New State Spaces, Globalization, and the Politics of Rescaling H.V. Savitch (University of Louisville) and Ronald K. Vogel (Ryerson University) Contact information: Professor Hank Savitch Professor Ronald K. Vogel Urban and Public Affairs Politics and Public Administration 426 West Bloom Street 350 Victoria Street Louisville, KY 40208 Toronto, ON, Canada M5B 2K3 [email protected] [email protected] 502-­‐852-­‐7929 416-­‐979-­‐5000 ext. 6054 Paper presented at Governing the metropolis: Powers and Territories. New Directions for Research, Paris, France, November 29, 2012. Introduction In the last century, the Metro Model served as a reference point for world cities in how government should be organized in the modern metropolis (Sharpe 1995). The main concern of the model is excessive fragmentation of local government, which leads to inefficient and ineffective public services, poor planning, inadequate infrastructure, and inequality in the financing and delivery of public services to residents (Savitch and Vogel 2009). Although the Metro Model was revered as the ideal, in practice the model has been under pressure since the 1970s as urbanization continued to spread beyond the boundaries of the metropolitan governments. Today, scholars and practitioners highlight the lack of correspondence between existing boundaries of the metropolitan governments and the sprawling metropolis beyond its reach. By the late 20th century, it no longer seemed feasible or even desirable to extend boundaries to create a vast metropolitan government (see Bish 2001; Savitch and Vogel 2009). Metropolitan or regional governance required building new institutional arrangements or processes. Thus, metropolitan government was reframed as metropolitan governance (see Savitch and Vogel 1996, LeFevre 1998). Critics doubted that metropolitan governance arrangements could ever be an adequate solution for coordinating or governing the metropolis or was as prevalent as often asserted (see Norris 2001, LeFevre 1998). Some also questioned the premise underlying the new regionalism claiming it was about state restructuring to meet the needs of global capital rather than good governance (Neil Brenner 2004). Ironically, while the Metro Model has declined as the dominant paradigm for metropolitan governance, scholars and practitioners increasingly point to the metropolitan region as the relevant scale to plan and develop the city and ensure its competitiveness in the world economy (Scott 2001). The region has been characterized as a new state space to highlight its importance as the central territorial scale in the world economy. Thus, we see the OECD has undertaken an extensive Territorial Review project to assess the 1 competitiveness of world cities emphasizing the relationship between political integration in the metropolis and economic competitiveness.1 Framework of Territorial Rescaling In this paper we establish a framework to compare global cities on territorial rescaling and metropolitan governance. Territory may be reconfigured through changing formal institutional arrangements or boundaries of existing governmental jurisdictions. However, territory can be rescaled by other means than changing the formal administrative organization or boundaries of a city. An interlocal agreement or process of interaction can also indicate a new way to govern territory and alter the outcomes of who benefits from the system. We propose a typology of regional governance and territorial rescaling placed along a continuum from monocentric to polycentric (see Figure 1). Insert Figure 1 about here The overall continuum ranges from monocentric at one end to polycentric at another. By monocentric we mean single, highly centralized government, run from a cohesive center of authority and couched in large territorial areas (big box). By polycentric we refer to multiple governments with multiple centers of authority and based upon smaller territorial units.2 Also, note the alignment along the continuum between government versus governance. Government stresses tangible institutions while governance emphasizes processes. As we employ the concepts government is identified by 1http://www.oecd.org/gov/regionaldevelopment/oecdterritorialreviewscompetitivecitiesintheglob
aleconomy.htm 2 These distinctions are somewhat akin to Hooghe and Marks (2003) classification of
jurisdictions they label as Type 1 and Type 2. Monocentric localities resemble a Type 1
designation, described as having a systematic architecture that is nested in a particular territory
that offers general (multipurpose) services. By contrast polycentric localities fall within Type 2
systems characterized as fragmented, overlapping and offering specialized services. Applied to
our localities we can say that consolidated, multi tiered and urban communities define
themselves by their territorial boundaries. Cross-border compacts and diffuse localities are
defined by their functions and by their propensity to mix and match services to suit the demands
of consumers.
