NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
RedState,BlueState:FederalismforAll
ROUGHDRAFTMarch2pm,2017
NOTFORCIRCULATIONORDITRIBUTIONBEYONDHOOVERWORKSHOP;NOT
FORCITATIONORQUOTATIONWITHOUTSPECIFICPERMISSIONOFAUTHOR.
VickiC.Jackson1
Introduction:OfBrandeisandtheDemocraticDeficitinNationalPolitics
Intheearlypartofthe20thcenturyLouisBrandeis,agreatprogressive
crusaderandoneofthefirst"publicinterest"lawyersinournation'shistory,argued
infavorofallowingthedifferentstatestoserveaslaboratoriesofexperimentation
ineconomicregulation.2Andheimplementedthisattitudeindecisions,asa
SupremeCourtjustice,rejectingchallengestostatelawsrestrictingeconomic
competitionandregulatingcommercialactivity.3
Thevirtuesofsmallercommunitiesassitesofdecision-makingwere
obscuredby"statesrights"rhetoricofthemid-20thcenturyanti-raceequality
movement,amovementthatstillcastsalongshadowoveranumberofsouthern
states.Butinlightofdevelopmentssincethemid-20thcentury’suglyinvocationof
statesrightstoprotecttheracialcastesystemexpressedinsegregation,our
thinkingaboutconstitutionalfederalismneedstobereconsidered,asbothpolitical
liberalsandconservativesexplorethevalueofdegreesofautonomousdecisionmakingatthestateandlocallevel.
Suchrenewedthinkingaboutfederalismalsoneedstotakeintoaccountthe
changesintherepresentativecharacterofthestatelegislaturesasaresultofthe
1WiththankstoRobertTaylor,MichaelTaylor,MarthaMinow,JohnManning,Dick
Fallon…forhelpfulconversations.
2SeeNewStateIceCo.v.Liebman,285U.S.262,---(1932(Brandeis,J.,dissenting).
SofarasIamaware,hedidnothaveinmind"experiments"insuchbasicrightsas
thoseprotectedbytheFourthAmendmentorFirstAmendment(thoughasJeff
Rosensays,neitherwasheacrusaderforracialequality).Butineconomicmatters,
Brandeiswasafanofsmallness,wherepeoplecouldlearnfactsandparticipatein
makingdecisions.
3SeegenerallyPhillipaStrum;JeffRosen[biographiesofBrandeis].
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
WarrenCourt’sreapportionmentdecisionsandtheVotingRightsAct.4Incontrast
toprevailingimagesintheearly1960sofstatelegislaturesasreflecting
malapportioned,frequentlyraciallyexclusionaryelectorates,statelegislaturesand
governorsnowmayhaveasomewhatstrongerrepresentativedemocraticcharacter
–inrepresentingthepeopleoftheirjurisdiction–thandoestheCongressin
representingallthepeopleoftheUnitedStates.5
AsChiefJusticeEarlWarrenwroteinReynoldsv.Sims,"Fullandeffective
participationbyallcitizensinstategovernmentrequires...thateachcitizenhavean
equallyeffectivevoiceintheelectionofmembersofhisstatelegislature.Modern
andviablestategovernmentneeds,andtheConstitutiondemands,noless."6
Althoughbythe1950sanumberofthestatelegislatureswereseverely
malapportioned,andstategovernmentssubjecttomassivecritiqueasineffective
4SeeVickiC.Jackson,TheWarrenCourtandthePostWorldWarIIModelof
ConstitutionalFederalism,inEARLWARRENANDTHEWARRENCOURT(HarrySchiebered.
2006).UntiltheVotingRightsActwasfullyimplemented,therewerestatesin
whichsohighaproportionofadiscreteracialminoritywerenotvotingthatthe
democraticlegitimacyofthestategovernmentcouldbequestioned.Todaythatis
lesstrue.
5Assumptionsorquestionsthatrequirefurthercheckingbeforepaperisfinalized:I
assumethatpriortotheVotingRightsAct,AfricanAmericanslivinginpartsofthe
countryoutsidetheSouthwerenotassystematicallyexcludedfromvotingasthey
wereintheSouth,andthustheHouseofRepresentatives--totheextentitreflected
votingbyamoreinclusiveelectorateinsomeofthestates–mayhavehadgreater
democraticlegitimacythanthelegislaturesinstatesthatsystematicallysuppressed
AfricanAmericanvoting.Astartonthisresearchisat
http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/HistoricalData/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/(showingthat
thereweresomeAfricanAmericanrepresentativesintheCongressbetween1871
and1901;andthennoneuntil1929,whenanAfricanAmericanfromIllinoisis
electedtotheHouse;in1945bothIllinoisandNewYorkhadoneAfricanAmerican
memberoftheHouse;in1955athird,andin1957,afourth,fromPennsylvaniaand
Michiganbecamemembers;in1967thereweresevenAfricanAmericansinthe
Congress,allfromnorthernstatesorCalifornia).Anotherquestiontocheckisthe
effectsofdistrictsizeintherepresentativenessofstatelegislatures,ascomparedto
theHouseofRepresentatives,withrespecttopartisanaffiliation.Iassumebutneed
tocheckthatthestatesallusefirstpastthepostwinnertakeallvotingfortheir
statelegislatures.
6ReynoldsvSims,377U.S.at565(1964)(emphasisadded).
2
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
andoutoftouchwithcurrentneeds,7thisbegantochangeinthelate1960s,after
theWarrenCourt'sone-person,one-votedecisions.Asaresultofthesedecisions,
statelegislaturesmustbeapportionedbypopulation,inboththeirupperandlower
houses.8Improvementinthequalityofstategovernmentseemedtofollow.9That
thereapportionmentdecisionswouldhaverevitalizingeffectonstategovernments
wasanticipatedbysomeprescientscholarsatthetime.10Indeed,levelsoftrustin
stategovernmentsvis-a-visthefederalgovernment--begantoriseinthelate
1960s;11today,oneseesgreaterconfidenceexpressedinthestategovernments
thaninthefederalgovernment.12(Moreover,allstategovernorstodayaredirectly
elected;intheearly19thcenturymanywereappointedbylegislatures.13)
7Seee.g.ROBERTMCKAYREAPPORTIONMENT:THELAWANDPOLITICSOFEQUAL
REPRESENTATION36-40(1965)(describinggovernancefailuresinthestates).
8Reynoldsv.Sims(1964);Lucasv.44thGeneralAssemblyofColorado(1964).
9SeeVickiC.Jackson,TheWarrenCourtandthePostworldWarIIModelof
ConstitutionalFederalism,inEARLWARRENANDTHEWARRENCOURT159-60(Harry
Schiebered,2006)(arguingthattheWarrenCourt,contrarytotheargumentsof
somescholars,wasgoodforthestatesandforfederalism);seealsoFerguson,
IntroductiontoStateExecutives,infranote13(notingeffectofreaportionment,
promotedbythecourt,ingivingstategovernmentsnewenery).
10See,e.g.ALPHEUSMASON,THESUPREMECOURTFROMTAFTTOWARREN262-63(1964)
(arguingthatreapportionment"maybetterequipthestatestomeettwentieth
centuryneeds,revitalizingratherthandisablingtheseessentialunitsoflocal
government").
11SeeM.KentJennings,PoliticalTrustandtheRootsofDevolution,inTRUSTAND
GOVERNANCE218,239(ValerieBraithwaite&MargaretLevieds.1998);seealso
WARRENEMILLLER&SANTATRAUGOTT,AMERICANNATIONALELECTIONSTUDIESDATA
SOURCEBOOK1952-1986,at256(1989)(findingthatconfidencelevelsinstate
governmentsbegintorisebetween1968and1972,whileconfidenceinthefederal
governmentdoesnotbegintofalluntilafter1972).
