Grounding the Postmodern Self
Author(s): Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 685-703
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
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GROUNDING THE POSTMODERN SELF
JaberF. Gubrium
Universityof Florida
James A. Holstein
Marquette University
In postmoderndiscourse, self is displacedas a central presence in experienceand
as yet anotherpersonalsignifier.This paperdescribeskey postmodern
reappropriated
views, thenreframespostmodernvocabularyin termsof interpretivepractice.It argues
that the postmodernframingof self is too abstractand that a distinctlymoderndiscourse focusedon the deprivatization
of interpretiveactivity can accountempirically
for featuresof postmodern"presence."Comparativeethnographicandnarrativematerial is offeredin illustration.Weconcludeby suggestinghow self can be retrievedfor
classical sociological commentaryand research.
The self has come on extraordinarilyhard times. Challenges are abstract and ontological,
whose leading theme is the postmodern denial of self as a central presence in experience.
The sharp turn follows decades of more grounded critique that presented the self's trials as
stemming from moral uncertainty, inequality and domination, organizations and the technical rationalization of everyday life, and their related "anonymizing" tendencies, all of
which have roots in classical social theory.'
The most recent and serious challenge-the postmodemrn-is less concerned with conditions of social organization, conveying instead the liquid, imaged "self" of electronic
media and consumerism.2 It denies the relevance of classical sociological commentaries
that directed us to processes of rationalization, modes of production and differentiation,
and collective representation (but see Pfohl 1992). In the context of the postmodern, the
idea of the self as a central presence dissolves and is replaced by the radicalization of what
Derrida (1978) calls the "play of difference," whose objects are ontologically enlivened
and deadened by floating signifiers, eclipsing substantiality. In the condition of postmodernity, the self is no longer a metanarrative, as Lyotard (1984) might put it, but one
term among others for representing experience. Moreover, the self is polysemic, that is,
attached to, and articulated with, multiple systems of signs. While supporters of this view
see new possibilities for the expression of experience, detractors consider it a philosophical smokescreen for the abdication of responsibility and gratuitous powerlessness (see
Lash and Friedman 1992).
Has the self, whether traditional or modem, disappeared from everyday life? If it has
Directall correspondenceto: JaberF. Gubrium,Departmentof Sociology, Universityof Florida,Gainesville,FL 32611-7330.
The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 35, Number 4, pages 685-703.
Copyright ? 1994 by JAI Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
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not disappeared,is there any sense in which self can be concretelydescribedusing
postmodernterms?In this paper,we arguethatby groundingthe self in everydayinterpretive practicesof self-definition,we can see that self remainsa substantialpresencefor
those who depictexperiencein relationto it. Webegin by specifyinghow self is elided in
postmoderncontext, move on to consider contrastingpostmodernconcerns, and then
examine empiricallyhow self's presencemight be conceptualizedto coincide in some
fashion with postmodernsensibilities.Our aim is to appreciatethese sensibilitieswhile
preservingthe self for classicalsociological consideration.
THEPOSTMODERN"SELF"
Postmodernismappliesto a varietyof contemporaryviews. The versionthatwe characterize is gleaned largely from the influentialwork of Jean Baudrillard,Jean-Francois
Lyotard,and JacquesDerrida.In Lyotard's(1984) expressionof the postmodern,master
narrativesevaporate,as do mastervocabularies.In their absence, the signal terms of
classical social theory-like theself amongothertermssuch as society,class, community,
value, attitude,sentiment,and reason-no longerapply in the same way. In postmodernism, one necessarilywritesthe termswith quotationmarks,if, indeed, it is still possible
to write them at all. How have the termschangedto requirethis style of reference?We
turnto Lyotard's(1984) ThePostmodernConditionfor an answerbecauseit not only is a
leadingstatementof postmodernconsciousness,but it also offersa basis for groundingthe
ostensibly groundless.
Lyotard'sIntroductiondescribesthe postmodern(and by implicationthe "self") as a
condition of knowledge in highly developedsocieties, where we can no longersimply
speak, write, or referto objectsin the way we had before the late nineteenthcentury(p.
xxiii). We can inferthatbeforethis, wordsin principlereferredto thingsseparatefromthe
words themselves. Of course, wordscould incorrectlyrepresentthings, and in thatsense
transmuteknowledge,but the "thingness"of thingswas not so muchat stakeas was their
accuraterepresentation.Forexample,one could misrepresentthe self or incorrectlyread
and realitywas takenas a matter
otherselves, but the discrepancybetweenrepresentation
categoricallyseparatefrom self's presence.3
According to Foucault(1973), this provided the primaryempiricalquestionsof a
varietyof intellectualdisciplines,fromstudiesof the historyof self to the psychologyand
sociology of self-organizationand self-presentation(see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982,
chap. 7). The disciplinesaimedto reliablyand validly describethe empiricalself in its
manifoldrelationshipswith the conditionsaffectingexperience. In the Anglo-American
context, the social and behavioralsciences favoreda scientific vocabularyof self, which
resonated with prevailingindividualisticand reformistsentiments(Rorty 1992). That
uniquelyAmericanbrandof sociology, symbolicinteractionism,focused its narrativeon
an essentiallypresentself, variouslytheorizingit as a solid, reflexive,labeled,performed,
or situatedentity (Stone and Farberman1970;Reynolds 1990).
Lyotardconsidersthe hallmarkof postmodernityto be a "breakingup" of these epistemological or grandbases of the disciplines (pp. 15 and 31-41). "Simplifyingto the
extreme,"he writes(p. xxiv), "Idefinepostmodernas incredulitytowardmetanarratives."
Withrespectto the social andbehavioralsciences as narrativesof the self, we takehimto
mean that theoriesof self can no longer be acceptedas principallyabout the thing they
represent.The incredulitystems from the possibility that the theories are also about
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Grounding the PostmodernSelf
687
themselves. One mightargue,forexample,thatthroughits wordsand theoreticalformuconstitutesthe objectof its descriptions.A disciplinehas
lations, symbolicinteractionism
tacit ontological rules abouthow to proceedin "doing"or constitutingthe realityunder
consideration.What is postmodernaboutthis is the view thatsuch rules constitutewhat
the rules are about, makingthe real game-likein Wittgenstein's(1958) sense.
