Discrimination and Assimilation
Jon EGUIA
University of Bristol
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of assimilation in a heterogeneous society composed of
two groups with distinct social norms and unequal background. Members of the
group with a relatively disadvantaged background face an incentive to assimilate,
embracing the norms of the more advantaged group. The cost of assimilation is
endogenous and strategically chosen by the advantaged group to screen those
seeking to assimilate. In equilibrium, only highly skilled agents choose to assimilate.
The theory provides a novel explanation of the so called « acting white »
phenomenon, in which students from disadvantaged ethnic groups punish their coethnics who succeed academically. I show that punishing success and thus raising
the cost of acquiring skills needed to assimilate is an optimal strategy by low ability
students to keep their more able co-ethnics in the disadvantaged group.
Monday, June 13, 2016 – 4:00 p.m. – Room b - 135
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-43677.html