12Gallup,TrustinGovernment(showinginSeptember2016,higherlevels(63%)
whohadafairorgreatamountofconfidenceintheirstategovernmentthanin
federalgovernment(44%ondomesticissues,49%oninternationalissues);in
September1972,therewerehigherlevelsofconfidenceinthefederalgovernment
(70%ondomestic,75%oninternational)ratherthaninstategovernments(63%))
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx
13Atthefoundingthiswasnotthecase.SeeMargaretFerguson,Introductionto
StateExecutives,EagletonInstitueofPolitics,RutgersCenterontheAmerican
Governor,athttp://governors.rutgers.edu/on-governors/us
3
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
TheCongress,bycontrast,isconstitutionallymalapportioned,with
Wyomingandits584,000peoplehavingtwoSenatorswhileCalifornia,withits38.8
millionpeoplehasthesametwoSenators.Atthiswriting,thereare52Republican
SenatorsintheU.S.Senate,a48Democrats(actually46Democratsand2
independents,whogenerallycaucuswiththeDemocrats).Basedonstate
populationsinthe2010Census,14the52Republicansrepresent136million
Americans.The48Democratsrepresentroughly172million.15Sowehavea
countermajoritarianSenateatthepresenttime.16Althoughthe"equalsuffrage"for
statesruleofthesenatewasmalapportionedfromthebeginning,thedegreeof
malapportionmenthasincreaseddramaticallyovertime.17Andtheequalsuffrage
provisionfacesanevenmoredifficultamendingprocedurethanotheramendments
totheU.S.constitution,whichis,inturn,farmoredifficulttoamendthanstate
constitutions.
governors/introduction-to-governors/introduction-to-governors-chapter-1/
(explainingthatgovernors,attheFounding,werequiteweakandinsomestates
wereappointedbythelegislatureratherthanbeingdirectlyelected;following
AndrewJackson'selectionin1828,manystatesbegantoswitchfromappointedto
electedgovernors).
14ForstateswithtwoDemocraticSenators,ortwoRepublicanSenators,allofthe
statepopulationisattributedtothatpartyinmycalculations.Instateswithone
Senatorfromeachpartythestatepopulationwassplitinhalfandallocated
accordingly.Seenote[15]belowfortreatmentofthetwoIndependentSenators.
15ThetwoindependentsarefromVermontandMaine.Ifthenumbersrepresented
bytheseindependentsaresubtractedfromthetotalrepresentedbythe46
registereddemocrats,those46stillrepresent171million.
16TheSenatehasbeenmalapportionedfromthebeginningofourcountry’shistory,
ofcourse.However,thedegreeofmalapportionmentbetweentherepresentationof
thesmallest,andlargest,stateshasincreasedbyafactorofaboutfive.Seeinfranote
75(largesttosmallestpopulationstateshadrationof13:1in1790,and67:1in
2010).Moreover,themostpressingconsiderationsthatdrovethecompromisethat
ledtotheallocationofsenatorsintheSenatehavelongsincedisappeared,as
slaveryhasbeenabolished,seeHenryMonaghan,WethePeople[s],Original
UnderstandingandConstitutionalAmendment,96Colum.L.Rev.121,145(1996)
(describingconcernfor,interalia,protectingslavestatesundergirdingprovisions
ofArticleV),andmajorregionaldifferencesdiminished,seeFeeley&Rubin,
FederalismasaNationalNeurosis,[cite],thoughnotdisappeared.
17Seeinfranote75.
4
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
ThePresidentiselectedthroughtheElectoralCollege,whichhastheeffectof
disproportionatelyweighingvotesinsmallpopulationstates.Thisaspectofthe
ElectoralCollegehasbeenhighlysignificant:Twiceinthelastsixteenyears
presidentshavebeenchosenwholostthepopularvotenationwide.The
malapportionmentofthepresidentialelectionsystemalsomeansthatU.S.
Presidentsdonothavethesamedegreeofelectorallegitimacy(vis-a-vistheir
constituents)fromarepresentativedemocracyperspective,asdostategovernors.
ThecurrentPresidentlostthepopularvotebutwontheElectoralCollegevote.
ItistheCongressandthePresidentwhoarethelawmakinginstitutionsof
thenationalgovernments.18Thereisnowagreaterriskatthenationallevelthat
legislationwillbeenactedandexecutiveactiontakenthatisinconsistentwiththe
viewsofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesthanthereisthat,inanygivenstate,
legislationwillbeenactedinconsistentwiththeviewsofthepeopleofthatstate.19
Thereis,inotherwords,asignificantstructural"democraticdeficit"inournational
lawmakingprocessesvis-a-visthoseofthestates.20
18Asshownintext,thePresidencyandtheSenatearepresently
countermajoritarianinstitution,measuredbythevotesoftheconstituenciesthey
represent.WithrespecttotheHouseofRepresentatives:AccordingtoBallotpedia,
inHouseelectionsin2016,Democratsreceived61.7millionvotes,andRepublicans
received63.1million,whilemorethan3millionvoteswerecastforIndependent
candidates.With49%ofthevoteRepublicanscontrolled55%oftheHouseseats;
theDemocrats,whowon48%ofthevote,held44%oftheHouseseats.See
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2016
19Thedistortingeffectsofthetwosenatorsruleonnationaldecisionmakinghas
longbeenobserved.Seee.g.GillianMetzger,StLouisUniv,at1075n142015citing
sources.
20Idonotmeantosuggestthatdemocraticrepresentativelegitimacyonapercapita
basisistheonlyformofdemocraticlegitimacythatisimportantortheonly
legitimatevaluepromotedbytheConstitution’sstructure.Somedegreeof
population-baseddisproportioninrepresentationintheupperhouseisnot
uncommoninfederalsystems,inordertoassurethatparticularinterestsofless
populousregionsarenotneglected.ButIamawareofnofederalsystemina
workingconstitutionaldemocracythathasthedegreeofdisproportionthattheU.S.
Senaterepresents.Andastoothervalues,havingstaggeredtermsformembersof
thenationallegislature,asexistsintheSenate,hasthebenefitofhelpingtoprevent
rapidswingsbasedonsingleelections–astabilitybenefitalsoimportantto
5
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
Howmightthisshifttowardsgreaterdemocraticlegitimacyofstate
governmentsaffectthinkingaboutconstitutionalfederalism?Inthistimeinwhich
membersofbothtraditionalpoliticalpartiesarebeingchallengedbynontraditional
movementsandcandidates,oneofwhomhasbecomethePresident,perhaps
liberalsandconservatives,redstateandbluestatelawprofessors,informedby
awarenessofthetherelativedemocraticrepresentativenessofstategovernments
vis-a-visthefederal,canfindsomecommongroundaboutthebenefitsof
federalism,ifnotofthestrategiesforachievingthosebenefitsortheparticular
substantivegoalstowardswhichthosestrategiesareused.
Thispaperaimstoassistthisre-evalutionbydescribing,incapaciousterms,
threedifferenttypesofapproachestothinkingaboutthepossibilitiesand
challengesofU.S.federalism.First,Ibrieflydiscussasetofdoctrinalconstraintson
nationalpowerarticulatedbythecourts.Second,Iconsider"newnationalism"
theories,includingthoseof“disruptive”or“uncooperative”federalismapproaches.
Third,Iconsiderpoliticalformsoffederalreconstitutionorreconstruction.The
discussionisanefforttolayouttheseapproachesasapositivematter;normative
argumentswill,forthemostpart,needtoawaitanotherpaper.