Postmodernnarrativescannot be evaluated in terms of their truth value. Instead,
narratives-ordinary, grand,or otherwise-are appreciatedin relationto their situated
communities"(Fish 1980).This centersissues of "truth"
acceptabilitywithin"interpretive
squarelywithin and between languagegames, not in the relationshipbetween narrative
and the things narrativeostensiblyreferences.In postmodernism,thingsbecome matters
of narrativecompetence,invention,and aesthetics.
Is "self" in postmoderncontext,then, an arbitrary,"up for grabs"(Sica 1993, p. 17),
"anythinggoes" entity (Gergen1991, p. 7; Featherstone,1992, p. 266), a perpetual"con
game"(Berman1992)?Lyotardsuggestsotherwise,implyingthatthe postmodernself is,
first, a conditionof knowledge.It is a "self" necessarilyreferencedin quotationmarks
because the natureof our knowledgeof self is markedlychanged from its substantial
modem form. Self no longersimply referencesan entity, a presenceor presences. It is
possible to speak of the diversityof self in both modem and postmoderndiscourse, but
modem diversityis substantialwhilepostmodernis constitutive,insubstantial.Neitherthe
old fashionedideaof a coreself northe morerecentnotionof a nonpathological,multiple,
and performativeself can representits postmoderncondition.
Second, in this conditionof knowledge,the word "self" becomesa discursivehorizon
for presence, a "floating,"but socially organizedsignifier, flexibly yet systematically
constitutingself accordingto alternativevocabularies.To speakof the postmodernself is
to set a discursive and experientialstage (or stages), as it were, upon which further
references,exchanges, repairs,andresistancesareplayedout. Using the Wittgensteinian
terminologythat Lyotardfavors,the self is a languagegame whose leadingconstitutive
rule specifies a centrallocationin experiencefor itself. Anotherversionof the rulemight
specify multiplelocations, but nonethelesslocationsin experience.
Third,postmodernsensibilitiescounterposeself and nature.As a floatingsignifier,self
does not naturallyrepresentany particularthing or domain of experience. If it significantlyrepresentsanythingin practice,it is of cultural,not purelynatural,significance.We
might say that in some culturalcontexts, self centrallyrepresentsexperiencewhile in
others it only marginallydoes, drawingin each case on a shared,workinglanguageof
representation.
FROM HYPERREALITY
TO PRAGMATICS
Still, the postmodernself, accordingto Lyotard(1984, p. 15) does "notamountto much."
Nonetheless, it remainsan objectof discussion, somethingthatpostmodernistscontinue
to describeand debate. Thereare two importantironieshere. One is thatpostmodernists
want to erasepresencebecausethereis no warrantfor it, yet they tell us whatthatlack of
presenceis like. This, of course,requirespresenceor at least some semblanceof substantiality. There needs to be somethingessentially modernabout the postmodernfor the
postmodernto be aboutanythingotherthanan instantaneousswirl into itself or no-thing.
Second, as irasciblyreluctantas postmodernistsare to be categorizedas pre- or postanything, they do bring intellectual(re)sourceswith them to their projects. While they
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resist the idea of "source,"the irony is thatmoderntheoreticaldifferences-from structuralismand critical theory to hermeneutics-are carriedinto descriptionsof the postmodem condition.Forexample,whatpostmodernistDenzin(1988, 1991, 1992)conveys
about self and experiencereflects his deep involvementin the symbolic interactionist
traditionand discourse (see, for instance, Lindesmith,Straussand Denzin 1988). This
contrastswith the postmodernvision of, say, Baudrillard(1983, 1988), whose point of
departureonce was modemcriticaltheory(see Baudrillard1981). Old-fashioned,modem
(re)sourceswork to articulatethe postmodernso thatthereis modemtheoreticaldiversity
in reportsof the postmoderncondition.
It is useful to thinkof thesetwo ironiesin relationto imagined,empiricalsites, thatis,
metaphoricalscenariosfor communicatingand theorizing"whatit's like," even while in
the postmoderncontext there is no substantial"it" to liken. For example, Baudrillard
We use this as a
locates the postmodernconditionin what he aptly terms"hyperreality."
point of contrastfor what we believe to be a more groundedsite, namely, the concrete
locations for self-constitutionsuggestedby Lyotard'sterm "pragmatics."
First consider Baudrillard'shyperreality.Baudrillardwrites of the postmoderncondition in parallelto electronic,not printmedia. The printmedia are linear, "wordy,"and
relativelyslow. They presentour selves, others, and the world in termsof before, now,
and after.A grandthemeof the modemthusundergirdsthe writtenmedia:time is ordered
sequentiallyand dividedinto periods;space is allocatedwithintime so thatwe peruseone
news location, another,and then another.
Accordingto Baudrillard(see Kellner 1989), electronic media, especially television,
changes this. Throughtelevision, we are taken instantlyto distantand disparateplaces.
Space in termsof distancedoesn'tseem to matter.In seconds, contrastingimagesof, say,
the self, arejuxtaposed,jarringa modem sensibility that usually keeps them apart.An
advertisementfor cotton fabric, sung in the mood and phrases of existentiallonging,
flashesintothe fantasticglitz anddizzyingpasticheof football'shalftimeactivities,which
soon whizzes into an ad for thecoolness andmasculinityof light beerandfastcars.And if
that isn't enough, the viewer can increase the speed and collapse space by "channel
surfing"via remotecontrol.
The site conveys the hyperreal.Reality,or modem time and space, are "crankedup"to
the point where the orderand bordersnormallyassociatedwith them no longer apply.
Substantialitybecomes a matterof images as simulationssupplantthe actual.Presenceis
thrownto the sidelines of a literallymindlessproject. Significancesare so flattenedthat
signs cease to have any referenceto things, becoming a playful site of signs-signs of
othersigns andothersigns of signs. The site offersthe Gulf Warto the Americanpublicin
the shapeof a mediasimulationor video game-sheer events with no center(Baudrillard
1991a, 1991b).As Kellner(1992, p. 147) describesit, televisionis a site of "purenoise,"
"a blackhole whereall meaningand messagesare absorbedin the whirlpoolandkaleidoscope of radicalsemiurgy,of the incessantdisseminationof imagesandinformationto the
point of total saturation."
Self hardlymattersin this site. It is nowhereand everywhereat the same time, totally
abstracted,rapidlyflittingbeforeus in myriadversionswithoutreferenceto experience.It
is struttedabout on news programs,in sound bites from talking heads. We hear its
authenticsecrets as the pained,troubled,and morallytriumphantspeakon talkshows of
their inner sorrows, deepest feelings, and private desires. The profoundlypersonalis
conveyed facilely and artificially,plasticizingthe genuine.
