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Conflict Minerals
Conflict minerals are those that are exploited, controlled, or used to finance the purchase of supplies by
armed actors in a conflict. Commonly involved minerals include cassiterite and coltan, used in electronics,
as well as diamonds and gold. These minerals are
rarely the cause of the conflict they “support” but do
affect its duration and intensity. Because conflict minerals are bought worldwide, there are international
repercussions for economies, natural resources and
security, and sustainable resource management on a
global scale.
C
onfl ict minerals have become a prominent subject
through protest or awareness campaigns such as
“blood diamonds” and “blood on your mobile.” Questions
thus arise about how to define confl ict minerals, and
what national and international dynamics trigger what
kinds of confl ict, and how they can be minimized or
avoided. According to the political economist and geographer Philippe Le Billon (2003, 216), confl ict minerals
are those minerals “whose control, exploitation, trade,
taxation, or protection contribute to, or benefit from the
context of, armed confl ict.”
The actors directly involved in these activities can be
warlords, rebel groups, a country’s regular national army,
or renegade members of the army. The armed actors use
the profits derived from confl ict minerals to finance their
pu r poses (e.g., purchasing weapons, ammunition, and
supplies) and in some instances to enrich them. In such
cases, conflict minerals are a main driver for perpetuating
armed confl icts. Confl ict minerals may thus not cause a
confl ict, but they are a factor in how a confl ict evolves
and how long it lasts.
As the minerals are usually sold to international customers, a number of external actors become indirectly
82
involved in the confl icts by way of using the associated
minerals.
Conflict Minerals and Security
Many of today’s confl icts are nontraditional, in the sense
that they are typically not a mi l itary confl ict between
nations. Instead, most of them are internal violent confl icts involv ing secessionist groups or rebels opposing a
government. Since the end of the Cold War, and with
the onset of globalization, the characteristics of confl ict
have changed substantially. In 1994 the United Nations
Development Program introduced the notion of “human
security” to address the dimension of people and development rather than just terr itories and arms, leading
some people to call these confl icts “new wars” (Kaldor
1999; Duffield 2001; Münkler 2002). Regardless of what
these wars are called, socioeconomic factors play an
increasingly important role in them; and mining activities producing so-called confl ict minerals often form part
of a region’s socioeconomic factors.
A scholarly debate on the link between natural
resources and confl ict emerged in the 1990s (Gleditsch
1997; Homer-Dixon 1995, 1999; Levy 1995; see also
Myers 1989 and Pirages 1978). The debate first focused
on the likelihood of an outbreak of violent confl ict over
a country’s richness in natural resources (Collier and
Hoeffler 1998; Col lier, 2000). The term “resource curse”
was coined (Auty 1993) to address poor economic performance of resource-rich countries. Research by the economists Paul Col lier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) analyzed
the incentives of those who aim to profit by starting a
violent confl ict that stems from characteristics of natural
resources. Subsequent research broadened the focus of
the debate to include state and military, as well as outside
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CONFLICT MINERALS
• 83
Table 1. Military Earning from Bisie (a tin mine in North Kivu)
Source
Earnings per Months ($US)
Mineral production of 250 tons per month going through the military
$1.14 million to $2.25 million
Taxes on diggers outside mines
$45,600 to $90,000
Taxes on porters going to Bisie
$3,300 to $16,800
Total from all known sources
$1.2 million to $2.4 million
Source: Global Witness 2010, 8.
The military in North Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo levy taxes not only on the production of tin in the Bisie mine but
on outside laborers and porters as well.
economic actors (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Humphreys
2005), and the env ironmental dimension (Dinar 2011).
It can be concluded that the combination of open
access to many natural resources and weakness of governments or institutions allows confl icts to arise far
beyond normal market competition. “Lootable” commodities, in particular, offer to unscrupulous parties the
means to enrich themselves and finance their operations.
Such commodities are often categorized as contraband
and contribute to prolonging wars (Ross 2004; Samset
2009; WTO 2010, 95).
The links between natural resources and violent confl icts can be seen as a dual relationship: “armed confl icts
motivated by the control of resources, and resources
integrated into the fi nancing of armed confl icts” (Le
Billon 2001, 580). Alternatively, the relationship can be
considered two sides of the same coin: resource conflicts
and con fl ict resources. While resource confl icts are
caused at least partly by opposing interests fighting over
a scarce resource, such as a particular mineral, confl ict
resources are mainly a means of carrying out a confl ict
which has other root causes (Le Billon 2001, 561; Mildner
2011, 13).
