev), Brioni, 8 November 1956."
163. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Our recommendations are: a) provide for the arrest of
Nagy as soon as he is released from the Yugoslav embassy; b) demand that Nagy sign a
declaration in which he admits his mistakes; c) send him and his group to Romania; and
d) prepare a text for the Hungarian government about Nagy."
164. TsKhSD, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 56, LI. 9-10. "Protocol #62 from the CC
CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shcpilov, and Gromyko,
"About the Answering Note to the Yugoslav Government's Note of Nov. 24, 1956 on
the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group." See also the note of protest that Yugoslav
foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on November
24, 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, 0. 2, D. 5, LI. 19-26, and TsKhSD, F. 3, 0. 64, D. 488, LI.
95-96. Information from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, November 23, 1956. This
elaborate plot was devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials. Interestingly,
Serov thought about using the same trick to arrest Cardinal Mindszenty — who had
sought refuge in the American embassy. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 53, L. 2, "Notes of
Serov on November 27, 1956." (There were several comunications, incidentally, between
Szanto and the Hungarian leaders, as well as several telegrams between the Yugoslav
Embassy and Belgrade, in the final days before the Nagy group left the Yugoslav
Embassy).
165. For details on the abduction, see the newly declassified correspondence
between Tito and Khrushchcv in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central
Committee archive "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentralnomu Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov
Yugoslavii/Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7
fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo
Soyuza," (Top Secret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, LI. 1-12 and
D. 84, 1.1, 1-18.
166. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 56, LI. 10-11. "Protocol #62 from the CC
CPSU Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko,
About the Reply to the Yugoslav Note of November 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre Nagy
and his Group, including enclosed copy of the November 24 letter.
167. Ibid., Dok 49, L 2, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov,"
November 22, 1956. In the end two promises were broken. The document "guaranteejd]
the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for the past events.
168. Ibid., O 2, D 5, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev from Bucharest,"
November 26, 1956. Emil Bodnaras (head of the Romanian armed forces from 1947 to
1957 and senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej) told Nikolaev: "We didn't think the Yugoslavs
would raise a fuss [podnimut shum] about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to
Romania. However, as You know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and
Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United
Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for various speeches and conversations in connection with Imre Nagy." The CC CPSU Presidium later discussed this
telegram, which went on to state that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (the Romanian leader)
planned to have high-level talks with Yugoslavia to soften tensions between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. TsKhSD, F. 3, O. 64,
D. 488, L. 177 "Excerpt from Protocol No. 60 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session," 27
November 1956. The protocol stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at
the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Comrade Bulganin is instructed to hold
negotiations with Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej." Later that same day, Bulganin called
Gheorghiu-Dej, which he later recounted in writing for the other CPSU Presidium
members: "I told Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest
level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a
good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a
meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with
Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile.... "TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2,
D. 5, LI. 16-17, "Information of Bulganin to the CC CPSU Presidium about the telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej," November 27, 1956.
169. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 52 "Working Notes from the Session
of the CPSU CC Presidium on November 27, 1956," compiled by V. N. Chernukha.
170. "We asked the Yugoslavs to refrain from any additional declarations about
the Nagy affair. The Yugoslav ambassador said any talks are useful, but the situation is
deteriorating, as if we are returning to 1948." (emphasis added) TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D
3, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev," November 26, 1956.
171. AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Papka 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956. "About
the Actvities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the
Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest."
"On July 23, 1956, Gero, in a talk with Andropov, said that Mikoyan called him from
Sofia, Bulgaria and reported that the Yugoslavs agreed not to support the hostile
elements in the press and radio... Gero emphasized that if he correctly understood
comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Ger6 as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have liked to see
Jdnos Kadar or Zoltdn Szdntd." (emphasis added)
172. Micunovic, Moscow Diary, 135.
173. TsKhSD, F 89, O 2, D 3, L. 11. "Yesterday, late last night, the negotiations
of comrades Kadar and Vidic were concluded.... On the evening of November 22 Nagy
and his group must leave the Yugoslav embassy. Essential measures [neobkhodimye
mety] in connection with this have been prepared jointly by comrades Serov and
Munnich." (emphasis added)
174. Ibid., F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L 24 (on the back), "Working Notes of the CC
CPSU Presidium Session on November 2, 1956," compiled by V. N. Malin. It is true
that Kad&r did agree to travel to Moscow without informing Nagy and other government
officials, and he did say during the November 3 Presidium meeting that "the correct
course of action fin Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government." Also, he emphasized the fact that the Nagy government had failed to prevent the "killing of Commu-
nists" and said he "agreed with [Soviet officials]" that "you cannot surrender a socialist
country to counterrevolution." However, even then Kadar stated that they should avoid
creating a "puppet government." Apparently Kadar had not planned to head this new
pro-Soviet regime either. TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006. L. 32, "Working Notes from
the CC CPSU Presidium Session on November 3, 1956, compiled by V. N. Malin. N.B.
Until the declassification of the Malin notes, scholars had not known what Kadar was
doing in Moscow on November 2 and 3. Both Kadar and Miinnich participated in
sessions of the CPSU Presidium on these two days, although Kadar spoke the most. On
November 2 they were joined by Istvan Bata {Hungarian defense minister until October
24), who was flown to Moscow on the evening of Octobcr 28 (along with Gero, Piros,
Hegediis). On November 3, they were joined by Imre Horvath (Hungarian foreign
minister until November 2), who took detailed notes of that day's session.
175. Marton, Forbidden Sky, 211.
176. TsKhSD, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," November 17, 1956. "Kadar has agreed with these recommendations."
(emphasis added)
177. Ibid., Per 45, Dok 38, L 4, November 10, 1956, Resolution of the CC
CPSU Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and
his Group," with the enclosures: telegram from Andropov and Epishev in Budapest;
letter of Khrushchev to Tito; letter of Tito to Khrushchev. "Kadar in a slightly worried
tone also said that information reached him that the United States began military
mobilization. He requested that someone tell him whether there is any truth to these
rumors."
178. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L 2, "Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet
Ambassador Andropov in Hungary," November 9, 1956.
179. AVP RF, F 077, O 39, Por 7, Papka 197, List 39, From the Diaries of V.
V. Astafiev and V. M. Raskakov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Janos Peter," September 5, 1958 Also: AVP RF, F 077, O
39, Por 3, Papka 197, List 7, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin, Manager of the 5th
European Divison of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Notes of a Conversation with Janos
Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR," January 23, 1958.
180. Lit van, op. cit., 187.
181. AVP RF, F 077, O 38, Por 14, Papka 193, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevskii, Attache, and V. Astafiev, Temporary Charge D'Affaires, "Notes of a Conversation
with Janos Peter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister and Istvan Sebes, Hungarian
Deputy Foreign Minister, June 17, 1958." Peter told Gulevskii about a recent talk he had
with Jovo Kapicic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary. Kapicic had just learned about
Nagy's sentence and execution. P6ter told Kapicic that other material — about the role
of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian events — would be included in the report of the Nagy
execution. Peter warned that if the Yugoslav government begins to attack Hungary, then
"Hungary will be forced to publish other materials in its possession."
182. TsKhSD, F 89, Per 45, Dok 77, L 8, Text of the "verbal note" from the
Yugoslavs given to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on June 23, 1958 by the Yugoslav
Ambassador Kapicic, transl. from from Hungarian, enclosed with "Telefonogram from
Astafiev of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest to P.S. Dedushkin of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, June 24, 1958.