Introduction: The Arab Spring in the Arabian Peninsula and its aftermath
Laurent Bonnefoy et Laurence Louër
Introduction: The Arab Spring in the
Arabian Peninsula and its aftermath
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In the Arabian Peninsula, mobilizations in 2011 against authoritarian rulers took various
shapes and followed different rationales. For that matter, Yemen, Bahrain and Oman, where
mass-mobilizations took place, are very different from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
where only a small segment of intellectuals demanded reforms. Contestation also met with
varying levels of success. As such, Yemen, where President ‘Alī ‘Abdallāh Ṣāliḥ was forced
to resign, is again different from Bahrain where repression apparently preserved the so-called
“stability (istiqrār)” of the country. Hence, a comparative analysis at the sub-regional level
adds to the assessment that monarchies and resource-rich states were better equipped than
republics to deal with protest.1 However, regardless of their initial success, these mobilizations
triggered long-term processes of change everywhere and at various levels of the social and
political order.
The Arabian Peninsula’s most populated country, Yemen, has recently been the focus of
several recent publications2 in addition to a number of op-eds and short analytical papers
written by researchers with extensive fieldwork experience. This interest is not only due
to the large scale of the “Yemen Spring” but also to the existence of a significant batch
of “Yemenologists”. Freedom of movement for Europeans and North Americans, liberal
visa regulations, the presence of foreign research institutions like the Centre Français
d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales (CEFAS) and the American Institute of Yemeni Studies
(AIYS) — or Yemeni institutions like the Yemen Center for Studies and Research — and a
true fascination for the country’s history and its society have structured academic interest for
Yemen despite increasingly precarious security conditions. Relative freedom of expression
has allowed Yemeni researchers to publish their share of analyses regardless of the dire
economic situation of universities there. As a result, our understanding of the country has
been greatly enhanced thanks to ethnographic studies of Change Square in Sanaa3, inquiries
into the role of political parties, particularly al-Iṣlāḥ, the effect of mobilization on the various
conflicts4 in Sa‘da5, the South6 and against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as studies
of the political transition process as specified in the Gulf Co-operation Council initiative7.
However, there is still much to be done and numerous constraints, the insecurity in particular,
increasingly limit our collective capacity to address fundamental issues and processes.
Analyses of the dynamics of the “Arab Spring” among the six Gulf monarchies differ widely
in terms of quantity and approaches. Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, which saw mass-protests,
mostly fostered research in domestic politics. Whereas, in the case of Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates, where no such mobilization occurred, protests were mostly
addressed from a geopolitical and diplomatic perspective.
The Bahraini uprising and its repression have generated most of the writings by academics
and experts. Few works however have analyzed the mobilization process per se and the
larger context in which it took place8. The bulk of the existing literature very much revolves
around various aspects of the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias and, in particular,
the sectarian paradigm through which the regime dispenses repression. Events in Bahrain
have even given rise to a series of books specifically focusing on sectarianism in the Gulf
monarchies in a comparative perspective.9 Only a handful of works have tried to offer
an understanding of the factional dynamics at play in the regime’s pre- and post-uprising
policies.10
As compared with the wealth of contributions focusing on Bahrain, protests in Oman and
Kuwait have attracted little attention. Yet Oman has witnessed a surprisingly large and longlasting mass-mobilization contrasting with the – apparently – apathetic political life since the
end of the Dhofar war in 197511. This lack is probably due to the fact that there are so few
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Introduction: The Arab Spring in the Arabian Peninsula and its aftermath
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academics and experts usually working on Oman. Despite the field being easily accessible and
many keen observers, events in Kuwait also generated little research, all of which underline
the continuity of the political crisis both before and after the “Arab Spring”.12
Focusing on foreign policy issues, works on Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
have generally eluded the timid demands for reform that were articulated in some segments of
civil society.13 Also, most academics’ approaches have focused on the “counter-revolutionary”
policies of Saudi Arabia and of the United Arab Emirates, for instance in Egypt. Saudi Arabia
has been described as “leading the counter-revolution”14 and being chiefly responsible for the
new upsurge of sectarianism at the regional level that followed the repression of the Bahraini
uprising and which it helped to orchestrate. 15 Very few works have tried to understand the
causes of the failed attempts at organizing protest inside the kingdom, or the mobilizations
in the Shia areas.16 The ambiguous role of Qatar in the Egyptian and Syrian protests sparked
a wealth of works and commentaries that have fed the debate on this small state’s creative
foreign policy.17 Geopolitical analyses have framed the rivalries and conflicting strategies of
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the case of the Egyptian revolution and
the Syrian civil war but have by and large overlooked the foreign policy decision-making
processes in these states.