The Case of the Democratic
Republic of Congo
Mining in the eastern Kivu regions (North and South)
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has often
been viewed as a case of confl ict over minerals. Owing to
specific geological conditions—deposits are too small to
be suitable for large-scale industrial mining—mining in
eastern DRC is mainly artisanal and small scale. In this
region, there is robust evidence showing how rebel groups
are profiting from the minerals extraction and trade. For
instance, a recent UN report (UNSC 2010) establishes
evidence showing that Congolese national army units
have gained control over mineral-rich areas in North and
South Kivu provinces and are competing among themselves for control over such areas; moreover, they collude
with armed groups in order to attack rival commanders.
Table 1 shows large sums earned by the military from a
North Kivu mine.
In the Kivu provinces, fi ghting over the control of
mining sites is not the dominant feature in which minerals are linked to confl ict. Added to this are numerous
oppor tunities for these actors to accrue resource rents—
profits derived from a resou rce—throughout a number
of subsequent transportation stages and intermediaries
at local markets within the region. The International
Peace Information Service (IPIS) offers reports and
maps, showing how armed actors make use of confl ict
minerals.
The number of actors involved in the commodity
chain, and the fact that official representatives and armed
groups often cooperate with each other, create a nontranspa rent situation. As well, market prices of those
commodities are much lower than those of reliable competitors (e.g., one of the DRC’s mineral products, coltan,
has been offered at one-third the price of comparable
Australian tantalum products).
Therefore, many players in the originating country and
downstream benefit from the current situation, and there
is little incentive to change it. Thus failing states get
locked into a self-perpetuating situation that extends
through a mineral’s value chain across countries.
Conflict Minerals as Part of a
Broader Natural Resources Picture
Minerals are but one type of natural resource that can be
linked to confl ict. According to the UN Expert Panel,
the armed groups in eastern DRC finance themselves
through the illegal exploitation of other natural resources,
such as timber, meat, and fish (UN IFTPA 2010). In
Ivory Coast, rebels and the government both acquired
funding for their fight from the cocoa business (Global
Witness 2007; Guesnet, Müller, and Schure 2009). Klare
(2001), Other analysts, such as Indra De Soysa (2002),
and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2003) underline the likelihood of war in countries that possess oil.
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84 • THE BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABILITY
Macartan Humphreys (2005), as well as Oeindrila
Dube and Juan Vargas (2006) point to agricu ltural commodities in general and coffee in particular as sources of
confl ict.
According to the Heidelberg Institute for International
Confl ict Research’s 2010 confl ict barometer, natural
resources rank second as a source of confl icts worldwide.
In this ranking, natural resources comprise extractive
resources and agricultural pro ducts as well as land,
habitats, and water (HIIK 2010). Research thus should
increasingly look at the nexus between different natural
resources and confl icts rather than spot single minerals.
The Social and Political Dimension
From the viewpoint of nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that work with local communities, human rights
are a major concern amid these natural resource–related
con fl icts. The NGO Global Witness defi nes confl ict
resources as a broad category embracing conflict minerals: “natural resources whose systematic exploitation and
trade in a context of confl ict contribute to, benefit from
or result in the commission of serious violations of human
rights, violations of international humanitarian law or
violations amounting to crimes under international law”
(Global Witness 2011).
This definition takes into account the different forms
of violence surrounding minerals extraction and trade. It
refers to situations of abuse, such as people being forced
to work under slave-like conditions, threatened by armed
overseers. Even if an armed confl ict is not involved, minerals are often mined under violent conditions.
Furthermore, the extraction of natural resources can
trigger new conflicts. At the local level of extraction sites,
the livelihood of the residents of the area can be badly
a ffected (e.g., by pollution of land, water, and air). If their
grievances are ignored, this can spark violent protests and
acts of sabotage and can lead into violent confrontations
with security forces. At the national level, confl ict over
the use of revenues from natural resources can occur. This
is particularly likely where nondemocratic governance is
combined with corruption (Paes 2009, 5). Such confl icts
have materialized, for instance, in the oil-abundant Niger
Delta region in Nigeria.
The Environmental Dimension
Environmental consequences of mining can spark confl icts at the local level, mostly between residents and
those exploiting the mineral (artisanal miners or a mining company). For instance, pollution may result from
unsafe mine tailings and waste dumps, acid mine drainage, improper closure of pits and mines, dumping of toxic
effluent into the water, mining waste, and the like.