I.ExistingDoctrine
The“federalismrevival”intheSupremeCourt’sjurisprudencecanbedated
toastatutorydecision,Gregoryv.Ashcroft,in1991.21Theissuewaswhetherthe
AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentActappliedtostatecourtjudges,whowere
subjecttoastatelawagelimitontheirservice.Thecourtheldasastatutorymatter
thattheADEAdidnotapplytosuchhighgovernmentofficials.Theinterpretationof
theADEAwasinformedfromtheoutsetoftheopinionbyconstitutional
considerations,asJusticeO’Connorexplainedthehistoricalreasonsforandbenefits
legitimategovernment.ButitalsomeansthatthemembersoftheSenate,atany
givenmoment,maynotmatchintheirpartyaffiliationsthemoodofthemostrecent
electionsfortheHouse.
21501U.S.452(1991).
6
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
ofconstitutionalfederalism,includingacapacityforinnovation,increased
opportunitiesforparticipationindemocraticpolitics,andgreaterresponsivenessof
thestatestothedifferentneedsofcitizens.22
IntheyearssinceGregoryvAshcroft,statutorycanonsofinterpretationhave
beeninconsistentlydeployedinfederalism-relatedcases.23Thesignificanceof
Gregoryisitsforeshadowingofshiftsinconstitutionaljurisprudencethathavemade
asignificantdifferenceintheformalscopeoffederalpower.
A.Anti-CommandeeringdoctrineasalimitonCongress
ThefirstcleardoctrinalsignaloftheCourt’swillingnesstorevivejudicially
enforceablelimitstoprotectfederalismwasitsdecisioninNewYorkvUnited
States,24holdingthatoneelementofafederalstatutewasinvalidinthatitimposed
acoerciveliabilityonastatetorequireittotakethekindofactionordinarily
requiringlegislation.Thisanti-commandeeringrulewassaidtobesupportedboth
byprinciplesofaccountabilityandbyahistoricaldecisiontoabandonthepowerthe
centralgovernmenthadintheArticlesofConfederationtocompelstatestoact.
Soonthereafter,theanti-commandeeringprinciplewasextendedtoadoctrine
barringfederalrequirementsthatexecutiveofficialsofstateorlocalgovernments
22Id.at458("Thisfederaliststructureofjointsovereignspreservestothepeople
numerousadvantages.Itassuresadecentralizedgovernmentthatwillbemore
sensitivetothediverseneedsofaheterogeneoussociety;itincreasesopportunity
forcitizeninvolvementindemocraticprocesses;itallowsformoreinnovationand
experimentationingovernment;anditmakesgovernmentmoreresponsiveby
puttingtheStatesincompetitionforamobilecitizenry.)
23Asanillustrationofthelackofconsistencyofinterpretivepresumptionsinfavor
ofstateauthority,compareMedellinvTexas,552U.S.491(2008)(President’s
memorandumimplementingICJdecisionagainsttheUnitedStatesarisingoutof
Texas’officialsfailuretocomplywithConsularConventionhasnoeffectonstate
criminalprocedurelaw)withAmericanInsuranceAss’nv.Garamendi,539U.S.396
(2003)(findingthatexecutivememorandumwithGermanyconcerningfoundation
mechanismtoresolveHolocaustperiodinsuranceclaimspreemptsstateinsurance
law).
24505U.S.144(199x)
7
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
enforcefederallawsagainstothers.25Thisdoctrineislikelytoremainastablelimit
onfederalpowersince,thoughoriginallypropoundedbymoreconservative
scholarsandmembersoftheCourt,ithasnowbeenembracedbyliberalor
progressivescholarsasameanstoinsulatestateandlocalgovernmentofficialsfrom
carryingoutfederalmandatesviewedasregressiveordiscriminatory,asin
immigration.26
B.LimitsonCongress’PowersundertheCommerceClauseandother
ClausesinArticleI
InUnitedStatesvLopez,27theCourtinvalidatedafederallawprohibiting
possessionofgunsnearschoolzones.Althoughaplausibleconnectiontointerstate
commercewasarticulatedbythegovernmentlawyersinitsdefense,itrequired
multiplestepsinaformofanalysisthatwouldsupportfarreachingfederal
legislationintomanyareasoflife.Moreover,thefactthattheprohibitedareawas
definedbyproximitytoschoolsseemedtosuggestaneffortorpurposetoregulate
education,amattertheCourtviewedastraditionallyoneforthestates.Although
thecaseoccasionedsignificantcriticism,andwasclearlyviewedasadeparture
fromthelineofcaselawonthescopeofthefederalcommercepowersince1937,it
wasarguablyjustifiableifunderstoodnotasacategoricalbar,butratheras
respondingtoaparticularruleoflawprobleminsofarasCongressitselfhadfailed
totakeseriouslytheneedtoshowhowitwasconnectedtointerstatecommerceor
whyafederallawwasneeded.28
25Inearlierwork,Idisagreedwiththeabsolutistapproachofthesedecisionsasto
executiveofficials,butwasgenerallysupportiveofthedecisionastolegislatures.
Forexecutiveofficials,thereismuchthatisattractiveabouttheideaofa
presumptiverule,allowingforexceptionsunderspecialcircumstances,e.g.,fora
draft,orothertime-sensitiveneedofthenationalgovernment.SeeVickiC.Jackson,
FederalismandtheUsesandLimitsofLaw:PrintzandPrinciple?,111HarvL.Rev.,
2180(1998)
26See,e.g.,Galarzav.Szalczyk,745F.3d634,643(3dCir.2014)(“[T]hefederal
governmentcannotcommandthegovernmentagenciesofthestatestoimprison
personsofinteresttofederalofficials.”)
27cite
28SeeJackson,PrintzandPrinciple?,at2234&n238,2238-39.
8
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
SubsequentcasesdevelopedLopez’sruleintoamorecategoricalone,
prohibitingrelianceonthecommercepowertoregulate,onanaggregatedbasis,
activitythattheCourtidentifiesasnot“economicincharacter.”InUnitedStatesv
Morrison29theCourtheldunconstitutionalaprivatecivilrightsremedyinthe
ViolenceAgainstWomenAct;forCommerceClausepurposestheCourttreatedthe
activitybeingregulatedasprivateviolenceagainstpersons(largelywomen)
becauseoftheirgender,ratherthanseeingprotectionfromviolenceasanecessary
aspectoffullparticipationinthe(federallyregulatable)economy.30YetinGonzales
vRaich,31theCourtupheldabanonpossessionofmarijuana(evenasappliedto
medicalmarijuana)becauseoftherelationshipofsuchpossessiontoanunlawful
interstatemarket.(DeterminingwhatpossessoryactionstheCourtwillfindnot
economicincharacterremainssomewhatuncertain.)
InNFIBvSebelius,32theCourtidentifiedanothersubstantivelimiton
Congress’commercepower:thattheCongresscannotcompelpersonstoengagein
commercialactivities.ItthusheldthattheCommerceClausedidnotsupporta
congressionalmandatethatpeoplepurchaseorotherwiseobtainhealthinsurance
(thoughtheprovisionswereupheldunderthetaxingpower).Determiningtheline
betweencompellingactionandregulatingcommercialactionalreadyundertaken
mayposeinterpretivechallengesinthefuture.
Ihavearguedinthepastagainstrigidapriorisubstantivelimitationsonthe
substantivescopeoffederalpower;Ihavealsosuggestedthattheruleoflaw
requiresshowingaplausiblechainofconnectionbetweenlegislationandafederal
sourceofpower.Inlightofmymorerecentreflectionsonthedegreetowhich–asa
29cite
30IwasacoauthorofanamicusbriefintheMorrisoncase,arguing,asIstillbelieve
tobecorrect,thattheconnectiontocommercewassubstantial,andwelldocumentedinthelegislativerecord,sincefearofviolencesubstantiallylimited
women’sabilitytoparticipateintheeconomyontermsofequalitywithmen,in
waysanalogoustotheeffectsofprivatediscriminationontheabilityofAfrican
Americanstotravel,inHeartofAtlantaMotel[cite].