There are still blind spots in the literature on the “Arab Spring” in the Peninsula, which for
instance has generated little if any comparative work. While the papers presented in this special
issue of Arabian Humanities can in no way offer a comprehensive look at the many kinds
of mobilizations, the reactions to them and their aftermath, they contribute to filling a few
of these analytical or geographical gaps. Much to our frustration, this special issue does not
include a contribution on mobilizations in Saudi Arabia.
All of them dealing with domestic issues, these papers first add to the analysis of mobilization
processes and of their actors, in particular in some little-known countries like Oman and
Kuwait. They also look at the lasting effects of these mobilizations on political, cultural, social
and institutional structures with specific emphasis on the sectarian divide and on the changing
social pact.
Mobilizations and Actors
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Most of what was published on the “Arab Spring” in the Peninsula in the months after 2011
has been shaped by enthusiastic accounts of mobilizations, with an emphasis on youth and the
difficult relations between those independent “civil society” actors who initiated the uprisings
and institutionalized political parties or forces. Evidently, analyzing the “revolutionary
moment” remains a necessity.18 How did these mobilizations unfold? Who was mobilized and
by what means? The mobilizations that took place in the seven countries of the Peninsula are
still to a large extent unacknowledged. Uprisings outside of the capitals remain largely under
the academic radar. However, gender-based approaches, focusing on sectoral mobilizations,
“reactionary” forces and cultural practices are likely to foster important contributions.
L. Bonnefoy and J. Kuschnitizki, F. Dazi-Héni, H. Al-Hasan, K. Hennessy and M. Valéri each
give us insight into the mobilization phases. The added value of their articles lies not only in
their capacity to account for events, actors and places that have been largely overlooked but
also, like in the case of Yemeni revolutionary theatre, to give flesh to the formidable creativity
at such times. Thus, K. Hennessy’s analysis of plays written or presented in Sana'a during
the revolutionary uprising is a window into the history of Yemeni theatre and its cultural
institutions, but most of all it is an insight into the debates and practices that emerged in the
process of mobilization. Through theatre, K. Hennessy analyses the way in which intellectuals
and the wider Yemeni public gradually became aware of the necessity of a revolution that
would not only target authoritarian institutions but also the very cultural foundations of their
society. L. Bonnefoy and J. Kuschnitizki focus on the role which Salafis in Yemen played
during the mobilization phase and on how this triggered a significant inflection in their relation
to institutional politics, to the point that some of them formed a party and mobilized in favor
of the transition process.
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The special issue also gives insights about the relations between social change and
protest. M. Valéri’s contribution shows how social anomie contributed to render ineffective
governmental techniques traditionally used by the regime to prevent and deal with political
chaos. One of these has been to give tribal leaders the official status of intermediaries between
the government and society, thus striving to maintain the social order by institutionalizing
— and at the same time reshaping — tribal modes of organization. These mediations proved
inefficient when the regime mobilized them to disband the 2011 protests, which mainly erupted
in the city of Ṣuḥār where the creation of an industrial port meant to be a showcase of Omani
development disrupted established modes of social regulation while causing deep frustration
and resentment.
The contribution by F. Dazi-Héni on Kuwait also highlights how social change among the
tribal populations is a key factor accounting for the emirate’s new political dynamics. The
youth movements which have proliferated in the past few years have proved unable to become
sustainable organizations but have nonetheless fostered new mobilization techniques, which
include more and more confrontational mass-demonstrations in the public space, in stark
contrast with past practices of peaceful mobilizations within the semi-private space of the
diwaniyyas, typical Kuwaiti informal home-based gatherings.
The Sectarian Divide
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A general consensus has emerged that one of the major consequences of the uprisings in
Bahrain and Syria has been a surge in Sunni/Shia tensions across the region. As such, the
advance of the Houthi movement in Yemen in 2014 and early 2015, and the Saudi-led
military intervention in March 2015 only strengthen our argument. The rise to power of this
once marginal Zaydi revivalist movement is fundamentally restructuring the political field in
Yemen, along with the religious spectrum. While distinct from Twelver Shias, Houthis have
redefined Zaydi identity and in turn are creating an impetus for reframing Sunni identity. The
Salafi Rashad party, for instance, as analyzed by L. Bonnefoy and J. Kuschnitzki in their article
is affected by such an identity process and builds on a redefinition of the meaning of Salafism.