Landscape alterations are often irreversible, with secondary effects on local agriculture that will become both economically and environmentally devastating if peasants
hire themselves out as diggers.
Sound planning through a Strategic Environmental
Assessment (SEA) depends by and large on voluntary
efforts, especially in countries with weak governments,
legislation, and enforcement. International standards on
such SEAs have been formulated (SEA-info.net 2011).
Attempts to measure such environmental pressures along
the life cycle of materials are called “ecological rucksacks” (Bringezu and Bleischwitz 2009).
In many cases, environmental pressures result from
mining outside the requirements of law, failing to perform proper assessments, not having to comply with
environmental laws and standards, and making no plans
for their rehabilitation. As an example of such negative
env i ronmental impact, in the Kahuzi Biéga National
Park, one of the last resorts of mountain gorillas worldwide, mining activity itself destroys natural habitat and
is exacerbated by the presence of armed groups controlling several areas. At the same time, local agricu lture
and subsistence farming su ffer from lack of continuous
activities and inappropriate interventions into local
ecosystems.
Which Minerals Are
Conflict Minerals?
The minerals most commonly involved in resource confl icts are cassiterite (tin), coltan (tantalum and columbitetantalite), diamonds, gold, and wolframite (tungsten).
Cassiterite is needed to produce tin. It is also used in
the manufacture of electronic goods, such as MP3 players. The world’s largest cassiterite producers are China
and Indonesia, followed by Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil. For
eastern DRC, however, cassiterite is the most important
mineral in terms of quantity and price.
Coltan, the nickname of a mineral extracted in Central
Africa, belongs to a group internationally known as
tantalum. It is mainly used for capacitors in electronic
devices, such as mobile phones, pagers, and personal
computers. Future demand is e x pected to grow. For
a long time Australia dominated the world market,
but the production situation has changed significantly.
Since late 2008, Africa (i.e., the lakes region including
Mozambique) has become a major, if not the largest, supplier of tantalum on the world market, followed by Brazil
and a few other suppliers.
Diamonds are used in jewelry and for some industrial
applications. They were the fi rst officially recognized
conflict commodity, following observations of brutal civil
wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. In response,
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CONFLICT MINERALS
the Kimberley Process on certification emerged (see the
section on Response Options, below).
Gold is used in jewelry, electronics, and dental products. It is also present in some chemical compounds used
in semiconductor manufacturing. Major gold suppliers
are South Africa, the United States, Australia, Russia,
and Peru; and gold is an important export good in countries such as Uzbekistan, Ghana, and Papua New Guinea.
For eastern DRC, almost all gold exports are illicit and
undeclared; no reliable statistics are available.
Wolframite, an important source of tungsten, has a wide
range of uses. It is also used in the metals industry,
wherein composites are used as a substitute for lead (e.g.,
in some gasoline refineries). Almost 78 percent of the
world’s production of tungsten occurs in China, but
Europe imports large shares from Kenya and Tanzania.
Tungsten’s economic importance is very high, since substitutes are rarely available and impose much higher costs.
This list of conflict minerals is incomplete, but it forms
part of a wider context of natural resources that drive
economic and political confl icts. Typically, confl ict minerals (except diamonds and gold for jewelry) pass through
a variety of intermediaries internationally before being
purchased by multinational companies (e.g., electronic
manufacturers) and consumers. Not all mineral suppliers,
however, are involved in confl icts. In most cases, confl ict
regions act as buffer suppliers during peak times but not
as main suppliers over a longer period. But rubies from
Burma, which are being mined under inhuman conditions and profit the Burmese dictatorial regime, can be
seen as a case where 90 percent of the world market originates from one conflict region.
Whether a given mineral and region are involved in
conflict depends partly on prices, since price peaks attract
revenue-seeking actors. Some confl icts—especially nonviolent ones—are a typical side effect of most extractive
industries and their commod ities; hence, good governance, including sound env i ronmental management
practices and control as well as the respect of social standards, can influence the scale of confl ict or whether it
even arises. Good governance at the national level and
within extractive industries and sustainable resource
management is needed to prevent negative consequences
of minerals extraction and related confl icts (Feil et al.
2010; Bringezu and Bleischwitz 2010).
International Interaction
Since most of confl ict minerals are indispensable for
a number of high-tech appl ications including green
technologies and sustainable energy (Graedel 2011), the
dimension of international trade is of vital strategic
importance (WTO 2010).
• 85
The recent discovery of minerals in Afghanistan
(worth approximately US$1 tril lion) suggests the possibility of extended confl icts in the future, potentially with
severe international consequences. The US National
Intelligence Council (NIC 2008) develops some gloomy
scenarios about how international repercussions of such
confl icts could jeopardize international security.