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Grounding the PostmodernSelf
689
In Baudrillard's hyperreality, the self is totally on display, multiply commodified for
mass consumption. We receive the sights and sounds of a thousand inner spaces. A mere
flick of the switch or flip of the channel selector offers an array of "we's" and "them's," of
what we were, are, and can be. It is impossible to harbor or protect privacy. Indeed, in
postmodernity, privacy is tantamount to pathology. The intimate is made public, the
private is totally exposed, with no space for inner life.
Hyperreality has its detractors, however (see Featherstone 1988; Poster 1988; Best and
Kellner 1991; Lash and Friedman 1992; Seidman and Wagner 1992). For example, Featherstone (1988) cautions that while Baudrillard attempts to describe hyperreality as an
empirical site epitomized by television, Baudrillard offers few clues to how the hyperreal
relates to practice:
Forall the allegedpluralismandsensitivityto the Othertalkedaboutby some theorists
one finds little discussionof the actualexperienceand practiceof watchingtelevision
by differentgroupsin differentsettings(p. 200).
Referring to the postmodern penchant for siting experience in channel-hopping and multiphrenic imaging, Featherstone also notes that "evidence of the extent of such practices,
and how they are integrated into, or influence, the day-to-day encounters between embodied persons is markedly lacking" (p. 200). In the Introduction to Selected Writings from
Baudrillard, Poster (1988) lists some additional criticisms, even while he later appreciates
Baudrillard's contributions to our understanding of the impact of electronic media on
society:
[Baudrillard's]writing style is hyperbolicand declarative,often lacking sustained,
he totalizeshis insights, refusingto qualify
systematicanalysiswhen it is appropriate;
or delimithis claims. He writesaboutparticularexperiences,television images, as if
nothingelse in society mattered,extrapolatinga bleak view of the world from that
limitedbase (p. 7).
These shortcomings, especially a seeming blindness to class, age, and gender differences, combined with a pervasive nihilism (Best and Kellner 1991), demand an alternative
treatment. While we appreciate Baudrillard'spolitical economy of signs, we aim to show
how several aspects of postmodern abstraction are concrete features of ordinary, day-today interpretive practice. It is one thing to write abstractly of the condition of experience
in an electronically-mediated, fast-paced, sign-consuming world; it is quite another to
describe and document existing actions in relation to hyperreality.
Lyotard fails to offer us a method, but he does provide perspective in his description of
the "pragmatics" of knowledge. Drawing on Wittgenstein (1958), Lyotard (1984) likens
the current, dizzying array of experience to socially organized, language games. This
would locate the self at "the crossroads of pragmatic relationships," that is, in the midst of
everyday, practical activities. Borrowing from Foucault (see Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982,
chap. 3), we might add that the language games of the self have become institutionalized
discursive formations. What there is to self is located at "nodal points" of communication
(Lyotard 1984, p. 15), the intersection of multiple language games.
Lyotard is aware of the overdetermination implied by institutional siting. Asked to
speak of the postmodern self, he might argue that while self can be thought of as "moves"
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in languagegames locatedin diverseinstitutionalsettings, "Weknow todaythatthe limits
the institutionimposes on potentiallanguage'moves' are neverestablishedonce and for
all (even if they have been formallydefined)"(p. 17). What Lyotardapparentlyhas in
mindis the idea of languagegameslinkedto institutionsas the locationof rationalizedand
routinized,but not determineddiscursiveofferings,akinto Bourdieu's(1977) conceptof
habitus(also see Bourdieuand Wacquant1992, especially pp. 113-158).
ORGANIZATIONAL
EMBEDDEDNESS,
DEPRIVATIZATION,
PRACTICE
AND INTERPRETIVE
The choice of institutionalpracticeas the empiricalsite for postmodernlanguagegamesof
the self relatesto a complexchangein the idea of privacy.Forhalf a century,sociologists
life (see
and social commentatorshavedebatedthe importanceof privacyin contemporary
Parsons 1971, Parsonsand Bales 1955, Riesman 1950, Sennett 1974, Skolnick 1973).
Initially the argumentwas that the most authenticaspects of our selves and lives were
revealed,if not produced,withinthe cloisteredconfinesof the household,family,or close
community.Dissenters,however,arguedthatlife is increasinglyconductedin the public
realm. Some went so far as to say thatthe traditionalsanctuaryof privacy-the homewas being"invaded"by otherinstitutions.As Lasch(1977) wrotein Havenin a Heartless
and
World,"the family is besieged,"with the home's traditionalfunctionsof nurturance
socializationdisplacedto publicarenas.
The debate suggests that the most intimatedetails of self and family are increasingly
mattersof public documentation,public record, and public definition (Gubriumand
Holstein 1990; HolsteinandGubrium1994a),a paradoxof an explosionof deprivatization
and simultaneousdesire for privacy.What is consideredreal or genuine is, more and
more, descriptivelydeprivatized,that is, interpretedwithin organized, public circumstances. At the same time, privacy and authenticitystill are arguablythe bedrockof
personaland domestic experience.The combinationleads us directlyto the postmodem
self.
Contraryto the inclinationof postmoderniststo see a radicalbreakbetweenmodemand
postmodernexperience,we view the postmodernself as not so totallynew. Rather,self's
social and intellectualconditioningover the yearshas dislodgedit fromtraditionalanalytic and experientialmoorings.While some would say thatthis self has ceased to exist as a
significantcategoryof contemporarylife, we contendthatit is the self's voicingthathas
noticeablychanged.
Increasingly,large and small organizationsare engaged in articulatingandevaluating
practicesthat, taken together,embed and accordinglygive voice to self-definition.If a
process of experientialrationalizationconcretelyoccurs anywhere,it unfoldsin sites of
interpretivepractice. From courtrooms,communitymental health centers, psychiatric
hospitals,schools for the emotionallydisturbed,to aftercareprograms,self-improvement
courses, supportgroups, counseling, and welfare agencies, the self remainsa central
categoryfor attachingsubjectivemeaningto experience(cf. Weber1947, p. 88).
While electronicmediapresentdiverse vocabulariesof self, the mediaofferfew clues
as to how the flux of experienceis embodied in relationto self. However,a focus on
interpretive
practice-the ordinaryproceduresthroughwhich
organizationally-embedded
personsunderstand,represent,and managetheirrealities-provides a pointof departure.