2 fixed and enduring responsibilities; governance is identified by flexible arrangements that continually adjust to circumstances. We begin with the left side of the continuum by describing city county consolidation as having absorbed smaller localities within one “big box” government. This is a classic reorganization of government where the new jurisdiction converts multiple bureaucracies into a single organization and places them under a single executive (mayor) that is accountable to a single legislative body (council). The larger land masses of consolidated areas are supposed to better absorb positive or negative externalities and consequent “spillovers”. Philadelphia, San Francisco and New Orleans were all products of mid 19th century consolidations that merged a central city with a surrounding county or parish. New York City’s grand merger of 1898 went further by incorporating five counties into a single municipality. Consolidation absorbed these counties into a single municipality covering 300 square miles, making New York the largest city in America and giving it international stature. After the 19th century consolidation faded as a common practice and most residents are now unaware their cities had been ever rescaled. In more recent times Indianapolis (1970) Toronto (1998) and Louisville (2000) have joined the consolidated ranks. While consolidation sought unification the newly merged territories have gone through periodic bouts of increased fragmentation. Within a few decades cracks on the surface of consolidation were evident and unintended consequences rippled through the system. Consolidation’s demarcated boundaries did not prevent “spillovers” of former residents moving beyond city limits. Urban sprawl and segregation advanced into the suburbs of Louisville, Indianapolis and Toronto. Spreading urbanization also made it all the more important to rely on regional agencies, thereby increasing the powers of external institutions. Indianapolis shows how intentions can go awry. The new metropolis’s “UniGov” had once been hailed by the media, but it turned out to be neither unified nor a single government. Today, Indianapolis consists of more than 50 units of local government and four independent cities. Among these are nine townships with different land uses and different taxing authority. As development pressures mounted UniGov loaded more burdens on the Center Township while reducing them for suburban townships. The 3 dynamics of growth led to a mushrooming of “free riders” within the system (Rosentraub, 2000: 186). Whatever else might be said for Indianapolis, the anticipation that consolidation would reduce “spillovers” has not been realized. Nor did the enlarged scope of consolidation reduce pressures from state or provincial authorities. The states of New York and Indiana levied additional mandates on their major cities while refusing to provide additional resources to fund them. Many of the same issues have affected Toronto. Ontario province arbitrarily downloaded fiscal responsibilities onto Toronto while uploading other functions. Toronto has not found relief from negative externalities nor does it have much say in the matter.3 Multi-­‐tiered jurisdictions retain existing cities within a metropolitan area, but take from them a degree of authority to create a brand new metropolitan tier. Here again we see a classic reformulation of government. The idea of a multi tiered system is to create an “umbrella level” of government in order to bring about larger cooperation between various localities. Seen another way, multi tiered government not so much establishes a distinction between “lower levels” or “higher levels” of authority, but between tiers that deal with “narrow” and “wide” issues. Ideally, small jurisdictions should be able to manage labor intensive services, which call for close, day to day relationships between service deliverers and citizen-­‐consumers (police, sanitation, and housing services). By comparison, the metropolitan tier is supposed to better deal with far-­‐reaching issues that cut across a number of local jurisdictions. These may include strategic planning or protection of the environment. Cities as varied as Vancouver and London operate under some kind of strategic umbrella yet retain a high degree of local authority.4 While metro government may appear to have reached a happy medium by combining localism with regionalism, it has been caught between one grindstone at the top and at the bottom. At the top, officials look 3 Although this review suggests that New York, Hong Kong, and Toronto fall on the monocentric side of the continuum, the metropolises of these cities has expanded to such a great extent that they no longer fit this criterion. As we discuss shortly, New York and Hong Kong reflect cases of Cross-­‐border Compact and Toronto the Diffuse City classification. 