Recent Advances on Finance Science and Management
Analysis of Tunisian Labour market rigidity
Dr. EZZEDDINE MOSBAH1 Ms. ZEINEB ZOUARI2 Prof. NIKOS MASTORAKIS3
1
National Observatory of Employment and Qualifications
Ministry of Training and Employment
36 Rue de Cologne, Belvedere 1002,Tunis
TUNISIA
[email protected]
2
Department of Economy
Faculty of economic sciences and Management (FSEG) Sousse
TUNISIA
[email protected]
3
Department of Industrial Engineering Sofia
Technical university of Sofia
BULGARIA
[email protected]
http://elfe.tu-sofia.bg/mastorakis
Abstract: The present paper aims to measure and analyze labour market rigidity. For that we choose model of
WS/PS model in wage bargain form and we complete the estimation by WS version and VAR model. Then
main results show that Tunisian labour market is rigid. Facing to unemployment, real productivity and real
wage lag1 changes, WS/PS gives that real wage is positively elastic to unemployment and productivity both at
Demand and supply sides. WS results gives that differential of real wage is negatively elastic to unemployment
and real wage lag1 but not positive and significant to real productivity in side of labour supply. The VAR
model shows that real wage is positively elastic and significant to wage lag1 changes, negatively elastic but not
significant to unemployment and positive and not significant to real productivity. In add, rigidity is determined
by employer social security contribution (ESSC), collective conventions and smig48.
Key- words: WS/PS model, labour market, rigidity, wage bargain, wage elasticity, flexibility.
enterprise trades off between hiring and or firing
basing on relationship between real wage and
productivity. In fact, when productivity is estimated
less than real wage enterprises stop hiring (may
makes fire) and unemployment began to rise and
vise versa. For this mechanism, liberal model
assume that real wage aligns productivity in order to
establish labour market equilibrium.
Some theories criticized this thesis and supposed
that, in real work environment, that labour market
mechanism is constraint by asymmetric information
making imperfect competition. In this context,
imperfection is translated by rigidity of labour
market to be self-adjusted. Then, relation of real
wage to productivity is being badly represented. The
efficiency wage that developed by Stglitz and
Yellen (1984) contested wage flexibility to be
sufficient to reestablish full employment [4].
Indeed, wage decreasing will reduce workers’
motivation which provokes decreasing of
1. Background
In Tunisia, still the first date of independence, the
major problem has been faced by Governments is
unemployment. Indeed, since that, refereed to
statistics of INS, unemployment rate hasn’t
decreased less than 14 % [1]. Then, many analysis
and interpretations of Tunisian case suggested that
the unemployment is being a structural problem,
that added to cyclical one in many times, will giving
a severe and sincere crisis as identified by E.
Mosbah and N. Mastorakis [2].
This means that labour market has no sufficient
flexibility to equilibrate labour and demand level in
other word to reduce unemployment. Generally,
flexibility is showed as “Rapid quantities, prices and
qualities adjustments to supply and demand volume
and structure changes on markets” [3].
Liberal Economic theory features labour market
by competitiveness and flexibility. This means that,
in context of profit maximizing profit hypothesis,
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productivity which makes difficulty to growth and
full employment. This theory suppose that wage
doesn’t align productivity in contrary the
productivity should align wage and employee
efficiency is a function of wage and enterprise,
adopt the high salary, should eliminate who is the
less productive. This principal, so called adverse
selection, means that employer is concerned by
effectiveness, he adopts a high remuneration policy
and avoid reducing of remuneration that could be
interpreted by employees as implicit ending of
contract by which they have in return to him a
maximum efficiency. Many ideas join this
hypothesis of efficiency wage to explain rigidity of
labour market presented by Akerlof et Yellen (1986)
[5] and Cahuc et Zylberberg (1996) [6].
Another factor making labour market rigidity,
labour union wage bargain which. It means that
employees in reality aren’t perfect wage taker, and
then they negotiate with employers to maximize
salary in case of passive syndicate (De Melo et Tarr
1992) [7]. When syndicate maximizes salaries and
employment level, it is qualified active syndicate as
noted by Mc Donald and Solow 1981 and Devarajan
et al. 1997 [8].