The mineral production facilities in Asia are probably
the main routes for illicit mineral chains. Involvement of
the Asian processing industry has been subject to investigations by UN Expert Panels and surveys (e.g., Resolve
2010). Accordingly, the consumer electronics assembly
industry in China and other Asian countries can be seen
as a main source of demand for confl ict minerals, though
many companies of Europe and the United States have
also been named in reports as being involved—at least on
a temporary basis. The end consumers of those products,
however, are located worldwide.
Response Options
Countries’ current main options in responding to the
confl icts related to minerals are to establish regulations
aimed at enhancing transparency and due diligence, both
in the extractive industries themselves and along international mineral chains (Bannon and Collier 2003). A
Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) is
available. Initiatives have been undertaken by:
• international organizations (OECD 2010; UN
Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action
2010);
• international and regional policy-makers (Analytical
Fingerprint, Certified Trading Chains, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region certification scheme in the Great Lakes Region of Africa,
the STAREC plan to establish local marketplaces in
the DRC);
• NGOs such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative and Publish What You Pay;
• particular industries (e.g., iTSCi—an initiative driven
by the smelting industry, and GeSI/EICC—an initiative driven by electronics industry); the International
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) supports
related activities; and
• advanced institutional hybrids such as the Kimberley
Process for diamond certification with all major industries, governmental administrations, and NGOs involved.
In July 2010, the US government introduced legislation (the Dodd-Frank Act) requiring oil, gas, and mining
companies registered with the US Securities and
Exchange Commission to disclose tax and revenue payments made to host governments in the countries of
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86 • THE BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUSTAINABILITY: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABILITY
operation. Th is law is still under discussion (as of
September 2011) and would affect eight of the world’s ten
largest mining companies. In June 2010, the Hong Kong
stock exchange introduced a similar regulation for listed
mining companies, which affects major players in the
Asian market. The US law also requires companies that
manufacture products containing cassiterite, coltan, wolframite, or gold to disclose whether these are sourced
from the DRC or surrounding countries, and to demonstrate what steps are being taken to avoid sourcing from
armed groups.
On 16 June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council
endorsed the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy’ Framework” proposed by UN special representative John Ruggie, which provides guidance
for businesses to act in accordance with human rights.
Taken together, these initiatives and forthcoming
legal requirements lay the groundwork for establishing a
minimum global standard of transparency for extractive
companies and manufacturers of critical minerals. If well
coordinated, properly enforced, and complemented by
expanding civil society initiatives, these initiatives could
set a precedent for greater transparency and accountability toward the goal of sustainable resource management
(Bringezu and Bleischwitz 2009). Improved supply chain
management and materials stewardship across industries
will further strengthen these efforts. In a broader sense,
all efforts to increase resource efficiency along the life
cycle of products and minerals, as well as for economies,
promote a business interest to lower demand for minerals
(Bleischwitz, Welfens, and Zhang 2010) and
decrease the ensuing confl ict risks.
Tracing value chains in a comprehensive manner and according to
standards of accountability will
be challenging, given that many
actors are involved. Besides
profit-seeking behav ior and
vested interests entrenched in
the conf lict regions, many
knowledge gaps downstream
still prevail that also hinder effective regulation. It remains to be
seen to what extent consumers
will become engaged, as long
as uncertainties and the tiny
percentage of confl ict minerals in any product make a
consumer’s responsibility
difficult to understand and
accept.
For that reason, global
governance with new and
legally binding mechanisms seems necessary to promote
accountability against corruption and in favor of sustainabi l ity. Proposals for an international metals covenant
and an agreement for sustainable resource management
have been made (Bleischwitz 2009; Wilts, Bleischwitz,
and Sanden 2010). Following a suggestion made by Paul
Collier and a fellow economist Anthony Venables (2010,
15), the anti-bribery legislation that the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development now requires
of its membership could also be a requirement of World
Trade Organization membership—a compliance issue for
China and elsewhere.
National governance of conflict minerals in the respective regions—such as an effective mining law, general
macroeconomic and political stability, and social sector
reforms; a fair share of revenues between the local and
national governments; and integrated land-use planning
towards sustainable development—needs to be instituted
as well.