31545U.S.1(2005
32132SCt2566(2012).
9
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
resultofactionsbythefederalcourtsandCongress--statesnowhaveastronger
claimtodemocraticlegitimacythannationallawmakers,Iwonderwhetherjudicial
approachestoreviewingfederalism-basedchallengestonationalactionoughttobe
developedthatconsiderthedegreetowhichsuchnationallegislationsufficiently
reflectstheinterestsofthepeopleatthenationalleveltowarrantdeferenceacross
theboard.Iwonderwhethercourtsshouldtakeamorecarefullookatasserted
basesofnationalpowerandgroundsforactingbeforeupholdingfederallegislation
orrulemakingthatwouldcutofflawmakinginthestates–atleastintheabsenceof
reasontobelievethatthelegislationwasneededbecausestateswereengagedin
discriminationorinequitabletreatmentofdisadvantagedminoritygroupsnotable
toprotectthemselvesinthestatepoliticalprocessorthattherewasaneedfor
federalactionbecausethestatesseparatelycouldnotregulatewellorsomestates
wereimposingseriousexternalitiesoninterstatecommerceorothersubjects
withinCongress’regulatorypowers.
C.LimitsonCongress’spowersundertheFourteenthAmendment:
InKatzenbachvMorgan,33theCourtupheldprovisionsoftheVotingRights
ActprohibitingdiscriminationbasedonEnglishliteracyforthosewhowereliterate
inSpanishbyvirtueofbeingeducatedinPuertoRico.TheCourthadrejecteda
challenge,fiveyearsearlier,toanEnglishliteracyrequirementinNorthCarolina,
concludingthatitboreasufficientrelationshiptothelegitimateaimofpromoting
aninformedelectoratethatitwasnotunconstitutional.InMorgan,however,the
CourtupheldthelawbothonthegroundsthatCongresshaspower,underthe
FourteenthAmendment,toconcludethatactsclaimedtoviolateequalitynorms,
whichhavenotbeenstruckdownbytheCourt,nonethelessdoviolatethe
FourteenthAmendment,oralternatively,thatprovidingaccesstothevotewasa
meanstoenableSpanishspeakerstopreventunlawfuldiscriminationinother
areas.
33384U.S.641(1966).
10
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
InCityofBoernevFlores,34theCourtheldunconstitutionalastatute,the
ReligiousFreedomRestorationAct,designedtoovercometheeffectsofitsdecision
inSmithvEmploymentDivision.35InSmiththeCourthadheldthatstatesgenerally
neednotaccommodategenuinereligiousobjectionstoagenerallyapplicablelaws,
distinguishingalineofcasesseeminglysoholdingasinvolvingbothreligionand
otherclaims.TheRFRApassedoverwhelminglyandrequiredthatwhenapractice
waschallengedasintrudingonreligiousfreedomstateshadtojustifyitunderthe
standardsofstrictscrutiny.TheCourtheldthatCongressdidnothavepowerunder
theFourteenthAmendmenttosoprovide.Disagreeingwithatleastoneofthe
theoriesofMorgan,itheld,Congresscouldonlyenactlegislationaimedat
preventingorremedyingconductthattheCourtwouldagreeviolatesthe
Constitution.WhileCongresscouldadoptprophylacticmeasures,thosemeasures
neededtobecongruentandproportionatetotheconstitutionalviolationtobe
sustained.
Sincethen,theCourthasrejectedaFourteenthAmendmentbasisforthe
ViolenceAgainstWomenActcivilrightsremedybecauseitpermittedsuitsagainst
non-stateactors,eventhoughthisremedywastargetedatstatefailurestofulfill
theirresponsibilityofequalprotectionunderthelaw.36Similarly,thepreclearance
provisionoftheVotingRightsAct–whichhadbeenanessentialtoolforincreasing
andmaintainingvoterregistrationamongpoorandblackvoters–-wereinvalidated
inShelbyCountyvHolder(2013),because,theCourtbelieved,thefactualbasisthat
oncesupportedthelegislationnolongerexisted.Ignoringtherecordonwhich
CongressactedandCongress’sconclusionotherwise,theprovisionwasfound
unconstitutional,asnotmeetingthestandardsofproportionalityandcongruence.
34cite
35cite
36Morrison,at__.TheCourt,interalia,misrepresentedthestateoftherecord,in
suggestingthatfewerthanhalfofthestateshadproblems,whentheevidence
beforeCongresswasthatinatleast21statestherewerestatesponsoredgender
biastaskforcereportsthathadidentifiedbiasintheprosecutionofviolenceagainst
women,andeveryreasontothinkthatsimilarproblemsexistedinmostifnotallof
theotherstates.Compareidat__withidat__(Breyer,J.,dissenting).
11
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
TheFourteenthAmendmentwasnotintendedtoabolishthestatesassemi-
autonomouspartsoftheUnitedStates,nortogiveCongressgenerallegislative
authoritytoenactlawsforthegeneralwelfare.Toocapaciousanunderstandingof
theFourteenthAmendmentmightleadinthisdirection.Soitisperhaps
understandablewhythecourtdidnotadoptthecapaciousapproachofMcCullochv
Maryland,whichinterpretedtheNecessaryandProperClausetoallowCongress
amplechoiceofmeanstofulfillitslegislativepowers,aslongastheywere
appropriatetotheendandnototherwiseprohibited.
Butwheretherehasbeenahistoryofstatepersecutionofminoritiesand
suppressionoftheirvoting,considerabledeferencetothenationallegislature’s
effortstoremediateandpreventrecurrencesisinorder.Therewasnothingunclear
aboutthecompellingfactualbasisfortheVotingRightsAct’sinitialenactment,and
Congress’decisiontorenewwouldseemtobewellwithinthelegislativejudgment
astohowlongtheremedywasneeded.InthisrespectthecaseisunlikeCityof
BoernevFlores,wheretheexistenceofmassiveconstitutionalviolationswas
doubtfulunderjudicially-controllingstandards.37
Boernev.FloresanditsprogenywillenabletheCourttomonitormoreclosely
pretextualusesoftheFourteenthAmendmentpower,shouldtheyarise.Arguments
incaseslikeFloridaPrepaidvCollegeSavingsBank,38thatCongressenactedchanges
tothepatentlawsbecauseofconcernaboutconstitutionalrightsviolations,wereto
somedegreepretextual;themotivationofthelegislationcouldreasonablyhave
beenregardedasprimarilyconcernedwithadvancingthepurposesofthepatent
andtrademarklaws.Bycontrast,ShelbyCounty(theVotingRightsActCase),or
Morrison,reflectedCongress’seriousattentiontoconstitutionalrightsofequality
37ThedecisioninShelbyCountygavetheappearanceofjudicialover-reachin
concluding,contrarytoCongress,thatthetimeforneedingthepre-clearance
remedyhaspassed.If,asthepluralitywroteinColemanvMiller,307U.S.433
(1939),thequestionofhowlongisreasonabletoratifyaconstitutionalamendment
isnonjusticiable,thenthequestionofthedurationofaremedythatwasatonetime
constitutionalwouldseemtobeonewhereverybroaddeferencetoCongressis
appropriate.
38527U.S.627(1999)
12
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
andrighttovote;thesedecisionswereviewedbyanumberofscholarsasinvolving
judicialoverreachinreviewingcongressionalaction,essentiallybecauseofan
ideologicalhostilitytothesubstanceofthelegislation.TheCourt’sFourteenth
Amendmentdoctrinethusholdsbothpromiseandpitfallsfortheoverallwellfunctioningofthedemocraticsystem.