Evidently, political tensions and violence in Yemen cannot be reduced to their sectarian
nature. Conflicts are fuelled by many other motives. The failure of the transition process when
interim President ‛Abd Rabbuh Manṣūr Hādī resigned in January 2015 and the institutional
marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood-leaning Iṣlāḥ party have multiple explanations
ranging from economic failure, corruption and mismanagement, to regional pressure and
authoritarian resilience. Nevertheless, the sectarian divide, as it came into being and departing
from the convergence dynamics of religious identities19, is increasingly becoming a lens
through which actors in Yemen are framing their own conflicts. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula is evidently the most active in such a construction. The Houthi leadership has been
pro-active, in the course of 2014, to reach out to non-Zaydi groups but with only limited
success. Salafis of the Rashad party in Yemen appear to be caught between their desire to
appear as reasonable actors in the transition process and the defenders of Sunni identity.
Sunni/Shia tensions have reflected with particular resonance in the Gulf monarchies. On the
domestic level, the uprisings in Bahrain and in the oil-rich, Shia-populated Eastern Province
of Saudi Arabia have sparked anxiety in some neighboring countries over a surge of protest
or subversive activities among their own Shia populations. At the regional level, in particular
as the Syrian crisis worsened, Shia mobilization has revitalized the “Shia crescent” paradigm
that emerged in the aftermath of the Iraqi regime change to analyze the change in Middle
Eastern geopolitics. As part of their counter-revolutionary strategies, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
broadcast across their media outlets the idea that their domestic Shia mobilization was remotecontrolled by Iran. This has had a dramatic impact on Arab public opinion overall. Hence while
other popular protests gained sympathy and were often seen as legitimate precisely because
they were endogenous, the Bahraini uprising has been seen as an attempt by Iran to pursue
regional hegemony. Within Gulf civil societies, the Bahraini uprising and the Syrian civil war
have had a significant polarizing effect. While Sunnis feel sympathy for the Syrian rebels and
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are suspicious of the Bahraini opposition, their Shia fellow citizens on the contrary tend to
support Bashar al-Assad and stigmatize the Bahraini regime as “sectarian” and anti-Shia.
Some of the papers presented in this special issue help to refine our understanding of the
dynamics of sectarianism in the Gulf (R. Azoulay and C. Beaugrand, H. al-Hasan). First,
they confirm that the Bahraini and Saudi situations cannot serve as archetypes of Sunni/Shia
relations everywhere in the Gulf.20 The most striking example is Kuwait. In this country,
which includes a numerically significant and politically powerful Shia population, the various
Shia political groupings have converged since 2009 towards unconditional support to the
government. This configuration is the product of a very specific context where two phenomena
reinforced each other. On the one hand, the government has been the object of relentless attacks
by an opposition dominated by Sunni Islamists and tribal MPs. On the other hand, the Shias
have faced increasing hostility on the part of these same constituencies since the Iraqi regime
change that brought Shias to power in Baghdad. In dire need of support within parliament,
the government has courted Shia MPs of all persuasion and the latter have come to conclude
that the government is their best ally to confront the opposition’s hostility. While it has put
the Kuwaiti government in an uncomfortable position in the midst of the repression of the
Bahraini uprising, this interest-based alliance has turned out to be long-lasting.
Second, in addition to the study of the aforementioned Salafi Rashad party in Yemen, this
special issue provides new insights about new Sunni sectarian actors who emerged in the
course of the Arab Spring protest. The case of the Gathering of National Unity in Bahrain
analyzed in detail by H. al-Hasan had until now been touched upon only in shorter papers21
and there was a need for a monograph grounded in fieldwork. Beyond the historical roots of
the movement and its diverse components, the article provides us with interesting hypotheses
about the dynamics of community building in the Bahraini context, which should be further
investigated. The difficulty of the Gathering of National Unity to rally the Sunnis behind it as
the Shia al-Wifāq has been doing for almost fifteen years shows that the Sunnis, despite their
status as a demographic minority, do not exist as a community, that is, as a group capable of
collective action based on its religious identity. Sunnis are more than ever politically scattered
between rival political and religious trends, as well as between different ethnic and social
belongings, which nurture alternative lines of politicization. Moreover, they have difficulties
to position themselves vis-à-vis the government, torn between a genuine desire for change
and the fear that any reform will strengthen an opposition they see as bound by an exclusive
Shia identity.
