Target US Support for the Camps in Western Sahara to Advance Refugee Rights and Promote Durable Solutions
2012
• Tens of thousands of refugees have been sequestered in refugee camps in southwest Algeria near the town of Tindouf for more than thirty years. Having initially fled or been forced to flee to the camps during hostilities between Morocco and the Polisario Front, the refugees are now warehoused1 in Algeria in deplorable physical and moral circumstances. The international community has done little to protect the rights of these refugees in what has now become, according to UNHCR, one of the longest protracted refugees situations in the world today. http://moroccanamericanpolicy.com/refugee/report.pdf • The refugees are almost completely dependent on international aid, as prospects for livelihood are limited both by the difficult physical environment and Algeria’s refusal to grant refugees the right to work or freedom of movement outside of the camps. The refugees rely on aid for food and non‐food items, heath care, education, water, sanitation, transportation, and other basic services. Anemia and malnutrition remain high, water resources are insufficient, primary school and health care centers operate with meager resources and supplies, and there is a dearth of secondary education facilities. These conditions all violate refugee rights under international law. http://www.uscrirefugees.org/2010Website/3_Our%20Work/3_2_1_3_Morocco/Stonewalling.pdf http://www.unhcr.org/4b05117f9.html • What is currently a humanitarian crisis is quickly becoming a security crisis. In recent years, the camps have become a recruiting ground for al‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a hub for opportunistic Polisario members trafficking arms, drugs, people, and goods across the Sahel. In addition to the finding that members of the Polisario have long been involved in trafficking in the region and suspected of collusion with AQIM and other militants, the rise of terrorism in the region and continued intransigence by the Polisario to resolve the Western Sahara conflict have exacerbated the security threat posed by the camps.2 • Refugee experts have long warned about the potential dangers of the Polisario‐run camps. The camps are controlled by the Polisario Front, an armed militant group that waged a separatist war against Morocco prior to a ceasefire in 1991. Although the Polisario headquarters and military camps are in theory separated from the refugee camps, “even if armed components of the refugee population can be removed or separated, they will retain links with their families, who in turn can support their military activities.”3 In addition, the UN Peacekeeping Mission in the region, MINURSO, only has a liaison office near the camps and is 1
The anti‐warehousing campaign of the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants defines warehousing as the “practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependence, with their lives on indefinite hold.” 2
Alexander, Yonah. “Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11‐Arab Spring.” The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2012): 1‐60, p. 7.
3
Jacobsen, Karen. “A Framework for Exploring the Political and Security Context of Refugee Populated Areas.” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 19, 1 (2000): 3‐22, p. 20. This information has been produced by the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP). www.moroccoonthemove.com MACP is a registered agent of the Government of Morocco. Additional information is available at the Justice Department in Washington, D.C. not authorized to provide security or implement demobilization of the Polisario armed forces. As a result, as Gil Loescher and James Milner, affiliated with the Refugee Studies Centre at Oxford note, “the Sahrawi military arm, the Polisario Front, has used the camps at Tindouf as a base from which to organise its political struggle and to recruit its soldiers.”4 Karen Jacobsen, of Tufts University, adds, “the presence of weapons, even when hidden, increases the combustibility of the situation in and around the camps, as does the problem of bored and frustrated young men in camps, who are candidates for involvement in crime or recruitment to militias.”5 • The problems associated with the militarization of the camps, the continued presence of an armed group in and around the camps, and the continued encampment of refugees creates further sources of instability, violence, and crime. Referencing the Sahrawi refugees, Loescher and Milner argue, “they are largely confined to camps or settlements, have little or no livelihood and are highly dependent on international assistance. Prolonged and unresolved refugee crises almost universally result in politicisation and militancy of refugee communities with predictable adverse consequences for host state and regional security. These populations frequently become the archetypal ‘refugee warrior’ communities.”6 • The camps are situated close to the porous border area between Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria, a vital crossroads of AQIM terrorism and trafficking in the region. The increased evidence of ties between the Polisario Front and AQIM and recruitment within the refugee camps near Tindouf has raised concerns among security experts.7 Dr. J. Peter Pham has noted, connections between AQIM and the Polisario Front, “come[s] as no surprise given that the large numbers of idle young fighters with no prospects in camps presents the terrorist group with a ready pool of potential recruits, both for its military operations as well as the criminal activities it is increasingly involved in.” http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/islamist‐threat‐africas‐rise‐2012 • Even the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, has warned about the continued dangers of encampment. In a letter to the Group of Friends in late August 2010, Ross emphasized the dangers of failing to resolve the conflict, noting, “the risk of a drift toward extremism or criminal activities among Sahrawi youth is growing. The danger that a military or paramilitary adventure could escalate into hostilities increases the longer diplomacy fails to produce progress.” http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100820/wl_africa_afp/moroccowsaharaspainun • This reality became all the more serious on October 23, 2011 when an AQIM splinter group kidnapped three Western aid workers from the camps, reportedly with Polisario insider help. According to Agence France Presse, “unarmed AQIM militants entered the Sahrawi refugee 4