4 We do not include Tokyo in this category. Even though Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) is definitely a case of two-­‐tier metropolitan government, the metropolis is no longer reasonably contained within its borders. 4 askance at “middle level” politicians who can command sizeable constituencies and overstep their bounds. At the bottom, localities dislike being told they must accept an unwanted incinerator or low income housing for the good of the metropolis. The big question for these systems is their political fragility and how that might affect long-­‐term success. London’s history with multi tiered institutions shows they can backfire on designers. In 1964 central authorities established the Greater London Council (GLC) to serve as a strategic umbrella for 32 boroughs. The GLC generous policies of “municipal socialism” seemed all well and good until the country elected free market enthusiast, Margaret Thatcher. By the mid 1980s a leftist GLC under Ken Livingston quarreled with a rightist government under Thatcher. There was little doubt over the outcome. With their command of central government the Tories abolished the GLC, while the boroughs seemed indifferent to its plight. For more than 20 years the boroughs acted as singular, separate entities and without a common institutional basis. Not until 1999 did another strategic authority emerge together with an elected mayor and Greater London was reborn. The outcomes for multi tiered arrangements do have their bright spots. London’s current metropolitan tier has spread the cost of mass transit and eased traffic decongestion in central areas by imposing a special tax. Vancouver’s metro tier has safeguarded green space and managed metropolitan growth. The urban community is a method of “collecting” many localities and forming an assemblage of cooperation with existing localities. Unlike its multi-­‐tiered cousin the urban community does not contain an additional layer of government. Urban communities work by keeping localities intact and by incorporating sitting officials into decision making. At the helm local officials sit in a larger assembly to decide larger issues on environment, transportation and revenue sharing. In this way, the urban community resembles a multi-­‐
tiered system because it assumes the wider role of a metropolitan umbrella, but unlike multi-­‐tiered systems it continues to be run by the same local officials it presumes to regulate. This makes all the difference in decision-­‐making and gives us something of a hybrid between government and governance. 5 Urban communities are perhaps the most variable of our models. The city of Lyon does not command a majority of the population within its own urban community and shares power with participating localities. By contrast Marseilles’ urban community is demographically dominated by its central city, and this too reflects its fortunes Montreal, poses entirely different problems because of a Francophone/Anglophone split and consequent fractures in the political system. Despite the paucity of systematic study, urban communities appear to hold promise. Impressionistic accounts of Lyon indicate that its urban community has minimized spillovers and largely succeeded in sharing the benefits of growth. Lyon’s urban community is solidly rooted, and this has helped it to recruit public support for a strong central city, a well-­‐run mass transit system and enlarged green space (Lusson, 2004; Personal Interviews, 2002; Baraize and Negrier, 2001). Marseilles is more challenging because of its economic and social distress. The evidence is still sketchy, but its Urban Community has made considerable progress, especially in matters of economic development, public transportation, and housing (Donzel, 2009: INSEE 2009; Savitch, 2011). Montreal presents a different profile and is a case of the best intentions gone awry. Despite the fondest hopes of its progenitors, the fissure between Anglophone and Francophone residents could not be bridged and one might conclude the urban community brought rifts to the fore. Shortly after Montreal’s rescaling Anglophone cities opted out of the arrangement and decided to remain apart. Cross border compacts have been with us for a long time, though they are achieving greater saliency. These compacts distinguish themselves by their capacity to work across metropolitan areas, encompassing a large number of jurisdictions. Cross Border Compacts take on a limited number of specialized functions—most often involving transportation and economic development. This unique quality allows them to be folded into any of our other territorial institutions. These Compacts are, in fact, overlays onto other types of rescaling and can be found among consolidated, multi-­‐tiered, urban communities or diffuse cities. Despite being embedded within other territorial arrangements, they have achieved real prominence and warrant close attention. Cross Border Compacts also enjoy separate sources of funding—either by tapping into private financial markets or by direct infusions of cash from higher level governments. 