For several years, we have been documentingempiricallythe everyday processesthat
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Grounding the PostmodernSelf
691
constituteself in diverseorganizational
settingsandhavebegunto incorporateelementsof
the postmoderninto a constructionist
perspectiveon social forms. The constructionismis
distinctive in being less concernedwith the large scale rhetoricof self or other social
forms (see Ibarraand Kitsuse 1993;SpectorandKitsuse 1987) thanwith self's everyday,
articulations(see Gubrium1993a;Holstein and Gubrium1994b).
naturally-occurring
Our approachclaims a middlegroundbetweenmodernismand postmodernismin that
we recognize the constitutivefluidityand multiplicityof social forms, includingthe self,
that is associated with postmodernity,yet we tie this diversity to socially organized
variabilityin the circumstancesof self production.The approachcapitalizeson a theoretiRatherthan elaboratelytheorizingthe
cal minimalisminformedby ethnomethodology.4
between
of self
organizations,interpretivepractice,and the characterization
relationship
from the top down, we documentfromthe bottomup participants'own "theorywork"or
practicalreasoning(Garfinkel1967)aboutself in the variedsettingswherethis occurs.5
We have studied self productionamong a spectrumof lay and professionalpersons:
supportgroup participants,counselors,judges, lawyers, humanservice and healthcare
personnel,troubledyouth,andfamilymembers,amongothers.They makethe self topical
using diverse interpretiveresources.Some settings offer highly crystallizedresources,
centeredon official understandings
of the nature,structure,and developmentof selves,
such as treatmentphilosophiesgroundedin behavioralprinciplesor psychoanalyticvocabularies. Other settings offer a bareminimum,their interpretiveresourceslimited to the
accumulating,day-to-daycontributionsof participants,such as a past week's stories of
self-actualizationsharedby membersof a supportgroup.
We refer to these interpretiveresourcesas "local cultures,"collective representations
writ small (Durkheim 1961; Gubrium1988, 1989; Gubriumand Holstein 1993). The
(culture
conceptis a way of being sensitiveto the practicaldelimitationsof metanarratives
writ large) while keeping the radicallyrelativizingimpulsesof ethnomethodologyfrom
dissolving all meaninginto constitutivemoments(Pollner 1991). Being local, cultureis
not so totalizedas to completelyfix participant'spracticalreasoning,but neitheris it so
ongoingly contextualizedas to be reconstitutedfrom the groundup on each interpretive
occasion.
RECASTINGPOSTMODERNVOCABULARY
IN TERMSOF PRACTICE
Postmodernistsregularlyreferto the decenterednessof experience,polysemy,the play of
difference,and the perpetualpresent.It is a highly abstractvocabularyused to describe
how the postmodernconditiondiffersfrom, say, the modernor traditional.How might
these terms relate to interpretivepracticewhere self is concerned?
In the following sections, we presentethnographicand narrativematerialfromstudies
of interpretivepracticethat demonstrateshow an ostensibly floatingpostmodernself is
empiricallygrounded.The settingsformalizethe commonplace.Like other formalsettings, they offer standardizedanswersto questions of self and mediate interpretation
accordingto highly textualizedprocesses (cf. Smith 1987, 1990). While we focus on
some specialized institutionalsites, we realize that questionsof self also arise in other
settings, such as within householdsor in friendshipgroups. As informantsmake abundantlyclear in the form of accountsof "athome thoughts"and of "friendlydiscussions"
among peers, considerationsin institutionalsites reflect and refract,as well as interact
with, discussionsat home, amongfriends,and elsewhere.
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Authenticity, Decenteredness, and Polysemy
Gergen(1991) notesthatunderlyingthe "centered"modemself is an authenticpresence
thatis knowable,where"theveryconceptof personalessences is [not]thrownintodoubt"
(p. 7). Whetherthe authenticself is cast romanticallyand definedin termsof feelingsand
the
moral fiber, or has a rationalisttone highlightingreason, choice, and predictability,
self is nonetheless"present"(centered)in experience.
How does this authentic,centeredself take postmodernform and become seemingly
decenteredto the diversediscoursesof a deprivatizedworld?A comparativeethnography
of two familycounselingprogramsshows one way in whichthe authenticselves of family
members, in particulartheircompetenceor incompetence,is constitutivelyembeddedin
contrastingorganizationalimagesof home life (Gubrium1992). In practice,self's presence is articulatedthroughthe organizations'respective sign systems, makingthe self
polysemic.
The two programs,locatedin differentfacilities, sharethe view thathealingthe family
cures the person, linking the self to local cultures of domesticity.In one facility-an
outpatientcounseling center called WestsideHouse6-domestic order is understoodin
termsof power and hierarchy.Anythingfamily memberspresentin therapyis takento be
a possible sign of authority.Informedprimarilyby the idea that domestic order (or
disorder,as the case mightbe) is a system of authorityrelationships,the healthyhousehold consists of clear hierarchicallines of decision-making,parentsor adultsin charge,
preferablyfathers at the head, and childrendutiful. An unambiguous,gender-flavored
hierarchycontributessystemicallyto each and every family member'scompetenceand
domestic well-being. Cross-cuttinglines of authoritypromptdomesticdisorder,causing
problemssuch as depression,addiction,and truancy,which in turn increasesdomestic
disorder.
Signs of authorityareremarkablyordinary.At WestsideHouse, they are seen in family
members'postures,theirverbalization,andmembers'seatingarrangement
duringtherapy
sessions. Erect posture, assertiveverbalization,and centralityof seating positionsignal
authority.Domesticorderis neveractuallyseen; participantsonly see its signs, whichlink
the very abstract,in thiscase domesticorderandpersonalcompetence,with themundane,
that is, posture, seatingarrangement,and verbalization.
To illustratehow authenticityis realizedin this interpretivecontext, considerhow the
of familymembers-read as a systemof signs-serve to
postureand seatingarrangement
embody authorityand cast a motherand her sons as particulartypes of persons.In a
meeting of family counselorsreviewing a videotape of the motherand sons' therapy
session, participantsare told thatthe motheris divorcedand depressed,andthathertwin
sons are repeatedlydisruptiveat school, "out of control,"so to speak. In the following
extractfromthe proceedings,notehow, in the counselors'talk, the sons' statusas troubled
youth is embodied in mundanesigns and interpretedin relationto the prevailinglocal
cultureof domesticorder.Justbeforethe videotapeof the therapysession is played,Leila
Korson,the counselinginternand formerschoolteacherwho is presentingthe case to the
other counselors, summarizesthe so-called family situation. As they play the tape, the
counselors (Gary Nelson, Nancy Cantor,TammyHorton, and Donna Reddick)turnto
the monitor, where they expect to "see" the family situation. The counselorslisten as
Korson,on tape, inquiresof the boys how it feels to grow up as twins. Nelson thenasks
Korson to put the tape on pause and identify the persons on the monitor.As Korson
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Grounding the PostmodernSelf
693
proceeds, she commentson the seatingarrangement,designatingpostureas a clue to the
"problemin this home."
