TURKEY
2023
The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
By Soli Özel
May 10, 2016
On November 24, 2015, despite multiple warnings from Turkish air patrols, a Russian
SU-24 aircraft that violated Turkish airspace for 17 seconds was shot down by a
Turkish F-16 fighter jet. The Russians denied that they were ever in Turkish airspace,
while NATO corroborated the Turkish version.1 According to Turkish sources, there
were repeated warnings for five minutes—which the Russians claimed they never
received—and Turkey’s rules of engagement were well known to the Russians.2 One
pilot was rescued by Russian special forces, but Turkmen rebels—trained and supplied
by Turkey—on the ground across the border in Syria shot and killed the other as he was
parachuting from the plane.*3
Turkish authorities immediately approached NATO for support, a move that reportedly
infuriated Russian President Vladimir Putin, who called the downing of the plane “a stab
in the back.”4 The Russian military claimed that the Turkish action was preplanned—an
accusation the Turkish General Staff denied.5 After initially reiterating that its rules of
engagement were clear, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed sadness at
the downing of the plane and his hope that the crisis could be resolved.6
From the measures the Russians immediately took, it seems that Moscow was ready for
such an incident. The Russian government imposed economic sanctions that hit the
Turkish trade, construction, and tourism sectors, exchanges that had benefited Turkey
immensely.7 Militarily, Russia announced that it would deploy its more advanced S-400
surface-to-air missiles in Syria and continued to pound the positions of the Turkmen
brigades that Turkey organized, trained, supplied with arms and money, and supports
fully in their fight against the Assad regime.8 Effectively, the Russian air force obliterated
these brigades both as part of Moscow’s campaign to weaken the so-called moderate
rebels in Syria and also to hit back at Turkey for the shoot down.
But Moscow did not take any steps to reduce the amount of gas it supplies to Turkey
nor did it use Turkey’s dependence on Russia for 55 percent of its gas consumption as
a threat.9 Instead, Russia insisted that Turkey take responsibility for the shoot down,
apologize, and pay indemnities—demands similar to those Turkey put to the Israeli
government after the Mavi Marmara tragedy. The cost of these sanctions to Turkey is
estimated to exceed $8 billion in 2016.10
1 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
The Turkish side did not have any retaliatory measures at hand for Russia. Turkish
officials simply repeated their regret that the incident took place and hope that tensions
could be resolved and relations would improve.11 To avoid provoking any direct Russian
military retaliation, Turkey was careful not to fly too close to the Syrian border, and
reported violations of Turkish airspace by Russian aircraft were ignored until January 30.
President Erdoğan, whose attempts to have an audience with Putin have been repeatedly
turned down, reacted angrily to the continuing violations, saying, “If Russia continues the violations of Turkish sovereign rights, it will be forced to endure the consequences.”12 What these consequences might entail was not explained.
The effects of the November incident almost completely cut Turkey out of the Syrian
theater. This has left Turkey with limited means to affect developments across the border
that it deems threatening to its core national interests, such as the territorial expansion
of the Democratic Union Party, or PYD—the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’
Party, or PKK, which has waged war against the Turkish state for the past 32 years.
More importantly, Russia and Turkey’s close relations, built since 2000, have been
severely harmed. This may be an irreversible development, particularly in view of
Russia’s strategic moves in Syria and elsewhere. The days when President Erdoğan asked
President Putin to let Turkey be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
are gone.13 The reaction of the Turkish government after the shoot down incident demonstrated that Ankara has finally realized that the country’s traditional NATO allies are
all that is left to rely on for Turkey’s security, despite profound differences concerning
the nature of the PYD and its role in Syria.