D.LimitationsonCongress’sSpendingClausePowerstoImpose
ConditionsonReceiptofFederalfunds
AsAllisonLaCroixhasargued,constitutionalfederalismintheUnitedStates
doesnothavefixedboundaries,asillustratedbyherstudyofthespendingpowerin
theperiodbeforetheCivilWar.39Specificallyshearguedthatearlynineteenth
centuryconstitutionalthoughtconceivedofthespendingpowerasrequiring
structuredformsofcooperation,inordertopreventfederaldominance.40Without
suggestingthat19thcenturynotionsoffederal-statepowerbeassuchrevived,the
notionthatanunboundedspendingpowerwouldmaketheideaofalimitedfederal
governmentverydifficulttosustainremainstrue.
TheresurgenceoftheSpendingClauseasalimitation,aswellasagrant,of
powertoCongressarrivedinthe21stcenturyinNFIBvSebelius.41Inthisrecent
decision,theCourtinsistedonandreliedonadistinctionbetweencoercive
regulationandconsensuallimitationsagreedtobyrecipientsoffederalfunding.The
Courtinvalidatedaconditiononfederalspendingthatineffectrequirestatesinthe
Medicaidprogramtoexpanditseligiblerecipients.Eventhoughthefederal
governmentwouldhavepaidallofthedirectnewcosts,statesobjectedtothe
administrativeburdenstheywouldneedtoassume,andarguedtheycouldnot
realisticallyturndownthenewrequirementbecausethestatutewouldpenalize
thembywithdrawingallfederalfundingforallexistingMedicaidprograms.The
Courtwrote:“CongressmayuseitsspendingpowertocreateincentivesforStatesto
39AllisonLaCroix,TheInterbellumConstitution,--StanLRev--(2015)
40Idat401
41132SCtat2304
13
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
actinaccordancewithfederalpolicies.Butwhen‘pressureturnsintocompulsion,’
thelegislationrunscontrarytooursystemoffederalism.”42
ThispartoftheCourt’sdecisioncapturessomethingimportant:Unbounded
authoritytoconditionfederalgrantsontheobservanceofpositiveornegative
requirementshastoomuchcoercivepotential--forstateandlocalgovernments,
andforuniversities.43Bothofthesegroupsareamongthemajor,ongoingrecipients
ofsuchconditionalfederalspendinggrants.Andbothlocalandstategovernments,
ontheonehand,andcollegesanduniversities,ontheother,playimportant
constitutionalfunctions:first,aschecksonabusiveuseofnationalpowerand
second,assourcesofinnovationthatwouldbenefitthepolityoverall.Theeffortto
relyontheexistingprogram(consenttowhichrequiredconsenttochangesthat
mightinthefuturebemade),wenttoofar,intheCourt’sview.AsHeatherGerken
outit,“theSpendingClauseanalysisis…themostdeeplyintuitiveportionofthe
opinion…rest[ing]onasimplepremise:Congresscan'tpulltherugoutfromunder
thestatesbyradicallyalteringthedutiesassociatedwithacooperativefederal
regime.”44
E.Limitations,derivedfromtheEleventhAmendmentandPrincipleof
SovereignImmunity,onCongress’spowertosubjectstatestoprivatesuits.
In1996theCourtoverturneditsearlierdecisioninUnionGas,whichhad
upheldCongresspower,whenitspokeclearly,tosubjectstatestoprivatesuitsin
legislationenactedunderthecommercepower.InSeminoleTribetheCourtheld
thatCongresslackedpowertosubjectstatestoprivatessuitsinlegislationenacted
underArticleI,althoughtheUnitedStatesretainedtheabilitytoitselfsuestatesfor
damagesunderfederalstatutes.TheCourtwasandremainscloselydividedonthe
issueofstatesovereignimmunity.
42NFIBvSibelius,at__2602(quotingStewardMachine)
43Cf.e.g.RumsfeldvFAIR,546U.S.47(2006)(rejectingconstitutionalchallengeto
federallawconditioningreceiptoffederalfundsonuniversitiesallowingmilitaryto
recruitevenifmilitary’spolicyviolatedanti-dsiscriminationnorms).
44Gerken,2014HLRat__.
14
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
AsIhaveexplainedinearlierwriting,45theCourthasbeenmistakeningiving
thisbroadreadingtosovereignimmunity.Butunlessthereisasignificantchangein
membershipontheCourt,thisdoctrineislikelytobestable.Thisdoctrinedoesnot
constrainCongress’substantivelawmakingbutonlylimitstheremediesavailable
toenforesuchlaws.AssuchIthinkitunlikelytoplaymuchofaroleinupcoming
federalismdebates.
II."Uncooperative"Federalism,Disruption,The"NewNationalism,"
FederalismAlltheWayDown,andtheLike Anothersetofscholarlyapproaches,includingthatofHeatherGerken,the
Dean-electofYaleLawSchool,challengesconceptionsoffederalismbasedonthe
ideaofsovereignty.Theyinsteademphasizedescriptiveaccountsofhowtheformal
doctrineconcerningsovereignty,theallocationofpowersandevensupremacyof
federallawdonotreflecttherealityofinfluencesgoinginmultipledirections.46
Emphasizingvoiceoverexit,Gerkenarguesthat“federalismwithoutsovereignty”
embracesasystemofverticalchecksandbalancesthroughsituationsof
interdependenceinlawenforcement,implementation,interpretation.47Sheoffers
amoredescriptivepoliticalaccountofhowthefederalgovernmentshapesstate
agendasandhowstatesshapefederalagendasevenafterlawisenacted.48Nodoubt
theseobservationsaretrue,anditisimportanttoseehowpoliticalimpactof
federalismworks;butitisnotclearhow"federalismallthewaydown"inthis
respectdiffersfromdecentralization.
45Jackson,1988,Yale;Jackson1997orso,NYU
46See,e.g.HeatherGerken,TheSupremeCourt,2009Term,Foreword--Federalism
AlltheWayDown,124HarvL.Rev.4(2010);seealso,e.g.,Gillian
Metzger[AdministrativeFederalism,cite};FederalismunderObama,cite];arguing
thatfederalregulationisnotazerosumgameattheexpenseofstatepower,which
surfacesinimportantwaysintheadministrationoffederalschemes).
47SeeGerken,supra,at10(“theenergyofoutliersservesasacatalystforthe
center”);idat33-44(exploringthe“poweroftheservant”).
48SeealsoAbbeGluck,Our[national]federalism,Yale2014(arguingthatCongressis
theprimarysourceofourfederalism).
15
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
TheargumentadvancedbyProfessorGerkenandothersisthat
governmentalprocessesinourfederalsystemaffordmanyopportunitiesforboth
levelsofgovernmenttoexerciseinfluenceontheother,withtheimplicationthat
accordingly,doctrineenforceablebycourtsbasedontheideaofsovereigntymaybe
inappropriateorunnecessary.Iamnotsure,though,thatthenormativeconclusion
followsfromthedescription,northatProfessorGerken’sapproachofferssufficient
guidanceastofederalismaslaw,exceptinonedirection.ProfessorGerkenclearly
intendstopreservethesupremacyofnationallawasamatterofjudicially
enforceableconstitutionallaw,apointonwhichIaminagreement49However,
explainingthatheraccountissupplementarytoothers,50herworksuggeststhatshe
maynotbelieveinanyjudiciallyenforceablesubstantivefederalism-based
constraintsonnationalpower.51
Shemakesapersuasiveandpowerfulnormativeargumentforanapproach
ofallowingexperimentationatstateandlocallevels,subjecttocorrectionby
nationallegislation.Indeed,sheargues,“divisionanddiscordareuseful
components”ofthefederalsystem,52andsuggests,alongwithJessicaBulmanPozen,53thatthe“uncooperative”anddisruptivefeaturesoffederalismhave
considerablenormativevalue.54Theseaccountslendnormativeforcetothe
49Id.(insistingthatthe“centercanplaythenationalsupremacycard”).