KORSON: This one twin [Johnny]was kindaquiet at first. I couldn'tget him to say
anything. Laterin the session, he moved over here [pointsto his current
seating position] and then he startedto talk more, like he was the boss
aroundhome. I thinkhe's the dominantone [twin]. Look at the way he's
sitting. [Johnnysits uprightand forwardin his chair.]He's like that all the
time, even whenhe was sittingover here [pointsto the seat at the right,out
of camerarange].
CANTOR: Now he's in thepowerseat andhe feels morecomfortable[pause]morelike
himself.
HORTON: Yeah, like he feels at home.
REDDICK: The mother,to me, is giving mixed messages to the boys about living at
home and going to the father[who lives nearby].She tells them if they
don't behave,they canjust get out of the house and go to theirfather.Then
she tells them thatthey betterbehave or they'll turnout just like him.
HORTON: [Pointingto the monitoras she restartsthe tape]Yeah[pause]andjust look
at thatkid [Johnny].Lookat how he sits at the edge of thechair[pause]like
he's going tojumpall overMom if she daresto cross him. Justlook at him!
It's writtenall over him. Thatlook he's giving her. My God, it'sjust telling
her [mother]thathe's in charge.And he knows it. If she crosses him, he'll
just marchover to Dad and live there.
CANTOR: And would you look at the otherone [twin]. He's watchinghis brotherreal
close-like, waiting to see what to do. And would ya look at Mom! [All
watch the monitorfor a few seconds] Look at how she looks down at the
floor all the time, like she's being steppedon when Johnnygets going. You
can see whata badscene it is. That'snot a very healthyhome. No wonder
those boys are delinquent.
Counselorsview and pointto the monitoras if they were actuallywitnessingdomestic
orderandthe competenceof familymembersbeforetheirveryeyes. Withcommentssuch
as "Lookat Mom","Justlook at him,"and"That'snot a veryhealthyhome,"the speakers
soundas if they areobservingthe household'ssocial orderand, at the sametime, how the
twins as personsfigurein. Mundanesigns areused to concretelyandlocallyreferenceand
constitutethe abstract,in this case, "nota very healthyhome"and "delinquency."
Johndominant
self
is
mediated
its
embodied
in
ny's dysfunctionally
accordingly, authenticity
terms.
observable"evidence,"in locally-understood
In the comparisonfamily counselingprogram,locatedin an inpatienttreatmentcenter
called FairviewHospital,a contrastingcultureof domesticorderprevails.Evidenceagain
is presentedin the course of practicalreasoningin relationto mundanesigns. While
Fairviewconsidersitself therapeutically
eclectic, the overridingimage of domesticorder
is a configurationof emotionalbonds. Domesticdisorder,it is said, stems from uncommunicatedfeelings. Anythingthat blocks the expressionof feelings or hinders active
listeningspells trouble.Poweris at the heartof troubles,the local nemesisof communication. As staffmemberssay andfamilymemberssoon learn,"powertrips"ruinthe family
and are the source of most social and personalills.
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Accordingto Fairviewstaff, the healthyhouseholdis like a democracyof emotions.
Each and every family memberor significantotherhas feelings. No one is withoutthem,
not even the youngest child or a seemingly insignificantmember of the household.
Feelings-especially love-are the bedrockof domesticorder.A householdin whichit is
possible to expressfeelings andwhose membersactively listen to each otheris a healthy
home, where individualself-esteemdemocraticallyintegratesthe membership.
A democracy of emotions is very abstract,not something readily observed. As at
WestsideHouse, a systemof signs linksthe abstractwith the mundane.At Fairview,signs
of domestic ordercan be seen in the same words and gesturesas at Westside.Seating,
posture, and verbalizationare significant.At Fairview,however, seatingrefersmore to
of family members.Sittingdown is thought
being seatedthanto the seatingarrangement
to be more conducive to communicationand the receptionof feelings thanstandingup.
The fatherwho sits down while describinghis unrulyson's behavioris more likely to
convey authenticfeelingsandbe trulyheardthanthe fatherwho standsup andintimidates
listeners. Posture, for example, sitting back, reflects communicativereceptivity.The
motherwho not only sits downto communicate,butsits backin herchair,is seen as better
equippedto empatheticallylistento herdaughter'sanxiouscomplaintsabouta boyfriend's
drinkingthan the motherwho sits at the edge of her chair and appearsreadyto cut her
daughteroff at any moment.Verbalizationis read in termsof voice modulation.Those
who speak in an invitingandcalm toneof voice andwho, in turn,show evidenceof being
preparedto "activelylisten," facilitatethe expressionof feelings.
While the signs of domesticorderanddisorderaresimilar,they meandifferentthingsin
of authenticityis polysemic.
the contextof the two programs,and thusthe understanding
At Westside, staff interpreta parentwho duringa therapysession seats him- or herself
prominentlyin the room, presentsconfidently,andspeaksforcefully,as beingin authority
at home, as it is locally believedparentsshouldbe. As a rule, parents,especiallyfathers,
counseled at Westside do not present in this way, which typically serves to explain
domestic troubles. Or fathersmightoverpresent,which signals dominationand possible
abusiveness. At Fairview,staff would view such fathersas intimidatingand thwarting
effective communication.The two programs'local culturesof domesticorder,in effect,
provideresourcesfor interpretingsigns relatingto self and competencein oppositeways.
How do the brief extract, the interactions,and their organizationalembeddedness
convey a kindof postmodernself? It is evidentthatthe modernidea of authenticityis still
intact. In both settings, participantssearchfor the core or essential meaningof conduct:
what behavior"actually"means;whatsomeone"genuinely"feels; how someone"really"
is. At Westside, counselorsperuseseating arrangement,posture, and verbalizationfor
clues to the "presence"of authority,which in its properdomestic distributionsignifies
order.At Fairview,the searchtargetsthe contrastingauthenticityof feelings. Feelingsat
Fairvieware presentat the core of experience,even while power andauthoritymay make
it appearotherwise.