6 They are also able to throw an extensive policy net across a very large territory. The New York/New Jersey’s Port Authority (PANYNJ) stands as one of the most notable organizations of this kind. It specializes in transportation and in addition to running airports, bus and subway lines, its real estate investments have given it a special stature. PANYNJ’s power has been boosted by coalitions of business and labor unions who profit from its economic ventures. In France a cross border public corporation built a vast central business district just outside of Paris. In China a Cross Border Compact facilitated trade between the island of Hong Kong and the mainland province of Guangdong. Both the French and Chinese versions of these Compacts have mobilized powerful coalitions of business, finance, and government. If anything, Cross Border Compacts have exceeded expectations, though their success has engendered other difficulties related to overly aggressive leaderships and democratic accountability. Diffuse cities are the last stop on the polycentric continuum and considered to be the norm in the United States. The idea of diffuse cities connotes proliferating bunches of independent jurisdictions nested within urban type settings. Metropolitan areas of this sort usually contain a major city as the solar center surrounded by smaller, satellite jurisdictions. The size of diffuse cities will vary from giants of more than 15 million down to a few million. Their powers also differ–– from the command of huge multipurpose bureaucracies and extensive taxing ability to localities with a few functions and a tiny budget. Because they are so common, diffuse cities have received the lion’s share of attention. The prevalence of diffuse cities was not particularly welcomed by an earlier generation of scholars. For many the rampant, helter-­‐skelter growth of diffuse cities represented the antithesis of good planning. In addition to their questionable esthetics they were regarded as politically dysfunctional and this “crazy quilt” of fragmented jurisdictions contributed nothing to civic virtue (Studenski, 1930; Jones, 1942; Wood, 1961, Lind, 1997). A later generation of public choice scholars saw matters differently. By public choice standards, large numbers of independent, competing cities were exemplifications of local democracy—functioning much like a market place of local governments where citizen-­‐consumers could decide which product to buy. The whole scheme was tailor made 7 to fit heterogeneous consumer preferences. Citizens who favored good schools and open space could opt for a high spending jurisdiction, while those who wanted lower taxes and had little need for public services could exercise their choice (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961). Besides this, public choice theorists contended that like any other marketplace inter-­‐local completion was a good thing because it held down expenses and operated more efficiently (Schneider, 1989). Applying the Framework to World Cities MasterCard Worldwide Center for Commerce Index (WCCI) identifies 75 global or world cities. There is an extensive literature and debate about the best way to measure global cities and a number of indexes. In this paper, we are less concerned with the specific way that world or global cities are identified. Rather, we simply need to identify the cities to include in our sample (see Table 1 below). In this paper, we focus on the first fifteen cities. Later, this analysis will be extended to the full set of 75 cities. The initial focus is to ask how these cases are classified under our scheme (see Table 2). This analysis will be extended to include the evidence that rescaling or reterritorialization has occurred, the form it takes, what claims are made to advance the change, and what are the consequences. Insert Table 1 and 2 about here Having identified the cities of interest, we still need to consider the appropriate scale of metropolitan or regional governance. On the one hand, we could focus on the historic classification of the cities in question. For example, New York City is clearly a consolidated city since 1898. Tokyo Metropolitan Government was established as a two tier metropolitan government to meet Japan’s wartime centralization needs. Toronto was set up as a two-­‐tier metro government in the 1950s and then amalgamated in 1998. However, the metropolis in many of the historic metropolitan governments has clearly moved beyond the old city boundaries. This has led some to suggest that the mega-­‐region is the real city-­‐region today. Indeed, this is the argument of Richard Florida and his colleagues. We examined this claim in order to help us consider the upward bounds of a 8 regional scale. We reviewed top 12 mega-­‐regions identified by Florida and his colleagues and look for indications that governance arrangements are developing to plan or provide public services in these territorial units. In virtually no cases was there evidence (see Table 3). This suggests that the spatial boundaries of mega-­‐regions have become overextended, at least for policy relevance. The city-­‐region or metropolis, not the mega-­‐region is the most relevant and meaningful boundary for thinking about governance beyond the central city. Insert Table 3 about here Therefore, we feel quite confident that the metropolis rather than the megaolopolis is the appropriate scale for analysis. A brief analysis of these metropolitan city-­‐regions suggests that we are indeed witnessing a movement towards a larger metropolitan region as new state space (see Table 2). Nine of the 15 cases are found in the diffuse city category—Tokyo, Chicago, Paris, Seoul, Amsterdam, Toronto, Copenhagen, and Zurich. This is not surprising given the trend towards the decentralizing metropolis and reluctance of states to extend boundaries or create general-­‐purpose government for the metropolitan region. Two cases are classified as consolidated but one is a citi-­‐state—Singapore and the other is a city that is eclipsed by the role of the state government—Sydney. If this pattern prevails as analysis is extended to the full set of 75 cities, we may need to relabel the category to better characterize the situation, as these are not consolidations per se. No cases came up in the first 15 as urban community. However, we anticipate a number such as Montreal and Marseille as we continue to code the cases. Two cases fall under the cross-­‐border compact category—New York and Hong Kong. New York was once a consolidation at the time it amalgamated with its boroughs in 1898. Since then as previously discussed, it has evolved a rather extensive system of Public Benefit Corporations in conjunction with state action (New York and New Jersey) to handle a number of services in the larger metropolis. Hong Kong is also a bit tricky to classify. Initially, it is a citi-­‐state, which could be coded consolidation. However, in the last decade there have been a number of cross-­‐border agreements in the Pearl River Delta that are 9 robust enough to justify a classification of cross-­‐border compact.5 The remaining nine cases reviewed fall under the diffuse city classification. However, in most of the cases there are signs that the city-­‐region is regarded as in need of greater regional policy. In a number of instances there is evidence that a complex organization is evolving to address regional policy, albeit uneven. The core city has been a key player in the regional policy efforts but not always. This last category deserves much greater investigation. This likely will also yield the greatest insights as it provides a test of the public choice and new regionalism ideals that governance can adequately substitute for government. We also note that lacking regional institutions, the state or central government often plays a critical role in promoting or pursuing regional policy. This is the first effort to code and classify these cases. This analysis will be extended to the full set of 75 world cities identified in the MasterCard Worldwide Centers of Commerce Index. This will provide a database to more fully explore the relationship between institutional structure and politics and speak more comprehensively about the nature of the new state spaces that is the subject of so much interest among scholars and practitioners. 5 Hong Kong is the case that most closely corresponds to the mega-­‐region unit of analysis that we dismissed. In the case of Hong Kong, there are significant steps towards political integration that go beyond most of the mega-­‐region cases discussed by Florida and his colleagues. 10 Figure 1
A Continuum of Re-scaled Territories
Monocentric Consolidation
/Annexation Multi-­‐tiered Urban Communities Big box jurisdictions Absorbed single multipurpose government Multiple cascaded jurisdictions Several layered multipurpose governments Collected jurisdictions Assembly of localities Indianapolis (1970) Louisville (2000) Toronto (1998) Vancouver (1967) Miami (1957) London (1999) Tokyo (1943) Marseille (2000) Lyon (1967) Montreal (2001) Government Polycentric Cross Border Compacts Diffuse Cities /Complex Organizations Non Separate and contiguous but competing, connected and jurisdictions overlapping jurisdictions An overlay of a Possible special “complex purpose organizations” authority through inter-­‐
local agreements Hong Kong Los Angeles (Pearl River Delta Zone) Paris (2003) Buenos Aires New York (Port Santiago Authority of New York and New Jersey) (1921) Governance
11 Table 1 MasterCard Worldwide Centers of Commerce Index 2008 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 London New York Tokyo Singapore Chicago Hong Kong Paris Frankfurt Seoul Amsterdam Madrid Sydney Toronto Copenhagen Zurich Stockholm Los Angeles Philadelphia Osaka Milan Boston Taipei Berlin Shanghai Atlanta Vienna Munich San Francisco Miami Brussels Dublin Montreal Hamburg Houston Dallas Washington D.C. Vancouver Barcelona Dusseldorf Geneva 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 Melbourne Bangkok Edinburgh Dubai Tel Aviv Lisbon Rome Mumbai Prague Kuala Lumpur Moscow Budapest Santiago Mexico City Athens Sao Paulo Beijing Johannesburg Warsaw Shenzhen New Delhi Bogota Buenos Aires Istanbul Rio de Janeiro Bangalore St. Petersburg Jakarta Riyadh Cairo Manila Chengdu Chongqing Beirut Caracas Source: http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/insights/pdfs/2008/MCWW_WCoC-­‐
Report_2008.pdf 12 Table 2 World Cities and Metropolitan Governance Classification City City Rank 1 London City Pop Metropolis City Classification 2011 Pop 2011 share 7,557,000 12,200,000 62% multi-­‐tiered 2 New York 8,364,000 20,090,000 42% cross-­‐border compact 3 Tokyo 8,653,000 31,036,000 28% diffuse city 4 Singapore 5 Chicago 4,988,000 2,853,000 4,988,000 8,770,000 100% consolidation 33% diffuse city 6 Hong Kong 7,055,000 31,000,000 7 Paris 2,113,000 11,769,000 23% cross-­‐border compact 18% diffuse city 665,000 5,300,000 13% diffuse city 11,153,000 24,472,000 46% diffuse city 762,000 1,536,000 50% diffuse city 11 Madrid 3,213,000 5,300,000 61% multi-­‐tiered 12 Sydney 185,422 4,400,000 2,615,060 5,583,064 47% diffuse city 14 Copenhagen 549,050 1,213,822 45% diffuse city 15 Zurich 333,000 965,000 35% diffuse city 8 Frankfurt 9 Seoul 10 Amsterdam 13 Toronto 4% big box (state) Institutional Platform or Process GLA + national agencies and regional planning agencies city + Public Benefit Corporations (PBCs) and Regional Plan Association Captial Region Summit; Capital Region Megalopolis Plan (TMG + PM) Citi-­‐state none Citi-­‐state + cross-­‐
border compact Ile-­‐de France administrative region plus other governments Frankfurt-­‐Rhine-­‐Main Strategic Vision Seoul Metropolitan Government and Capital Region Plan City-­‐region Amsterdam Autonomous Community of Madrid small city government; state primary actor none Regional Council and Regional Development Plan of Capital Region Verein Metropolitanraum (voluntary annual metropolitan conference) Regional Coordination Modest Modest Modest Strong Weak (non-­‐
existent) Strong Weak (battleground betw left and right Weak (paralysis) Strong (central govt coordinates) Weak (platform for cooperation) Strong Strong (state) Weak (Province directs with regional transp. planning agency and greenbelt) Weak Weak 13 Table 3: Mega-­‐region Governance? Mega-­‐
region Greater Tokyo Bos-­‐Wash Chi-­‐Pitts Am-­‐Brus-­‐
Twerp Osaka-­‐
Nagoya Lon-­‐Leed-­‐
Chester Rom-­‐Mil-­‐
Tur Char-­‐lanta Population (Millions) Regional political institutions, process, or policy 55 National Capital Region (42 million) planned for by Ministry of Infrastructure, Land and Transport 54 Northeast Corridor Master Plan Working Group (advisory group) set up under Federal Passenger Rail Infrastructure and Investment Act of 2008 America 2050 promotes (Regional Plan Association) promotes transportation planning for Northeast megaregion 46 America 2050 promotes Great Lakes mega-­‐region 59 No No No 36 No 50 No 48 No 22 America 2050 promotes Piedmont mega-­‐region; mega-­‐
region mayor’s’ summit held in 2009; a Piedmont Mega-­‐
region Alliance was createda America 2050 promotes SoCal mega-­‐region No So-­‐Cal 21 Frank-­‐Gart 23 Barce-­‐
25 Lyon Tor-­‐Buff-­‐
22 Chester a. Neal Peirce, “Bipartisan Mayors Launch Piedmont ‘Megaregion’ Alliance,” Nov. 27, 2009 http://citiwire.net/columns/bipartisan-­‐mayors-­‐launch-­‐piedmont-­‐megaregion-­‐alliance/ Mega-­‐region governance No No No No No 14 General References Bish, R.L. (2001). Local government amalgamations: Discredited nineteenth-­‐century ideals alive in the twenty-­‐first (CD Howe Institute commentary) Brenner, N. (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brenner, N. (1999). Globalization as Reterritorialization: The Re-­‐scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union. Urban Studies, 36(3), 431-­‐451. Florida, R., T. Gulden and C. Mellander. (2007). The Rise of the Mega Region. Toronto, Ontario: The Martin Prosperity Institute. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. 2003. Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of multi-­‐level governance. American Political Science Review 97 (2): 233-­‐43. Lefevre, C. (1998). Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western Countries: A Critical Review. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(1), 9-­‐25. Norris, D.E. (2001). ‘Whither Metropolitan Governance,” Urban Affairs Review, 36(4): 532-­‐
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