From historic enemy to strategic partner
Historically, the Russian Empire often expanded at the expense of the Ottoman Empire,
and the relations between Russia and Turkey are often framed by the number of wars
they and their predecessor states fought. But there have been periods of cooperation
and mutual reliance as well, most notably during the Russian civil war following the
Bolshevik Revolution, which coincided with the Turkish War of Independence.14 The
two sides helped one another and relations were smooth until the end of World War II
when Joseph Stalin made territorial claims on Turkey and demanded joint control of
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits; it was this threat that pushed Turkey toward the
American side and NATO membership during the Cold War.15
Economic relations improved beginning in the early 1960s, and the 1984 signing of a
swap agreement of Russian gas for Turkish products initiated a period of tightening economic links.16 In the 1990s, the two sides continued to have good relations economically
despite stark political disagreements; elements in Turkey supported the Chechen rebellion against Moscow,17 while the Russians supported the PKK in its struggle against the
Turkish state.18 There was also competition for influence over the newly independent
Central Asian Turkic republics, as well as strategic competition in the Caucasus. By the
2 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
end of the decade, the two sides had decided to lower tensions, cooperate, and refrain
from military competition in the Black Sea. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s
visit to Turkey in October 200019 inaugurated a new era of close cooperation that would
lead to a hesitant—and perhaps untenable—strategic partnership.
In Turkey, some security elites favored distancing the country from the European Union
without alienating the United States and looked to cooperation with Russia and Iran.20
This outlook was at least partly informed by Turkey’s desire to become an energy hub.
Within 10 years, trade between the two countries increased sevenfold; Turkey became
Russia’s sixth-largest trading partner, and Russia became Turkey’s second-largest trading
partner.21 The energy cooperation that began in the 1980s deepened with the 1997 Blue
Stream project,22 which brings Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkey, and culminated in 2010 when Turkey awarded a contract to build a nuclear reactor to Russia.23
As energy cooperation increased, Turkish contractors prospered in Russia, and visa
restrictions were lifted.24 Relations reached the level of a strategic partnership at the
first meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council, an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism that lays the foundation for the partnership between the two countries.
The meeting was held in 2010 despite tensions between Russia and the West following
Moscow’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, which drew harsh condemnation from the United
States and NATO.25 Turkey largely looked past the Russian invasion in favor of energy
and economic cooperation with Moscow. During this period, Turkey also became the
first NATO member to buy weapons from the Russian Federation.26
The intensification of economic relations took place mainly under Justice and
Development Party, or AKP, governments in Turkey. The leaders of the two countries
met frequently, often signing lucrative deals on energy and other industries.27 But this
was not an equal relationship. Turkey became increasingly dependent on Russian gas,
and as overall bilateral trade expanded beyond $30 billion, Turkey’s trade deficit with
Russia neared $20 billion annually.28 In this context, the award of the contract for the
construction of the nuclear reactor to Russia seems all the more curious because it
increases Russia’s energy stranglehold on Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey provides
Russia with a reliable and expanding market for its gas.
Moreover, Moscow has often opposed Turkey on matters of political and strategic importance. Russia was instrumental in impeding the Cyprus deal prepared by
then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2004 and blocked Annan’s report, which
was critical of the Greek Cypriot side, from being submitted to the U.N. Security
Council.29 In the Caucasus, Russia is the main supporter of Turkey’s rival Armenia.
Recently, Turkish-backed Azerbaijan and Russian-backed Armenia clashed again over
the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.30 Additionally, Russia’s use of military force
against Georgia was against Turkey’s interests—demonstrating Russian hard power
in the Caucasus, as well as Turkey and the West’s inability to prevent it. And after the
Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s annexation of Crimea embarrassed Turkey, which has long
patronized the Crimean Tatars, and threatens to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake.31
3 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
Still, Turkey chose not to participate in the Western sanctions against Russia in response
to Moscow’s invasion and annexation of parts of Ukraine.32 In fact, the crisis was followed by the announcement of a new pipeline project—dubbed Turkish Stream—to
bring more Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkey and, eventually, Europe.33 But in
light of the crisis in bilateral relations triggered by the shoot down, Turkish Stream has
been shelved for the time being.34
As Evren Balta—a professor of political science at Yıldız Technical University in
Istanbul—writes, relations with Russia, which have been presented by successive AKP
governments as a foreign policy accomplishment, were in fact defined by “an unequal
relation of dependency that worked against Turkey’s interests,” the continuation of
which “was predicated on the stability of the international status quo.”35 Starting with
Russia’s reaction to the Arab revolts—particularly the NATO intervention in Libya—
and the Ukraine crisis, the international status quo was anything but stable.