But what is presentand centeredin local understandingis variableand decenteredin
interpretivepractice.While somethinglike Gergen'sso-called romanticistself is viewed
as authenticat Fairview,a more rationalistself embodies authenticityat Westside.The
contrastunderscoresself's polysemiccharacter.Whatis more, thereis extensiveevidence
in each setting that what is consideredauthenticin the other setting is thoughtto be
damagingto the self and domesticorder:Westsidecounselorsshow little patiencefor the
expressionof feelings;Fairviewtherapistswallow in it, denigratingexpressionsof power
and authority.
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Grounding the PostmodernSelf
695
Inasmuch as the two settings conduct family, not individual, therapy, individual selves
are further embedded in the systems of interpersonal relations treated on the premises.
While selves still make sense in the facilities, their dynamics are caught up in the family
systems undergoing therapy, further decentering self and multiplying its "authentic"
meanings.
Difference and Presentness
Postmodernists also write of the play of difference and collapse time into a perpetual
present. The question is how "playful" is difference? Can it be likened to the alleged
swirling, dizzying signifiers and significances of MTV, where a perpetual present displaces any concrete sense of the past or future? How might an authentic, centered self with
a past, present, and future reveal itself in these terms and yet be grounded in interpretive
practice?
Consider first how the meaning of self is diversely constructed in involuntary commitment proceedings where the hospitalization of persons thought to be mentally ill is
reviewed. The proceedings orient to standardized criteria which stipulate that the candidate patient should be hospitalized only if he or she- is a danger to self or others, or is
gravely disabled, that is, unable to provide the basic necessities of life (see Holstein
1993).
Proceedings typically provoke multiple reality claims as discourse coalesces around
competing professional understandingsand vocabularies of functional ability, potential for
havoc, and dangerousness. At first glance, the situated constructions of self clearly suggest the "overabundance of meaning" (Denzin 1991, p. 8) that "saturates"(Gergen 1991)
the postmodern self. Typically, divergent self characterizations are posited for the candidate patient. For example, in Arlene Bluman's commitment hearing (Holstein 1987), a
psychiatrist initially characterizes Bluman as a "schizophrenic, disorganized type." In the
psychiatrist's words:
Arlene is often quite delusional....
Her reality orientationis very poor. She has
difficultyseparatingfantasyfromreality.She displays an insidiousreductionin external attachments,relationships-a pathologicalindifferenceor apathythatinfringeson
her ability to functionsocially.
Following testimony from the candidate patient, the District Attorney (DA) arguing for
Bluman's commitment appeals to the presiding judge to hospitalize Bluman because of
her inability to function and her recurrent social impairment:
[Bluman]has a repeatedhistoryof failurein noninstitutionalsettings. Thereis abundantevidence that she has troublekeepingherself togetherwhen she's released. She
has troublemanaginghermoney.She has troublewith almosteverything-interacting
with others, gettingalongwithpeople, takingher medications.She simplyisn't ready
to resumea normallife at this point ... She is a very sick womanwho needs a lot of
care.
Bluman's Public Defender (PD) responds, claiming that Bluman is capable of managing life in the community, offering her own characterization of the candidate patient:
My client has a place to.live. It's everythinga woman needs. The landlord,a Mr.
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He lives in the building
Dietrich, has agreedto renther a room with a kitchen ....
and says he'll look in on herfrom time to time. Arlene has some problems,but she's
awareof themnow. Shejust needsa little help. This womanwill not be muchtrouble.
How much troublecan a woman like her be? She won't cause anyone any harm.
Looking after a woman in thatsituationwon't requirevery much ... Miss Bluman
can managevery well with him [the landlord]helping take care of her.
The judge rejects the PD's plea skeptically, offering his own assessment of Bluman:
It seems that Arlene might be taken care of all right. But that's what worries me.
Wouldwe be doing the rightthingby placing this womanin the care of some strange
man? ... I don't feel good abouta woman living alone in this kind of arrangement
.... This makesme very uneasy.A womanis very vulnerable.I'm concernedabout
her safety. I'm concernedthatthis may not be the most properthing to do.
And the PD responds:
We have no reasonto believethatanythingimproperat all would happen.Justbecause
she's a womandoesn't meanshe has to be protectedfrom every male that'sout there
.... Whatthis womanneedsis just a little help to get by. Should we distrustanyone
who offers to help?
The judge answers "No," and reiterates his worry that Bluman's vulnerabilities as a
woman raise the risk of her being exploited:
We'retalkingabuta woman'sbestinteresthere. A woman's.And I've got to makethat
the basis for my decision. Ms. Bluman'snot well yet, and even if she were, I don't
know as I'd recommendher living in a place like this. It's importantthattherewould
be someone therethatcould takecare of her. I'm surehe would, but that'smy worry.
That he would take care of her, if you know what what I mean'.
Borrowing from poststructuralist formulations (e.g., Derrida 1973, 1976, 1978), a
postmodernist might characterize this exchange as a process of free-floating signification.
Meaning, the postmodernist would argue, is not produced in a stable, referential relation
between subject and object, but within the intertextual play of signifiers (Best and Kellner
1991). The meaning of a thing or concept, such as Bluman's character, is "necessarily and
essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another and to other
concepts by the systematic play of difference" (Derrida 1973, p. 140). Characterizations
of Bluman's self continuously and infinitely shift in a swirl of ungrounded signification.
This "play" of meaning, however, is serious business and can be seen as contextually
structured when examined in terms of interpretive practice. While ontologically naive,
participants systematically characterize self in ways that belie the postmodem swirl.
Interpretive practice reveals a structureto the play of difference. While the self remains an
emergent descriptive project-an "artful" congeries of qualities and traits, as Garfinkel
(1967) might put it-characterizations are parsimoniously formulated (Sacks and Schegloff 1979), tending to revolve around a limited number of well-known, locally-sanctioned
categories or typifications. Using a particular category implies a constellation of ancillary
features commonly associated with the category, such as the "grandfatherly gentleman"
implying harmlessness. The application of a categorical description thus provides a working narrative rule for ascribing other characteristics, attributes, and motives (Sacks 1972).