W. Leontief (1946) presented syndicate as labour
monopoly seller that makes wage and employment
level in firms [9]. labour market, facing monopoly
syndicate behavior, will be inefficient and rigidity
rises when wage and employment level are fixed
over than those correspondent to the equilibrium
level. In alternative view, McDonald and Solow
(1981) suggested that firm and union negotiate over
both the wage and employment level, leading to a
Pareto efficient contract. Their work led to a second
class of union models called the efficient contract
model. This model, compared with the monopoly
model, predicts a lower union wage but a higher
level of employment. In the two cases labour market
mechanism can’t functioned perfectly and
competition isn’t exist. For that rigidity of Labour
market in adjustment of its aggregate is higher and
unemployment can’t be reduced.
The factors lied to Government intervention,
influencing labour market rigidity, can be identified
in labour code as regulations of firing, employers’
social contribution and securities and minimum
wage, etc. these regulations affect rapid adjustments
of self labour market to realize equilibrium and by
that reduce unemployment.
In Tunisia, we can note that syndicate has a great
influence on labour market functioning. Generally,
repetitive conventions (one time each three years)
were signed between labour union and trade union
and Government in context of tripartite collective
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convention. These conventions fix minimum wage
and the supplement amount to salary. Then,
minimum wage increased by 33% during period of
77-1981. After that, minimum wage increase was
consolidated by social pact in order to preserve
purchasing parity salary workers, by suggesting
wage augmentation for price augmentation by over
than 5% [10].
Concerning collective convention of labour, they
stated at 1977, concluding a social pact between
Labor Union (UGTT) and Trade Union (UTICA) to
include an adjustment of salaries and establish a
negotiation process between them for the next years,
in triennial convention. In add, these conventions
suggested many complementary indemnities lied to
transport, to monthly kilometric indemnity and to
management and execution indemnity. After
revolution we note that all professional categories
are beneficiated by salary annual augmentations and
grievous Labour union claiming.
In this context of theory development and real
fact of Labour market functioning that showing
little flexibility of self adjustment of real wage to
make equilibrium and reduce unemployment, this
paper aims to analyze and measures Tunisian labour
market behavior and its rigidity in presence
collective convention, Labour union negotiations
and government structural labour policy.
For that, we will develop in second part model
taking consideration of op cited factors that
supposed influenced labour market rigidity. The
third part, we will develop results interpretation.
Final part will conclude the paper.
2. Theoretical Model frame work of WS/PS
We will adopt and follow the model developed by
R. Layard and S. Nickel (1986) supposing that
prices are determined by firms as mark up on
expected wage costs and wages are bargained by
workers as mark up on prices [11].
2.1. Labour demand and price formation
Microeconomic theory has suggesting that firm
behavior in competiveness market try to choose its
production level that maximizes its profit under
constraint of production technology.
3.1.1. Firm strategy in competitive environment
(1)
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Recent Advances on Finance Science and Management
efficiency parameter, , competitiveness parameter
of goods market, k.
Under form log linear, PS relation is increasing
over the plan dressed wage-unemployment.
For long period, capital cost is exogenous and
equal to (world rate or discount rate), PS curve
doesn’t contain productivity and will be horizontal
in plan of wage unemployment, as following:
This gives:
(2)
Then, in equilibrium, the optimum solution gives
price equal to the margin cost.
The economic problem can be rewritten as
minimizing cost function as following, in case of
short term decision:
(6)
then
3.2. Wage Formation workers strategy (WS
model)
In order to identify salary bargains, Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) suggested that we
can referee to criterion called Generalized Nash for
which the solution correspond to non cooperative
game of Rubinstein [12]. Employees and employers
problem in negotiation consists to choose the wage
level that maximizing the product of their respective
surplus, e.g. gap between their objectives in the
negotiation [Ui et i] and the point of starting [U0,
0 ], this game was manipulated under a force
weighted .
This can be written as:
(3)
In this case, the optimal solution is given at the
condition of real wage equals the margin
productivity.
strategy
in
monopolistic
3.1.2. Firm
competitiveness
In monopolistic competitiveness, enterprise faces a
demand more sensitive to price than competiveness.
The economic problem of enterprise constitutes to
choose the price that maximizing its profit. So, we
can write the economic problem as:
2.2. Syndicate Strategy
The objective function that will be maximized has
the following form:
(7)
Maximization requires that first derivation of
objective function equal to zero, as following:
This gives that:
i: real profit depends on product level, Yi ,
weighted by its price, Pi, divided by average price
of economic production, Pva. Factors such as labour
demand, Li, and capital, Ki, weighted by their
respective prices: labour cost, Wi, and nominal
opportunity capital cost, Ci. K: is the market
competitiveness degree (k).