Loescher, Gil and James Milner. “Case studies: contemporary protracted refugee populations in Africa and Asia.” The Adelphi Papers, 45, 375 (2005): 35‐65, p. 36. 5
Jacobsen, p. 11. 6
Loescher and Milner. “Case studies”, p. 36. 7
Alexander, p. 7. camp in Tindouf, western Algeria, where sympathizers of the Polisario Front gave them weapons and helped them seek out the hostages.” The Polisario‐run refugee camps have thus become what refugee experts have long warned about: “places of outright danger, both for refugees and relief workers.” 8 http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gfsKPTIgBS_lQzBQK_R‐Fdj_‐
z0A?docId=CNG.fb5674e8c48dbb7ef3f59c256d4c3f07.531 • In subsequent weeks, militants affiliated with Polisario were involved in further crime in the region. On December 15, 2011, members of the Polisario reportedly launched an armed incursion into northern Mali, killing one and abducting three others. Following this incident, Mali distanced itself from the Polisario Front, accusing it of kidnapping, drug trafficking, and suspected collusion with a Sahrawi branch of AQIM. The camps have rapidly become a source of terrorism in the region. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i4CHA2HdwpcQJ_XrfCkoFfM4eHBQ?docId=CNG.09c4b8e975cfc23c
8718b820ade10fec.161&index=0 • These security problems are compounded by Polisario policies in the camps, in which violence and intimidation are used to pressure refugees not to repatriate – one of the solutions to both the humanitarian crisis and the security crisis. Rather than helping to keep the camps secure, the response of the Algerian government and the Polisario to close borders to refugees and impose restrictions on them has in fact aggravated security problems. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of refugees have made the dangerous escape from the camps near Tindouf to repatriate to the Western Sahara, indicating that voluntary repatriation would indeed be a plausible solution and that the conditions for return in safety and dignity have been met. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403324.html http://www.uscrirefugees.org/2010Website/3_Our%20Work/3_2_1_3_Morocco/Stonewalling.pdf • As refugee experts Loescher and Milner have long advocated, it is time for increased policymaker and donor attention to the political and security implications of protracted refugee situations; “protracted refugee situations are no less dangerous sources of instability that other more conventional security threats, and should be paid due attention by the US and other Western donors governments, relevant regional powers and multilateral security organisations.”9 In their recommendations, the scholars note, “in the long term, the security implications of forced migration can only be fully addressed by formulating and implementing comprehensive solutions for protracted refugee scenarios. Such a response would employ the full range of possible solutions for refugees – repatriation and reintegration, local integration in the host country, and resettlement in a third country.”10 8
Jacobsen, p.3. Loescher, Gil and James Milner. “The significance of protracted refugee situations.” The Adelphi Papers, 45, 375 (2005): 7‐12, p. 9. 10
Loescher, Gil and James Milner. “Towards solutions for protracted refugee situations.” The Adelphi Papers, 45, 375 (2005): 67‐84, p. 71. 9
• Yet, there are more than just moral and security imperatives for promoting the rights of Sahrawi refugees. It is also in the interest of UNHCR, Algeria, and donors to open the Tindouf camps since the long‐term care and maintenance programs come at a significant human and material cost. To date, the international community has provided over $1.3 billion dollars to UNHCR, the World Food Program, and MINURSO for the Sahrawi refugees, of which the United States has contributed over $300 million.11 While this money has provided vital resources to the refugees, it has done little to promote durable solutions, the primary mandate of UNHCR under international refugee law. Rather than help sustain a humanitarian crisis and an increasingly volatile security crisis, US support to UNHCR should be targeted for the promotion of durable solutions, including voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement in a third country. http://moroccanamericanpolicy.com/refugee/report.pdf http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000603.pdf • Now is the time to take action to guarantee the stability and security of the Maghreb and Sahel by resolving the refugee crisis. The United States must target funding to UNHCR until and unless the refugee agency: o Establishes a significant presence in the camps to ensure the protection of refugee rights and prevent the militarization of the camps. o Conducts a census to identify and provide documentation to Sahrawi refugees in order to establish conditions for repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration. o Establishes an intimidation‐free, voluntary repatriation program for those Sahrawi refugees who wish to return to their previous homelands and families in Morocco. o Establishes a viable resettlement program for those Sahrawi refugees who wish to settle in a third country, including Spain and Mauritania where many may have claims to citizenship. o Works with the Algerian government to improve prospects for local integration for those who want to remain in Algeria. • Sahrawi refugees must not continue to suffer for the failures of UNCHR, Algeria, and the Polisario. It is in the interests of the United States, both from a security and financial perspective, that UNHCR work to find durable solutions to the Sahrawi refugee crisis. For more information, visit http://www.moroccoonthemove.com/ ‐ Follow on Twitter @MorocOnTheMove 11
“MINURSO Facts and Figures.” United Nations Mission for a Referendum in the Western Sahara, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/facts.shtml>. “Congressional Budget Justification for Department of State Operations.” United States Department of State (1991‐2012), <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c6112.htm>. “The Global Report and Funding Reports.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1999‐2010), <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c278.html>. “Food for Peace Fact Sheet.” United States Agency for International Development (2002‐2011), <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/algeria.fs.01.04.11.pdf>. “Algeria.” World Food Programme, <http://www.wfp.org/countries/Algeria/Operations/WFP‐Activities>.