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697
In the first extract from the commitment hearing, the psychiatrist characterizes Bluman
in technical, behavioral terms. Bluman's self is composed from psychic elements, disorders, pathologies, and states of well-being, articulated in professional psychiatric discourse. Her schizophrenic self is real in the same terms. While not directly contesting this
characterization in the other extracts, the two attorneys and the judge employ contrasting
vocabularies, which are themselves professionally grounded in concerns for community
order and protection from the havoc associated with mental illness (Holstein 1993). Their
characterizations of Bluman orient to how well she might be able to carry on in the
community as well as to her vulnerability. Their descriptive vocabulary of self reflects
these orientations. The PD argues for release, using a discourse of manageability. Bluman
is easy to control and contain. The minimal assistance of a kindly landlord is all that is
necessary to make community living viable for the "harmless" Ms Bluman. However, the
language of vulnerability is resurrected by the judge, referring to a well-intentioned
"stranger" (the landlord) who, the judge argues, actually might be a sexual predator.
The preceding exchange is replete with difference: alternate vocabularies cast and recast
the practical reality of Bluman's personality. Yet, the flow of interpretation is socially
organized, reined in by the hearing's communicative agendas, which in turn are linked
with speakers' professional concerns. The PD stresses the connection between gender-a
seemingly straightforward attributeof self-and manageability, seeking to articulate how
easily managed Bluman would be and, in the process, rhetorically invoking "what everybody knows" about femininity. The judge constructs Bluman's vulnerability by playing off
of a different constellation of implied meanings for gender, associating being female with
helplessness and sexual susceptibility. The competing versions of what it means to be
female rise and fall in the give-and-take of the exchange, but the shifts in meaning are
neither arbitrary nor capricious. They are tied to local, organizationally-circumscribed
discourses that play on distinct cultural configurations.
Analogously, the use of the personal past, present, and future to define constituents of
self is also locally grounded, making life history a present-time enactment. This, too, is
evident in the commitment hearings, where the various participants formulate personal
histories according to distinctive interpretive agendas. Lives are narratively constructed,
made coherent and meaningful, through the "biographical work" that links experiences
into circumstantially compelling life courses (Gubrium, Holstein and Buckholdt 1994).
The process is artful, a complement to the play of difference, but it is locally informed and
organized.
To illustrate, consider how candidate patient Andre Wilson's life course is revealed in
the competing scenarios offered by the psychiatrist who testifies regarding Wilson's
mental condition and the judge who decides to have Wilson hospitalized. While the
psychiatrist and judge agree on the need to hospitalize Wilson, they articulate Wilson's
life history quite differently. First, the psychiatrist offers his version of Wilson's past and a
prediction for Wilson's future:
type .... Mr.
My diagnosis:Mr. Wilsonis a schizophrenic,chronicundifferentiated
Wilson has been hospitalizedin the MetropolitanCity areaseven times in the last five
years. His record indicatesthat as long as ten years ago, he's shown symptomsof
deterioratingrealityorientation.He is severely delusional. We have noteddelusional
claims for ten years. He has reportedinstanceswherehe thoughthe was a memberof
the police force, timeswhenhe claimedhe was a doctorwho hada cureforcancer,and
he has claimedthatpeopleon thehospitalstaffhavebeen stealinghis belongingswhile
he's been at Metro[thementalhospital].This historyof delusionsandmentaldeterio-
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rationindicatespsychosis,thathe's severelydisturbed.It's likely he'll get worse if he
is not hospitalized.
Following other testimony, the judge orders Wilson's hospitalization, offering the following rationale:
I tend to agree thatMr. Wilsonhas problemsthatmake it difficultfor him to manage
his affairs.Squanderinghis disabilitychecks is not a good habit. I'm also troubledby
the historyof encounterswiththe police. He doesn't seem to be able to get along with
others very well. [Turnsto Wilson] Mr. Wilson, you probablywon't like this, but I
thinkyou are going to end up in jail if we don't get you some morehelp. You'vegone
off your medicationsin the past and you don't seem to listen to anyone who triesto
help with your meds. It seems theonly way we can get thingsundercontrolis to have
the hospitallook out for you for a little while longer.
As Foucault (1975) might put it, a psychiatric "gaze" focuses the doctor's description
on Wilson's mental status, which is expressed in terms of symptoms, psychoses, and
delusions. Wilson's biography is marked by repeated psychological breakdowns and
encounters with psychiatric professionals. The pattern of past delusional behavior is
projected into the future, culminating in the prognosis of worsening illness. Contrastingly,
the judge constructs Wilson's life history in terms of custodial concerns, relating to the
candidate patient's past ability to take care of himself or others' inability to deal with him.
Wilson's past is not so much a psychiatric history, as a series of community management
problems.
Both trajectories warranthospitalization, according to their speakers, but are conveyed
in terms of speakers' circumstantially relevant vocabularies. While the contours of Wilson's personal past (and future) are assembled in the present, and in that sense exhibit
postmodern "presentness," the respective time lines are taken by participants as real
features of perceivedly distinct chronological realms. The present provides interpretive
resources for constructions of Wilson's relevant life course, while biographical work
sustains and concretizes the causal and justificatory reality of Wilson's conduct over time.
CONCLUSION
Decenteredness, polysemy, difference, and presentness are a ubiquitous terminology of
postmodern texts. The vocabulary is increasingly subject to fast, loose, and overly abstract application.7 Against this tendency, we have argued for an appreciation of the
postmodern critique of self, but grounded in interpretive practice. The complex change in
the social conditioning of self that we have called "deprivatization" shapes practice, so
that the self emerges empirically in fluid, "postmodern" form. As the preceding materials
show, this self is decentered; it is mediated by diverse local cultures, competing discourses, and the gambits of practical reasoning. Variation in interpretive practice provides
for self's multivalent and polysemic reality. This does not mean that self is a floating
signifier akin to the postmodern radicalization of Derrida's play of difference (cf. Norris
1990). If self floats, its does so within the bounds of its social and descriptive organization.
Grounding the self in this way offers both theoretical and methodological guidelines for
research, as well as a particulardisciplinary orientation. First, before we too hastily cross
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699
"the postmoderndivide" (Borgmann1992), it is importantto considerhow, with the
appropriatemodifications,the modem,analyticnarrativesof classical sociologicaltheory
can addressa postmodernconditionof self. We have arguedthat this can be done when
as a modeof production.Tyingthe "real"to interpreinterpretivepracticeis foregrounded
tive practiceavoidsthe postmoderndilemmaof criticizingwhatis substantialor presentin
experience from a groundlessposition. It avoids the ultimate irony of attemptingto
researchno thing (nothing)at all.