In case of technology type of Cobb –Douglass,
this lead to identify PS curve as:
Then we have the following equality:
This can be rewritten as:
Finally, we have
maximization result:
(5)
Then real labour cost depends on unemployment
rate, apparent productivity of full employment and
structural parameters describing economic labour
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the
general
form
of
(8)
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Recent Advances on Finance Science and Management
This equation indicate in the right term the
margin cost for the employer for an add wage unit
and in the left term the margin gain for syndicate of
an add wage unit. We adopt envelop theorem of
enterprise profit maximization program. Then, we
will have:
This can be written as:
Then, inverse of this gives
Then, it could be written:
(9)
With t1: employer social security contribution
ESSC, Li: labor cost
This means that Cost margin of add unit of wage
is equal to ratio of added labour cost by ESSC
which is indexed to wage.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) suggested that
representative objective of syndicate is to maximize
purchase parity of wage, net of levy (absence of
monetary illusion and fiscal of salaries). We
suppose that utility function is with constant risk
aversion .[13]
So, his utility objective is:
Finally we have
Then
(12)
If we remember the starting rule that suggesting
(10)
Wage wedge, W, corresponds to the ratio of net
salary of all levies on labour cost. Then, W depends
ratios of ESSC, t1 and t2, revenue Imposition ratio,
t3, TVA ratio, t4, and consumption price hors tax,
pc. We can also take in consideration counterpart of
this levy in welfare (funding unemployment
insurance, retirement, infrastructure, etc.) by
weighting each ti, by i,
We can write
(13)
So, we can write WS equation as:
(11)
The endowment point of syndicate is U0. It
represents the situation of workers if negotiation
doesn’t success, then workers may find another job
with probability 1- u with  is unemployment risk,
and receives a current salary w, or enters in
unemployment with complementary probability u
with no remuneration.
The point of endowment of syndicate in the
negotiation will be written as:
To determine the left side term of equation we
suppose that Ui is
Then we have derivation fog, we will have the
following equation:
(14)
In equilibrium, wi = w, then we can write
Then
∏=(1-k)Y
We have WS:
(15)
This equation is adopted for all form of
production. Then the labour cost is higher with good
market competitiveness degree (K) is lowest and the
parity syndicate negotiation parity is highest (B). in
add it decreases with unemployment rate. The form
log-linear of structural relations PS and WS as
defined by Layard, Nickell and Jakman (1991) is:
[14].
(PS )
(q-n)
(16)
(WS)
(q-n)
(17)
=
Concerning the endowment point (return point)
U0, we have:
, so
we can write
then:
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All of variables are in logarithm form except the
unemployment. Where (w-p): real wage; u:
Unemployment rate; n: Number of active
individuals; Zw: include institutional, policy,
structural and shock variables.
The WS model imposes a unitary elasticity
between real wage and productivity. The same
hypothesis will be imposed in PS model between
price and productivity. The intersection between the
two equation wage and price means that
unemployment rate doesn’t depend on labour
productivity. it should be noted that unitary
indexation between wage and productivity suppose
that
worker
take
consideration
either
macroeconomic equilibrium or firms profitability in
their salary claiming. While this constraint imposes
a severe restrictive constraint in econometric
estimation which will be rejected by data (lopes
villavicenzio and silva (2011).
The second proposition refereed to Sargan
(1964) specification, in which targeted real salary
doesn’t depend to productivity level but it follows
an exogenous trend. In this case the unemployment
level of equilibrium increase when labour
productivity decrease.
Most of empirical works estimate WS curve,
which suppose a unitary elasticity between real
wage
and
productivity,
under
following
specification. As mentioned by L’Horty and
Sobczak (1996), the common form of estimated
model that developed by Layard et al. is written as:
[15].
(18)
Variables are all in log form except
unemployment u.
With w-p: real wage, u: unemployment rate,
y: labour productivity. We will add others factors
that influence real wage sensitivity such as
minimum salary changes and collective syndicate
bargain,
Concerning flexibility / rigidity of of wages, they
will be interpreted through, condition of a long term
correspondent to existing relation between real wage
and unemployment rate such as:
3. Empirical work
3.1. Data
They are gathered for period 1989-2014 from BCT
data Base and ITCEQ [16]. Variables are real wage
composed by w: nominal wage and ipc:
consumption price level index, u: unemployment
rate, real productivity composed by Y: private non
agricultural gross domestic product, n: private non
agricultural occupied active labour number (private
non agricultural workers), cote: ESSC, pcb:
periodicity of collective bargains, smig48: minimum
wage 48.