50Seeidat10-11.
51HereIdrawinferencesfromworksshecites.Seee.g.id.at12-14andnn.13-20.
Seealsoidat16-18(discussingdebatebetween“process”theoristsandand
“federalists”overstatepowerandidentityandasking,why“webothertohaveit”);
idat28.InotherworkGerkenappearstoendorseclearstatementrequirements,as
proceduralconstraints.
52Id.at10.
53JessicaBulman-Pozen&HeatherGerken,UncooperativeFederalism,118YaleLJ
1256(2009).
54Id.at20(arguingthatthisuncooperativedimensionallows“minorityrule”in
statesandlocalgovernmentstoshapeidentity,promotedemocracy,anddiffuse
powers).Seealsoidat24“(“Whenstatebureacratsrefusetoimplementafederal
program,properlyorhijacktheprogramfortheirownends,theysendamessageto
Washington...aboutthefutureoffederallaw”);idat40(valueof“dissentand
resistance”).Sheurgesattentiontocities,zoningboards,schoolboards,juriesand
16
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
requirementthatifnationallegislationintendstodisempowersuchstateandloca
initiativesitneedstospeakclearlyindoingso.55Theyalsoevenmorestrongly
supportargumentsagainstexecutiveoradministrativepowertopreemptstate
laws.56Giventhebenefitsofstateexperimentationanddiversity,herworkstrongly
suggests,aconsidereddecisionbythemostrepresentativefederaldecision-maker–
theCongress–shouldberequiredbeforethosebenefitsaredisrupted.
SomeofthelegalcomponentsofGerken'sapproach,thoughframedunder
therubricoffederalism,mightinsteadbeunderstoodasarguingforamore
expansiveconceptofconstitutionalequalitythanexistsundercurrentdoctrine.For
example,shewouldallowroomforamorediverseconceptoftheconstitutional
roleofdiversity,e.g.,allowingracialmajoritiesinsomeareastofavortheirown,as
ethnicimmigrantgroupsdidbeforethem.Thisappearstoenvisiona
reinterpretationoftheequalprotectionclause.Ifso,questionswouldarisewhether
currentU.S.lawhassufficienttoolstodistinguishsituationofdisadvantagedracial
minorityorimmigrantgroupsfromsituationofthosewhofeelsubjectively
disadvantagedbyequaltreatmentforminorities/women.
Inlaw,descriptiveandnormativeclaimsareoftenblended;thethrustofthis
scholarshipfeelsnormativeeventhoughitclaimsattimessimplytobedescriptive.
Itisinpartausefulefforttodisruptlawyers’focusoncategoriesandcourts,andin
other“specialpurposesinstitutions”oflocalgovernance,idat24-33,butwithout
explicitlyconnectingthemtoconstitutionalfederalismindeed,drawingon
scholarshipnotingthestrengthofmayorsinaunitarysystem.Id.at42(citing.Cf.
VickiCJackson,Citizenship,GenderandFederalism,in___(notingschoolboardsand
otherinstitutionsoflocalgovernmentaslocationsfor“actsofpubliccitizenship”
andquestioningwhetherthedensityoflocalgovernmentstructuresisorisnot
relatedtofederalism).
55CfGerken,SlippingtheBondsofFederalism,128HarvLRev85,92,109,122
(2014)(celebratingclearstatementapproachtointerpretingfederallegislation,
stating,interalia,that“IfyouworryaboutCongressinadvertentlyreadingonstate
powerinimplementingtreaties,itmakesperfectsensetoimposeaclearstatement
rule.”)
56SeeBulman-Bozen,102VaLrev953,1024(2016)(suggestinggreaterChevron
deferenceiffederalagencydecidesstatelawisnotpreemptedthanifitdecidesthat
itispreempted).
17
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
partanefforttoshiftmeanings/understandingsofcategorieslikediversity.It
suggeststhatsomedefiantoruncooperativebehaviormaybenecessarytoadvance
legaldevelopment.Historyshowsthetruthofthis,sometimes.
Butthereareruleoflawconcernsforapproachesthatresttoomuchon
disobedienceanddisruption.57BearinginmindCoopervAaron,58anapproach
givingnormativeweighttodefiancebystateandlocalofficialsraisesconcernsabout
theincentivesforthosewhodisagreewithalaw,oraruling,tocomply.Thereis
clearlyanargumentthatdefianceofstatutes,forpurposesoftestingtheir
constitutionality,islegitimate(evenifnotalwaysprudent),andthusperhapsone
coulddistinguishthatfromdefianceofafinalcourtjudgmentonalegalpoint.
Anotherconcernisthequestionofwhethersuchanapproachispresumedtocarrya
onewayratchet.Wouldthosewhocelebratestatelawspermittingmarijuanauseor,
priortoWindsororObergefell,thegrantingofmarriagelicensesindefianceof
existingstatutorylaw,equallycelebratedefianceofguncontrollaws,orby
opponentsofstateuniversityaffirmativeactionplanstoprocurebyreferenduma
banonsuchplans?59Isthereanargumentforaonewayratchetinfavorof
defiancesonsomebutnotallissues–andifso,whataretheargumentsforthis
normativeposition?Isitnecessarytocivilizedsocietytograntthosewedisagree
withsimilarrightsof“defiant”or“disruptive”federalism?Isthereariskthat
argumentsfor“disruptive”federalismmaydetractfromruleoflawvaluesreqiring
compliancewithunpopularbutimportantnorms(e.g.,ofcriminalprocedurerights
fordefendants)?
57SeealsoGillianMetzger,TheStatesasNationalAgents,StLouisUNiv(arguingthat
Gerken'saccountgivestoolittleweighttostateautonomyandtherespectduestates
asconstituentpartsofthegovernment).
58358U.S.1(1958).
59SeeCaliforniaProp.209.Howwouldthetheoryapplytoissuesdecidedbya
SupremeCourtdecision,butbyanarrowlydividedCourt?Cf.MarkJoephStern,Is
Same-SexMarriageSafe?,Slate(March12017)(describingTexasSupremeCourt's
hearingofacasechallengingexpenditureofpublicfundstoprovidebenefitsto
same-sexcouples).
18
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
Toreturntotheimplicationsforlawofthe“newnationalism”approaches:
Suchapproaches,focusingastheydoontheactualdegreetowhichstates,local
governmentsandthenationalgovernmentareinterdependentincarryingoutmany
aspectsoffederallaw,supportdoctrinesthatpromotegoodprocessesfor
establishingsuchframeworks.Strongerandmoreconsistentlyapplied
presumptionsagainstpreemption,andespeciallyagainstpreemptionbyexecutive
oradministrativeactionalone,wouldbeconsistentwiththenormativeargument
implicitinthenewnationalism.Clearstatementrules,aswell,mighthelppromote
actualcongressionalconsiderationofeffectsonstateandlocalgovernments.Clear
statementsinlegislationmayalsoprovidenoticetostateandlocalgovernments–if
theycomeupearlyenoughinthelegislativeprocesstodoso.Butitisunlikelythat
suchaproceduraltimingrulewouldbejudiciallyenforced;despiterejecting
nonjusticiabilityargumentsconcerningOriginationClausechallenges,theSupreme
Courthasbeenotherwiseunwillingtomonitorthefairnessandregularityof
legislativeprocessesoftheCongress.60
III.ReconstitutingPoliticalCommunit(y)(ies)ThroughLocalAction
Federalismmightbethoughttoofferopportunitiesnotonlytoinfluence
substantivepoliciesbutalsotoaddressproblemsofpolarization,inaction,and
failuresofrepresentationatnationallevel.BythisImeanatleasttwokindsof
failuresofnationalpolitics:failurestorepresentmajoritiesandfailurestogive
appropriateconsiderationtominorities.Inboth,partofCongress’sfailureof
responsibilityhasbeenasimplefailuretotakeactionthatisneeded–legislativeand
oversight.Partofthefailurehasbeenaninattentiontoconsideringminorityviews
andtheeffectsonminoritiesofproposedcoursesofaction.Whatarethe
possibilitiespresentedbyfederalismforimprovingqualityofpolitics?