The Syrian debacle
The most important disagreement between President Putin and President Erdoğan
is Syria. Turkey, after an initial effort to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to
reform, turned vehemently against the Baathist dictator, while Russia has lent its full
support to the regime from the beginning. In retrospect, Turkey appears to have underestimated Russia and Iran’s determination to prop up the Syrian regime. In its quest to
topple Assad, Turkey has actively supported Syrian opposition groups and looked the
other way at its border crossings, allowing relatively unfettered access to Syrian and
foreign fighters.36 Furthermore, as the Syrian war became more violent and sectarianism
intensified, Turkish foreign policy turned away from its traditional secular orientation
and favored a pro-Sunni stance and discourse.37
Turkey’s goals changed somewhat in 2014, when American aerial support of Syrian
Kurdish forces led by the PYD held off a determined Islamic State assault on the town of
Kobani. The PYD and its armed militia—the People’s Protection Units, or YPG—are affiliates of the PKK, which has been fighting the Turkish state since 1984. Turkey therefore
considers their consolidation of power in northern Syria, where they have set up a de facto
government, to be a major security threat.38 In response, Turkey’s Syria policy changed;
Ankara now had two targets in Syria: the Assad regime and PYD. To secure both goals,
Turkey intensified cooperation with Saudi Arabia and jointly supplied more weapons and
money to Arab and Turkmen opposition groups while refusing to cooperate with antiIslamic State coalition activities in support of the Syrian Kurds.39 When Russia stepped up
its intervention in Syria at the end of September 2015 to rescue the Assad regime, its first
target was not the Islamic State but the Turkish- and Saudi-backed opposition groups that
were advancing rapidly into regime-held territory in northern Syria.40
4 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
The Russian intervention was devastating to Turkey’s policy in Syria, and in that light,
Moscow can be said to have provoked the downing of the Russian plane. Russia had
already increased its presence in the eastern Mediterranean with the express intention of
defending its military base in Tartus, Syria. The deployment of Russian attack planes to
Syria at the end of September sparked several incidents that foreshadowed the trouble
ahead between Russian and Turkish forces. On October 3, a Russian fighter jet entered
Turkish airspace and was escorted out by Turkish jets. The Russian ambassador claimed
that this was a navigation error.41 The next day, a Russian MiG-29 approached Turkish
airspace from Syria and locked its radar onto two Turkish jets cruising the Turkish side
of the border. On October 5, the show repeated, with a Russian plane locking its radar
on eight Turkish jets, again cruising within Turkish territory.42
These incidents suggest that one goal of the Russian intervention was to impede
Turkey’s political and strategic success in Syria. The Russian intervention made it almost
impossible to overthrow the Assad regime. The Russian air force incapacitated the
opposition troops that Turkey supported, both newly formed Turkmen brigades and
jihadi-oriented Arab groups. These developments were sufficiently damaging to Turkey’s
interests to lead Ankara to down a Russian plane and thereby nullify 15 years of investment in building better relations with Russia. One plausible explanation for this risky
reaction is Turkey calculated that, since it could not take on the Russian military in Syria
alone, downing the plane might be enough to bring NATO into Syria more actively on
the side of Turkey. However, while both NATO and the United States took Turkey’s side
legally and offered additional military reassurance, they considered the matter separately
from the wider Syria crisis.
The net result of the downing of the Russian plane, therefore, was the defeat of Turkey’s
plans in Syria and a setback in its strategic ambition of acting as a regional power that
determines the course of events in the Middle East. Effectively, Turkey has little leverage now over military developments in Syria. Ankara considers the PYD a genuine
security threat but cannot convince the United States to stop helping the organization
gain ground. Diplomatically, Ankara can still block the PYD from attending the Geneva
peace talks but has not been able to offer an alternative to its success against the Islamic
State, which adds to the group’s international legitimacy.