3.2 Estimated model forms
Estimation concerns first WS/PS model as
developed by Layard et al. (1991) which suppose a
form based on syndicate bargains. Second, it
concerns only WS model form as noted by L’Horty
and Sobczak (1996).
3.3 WS/PS Results analysis
3.3.1. WS/PS Residual tests
Johansson coeintegration test indicates 2
cointegrations equations at both 5% and 1% levels.
Trace statistic of hypothesis, None : there is no
cointegration 170.78 (critical value 5%, 94.15, 1%
103.18) and hypothesis : at most 1 cointegration
trace statistic is 91.8 (critical value at 5%: 68.52 and
at 1%: 76.07) then we can’t reject null hypothesis
that at least 2 cointegrations. Max –eigen statistic
valid the results of 2 cointegrations.
Breusch – Godfrey serial correlation LM test
gives that Obs*R-squred is 6.14 with pro = 0.0463
<5% this means that we can accept null hypothesis
if there is serial correlation. Normality Test by
Jarque-Bera test gives that coefficient is 1.487 and
prob = 0.475 which implies that we can’t reject null
hypothesis of residual are normal distributed.
Augmented Duckey Fuller test statistics (intercept
and trend) shows -2.504 is superior than critical
value at 1% is -4.394 at 5% is -3.612 and at 10% is 3.241 we can’t reject null hypothesis of unit root.
Variable is not stationary. Test of white
heteroscedasticity shows that obs*R-squared =
(19)
Rigidity means that real salary doesn’t very
sensitive
to economic
conditions
mainly
unemployment rate
. If
,
rigidity of real wage is extreme (or total) and in this
case long term equilibrium unemployment rate
doesn’t exist.
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9.758 with prob = 0.37. For that, we can’t reject H0
of homoscedasticity and accept that the model
doesn’t contain heteroscedasticity.
3.4. WS model estimation
3.3.2. WS/PS Results interpretation
In side of labour demand, Real wage elasticity of
unemployment is positive and significant. In fact,
the coefficient is equal to 0.0287 with prob < 5%.
This means that increase unemployment by 1 unit
make a rise of real wage by 0.0287%. We will test if
this rate is significantly different from 0 and arguing
that unemployment has no effect real wage in side
of labour demand which represent employer
behavior. Then this hypothesis is significantly
confirmed by test gives that khi squared is equal to
13, 279 with prob = 0,000268 < 5% and 1% so we
can’t reject null hypothesis that suppose low effect
of unemployment. Concerning elasticity of real
wage to real productivity 0.8177 and prob < 5%.
This means that change of real productivity 1%
induce a change of 0.8177 %.
In side of labour supply, real wage elasticity is
positive and significant. In fact, the coefficient
doesn’t confirm theory which supposes it negative,
it is equal to 0.0075 with prob = 0.0092. this means
that unemployment changes by 1 unit real wages
will increase by 0.0075%. we assume that this
elasticity is low which is confirmed by wald test
(khi squared = 7.4 prob= 0.0065) the same
conclusion that observed in side of labour demand,
that unemployment changes has no effect on real
wage change. So there is rigidity in labour market in
side of labor supply.
Elasticity to employer
social security
contribution (ESSC) is positive and significant this
means an augmentation of cote by 1 unit induce a
change of real wage by 0.0005 % ( Wald test gives
khi 2 = 48.287 and prob = 0) that means that labour
market is not flexible to employer ESSC and
supplement labour costs. Concerning elasticity of
real wage to smig48 is negative and significant this
means that for a change of smig48 by 1 unit affect a
decrease of real wage by 0.00051 % (Wald test Khi
2 = 81 prob=0) effect of smig48 is low and doesn’t
affect real wage elasticity. Elasticity of real wage to
collective bargains is positive and significant. Then
when collective bargains exist real wage increase by
0.021% (Wald test indicate that khi 2= with prob
=0.13 > 5%) then effects of bargains is positive and
limit flexibility of labour market.
WS/PS as model form seems weak. So, the form of
WS/PS as identified in system form can’t be
retained to estimate the rigidity of the labour
market.