A.Howwelive:Physicalmovementsofpopulations?
60See[19thcenturycaseconclusivelypresumingthatifrecordsaysthatenough
voteswererecordedtheywere].
19
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
Itisuncleartheextenttowhichstatepopulationsaremorepolitically
polarizednowthaninthepastbutthereissomereasontothinkthatlivingpatterns
todayreflectmuchgreaterpoliticalpolarizationthaninthepast.Somedatasuggest
thatatthelevelofthecounty,morepeoplearelivingincountiesthatare
overwhelminglypartisaninonedirectionoranother(i.e.morethan20%margins
forpresidentialcandidateinrecentelections).61Thisaccordswithdatashowingan
increase,between1994and2014,of“ideologicalsilos”ofsocialcircles,thatis,that
thepercentagesofliberal,andconservative,voterswhoareclosefriendsprimarily
withpoliticallylike-mindedpeopleareincreasing.62Itisalsoconsistentwithdata
reflectingthatthereisasignificanturban-ruraldivideinpartisanandideological
identification.63
Thispolarizeddistributionofvotersbypartisanshipmayreflectsomesortof
Tieboutiansorting.Butwhilethismightbethoughtabenigndevelopmentinterms
ofmaximizingpreferences,whatislostinsuchanalysisisthewaysinwhich
preferencesarenotstablebutdependinpartonsocialinteractions.Notonlyare
preferencesconstituted,inpart,bytheirsocialcontexts,butsatisfyingsome
preferencesmayimposeexternalitiesonothers--andthetrendsinthese
demographicdistributionsimposesevereexternalitiesonpoliticalprocesses.
Themorewespendtimeonlywithpeoplewhothinklikeus,thelesspractice
wehaveinhavingconversationsandfriendshipswiththosewhothinkdifferently.
61BillBishopandRobertCushing,TheBigSort:Migration,EconomyandPoliticsin
theUnitedStatesof‘Thosepeople,"
‘https://web.archive.org/web/20080624204202/http://www.aei.org/docLib/200
80229_BillBishop.pdf
62CarrollDoherty,7ThingstoknowaboutpolarizationinAmerica(PewResearch
CenterJune12,2014).
63SeeThomasSchaller,GrowingUrban-RuralSplitProvidesRepublicansWith
Down-BallotAdvantages(June2,2016),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/growing-urban-rural-splitprovides-republicans-with-down-ballot-advantages/;JoshKron,“RedState,Blue
City:HowtheUrban-RuralDivideisSplittingAmerica,”TheAtlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-howthe-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/
20
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
Themorepolarizedandhomogenousourideologicalcommunities,thegreaterthe
riskoflessandlessbridgeabledifferencesarising.Whetherthereareappropriate
andnon-coercivewaystoincentivizepeopletomoveinto(andcreate)morerather
thanlessideologicallydiversecommunitiesisaninterestingquestion,64asis
whetherasanormativeandpracticalmatteranysuchapproachesshouldbe
pursued.
B.Newpoliticallyadoptedrulestoencourageconsideringminority
viewsandincreasetendenciestowardmoderation.
Isitpossibletopersuadepeopleinexistinglocationstoadoptnewpolitical
rulesthatwillempowerminoritiesandincreasetendenciestowardsmoderation?
Thismaybemorelikelytohappeninsmallercommunities,wherethereisa
greaterpossibilityforone-on-oneconversationonthemeritstohaveanimpact,or
inlargerjurisdictionsinwhichpoliticalpartisanshipisrelativelyevenlybalanced,so
thatbothsidesmightthinkeachhasachancetobenefit,ortominimizetheirrisks).
Reformisnotimpossible.Arizonaadoptedanonpartisancommissionto
reapportion,inamovethatwasupheldbytheSupremeCourt.65OneofPresident
Obama'slastspeechessuggestedthatinreapportioninglegislativedistricts,itis
importantnottodrawlinessuchthatonepartydominatesandcandidatesendup
appealingtothemostextremewingoftheirownparties;apportionmentwithless
unequalnumbersofvotersfrombothpartieswillhaveatendencytohavea
moderatingeffectonpublicdiscourse.66Ifnoonepartyalwaysknowsitcan
64OnpastincentivesformovementforpurposesofsettlementoftheWest,consider
thevariousHomesteadActs.
65cite
66SeeBarackOBama,AddresstotheIllinoisGeneralAsebly,January--2017)
https://www.c-span.org/video/?404557-1/president-obama-address-illinoisgeneral-assembly("politicansshouldnotpicktheirvoters;votersshouldpicktheir
politicians").Cf.DonaldHorwitz'sEthnicGroupsinConflict(1985)(arguingthat
"centripetalism"inplaceslikeNigeria,withethniccleavages,andvotingsystem
drivingpoliticianstoseektobeasecondorthirdchoiceforfolkswhoarenottheir
principalsupporters,helpsavoidextremismandgovernmentalbreakdowns)
21
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
control,candidatesfromeachpartywillhaveincentivestolistentoandappealtoa
widerswatheofvoters.
ScholarshaveobservedformsofwhatJessicaBulman-Pozenhascalled
"executivefederalism,"meaningnegotiationsamongfederalofficialsandthe
officialsofoneormorestates,thatareproviding"aneededforumforbipartisan
compromise."67Assheexplains,"[r]atherthanrequireagranddealthatsatisfiesan
aggregatenationalbody,executivefederalismunfoldsthroughmanynegotiations
amongdisaggregatedpoliticalactors.Thesediscreteconversationsfacilitate
intrapartydifferenceatthesametimeastheprocessofimplementationfurther
complicates,andmayattenuate,partisancommitments."68Shearguesthatalthough
theseexecutivediscussionstakeplaceinnon-publicfora,thismaybealegitimate
strength.69Non-publicdiscussionmaypermitbothmorecandorandmore
willingnesstomoveoffofinitialpositions,therebyfacilitatingthekindsof
compromisesonwhichworkinggovernmentdepends.70
Aseldomdiscussedpossibilitywouldbetointroduceorreintroduce
proportionalvotingforcollegialbodies.71MorethanadozenU.S.citiesused
proportionalvotingearlyinthe20thcentury;scholarlyevaluationsofitseffectsare
largelyfavorable.72Well-designedPRsystemscanpromotemoreinclusiveformsof
67JessicaBulman-POzen,cite(2016)at955,1001-
68IDat__
69Id.at__.SeealsoSarahBinderandFrancesE.Lee,MakingDealsinCongress,in
SOLUTIONSTOPOLITICALPOLARIZATIONINAMERICA252(NathanPersilyed.2015)(on
importanceofsecrecyinenablingsuccessfuldeal-makinginCongress);GeorgeC.
Edwards,StayingPrivate,inSOLUTIONS,supraat__;JayneMansbridge,chapterin
samebook.