Support for the PYD is one of the areas of common ground between Washington and
Moscow since the Russian intervention in Syria. Moscow has said it does not consider the PKK a terrorist organization and gave the PYD permission to open an office
in Moscow. The main goal of Russia vis-à-vis Turkey in Syria is now accomplished:
Turkey’s proxies are weak and its sectarian policy is a colossal failure. Strategically, the
country is encircled by Russia and its proxies in the Black Sea, Armenia, the eastern
Mediterranean, and Syria. Turkey’s room for maneuver is exceptionally limited.
5 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
Conclusion
By downing the Russian plane, the government in Ankara broke the cardinal rule of
Turkish diplomacy since Ottoman times: Do not take on Russia unless you can rely
on another great power. Turkey’s relations with its major ally the United States are, at
the very least, troubled. Turkey’s perceived half-heartedness in the fight against the
Islamic State and its insistence on treating the PYD not as an ally against the Islamic
State but as an equivalent terrorist organization have contributed to a lot of static in
U.S.-Turkey communications.
Russia has been challenged and is striking back at Turkey by exploiting Turkey’s chief
vulnerability: the Kurdish problem. As Michael Reynolds suggests, “Turkey’s great
vulnerability is the Kurdish Question, and the country is currently on the brink of
a civil war. Russia has a long and rich history of interest—diplomatic, military and
academic—in the Kurds that dates back to the eighteenth century.”43 Some have
speculated that Moscow may again be supporting the PKK, which is currently targeting Turkish security forces, as it did during the 1990s.44 Certainly, there is evidence of
Russia’s support for the PYD in Syria.45 Russia is helping advance Turkey’s nightmare
by actively supporting the PYD in its efforts to secure control and autonomy along the
entire Turkish-Syrian border.
Overtures from the Turkish government since the shoot down incident failed to change
the Russian position. Anecdotal evidence does suggest that the initial Russian pressure
on Turkish businesses operating in Russia has subsided.46 The Russian government has
also allowed the resumption of direct scheduled flights to Antalya in Turkey after previously banning them.47 Yet Russian tourism remains well below precrisis levels and the
diplomatic standoff continues.48
A much-needed recalibration of Turkish foreign policy will have to include repairing
relations with Russia. The two countries are economically integrated and a continuation of tensions does not serve either side’s interests. Turkish efforts to get closer to
Ukraine will not be enough to tilt the balance of power in Turkey’s favor. Fortunately,
diplomatic relations have not been severed entirely, which presents an opportunity to
return to dialogue once tempers have cooled. Turkey may have to formulate a statement that assuages Russian concerns about the incident without sacrificing Turkey’s
right to self-defense and bring the killer of the Russian pilot to justice. For Turkey, this
is a step worth taking.
* Correction, May 11, 2016: This article incorrectly stated the number people killed in the
downing of the Russian jet. One pilot was killed, while the other was rescued.
6 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
Soli Özel is a professor of international relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul.
The Voices from Turkey series is part of “Turkey in Europe and the World—A Trilateral
Initiative,” funded by Stiftung Mercator. The project is organized by the Center for American
Progress (Washington), the Istanbul Policy Center (Istanbul), and the Istituto Affari
Internazionali (Rome) and aims to outline a long-term prosperity vision for Turkey, explore
its role in Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship, assess the state of the republic and its
institutions 100 after its foundation, and examine its position in the region and the world.
The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the Center for American Progress.
The Center for American Progress produces independent research and policy ideas driven by
solutions that we believe will create a more equitable and just world.
7 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
Endnotes
1 Al Jazeera, “World leaders react to Turkey’s downing of
Russian jet,” November 24, 2015, available at http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/russian-jet-shot-turkey-syriareaction-151124210400768.html.