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3.4.1. WS residual test
White heteroscedasticity test gives that Obs*R
squared is 10.81 with prob 0.76 which means that
we can’t reject null hypothesis of residuals are
homoscedasticity.
Breusch
–Godfrey
serial
correlation LM test shows that Obs*R squared 0.19
with prob equals to 0.90. Then, there is no serial
autocorrelation for differential WS model form.
Jarque-Bera test suggest that residual distribution
is normal because of coefficient is 1.69 and
probability 0.42. For that we can reject null
hypothesis of normality. The ADF test statistic of
first differential shows that coefficient is -6.329 high
that critical value for 1% (-4.44), 5% (-3.63) and
10% (-3.25). Coefficient is stationary.
3.4.2. Results Analysis of WS model
Elasticity of real wage to unemployment lag 1 is
negative but not significant. When u(-1) changes by
1 unit real wage increase by -0.0046% with prob
equal 0.45. elasticity of real wage to real wage lag
1 is negative and significant when real wage lag 1
changes by 1% then real wage increases by - 0, 347
% (prob= 0.0126) <5 %. Unemployment variation
influence negatively changes of real wage growth
but not significant with -0.0008% for a change by 1
unit of gap between the actual level and
unemployment lag 1 level.
Real productivity variation influences positively
real wage but not significant. The fact that elasticity
of real wage increases by 0.3% when real
productivity increase by 1% (with prob =0.17).the
effect of ESSC change is positive and significant. if
ESSC changes by 1 unit real wage elasticity will
increase by 0.000186 %, while smig48 has a
negative effect and significant. That means a
change of smig48 by 1 unit introduce a decrease by
-0.0002% of real wage elasticity. Collective bargain
has a positive effect on real wage elasticity but not
significant. in fact real wage elasticity increase by
0.0096% when collective bargain exists;
The rigidity of real wage is measured by the ratio of
elasticity of real wage to unemployment lag 1 and
real wage elasticity to real wage lag 1. When this
ratio is low then labour market is rigid. Then, this
ratio (-0.004600/-0.347959) equals to 0.01322
which is considered as low and then Tunisian labour
market could be judged as rigid.
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(prob = 0.446). Wald test applied to test if smig48 ,
ESSC and collective bargain are jointly affecting
real wage rigidity , results gives a khi squared equal
to 9.38 with prob = 0.0245 which is less than 5%.
Then, we can reject the null hypothesis suggesting
zero effect. At the end, we can conclude that these
variables are jointly affecting labour market rigidity
(flexibility).
3.5. VAR model estimation
3.5.1. VAR Residual test
Portmanteau test shows that we accept null
hypothesis that there is residual autocorrelation for
lag 1 and there is no residual autocorrelation up to
lag 1. Normality test of Jarque-Bera shows that
coefficient is 1.326 with prob = 0.51 this means that
residual distribution is normal. Breusch-Godfrey
serial Correlation LM test gives Obs*R squared is
0.81 with probability equal to 0.66 this means that
there is no serial correlation at lag 1.
4. Conclusion
The present paper aims to measure and analyze
labour market rigidity. For that, we choose model
WS/PS model based on syndicate bargains which
related real wage with unemployment, real
productivity, and exogenous factors such as ESSC,
minimum wage (48Hours regime) and collective
conventions. Furthermore, the form of WS
differential is also retained to be estimated and then
an application of var model to valid results in the
last two forms.
Results give that estimation of model WS/WS
gives that in side of demand labour (employer) real
wage is is elastic to unemployment change and
productivity change. This means that in this side
labour market is flexible. Although, in side of
Labour supply, real wage elasticity is positive and
non significant, in contrast of economic theory, to
unemployment change which explain a rigidity of
labour market in this side. Meanwhile its effect is
judged null which means there is no change of real
wage to unemployment change. Concerning ESSC,
smig48 and collective bargain have a significant
effect on labour market rigidity. WS/PS seems weak
for estimating labour market rigidity.
Concerning WS model results, they highlighted,
in contrast of WS/PS model that real wage elasticity
is negative to unemployment lag 1, u(-1), change
and the same behavior to real wage lag 1, wp(-1).
Then rigidity coefficient equal to 0.01322 which
indicates that labour market rigidity is high.
Concerning changes of real wage to real
productivity is positive for that we can suggest that
real wage depended in side of syndicate on
productivity changes. Furthermore real wage is
affected by ESSC, smig48 but not affected by
collective bargain. Tunisian labour market rigidity is
caused many factors.