70SeeJackson,Proconstitutionalrepresentation,WilliamandMary2016.
71ForarecentproposalforproportionalvotingforCongress,seeArendLijphart,
PolarizationandDemocratization,inSOLUTIONSTOPOLITICALPOLARIZATIONINAMERICA
76-78(NathanPersilyed.2015).
72SeeDouglasAmy,ABriefHistoryofProportionalRepresentationintheUnited
States,
http://www.fairvote.org/a_brief_history_of_proportional_representation_in_the_uni
ted_states.Amy,aprofessorofpoliticalscienceatMtHolyoke,reliesalsoon
KathleenBarberetal,ProportionalRepresentationandElectoralReforminOhio.
22
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
representationthatavoidgivingexcessivepowerwithinlegislaturestopartiesthat
haveonlyasmallmajorityofthepopularvote.Howlikelyitisthatsuchmethods
couldbeadoptedisunclear;and,forthenationalCongress,legislationinplacesince
1967requiressinglememberdistricting.73Butchangeatthestatelevelcanhave
effects,albeitindirectly,onnationalpolitics.
C.Constitutionalamendment
Anotheravenuebywhichtoredressthedemocraticdeficitinournational
politicsisconstitutionalamendment.IntheorytheprovisionsoftheElectoral
Collegefortheelectiontopresidentcouldbeamendedthroughtheordinary
amendingprocess.Thisprocess,however,isquitearduous,anditwouldtakeyears
tobuildthepoliticalwill.And,becauseitwouldrequirethatsmallerpopulation
statesgiveupsomeoftheadvantagethatElectoralCollegecompositionprovidesto
thesmallerstates,itisunlikelythatenoughofthesmallerstateswouldwillingly
giveupthisadvantage.
Afortiori,thepossibilityofamendingthecompositionoftheSenateisasa
practicalmatteralmostnon-existent,absentsomeemergencythatwouldcreatean
extraordinarysenseofexigency.UnderArticleVoftheConstitution,nostatemay
bedeprivedofitsequalsuffrageintheSenatewithoutitsconsent.Ineffect,notonly
doesthisrequiremeetingtheeveryrigorousbarrierofthree-fourthsofthestatesto
ratify,butitgivesavetotoanysinglestatethatobjectstopreventthechange.
Thus,atthenationallevel,ourpoliticsonthisissueislikethepoliticsin
TennesseeatthetimeofBakervCarr74--thatis,frozeninananti-democratic
posturebyvirtueoftheunwillingnessofincumbentsandtheircitizenpopulations
AccordingtoProfessorAmy,politicianssuccessfullydismantledthesesystems.,e.g.,
inthe1950sinNewYorkcity,whenCommunistswereelectedinsmallnumbers
andtheColdWarprovidedammunitionformajorpartypoliticianstocampaign
againstPR,orwhen(alsointhe1950s)inCincinnati,African-Americanswere
electedtotheCityCouncilforthefirsttime.SeealsoAmy(notingthatproponents
believeitis"accuratetoconcludethatthissystemwasrejectedbecauseitworked
toowell").
73See2U.S.C.Section2c
74369U.S.186(1962).
23
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
toabandontheadvantagethattimeanddemographicchangehadconferredon
longstandingboundaries.75Inthesameway,ournationalrepresentativesandtheir
homeconstituenciesareunlikelytobewillingtoredresstheincreasinglycountermajoritariancharacterofCongress.Constitutionalamendmentisthus,barring
extraordinarycircumstances,notanavailablevehicleforthiskindofmuchneeded
change.
D.Secession
ManyAmericanscholarsbelievethattheCivilWarandsubsequentcaselaw
decisivelyruleoutthepossibilityofsecession.Notso.Whattheslimcaselawafter
theCivilWarrejectsisunilateralsecession,withouttheconsentofotherstates.76
Thecasethuscontemplatesthatsecessionwithconsentwouldbepermissible,
thoughitslanguageleavesunclearwhetherwhatiscontemplatedistheamending
procedureorsomeotherwaybywhichthestatescouldconsent,asinbyordinary
legislation.77Ifsecessionarydrivestrongenough,otherstatesmightagree?But
secessionshouldbeverylastoption(evenifnotaccompaniedbyviolenceand
75In1790,theratiobetweenthelargestpopulationstate(Virginia,747,000)andthe
smallest(Delaware,59,000),wasaround13:1--andthisassumestotalpopulation
figures;theratioof"freewhitemen"overage16(110,000to11,000)wouldbeeven
lower.[citeforsource?IthinkU.S.Censusbureaudaya]Today,theratiobetween
ourlargeststatetoday(California,about39,250,000,U.S.CensusBureau,estimate
2016,https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html)
andoursmallest(Wyoming,585,000,U..SCensusBureau,2016estimate)is
somethinglike67:1.Thus,intheUnitedStatesasinTennessee,thepassageoftime
resultedinincreasingthecounter-majoritariancharacteroftheSenate's
composition.
76Texasv.White,74U.S.700,725(1869)(statingthattheunionwas“indissoluble”
and“[t]herewasnoplaceforreconsideration,orrevocation,exceptthrough
revolution,orthroughconsentoftheStates”).
77QuerywhethertheprovisionsofArticleIV,Section3,statingthatnostate's
boundariescanbechangedwithoutitsconsent,wouldcomeintoplayintheeventof
secession.Asecessionwouldintheoryleaveboundariesuntouched.Whatwere
formerlyboundariesbetweentwostateswouldbecomeboundariesbetweenpartof
theUnitedStatesandadifferentpolity.Sincethepurposeofthisprovisionwas,I
believe,toprotectastatefromlosingpartofitspreexistingterritory,itwouldnot
makesensetoapplyittothesituationofsecession,givinganyonestateavetoona
politicalsolutiontowhatmightotherwisebeanintractableproblem.
24
NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notfor
citationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.
lastingbitternessthatmayconfoundrelationsforyears)stilltendstoleaveboth
politieslessdiversethantheywerebefore.
Secessionshouldbealastresort,hopefullyonenotneeded.Aftersecession
bothpolitiesofwhatwasonceasinglenationendupbeinglessdiversethanthey
werebefore.Secessionisoften,thoughnotalways,accompaniedbyviolenceand
lossoflifeandenduringbitterness.Itistobehopedthatthingswillnotcometothis
pass.
Conclusion
Thegoalofthispaperhasbeentoidentifydifferentapproachestothe
enduringquestionsofU.S.federalism.Framingthediscussionistheargumentthat
Americanfederalismnowhasbetterdemocraticrepresentationwithinthestates
thanitdoesatthenationallevel.Untilslaverywasabolishedthiswasnottrueof
thosestatesthatmaintainedslavery.Manyofthosesamestatescontinuedto
disenfranchiseAfrican-Americanvotersintothe1960s.Butinthe1960s,Congress
andtheCourtsubstantiallyreformedthedemocraticbasesforrepresentativestate
government.Thesereformstooksometimetobecomeacceptedandbearfruit,
althoughbythe1990sprogresstowardsracialinclusionhadbeguntobeseen.78
Scholarsoffederalismneedtoconsiderthedemocraticdeficitatthenational
level,adeficitthathasincreaseddramaticallysincetheFounding.79andthatnow
standsinmarkedcontrasttothedemocraticlegitimacyofthestategovernments.
78Forexample,from1877until1993,theStateofAlabamaelectednoAfrican
AmericanstoCongress.Seehttp://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-andPublications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senatorsby-State-and-Territory/.Alabama'spopulationwas45%blackin1900;by1990,it
was25%black.See
http://www.bplonline.org/resources/government/AlabamaPopulation.aspx`
79Seesupranote75.
25