2 Burak Ege Bekdil, Matthew Bodner, and Andrew Clevenger,
“Turkey Shoots Down Russian Jet on Syrian Border,” Defense
News, November 24, 2015, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2015/11/24/
turkey-shoots-down-russian-jet-syrian-border/76302108/.
3 BBC, “Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane - what we
know,” December 1, 2015, available at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-34912581.
4 Al Jazeera, “Putin: Turkey’s downing of jet a ‘stab in the
back,’” November 24, 2015, available at http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/russia-turkey-jet-syriashot-151124140238943.html.
5 Camila Domonoske, “Russia Calls Downing Of Its Plane
A ‘Planned Provocation,’” NPR, November 25, 2015,
available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/11/25/457350907/russia-calls-shoot-down-of-itsplane-a-planned-provocation.
6Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey ‘saddened’ about Russian jet’s
downing, Erdoğan says,” November 28, 2015, available
at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-saddenedabout-russian-jets-downing-erdogan-says.aspx?PageID=23
8&NID=91807&NewsCatID=510.
7 Reuters, “Factbox: Russia-Turkey economic and trade relations,” November 24, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-turkey-ties-fac-idUSKBN0TD26K20151124.
8 Milliyet, “Rusya Türkmen Dağı’nı bombalıyor (Russia bombs
Turcoman mountains),” March 12, 2015, available at http://
www.milliyet.com.tr/rusya-bolgeyi-bombaliyor/dunya/
detay/2157722/default.htm.
9 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looking to End Russian Gas Dependence,” Voice of America, December 14, 2015, available
at http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-russia-gasdependence/3102230.html.
10 Mustafa Sönmez, “Cost of Russian crisis continues to rise,”
Hürriyet Daily News, March 7, 2016, available at http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/cost-of-russian-crisis-continues-torise.aspx?PageID=238&NID=96107&NewsCatID=344.
11 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey ‘saddened’ about Russian jet’s
downing, Erdoğan says.”
12 Fox News, “Erdogan issues warning to Moscow after warplane allegedly violated Turkish airspace,” January 31, 2016,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/01/31/
erdogan-issues-warning-to-moscow-after-warplane-allegedly-violated-turkish-airspace.html.
13 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkish PM Erdoğan to Putin: Take us
to Shanghai,” November 22, 2013, available at http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-to-putin-takeus-to-shanghai.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58348&NewsCat
ID=359.
14 Jeffrey Mankoff, “Why Russia and Turkey Fight,” Foreign
Affairs, February 24, 2016, available at https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-02-24/why-russiaand-turkey-fight.
15 J.C. Hurewitz, “Russia and the Turkish Straits: A Revaluation
of the Origins of the Problem,” World Politics 14 (4) (1962),
available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAb
stract?fromPage=online&aid=7605012.
16 Hürriyet Daily News, “Old rivals, new partners: Russia and
Turkey, tied by energy dependence,” September 8, 2010,
available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.
aspx?pageid=438&n=russia-and-turkey-tied-by-energydependence-2010-08-09.
17 Ian Traynor, “Chechnya fuels Russian-Turkish tension,” The
Guardian, April 26, 2001, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/26/chechnya.worlddispatch.
18 Michael A. Reynolds, “Turkey, Russia, and NATO Enter the
Danger Zone” (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2015), available at http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/12/
turkey-russia-and-nato-enter-the-danger-zone/.
19 Mitat Çelikpala, “Rusya gazı keser mi? (Will Russia cut the
gas supply?),” personal communication, February 20, 2016.
20 Radikal, “General Kılınç: AB bize uymaz (The EU does not suit
us),” March 8, 2002, available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/
haber.php?haberno=31291.
21 Çelikpala, “Rusya gazı keser mi?”
22 Gazprom, “Blue Stream,” available at http://www.gazprom.
com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/
(last accessed May 2016).
23 Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey’s Pact With Russia Will Give It Nuclear
Plant,” The New York Times, May 12, 2010, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/world/europe/13turkey.
html.