Outlook for the Future
Confl ict minerals continue to support fi nancing of
armed confl icts around the world, and especially in
parts of Africa. While attention was initially focused on
rebel groups fi nanc ing their fi ghts through extraction
and trade in these minerals, it became clear over time
that state armies sometimes use/abuse minerals in the
same way. Since confl ict minerals appear on the world
market and in consumer goods, the private, public, and
civil actors doing business in or purchasing their minerals from confl ict regions carry a responsibility
in how those minerals are handled. The economic dimension
of the problem originates from
low-cost supply-driven competition not covering the enormous
social costs, and international trade
hid ing its responsibility through
the World Trade Organization
principle of neutrality toward
process and production methods. High volatility (e.g., measured on an a n nual basis
compared to other goods)
aggravates the risks for producers and users.
The challenge for international business and policy
makers to cope with these
is sues hence is enormous. In
order to eliminate the confl icts
surrounding the minerals discussed
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CONFLICT MINERALS
here (as well as other minerals), governments and corporations must act on princ iples of social responsibility, good citizenship, and material stewardship—and
they must initiate and adhere to certification and legal
mechanisms—along every link in the mater ial value
chains (Bringezu and Bleischwitz 2009; Feil et al. 2010).
The high probability of rising raw material prices, and
greater efforts toward building a green economy, should
promote international efforts toward sustainable resource
management at a global scale.
Raimund BLEISCHWITZ
Transatlantic Academy Fellow, Wuppertal Institute
Lena GUESNET
Bonn International Center for Conversion
See also Bushmeat; Coltan; Electronics—Raw Materials;
Gemstones; Gold; Heavy Metals; Minerals Sca rcity;
Mining—Metals; Mining—Nonmetals; Rare Earth
Elements
The authors used the following sources for their data, in
addition to those found in the Further Reading section:
• Armed Conflict Dataset, provided by Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (UCDP) and the Centre for the Study
of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute,
Oslo (PRIO);
• Conf lict Information System (CONIS, formerly
KOSIMO) provided by the Heidelberg Institute for
International Conf lict Research, University of
Heidelberg;
• Correlates of War (COW) established by Melvin Small
and J. David Singer at the University of Michigan.
FURTHER READING
Auty, Richard M. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies:
The resource curse thesis. London: Routledge.
Bannon, Ian, & Collier, Paul. (Eds.). (2003). Natural resources and violent conflict: Options and actions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Bleischwitz, Raimund. (2009). Ein internationales Abkommen als
Kernelement eines globalen Ressou r cenmanagements: Ein
Vorschlag an die Politik [An international agreement as pillar
for sustainable resource management: A proposal]. In Raimund
Bleischwitz & Florian Pfeil (Eds.), Reihe EINE WELT: Bd. 21.
Globale Rohstoffpolitik: Herausforderungen für Sicherheit,
Entwick lung und Umwelt [A World Series: Vol. 21. Global resource
politics: Challenges for security, development and environment]
(pp. 147–161). Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag.
Bleischwitz, Raimund; Welfens, Paul J. J; & Zhang, Zhong Xiang.
(Eds.). (2010). International economics of resource effi ciency: Ecoinnovation policies for a green economy. Heidelberg, Germany:
Physica-Verlag.
Bringezu, Stefan, & Bleischwitz, Raimund. (Eds). (2009). Sustainable
resource management: Trends, vi sions and policies for Europe and the
world. Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf.
• 87
Collier, Paul. (2000). Economic causes of civil confl ict and their
implications for policy. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Collier, Paul, & Goderis, Benedikt. (2007). Commodity prices,
growth, and the natural resource curse: Reconciling a conundrum.
The Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) Work ing
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war. Oxford Economic Papers 50 (4), 563–573.
Collier, Paul, & Hoeffler, Anke. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil
war. Oxford Economic Papers 56(4), 563–595.
Collier, Paul, & Venables, Anthony J. (2010). International rules for
trade in natural resources. World Trade Organization (WTO)
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ERSD-2010-06. Geneva: WTO.
De Soysa, Indra. (2002). Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989–99. Journal of Peace Research 39(4), 395–416.
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[Avoiding resource confl icts in a sustainable way: Recommended
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need for international action on Congo’s confl ict minerals trade.
Retrieved August 1, 2011, from http://www.globalwitness.org/
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metals. Annual Review of Materials R esearch 41, 323–335.
Guesnet, Lena; Müller, Marie; & Schure, Jolien. (2009). Natural
resources in Côte d’Ivoire: Fostering crisis or peace? The cocoa,
diamond, gold and oil sectors. BICC Brief 40. Bonn, Germany:
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Heidelberg Institut für Internationale Konf liktforschung e.V.
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