The Social Pact
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This special issue also looks at the social dimension of the “Arab Spring”. The protests in
some Gulf monarchies (Bahrain and Oman) did indeed have a clear social backdrop, and
the same can be said of the counter-revolutionary strategies, which everywhere included
various types of distributive measure. M. Valéri’s contribution offers a compelling analysis
of the social underpinnings of the Omani uprising. The transformation of Ṣuḥār from a sleepy
provincial city into an economic hub at the hands of the economic oligarchy around the palace
aroused resentment. By contrast, in Bahrain where demands were chiefly political in nature and
expressed by a wide array of different people in terms of economic status, Omani protestors
were mostly young unemployed or low-skilled, low-income workers demanding that their
social difficulties be addressed and, beyond that, that obstacles to social mobility be removed.
There is widespread social discontent in the three low-rent economies of the Gulf, namely
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman, which have less fiscal room for maneuver to deal with
the opposition and maintain social stability through generous distributive policies, as their
wealthier neighbors do. The welfare state in the Gulf has been the cornerstone of the regimes’
legitimacy since the 1970s oil boom, which enabled rulers to have ambitious labor, housing,
health and family policies. As shown in L. Louër’s contribution, this social pact has been in a
state of crisis since the emergence, in the course of the 1990s, of mass unemployment among
nationals. In order to tackle this problem, all Gulf governments, with varied levels of success
and seriousness, have reformed their labor policies based on a labor market segmentation
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between nationals and expatriates on the one hand, and between public and private sector
on the other. The “Arab Spring” has pushed governments to accelerate labor market policies
aimed at encouraging nationals to seek employment in the private sector. They can even be
considered an integral part of the counter-revolutionary arsenal. Far from being politically
benign however, these reforms have far reaching and sometimes unexpected effects on the
relations between state, business and labor. More specifically, they are the engine of a prolabor policy shift that is appearing in new stricter regulations as well as in increased labor costs
for the private sector. Moreover, in order to generate support for these new labor policies and
to pressure the private sector to effectively implement them, the governments of the low-rent
states are choosing to empower organized labor, including in the form of full-fledged tradeunions, and are experimenting with formal tripartite negotiations, hence creating the conditions
for a more bargained social and political order.
In Yemen, where the capacity of the state to redistribute resources is very limited, the “Arab
Spring” started a reflection on the social and national pact. A nine-month long National
Dialogue Conference (NDC) in 2013 was designed to address the multiple challenges of
Yemen and redefine the nation through the establishment of a federal constitution. One of the
prime focuses during the NDC has been on justice as S. Steinbeiser’s contribution highlights.
With the revolutionaries’ slogans calling for dignity (karāma), debate on the meaning and
process of justice, including of transitional justice, became a central point of contention.
Debates had to build on the history and existing practices in Yemen but also implied some
theoretical discussions.
Such debates on justice in Yemen and on state distributive policies in rentier states are just
two of the many policies that mobilizations have triggered in the Arabian Peninsula since
2011. Despite authoritarian resilience, repression, failure of transition and obvious pessimism
among citizens, reflection on the social, national and political pact highlights how profound a
change the region is undergoing and how “Arab Spring” mobilizations have affected the very
structures of states and societies.
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Notes
1 Ross, 2011 ; Bank, Richter & Sunik, 2014 ; Derichs, C., Demmelhuber, 2014.
2 Bonnefoy, Mermier, Poirier (eds.), 2012 ; Lackner (ed.), 2014 ; Philbrick-Yadav, 2011 ; Al-Salahi
(ed.), 2012.
3 Bonnefoy, Poirier, 2013 ; Damesin, 2014 ; Finn, 2015 ; Grabundzija, 2015.
4 Day, 2012 ; Heinze, 2014.
5 Icg, 2014 ; Brandt, 2013.
6 Augustin, 2015.
7 Longley Alley, 2013.
8 Icg, 2011 ; Khalaf, 2013 ; Alshehabi, 2014.
9 Matthiesen, 2013 ; Potter, 2014 ; Wehrey, 2014.
10 Gengler, 2013 ; Louër, 2013.
11 Worrall, 2012 ; Valeri, 2013.
12 Tetreault, 2012 ; Coates-Ulrichsen, 2014a.
13 Coates-Ulrichsen, 2014b ; Kamrava, 2013.
14 Steinberg, 2014 ; see also Al Tamamy, 2012 and Kamrava, 2012.
15 Al-Rasheed, 2011.
16 Lacroix, 2014 ; Matthiesen, 2012 and 2014.
17 SULTAN, 2013.
18 ALLAL, PIERRET, 2013 ; CAMAU, VAIREL, 2014.
19 BONNEFOY, 2008.
20 Louër, 2013.
21 Gengler, 2012.
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