24 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey, Russia accelerate cooperation,”
January 19, 2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-russiaaccelerates-cooperation-2011-01-19.
25 Ibid.
26 See, for example: Richard Weitz, “Reducing Its Dependence
on Foreign Arms Suppliers, Turkey Enhances Its Strategic
Autonomy,” Hudson Institute, August 30, 2010, available
at http://www.hudson.org/research/7305-reducing-itsdependence-on-foreign-arms-suppliers-turkey-enhancesits-strategic-autonomy. On NATO sales, see: Fatih Ozbay,
“Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi Ve Türkiye-Rusya (The
purchase of military helicopters by Turkey from Russia),”
Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies, July 20, 2005,
available at http://www.tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/281/askeri_
amacli_helikopter_alimi_ihalesi_ve_turkiye-rusya_.
27 Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey, Russia accelerate cooperation.”
See also: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Fourth
Meeting of the Turkish-Russian High Level Cooperation
Council was held in St. Petersburg,” available at http://www.
mfa.gov.tr/the-fourth-meeting-of-the-turkish_russianhigh-level-cooperation-council-was-held-in-st_-petersburg.
en.mfa (last accessed May 2016).
28 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Fourth Meeting of
the Turkish-Russian High Level Cooperation Council was
held in St. Petersburg”; Makovsky, “Turkey’s Growing Energy
Ties with Moscow.”
29 Sinan Oğan, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Kıbrıs Politikası (The
Cyprus policy of the Russian Federation),” Türksam, February
6, 2005, available at http://www.turksam.org/tr/makaledetay/603-rusya-federasyonu-nun-kibris-politikasi.
30 Anna Nemtsova, “In Nagorno-Karabakh, a Bloody New
War With Putin on Both Sides,” The Daily Beast, April 4,
2016, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/04/in-nagorno-karabakh-a-bloody-new-warwith-putin-on-both-sides.html. See also: Paul Huard, “Little
Armenia Could Play a Big Role if Russia and Turkey Ever Go
to War,” War Is Boring, March 17, 2016, available at https://
warisboring.com/little-armenia-could-play-a-big-role-if-russia-and-turkey-ever-go-to-war-7ee632040a50#.xgbvpwx5x.
31 Natalia Zinets, “Turkey offers $50 million loan to Ukraine,
urges protection of Crimean Tatars,” Reuters, March 20,
2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkeyukraine-idUSKBN0MG0VZ20150320.
32 John E. Herbst, “Estranged from Russia, Turkey and Ukraine
Join Forces,” Newsweek, April 15, 2016, available at http://
www.newsweek.com/estranged-russia-turkey-and-ukrainejoin-forces-447473.
8 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations
33 For more on Turkish Stream and Turkish-Russian energy
relations, see: Makovsky, “Turkey’s Growing Energy Ties with
Moscow.”
34 Denis Pinchuk and Olesya Astakhova, “Exclusive - Russia
may freeze Turkish Stream gas project: Gazprom sources,”
Reuters, December 1, 2015, available at http://uk.reuters.
com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-russia-turkey-gas-idUKKBN0TK4WP20151201.
35 Evren Balta,”Rusya ile Savaş İhtimali (The probability of War
with Russia),” Birikim, February 25, 2016, available at http://
www.birikimdergisi.com/haftalik/7533/rusya-ile-savasihtimali#.VyPkJKNcSko.
36 On jihadi elements, see, for example: Der Spiegel, “Striking the Heart of Europe: Turkey’s Failed Anti-Extremism
Strategy,” January 15, 2016, available at http://www.spiegel.
de/international/europe/attacks-in-turkey-symptomatic-offailed-strategy-for-extremism-a-1072287.html; Tim Arango
and Eric Schmitt, “A Path to ISIS, Through a Porous Turkish
Border,” The New York Times, March 9, 2015, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-through-porous-turkish-border.html; Ayla Albayrak and Joe Parkinson,
“Turkey Struggles to Halt Islamic State ‘Jihadist Highway,’”
The Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014, available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-struggles-to-halt-islamic-state-jihadist-highway-1409777884. On foreign fighters,
see: Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari, “The Flow of Foreign
Fighters to the Islamic State” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2016), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/03/17/133566/
the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-to-the-islamic-state/.