Second, at the sametime, we mustnotturnawayfromthe seminaltheoreticalchallenge
of postmodernism,whichmaintainsthatthe realitiesof social life areconstitutivelytied to
their workingdiscourses.If we modifyWeber's(1947) classic concernwith rationalization so that it is attunedto practiceand sensitive to local culture,we see rationalityas a
discursiveprocesssuffusingeverydaylife. Acknowledgingthis, theoristsof self shouldat
least initiallyeschew totalizedmetasociologicalformulationsand attendto the descriptive
organizationof the ordinarysituationsand vocabulariesthat fuel self's embodiments.
Beginningwith "mundanereason"(Pollner1987), we can makevariousandcomplicated
embodimentsof self visible fromthe bottomup andfeaturetheircontemporary
ubiquity.8
Third, we need not assumea priorithata universalisticcriterionof authenticityis the
final test of self knowledge. As we have shown, authenticitycontinues, directly or
indirectly,to be an indigenousconcernacrosssituations.Participantstake accountof its
local understandings
and interpretations,
lookingfor the "true,"the "genuine,"the "real."
Authenticityis thus a member'scriterion,not an analyticstandard.
Fourth,inasmuchas self's postmodernformis shornof presence,it is bereftof responsibility. It has no occasion to be moral, powerful, or powerless. Groundingself in
interpretivepractice,however,ties moralityand politics to local understandings,conditions, and resources.Responsibilityis concretelysituatedin, and orientedto, local accountabilitystructures(Gubrium1993b;Holstein 1993), frameworkswithinwhich actors
and actions are defined or define themselves in circumstantiallyrelevantterms with
referenceto situatedvalues. This providesboth space and motivationfor agonistic and
resistivemicropoliticsof the sortadumbrated,butnot fully developedby, say, Foucaultor
Lyotard(see Best and Kellner1991). Linkedto local culture,the self is both responsive
and responsibleto the practicalcontingenciesand moralitiesof choice and action.
Finally,the orientationto interpretivepracticepointsin two methodologicaldirections.
First, researchmust attendto the ineluctablylocal. The varieddomainsof everydaylife
harborseparateand distinct understandings
of the natureof self and criteriaof authenticity, local cultures of self. The emergenceof myriadorganizationswhose business
includesdefiningthe self has beena significantrecentdevelopment.Relatedconstructions
of self's organization,workingsenses of self's relationto collective life, and ordinary
views of how self develops over time, are situated resources for depicting self and
informingcoursesof actiontowardit. Withinandbetweenorganizationswe findadditional circumstancesthat furtherspecify and localize self's shape and substance.Even socalled nationalor internationalperspectivesare locally mediatedas they areconjuredup,
invoked, and communicativelylinked to mattersof immediateconcernto participants.
At the same time, local cultureis not set in stone, which suggests a second methodologicaldirection.Culturedoes not governthe self's constitution;its elementsarepart
andparcelof interpretivepractice.Practicalreasoningarticulatesthe substantiveelements
of what local cultureis otherwisetakento be about.Practiceis both aboutcultureand is
the use of cultureto indicateandproducepractitioners'concreteconcerns.Procedurally,
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the grounding of the postmodern self is made visible in the documentation of culture as,
and in, interpretivepractice.9
Ultimately, the postmodern challenge to the self extends to the very disciplines that
theorize and research it, casting doubt on their privileged status as sciences. As noted
earlier, the position we have taken settles on a middle ground; our project is a kind of
constitutive and critical empiricism, focused on social and discursive practices. The
perspective is classically concerned with the significant, representative objects of our
collective experience-the self among them-but is decidedly attuned to the objects'
ontological status in everyday life. The approach recognizes the need to adjust conceptually and methodologically as disciplines to both emerging challenges and traditional
footings.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank our colleague Gale Miller and the Quarterly's anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Mills' (1951) discussionof the manipulationand sellingof self, Riesman's
(1950) depiction of the inner-and other-directedself, Goffman's(1959) presentedself, Berger,
Bergerand Kellner's(1973) homeless mind, and Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, SwidlerandTipton's
(1985) self that is lived for itself and throughothers, all of which lead us, classically,to Gergen's
(1991) view of the saturatedself. Equally importantare commentariesderiving from feminist,
gay/lesbian, cultural, interactionist,critical, psychiatric,and political economic perspectives.
2. For discussion of postmodernismand its relation to social theory,see Alexander(1991),
Antonio (1991), Bauman(1988), Best and Kellner(1991), Bogard (1990), Katovichand Reese
(1993), Kellner (1988), Lash (1990), Lemert(1991), Norris (1990), Richardson(1991), Rogers
(1992), Rosenau(1992), Seidman(1991), and Seidmanand Wagner(1992).
3. See Ichheiser's(1970) work, especiallyhis book Appearancesand Realitiesfor an example
of this genre.
4. Ethnomethodologyand relatedversionsof constructionism(see Garfinkel1967, Heritage
1984, Holstein and Gubrium1994b, Holstein and Miller 1993, Pollner 1987, Gubrium1993a,
Silvermanand Gubrium1994) have critiquedmodernism'scharacteristically
overly theorizedadumbrationsof the empirical.Still, for the most part, ethnomethodologistshave seldom explicitly
engaged postmodernconcerns.
tries this from the top down andthe resultis
5. Giddens's(1984, 1992)conceptof structuration
an overly neat and idealizeddepiction.See Silvermanand Gubrium(1994).
6. The names of personsand organizationshave been fictionalizedthroughout.
of postmodernismas eitheraffirmativeor skepticalwould
7. Rosenau's(1992) characterization
suggest that it is the skepticalswho are overly abstractin the use of this vocabulary.It might be
informsour own groundingin interpretivepractice.While
arguedthatan affirmativepostmodernism
our bottom-uporientationto the empiricalcontrastswith Giddens's(1990), he seems to have the
same distinction in mind and similarlysituates his approach,calling it "radicallymodern,"not
(skeptically)postmodern.
8. Analysts mightalso considerotherchallengesposed by the postmodern,includingquestions
addressingless discursiveissues like self's ultimatelyemotional(see Denzin 1993) or impulsive
properties(see Turner1976) and theircircumstantialconditioning,for example.
9. For furtherdiscussionof the relationbetween interpretivepractice, local culture,and inter-
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701
pretive resources, see Gubrium(1992), Gubriumand Holstein (1990), Gubriumet al. (1994),
Holstein (1993), and Holsteinand Gubrium(1994b).
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