The VAR model results show that real wage
elasticity is positive to real wage lag 1, wp(-1). This
means that real wage increase from time t-1 to time
t. which explains the labour market rigidity. This
3.5.2. VAR Results interpretation
Model results Estimation gives that elasticity of real
wage to real wage lag 1 is positive and significant.
Then an increase of real wage lag 1 by 1% induce
an increase of real wage by 0.657% with t=6.17
(prob=0). Elasticity of real wage to unemployment
is negative but not significant. in fact, empirical
results
confirm
theory
suggesting
that
unemployment has negative effect on real wage
then, when unemployment changes by 1 unit the
real wage decrease by -0.00195 %. Then, Wald test
applied to this elasticity shows that khi squared is
0.18 (prob=0.66) than we can accept that this
elasticity is zero. This means that labour market is
rigid facing changes of unemployment, the real
salary doesn’t influenced by unemployment
changes.
Concerning effect of real productivity is positive
and significant. Real wage elasticity is 0.369% for
changes of real productivity by 1%. Wald test of this
elasticity gives that khi squared equals to 13.007
prob = 0.00031 <5% this means we can reject null
hypothesis that real productivity effect is zero.
Then, we can conclude that real productivity
influences real wage changes. Concerning smig48
effect, elasticity of smig48 is negative and
significant. Real wage decreases by 0.0002 % when
smig48 increase by 1 unit monthly. This means that
public intervention considering labour code acts
influence negatively real wage evolution.
Meanwhile, ESSC change affects real wage
changes positively and significantly. Then elasticity
is equal to 0.0002% when ESSC changes by 1 unit.
Concerning effect of collective bargain, it is positive
but not significant. in fact, real wage elasticity
equals to 0.0097 % with t test is equal to 0.777
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rigidity is confirmed by real wage elasticity is
negative but considered as very low near zero. The
real wage is not elastic to real productivity and
collective bargain but it is elastic to ESSC smig48.
In total, smig48, ESSC and Collective bargain are
jointly influencing real wage and then labour market
rigidity.
[7] De Melo, J. et Tarr, D. (1992), A General
Equilibrium Analysis of US Foreign Trade
Policy, The MIT Press.
[8] McDonald, I. M. et Solow, R. M. (1981), Wage
Bargaining and Employment, American
Economic Review, 71: 896-908.
[10] Banque Centrale de la Tunisie (BCT): annuel
reports 1989-2013.
[11] Layard, R. and Nickell , S. (1986).
Unemployment in Britain. In Economica , N°
53.
[12] Binmore K. G., Rubinshtein A., Wolinsky A.
(1996): the nush solution in economic
Modeling. Rand Journal of Economics, 17(2).
[13] Blanchflower, D. and Oswald, A. (1994), the
wage
Curve MIT
Press, Cambridge
Massachusetts.
[14] Layard, R. Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. (1991):
unemployment, Macroeconomic performance
and the labour Market . Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[15] L’Horty, Y. Sobczack N.(1996): identification
de la courbe de salaire et déterminants du
chômage d’équilibre dans un modèle de
négociation de salaire. document travail N° 967, Ministère de l’économie et de la finance.
Paris-France.
[16] Ben Chabeen M. (2014). La rémunération des
salairiés1989-2014. ITCEQ, N°8, 2014.
[17] Solow R.M. (1998° what is labour market
flexibility? what is it good for?, British
academy, pp 189-2011.
References
[1] Institut National des statistiques (INS) de la
Tunisie et la Banque Mondiale: note statistique
entreprises stagnation structurelle: données au
niveau des entreprises sur la création d’emplois
en Tunisie.
[2] Mosbah E. and Mastorakis N. Simulating Active
Labor Market policies’ (ALMP) effects In
Tunisia. Revue Recent Researches in applied
Mathematics, simulation and Model. ISBN.
978-61804-308-5, pp 83-97.
[3] C.-D. Echaudemaison (sous la direction) «
Dictionnaire d’Economie et des sciences
sociales ». NAME imprimeurs à Tours, Mai
2000, p 193.
[4] Shapiro, C. et Stiglitz, J. E. (1984), Equilibrium
Unemployment as a Worker Discipline.
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[5] Akerlof, G. A et Yellen, J. L. (1986), Efficiency
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university Press.
[6 ] Cahuc, P. et Zylberberg, A (2001), Le Marché
du Travail. Ouvertures Economiques, De
Boeck Université.
Annexes:
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Table 1.WS/PS estimation
System: SYSTEMLAMRIG
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 07/08/15 Time: 21:44
Sample: 1989 2014
Included observations: 26
Total system (balanced) observations 52
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Coefficient
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
C(4)
C(5)
C(6)
Determinant residual covariance
Equation: LWP=C(1)*U+C(2)*LYND
Observations: 26
R-squared
0.702923
Adjusted R-squared
0.690544
S.E. of regression
0.075942
Durbin-Watson stat
0.511593
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
0.007882
0.025678
0.002775
6.71E-05
5.63E-05
0.014091
3.644066
31.84242
-2.720352
6.948887
-9.018650
1.489706
0.0007
0.0000
4.64E-06
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
4.212628
0.136515
0.138411
Equation: LWP=-C(3)*U+ LYND+C(4)*COTE+C(5)*SMIG48+C(6)*PCB
Observations: 26
R-squared
0.902611 Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.889330 S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.045415 Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat
0.827841
4.212628
0.136515
0.045375
Source: our estimations
Table 2. WS model estimation
System: SYSTEMRIG
Estimation Method: Full Information Maximum Likelihood (BHHH)
Date: 07/09/15 Time: 01:12
Sample: 1990 2014
Included observations: 25
Total system (balanced) observations 25
Convergence achieved after 42 iterations
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
C(4)
C(5)
C(6)
C(7)
C(8)
Coefficient
Std. Error
z-Statistic
Prob.
0.142896
-0.004600
-0.347959
-0.000838
0.300047
0.000186
-0.000203
0.009599
0.118638
0.006195
0.139479
0.009986
0.222185
8.94E-05
9.75E-05
0.013507
1.204477
-0.742442
-2.494701
-0.083937
1.350437
2.082087
-2.076685
0.710664
0.2284
0.4578
0.0126
0.9331
0.1769
0.0373
0.0378
0.4773
Log Likelihood
Determinant residual covariance
60.11357
0.000477
Equation: LWP-LWP(-1)=C(1)+C(2)*U(-1)+C(3)*(LWP(-1)-LYND(-1))
+C(4)*(U-U(-1))+C(5)*(LYND-LYND(1))+C(6)*COTE+C(7)*SMIG48
+C(8)*PCB
Observations: 25
R-squared
0.490607
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.280857
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.026499
Sum squared resid
Durbin-Watson stat
1.888625
Source: our estimations
0.011875
0.031248
0.011937
Table 3. Var model estimation
Vector Autoregression Estimates
Date: 07/14/15 Time: 20:33
Sample(adjusted): 1990 2014
Included observations: 25 after
ISBN: 978-1-61804-335-1
80
Recent Advances on Finance Science and Management
adjusting endpoints
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
LWP
LWP(-1)
0.657250
(0.10642)
[ 6.17621]
U
-0.001946
(0.00448)
[-0.43387]
LYND
0.369652
(0.10249)
[ 3.60659]
SMIG48
-0.000218
(8.3E-05)
[-2.62797]
COTE
0.000197
(8.4E-05)
[ 2.35413]
PCB
0.009686
(0.01246)
[ 0.77730]
R-squared
0.972038
Adj. R-squared
0.964679
Sum sq. resids
0.012617
S.E. equation
0.025769
F-statistic
132.0982
Log likelihood
59.42175
Akaike AIC
-4.273740
Schwarz SC
-3.981210
Mean dependent
4.217385
S.D. dependent
0.137114
Test t
Dependent Variable: LWP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/14/15 Time: 20:35
Sample(adjusted): 1990 2014
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints
LWP = C(1)*LWP(-1) + C(2)*U + C(3)*LYND + C(4)*SMIG48 + C(5)
*COTE + C(6)*PCB
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
C(4)
C(5)
C(6)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Source: our estimations
Coefficient
Std. Error
t-Statistic
Prob.
0.657250
-0.001946
0.369652
-0.000218
0.000197
0.009686
0.106417
0.004484
0.102494
8.28E-05
8.36E-05
0.012461
6.176205
-0.433872
3.606593
-2.627967
2.354126
0.777304
0.0000
0.6693
0.0019
0.0166
0.0295
0.4466
0.972038
0.964679
0.025769
0.012617
59.42175
ISBN: 978-1-61804-335-1
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
4.217385
0.137114
-4.273740
-3.981210
1.716406
81