37 See, for example: Semih Idiz, “The ‘Sunnification’ of Turkish
Foreign Policy,” Al-Monitor, March 1, 2013, available at
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/
akp-sunni-foreign-policy-turkey-sectarianism.html#; Jonny
Hogg, “Turkey turns inwards as war spreads from Syria
to Iraq,” Reuters, July 4, 2014, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-turkey-foreignpolicy-iraq-idUSKBN0F90AK20140704; Stratfor, “Turkey, Saudi Arabia Strive
for Sunni Leadership,” March 30, 2015, available at https://
www.stratfor.com/analysis/turkey-saudi-arabia-strive-sunnileadership; Eric S. Edelman, “America’s Dangerous Bargain
With Turkey,” The New York Times, August 27, 2015, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/opinion/americasdangerous-bargain-with-turkey.html?smprod=nytcoreiphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0.
38 See, for example: Aslı Aydintaşbaş, “A Kurdish Autumn Becomes Turkey’s Long Winter” (Washington:
Center for American Progress, 2016), available at
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/
report/2016/04/19/135785/a-kurdish-autumn-becomesturkeys-long-winter/.
39 On the expanded Turkish and Saudi support, see: Sara
Hussein, “‘Army of Conquest’ rebel alliance pressures Syria
regime,” Agence France Presse, April 28, 2015, available
at https://www.yahoo.com/news/army-conquest-rebelalliance-pressures-syria-regime-090529121.html?ref=gs.
On the halting Turkish participation in the anti-Islamic
State coalition, see, for example: Humeyra Pamuk and
Daren Butler, “U.S.-led air strikes intensify as Syria conflict
destabilizes Turkey,” Reuters, October 14, 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-idUSKCN0I30ZI20141014.
40 On the targeting of non-Islamic State rebels, see: Maksymilian Czuperski and others, “Distract, Deceive, Destroy: Putin
at War in Syria” (Washington: The Atlantic Council, 2016),
available at http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/distractdeceive-destroy/assets/download/ddd-report.pdf.
41 Akın Ünver, “Turkey-Russia Tensions: It Is Different This Time”
(Washington: WikiStrat, 2015), available at http://www.
wikistrat.com/wikistrat-report-turkey-russia-tensions/.
42 Ibid.
43 Reynolds, “Turkey, Russia, and NATO Enter the Danger Zone.”
44 Ibid. See also: Soner Cagaptay and Andrew J. Tabler, “The
U.S.-PYD-Turkey Puzzle” (Washington: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2015), available at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-u.s.-pydturkey-puzzle.
45 Cagaptay and Tabler, “The U.S.-PYD-Turkey Puzzle.” See also:
Roland Oliphant, “Syrian Kurds open diplomatic mission
in Moscow,” The Telegraph, February 10, 2016, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
russia/12150692/Syrian-Kurds-open-diplomatic-mission-inMoscow.html.
46 Daily Sabah, “Desperate Russia eases sanctions on Turkish
firms,” January 15, 2016, available at http://www.dailysabah.
com/money/2016/01/16/desperate-russia-eases-sanctionson-turkish-firms-1452887457.
47 Hürriyet Daily News, “Russia lifts ban on airline’s flights to
Turkey,” March 24, 2016, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-lifts-ban-on-airlines-flights-to-turkey--.as
px?PageID=238&NID=96872&NewsCatID=345.
48 Turkey was set to lose 4.5 million Russian tourists in 2016
if the ban on flights and tours continued. Will Coldwell,
“Turkey’s tourism industry counts cost of unrest as holiday
bookings fall by 50%,” The Guardian, March 23, 2016, available at http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2016/mar/23/
turkey-tourism-industry-summer-holiday-bookings-fall50-percent.
9 Center for American Progress | The Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations