Myanmar and the Two Koreas:
Dangers and Opportunities
April 11, 2011
8:30 AM – 5:30 PM
Kenney Auditorium
1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036
TRANSCRIPT
Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 2 Welcoming Remarks and Panel 1: Politics and Economics in Myanmar under
a New Administration
William Wise:
Well good morning everyone. On behalf of our co-sponsors and our
donors, welcome to the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and to our
conference on Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities. My name is Bill Wise,
I am the Director of Southeast Asian Studies at SAIS and it is my great pleasure to open this
important conference and welcome you here today.
This conference is jointly sponsored by the Southeast Asia Studies Program and the U.S.-Korea
Institute at SAIS and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. My colleague, Dr. Jae Ku
from USKI and Dr. David Steinberg from Georgetown will speak to you in just a moment. First
however, I want to express the gratitude of the SAIS community and the other persons involved
in this conference to the Pacific Century Institute for its generous contribution which has made
this conference possible. We simply could not have done it without the Pacific Century Institute’s
support.
Second, I want to take this opportunity in particular to thank several persons who have done the
real hard work in putting a conference together. Jacqueline Ganam, Program Coordinator for
Southeast Asia Studies; Jenny Town, Research Associate at USKI at SAIS; and Jennifer Hill,
Program Coordinator for Korean Studies at SAIS. These are the people whose hard work has
produced this wonderful opportunity for all to learn about the topic of the day. So thank you all
for your tireless efforts.
Finally, I want to mention SAIS connection to Burma-Myanmar. Few of today’s’ students realize
it but SAIS has a deep institutional interest in higher education in Burma almost from the
founding of our school in 1947. SAIS offered an academic center at Rangoon University from
1953 until we were rather unceremoniously evicted in 1962. We provided both professors and
teaching assistants and assisted with everything from developing curriculum to teaching classes
to producing library services. We have also had a significant number of students in our Southeast
Asia Studies from Burma-Myanmar over the years, a practice that continues to this day.
Additionally we sought to promote discussion of Burmese affairs and U.S.-Burma-Myanmar
relations through a variety of means; in particular for example, today’s event is the third
international conference on Burma-Myanmar that we have hosted in the past 18 months.
Our topic today: The Relationship Between Burma-Myanmar and North and South Korea, is
perhaps narrower than previous conferences, but as you will soon hear, it is no less important.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 3 We have assembled for you today a truly distinguished group of experts from four continents. I
hope you will listen closely to their presentations and in the spirit of academic investigation that
we promote here at SAIS, I would like to urge you to consider carefully and respectfully the
views that you hear; to ask good questions and reach your own conclusions on these important
issues of politics, trade and security.
Now it is my great pleasure to introduce my colleague Dr. Jae Ku of the U.S.-Korea Institute. Jae.
Jae Ku:
Thank you Bill. As one of the three organizers we are delighted to welcome you
to this conference – Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities. In 1960
Myanmar had a greater GDP than South Korea. With more natural resources Myanmar certainly
had better prospects. Historically the two regions did not have much interaction and this changed
in 1983 when North Korean agents tried to assassinate a visiting South Korean President. Instead,
21 Senior South Korean Officials were killed. In 2007, Myanmar reestablished relations with
North Korea and since then Myanmar’s relations with the Korean Peninsula has dramatically
intensified. And I believe that is why we are having this conference today.
Many of the pertinent issues will be discussed today: South Korea’s economic presence; North
Korea’s military; even a nuclear connection; and Myanmar’s strategic relations not only with the
two Koreas but also with her neighbors. Recognizing the growing interest in this relationship the
U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS led two academic delegations to Myanmar last year. The upshot of
the visits was the beginning of a training program that brings out two Myanmar Foreign Service
Officers to be trained – one at SAIS and one at Chung Ang University in Seoul, Korea. After
completing a one year mid-career Master’s Program, the diplomats switched to gain a second
Master’s Degree. We hope to continue and expand this educational program.
Finally, I would like to thank the Pacific Century Institute and Mr. Spencer Kim for his generous
support and my colleagues Professor David Steinberg and Professor Bill Wise for putting this
conference together. We welcome you. And there is Professor Steinberg, ask Professor Steinberg
to come up and say a few words.
David Steinberg:
Thank you very much. On behalf of Georgetown I also welcome all of you
here. I am perhaps the only person in the room who actually remembers SAIS’ connection with
Burma since I got kicked out along with SAIS in 1962 when I was Assistant Representative of
the Asia Foundation there. We will play at this meeting by Association for Asian Studies Rules
which is if there are more people in the audience than on the panel it’s a success. And so we will
start now and I will save my remarks for the Chair on this first panel. I invite the panelists to
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 4 come to the podium and we will begin the discussions. I welcome you here and I hope that we
will have a very good and vigorous debate about some of the issues. Thank you.
Thank you very much. This first panel is designed to essentially set the stage for what will follow.
There have been important developments in the country, you may either call it Burma or
Myanmar as you wish, but here we will use either term without any political connotation. This is
very important. I have already had emails from people complaining that we use the term
Myanmar in the title. I have explained that both Koreas use Myanmar and therefore we have
used it here. Dr. Tin Maung Maung Than from Singapore was scheduled to be on this panel. He
missed his plane. I have his PowerPoint presentations which I will give on his behalf, but my
remarks should not be construed as his simply because I will add my own views to them.
So the role of the Chair here is not just as timekeeper as usual in these kinds of meetings. This is
a discussion and we want to have a dialogue among the panelists but also with the people in the
audience. This event takes place really in quite an important context. Two days ago Senator
Lugar issued a letter to the State Department endorsed by Senator Mitch McConnell and others
calling for an unclassified report on North Korean relations with Myanmar on the nuclear and
other kinds of military issues. So, I think this happens to be serendipitously well timed for that.
We have been called by Roland Watson of Dictatorship Watch; this is a pro-military regime
conference. This is anything but a pro-military regime conference, it is a conference trying to
look at the policy issues connected with a series of relationships and our job as an academic
institution, or series of academic institutions is to try and analyze the situation and you will
otherwise reach your own conclusions.
As one last personal point some of you who know me know that this sort of my attempt to get
my schizophrenic life together by combining Korea and Burma into one meeting. There is
another Burma connection from Korea that I might mention. Former President Kim Dae-Jung
took an extremely strong personal interest in Burma and before he was President we met many
times to discuss Burma and he was very concerned about Aung San Suu Kyi. I even met with
him in the Blue House when he was President and after he was retired at his home and he
continued to discuss the Burma issue up until the time of his death. So, we now turn to our
panelists: Dr. U Khin Zaw Win will go first and then Priscilla Clapp and then I will take up the
rear. With that I turn it over to U Khin Zaw Win.
U Khin Zaw Win:
use both in there.
Thank you very much. I will be using the PowerPoint so I will probably be
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities David Steinberg:
Yes, please. If it is a PowerPoint then maybe we should move.
U Khin Zaw Win:
No, no. You can watch it on the other screens.
David Steinberg:
Okay.
Page 5 U Khin Zaw Win: So good morning everyone and thank you David and special thanks to
SAIS and to Georgetown University for convening this event which I think people have
remarked on has been very timely. Thank you for inviting me again, I think it has been my good
fortune to be able to speak here almost every year now, even across the road at Brookings
Institution. When I first was invited and notified about this event, I said it is good timing because
as you are probably aware, the new government in Burma-Myanmar was inaugurated only 12
days ago. So, this is also my first trip abroad since that event and there will be quite a lot of
things to discuss. As David has said, it is going to be more of a discussion.
Each of the panelists was only allocated 10 minutes, so I have provided PowerPoint and also a
paper which I have already distributed. I think I will leave the main action as we all know for the
question and answer period.
Elections that were held on the seventh of November last year came after a gap of 22 years
which I call two lost decades in political progress and development. We know that the regime is
spotty, the Union Solidarity and Development Party won by a landslide. However, in those same
elections millions of voters from fearless ethnic groups cast their votes for non-USDP parties.
These are people who supported the election and wanted democratic parties to win. We
deservedly, I must say, criticize elections and end stream Parliaments have opened the way
however narrowly from maneuvering in a space that had not existed for nearly 50 years. They
bring to an end a period in which the country was ruled directly by military council or by a
military backed one party system. As we all know the process of moving back to a democracy
was difficult and long, made more so by the conflict between the regime and the leading
opposition party. I myself and others who were deeply disappointed because of the way the
elections were held and the outcome understand that precisely because of those reasons we have
to keep on pushing and building the key components of a democracy. Nothing is to be
accomplished by sitting it out.
Most of my trips abroad are invited to speak on the situation inside and I do my best to give an
honest and sincere account of how we inside the country feel, right now. Most of the world
outside sees the contest in Myanmar as one between a military dictatorship and a democracy
movement. While this is true to a certain extent it also challenges the question why both sides are
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 6 so stubborn, they are sticking to their entrance positions while allowing the countries other
problems to fester and grow.
For those who have not seen these pictures, I have not seen it in real life myself. Those are new
Parliament buildings in Nay Pyi Taw, where the first multi-party Parliamentary Sessions were
held beginning on the thirty-first of January this year and a new government was nominated and
inaugurated in that session.
You might have seen this picture before. The patchwork quilts of areas with different colors are
the areas in Burma that are controlled by ethnic arms organizations, some of which have come in
to cease fire arrangements with the regimen almost two decades ago and some of them are still
engaged in what is perhaps the longest running civil war in the world. Now, this is very much a
part of local life in Burma. The most striking repudiation of the belief of the countries destiny
can be decided by the favorable interaction of two leaders is the six decades old ethnic autonomy
related conflict that is yet to be resolved. Hence it has become an urgent necessity to refrain the
overarching issue or to see things as just two opposing sides pitted against each other, or as a
complex and many sided game involving a whole array of players old and new.
Some particular concern to our friends abroad, the recognition of our wider circle of stakeholders
is not too much to ask in a country that could be facing more turmoil ahead and a handling of
whose problems are far beyond the capacity of a single leader party. If this is not acknowledged,
it is bad for the leader and exponentially so for Myanmar.
I have compared Burma-Myanmar’s long and costly stalemate with World War I trench warfare
which you are all aware of. But perhaps the unending sanctions and dial-up approach, factor an
even earlier motive warfare that of each warfare and slowly starving an enemy into submission.
Well, I said before and I will say it again, it is not working and it will never work. Sanctions from
the West are having to make up for poor domestic leadership. Okay, a lot of people are
disparaging the recent elections, but you can’t deny that the Myanmar people are hungry for it,
for politics; the kind of politics that would improve their lives and their children’s futures. We all
need the kind of politics, what passes off as politics that is to gain and embracing clearly
unattainable position.
A lot of people have commented on the present situation, the international crisis group has issued
regular reports on how things are going in the country and how the international community
should respond, and Thant Myint U who also visits Burma quite regularly has written books,
another book is coming out soon.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 7 And then I will say a few words on the economic system. If you think the new politics is marked
by uncertainty and is a cause for real worry wait until we come to the economy. The policy and
implementation of failures of the command economy that prevails under the Burma Socialist
Programme Party, the BSPP One-Party State, and brought the country to least devout status,
came to an end in 1989. It affected everyone more or less evenly and the whole country was glad
to see them go just as the political change of the country was ill prepared to handle the transition.
There was universal agreement and hope that the reinstatement of democracy would be
accompanied by economic resurgence; general prosperity for the people; and better standards of
living. But the gainers have said the country’s gain in the form of unresolved political conflict
spilled over yet again to other spheres.
At the same time, while we know the effects of the long-standing political conundrum at the
same time economic policy itself is also one of the risks. Besides the arbritrarilists, self-interest
and corruption in the way the economy is disposed of there is a clear lack of economic
understanding across the board in Burma’s elite.
Now, it is generally understood that the economy requires direction, regulation, and management
from the government, but where exactly is that going to come from? The capacity within the
government is questionable and academia is extremely weak. Neither is it the job of the private
sector, even if the expertise were there. Any country in Myanmar’s position would be looking for
or being pressed for a way to look for advice from abroad, but here to the unfortunate effects I
have mentioned make a mock. So again we come, it is not surprising that hope has gravitated to
the newly installed government.
If I may remind policy makers it is the high top incongruity and ridiculousness to assume that
continued poverty and current disparities will help bring about democratization and nation
building. It is a very simple fact but a lot of people and governments seem to have neglected it.
Since this conference is on our relations with the two Koreas I have said something in my paper
about defense and security arrangements. Hope, expectations gravitating to the new governments.
Together with the new government there has been a changeover in the military leadership as well.
A number of younger Generals have taken over from the previous successors who have held on
to power for much too long. So the role of the newly appointed and younger military leadership
will no doubt be important too. Will they share the insecurity, even paranoia, of the previous
leadership or can they be weaned away from that. These are not merely caveat questions.
Again, we talked about the state of the economy and, for instance, as we sit the defense and
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 8 security arrangements with North Korea that are arousing so much concern all over the world,
this is where it comes into play. The previous leadership entered into such arrangements of which
we know very little. I can tell you if you are in the dark here in the West, we in Burma-Myanmar
are similarly in the dark about this.
Most people are not interested; none of the political leaders or the political parties are even
talking about it. It is worrisome yes, especially with a country like North Korea. So, I think
sooner or later we will have to start dealing with it with the new military leadership. And we
hope that a new approach, a new attitude will perhaps, like I said, wean them away and they will
be saddled with less of the insecurity that their previous successors had.
In my final paragraph in my paper, I have made comparisons with China. I will leave most of the,
like I said, interplay with the question and answer period.
Just to sum up what I have said here, Myanmar is much about doing something at the expense of
something else. We are not talking about excluding anyone. It is only about acknowledging
realities as in the China of 1949. There needs to be less of an emphasis on emotions and less
reliance on punitive measures what lies ahead for Myanmar both inside the country and outside
is about all a task for brains.
Now, there are a lot of new expectations for the new government on the economy and many
aspects of life. We have had two decades of impasse and stagnation and lack of progress. For us
in Myanmar we do not have any choices and I do not think it is an option to stay out of the game
or sit by the sidelines and just talk. I have been through a lot. My colleagues and my country
people have been through a lot. We need to keep on pushing and we have heard from friends. So,
of course, yes I said I was disappointed, many of my colleagues were despondent at the results of
the elections, but the story certainly does not end there. We are to keep on pushing and I think
conferences and seminars like this go into action with the international community, not only for
people like myself but also with the new governance there are already, I am happy to say,
initiatives to have people come abroad for that.
So I hope that this new process that has been initiated is not, like I said, all that bright, but just
because the realities. As I have said are we looking for a fairytale ending or are we thinking and
talking about pushing a least developed country along the path of democratization.
So I will leave the issues for the question and answer period. I think we have quite a bit of time.
Thank you.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 9 David Steinberg:
Thank you very much U Khin Zaw Win. Copies of his paper have been
distributed to many of you. We will see if you need more copies later. Now we turn to Priscilla
Clapp. You have the biographies of all of our panelists and the rest of the panelists so I do not
need to go into that. But she is just back from Beijing and you have some comments on that as
well.
Priscilla Clapp:
Yes, I forgot how to speak English. I can only speak in Chinese now.
David, do you prefer that I stand?
David Steinberg:
No, you do as you wish.
Priscilla Clapp:
Okay, I will stay here. Thanks. Good morning everyone. As U Khin Zaw
Win said, the new government in Burma is still a work in progress. And there are many things
we do not know about it. Judging by the stop and start nature of its formation process it appears
that they are also somewhat confused about how to proceed. I will make a few points about how
I see things at this stage in the process, through a glass, dimly.
First, despite the dissolution of the SPDC with the swearing in of the new government at the
beginning of April, many elements of the SPDC are still in place and may act as a spoiler as the
new government attempts to implement the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. Senior General
Than Shwe is still the ultimate authority even if he does not hold a formal title in the new
government. He and his sidekick Maung Aye occupy a palatial well secured compound in Nay
Pyi Taw and we can expect that this will remain the case as long as he survives, if only for the
comfort and safety of his family and cronies. The senior members of the SPDC and its ministry
still occupy positions of power in the new government albeit without their military uniforms.
Many of the privileges accruing to the military under the SPDC have been preserved in one form
or another in the new government. Just before the new government was sworn in, for example,
the SPDC established a so-called special fund under the sole authority of the Commander in
Chief to be used for purposes determined by the military. This fund is probably the hard
currency special projects fund that was controlled by the Senior General under the SPDC which
contains the hard currency earnings from gas and other resource exports. Its creation suggests
that the military will continue to control the lion’s share of national resources under the new
government and there will be little chance of improving the public welfare.
Second, it is a discouraging sign that the new government does not feel bound to observe the
provisions of its own Constitution as the law of the land. Although we can hardly consider the
Constitution to be a prescription for democracy, it was at least a step in the right direction.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 10 Nonetheless, the SPDC flagrantly disregarded both its spirit and content by promulgating
election laws designed to favor the government party and impose harsh restrictions on all
opposition parties, especially the NLD. As if this were not enough, election officials engaged in
blatant ballot stuffing when it became apparent that some of the governments chosen candidates
would lose to opposition parties in a fair vote. After the new Parliaments were seated the
Election Commission proceeded to find that more than 75 elected members were disqualified to
serve because of alleged misreporting of election finances. All but one of these NPs were from
opposition parties, funny thing. Between this and the NPs who had been appointed to executive
positions in the new government the new Parliaments of both the National and State levels are
now missing a substantial proportion of their membership and no plans for replacing them have
been announced. Rumors persist that the supreme state council with the same membership as the
outgoing SPDC may be created to serve as the ultimate authority for major government decisions.
If such a body is established either formally or informally it will be clearly extra-Constitutional
and outside the law.
Special laws that were passed in the waning days of the SPDC to secure extra privileges for the
military have no standing under the new Constitution and could be legally challenged if anyone
dared to do so. For example, the creation of the special fund under the control of the Commander
in Chief, as I mentioned earlier, was clearly an extra-Constitutional measure. Similarly, the law
providing for retired military officers to return to uniform service, if necessary, has no standing,
no particular standing under the new Constitution. Both these laws were executed outside the
authority of the new Parliament even though it was already sitting when they were passed, it
seems.
Three, despite the remnants of the SPDC that persist in the new government, we would make a
mistake to conclude that it is merely a carbon copy of the SPDC, it is not. The new government
is a far more complex creature and some of its features will introduce elements of competition;
popular representation, and even transparency that have not existed for decades. We must begin
to distinguish, for example, between the uniformed military and those who have been forced out
of uniform and into political life. They are not the same creature anymore. As they become
increasingly involved those who have been forced out of uniform that is, those who are no longer
in uniform, as they become increasingly involved in the process of Parliamentary governance,
the ex-Generals will probably seek to translate their new elected and appointed positions into
greater power for civilian institutions in order to replicate the authority they had while in uniform.
Uniform military will no longer control civilian institutions as they did under the SPDC and it
can be said that they have taken one or two steps back to the barracks already. We are likely to be
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 11 able to differentiate more easily among the new senior officials now than was possible during
military rule. It will be possible to identify ministers who are reform minded and responsive to
popular concerns. Ministers will no longer have to split their interests between civilian and
military priorities. Ethnic minority representation in the new national and state or regional
Parliaments is significant and will give them a platform, will give the ethnic minorities a
platform, for pursuing their interests in a more coordinated and sustained manner. Their access to
authority under military rule, that is under the SPDC, and previous military committees that were
running the country was capricious and unstructured. Although we have only had a brief glimpse
so far of how the new national Parliament will operate there are already signs that it will be at
least somewhat more responsive to public concerns than was the case under military rule. In
response to questions from opposition parties, for example, the new Parliament has provided
more substantive answers than has ever been the case with military rule. The optimists among us
can hope that this trend continues as the Parliamentary Committees begin to do their work.
In this brief panel presentation I can only scratch the surface really of the complex situation that
is now evolving in Burma and that will continue to evolve over the coming five years of the term
of this Parliament. So let me conclude with just a few observations. First, the key determinant
during this period will be the fate of Senior General Than Shwe. He still controls major decisions
and can be expected to do so as long as he survives. Both the SPDC and the new government are
reflections of his predilections and preferences and there is no question that he exists in his own
strange universe, harboring deep and irrational apprehensions about the outside world that tend
to deny Burma the benefits of interaction with the dynamic global community. Things could
change rather quickly once he is no longer in place.
Second, despite its exclusion from the 2010 elections, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi will
remain a potent political force in Burma that could serve to strengthen the position of opposition
parties in the new Parliaments if NLD leadership is able to associate with a broad collation of
opposition forces and the government does not take further repressive measures against them.
This is a big if.
Third, economic reform will be key to the success of political transition in Burma. If the country
continues on its current course toward predatory crony capitalism under which wealth is held
only by a small upper layer of privileged society, resentment will fester and problems will
inevitably arise. If the new leadership recognizes the need for serious reform as has been
advocated by the International Financial Institutions the conditions for real economic
development could be put in place rather quickly.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 12 Fourth, the new government must address the SPDC’s unfinished business with cease fire groups
immediately and, rather than dictating conditions, must negotiate reasonable agreements that
allow these groups to become enfranchised by the new government and not left out in the cold as
they were by the arbitrary election laws.
Finally, the new government needs to rethink its relationship with North Korea. I don’t want to
preempt the discussion we will have this afternoon, but in many ways it defies rationality for
Myanmar-Burma to be pursuing the kind of military relationship it has with North Korea at this
point. It is not going to help its relations in Asia let alone its relations with the western world and
we will hear more about that this afternoon. Thank you very much.
David Steinberg:
Thank you Priscilla. I am somewhat obsolete so Jenny will operate the
PowerPoint for Tin Maung Maung Than, and I will sit here and comment on it, but you should
understand that Tin Maung Maung Than’s comments are on his PowerPoint and the things that I
say beyond the PowerPoint are my own and should not be attributed to Tin Maung Maung Than,
that would be unfair.
So, let me begin by pointing to his first comments, which are on the elections. I will not read the
PowerPoint because you have them in front of you. We all know what has happened in terms of
the government majority and the USDP Party. The really important part is the comments in red at
the bottom of his page. The point of this was not to share, but to distribute power within the
military elite. I think that is a very important comment. And do we see Pluralism beginning in
that society. Since 1962 there has been basically a unitary centralized government not responsive
to local needs and that may or may not change, we don’t know yet, it is far too early to say. But
with 14 Provincial, if you will, Legislatures, this may be an important change I will get into in a
moment.
The second slides please, thank you. Essentially, Myanmar has been, as we would say in social
sense, is a garrison state. The military has used the threat of both internal and external threats to
their regime as an excuse to keep power. This has been very important for all governments since
General Ne Win had the coup in 1962 and in fact actually since 1958 when the caretaker
government came in under the military. It is as Tin Maung Maung Than says, a national security
state, and as he says also the nation in the state is changeable and the regime and the state are
conflated, that is important. This will likely, as he says, continue for a while, but there are
essential elements that we should keep in mind and that is the tensions between, as Priscilla said,
those in the active duty military and those who are in the military in the party. We have seen this
under the Burma Socialist Programme Party as well that was in part estranged from elements of
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 13 the military until 1988 and it could well happen again. Also, there is nothing in the Constitution
to deal with the issue of the 13 Regional Commands of the military and the local Legislatures. In
other words that that connection there is not stated and we do not know how that will work out.
But it is something important to keep in mind. The military is continuing influence and rogue as
Tin Maung Maung Than points out from the point of view of the autonomy to manage its own
affairs and budgets. The Commander in Chief, the National Defense and Security Council, 25%
seats in all Legislatures at all levels and even in the minority areas where the government did not
get a majority, they got a plurality with the military 25% of course they do have a majority and
can control. So, the military as its constant power and if you call the elections a sham as some in
the U.S. government and foreign observers have said I would not say that is not true. Deeply
flawed, yes, but there are significant elements of potential change that we have to keep in mind.
The most important of which are the minority, the Legislatures in minority areas. This is the first
time in Burmese history that this has happened. We will see whether that really makes any sense.
The generational change in the military has been something discussed a lot in the comments
about the new government and Tin Maung Maung Than outlines that very clearly as also the new
relationships between those in the military who have cabinet positions, the Defense and Minority
Affairs; military people have been appointed to those roles.
There are a series of non-traditional security conflicts and this becomes exceedingly important as
local Legislatures may have some role in the society. He talks about resource and labor
exploitation of the hydro electric gems of mining and timber and so forth. But the question that
should be kept in mind is: when will minority identity trump politics? In other words, will
Kashan Kachin Man or other groups, both government and opposition, join forces to complain
about some of the inequities resulting from these massive infrastructure projects like dams which
do not provide jobs; provide environmental degradation; do not provide services or facilities like
electricity to local populations. And this is something we have to watch over time. We don’t
know how this will develop but it seems to me exceedingly important that we keep this in mind.
There is, always been the question of since independence that the minority areas have felt that
they have not received enough funds. General Aung Sang said if we, the Burman’s, get one jut
you the minorities will get one jut. Whether that means an even split between the majority
Burman’s, two-thirds the population are the minorities or one jut for the Burman’s and seven juts
for each of the big minority groups, that has been a subject of some debate.
In any case, what will happen and this is something new also in Burmaese history that there is a
plan where the minority state governments can borrow money from the central government for
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 14 their own development purposes. Now, whether the President Thein Sein portraits of this may
lead to greater autonomy for local areas in fact it may tie the local areas more directly to the
central government because they will be in the central government’s debt very clearly. So that is
something that we want to keep in mind as well.
There are all sorts of issues connected with the narcotics traffic and trafficing issues. Pandemics,
refugees of course, and HIV-AIDS, we will come back to that in a moment. The arms conflicts
remain unresolved. Tin Maung Maung Than has a list of these, breakaway groups, arm groups,
the major ethnic cease fire groups and this all relates to the issue of the border guard forces. And
for about two years they have been sent by the government to integrate and thereby I would
argue castrate the forces of the minorities by forcing them into the national government, the
Tatmadaw, military. This has been treated with great resistance by the major groups and it is yet
unresolved even though the last deadline was September 1st, 2010 after which the government
declared that these cease fires would no longer be effective. The new government is going to
have to deal with that and this causes great issues related to China, which we will discuss later in
the program, because Chinese wants stability. It is interesting to me that Chinese policy toward
North Korea and towards Myanmar is basically the same and that is - no refugees, border
tranquility and opportunities for Chinese investment in both places. These broad elements I think
define the nature of the Chinese interests in the area among other things.
There are international security issues, he lists them: Bangladeshi, of course the Rohingya which
are the most deprived of the minorities. India’s interest not only encountering China but in their
northeast insurgencies. This is very important. I have written that the issue for the Indian’s has
been the Chinese penetration of Myanmar and Indians have written me back and said no, the real
issue for the Indians is the northeast and trying to do something about the northeast insurgencies.
In any case, India’s concern is China, we know. The Kokang incident was an embarrassment for
China and indicates perhaps a split between Kunming and Beijing in terms of information flows
that might have affected that issue. And Thailand has a continuing interest.
The nuclear issues that he goes into we will discuss later on. There is, I think, that one of the
questions that people ask today is will the Middle East events affect Myanmar? In other words
will public popular uprisings in the Middle East spill over? I would guess, and of course this is
an extreme guess is that, they will not simply because the elections have taken a little bit of the
steam out of the pot that has been boiling in that country. In other words somewhat of a release
of some of the frustration may diminish as we see whether the government does respond to local
needs.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 15 There are a couple of other things that we should mention in this connection and that is the
possibility of economic change. We are seeing greater openness about economic issues than we
have seen in the past two years and we have seen in previous governments for quite a long period.
There is a plan underway, not yet approved I understand, that Myanmar will have a unified
exchange rate in accordance with ASEAN regulations during 2011. If that happens, that will be a
major reform. It has, I say, not yet been approved but that is part of the stipulations that
Myanmar has to deal with in the ASEAN context. Whether there will be a Supreme Council has
been a debate; Irrawaddy Magazine suggests there is, people in Nay Pyi Taw are saying no, there
is not. I have no idea whether there will or not be but I agree with Priscilla that Than Shwe will
continue to have personal influence for considerable period. One has to just look at what
happened under Ne Win after he retired, two retirements – one from Head of State in 1980; one
from Chairman of the Party 1988. But in 1992 when Zaw Maung was removed from his position
I knew when Ne Win was consulted to make sure that Ne Win approved of that so Ne Win’s
influence at least on major influences lasted four years beyond his retirement and I would think
that Than Shwe’s influence both personal and through loyalty through the command structure
will also continue.
One last point I would like to make is to look at President Thein Sein’s inaugural speech which
was printed in full in the New Light of Myanmar, the end of March. It may be an important
speech. He said a lot of very, very good things, but whether these are campaign slogans as in an
American political campaign or not, I’m not sure. If they’re just campaign slogans, that will be
very sad because he did say some important issues. He talked about more expenditures on
education; more expenditures on health; sending people abroad for training; less censorship;
more authority for minority groups. Now, we will see whether any of these things happen but it
seems to me that one of the issues for foreigners is to when we approach the Burmese about
changes that they might make we simply do that from the point of view of not demanding
foreign changes, changes from foreign sources, but saying your President has said certain very
progressive and good things about the future of the country and we agree with them and we
would like to see them implemented. So, let us improve educational systems; let us improve
health; let us see a better economy and I think the last thing I would like to mention – well two
things - one is that in terms of U.S. policy I would still argue that Aung San Suu Kyi’s views, or
those that are reported to be her views, still basically determine U.S. policy toward Burma.
The second thing is about the economic development in the middle class. I am very, very
concerned because if you look at the capital available within the country to flow to the private
sector, very little of the banking capital goes to them. At least two-thirds goes to government and
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 16 government supported institutions. The result is that your middle class may well be Chinese who
have access to capital through other sources and a higher level of retired military. This could
create problems for the society and I think that any one advocating donors going into Burma
should keep this in mind because there has to be a feeling that the Burmese control their own
economy. That is one of the critical issues that came out of the colonial period and influenced all
the economic policy since independence. Let me stop there, and my colleague can comment, and
we will open it up to the floor. If you ask a question, please wait for the microphone because this
is being taped and state your name and affiliation, if any, and the question and direct it towards
anybody on the panel. Okay.
Wakar Uddin:
Dr. Wakar Uddin, Penn State University. I am also Chairman of the
Burmese Rohingya Association of North America. My question is for all three of you David, U
Khin Zaw Win, and Priscilla, I have a question about Rohingya, naturally, I’m Chairman of the
Rohingya Association. During the election in Burma, USDP has allowed Rohingya candidates to
be in the USDP and now Rohingya member of Parliaments are serving in the National Assembly
as well as the Provincial Assembly. And during the election Rohingya, the population not the
Rakhine State, were allowed to vote. So a process took place very well. Could you give me your
insight given that situation why the Junta or Korend Administration is still refusing to grant or
recognize the citizenship of Rohingya’s while they were allowed to vote?
Priscilla Clapp:
I cannot answer for the regime.
David Steinberg:
But it is an anomaly, it is an anomaly that they were allowed to vote but
they are still not citizens. General Than Shwe has supposedly said that that border with
Bangladesh is the most difficult, most dangerous border in the country. This goes back of course
to the Nineteenth Century issues and the first Anglo-Burmese war. But at the same time, I think
that we have to pay more attention to the Rohingyas because they are the most deprived of all the
groups in the country.
U Khin Zaw Win: I have a question. I think I have also alluded to my paper and I think both
of us know about the means that the USDP utilized to win this election. So I think the most
obvious reason is that in the Northern Rakhine state they wanted the Rohingya votes. At the
same time you might have also heard that they did not actually select Rohingya candidates to run.
They had Muslim candidates but they were not from Northern Rakhine states, they were from
Yangon itself. So, I think number one – they wanted the votes of the USDP victory. But on the
voter context, as you already know, this problem of the Rohingyas I think will continue to be
persistent, will persist. They will not actually attack any regimen or any governments that comes
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 17 to power in Myanmar, but we know how the SDPC says handle it. We hope that the new
governments, and by the new government I mean the union government as well as the
governments in Rakhine states will take a fresh approach. We still do not know. But I think as I
have said for all the political parties and for the new Legislatures, I think it is incumbent upon
the people who got elected to at least speak out. I mean they are on the front lines. If the
candidates who represent the Northern Rakhine state do not speak up, who else will? But then of
course you can say on the other hand the government has used measures to prevent that. Or there
are Muslim candidates because it is the most majority area, but if the Muslims are not Rohingya
there will be less incentive for them to speak up. So this is something that we all have to keep on
pushing. As we know with the 14 new Provincial Legislatures that there should be new
opportunity for this, as David has said, that part of Myanmar, that border with Bangladesh, is
also the poorest; potentially explosive and I think I was saying, yes, the most miserable part of
the country. So it is not a place that needs to be neglected anymore.
Patrick Cronin:
Thank you. Patrick Cronin from the Center for A New American Security.
Thank you for all of your points including our missing panelist in Singapore for the PowerPoint.
David had such a good one line summary of Chinas approach to Burma in terms of stability, no
refugees, continued investment. I wonder whether we could do the same thing with U.S. policy
and strategy. If I were to glean from the sets of comments I would probably underscore political
reform; economic reform; military restraint vis-à-vis North Korea but are we in a wait and see
attitude? To what extent do we have leverage to accelerate this? And to what extent do we just
realistically have to wait for internal changes to take place? Thank you.
David Steinberg:
Priscilla, do you want to start?
Priscilla Clapp:
Okay, I think wait and see is the operative term here. As I said in my
remarks we really do not know much about how this is going to develop yet. Our policies have
not been conducive to a friendly relationship with the Myanmar government and I do not see the
conditions for changing those policies developing on the near term horizon. The legislated
sanctions that we have against the country are based on certain conditionality and until that
conditionality is met in the eyes of the Congress it is going to be very difficult to remove those
legislated sanctions. The Executive Branch has a certain degree of flexibility in moving in a
more friendly direction within its own mandate. But it has to be very careful that it is responding
to something positive when it does so. I think there would be a very negative political reaction in
the United States if the U.S. government were to get out in front of what is happening on the
ground in Burma. So far there have not been real changes that could be brought home to justify a
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 18 significant policy change on the part of the U.S. I know this sounds rather pessimistic but, as I
said in my remarks, if things do change this could change quickly, too. We have been known to
alter our policies quickly in response to positive changes in countries that are engaged in
transition and there are some possibilities in this new government for better things to happen. But
also, as I said in my remarks, my feeling is that as long as the Senior General is calling the shots
there, they’re not going to want a friendly relationship with the United States. This is a two way
street and it has not been all our fault.
U Khin Zaw Win: Just want to make a few remarks about what is going to happen with the
European Union. In fact tomorrow, I can share this with you because it is going to be announced
tomorrow, the European Council is going to make its decision about sanctions tomorrow. While
it has been a very intense and laborious process often consulted about how it’s going to be done.
On the whole, the EU sanctions are going to remain in place, but they will be modified. And how
would the new government respond to this? We know that if the EU relents, if we can use that
word on sanctions maybe policy makers in the United States might also have a new approach to
it. So, I think on at least two points there will be some modifications; some of you just call it
cosmetic. As we know, a number of civilians have been appointed to the Cabinet, especially in
the Regional or the Provincial Cabinets too. And so all the visa ban on them will be lifted and I
do not know whether their supplies to the Union Parliaments, but for the Provincial governments
the visa ban will be lifted. So if you count all the members of the Union Cabinet and also the
Provincial Cabinets there are about 75 people and of that 25 will have the visa ban lifted. So I
think that is while a small beginning. I think also some of the small companies that do not count
for much; the trading sanctions ban will also be modified.
On the bigger picture I would say that the new engagement, of course, has been a very frustrating
period. I was here last year when the new Deputy Assistant, Dr. Sate was appointed and they
launched the new engagement with Burma-Myanmar and it just ran into a brick wall, it did not
make much headway. It is very frustrating, but not with the changeover to the new government.
Perhaps another attempt could be made while it is still a very rigid hierarchal and almost there
are none from the parties represented in the Cabinet. But again going back to the new Presidents
inaugural speech – couldn’t another attempt be made directly with him or senior members of his
government?
Secondly, and also more importantly, the stumbling blocks that have been so frustrating in this
process should also be looked at anew. Are we going to let these stumbling blocks persist and
frustrate the process again or can’t we have a fresh approach to that? There are other
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 19 stakeholders present in Myanmar now and they have also expressed their opinions on sanctions.
The new political parties have expressed the recent sanctions but those views also need to be
taken into account. So, I think I really lobby for a fresh approach taking in a broader circle of
stakeholders.
David Steinberg:
I think that when the Obama Administration came in both sides sent small
signals that they were interested in improving relations. A mid-level State Department official
meeting the prime minister was unheard of in protocol terms in Myanmar and yet he did. At the
same time we signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN which we had not
signed before basically because of Burma. So we both sent signals but they were not sufficient
signals on either side. Basically, I think we wanted Aung San Suu Kyi released and they wanted
relief from the sanctions and neither side would agree to that. So we have this situation where the
Obama Administration did what was politically feasible to do inside the United States, which
was keep the sanctions because that is a bipartisan effort that is strongly felt in the Congress, but
to have dialogue. We are still in that position, but the Obama Administration since then has been
weakened as a result of the U.S. 2010 elections.
And if it were, as I argued earlier, a boutique issue before, it is even less or more of a boutique
issue I should say at the present. In other words, there is very little room for the Administration
to do something unless it is done for the certain quid pro quo quietly with the regime to try and
take specific actions. I think there are things that can be done; most obvious of course is from the
Burmese side release political prisoners. But there are other things. And the U.S. may have a
dilemma coming up. Supposing there is some economic reform; supposing there is a unified
exchange rate; supposing that the economic rationality of the government increases, God knows
it has been very bad up until now. And then the U.S. might say well the elections were still badly
flawed, but Myanmar is going to Chair us in 2014 inside the country and what will happen to it
and U.S. policy at that particular time is a really interesting problem for the United States. So I
think that there are elements of trying to see an alleviation of the issue. Yes, I think it is true that
the General Than Shwe has not been willing to give ground, but I think that also, there are some
inferences from Chinese sources and Chinese are conflicted. On the one hand they think that the
Obama Administrations attempt to improve relations was an attempt to stop Chinese pipelines.
There is this conspiracy theory in China that everything the U.S. does is trying to counter their
rise in the region, including South China Sea and many other things as well. But on the other
hand there are those in China who say no we need some reform in Myanmar because we have
two fears. One is a fear of minority insurrections that would affect our infrastructures, pipelines,
and everything else on the border. It would create just the instability that we do not want. The
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 20 second is a general uprising like 1988 which would really hurt the Chinese position. So I think
the Chinese would be interested, and have expressed the past interest in some reform in the
country. They may say the elections have given that reform and they are satisfied with that. But I
do think that some modest American improvement would not be against the Chinese interest at
least on the leadership side. But that we will maybe see at lunch time when we talk about the
Chinese role. But there are things that I think the U.S. can do while still keeping the majority of
sanctions. But Aung San Suu Kyi becomes pivotal in this whole thing.
As some of you know I wrote last September that up until January, 2010, she was mentioned
1,598 times in the Congressional Record. I do not know how many times since then because I do
not have a student working on that unfortunately with a good computer sense which I do not
have. But your influence is clearly important. She gave a very important speech or statement to
Davos which was quite good. The Davos speech did not talk about sanctions directly, but it
talked about the right kinds of foreign investment. Ones that were foreign investor sensitive,
labor appropriate and so forth. This was a very good statement which was followed by the NLD
statement supporting sanctions again because it did not affect the people which I thought was a
rather poor statement which she signed off on, I gather. So we have a problem in how she reacts
to all of these things and that will affect U.S. Policy a lot. Questions. I am surprised. Christina.
Christina Fink:
Hi, I am Christina Fink and I am currently a consultant for Inter News. I
am just wondering what all of your opinions are on how we might strengthen or support the work
of people who would like to see a different kind of Burma in the future. Whether those people
are in the government, in opposition parties; retired military; business people; civil society, what
are the things that you think we might be able to do to support and strengthen their work?
David Steinberg:
Priscilla, do you want to stand up?
Priscilla Clapp:
That is a very broad question. I see lots of new elements coming forth now
in Burmese society. It is not just a transition in government. I think there is a whole new sort of
activist class arising among young people, particularly in Yangon itself. I do not know about
other cites, but in Yangon I think it is quite active. We have seen it over the last few years in the
increased interest in community organizations, local NGOs, private educational institutions and I
think these are all very good signs because real democracy begins on the ground. It is not
brought from the top down. You really have to have a very active community based approach to
democracy and I think that is what’s beginning to happen there. There are so many things we can
do to help it, I do not know where to begin. But, I believe that we are already headed in that
direction. The U.S. government actually has a lot of assistance programs now in the country.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 21 They are community based; they don’t go through the government. As the new government
develops over the next five years, depending upon how things go, one may very well be able to
argue convincingly that we should also be contributing to capacity building inside the
government itself. I think the government is at a stage right now where it is losing a lot of its
trained and talented civilian civil service. They are reaching retirement age and the people
coming in behind them have not had the same kind of training as the people who are leaving. If
there is to be serious reform in the country both political and economic it is going to need a
competent civil service to carry out government programs. So, I think that is something that we
need to look at in the future. Right now it is not really political possible for the U.S. to do that.
The Congress simply will not allow it. I think we need to follow that and I think we need to keep
a close watch on the way things are developing on the ground. I would include in that the rise of
free market business community in Burma. As I said in my remarks, right now the free market
sector of the Burmese economy is so controlled by the cronies and the Generals that it really is a
kind of a mafia economy. Eventually I think we should be looking for ways to encourage it in
more normal directions.
U Khin Zaw Win: I would say the process of issues that was raised by the question is not
new; it has been going on for quite some time already. It is not pushed by the governments. Local,
international, civil society and foundations have already been working like this and it is well on
its way and it is really to be welcomed and is to be expanded. I think just before I left Yangon to
come here, I saw advertisements for the Fulbright Program, the United States from the
Humphrey Program and then Master’s and Doctorate Scholarships offered by Australia. It is
common knowledge of course the requirements are rather stiff so people really have to be
qualified to do that. And then sort of the last of surveys, research and then assessments have been
made of what civil society is coming. I would even say that the second generation society
oppositions are really coming into their own now. We call it 2G to replace all these older civil
society organizations which have lost some of their credibility. In this process I think even the
United States government is not really out of it. It is doing what it can. USAID fines have
already been advocated for relief work. The real obstacle to all of this is I would say the lobby
groups; the exile groups, some of them who are broad and who think that anything, any
assistance that is provided inside the country is detrimental or goes to the regimen or is misused.
That is a big illusion that we have to dispel. It is I would say even deliberate. So, of course in the
West many of the governments have listened to the lobby groups and all the democracy attempts
and all of that. I think that is the biggest obstacle that we are facing if the kind of thing that the
kind of process they want everyone to expand within the country is to continue. So I think people
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 22 need to take a broader view which is almost, I would say, impossible to think of, you think about
the kind of attitudes that these people harbor I am ashamed to say. If these attitudes are not
dispelled, I think we are not going to make much headway and there will be other people getting
in. The private sector has been also mentioned and some initiatives are starting for this process
not to be too dependent on foreign assistance and funding but also for the local private sector to
come in. As we have said I am all for this and so we need more of this if the country is not to be
left behind; if democratization and vision building are to proceed.
David Steinberg:
I think Christina has asked a very important question. It seems to me that
we start by focusing on the people, not on policy, but how can we help the people and in what
way will that make some sort of sense because as, I forgot who I had on the panel this morning
already, said in the 1950’s Burma was supposed to be the most richest country in the region; it
was supposed to be the developed country and South Korea was supposed to be the last possible
developed country in Asia. And we have this terrible status of the Burmese people brought down
where even Laos and Bangladesh have higher per capita incomes now that Burma, that is really
terrible. So if we focus on people how can we do that? There are those who say bring in foreign
aid as opposed to humanitarian aid, economic aid. I have not been in favor of that personally
simply because I feel that the government has not yet illustrated the capacity to manage foreign
aid properly.
Secondly, I think that we should be focusing on the local response to local issues. Even in the
1990 elections when you had 93 political parties that actually put candidates out of 243
registered. What you had was a concern about the central governments capacity to deal with
local problems and they could not and the system would not allow it to happen. But now we have
local legislatures, in Burman areas and in minority’s areas. But these legislatures as far as I know
have no trained staff; they cannot operate, never had any experience about putting forth
legislation; doing research so forth. It seems to me the building up of capacity as Priscilla just
mentioned is capacity building is absolutely essential to when you can focus on certain groups
like the capacity of local areas to at least address local problems. This maybe cannot be done by
the U.S. but it could be done ASEAN. And if the U.S. were to fund ASEAN to build up the
capacity of local legislatures I would say that would be something we could do.
On civil society, yes, if you look at the whole issue of this government what you have in Edict
Number 6 I think in 1988, was the law allowing civil society to exist. Of course it did exist at the
local community based organization even in the Socialist period, but advocacy groups and major
groups did not exist without government approval. But the law in ‘88 allowed this to happen
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 23 whether it was based on a 1987 Chinese law allowing the same thing, is a question I leave open
because I do not have the evidence, but it may be. But civil society may be something with
whom one can work on different kinds of local problems, and alleviation of local issues. But we
have to be very careful, if we think that civil society in a certain country, any country will bring
about the arrival of the U.S. Calvary and complete change in the society that is something that
we have to take very, very carefully. Because if the concepts of power, authority, hierarchy,
entourage building, patron/client relationships, etcetera, etcetera are true in a society for the
government, are they true in the same society for civil society groups? So we have to be very
careful to make that intellectual leap that civil society is inaudible [01:20:25] that is kind of
going to solve all the problems. I worry about that a bit.
But I agree also with Priscilla on the capacity building in general because the population, Burma
has lost one percent of its educated population, not counting workers in Thailand. These are the
people who would staff the government in the future theoretically; staff the universities; staff the
NGOs; staff the private sector. Those are the ones with some education who have left the country
for both political reasons and economic reasons. Somehow these have to be replaced. One would
hope that some could go back, but developing indigenously in a society is absolutely critical and
we have seen basically the destruction of the educational standards in the society, they are not
producing the kinds of people who can run a new government. The military has taken that
themselves into that role. The sign over the military academy is what - The Future Elite of our
Society – I think that is a paraphrase of the sign but it is about that, which indicates that the
military tends to play an important role beyond military role in society. I think we have to
develop non-military avenues of mobility because all of the channels of mobility are now
controlled by the military and that is detrimental to the future for the people of this society. Last
question before we break for coffee.
Unidentified Male: Picking up on the sign over the entryway over the military academy, I
would like to ask the panel about the prospects for military-to-military relations with Burma. As
a general proposition U.S. contact with foreign militaries gives those foreign militaries a better
understanding of American policy and especially American security interests and it provides us
often with points of entry into establishments that we otherwise cannot get into. But at the same
time, military-to-military contact can also be used by foreign militaries to imply American
acceptance of what is specifically unacceptable. How can we manage the prospects for militaryto-military contact with Burma?
U Khin Zaw Win:
That is a very interesting question too. I think just last week the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 24 Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command has made some threatening noises which has helped
the process very much. I was quite surprised because a person in that position usually does not
say those things. For many years now, the two decades of this impasse that I mentioned there has
been quite an active Track II process, going on even Track 1.5. Europe has been quite active, and
the United States too, and they have been starting with contacts in civil society and think tanks
and also in certain ministries of the central government. Perhaps a similar process could be
started with the military. With the situation prevailing as it is, overt relations, public relations
between the militaries probably might not be possible, but if that track two could be started it
would be very constructive. I think some years back there was a small initiative started about
MIA-POW, no not that, I think it was retrieving the remains of American servicemen in remote
areas in Northern Myanmar the remains during World War II. I think that was one common
ground and I think there were some exchanges between the two militaries, but then it stopped.
Perhaps a common issue like that could be started and I would really if you ask of and advise for
that process to be started first if it were more overt and public formal exchanges can be started.
David Steinberg:
Priscilla.
Priscilla Clapp:
One of the elements of the European sanctions on Myanmar was the
withdrawal of their military attaches from their Embassies in Rangoon, we did not do that. So we
in fact do have military-to-military communications and we have all along on the ground there
and there is some here as well. As U Khin Zaw Win mentioned we have had an ongoing interest
for many years and we have continued discussions through military channels with the
government in Myanmar about retrieving remains of U.S. military who were shot down, whose
planes either crashed or were shot down over Burma in World War II. Most of this is in the
Kachin state and it is very remote areas. We were never able to identify whether the remains
were actually there. It is a very complicated process. But that is certainly on the agenda of the
engagement policy of the current administration. We have also cooperated in the past on counternarcotics and this is involved some military-to-military contact as well. I think that is an area that
is being pursued under the engagement policy. So there are small things that can be done. But
under the current circumstances we cannot go much beyond that, we certainly could not go into
training at this point an I think that there are ways of adjusting Visa requirements and sanctions
and so forth to allow a broader conversation in military-to-military. But that will come as things
change.
David Steinberg:
Certainly I think that this is very important. I am glad Priscilla mentioned
the military attaché and keeping them in the EU’s blindness and getting rid of them and sending
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 25 them all Bangkok. Actually in the question of anti-narcotics people in the State Department years
ago told me that the U.S. Anti-narcotics Program in Burma was more theater than reality. It did
not really do very much but what was very important about it was it gave us this contact with the
military-to-military in a very important way. We did have a major I-MET Program before 1988
and as a matter of fact one of the SAIS Students did a paper for me on that program listing all the
people who have been through it from independence which is rather remarkable I would say.
What I would love to see in the best of all possible worlds is military trained at Honolulu in the
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies which is a military non-lethal think tank, Sasha knows
very well, he used to teach at it and this would allow them not only to have contact with the U.S.
but other Brigadier Colonel level military from other countries. So I think that would be very
useful. But I am afraid we must stop now, slightly over our time. Thank you all for being a good
audience and we will resume at ten thirty.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 26 Panel 2: Myanmar-South Korean Economic and Trade Relations
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
My name is Thitinan Pongsudhirak, I’m a visiting professor with
the Southeast Asia Studies Program at SAIS, and my task is to chair the next panel, Panel 2:
Myanmar-South Korea Economic and Trade Relations. This is our first panel that will address
South Korea’s role in Myanmar, not just Myanmar domestic politics and prospects itself. We
have two speakers, I want to introduce them very briefly. Their bios are available and you can
read them on your own, but briefly, we have Dr. Taeyoon Kim to my immediate right, associate
research fellow at the Center for Regional and Economic Studies, Southeast Asia and South
Asia, at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. And the other speaker, to my far
right, Mr. Bradley Babson. He’s a consultant on Asian affairs and chair of the DPRK Economic
Forum at the U.S. Korea Institute here at SAIS. So, we will begin very shortly. I just want to
make a few a just introductory remarks. I’ve been given strict instructions to stick to the
timetable so that we can have lunch on time, and we don’t want to miss that.
Now this week, it happens, in Myanmar there is a Track II Conference, so there is a general
sense that there are some openings in Myanmar. This Track II Conference is organized by a
German foundation, but they’re trying to attract all the representatives from the think tanks of
ASEAN. And so the Institute for Security and International Studies think tank in Bangkok’s been
invited. I’m away, so I nominated a good friend, and then they came back and said, “Well, we are
blacklisted.” Out of their hands, the German foundation cannot do anything about it. So that
means they will miss Thailand, we don’t have a representative at this conference. But the feeling
that we get now in the Track II think tanks in ASEAN is that after the elections, the SPDC, the
new, you might say “new government” or “post-election government,” is reaching out. They’re
trying to create a new environment. And we can see that certainly in ASEAN in our think tanks.
Sometimes you’ll have to excuse me for saying Burma/Myanmar instead of just Burma or
Myanmar because even the wording, what we call this conference is significant, it makes a
difference. I don’t want my friends on the Thai-Burma border to be upset with me, so I will say
Burma/Myanmar. It’s very politicized, the polarization is raw, and Professor Steinberg mentioned
that we’ve been accused of having a pro-regime conference, but in fact, certainly not in my case,
it’s not a pro-regime conference.
This is the first panel that will be dealing with trade and investment, and also Burma’s economic
relations with the outside world. The access with South Korea is apt, if you see in Yangon the
billboards in Chinese, Korean, Thai. In the main roundabout there’s the Thai big billboard sign
PTT competing with a Korea Samsung sign, and you can see that the financing of BurmaU.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 27 Myanmar’s development after the elections, and prior to the elections, is a critical issue. The U.S.
is not so involved, there were not McDonald’s signs in Yangon, but we’ve seen a lot of Chinese
signs. So it’s apt for us to begin this panel with Dr. Kim. He has prepared 20 minutes of remarks
and a Power Point presentation, so Dr. Kim, the floor is yours please.
Taeyoon Kim:
My name’s Taeyoon Kim, as Thitinan already mentioned, and I am very
honored to be here. Professor Steinberg asked me to do a presentation on the Korean-Myanmar
economic relationship. Myanmar is typically used, but the name dispute is a fight I understand.
Many people say Burma also, but as far as the companies involved go, they just say Myanmar, so
I just put Myanmar here. Here also I’m just focusing on the economic issues rather than political
issues. I have some graphs and some data so that you can look at these trends in those
relationships between Korea and Myanmar. So I’d just like to say economic issues are important
in Korea, so I will start with this comment.
I have some Power Point presentations, introductions and economy rationales focusing on trade
and FDI, Foreign Direct Investment, and Korean aid and so on. And also, I’d like to mention the
potential of Myanmar as a market for Korean companies and sort of the challenges and prospects
it presents. At the beginning, Dr. Jae Ku already mentioned the relationship between Korea and
Myanmar, Burma at the time. You have the official diplomatic relationship since 1975 and also in
1983 a big national event, but still because of that event, North Korea is connected with
Myanmar and in terms of South Korea, their relationship was increasing in 1987 when the
Daewoo Group, one of the big conglomerates at that time in Korea, had some train building
facilities in Myanmar. They incorporated in Myanmar at the time, and in 2002 brought lots of
Korean cultural property to Myanmar including some Korean drama, for example Kaul Tonghwa,
or Autumn Tales.
The Myanmar people like these dramas and lots of businesses are talking about this issue when
they do business with Myanmar offices. And in 2009 you had a survey, especially of Korean
companies investing in Myanmar. We have around 70 or 80 branches there, and their
expectations of the 2010 elections were promising, their thinking was that the business
environment will be better after 2010. There was an improvement in 2009. We need to think of
the sort of divisions of institutions including ASEAN and ASEAN+3, and Mekong Regional
Development because we are not cooperating with Myanmar itself, we are cooperating with
ASEAN countries, including Myanmar. Also we have sort of a relationship with Greater Mekong
Subregion countries including Myanmar. So this should be mentioned before my presentations,
so I just put some programs involving those issues. In 1992, as you know the GMS was created
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 28 as a consortium program, started by the ADB. In 1999 ASEAN+3 established the Chiang Mai
Initiative for bilateral currency swaps among these countries so that they, because we
experienced in Asia a financial crisis in 1997, we want to secure those financial markets in that
region. And then in 2003 we also talked about the Asia bond market initiative, which encourages
our investors to invest in regional divisions through their credit guarantees. In 2006, we also
have the Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN countries including Myanmar. And in 2009 we had
a credit guarantee investment mechanism from the inaudible [00:10:01] which guarantees Asian
bonds with credit by the government. And in 2010, the Chiang Mai Initiative’s multilateralism
was realized, so the fund at this point is $120 billion and Myanmar will get $300 million, which
is a small portion of that money, but still we are working together through those raisings.
The second part of this presentation is on trade relations. The blue line is exports to Myanmar
from Korea and the red dashed line is imports from Myanmar, as you know. The trend is
increasing, especially after 2008, 2009. Around 2010, there was lots of trade volume but from
2001 to 2003 our trade decreased because of the sanctions against Myanmar. But the volume you
see is not the portion of the Korea inaudible five percent, but you can see a more increasing trend
here. You know that Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997; in Korea we signed a Free Trade
Agreement with ASEAN in 2006. Our export volume to Myanmar in 2010 was around $400
million, and the main products were iron and steel, and machinery and mechanical appliances
and plastics. Lots of exports are based on the company investing in Myanmar. They rely on
imports of those materials from Korea.
As I mentioned before, iron and steel are very promising exports to Myanmar from Korea. You
can see the stability of that market, so lots of Korean companies are involved there. The left side
is iron and steel. You probably know system of 72, 72 digit, a two digit of 72, and the red dashed
line is the share of the total on the right side. So in 2010, you can see around 27%, 28% of their
products in terms of export volume. The blue line states the value of the export, around $140
million in 2010. On the right side you have other products like HS-84: nuclear reactors, broilers,
and machinery and mechanical appliances. This is increasing in terms of share and in terms of
value. We also have other export products like plastic and articles thereof called SS-39.
The value of this trade has increased over time. It’s up from 1995 to 2010. On the right side, we
have also big exports of rawhide and skins and leathers. So then, these are the increasing export
products from Korea to Myanmar. And also, there are other decreasing exports to Myanmar.
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts, and articles of iron and steel, there are many
China companies that export those products to Myanmar. So our competitiveness in terms of
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 29 price is decreasing, but still we are focusing on high quality of our product. If we compare our
products with those of Japan, we can say their quality is comparable, but still we are improving.
The total value of imports from Myanmar in 2010 is around $160 million. The main part of the
products is apparel which is almost 74% of total imports from Myanmar, and also some
vegetables and rubbers as well as apparel. So lots of Korean companies, especially apparel
companies export those products from Myanmar to Korea These are the specific products, like
the left side we have apparel, they are also value and share of tourists, as you can see. It is
increasing after 2005, so our economic relationship between Myanmar is increasing in terms of
this product, mainly caused by the Korean companies investing in Myanmar. Some wood and
charcoal and other electric machinery and equipment is decreasing. We import these products
from other countries, but the main point is that we have certain products increasing because of
the Korean companies.
Here we have the data for Korean direct investments. For 1990 to 2010, I just separated the
period of 1990 to 2006 on the left side, and 2006 to 2010 on the right side. The blue line shows
the investment registered and the red dashed line indicates FDI implemented. Typically, we can
see around 30-40% of FDI is implemented compared to registered. In 1990, we had lots of
Korean direct investment registered, around $60 million. At that time, our FDI implemented was
around $10 million. But after 1992, it dropped dramatically. In 1997, it was around more than
$10 million in terms of FDI registered, and in 2000, more than $20 million. But if you look at the
right graph, in 2009, we have FDI registered at around $3.5 billion, but FDI implemented was
around $500 million. Previously, our main areas of investment were manufacturing and
wholesale and retail, but in 2009 our main industry was mining. We probably implement by their
international year. There are also minor repairs there. They are looking for some gas there. Our
total foreign direct investment implemented from 1990 to 2010 was around $646 million, mostly
going to the mining industry because of recent developments, recent investments. Before 2009,
most FDI goes to manufacturing and transportation.
Here, the number put in parenthesis is tourists in Myanmar. The source is Korean Exchange
Bank, it has around 62 branches, or when I look at other data, around 80 branches there, so we
can think of 60 to 80 branches are working in Myanmar. And the number of remittances is
around – from 1990 to 2010, 285 times. And here, the number put in parenthesis is tourists. As
you can see, during 1990 to 2001 it increased a little bit. The number of remittances from 1990 to
2001 has increased and the recent year, 2010, was more than 70. In terms of the branches
established it stayed up and down, but on average around three to five branches per year. This is
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 30 endorsed by the KOTRA which is Korean trade agencies, promotional trade agencies. They’re
saying the number of Korean firms in Myanmar in 2010 was around 80. Most of them are
working for common industry, and hotels and restaurants and inaudible and papers, and
manufacturing and construction, also rubber and home appliance. And steel, mining, gas and oil
is around just two companies.
Here’s our aid grant to Myanmar. The horizontal line represents millions, so from 1991 to 2009,
as you can see, our grants increase after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, and after we reached
an agreement in 2006. In 2007 because of the financial crisis, our grant was cut because of
funding problems, but it still increased overall. The grant was mainly composed of aid for the
agricultural, education, industrial energy, environment, and IT sectors. The total was around
$27.9 million.
In terms of our labor relationship, we have people from Myanmar working in Korea. There’s a
number of workers from Myanmar in South Korea in 2010. In terms of working programs, we
have two systems. One is the E-9 visa for short-term workers, guaranteeing just two year’s work
in Korea. It can be renewed by three or four years, and there are around 12,700 of these people in
Korea. And skilled workers, we have just two people in Korea, and there are many students
because we promised to increase our students from ASEAN countries by around 1,000 per year.
So we are trying to increase the number of Myanmar students in Korea. So, what I’m saying is,
we are cooperating with Myanmar, including with labor issues.
Here we see the Myanmar market. As you know, Myanmar has two schemes of exchange rate
system, official and free market. The red dashed line is the free market exchange rate. You can
look at the right vertical lines. As time goes on, from 2006 to 2010, we can see the value chart is
increasing. On the right side, electricity generation from 1986 to 2009. This is increasing because
of the demand for industry. So we can see the economic growth or the economic activity will be
increased. And the average labor cost in 2009, surveyed by Japan, in Vietnam is around $1,500
per year. In Myanmar, we saw $500 per year, which is very cheapest one, and in Thailand more
than $5,000. So many Korean companies are looking for Myanmar as the next Vietnam, where
we have about 2,000 companies, especially in the garment industry. At the margin, they are
thinking of moving their factories to Myanmar these days, so many are interested there.
Here are just some prospects and challenges. Based on the economic issues, we see Myanmar’s
image market, because they have more than 48 million people there, and lots of garment
industries are interested in Myanmar because of labor. And we can see also their labor is
productive compared to Cambodia and Indonesia, similar to Vietnam. And also there is the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 31 growing popularity of Korean culture there, so the business environment is increasing in terms of
Korean comfort. And in Korea, you have Mekong Regional Development, you have the minister
meeting in this late summer, which includes Myanmar. So we have cooperated with Myanmar’s
government.
There are many resources there which are not very scrutinized but we can see, and it was nice
sharing economic programs. In 2010, the Myanmar government asked us to share our economy
growth model, especially focusing on Korea’s regime in the 1960s and 70s, so they are interested
in those parts of the Korean economy growth. There are also some training sessions. You know
there are sanctions, of course and there are government policies inaudible. Also, there are, in
terms of the companies, Korean companies, there is much competition against China and
Thailand and India. Also there are many projects implemented by Chinese companies, and we all
know the lack of infrastructure, the electricity problems and transportation costs. And we know
there are limits to the financing system. Myanmar wants to be a part of the ASEAN community,
they have their plan of economic integration by 2015. They want Myanmar as a member of
ASEAN and they want Myanmar to be more developed and to be advanced to work. So I can say
in terms of economic issues, Myanmar is sort of an emerging market for Korean companies.
Thank you.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you Dr. Kim. These are revealing data and they remind me
of the views of my students back at Chulalongkorn University when they do their papers on KPop and they say Korea is a new Japan in Southeast Asia. Now without further ado, let me
proceed to our next speaker, Bradley Babson.
Bradley Babson:
Thank you very much, and I appreciate the invitation to participate in this
panel this morning. My experience with World Bank brought me into a relationship with both
South Korea, beginning in 1974 in my first assignment in the operational part of the bank, and
with Myanmar toward the end of my career at the bank. So I’ve had great interest in both
countries for many years. And I’d also like to thank Dr. Kim for his very informative overview of
the evolution of the economic and trade relations since the early 1990s. What I thought I would
like to do to set the stage for a discussion is first to highlight several features of this relationship
that I believe have significant meaning. I’d like to talk about some of the drivers of the economic
relationship between these two countries in recent years, and what’s at stake for these countries
as they have shaped this relationship. Finally I’d like to offer a few observations and
recommendations on how the economic relationship between South Korea and Myanmar could
evolve in the future in ways that could reinforce the dynamics of change in Myanmar and its
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 32 external relations in positive ways, to sort of build on the discussion in the first panel.
So let me begin. While South Korean investment and trade with Myanmar is not in the same
league as Thailand, China, or India, it nevertheless is significant, both in scale and composition,
and provides one model for Myanmar expanding economic relations with other middle income
and advanced economies that are not neighbors. South Korea is now Myanmar’s fifth largest
foreign investor, and eighth largest trading partner. It’s noteworthy as a result of the KoreaASEAN FTA that Dr. Kim mentioned, which was actually negotiated in 2006 and I believe
signed in 2007. Import tariffs on goods from Myanmar to South Korea have been lowered to
Korea’s preferential tariff scheme for least developed companies for 85% of the items that are
imported from Myanmar. And this is bound to have an impact on increasing the volume of trade
between the two countries.
I would say that the basic economic relationship is fundamentally based on commercial selfinterest and the benefits that both countries receive from their economic relationship. South
Korea’s approach combines private sector motivations to seek profits and government strategic
interests in its relationships with ASEAN and with Myanmar. This is a traditional hallmark of
how South Korea has operated, both in its own economic development history and in pursuing its
foreign economic agenda. There is complementarity in providing official development assistance
for technical assistance through the Technical Assistance Aid arm of the Korean government,
KOIKA, in education and capacity building projects, with the foreign investment and trade that
is provided by the private sector in areas of interest for Korea, such as agriculture and fisheries,
mining, energy, automotive technology, information technology, and finance.
The economic relationship between these two countries is diverse, multifaceted. The investments
are largely in oil and gas, but they also cover mining, agro-industry, hotels, and a list of topics
that Dr. Kim reviewed with us. Trade covers about 3,000 items of exports from Myanmar to
South Korea and the technical assistance and education projects that KOIKA has been funding
for many years include quite a wide variety of areas that in addition to various technical subjects,
actually have addressed economic development policy planning issues, reforms in economic
management related to ASEAN initiatives, particularly for trade liberalization in the region, and
legal system development.
Tourism is another feature of the economic relationship. I just noted that in January 2011, there
was a surge in foreign tourists to Myanmar and South Koreans were the third largest group. As
Dr. Kim mentioned, contract labor from Myanmar for businesses in South Korea through the
employment permit system have been growing, and this is part of a larger ASEAN-related
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 33 initiative. And I think it’s noteworthy that the government is committed to increasing education
opportunities in Korea for students from Myanmar. These are both linked to efforts that are being
funded by the Korean government to expand availability and opportunity to learn the Korean
language inside Myanmar.
Financial services are another area which is just really beginning to take off. There are a number
of Korean banks that, along with other banks from other countries, are now exploring ways to
expand their financial services in the country, and the Korea Exchange has opened discussions
recently with the government about the possibility of opening a stock market in Myanmar. It’s
important to remember that South Korea has also provided humanitarian and poverty-focused
assistance, both in response to cyclone Nargis and in support for humanitarian needs in the health
sector and in rural development, and more recently focusing in vocational training kinds of
projects.
I think it’s fair to say that under the Lee Myung-bak administration, there has been a fairly rapid
escalation of economic relations and 2010 was a particularly significant ramp-up in both
investment commitments and visits of business delegations exploring areas for expanded
economic cooperation. The survey that Dr. Kim mentioned probably underpins some of that
motivation to ramp up initiatives. But it’s fair to say that South Korea clearly sees that the
democratic transition taking place in Myanmar is an opportunity to further develop business and
economic ties.
So let me speak briefly about three main areas of motivation that have shaped the South KoreanMyanmar economic relationship in recent years. First, as already mentioned, is ASEAN+3. South
Korea has been a very active participant in the ASEAN+3 process, both in promoting Asian
regionalism and shared values, and supporting the ASEAN agenda for economic liberalization
and harmonization. The Korean-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has already produced important
benefits for both South Korea and Myanmar, and South Korean organizations have been forming
joint ventures to implement the ASEAN agenda for economic development and regional
integration. What I mentioned about the Korean Exchange discussions with respect to a stock
market builds on the fact that Korea Exchange already has agreements with both Laos and
Cambodia to develop stock markets in those other ASEAN countries, so this is a natural
extension of an institutional involvement that is regional in its orientation, not just countryspecific. Thus through its ASEAN-related activities, South Korea has been having a positive
impact on the modernization of Myanmar’s economic management and integration of the
regional economy beyond its immediate neighbors.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 34 On Myanmar’s part, economic management improvements that are mandated by ASEAN
agreements have been easier to pursue than domestically driven economic reform efforts under
the former military government, and South Korean support and assistance has been valued as
pragmatic and non-politicized means for pursuing desirable changes. One of the points that was
made earlier this morning is that ASEAN does provide one avenue of pursuing economic reform
initiatives with Myanmar that are not perceived as threatening foreigners pushing outside ideas
on them, and South Korea has been supporting that kind of an approach.
The second driver is simply natural comparative advantage. The endowments of these two
countries are dramatically different, and under classic trade theory, it is not surprising that
investment and trade relations have shaped up the way they have. South Korea is poorly
endowed with natural resources, but has highly developed human resources and technological
capabilities. Myanmar has a rich natural resource and agricultural endowment, but has poorly
developed human resources and a low level of technology. In this situation, it is economically
rational for both countries to deepen and expand their trade and investment relations, and there is
considerable logic and significant potential for this process to continue to grow in the coming
years.
The third driver is really balancing South Korean and North Korean relations with Myanmar. For
political rather than economic reasons, it is in South Korea’s interest to nurture a high stake for
its economic relationship with Myanmar as a counter-balance to the non-transparent and growing
relationship between North Korea and Myanmar that is motivated by both economic and security
factors. Since the cutoff in bilateral relations between Myanmar and North Korea following the
bombing incident in 1983, it must have been a shock for South Korea to see resumption of North
Korea and Myanmar relations in 2007. This could be one reason for the redoubled efforts to
expand economic relations under the Lee Myung-bak administration. And it also may be a factor
in the more muted tone from South Korea in recent years on Myanmar’s human rights and
democratization issues, following a fairly vocal concern on these aspects of relations with
Myanmar during the earlier Kim Dae-jung era.
On Myanmar’s side, the relationship with North Korea appears to be something of a devil’s
bargain of trading food, luxury goods like liquor, and access to foreign exchange that North
Korea desperately needs for access to conventional munitions, tunneling expertise, and possibly
nuclear technology that are sought by Myanmar’s military leadership despite the existence of UN
sanctions on such trade. How the new government setup in Myanmar will attend to the balancing
of its relations with the two Koreas and its willingness to be transparent and conform to UN
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 35 sanctions on trade with North Korea will be one metric of the underlying significance of the
democratic transition.
What South Korea has done is set the stage for significant growth and economic benefits to
Myanmar, if the economic and political relationship continues to grow. But whether it will attach
strings to the process linked to Myanmar’s economic relations with North Korea remains to be
seen.
Notable by its absence is the role of economic sanctions in the South Korean economic relations
policy with Myanmar. South Korea has aligned its policy more with the Chinese approach than
with the Japanese, despite the fact that Japan was historically the largest foreign aid donor to
Myanmar before 1988 and has similar economic interests in Myanmar as South Korea does. The
U.S. alliance, and pressures on Japan to align its policies towards Myanmar with those advocated
by Washington, caused Japan reluctantly to curtail its investments and aid program. This does not
appear to be the case for South Korea, where despite a similar alliance and democratic values,
western style sanctions—while perhaps they have dampened investment enthusiasm—have not
dictated limitations or curtailed expanding trade. The only area where sanctions appear to
directly impact the economic relationship between South Korea and Myanmar is in remittances
by banks in U.S. dollars. This practice was stopped under pressure from the U.S. but continues in
other convertible currencies such as the Euro. One possible factor is the South Korean memory
of their own experience, which was that economic development initiated under a military
government led to an educated population and a middle class that later embraced democracy
robustly. The South Korean experience of the 1950s, with a country unprepared for democratic
government but encouraged by the U.S. to take this path, led to corruption, weak governance,
and poor economic performance. This experience was not dissimilar to Myanmar’s experience
with democratic government in the 1950’s. And in both countries, the military stepped in to
restore stability and guide the path of future national development, but as we have seen, with
very, very different outcomes. So a question for today’s moment is how lessons from South
Korea’s economic experience could be usefully applied to Myanmar and reinforced by the
economic relations between the two countries.
So let me make a few observations and comments about the future. First, Myanmar’s new
constitution contains some important markers for future economic policies and management, and
I’m referring here to Articles 35-37. One is a commitment to building a market economy.
Another is a commitment to developing the private sector and respecting property rights. And a
third is a commitment to improving the socio-economic welfare of the Myanmar people. South
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 36 Korea’s economic relationship with Myanmar can be a significant contributor to all of these
constitutionally mandated goals, building on a solid foundation that already exists. Aligning
future investment, trade development, and technical assistance activities with government efforts
to deliver on these constitutional mandates should be a priority for the South Korean government
and private businesses. Helping the new government to experience success and reinforce the
positive impact of a transition to a new economic government system. Supporting reforms that
are needed and not controversial in the international community without being seen as pushing
foreign ideas on the country. Encouraging and nurturing technocratic capacity building for
macroeconomic policy and management and economic development planning, including
developing the role in Myanmar of economic research institutes. Recognizing the important role
that the Korean Development Institute and the Korean Institute for International Economic
Policy, for example, and other think tanks have played in South Korea over the years.
South Korea also has both deep democratic values and experience in managing a transition from
military to democratic governments while pursuing a successful economic development process.
South Korea should draw on its experiences to be an active voice in discussions about how best
to support the democratic transition, socioeconomic development, human rights improvements
and ethnic reconciliation in Myanmar. And this applies to the group of friends that is convened
by the UN Secretary General, but also to any future aid coordination and economic dialogue
forum that emerges for the international community to engage more coherently with the new
government on future economic development and governance policies and strategies.
South Korea should also provide opportunities to demonstrate inclusiveness in consultation
processes that involve local stakeholders in future projects. The KOIKA program could also be
designed to provide capacity building for economic governance not only at the central level, but
also at the state level and to promote partnerships between local governments, private sector, and
civil society, as we discussed earlier this morning. Supporting expansion of low cost public
access to the internet and use of modern communications, and fostering increased networking
inside Myanmar could draw on South Korea’s experience with integrating information
technology with democratization and economic development. Attracting and mobilizing the
interest of youth in their own future could make a major positive contribution to socioeconomic
development and building civic involvement in public affairs over time.
Finally, South Korea’s involvement in the energy sector could help correct two major problems
facing the new government. One is the need to restructure the accounting and use of government
revenues from oil and gas projects. The accounting issue has to be addressed through exchange
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 37 rate reform and national accounts reporting. The use of these revenues has to be addressed
through measures to introduce transparency in the reporting of revenues and taxation of stateowned enterprises that have joint ventures with foreign companies in the energy sector, and
inclusion of these resources in the national budget. South Korean profits from participation in
these joint ventures should also be transparent. If South Korea is seen as abetting continuation of
a non-transparent and corrupt management of oil and gas foreign exchange earnings that is
functioning as an off-budget financial source for the military outside the control of the new
government, international public criticism is likely to continue and justifiably increase.
The second issue is lack of attention to social and environmental impacts of large-scale energy
infrastructure projects, including both the pipelines and planned hydropower projects. South
Korean involvement in this sector cannot be disconnected from concerns about these issues and
related implications for human rights and ethnic relations. South Korea should draw on its own
social and environmental record, and its current emphasis on green development, to help
Myanmar address these important aspects of its own economic development planning. Support
for policies in capacity building, as well as public participation processes should be given high
priority by South Korea in supporting the new government, and in helping the people of
Myanmar to make the democratic transitions a meaningful one in these critical areas of national
development.
In conclusion, South Korea’s economic relationship with Myanmar is important, if not in the
same league as Myanmar’s neighbors. It differs from that of other countries in character, not just
scale. South Korea’s economic relationship has been having a positive if limited impact on
Myanmar’s economic development and integration in the regional economy. This impact can be
enhanced and amplified to take advantage of new opportunities following the formation of the
new government and implementation of the new constitution. South Korea’s own successes in
economic and democratic development can make an important contribution to Myanmar’s future
national development process, and both countries should be encouraged to continue to develop
their economic relationship to serve these goals and to foster a better peace and more prosperity
in Asia. Thank you very much.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you Mr. Babson. I think I’m going to be reprimanded now
for not keeping time but I think it has been worthwhile to hear your presentation, even though it
exceeded time a bit. The floor is opened to questions and comments. Please identify yourself, tell
us your name and your affiliation, and please keep your remarks, comments, or questions brief so
that we can have more participation please.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 38 Mike Billington:
Thank you. Mike Billington from Executive Intelligence Review. Two
questions. One, do you think there’s any potential that Korea will use its recent development of a
nuclear export capacity to help Myanmar develop a nuclear power industry, which would be very
interesting in regard to all the talk about connections to North Korea. And secondly, in regard to
the recent earthquakes, not just Japan but the whole series of earthquakes around the Ring of Fire
and the extreme danger that this is a process that’s expanding, and of course you had this
earthquake in Myanmar. North and South Korea have recently sort of gotten together around
dealing with the volcano in the north, its potential explosion and I think also on earthquake
activity. So I’m wondering if some of the expertise from Korea is being applied to Myanmar’s
capacities, and other scientific related issues that you might want to comment on.
Mr. Babson: Let me just say, I have very low expectation that nuclear power plants will be part
of Myanmar’s future anytime in my lifetime or later. Myanmar’s well endowed with oil and gas
of its own that don’t require buying technology of that type from other countries, and it has a
large hydropower potential. So there isn’t any great economic logic to Myanmar investing in
nuclear power technology. As far as expertise relating to earthquakes and things, I don’t know
what the South Korean response to the recent earthquake has been in Myanmar. I do know there
is agreement to do geological studies together; looking at mining potential, particularly for rare
earths, is the most recent topic where there is going to be collaboration in geological surveys. But
that’s less related to events like volcanoes and earthquakes than it is to potential economic
interests in finding new mining resources, and of course Myanmar’s rich in its mining assets.
Taeyoon Kim:
My point is similar to Bradley’s and the first case, you’ve got the nuclear
plant cooperation in Myanmar. It is a small one because we are focusing on just, you cannot
provide the economic development officially in Myanmar, but a private company can do that
using several ways, but in terms of the government collaborations with Myanmar, they might
have some discussion on this issue, but there is not main point in this moment. In terms of
earthquake cooperation, the earthquake in Japan, we have lots of concerns in Korea because of
our nuclear plants, but still we depend on 35% of our electricity from nuclear plants and I think
our country supports a nuclear plant to be advanced and to be more secure for the time being. In
terms of the volcano case, with North Korea, I’ve heard we have some scholars meeting with the
other one, so we might cooperate with these issues rather than particular issues.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you Dr. Kim. David Steinberg then Lex Rieffel.
David Steinberg:
Thank you. David Steinberg. A couple of comments. One on the South
Korea nuclear training. Last time I checked, which was a couple of years ago, South Korea had
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 39 trained over 300 people from the ASEAN region in some sort of nuclear technology, of whom
over 50 were from Myanmar. South Korea is really interested in Indonesia and power plants in
Indonesia. That’s where the action really is. And they’re concerned about billions of dollars in
investments in that area. I want to clarify one point from Brad, on the question of North Korean
relations with Myanmar as a shock to South Korea. Now this is not accurate, at least the South
Korean ambassador in Rangoon told me. In the last days of Roh Moo-hyun’s administration, and
that means the Sunshine Policy, the South Korean government formally approached the Burmese
government and said that they would have no objections to Burma re-recognizing North Korea.
Ban Ki-moon, who was Foreign Minister in Seoul, told the Burmese ambassador the same thing.
So the South Korean government knew about this and was pushing it as a part of their overall
policy toward North Korea. Lee Myung-bak’s government would of course be quite different.
The question of lessons from Korea to Burma, one of the remarkable things from Korea since
1960 has been the development of social mobility in that society, which has been enormous and
far more than in most other societies. And in reverse to South Korea, Burma has limited social
mobility, as I said earlier this morning. One of the issues that maybe South Korea can try and
convince the military is the need to open these avenues of mobility if they really want to develop,
because Korea’s a very good example. And Korea’s a remarkable case because here is a country,
maybe unique, where the military stepped out of power without a demonstration, without a
murmur, without a loss of life. And the last point I want to make is the question of investments.
In 1987 the liberalization in Korea raised wages, and so you’ve got this push to invest in
Southeast Asia because labor costs in labor intensive industries were too high. And at that point
they began to bring in the labor from Southeast Asia, or from other parts of Asia, including
Myanmar, with a result that they could pay these people less than the official Korean minimum
wage. So that was an attempt really to exploit these countries, I think, for Korean industry, to put
it bluntly.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you. Lex Rieffel?
Lex Rieffel:
Lex Rieffel with the Brookings Institution. I have a question about
security cooperation between South Korea and Myanmar. I hope this is not out of order. There is
a panel in the afternoon about security cooperation with North Korea, but this panel didn’t say
anything about security cooperation between South Korea and Myanmar. I think that would be
interesting and in particular I understood that there had been some arms sales or military
equipment sales from South Korea to Myanmar in the past, and even some manufacturing by
South Korean companies in Myanmar technology transfer.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
ASEAN+ROK.
Page 40 Yes, and also in the context of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1,
Taeyoon Kim:
Well first of all, in response to your question on security cooperation
between South Korea and Myanmar, I cannot see any evidence but since Korea has the security
partnership with ASEAN, which means you have military cooperation with ASEAN countries,
there might be passive military cooperation with Myanmar. In terms of nuclear cooperation with
ASEAN, our government is trying to export our nuclear technologies to ASEAN countries. We
got a large project from UAE last year, and we also are actively participating, want to participate
in nuclear power plants in Malaysia and Vietnam. So there are many activities there, but I cannot
see cooperation with Myanmar. The other question was the Korean minimum wage that you
mentioned. Well, lots of Korean companies, they don’t care about it, I don’t think. The main
reason companies are in Vietnam, or Southeast Asia including Vietnam and Indonesia and
including Myanmar, is that wages are around $200 in Vietnam for everything, around $300 in
China, while it’s around $50 in Myanmar. Some companies at the margin, they are trying to
move their factories to Myanmar right now. So, in 2009 we had seminars regarding industry in
Myanmar, we opened those seminars to the public, and many private companies participated and
they are asked about Myanmar’s potential. There are many companies interested. So I cannot see
the sort of the restrictions, in terms of the minimum wage.
Mr. Babson:
Lex, I think you’d better ask that question this afternoon to the security
panel. I don’t think I have much knowledge of the security relationship between South Korea and
Myanmar.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Yes, and the afternoon panel I think will not be strictly confined to
just Myanmar and North Korea. Please.
John Lyle: My name’s John Lyle, I’m a contractor at the Department of State. One question I
had was the implication of what you said is that nobody is, none of these investors are trading at
the legal exchange, right? And I wonder how they get around it. I mean what’s the mechanism?
So many investors, some scale to them is all the curves are going up. It’s interesting to see how
they get around the nominal legal exchange rate which would make that all impossible.
Bradley Babson:
John Lyle:
Well I think –
If that’s too sensitive we can go on.
Bradley Babson:
No, no it’s not too sensitive. I think most of the transactions are now
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 41 taking place at the official, not at the official rate of six or whatever, but at the recognized rate
that moves pretty closely in parallel with the black market rate. Not exactly, but pretty close. A
large percentage of transactions are now allowed at that rate, but the big ones, particularly oil and
gas, are still booked at the official rate, and largely I think those assets are held offshore so they
don’t actually enter the country, and don’t show up on the balance of payments and don’t show
up in the budget.
And I think this is the point that Priscilla was making this morning, that this represents a very
large slush fund of cash for whoever controls those offshore accounts, and it also creates a
certain amount of ambiguity about the way the foreign partners participate in the oil and gas
sector, in the distribution of revenues between the various parties involved in these relationships.
I believe there are about 23 different companies from at least 13 countries who have contracts in
the oil and gas sector. So it’s a rather large and complex part of the economy that’s pretty much
offline. And that represents in my mind, and I definitely agree with what Priscilla said this
morning, a big red flag in the way this system is going to evolve over the coming years. Whether
they can make that part of the system transparent and bring those resources under the budget, and
whether the military has a budget that at least the parliament knows about, so that this can be run
more like a normal country. And, if it doesn’t do that, I think we have a big problem on our hands.
Taeyoon Kim:
The same, they’re using the black market exchange rate, and they use the
official exchange rate for things like oil and gas, they’ll transport those officials to the free
markets, but they pay like some – they give incentives to companies because the free market is
much lower than the official market, so they want yesterday’s.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Myanmar government?
So it’s determined between the investing companies and the
Taeyoon Kim:
No. The free market rate is – actually it is very popular, and the official in
this case is not, is rarely used.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Okay, next question, comment? Please.
Unidentified Female:
Hi, I’m inaudible. I’m consulting for Burma programs. I have two
questions. There’s a lot of companies there doing business. Is there corporate responsibility
imposed on them by the Burmese government and could you expand on the repatriation of any of
the businesses that deals inside the country? Thank you.
Taeyoon Kim:
Well in terms of ethics, like for example, they are international, they are
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 42 investing much money to build facilities in Myanmar, and they are making profits. Well, they
might give those profits to their government. They think this will be beneficial to their people,
even though there are some people who are moved out because of the development, which has
been very patronizing in developing countries in Korea, even though in Korea in the 1970s there
were inaudible there, but the companies also care about those issues, so they’re trying to help
people in Myanmar through their business. This is a very persistent way of doing business.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Okay, thank you. Questions, comments? I would like to ask
something if currently there are no questions on the floor. Burma/Myanmar has been open for
business for some time, prior to the elections for some time, a very long time, and South Korea
obviously is there. What are the trend lines, you know certainly the stock of investments, China,
Thailand, South Korea and so on, and is the U.S. business missing out? Here is really a question
on the minds of many around here with the sanctions, and then things are moving on. Are they
moving on, and is U. S. business missing out?
Bradley Babson:
I can make a couple of comments. One of the charts that we saw earlier
showed the sort of spike in 1990 of investment from Korea, and then things sort of flattened out
and then spiked again more recently. I remember, I was in Vietnam at the time, and both Vietnam
and Myanmar were implementing rather significant policies of attracting foreign investment in
the early 1990s and making changes. And David Abel at the time was the Minister of Finance
and Planning at the time, and he implemented a whole series of liberalization reforms, private
sector development reforms. And I can remember being in Hanoi and having private companies
from Japan and Korea and other countries come to me and say, “Is it better to be in Vietnam, or
better to be in Myanmar?” because before 1995, that was a serious question that a lot of private
companies were asking themselves. And it’s not surprising that there was the spike in foreign
investment that we see in South Korea’s activities in the early 90s.
That all pretty much came to a screeching halt after Than Shwe assumed command. When he
took over, he basically shut down the effort to pursue economic reforms, particularly private
sector development reforms that David had been pushing. He’s pretty much sat on all initiatives
to pursue economic reforms ever since. So I think the big question in my mind is, investors are
sort of investing with the hope that things are going to change, that the policy environment will
be more conducive to private return and cooperation with this new government. And that’s a bet
right now, that’s not – and I think the big question in my mind is whether this government gets
serious about macroeconomic and financial sector reform. I think if they do, that things—as
Priscilla said this morning—could evolve rather quickly. The IMF has recently been there,
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 43 they’ve had a very good mission. They left a very long list of here are things you can do that
would make a big difference.
It’s not that the answers aren’t known. The answers are known. The question is, are they willing
to sit down and work together with others to do it? To me, that’s a big question. Exchange rate
reform, there are things to be done in the financial sector, there are things to be done in fiscal
management that would really make a huge difference both for the domestic economy and for the
environment for private investment in the country. The U.S. isn’t going to be able to play a big
role in that right now, for all the reasons we heard about earlier. That doesn’t mean others can’t.
The question is whether countries like Korea that have a stake in the relationship know what the
importance of good policy is.
If there’s any lesson from the Korean experience for Myanmar, it’s that good policy really
matters. Getting good technocrats in charge of economic policy is really important; I agree with
David that opening up avenues for social mobility is important, but getting good economic
policy and research is important too. And helping to build that capacity, encouraging them to
appoint people who can be good economic technocrats in the interest of the country as a whole, I
think would do a lot to create an environment that would create confidence for foreign investors,
with or without the United States.
One last comment. I do think the main constraint that we impose on all of this is our financial
sector sanctions. Not being able to do banking transactions through banks that have American
connections, not being able to use credit cards in the country, this sort of thing really does affect
the environment for private sector initiative. Small people can’t do big things, and they need
institutions like banks and credit cards to be able to do business efficiently. I think our role here
is a constraint rather than a help in helping the private sector take advantage of opportunity.
Taeyoon Kim:
I think in terms of increasing the relationship with Myanmar or with the
ASEAN countries, it’s better to focus on multilateral cooperation like Mekong Development or
these issues. If you’re focusing on just one country like Myanmar, it’s hard to advance those
relationships, because of some sanctions and financial issues, but if you are focusing on regional
development, then there are many stakeholders there and we can discuss development and those
regional issues so that the political issues are minimal. Then our relationship with Myanmar will
be increased. So this is one of the ways at this moment that Korea is involved in Mekong
Regional Development including Myanmar. I’ve heard the U.S. case, you do not have Myanmar
as a part in it as a role maker initiative, so if regional development is very popular or is
increasing, then where the other issues might be minimized.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Page 44 Okay, thank you. Please go ahead.
Kelley Currie:
This question I guess is directed to Mr. Kim, but I welcome Mr. Babson’s
input also. You noted in your presentation one for the challenges for South Korean businesses in
Burma is sanctions, and you’ve had, looking at the slide, uncertainty over sanctions. I guess my
question is, are the companies that are investing there, do they not intend to export those
products to markets such as the Untied States where these sanctions are in place, or are they
engaged in sanctions avoidance strategies to re-export and then reprocess or further process
things so that they don’t have a Burma label on them? Do you know enough about what they’re
doing to unpack a little bit of what the actual impact of sanctions is on their business decisions
here?
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Kelley Currie:
I’m sorry, did you tell us who you, where you’re from?
I’m sorry, Kelley Currie from Project 2049 Institute.
Taeyoon Kim:
Basically, since the sanctions come from the U.S. and Europe, the
companies in Myanmar cannot export those products to the U.S.A. or European countries. The
exports and imports from Myanmar and Korea are based on Korean companies, so they know the
products. I don’t think there is really anything exported to the U.S.A. or European countries.
That’s why the increase in volume of export, or import from Myanmar depends on the companies
in Myanmar, the Korean companies, basically.
Bradley Babson:
I would just add that I think any sanctions that limit access to the U.S. and
the European markets distort decision-making. Obviously they’re not going to invest in projects
for those markets, even if those sanctions were not there, they would be good economic projects
that would generate jobs and positive foreign exchange earnings for the country, and profits for
the joint venture partners. So sanctions just do affect the environment of decision-making. That
doesn’t mean they won’t do things but they’ll do them for other markets, as Dr. Kim has said.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Anyone else? Question or comment? Otherwise, I think I would
like to make just a couple of remarks. You have another question? A quick one please?
Billington: Mr. Kim, you mentioned the Korea model as applicable to Myanmar. I know that
Korea is involved in Africa in contracts with governments on developing the overall Korea
model from the 70s, the Park Chung-hee industrial model, the Saemaul Undong and the whole
socioeconomic structure. I’m wondering if that’s what you mean. Are you making efforts to help
design an overall program for the Myanmar government in the context of the Korean model?
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 45 Taeyoon Kim:
You talk about Saemaul Undong, which was the regional development
program in Korea in the 1970s and 80s. Actually, Myanmar was interested in the Korean
development programs like Saemaul Undong in rural areas. And also they are interested in
Korea’s powerful presence in 1960 and 1970s, President Pak Chung-hee at the time. Overall,
we’re actually, we are just a small country in the world, but our economic growth was very fast
during the last 40 years. In terms of the Korean government, they are trying to sell their image,
their development strategy to developing countries, so that if it is helpful, it would be great. So
that’s why we developed our program that we call the Korean knowledge sharing programs,
which includes programs like Saemaul Undong or regional development in Korea in the 1960s,
70s, 80s. So we are trying to modernize those programs so that if they are applicable to African
countries or Myanmar, then it would be great. But there are many failures of that plan because of
social differences, peoples’ attitudes are different, so we are trying to develop applicable versions
of the model using a different modeling. So if that is beneficial to developing countries then it
would be great. This is what the Korean government is thinking, and also we can build our
economic growth model through that program. So overall, it might not be beneficial to Myanmar,
but like a quick program, they’re trying to give those programs to Myanmar, if that is successful,
if it is well-developed, then probably next we will be focusing more on those issues.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you Dr. Kim. If I may bring us to a conclusion here for this
panel, so this panel has to do with trade and economic relations between Burma/Myanmar and
South Korea. Dr. Kim mentioned about GMS all the way going back to 1992, and if you look at
mainland Southeast Asia now, you have the east-west, north-south corridors, and you can travel
from Myanmar/Burma to Da Nang and points in Vietnam, and this is inexorable. It will keep on
intensifying. And South Korea is not the largest and it’s not the first to have trade investment
relations with Burma/Myanmar. I think Thailand has been a major investment and trade partner
for a long time. China increasingly, and I think that one of the implications from this particular
panel is what this means for the U.S. and the Europeans, other Europeans have had mixed
records in Burma/Myanmar, and some European companies are present and operational. So on
that note, we have other panels coming up on strategic dimensions, on security cooperation and
so on. And some of the issues that were covered on this panel will be revisited in subsequent
panels. For now, please join me in thanking our two speakers.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 46 Panel 3: Strategic Interests in Myanmar: China, India and ASEAN
Moderator: If you folks in the back would like to join us in the front, these are after all, the
very best seats.
Moderator: I will simply say it is my great pleasure to introduce from Georgetown University,
uh, Doctor Robert Sutter, the Chairman of panel three, Bob.
Robert Sutter:
Everybody all set and comfortable? We are really in for a treat today. I
want to thank the organizers for asking me to chair this panel. I have a lot of interest in Chinese
foreign relations and so this is something that I’m quite interested in. We have three remarkable
speakers who I think will give us very different perspectives. Each speaker is supposed to talk for
about ten minutes each and then we might have a little bit of time to talk with each other on the
panel, if that is okay. In other words, particularly if you find that we’re all making points that we
agree on or maybe points where we don’t agree on, and you feel like saying something about that,
I’d encourage the panelists to do that. We’ll leave a little time for that and maybe after we all
make our presentations, we’ll do that. And then, we’ll open it up for general discussion. Is that
okay with everyone?
And our plan today, the panel is, “The Strategic Interest of Myanmar: China, India and ASEAN.”
And we have three distinguished presenters. The order of presentation will be Ms. Yun Sun, a
Senior Program Officer at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, will be the
first speaker. And I assume you might be talking to somewhat about China, is that right?
Yun Sun:
Yes, I’ll try.
Robert Sutter:
Right okay good. Okay and then, and then Professor Thitinan, a visiting
professor from here at SAIS and is an Associate Professor from Thailand, will offer his
perspective on this set of issues. And last but certainly not least, Mr. Tin Maung Maung Than, a
Senior Fellow with the Institute for South East Asian Studies, will offer his perspective on these
sets of issues.
So again, about ten minutes each and I will keep time a little bit but I won’t be very harsh, but
hopefully you can keep it to ten minutes and then we can have a little discussion among
ourselves and then we will open it up for everyone to ask their questions, okay please.
Yun Sun:
Thank you very much Professor and thank you very much for having me here
today. Let me start by saying that although I am working for NDI, I was based in Beijing with
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 47 ICG and currently I am still advising ICG and a few other organizations in China on ChinaMyanmar relations. The views that I am expressing here today, they are my personal views, they
do not represent the views of any of these organizations. So I am asked to talk about China’s
strategic interest in Myanmar. China’s strategic interests in Myanmar are primarily focused on
three aspects: border stability, economic interests, and geopolitical calculations. China’s top
concern on Myanmar is to ensure the stability of the shared border. The biggest challenge in this
regard is the unsettled status and the relationship between the Burmese Government and the
ethnic groups.
We know that there are a lot of ethnic groups in Myanmar but Beijing is only concerned about
those along its border. So most importantly, the Kachin and the Wa. They both have their own
military forces, the Kachin did Independence Army, KIA and United Wa State Army, UWSA. In
2009, the military government took military actions against a Kokang special region and
instantly caused more than 37,000 refugees to flee into China. This is China’s biggest fear. Those
KIA and UWSA have much stronger military forces and cover much larger geographic regions.
This means if a conflict is to break out between the Burmese Army and the KIA and the UWSA,
China will be the direct victim of tens of thousands of refugees. And the refugees themselves are
only part of the problem. If there is a conflict, the border will be closed. Therefore, the border
trade, China’s existing advancement in the border region, and China’s bigger blueprint for the
energy pipelines will all be jeopardized.
The inflow of refugees also means inflows of drugs, weapons, and crimes. Therefore, Beijing’s
top priority in Myanmar is to insure there is no military conflict between the government and the
border ethnic groups.
Beijing has consistently called for national reconciliation in Myanmar but last year the issue was
particularly urgent because of the military government’s proposal to transform the ethnic group’s
armed forces into border guard force. And their frequent ultimatums in the first half of 2010.
They didn’t think that neither the government nor the Kachin or Wa intended to initiate a war
because with governments, the priority last year was to ensure the success of the elections. And
the democratic oppositions, they were the biggest challenge in that regard. The ethnic groups,
although they are not agreeable with military government, they were not seeking to overthrow
the government or expand their territories. So from Beijing’s prospective, the posture of the
cease-fire groups, they were mostly defensive. They were not seeking to launch an offensive
against a government. Therefore, the most likely trigger of a war would not be a full-scale
military offensive, but rather a misfire or a skirmish that might evolve into a wider conflict. And
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 48 to prevent such a thing from happening, Beijing put a lot of pressure on both the government and
the ethnic groups, demanding both of them to negotiate on issues such as the status of the cease
fire forces, their sizes, and their relationship with a new government. This strategy has worked in
that despite of the tensions and the military mobilization on both sides, no conflict broke out last
year. However, the issue remains.
After the elections, Beijing is still uncertain what approach that a new government is going to
adopt to solve the ethic groups issue. And the money officials and analysts in China, they are
alarmed by the fact that the Ministry of Border Affairs has been elevated to the third Ministry in
the bureaucratic ranking in Myanmar. Only after the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of
Home Affairs and all of these three ministries, they are under control by the military. These two
facts send a strong message to Beijing that the solution to the ethnics’ groups issue is going to be
dominated by the military, which makes the future even more uncertain. Therefore, during the
visit of Jia Qing-lin, the number four political figure of China and the Chairman of CPCCC last
week, border stability remained to be on the top of the agenda. According to someone from the
delegation, Jia urged the Burmese leaders to maintain the peace and stability of the border region
and solve differences through dialogs and negotiations. And Chinese Embassy in Yangon, they
have they have been instructed to prioritize the monitoring of the development and policies on
border affairs by the new government.
While China’s policy towards the border stability and the ethnics groups issue is quite interesting.
There, I am going to be bold, but there is some similarity between Beijing’s policy on the border
issue and the U.S. policy towards Taiwan. China supports the solution of the ethnics groups issue
but emphasizes the solution has to be achieved just through negotiation and it has to be peaceful.
This is exactly what U.S. calls for in terms of the cross-river relations. So China has a vested
interest in the peace and stability of the border and U.S. has a vested interest in the peace and
stability of West Pacific. Now of course there are a lot of distinctions. For example, U.S. has a
legislation and China does not have any legislation towards the ethnic groups in Myanmar. U.S.
still sells weapons to Taiwan but China has already stopped doing that two decades ago although
China is still supplying the border ethnic groups with food, aide, supplies, and all sorts of support.
And the biggest distinction lies in the fact that if a conflict is going to break out along the border,
China most likely is not going to intervene militarily. But Chinese influence over the Myanmar
Government does not come from the potential or the threat of military intervention. Rather, it is
from the fact that Chinese aid, trade, investment, international support, and diplomatic coverage,
they are indispensible for the survival of the Myanmar regime. Therefore, China’s interference of
the Burmese internal affairs, as exemplified in the case of the ethnic groups, is both ironic and
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 49 intriguing.
Secondly, economic interest is another key component of China’s strategic interest in Myanmar.
Of course, everybody knows that geographically, China’s export already the economy suffers
from a rather limited coastal line and because of the sharp disparity between the coastal areas and
the interior China, which Beijing has to resolve to maintain its legitimacy, Myanmar is an
important outlet for the economic development of the interior provinces, especially Yunnan and
Sichuan. Then in terms of the real deliver boats, the important area that China’s interested in is
energy. And there are two aspects: energy transportation and energy supply. CNPC is currently
constructing the pipelines from sea trade to Yunnan Province. This project is one pillar of China’s
grand strategy to diversify China’s energy transportation routes. The other two, they are the
northern pipeline from Russia to Northeast China and the western pipeline from Central Asia to
Xinjiang. The primary goal of the Myanmar pipeline is transport part of China’s crude oil import
from North Africa and the Middle East through Myanmar to Southwest China. And another
minor element of this plan is to tap into the offshore natural gas resources that South Korean
Daewoo and several other companies are jointly developing. The gas produced will be sold to
CMPCs and transferred back to China. And in terms of the real large energy supplies, the key is
the hydropower. China’s goal is to tap into the rich hydropower resources in Myanmar to
mitigate the energy shortage of Southwest China and hopefully to bring some of the electricity to
Eastern China. CPI’s seven dams on upper Irrawaddy is a vast example in this area. It should be
noted that theses plans and these investments are not aimed at improving the energy or the power
shortage in Myanmar. The power produced by these projects will be purchased by Chinese
companies at a price lower than market price and sent back to China through the network
currently being constructed by China’s Southern Grid. The Burmese Government will benefit
from these projects through the revenue of sales, but supposedly ten to fifteen percent of the
power generated will stay in Myanmar. But in reality, according to Chinese business people and
officials, Myanmar does not have the infrastructure to either transfer or to make use of these
benefits.
Now of course there is a massive investment in the mining sectors in Myanmar by Noranco and
by China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group and officially, starting from 2010, China has become
the largest investor and economic patron of the Myanmar economy. They’re of course various
data but nobody is challenging the basic facts that China has now become the biggest investor in
Myanmar. Several reasons for these major leap forward in terms of the investment in Myanmar
last year. The most important thing is several deals, which had been negotiated in the previous
years. They were finally concluded in the fiscal year ‘010, 2010 and they were included in the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 50 official statistics.
So certainly, the strategic interest, Myanmar is strategic corridors that allows China to gain
access into Indian Ocean. Myanmar is a continental bridge for China into South Asia and
Southeast Asia as well as a buffer zone between China and other major powers around the Indian
Ocean. And some Chinese and foreign analysts refer to this as a way for China to overcome its
single ocean strategy, which means the pacific, and to pursue a two-ocean strategy, which is
Pacific and Indian Oceans at the same time. And Myanmar’s geographic significance is
demonstrated through the hands to military-to-military appropriations between the two countries.
Last year the PLA naval ships visited Myanmar for the first time in history and just last month,
the PLA send another senior delegation to Nay Pyi Taw to discuss – oh, I’ll be fast – to discuss
cooperation and share views on –
Robert Sutter:
Yun Sun:
Okay, thanks.
Robert Sutter:
Yun Sun:
We are not that short, don’t worry.
It is very informative.
--to discuss cooperation and share views on regional issues.
I will be brief, so let me wrap up by giving you some information on China’s perception of the
new government in Myanmar. China has applauded the November elections. It sees the process
has been largely smooth and successful despite reports of manipulations in the voting process.
China acknowledges that the new government is basically just a new generation of military elites.
The structure may have changed a little bit but they don’t see the outcome as to be too different
from what they had before. However, with this new government, China is very confident and
now Chinese investment has become indispensible for the Myanmar economy. The bilateral
relations are not going to suffer any major turbulences under the new government. There is still
uncertainties. On the government side, China does hope the new government could improve its
economy and provide a better life to Myanmar people. That is the area where China wishes the
new government could accept more advice and technical assistance from Beijing. Like China
share its governance experiences is an open request that Chinese Leaders now make to their
Myanmar counterparts whenever they meet, as exemplified from the from the Jia Qing-lin’s visit
last week.
Then on domestic stability, China is watching the new government closely for signs of possible
conflicts due to the new distribution of power. For a while after the elections, the Myanmar
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 51 Government closed the land-ports along the border raising fears amount Chinese investors and
officials that the country might be heading into an internal conflict. And although these ports
were opened later, it still had caused tremendous losses for Chinese investors who were
operating under the crop substitution programs along the border. Many of them are now
considering relocating their investment to Vietnam. Although it is most expensive, but the
political situation there is more stable.
And lastly, about the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Beijing’s was nervous when Aung San Suu
Kyi was first released because Beijing didn’t know whether the west would be supportive of her
again to act against the new government. But as of now, the concern has subsided and Beijing
doesn’t see much political influence or potential for her in the current power structure. What also
pleases Beijing is the continuation of the U.S. Sanction Policy of which China is actually a
beneficiary. Beijing was concerned that as the engagement policy proposed earlier, like Professor
Steinberg pointed out this morning, was part of a bigger conspiracy for the United States to
encircle and contain China. But now with the engagement policy not going anywhere, Beijing
certainly feels more secure and confident about a strategy in Myanmar. Thank you.
Robert Sutter:
Yun Sun:
Thank you very much, excellent presentation there.
Sorry, it was too long.
Robert Sutter:
No, that was quite all right, it was full of information. Our next speaker
please, Professor Thitinan, you’re next sir.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Thank you Professor Sutter and we have made a modification to
the program and my good friend and colleague from ISIS in Singapore is here, he just arrived
and so I think we will overlap just a bit in some areas. We haven’t coordinated so I hope not too
much overlap. I have just a few, five small clusters of points to make. First, we need to discuss
the nuclear issues. There have been reports and I think we will hear more on the next panel from
the distinguished speakers, we have a great line-up for the next panel. But you know, there has
been these conflicting reports of tunneling work, North Korean involvement and whether this
will lead to some kind of a nuclear weapons program and I have spoken to many number of
sources including the Thai military and the work of the Australians. There has been some
information intelligence coming out of defectors from the regime and so on and we will hear
from I think Bob Kelley next panel. Suffice it to say that there is some kind of ambition, interest
at minimum, to develop some kind of nuclear program. But whether this has changed where the
status is, after elections, is uncertain. But for ASEAN, for Thailand in particular, this would what
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 52 would be called around here, a game changer. This is the number one security concern for
Thailand and for the ASEAN broader region. It would be in violation of an existing treaty that
Southeast Asia has called SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. SEANWFZ.
Now ASEAN has not addressed this directly and the information we get is still murky. The
tunneling may be just to provide sanctuary for Than Shwe’s future, a bunker of some sort deep
underground. But there have been also reports that the tunneling work has involved a reactor in
the mountains and the security planners in Thailand are mindful and fixated with this in their
own quiet way and so I have asked him, you know what would happen, we have no plans and
they said yes, we have a plan. It is not an advance plan. It is not the kind of a plan that you would
think of in terms of surgical strike or fighter jets and so on, or the unmanned aerial vehicles but
they are very kind of old fashioned plan and that’s about all I can say.
It is the number one threat and there has to be more transparency from the post election regime
on this nuclear development issue. On the other hand, there is also a nuclear energy issue and
Southeast Asia in this period of the nuclear renaissance, so called, despite of the disasters and
catastrophes in Japan, nuclear energy will be arriving on the scene. Vietnam is going to have two
reactors in twenty years and Indonesia is poised to develop a nuclear energy program and if you
look at the energy demand supply, it is very logical that we will enter that era of nuclear energy
in Southeast Asia after this period subsides from the aftermath of Japan. So the first issue is
nuclear and here I think ASEAN has to be vigilant, has to be more demanding of the new regime,
well new post election government in Burma about their nuclear development plans.
Second involves the relationship between core and periphery in Burma-Myanmar. There are
security concerns of course with the constitution, and now elections, and now parliament,
government, but relations between Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic
minorities remain contentious. And we have seen recently that there were border clashes. The
Corinne’s are fighting of course, Corinne’s didn’t lay down arms to become the BTF so the areas
that are not BTF, they are continuing to be clashes with the Tatmadaw and a number of Corrine’s
fled to Thailand, Thailand sent them back inaudible [23:03]. And then of course the clashes were
renewed on a daily basis so this in an inherently unstable volatile situation. There is no
permanent cease-fire. There needs to be some kind of a cease-fire agreement. Now the security
consents for Thailand and beyond Thailand, especially ASEAN, is the balkanization, this
nightmare scenario of balkanize Burma-Myanmar with influxes of refugees all over the place in
ASEAN and especially Thailand. And now Thailand has taken a bit of a stiff stance towards
refugees, displaced persons not as accommodating as in the past, has been sending them back on
the notion that Europeans, your Americans, are not forthcoming with the funding and therefore
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 53 should not be Thailand’s main burden to provide sanctuary to these displaced persons and
refugees.
The third point I would like to make is back to energy again, but in a different way. For Thailand
and ASEAN, Burma is abundant nexus of energy resources and in Thailand more than 25% of
electricity generation comes from the natural gas imported from Burma. It is Ithacan (?) and
pipeline and another one coming on line inaudible [24:57] and more and now we have seen also
Yunnan, Southern China, constructing a long pipeline across I think minority areas that Shan
State and on so this energy dependency of Thailand and I think for the other ASEAN companies,
is less. But China, Thailand, will be increasingly dependent on natural gas from BurmaMyanmar and the nexus of energy dependency and foreign policy, you can see that now, as
mentioned, Thailand has been less accommodating to Burmese-Myanmar ethnic groups.
Fourth, this migrant labor issue. The flow of migrants, the ethnic minorities the Corinne’s in
Thailand now, there are more than two million, more than two million migrant workers from
Burma-Myanmar. Only one quarter of them registered and some estimates suggest that there are
more than two, well over two million. They have become indispensible to the Thai economy but
you also have now Burmese-Myanmar people working in all ASEAN countries. Less so in
Philippines but the closest to Burma Myanmar you see them. So Malaysia, the fishery industries,
these are some, certainly Thailand and the consequence of this migrant labor from Burma
Myanmar is that there is a new generation of Burmese-Myanmar people taking root, growing up,
being socialized in these countries. In Thailand for example, there are thousands, hundreds of
thousands of new kids over the last twenty years that are not being cared for with education,
health care and so on. And this demographic kind of a time bomb is something that should be
receiving more attention spotlight in ASEAN.
My last point before I yield the floor to Dr. Tin is just the broader prospects ahead. What does
this mean after elections? Some people you know, they say it is not a new government, it is just
old government dressed up in a new way and that is why sometimes we say the supposed
election government. This means a lot to everyone. Burma-Myanmar is the vortex. It is the
intersection between South Asia. Southeast Asia is critical to mainland Southeast Asia to China,
India, ASEAN but beyond. European capitals, Washington, New York and so on. For ASEAN, it
is very clear. After elections, this is good news. I think that there is some divided mixed response.
The Philippine President called Aung San Suu Kyi very quickly and after she was released and
before elections to say that Philippines continue to support NOD Suu Kyi but the rest of ASEAN,
even Indonesia when Minister Marty came to speak at John Wayne University in December. You
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 54 know this is part of the Burma Myanmar roadmap but also part of the ASEAN constructive
engagement and things are moving on and I think you will see this year that under Indonesia’s
chairmanship, ASEAN would become a bit more assertive. There has already been two ASEANU.S. Summits, there is likely to be a third. For further away, Europeans, Americans, they have a
dilemma now, a daunting dilemma. The Europeans are reconsidering, the Americans have a
policy review but I think in a conundrum this kind of stuck. Moving forward till you have now
an industry of the Diaspora in Brussels, and London, and New York, and Washington and other
places elsewhere that are opposed to any kind of accommodations whatsoever. So this is a
daunting dilemma for further away. European capitals, the U.S. but my last just bit on this point
is to focus on the role of ASEAN. I think ASEAN remains a broker and Burma-Myanmar is a
member of ASEAN. ASEAN has a certain framework, it has a ASEAN charter now. It is intent to
cultivate a ASEAN community by 2015, it is going to fall behind schedule but never mind, there
will be three pillars to it and so on. It is very flowery talk and, there is a document now that has
qualified the ASEAN ways, the ASEAN norms. So ASEAN is a regional player that if you
bypass ASEAN I can tell you, you won’t go far, won’t go far because there will be all kinds of
you know, people in ASEAN that won’t go along with it and that will provide leverage for
Myanmar-Burma. So on that note, let me pass it forward to, back to the Professor Sutter and I’m
sure we will go to Dr. Tin, thank you.
Robert Sutter:
please.
Excellent presentation, thank you very much, very clear points and Dr. Tin
Tin Maung Maung Than: Thank you, I must apologize for not being here this morning,
which I should be here, but David probably do a better job than me. As all Burmese, I don’t have
a script. Last year I was here and I said something which David picked up about the train in
London. I want to have a new version of it. I know that in London when you have the train,
underground metro, other people call it Metro, or call it Tube, they call out to you about mind the
gap. And then you say all clear because it is the end of the line. So that was before the elections,
that was before the new government. I stand by it. Regarding the neighbors, I will start with
Titanan first. It is not like I am trying engage now but that is the basis of what I am going to say.
If I weigh an issue, I would say the same thing. But it reminds me of the cartoon Jungle Book.
We aren’t that old, I mean the earlier versions, where there was this series of vultures, if people
remember, and they were looking at Mowgli’s and then as vultures, the cartoon is very distinct
and the wings, so they would shrug their shoulders like that. What I going to do, what I going to
do, what I going to do? So in that case, the question arises is what is the new government,
somebody beats me to it but I can’t think who started it but it is a Pepsi versus Coke thing right?
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 55 Basically what you want out of it and how I’m going to make the best out of it, that is one story.
Another story is of course, get the same old way of trying to spicing, we don’t want regime
change but in the sense that we wish that there was a regime change in a sense. So for China,
nobody talks about India yet, I don’t know why, but anyway China beats India by a mile when
dealing with Burma-Myanmar. I don’t care, I usually call it Burma for the last 35 years, so I’m
going to call it Burma.
The thing is there is a kind of a so-called competition. People dance you see, right in China and
India. But I think it is a very uneven competition because China has an inside track and more
resources, strategic and other wise. So India is playing second fiddle and the Burmese also
benefit by playing off a little bit of each other. And Bangladesh was a spoiler of course, because
of the gas issue. But the thing is, the build up of the arms and all these things came out of the
Burmese army. The Burmese army has always been short of modern weapon systems and now
we have the money for it so they go in for it. All armies do that I suppose, except maybe the
United States. The issue with the border, the CGF issue, I mean this is a no win solution kind of
thing for everybody unfortunately because when it started in 1990’s General Kin Yun and the
military intelligence somehow had the notion that if you socialized them and give them enough
concessions they will become you know, more or less accommodating, right? So, that is their
first line of strategy. So we do the DDR and not even in reverse, demobilization, demilitarization,
and reintegration. We tried reintegration without demobilizing and demilitarization, and it is not
a proper integration. It is just throwing concessions and allowing them to run the territory as if it
they were a separate state and it comes to roost now with the constitution. Even China, would
China be happy supposing if Xinjiang has his own army or if Tibet still has it’s own army? Of
course not. I mean any government in Burma to be fair, I am not a slop fan or SPDZ fan either
but any government in any country, democratic or otherwise, cannot allow states within a state.
With their own territory, using yuan as a currency ren min bi or whatever you call it and have
armed forces. So somehow, that has to be somehow to be settled by which means. The answer is
very difficult because if you let them run the show for twenty-five years or twenty years and
before that under BCB for another twenty years, what kind of incentives can you give to that
kind of almost complete autonomy? What can you exchange that for, how much concession can
you get from the central government. It is almost impossible for the other side to accept less than
that, right? Unless of course there is a threat of force. Going to war against the Wa or Kachin is a
very costly process. Some idiots, I am sorry to say, talk about the three land gun solution, the
military solution. It is not the same, right?
China would not give unlimited supply of weapons to the Burmese army to defeat the Wa and
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 56 collateral damage is, another kind of collateral damage could be found. This time, on the China
side and they don’t have their back to the wall, they have a back to the China’s border. So the
likely scenario, which may not come about is that there will be economic choking off of the Wa
and the Kachins somehow. It is starting now but it is not a completely, not completely fool proof
because there is a lot of leakages on the Chinese side. So the Burmese may ask the Chinese to
block the border from this kind of entreats or thing. That is the kind of high raising the stakes and
China would be in a quandary, I don’t know what they could do in that circumstances. So you
can choke them off but how long can one survive with that kind of choking off the trade and
things. Quite a long time I suppose, that’s another story because the Burmese Socialist
Government survived twenty-five years, right? So the Wa can survive maybe another twenty-five
years. So it’s a not win, I have no solution, if I had the solution I would be, you know maybe
somebody would give a National Security Advisor post, right? So I am just telling all the
problems as usual as academics do, in my line of work, I’m not attacking other academics.
So the Burma issue is, I think, the most important issue is that rather than Aung Sang Suu Kyi
being a thorn in the side of the, or as inaudible [37:12] say, Burma is a pebble in the shoe of
inaudible [37:16] The greatest issues facing any new government in Burma is the issue of how
we settle them and how do you settle that, I don’t know. They have described their constitution I
suppose. Within the constitution there is no way to sell them except just disarm them by force.
And giving Wa administrative division, one-step lower than the state, it is also seen as kind of a
front. And I think Thailand, our old friend and enemy, you must worry about the nuclear thing
but you better worry about the short-range ballistic results. Thank you.
Robert Sutter:
Thank you very much. What I would like to do is now, if our speakers
have some questions with one another, for one another, that would be very useful to do and I
would like to start if I may, among our group, to raise the issue of stability. This is a big issue for
China, China likes stability and this conference is in, it deals of course with the issues that it
deals with but in the broader context of Southeast Asia. We’ve had big, we’ve had a serious
concern about stability in Southeast Asia over the last few years because of China’s more
assertive policies on the South China Sea in particular. And a number of other issues along the
rim of China. And that seems to have subsided and we’re more relaxed now about it, we’re glad
that China has come back to stability and yet stability seems to get in the way when you deal
with issues like Myanmar and North Korea. It seems like the United States doesn’t want stability
in that regard. I mean China is supporting Myanmar and just keeping it nice and stable, it makes
sense in one direction and I think our speaker has made it very clear that is what China wants.
And then the same thing with North Korea. The Chinese want stability with North Korea. They
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 57 don’t want to disrupt their relationship with North Korea. And yet it seems that from the U.S.
point of view that this is not desirable, that this kind of stability isn’t what the U.S. wants, it
wants a policy that will change the situation because it leads to what one of our speakers has said,
a game changer from the point of view of Thailand and ASEAN. So I just wanted to raise this
issue of stability and to see okay, if China persists with this approach toward both North Korea
and Myanmar, doesn’t do anything about this, keeps on good terms with both administrations.
Even if it turns out they are doing these nuclear things in Myanmar, what’s the reaction going to
be in among Thailand and among the ASEAN more broadly and particular. I think the reaction in
the United States will be concern, a great concern, but I am not sure what the regional reaction
might be. So maybe we’ll, that’s one question I have. And I think it’s perhaps directed to
Professor Thitinan please.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Okay thank you, well China would not be the first one no, the only
country that favors stability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has long favored stability and has seen
this as a stabilizing outcome but China I think, they’re not let or the determinates of their stance
vis-à-vis Burma-Myanmar not focused as much on human rights democracy and so on and in
fact, stability is being achieved, it is being achieved. It is manageable and I that is why, I think,
you see ASEAN will take this election as in stride and ASEAN will present kind of a united front.
And this is another checkbox and they will proceed on to other endeavors including the ASEANU.S. Summit and the ASEAN plus three, the East Asia Summit, the various regional architectural
building exercises, so very much in line with China, very much in line with China and China is
very much in line with ASEAN. So it’s made Thailand less so a maritime ASEAN but very much
so on the mainland ASEAN. To a lesser degree, Vietnam and that stability means managing this
Myanmar question in a sustainable fashion as it comes. And so far, so good, so very much
consistent.
Robert Sutter:
Uh-huh, thank you other points on this or other questions that people
would like to ask one another?
Tin Maung Maung Than: I just had one or two points about the stability issue. I mean as an
academic sometimes I can see that stability and status tends to merge into each other, right.
Another thing is China, well there was a story by Major Thein Thin Win, who defected last year,
about the nuclear thing. He said that when he was about to send to, he said VUE, I think, when
he was about to be sent to Russia in 2001 I think, something like that. General Mau Ae, the
Deputy Commander in Chief of Armed Forces called him up and gave him a pep talk in which
the Minister of Science and Technology U Than, who is no longer in the cabinet, I do not know
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 58 where he is now, he is not in the cabinet and he is not in the regional too. Told him that they
approach China first to train military officers in nuclear engineering and China declined. And
then India said, supposedly said they would, but then the Russians said yes so between Russia
and India, or course they chose Russia. So China was more or less was responsible in that and it
is just like the sanctions, there are other guys willing to pick up the pieces.
And then again we talked about the new government and yeah the new government seems to be
quite have a script I suppose and they have been giving all sorts of signals which are seeing if
you are optimist as optimistic. Yes, they been talking about and they mentioned the CU, not
cancer, corruption in parliament and they mention good covenance, GG in parliament so all the
right words have been said and hopefully people, I don’t know, will follow through or not. And
of course the jury, you have to accept them, I mean you can’t say, and the nightmare for ASEAN
is if Burma said that they would like to take up the chairmanship, which they have declined. And
ASEAN had said that you can take up any time out of line, according to the alphabetical order,
supposing Burma offered to pick up the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2015, the year the
accommodating is when you happen. Then you have, how do you react to that.
Robert Sutter:
Yes please.
Yun Sun:
I’ll just be, I have a very brief comment on that. So China wants stability,
everybody knows that, and China also wants gradual changes in both Myanmar and North Korea.
China doesn’t want to see anything radical, overnight there is a regime change, not in China’s
interest but China does hope that these two countries could adopt Chinese model on leader
reform and someday that could lead to open market and some sort of better governance, that is
China’s home. Then in terms of stability, I don’t think that China should be blamed for wanting
stability because China has a lot to lose. If there is a radical regime change in either country and
if there is military conflict in either country, then China will be the one carrying the burden of
tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing into the Chinese border, not
the American border. So when China says, then Americans, you guys are standing aside and
asking us to do something against our own interest, you’re simply not being fair. And what does
China have to gain from these regime changes? Let’s say Aung San Suu Kyi becomes the
President of Myanmar or Kim Jong-il, tomorrow, Kim’s family would no longer be in power in
North Korea. We have democratic governments in both countries, what is in there for China?
Those new countries will be at least friendly towards the United States and they are sitting right
on Chinese border. And for China, well China does have this entrenching fear of U.S.
containment and encirclement, so China sees those developments as a threat to its national
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Robert Sutter:
Excellent, excellent, other points with each other? Otherwise we’ll open it
up for questions from the audience. Just please, identify yourself and ask your question. If you
have it to a particular person, please address it to a particular person.
John Lyle: My name is John Lyle and I work in the State Department’s Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, so I wanted to note one of the other
exports that China and Thailand is getting from Myanmar of course are narcotics. And the
circumstances involving the cease-fire groups, in particular the Wa, a stability to them means
more narcotics coming out. So how does that play? I mean obviously the strategic interests that
you rose, you can see how they might predominate but there’s a lot of misery that’s associated
with the export of narcotics and there is no solution to that that doesn’t involve some change in
the status quo, because they’ll just go on. You could argue that the Wa state in particular, is
simply a fraud and a façade behind some Chinese ethnic Chinese criminals who are exploiting
narcotics, both to Thailand and increasingly in the whole region. So what about that?
Robert Sutter:
Well put.
Yun Sun:
Absolutely, well narcotics is a big issue in China’s relationship with Myanmar and
actually cocaine, in 2009, when inaudible [47:34] was taken out by the Myanmar government,
the excuse is that they use was inaudible [47:40] was producing narcotics in his factories. And
the issue of narcotics is sort of a policy leverage for the cease fire groups to play against both
Nay Pyi Taw and Beijing. Where there is pressure from Nay Pyi Taw for the cease-fire groups to
disarm, they would comply better on the campaign against narcotics. Actually, last year both Wa
and Kachin launched multiple campaigns in collaboration with the Chinese public security forces
to clear their regions of narcotics. So narcotics has become more of a political issue rather than
just a trade issue. And as for Thailand too.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Yes, narcotics in this context means amphetamines,
methamphetamines. And in fact there has been a search of methamphetamines seized in Thailand
and every time you see them, you can assume that most of them, how much more that has not
been caught. There was a search in a run up to the elections and when you see fierce fighting,
there tends to be kind of a growing correlation. Ethnic minorities need to finance their weapons
and war plans and battle plans. Now the Wa State, and this is where Thai party is incoherent
because it is so domestically contested at home and divided. The Wa State, for a time in the early
2000’s, there was a big crackdown and it was effective but it also took a toll. A lot of extraditial
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down and unlike the past when heroin was involved, this time it is destined mainly for the Thai
market and have no real effective policy response except for sporadic, random arrests and
seizures. So the longer term is really to address this relationship as a whole in this complex
multifaceted fashion.
Tin Maung Maung Than: Well, the issue of it is basically, the opium is much more easier to
integrate and you can see from satellite images and things. It is of course a whole inaudible
[50:06] kind of laboratory that can run around from one place to another so I mean it is
extremely difficult, the supply side got off, the demand side issue of course is another problem.
The Burmese Government will always have that excuse that we cannot go into Wa territory, we
can’t go into SSE territory so it just given them an excuse as well. And the Wa said yes, we have
cracked down on, in fact in the Kachin and Wa area trading in narcotics is a death penalty. Which
they have executed several people across through the years. But it is just like squeezing jelly, it is
not easy, right. So how to you do that. Supposing theoretically the Wa gives away to a Central
Administration. Would that solve the problem if you have Burmese Administrators running the
show with enough budget to double up the thing, I don’t know, when I worked in Thailand in the
early days, when you have crops substitution. Crop substitution is a problem, it is an ecological
problem because basically in those areas where the opium is grown, other crops can’t grow,
simple as that. Unless you can subsidize for the rest of your life somehow. But I think opium
problem is less than that of the EDS and EDS is extremely elusive thing and very lucrative and
then you can also see that even heroin you can check where it comes from. There is kind of a
tracing a forensic tree. I think EDS, is more difficult for forensics too so you, just like the Thai
logging, the old logger coming and bringing them in as Burmese law. It could be, I am sorry, it
could be that dude, that Thai is doing the own EDS and on route from Burma back into, I mean
the gangs are doing that perhaps too, sorry.
Robert Sutter:
Okay, yes ma’am please. Come in on this side.
Vichi Mennon:
Thank you, my name is Vichi Mennon, I am an Independent Consultant,
originally from Singapore so naturally I have a very close interest in the role of ASEAN in
Myanmar and one of my question is, what is the extent of ASEAN’s economic involvement in
Myanmar. And we talked in the panel earlier this morning about South Korea being a model for
Myanmar that the economic development could, in the end, or could later, help the process of
democratic development. So to what extent is ASEAN contributing to stability and economic
development and probably in the future. You know, this could assist the process of democratic
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 61 development in Myanmar. That is the first question. My other question with regard to the role of
India in Myanmar. I know that India has been rather concerned about China’s very active role
within Myanmar as we heard from Yun Sun on the panel and I know Dr. Tin also touched briefly
on India in his comments earlier but I wonder what anyone on the panel would care to comment
or elaborate on India’s role in Myanmar.
Robert Sutter:
Excellent questions. Who wants to start?
Tin Maung Maung Than: Okay, I was ASEAN skeptic and then I became a pro-ASEAN
because that’s the only hope. We have an ASEAN center in our institute anyway my regards
increased who’s ASEAN was sitting there and Su Ren is my friend, anyway. ASEAN as a whole,
what is ASEAN, I mean that is a difficult question to answer, right? So ASEAN, it’s what true
economic development through the treaties and all those things, right and many of them are
voluntary, more or less. Let us go about the most celebrated of ASEAN treaties after, ASEAN
free trade, you know free trade, everybody says free trade, fair trade is another story. Free trade
area is included the Burmese side, I mean to be fair to the Burmese governments of the day, they
never say no to signing all those documents. They don’t even, even in discussions they do not
object. The other guys object, even the human rights commission that is set up, right, the
Burmese were not the one who were sticking points at the Vietnamese, I’m sorry. They signed,
they sign everything, so they are very compliant. That’s all, I don’t end up inaudible [54:35] for
that. And so, in the case of ASEAN and ASEAN free trade area, there is such a thing as a list,
right? An exclusion list which were thousands and thousands before and been reduced. So the
exclusion list include like in Burma we will not, and you know, Burma said we will reduce the
tariffs, great so you will do five percent then eventually. To there’s an exclusion list for strategic
industries like the motorcar industry in Malaysia. So that’s one loop hole but I think that the
Burmese don’t have that much loophole, maybe rice, I don’t know. But the biggest loophole in
Burma is that you talk about a free trade area in a country which has a licensing system of trade.
You cannot import and export without a license. So what is free trade, I’m talking about. So it’s
all I have the system stays, the government can regulate the amount of quantity, the volume, the
amount by that, right. And also selectively yeah. So that is the monetary barrier in DP. So that
has come out, it is not only in Burma but other countries do have that too so that’s thing. And
then ASEAN free travel, right agreement for professionals and so on and so forth, I need Visa to
go anywhere in ASEAN except Philippines, I think they forgot that we are Burma so allow us in
without a Visa. So it only applies to people with diplomatic passport and green passports which
are…so there’s a lot way to go within ASEAN for economic development, you ASEAN
investment area. The problem with the case of Burma I suspect is that the easier part is gone,
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and that is the problem and not ASEAN or China will come to that kind of sectors. You lift
sanctions tomorrow, I don’t think anybody will beat the part to Burma yet because the easier part
is already gone. So I think economic development of Burma is quite a issue which you can talk
for seven days and seven nights and things like that. But the big problem is basically not only
privatization, or, it is basically the question of rent seeking, simple as that. Rent seeking
somehow is anywhere in the world but in Myanmar case, I think rent seeking is in itself
economics.
Robert Sutter:
Professor.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Yes, if you look at the 1950’s for example, Thailand, Indonesia,
you see a cumbersome bureaucracy. Widespread pervasive rent seeking and colonialism and so
on. So if you look at economic development in the long view, somehow you have to start from
somewhere and so this is something that I think ASEAN has used as a rationale of engagement.
Now for ASEAN, as Dr. Tin mentioned in some of his points, Burma-Myanmar has signed onto
it, the charter for example. And in fact one view I’ve heard that where it is an anecdote that the
Aung Win you know, the Foreign Minister when he sign on to this, he had no interpreter with
him, no one so he didn’t know what he was signing onto. You look at ASEAN charter, it has its
fundamental freedoms, human rights, protection, promotion, and so on, and it was it was
antithetical to what Myanmar-Burma was doing. So there’s that anecdote because it only had the
Foreign Ministers in the room. Now India, I think that Dr. Tin could say more about that but for
ASEAN now, we know that SPDC does its banking in Singapore, right? And there is a lot of
trades and Thailand has invested in a huge multibillion-dollar port development, you know
extensive port development project in the wide and we will have more gas piped in from BurmaMyanmar and so the economic development of Burma-Myanmar is intrical and largely
determined by what happens in the neighborhood. So somehow if the bigger major players
outside, in Europe and in the U.S., want to play a role, have an impact, somehow they have to
engage in this process. This is not, it is not going to halt. It becomes a security imperative for
energy, for example, and things have been on this trend line. You know the more investment,
more trade, Thailand, Burma, China, Burma-Myanmar, Burma-Myanmar has access to
healthcare, banking services and so on. Malaysia, Singapore and it is going on for sometime. So
you have to somehow accept this and then you have to look at how ASEAN is very peculiar,
enigmatic, constructed creature. It works in different ways and has it’s own charter. You cannot
really pinpoint ASEAN, what it is. It’s a strange creature, it evolves all the time. It is open ended
but yet it has come far enough, you know it has come to this point and Burma-Myanmar is a
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Laos. You know it is supposed to be 2015 if they go in rotation but it could be next year if
Cambodia is willing to stand aside for a year. So somehow, ASEAN is, I think, indispensable,
instrumental, integral to what happens in Burma-Myanmar going forward.
Yun Sun:
ASEAN and Myanmar, I can only talk about China’s perspective on those things.
Well last year as Professor Sutter just mentioned, China’s relationship with some Southeast Asian
Countries were damaged because of the South China Sea issue and part of the strategy from
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing to tackle that challenges, this year there will be more
amass from China in ASEAN. China does not mind to see the diversification of investment from
Myanmar coming from different countries but we all know by the end of the day China is the one
with the most capitals so China is not afraid of the competition. Then on the issue of India, China
understands the diplomacy, the foreign policy of Myanmar does not rely on China only. China
understands that Myanmar wishes to diversify the sources of the diplomatic support and
international investment as much as possible. The only problem is now western support and the
western advancement are not available to Myanmar so of course India has become a natural
choice of the Myanmar government and China respects that. However, having said that, last year
when Than Shwe visited India before he visited Beijing. He visited India in July and visited
Beijing in August to brief these two countries about the preparation of the USDP. In the elections
and the campaigns China was tremendously angered by the fact that Than Shwe went to India
first and such these satisfactions was expressed during his stay in Beijing. In terms of the
competition between China and India still again coming back to who has more money, China
certainly does and China is not afraid or concerned about the India competition in Myanmar with
China.
Tin Maung Maung Than: Well I think why, you know the facetious answer to why India,
why Than Shwe went to India before China is astrological advice. You can’t go to the northeast
you go to the northwest first.
Joking aside I think Burma sometimes tries to show that they are independent also. Another thing
is of course, Than Shwe wanted to go to Buddhagaya, the birth place of Buddha, and he had
special significance for his legitimacy within the Burma. Although in fact, it doesn’t help I
suppose. India has two biggest obsessions with victims, Pakistan and China, right. Everybody
knows, right. In the case of China, from the perspective of China, India is not so much in terms
of priority, a strategic threat is not much. So there is a symmetric relation between India’s being
very nervous about Chinese inroads into Burma versus China nervousness of India inroads. So it
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 64 is not equal, everybody will agree that too, it is conventional wisdom. Because I mean the case of
the Indian intelligence service, Indian Navy, always complain about Chinese bases in Burma
south and all these things. Andrew is here, is Andrew here?
Unidentified Male: Uh-huh.
Tin Maung Maung Than: So you know about this story about Coco Islands and things like
that. You try to bang it but it comes back, it never goes away. So these are the kinds of things so
we have to live with it. And the Burmese Navy had to exercise with India I think, we certainly
descend to Corvette, Norita, to have an exercise in the Indian Navy quietly I think so yes, they
are hedging their bets. India’s also concerned, like China, about border stability because of the
missile run and also about those smuggling again, now partakes and again those people who are
having sanctuaries in Burmese hills who are separated from India. So they also have border
stability and they also want a corridor to the east and that’s why they are developing the port in
Sittwe and Kaladan River and of course try to outwit Bangladesh in some way. So yes, similar
interests, yes but they have less technology, the Wasinas have less technology, less international
clout, not part of the big five and so on and so forth. So they are a little bit late and so forth. And
then I think there are certain affinities as well for both India and China because the Burmese
borrowed their shirt from China and sarong from India.
Robert Sutter:
David, please.
David Steinberg:
Thanks, David Steinberg. Tin has covered a lot of what I wanted to say
about India but there is one thing that has been left out. The most severe rebellion in Northeast
India has been Naga’s. Under the new constitution in Burma, that is one of the six areas, substate regions, that will have a certain degree of autonomy is the Naga Region.
Robert Sutter:
Seven.
David Steinberg:
Which is on the border with India. So will you get an irredentist
movement among the Naga to join together when the India side and the Burma side, this is not
been looked at, I have never heard it discussed, but it is significant I think and I am sure the
Indians are very concerned about this.
Robert Sutter:
Anyone have the expertise on that one?
Tin Maung Maung Than: I haven’t heard about it but it’s a possibility and I think neighbors
worry about the Indians much more. I think the Indian will feed the Burmese on that basically.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 65 But I suspect that this autonomous zone they are giving administer itself, administers area was
given to the Naga’s. I suspect that draw, when the constitution was being drawn up, the security
viewpoint perspective given into the constitution drawing of people, especially people like Tun
Shen [PH] are more or less internal security. Basically they are worried about opposition. They
ignore the big players China and so forth but I think they don’t think that involves consideration,
during that time. On second thought, it should have taken that in consideration. Thank you.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
When we look at internal conflicts, it’s often mentioned as one of
the key cases, one of the cases to be included, India and Naga land, and we often forget you
know, that Burma, until recently, was part of India, British India. And I think that BurmaMyanmar has played us very well, it liberates as well to China, India, ASEAN in a mix,
fluctuating mix to their interests and their preferences.
Tin Maung Maung Than: That’s all the psychological element in the Burmese psyche and in
the elites as well. The Indians are seen in two ways. Under Colonial Burma, Indians, Burma is
the sub Colony of India, of true India and the Burmese say well if you were to be a Colony, why
not be a first class Colony then a second class Colony? And they resent that and on top of that,
the Indians who came and worked in Burma are two classes. One are very low-level workers and
peasants which the Burmese looked down upon them, I’m sorry to say that. And then there are
professionals, engineers and doctors and so on, Administrative police which are seen again as
something which is not good too, in a way, because the oppressors they are the hand maiden of
the … In the case of China, the earlier Chinese are traders, settlers. So the Burmese treat China
as equals or even superiors some times. They treat the Indians as inferior, which is of course
rationally wrong. But that is the psychic of my father’s generation. It still lingers on in the army
too.
Robert Sutter:
Very interesting. Yes, the question over here.
Eddie Walsh:
Eddie Walsh, John Hopkins, SAIS. Earlier, Ms. Sun had pointed out that
one of the big challenges for China is the lack of development perhaps in the interior relative to
the coastal areas. And you said that Myanmar represents to quote “an important outlet for
internal development” so we’ve also heard from numerous scholars this year that China has a
huge challenge with trying to control domestic interests within Yunnan and control their
activities with respect to Myanmar. So that leads to one of two challenges. Either the federal
government does not have much control over domestic actors on the periphery within China or
they are using that as an excuse to mask behavior which might run counter to what the official
policy of the Chinese state is. So my question is, is it a transparency issue that we’re facing with
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especially Yunnan, or is it a larger issue about governance and control within China. And in
follow-up to your answer to that question, what are challenges that arise from your answer?
Yun Sun:
I’m sorry, the last question is?
Eddie Walsh:
Yun Sun:
What are the challenges that arise from your answer.
Oh.
Tin Maung Maung Than:
Eddie Walsh:
She knows the answer already with an answer.
When you answer one question then it raises another one.
Yun Sun:
In the relationship between Beijing and Yunnan, what you said is both correct.
They are both are transparency issue and a governance issue and it is also an issue from set a
scene at the both from China’s political system. The structure is set that way, that Beijing doesn’t
have all the control over the provincial actors. And the provincial actors they have every single
reason to go their own way to pursue their interests and hope that Beijing doesn’t know about it.
But the unfortunate part is Myanmar, Beijing does find out about it through various reports from
international crisis group and other news media. So then well, then we will talk about the
domestic actors in Beijing and who are you talking about. Are you talking about Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, or Ministry of Commerce or the inaudible [01:10:10] Bureau, which doesn’t talk
about Myanmar everyday. If you ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it’s going to tell you that
what Yunnan is doing is absolutely wrong, Yunnan is allowing illegal businessmen to go into
Myanmar to chop on their trees and explore their mineral resources and these are completely
against legislations and regulations from Beijing. But Beijing doesn’t have the capacity to catch
every single cases. And what it can do is issue orders to Yunnan and telling Yunnan that you have
to stop this but when Yunnan doesn’t, unless Beijing finds out, there’s very little Beijing can do.
So I would say it is an internal problem of Chinese political system. It is not necessarily only as
applicable in the case of Myanmar, it happens through other provinces and other border countries
as well.
Robert Sutter:
Excellent, any other questions here? I had one small question which I
wanted to ask the group and that has to do with, we were talking about the background and the
attitudes towards India and attitudes toward China and so forth, how much does history impact
on the current administrations view of China? I’m thinking in particular in the lifetime of these
leaders of Myanmar who were Generals and fought in the military, I assume they fought the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 67 Burmese communist party. This was an insurgency of over 20,000 people. And my
understanding of it was that it involved a lot of the armed forces along the border like the Was
and the people of that nature. I wonder if this has any sort of a vocations for China’s for the
Myanmar administrations policy towards the Wa and just wanting to disarm these groups and are
they settling scores?
Tin Maung Maung Than: I think Burmese have scheduled frantic about this thing, about
Burmese command or hierarchy I imagine. They are, those who are now, people like inaudible
[01:12:16] they have fought the BCB, lost their men, suffered defeats at battalion level. They do
have memories. On the other hand the top leaders decide to be cozy with China for obvious
reasons. So rationally they accept that perhaps and also because of hierarchy. And Wa also. The
thing is that the Chinese collusion with the enemy, if may use that term in the past, well the
Chinese think this is the new policy, foreign policy, bump an interest no friends and enemies sort
of thing. This becomes quite schedule friendly right, but of course in the case of Burma up till
now, one or two men decide. So it doesn’t, operationally it doesn’t come into the problem.
Robert Sutter:
Uh-huh.
Tin Maung Maung Than: But in the parliamentary system, if they really practiced that there
would be questions asked about this thing and of these things. And of course in the Burmese
history of the Tatmawdaw they have to recon those battles and taught again in national defense
college and the defense of is again be the battles with the Chinese in the 13th century even, we
won. Which is not Chinese gesture, just a small part of China I suspect, but we won, that’s the
point. So we won with the Thais, so they are quite comfortable with the Generals are always, the
soldiers are the one who doesn’t want to fight, right? So this is the problem in Burma too. Yes
and history is written by the government so there are no ordinary streets available for those
inside. It is a pretty bad situation with the case of China history, with Thailand. History is one of
the problems both sides, history. So I would say so but operationally it doesn’t really affect at the
moment and then in the near future I don’t see it affecting it.
Robert Sutter:
Well thank you very much, and I thank the audience for very good
questions and please join me in oh, we have one more…yes Bill.
Bill Wise:
One question about the future.
Robert Sutter:
I’m sorry, we have one more question please. And we have plenty of time.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 68 Bill Wise: Bill Wise, Bill Wise from SAIS. It’s clear at the moment that Chinese and Indian
interests in Burma don’t overlap or actively conflict but I wonder about the future. Are there
circumstances in the future where you see either a natural conflict among, I don’t know what to
call them, strategic adversaries perhaps, over Burma or where the a Burmese regime of the future
might find advantage in playing major neighbors off against each other in a more aggressive
fashion?
Tin Maung Maung Than: It may not come directly China in the confrontation. It may come
indirectly through Pakistan, India confrontation in the future. If there is a confrontation which
leads to Cargill plus, then China would have to somehow stand in terms of weapons supplies and
things like that or even that in the UN Security Council. In that case they could drag it into the
Burma in logistic sense or in that, that is one scenario I think of. I don’t think of any China in
direct confrontation. Taiwan issue I don’t think India would bother. Bangladesh and India also
could have a confrontation and then of course China comes in again and Burma is caught in the
middle.
Robert Sutter:
Other comments on this, please.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
One area certainly is energy resources and despite the abundant
endowment of Burma-Myanmar, there are, is a race taking place for these resources and for
ASEAN and for China and India. And this is one area where you know, the eventual scarcity of
energy will act as a kind of clamp or constraining push factor for potential tension and that’s not
just between China and India but beyond as well. Another area that I think if you have a closer
U.S.- India partnership, more aligned U.S.-India position. China is very much concerned with
this what Yun Sun mentioned earlier about its encirclement that the isolation encirclement, that’s
why I was trying to go in different directions, even far, far away in Africa and so on. And for
India, they have had more of a decade, very active look east policy stance and we have had the
Indian Foreign Minister in Bangkok at inaudible University came to talk some months ago and
very clearly they are going to be much assertive in ASEAN. Especially in mainland. So now, for
the time being, it’s not an area of consternation, more cooperation than consternation but in the
future, dynamics can change and I think that the energy resources area is one potential arena for
attention.
Yun Sun:
There is certainly competition between China and India in terms of Myanmar but
whether that competition is going to evolve into a confrontation, such as a military confrontation,
I don’t think China certainly hosts that view. So if it is economic competitions in China’s bottom
line, let’s compete on economic terms, who has the better offer to make to Myanmar. But
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 69 economic competition, even in terms of energy, it is not going to lead to military confrontation
like China and India will compete for energy resources in other continents like in Africa. It
happens a lot but we haven’t seen any real diplomatic confrontation let alone military
confrontation over that issue.
Robert Sutter:
Thank you for the question. Other comments. Okay please join me in
thanking the panel for this wonderful presentation.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 70 Panel 4: Security Cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea
William Wise:
We are, as you can see, ready for panel four, and I am going to turn the
program over to Joel Wit.
Joel Wit:
Thank you. So I am glad to see that everyone is here. I think this will be a very
interesting discussion; as we all know the North Korea-Burma connection has been in the news
quite a bit over the past few years and we have an opportunity today to listen to some people
who I think know a lot about the issue, particularly in the technical area where I think a lot of the
media coverage has been sort of off base. We have five people on our panel; I guess I should
introduce everyone. Starting all the way at the end, there is Andrew Selth, who I think many of
us know has written extensively about Myanmar and Southeast Asia and is based in Australia at
the Griffith University in Brisbane. Then we have Jack Pritchard, who those of us who work on
Korea have known for a long time, is President of the Korean Economic Institute and prior to
that he was a visiting fellow at Brookings and has served as Ambassador and special envoy for
negotiations with North Korea. Then we have my old friend “Sasha” [Alexandre] Mansourov,
who is currently a visiting fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS. And then Bob Kelly,
another old friend who is a nuclear engineer and whose current affiliation is associate senior
research fellow at SIPRI and then finally David Albright, who many of us know has been
working on nuclear proliferation issues for many years and is the president of the Institute for
Science and International Security.
So, the way I propose to proceed is we will start from the end of the table and work our way
down. The first three presentations will be more focused on political and policy issues, and then
as we get down to this end, David and Bob are going to grapple with the evidence about the
North Korea-Burmese nuclear connection. I am going to be very strict, since we have a fairly
large panel. And what I propose is that every speaker talk for 10 minutes, and then we will open
it up for discussion up here and then to everyone in the audience. So why don’t we start, Andrew.
Andrew Selth:
Thanks, Joel. When I was looking for something to say this afternoon, I
tried deliberately to pick a topic that wasn’t going to overlap with the other four speakers. So, it
was a bit of a toss up between talking about why there has been so little official comment about
Burma’s relationship with North Korea, in particular about the possibility of nuclear proliferation
or missile proliferation and the other subject I thought I could perhaps look at was the issue of
why the Burmese government might want to pursue missiles or nuclear weapons if indeed that is
what they are doing. Now with only 10 minutes, I am only going to talk about the second of
these subjects.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 71 I think it is very important in looking at the question of whether or not the Burmese government
might be pursuing missile proliferation or nuclear weapons. We try and understand why they
might be doing so. This is an area that doesn’t seem to have been given very much coverage in
all the publicity and all the controversy that is swirling around the subject, but I think it is
absolutely crucial for reasons that are outlined. The mindset of Burma’s military leaders have
been very difficult to fathom, and there is precious little hard data on the long-term strategic
thinking. Its key decision-making processes, I think we all would agree, are equally opaque. But
for the sake of discussion today, let me offer four reasons why Burma might be developing a
defense relationship with North Korea that could possibly have quite disturbing ramifications for
the region.
Firstly, ever since the 1998 uprising, the General seems to be convinced that Burma faces
external intervention, possibly even an army invasion, either from the United States or an UNendorsed coalition. Over the years these fears have been dismissed as the paranoid delusions of
an isolated group of poorly educated and xenophobic soldiers, jealous of their own privileges and
afraid of being held accountable for their crimes against the Burmese people. But I think this is a
rather simplistic and self-serving explanation for the regime-siege mentality, and it ignores the
evolution of quite a complex world view among Burmese military leaders that have important
implications for the country’s foreign relations.
Now to us, an invasion of Burma might sound bizarre, as such a move has never really been
contemplated nor probably ever would be. But as gold in my ear as one supposed to have said to
Henry Kissinger, even paranoids have enemies. It would not be difficult for a Burmese strategic
analyst sitting in Nay Pyi Taw to look at developments over the past 20 years or so and construct
a picture of an existential threat to Burma, specifically to the military government. From the
United States and possibly other countries, it seemed quite real. This assessment would
obviously be floored in a few key respects, but it would still or still could be quite logical, quite
internally consistent, and supported by quite a lot of evidence, hard evidence. And as a result, I
think we have to accept that it could be really quite persuasive to the ruling leadership. Consider
this: for more than 20 years now, the military government has been strongly and publicly
condemned by a wide range of countries and international organizations. It has been the target of
financial and economic sanctions, arms embargos, travel bans, and other punitive measures. A
number of world leaders have openly expressed their wish for the military government to be
overthrown. And official funds have been provided both directly and indirectly to groups that
have as their avowed aim the regime change in Burma. So if the definition of a military threat is
a combination of intent and capability, then, from Naypiyadaw’s point of view, countries like the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 72 U.S. have clearly met both criteria, and these fears can only have been heightened by other
events around the world over the past 20 years, most recently in Libya.
Now, I should emphasize that trying to understand the military mindset is not the same as
agreeing with it or supporting it. But it is quite important, I think, to recognize that Than Shwe
and those around him could have looked at countries like North Korea and decided that the
possession of strong military forces, possibly including ballistic missiles and even nuclear
weapons, could provide Burma with a powerful bargaining chip to use in negotiations, protect
the country against international pressures, and even provide deterrents against an armed attack.
This leads me to the second reason I put forward for Burma’s current policy settings: namely the
regime’s intense nationalism and extreme sensitivity to any perceived threat to Burma’s unity,
independence, or national sovereignty. Bear in mind too that over the years the generals have
conflated the security of the country with the security of the armed forces, and that means the
security of the government and, indeed, their own security.
A third reason I would suggest, is the possession of a large and powerful armed forces, armed
with the latest technology which satisfy the regime’s view of Burma’s important place in the
region and indeed, the world.
A fourth possible reason could be that Than Shwe himself, who decides (or used to decide,
probably still does decide) what happens in Burma, woke up one day and decided he’d like to
have a nuclear weapon and, in an authoritarian regime like that, one individual’s wishes becomes
policy.
Why North Korea? Well, I think clearly both are very pragmatic regimes, they probably don’t
like each other terribly much, but they can help each other out. There is a complementarity
between Burma and North Korea where North Korea can provide conventional arms, expertise,
and things of that nature, and in return get cash, primary goods, and so on back from Burma;
they can help each other out.
Examining these issues is more than just an academic exercise, though, because unless we have a
sound knowledge of how the Burmese regime views itself and the outside world, then we will
not be able to determine why it might be adopting the policies it has, including the possible
pursuit of higher-level weapons. And unless we understand the General’s world view and
recognize Burmese threat perceptions, consider their strategic thinking, and try to discover their
decision-making processes, then we are unlikely to be able to formulate any policies and
implement any measures that might have some real impact in Nay Pyi Taw. I would suggest that
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 73 over the past 20 years, some of the policies that have been adopted and clung to with some
strength have not in fact been predicated on a careful understanding of what the Burmese
military leadership is really thinking and how it might react. I think this is critical, because
policies that are implemented without careful thought about their likely impact on the regime,
and their possible long-term consequences, risk being useless or, in the worst case, even counterproductive. And if Burma really is pursuing WMD programs, whether it is developing ballistic
missiles or possibly even a nuclear weapon, and we will hear more about that shortly, then that
clearly would be disastrous.
Let me leave you with one question: if one accepts the reasons I have suggested for Burma’s
defense relationship with North Korea, and there is probably other reasons that could fit into that
mix as well, and if Nay Pyi Taw is interested in developing missiles and possibly a nuclear
weapon, then is there anything that the international community can realistically do to try and
persuade them otherwise? If you accept that the regime’s mindset is as I have outlined it briefly,
then there doesn’t seem to be a great deal that any country is likely to be able to do to change its
mind, because what we are dealing with here is a deep-seeded sense of threat, a deep-seeded
conviction that Burma needs to protect itself from the outside world, and obviously, the Burmese
government has India and China in mind when it looks at its strategic environment, not just the
U.S. or the UN. So, if these are the deep-seeded issues that go to the core of some of the
Burmese government’s policies, to what extent are we able to influence their strategic thinking
and therefore influence those policies? And I would suggest that actually there is not very much
we can do. I might leave it there, Joel.
Joel Wit:
Thank you, Andrew. Jack?
Jack Pritchard:
Thank you, Joel. Thanks to the organizers of this conference. I was a little
concerned about the direction we were going to go, from the vague to the specific, but I am
actually very glad Andrew went first, because it is reinforcing what I intended to talk to, and that
is the similarities both between Burma and North Korea and how we perceive them. I would
almost say that you could take virtually everything that Andrew said, his four points, and
substitute North Korea for Burma, or Myanmar, and it would be absolutely correct to include his
concluding remark in terms of there may be very little that we can do about it in the sense that a
regime is well-entrenched, and that from a strategic point of view as how they look at things,
we’re not on their same page, they are well-ensconced in what they believe, and there is very
little that we can do externally.
So let me take a look, first if I may, in terms of the similarities on how we, the United States,
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 74 view each of the countries; we are going to start with the parallels here. Obviously we view both
of these countries as dictatorial regimes, the military plays a significant role, one more so than
the other, but not quite, and they are very parallel. Both are very secretive and non-transparent.
We view them as being outside of the international mainstream. We often talk about bringing
them back into the international fold. Both are under U.S. and international sanctions. We are
concerned about their human rights abuses and their political suppression of their peoples. Both
are viewed as potential regional threats. One has, and the other may have, a nuclear weapons
program; we will hear more about that, and I will circle back to talk about that a little bit more.
This one is not quite parallel, but it is part of the evidence that is being discussed: one is a master
tunneler, and the other may very well be a master tunnel apprentice. We’ll have to see.
Both have decades of economic mis-management. There is significant malnutrition, particularly
among the young, among children, and in that sense we see a real need for humanitarian
assistance in both cases. How we go about that in each case may be different. Neither Burma nor
North Korea is a client state of China, but both have critical relationships with Beijing. In this
case, Beijing is concerned, as we heard earlier in the previous panel, really about the same things;
the stability along their border. As we talk about North Korea and Chinese concerns about the
North Koreans’ nuclear program, it is very clear, to those of us that watch this, that the Chinese
national interest that trumps even that is their concern about stability.
We see a lack of cooperation with the IAEA. So, these are a lot of things that we see that are
similar. Now the one significant difference (and it may develop that it is like this) is that we
view the threat by North Korea more than just in regional terms. This is, in some cases, a threat
to other allies and directly to the United States, depending on what you believe their pace of
development of their delivery systems would be, but ultimately we are concerned about the
threat to the United States by North Korea. That I am not sure I can buy into in terms of
Myanmar. And I suggest that when you take a look at some of what we are moving at in terms of
policy approaches to both Myanmar and North Korea, how we view them has a great deal in
which to offer as a point of explanation.
We take a look at some of these things; what we want out of both is adherence to and compliance
with arms control, non proliferation in some cases, and disarmament agreements, and we find
that we need, in terms of identification of nuclear or suspect nuclear sites (in the case of North
Korea we are mostly concerned about the newer revelations about their uranium enrichment), a
voluntary effort by the countries involved, because of our inability to pinpoint exactly where
things are. We want full transparent implementation of UN Security Council resolutions, which
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 75 we deemed to be critical to global peace and security. In these cases again, Myanmar and North
Korea are essentially interchangeable.
The U.S. policy towards Burma has been described as pragmatic, involving senior-level dialogue,
a need to test their intentions. We say it will take time, it ought to be step-by-step, and we need
concrete actions on our core concerns before we are prepared to move forward into a new
relationship. We also suggested with the case of Myanmar that if it doesn’t really work out, let’s
look to the future; there is a new generation of leaders which we may be able to work with.
And we also heavily depend upon the international community to help guide us there. Now, our
view of North Korea is not much different. We described our policy towards North Korea as one
of strategic patience. We say that North Korea needs to show a level of sincerity, and we need to
see movement on our core issues there. We have concerns that they, as Andrew indicated with
Myanmar, are really not going to give up their nuclear weapons. We talked about a need for
North Korea and South Korea to show progress in their own development and in the case of
North Korea, we have refined what we had talked about in terms of the international
community’s input, that being the Six-Party Talks process.
I pulled some testimony from David Steinberg, and I don’t know if David is here or not, and it
goes to Andrew’s number one point. In the testimony when he is talking about Burma, he says
we have in effect played into the hands of military leaders who thus justify their position that a
garrison state under their dictatorial control is necessary because of perceived foreign threats.
That is absolutely true with regard to North Korea. And as Andrew put it so well, that from the
outside, if we take a look at the North Koreans’ justification of what they are doing, you kind of
scratch your head and say I’m not sure I’m going to buy into that. An invasion of North Korea by
the United States? Probably not in the cards there. But from their own points of view, and with
equal amounts of evidence in stunning parallel to Andrew’s points, the North Koreans believe
that as well.
And finally, I think there is, from both points of view, a decided lack of priority in terms of how
the United States approaches both North Korea and Myanmar. Now, I want to get into just kind
of a brief description of concerns that I have and prescription of where this may lead. With
regard to North Korea, and ultimately I would suggest the same applies to Myanmar, we are very
concerned about the potential for proliferation and in the case of North Korea, there is a proven
track record of nuclear technology proliferation. We saw that most vividly when the Israeli air
force eliminated a Syrian reactor in September of 2007. Not that that occurred, but that it could
occur under the circumstances in which it did, a post 9-11 environment, the North Koreans took
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 76 a look at what they were facing and made decisions about consequences and moved forward
anyway. So while I don’t pretend to be an expert on Myanmar, I have to believe that ultimately a
nuclear weapons program, if that is in fact where they are headed, in the hands of the Burmese,
as you take a look at the lack of transparency of the regime, would have to be a concern that we
have.
The enriched uranium facility that the North Koreans revealed to me in early November of this
past year has to be a concern in the sense of how quickly this particular facility came up, the
location it came up, and the quality of what has at least preliminarily been described, which all
points to a tendency of the United States to underestimate the abilities of North Koreans to do
things both at the pace and at the quality. I have to think that we have to be concerned about
Myanmar as well.
One of the things that I just want to interject here from the previous panel (or maybe it was the
earliest panel today), is the relationship between South Korea and the United States and the
impact that it may have on U.S. policy with regard to North Korea and Burma. In the case of
South Korea, there is a serious economic relationship with Myanmar. That is not the case with
South Korea and North Korea, with the minor exception of The Kaesong Industrial Complex, but
it sets up the potential tension between the United States and South Korea, should the concerns
about Burma proceed anymore rapid and in a more fulsome pace. While our relationship with the
South Koreans regarding North Korea is absolutely solid to the point that we have deferred to the
South Koreans a judgment on really when the United States can move forward in its own
relationship with North Korea, there is the potential contradiction here and the potential of
conflict between the United States and South Korea should these concerns move forward.
Let me try to wrap up my comments in terms of where we need to go and what we need to take a
look at. I would suggest that the weak points, whether or not we can do this or not is up to debate,
but we ought to focus on some of the weak points. When we were concerned about the full
application of the UN Security Council Resolution 1874, we saw the North Koreans try to test
that right out of the get go, and in terms of a potential shipment of military or illegal cargo on the
North Korean merchant ship, the Kang Nam, coming out of port in North Korea, headed, we
believe, to Myanmar. Now, the international spotlight at that point in time was both on North
Korea and the recipient country, and I would like to believe that the spotlight was intense enough
that the authorities in Myanmar, regardless of the relationship between Myanmar and North
Korea, essentially sent a message to the North Koreans: “turn that ship around, we are not going
to unload it, we are not going to have this essential spotlight on us as we unload illegal cargo.”
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 77 That seems to be a vulnerable point that, with some degree of planning, we can focus on.
Let me just end by saying that whether it is pragmatic or strategic patience, I think this is a
euphemism for not having a very active or coordinated plan, and a willingness by the United
States to let things run their course until it becomes a high enough priority. I was part of a
Council on Foreign Relations task force on U.S. policy towards North Korea, and one of the
things that the taskforce expressed its concern about was that there is a significant risk that the
administration’s strategic patience will result in acquiescence to North Korea’s nuclear status as a
fait accompli. I think that same risk applies to the growing security cooperation between
Myanmar and North Korea; the US needs to pay serious and continuing attention to the
Myanmar-North Korea relationship, or as I had indicated earlier, we are going to be surprised
one day. Let me stop there.
Joel Wit:
Thank you, Jack. Sasha?
Alexandre “Sasha” Mansourov: Thank you, good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Let me
first express my gratitude to the organizers of the conference, David Steinberg and Jae Ku, for
their kind invitation. I was asked to talk about the North Korean’s perceptions of this relationship.
Let me start by saying that, although everybody seems to be focused on the past four years since
the normalization, the North Korean-Burmese relationship has been relatively old. They go back
to 1957, when the first interstate trade treaty was signed and following that, basically, for about
25 years they had very robust cultural economic exchanges, culminating in the visits of the prime
ministers back and forth, the economy ministers, cultural ministers, people like Kim Yong-nam
(if you are familiar with the name), the current Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) president and
the nominal number two leader in North Korea. He went to Burma in 1982, I believe. Yang
Hyong Sop, the vice chairman of the SPA, he went to Burma too. If you look at the top North
Korean leadership other than Kim Jong -Il, even Hwang Jang-yop, the guy defected to South
Korea when he was the head of the international department, he went to Burma. Most of the
senior generation of North Korean leadership back in the 70s and 80s went to Burma, or
entertained Burmese officials coming to Pyongyang. And there was a time when, especially in
the 60s and early 70s, South Korea was lagging behind North Korea in its economic growth and
the Burmese were actually learning from the North Koreans how to run their economy, how to
educate their students, and how to manage their healthcare system.
So that was then. But then, of course, despite all these exchanges, we have the October 1983
Rangoon bombing. When I arrived in Pyongyang, I think in late ’84, as one of the diplomatic
functions, the talk of the town was the disappearance of Kim Jun Rim; that is how I got my
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 78 introduction to the North Korean-Burmese connection. Kim Jun Rim, of course, was the party
secretary in charge of South Korea affairs, the director of the UFD, United Front Department at
the time, and the guy who masterminded the Rangoon bombing. Of course, because it didn’t go
well, he was set, disappeared, and we had these discussions on whether he was executed or what.
Of course, two years later, he emerged in 1986 as president of KCNA, Korean Central News
Agency. So that put an end, kind of, to that saga inside Pyongyang and all the purges.
But from November ‘83 until April 2007, for almost another quarter of a century, relations had
basically been severed, despite repeated overtures from Pyongyang and efforts to normalize these
relations especially since 1990, when the military junta took power. Relations didn’t really go
anywhere, despite the fact that North Korea supported the Burmese application to join ASEAN
in the mid ‘90s. North Korea opposed the UN, the U.S., and Western sanctions against the
military junta in the ‘90s. It sold a whole bunch of weapons, Andrew talks about it in his
writings, to the Burmese. So, despite all of that, for quarter of a century, there was no
relationship and it was only in 2007 that the long and arduous march towards normalization
finally produced some results. I was in Brunei in March 2007, talking to a student audience and
then we had a reception. All of a sudden a Myanmar diplomat came up to me and asked me a
question. I was, at that time, working for the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, the DOD
institution, and he came up to me and asked me: “what do you think if Burma normalizes
relations with North Korea?” I was stunned to hear that, and my first reaction was to refer him to
the State Department to get the official U.S. Government reaction. The only thing I could say
was: “if your government no longer considers North Korea a terrorist state and, by the way, it
was your government that not only declared North Korea to be a terror-sponsoring state, which
gave a reason, a good reason, for the United States to later put North Korea on the list of terrorsponsoring states, but it actually de-recognized North Korea as a member of the international
system. So, if you don’t need any apology, if you don’t need any compensation, and if you no
longer see North Korea as a terror-sponsoring state, that is basically your decision.” And guess
what? A month later, Burma and North Korea established diplomatic relations, without any
apology, without any compensation.
The relations obviously quickly expanded to cover the military technical area, culminating in the,
I would say first, the foreign minister’s exchanges back and forth, the visa-free agreement, and in
November 2008, we had this major military delegation from Burma visiting North Korea. But
again, as I said, the relationship was up and down, up and down all the time because, as probably
you are aware, very soon the news about this visit was leaked and was posted all over the world
via the internet, which really slowed it down and I would say even froze it. It froze the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 79 relationship for the entirety of 2009, because this was a very serious security breach on the part
of the Burmese. The North Korean establishment, those elements within the North Korean
national defense establishment, especially the intelligence community and security services,
which was still suspicious about the Burmese and couldn’t get over the fact that the Burmese derecognized North Korea in 1983, basically went to Kim Jong-Il and said: “we told you so, you
cannot trust these people who essentially kept us in the dungeon for 25 years.”
The relationship began to improve slightly only in 2010, that is last year, and I guess, as you
probably heard, after a whole bunch of prosecutions and executions in Rangoon, which mollified
the North Korean concerns about those people who leaked that sensitive information, the North
Korean foreign minister went back to Myanmar last August and basically turned the page. So I
would say new chapter in the relationship was opened.
So what are the basic North Korean perceptions about Burma? First of all, and I agree with
everything Jack said, by the way, about the similarities between the two regimes and the
domestic position, the international position, Kim Jong-Il does not regard Burma as “core state”
vital to North Korea’s national security. Hence, core states include China, Japan, Russia, South
Korea, and the United States, and that’s it; anything else is not vital. So he doesn’t consider the
Burmese relationship to be strategic, because no matter what happens to this relationship, and we
saw good days and bad days, there won’t be any direct impact on the survivability of the North
Korean regime, and that is how he defines the core state. I mean, a breach with China could have
a big impact on that. South Korea is existential, but with Burma, again whether it is an up or a
down, really, the regime does not feel much pain. So that is number one.
Number two, given Kim Jong-Il’s imperative to form a common front, a common front with the
countries that are anti-American, anti-imperialist leaning, North Korea seeks to develop
relationships with all the countries that are subject to the U.S., what they call U.S. hatred, U.S.
hostile policy, U.S.-led international sanctions, especially if those countries seek to develop
strong militaries but lack the necessary military technology and expertise. There is a list of about
10 countries starting with Cuba, (number one on that list), Vietnam, Syria, Laos, and Burma,
holding the fifth place on that list of countries, surprisingly well ahead of Iran in that united
common front of anti-American, anti-imperialist countries with which North Korea is trying to
develop a relationship. As soon as the Bush administration branded Rangoon as a rogue regime
and North Korea in 2002-2003, the North Korean government basically stepped up its efforts to
consolidate the common anti-U.S., anti-imperialist front, and reached out to Burma and really
tried to push forward with this normalization process.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 80 So, again, this inaudible with Burma should be regarded as part of the North Korean
government’s broader strategy to mount international resistance to the “U.S. global offensive”
against what they call peace loving and independent nations.
Now, the third consideration on how North Koreans approach Burma is really economic. Given
the small number of markets, potential markets for the North Korean trade both legal and illegal,
Kim Jong-Il sees Burma as a useful economic partner, again, not vital, not crucial, but one which
is interested in many of the military goods and services that the North Koreans want to sell
despite international sanctions, specifically what we call the three G’s: guns, grains and gems.
Burma needs more military hardware, especially to suppress an increasingly rebellious urban
population and ethnic rebels in the border areas, and North Koreans basically have it for sale. For
its part, North Korea needs rice, rubber (a big item in bilateral trade), and other essentials, and is
willing to accept the bartered deals, deals which suit the Burmese generals.
So, if you look at some other areas of cooperation, you will see joint development of timber
resources (North Koreans have a great expertise in timber, with North Korean labor in Russia
doing all this logging), the hydro power plants construction and dam construction; this is the
North Korean expertise at work. North Korean assistance is also obviously in mining; they have
a great expertise in mining and construction. You saw the picture of the palace; I need to do some
more research but I suspect that the inaudible overseas construction company from Pyongyang
built that palace in Rangoon, the new palace for the generals.
And, of course, you have the arms sales. Again, Andrew wrote a lot about the arms sales from
Pyongyang to Rangoon, and it is a lucrative business for the secondary economy committee, an
organization inside North Korea which is responsible for the ammunitions industry as well as the
ammunitions industry department within the central committee. It is interesting that before the
Rangoon bombing, essentially the cabinet of ministers, the international department, and, at
some point, the united front department, were primarily involved in all dealings with Burma in
North Korea. After the normalization, the set of actors changed on the North Korean side, and we
see the second economic committee of the ammunitions industry department and the
international department kind of running the show.
But again, you have to keep in mind the fact that North Korea is India’s major rival in the
Burmese arms market and China doesn’t really mind North Korea undermining the Indian arms
sales in the Burmese arms market with its business deals. Now, the rivalry with South Korea in
Burma is an important consideration as well. After all, the 1983 bombing, I mean not the
bombing itself but everything leading up to the bombing, all the exchanges, were designed to
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 81 deny South Koreans entry into Burma. And so, even today the North Korean government is
seeking to contain and counter act the South Korean economic and political influence in Burma
via the arms deals.
Now, what are the prospects (and here I will stop)? If you follow the diplomatic traffic between
the two countries, we see personal messages from Kim Jong-Il to the Burmese leaders and this is
unusual; it shows that there is an interest in communication and in a relationship among the
senior leadership. Now Kim Yong-Il, the current director of the international department close to
Kim Jong-Il, is involved in this relationship and managing this relationship. He was the guy who
went to Burma in 2007 to normalize ties, he was the guy who went to Burma to sign the visa-free
agreement for diplomatic and service passport holders in 2008, and he is, again, he is the main
China guy in the North Korean foreign policy establishment, so clearly in Kim Jong-Il’s mind,
Burma and China are linked closely and Kim Jong-Il pays personal attention to everything
related to Burma.
So his decision on how much to engage Burma will depend critically on his assessment of two
factors: first, his assessment of the prospects for the U.S.-North Korean bilateral diplomacy and
for breaking out of international isolation, and second, on his assessment of the impact of North
Korean-Burmese cooperation on relations with China. On the first one, if talks with Washington
completely break down, Pyongyang probably will step up its efforts to upgrade military to
military ties with Burma by expanding weapons trade to include long-range missiles, interpreting
the collapse in talks with Washington as portending long-term isolation and the need to rebuild
ties with like-minded countries.
Now, the second factor, given heavy Chinese interest in Burma, and again, Chinese played a very
significant role in bringing North Korea and Burma back together in 2007. I believe Pyongyang
would carefully consider the potential impact on North Korea-China relations, before they get
deeply involved in any kind of nuclear cooperation with Burma without the Chinese consent.
And I don’t believe that the Chinese now favor the emergence of the Burmese bomb. So, Kim
Jong-Il would have to be persuaded that the benefits to North Korea far outweigh the costs to his
relationship with Beijing. What other benefits could he derive from Rangoon that they would
outweigh, far outweigh, the damage to the relationship with Beijing? It is really difficult for me
to see how the nuclear cooperation with Rangoon, despite the North Korean track record of
proliferation, would advance the core North Korean interest. Because again, if Kim Jong-Il
judges that the Chinese strongly oppose North Korean nuclear cooperation with Burma, he
would be very reluctant to move forward given North Korean political and economic dependence
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 82 on Beijing, Kim Jong-Il’s ongoing efforts to improve ties with China and increasing tension on
the peninsula.
Again, only and only if Pyongyang’s relations with Beijing slide into a new negative phase, and
this is possible, I mean we saw it before, will Kim Jong-Il, might Kim Jong-Il, share his nuclear
expertise with the Burmese in the same way he approached Syria after China supported the UN
Security Council resolutions against Pyongyang following the North Korean missile and nuclear
deaths in 2006. Thank you very much for your attention.
Joel Wit:
Thank you Sasha, very interesting. Now we are going to switch gears a little bit
and get to the issue that I guess a lot of people are concerned about, and that is the nuclear
relationship between North Korea and Burma. Both of our speakers have written very
extensively about that, so we will start with Bob Kelley.
Robert “Bob” Kelley:
Thank you very much Bill and Jae for inviting me here; coming to
the U.S. is always a treat and to talk to people about what we are doing. Over the last year I have
talked on this subject quite a bit, about why there is strong evidence for a nuclear program in
Burma. But the question that keeps getting asked, and was asked for this conference, was: what
is the evidence that it is tied to the DPRK. And the answer in one word is there really isn’t any; I
guess none is one word. And when we published our paper back in June of last year, I think we
said that as clearly as we knew how.
Where there is plenty of evidence is in other areas such as tunneling, such as missiles, such as
other conventional military arms cooperation between the two countries. But when Olli and I
looked at all of the defector information that was available and other things, we really didn’t find
much. And we found what the press does, which is turn your words around and say “oh, yes, they
found evidence of program cooperation between the two countries,” and that just isn’t the case.
So my opening statement to you is there really isn’t any evidence that we have found at this point,
and I will talk a little bit more about what I have done to look at that.
Let’s go forward just a little bit here, and start with the assertions about the program. No doubt
you have heard that there might be some controversy on this topic, but I assure you after 35 years
in the University of California weapons labs and managing nuclear intelligence at Los Alamos, I
am on pretty safe ground here. I think we are going to see something very good today though,
and that is that my good friend and colleague David Albright has published some technical
criticism and I am really looking forward to that, because there hasn’t been any technical
criticism for the 10 months since this paper came out.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 83 We know that there is a small acknowledged program; that is really not much of a question. They
have a man who works with IAEA and is their front to the world named Ko Ko Oo. They have
an agreement with the Russians for a small laboratory and a small research reactor; they say it is
for medical purposes. That goes back to about the year 2000; however, it has never been
consummated. The agreement was upgraded in 2007, but there is no way the Russians are going
to supply that laboratory and that reactor because they are smart. They know that it would not be
under proper safeguards and they don’t trust this country. And so, they are asking, and the IAEA
is asking, Burma to upgrade their IAEA agreements. They are very out of date, they are the most
obsolete type, and the way Burma handles that is not by saying we can’t do it, we won’t do it, we
will do it; they just won’t answer the mail. It’s a good diplomatic stalling tactic, but after some
years of this activity, you begin to realize that they don’t intend to cooperate.
Now, it could be because the phone lines are down, but that is probably not it, because they take
several million dollars a year from the IAEA for technical cooperation, training scientists as you
heard this morning. Many scientists were trained in South Korea, and they work on a number of
topics. This is not related to a nuclear power program. We had that question this morning for Dr.
Kim; it is not for nuclear power, you can see that. They are way too small, they don’t have
anything close to the kind of infrastructure that they need, and the kinds of things that we have
seen them working on are not related to nuclear power; it is a small research program, potentially
a clandestine weapons program.
Now we have had rumors for a long time, I think you all have heard them. I probably read
reports from a half a dozen defectors now who have talked about the same things; could it be that
the defectors are talking to each other and reinforcing each other? Always could be. They talk
about things like the training in Moscow that they have been receiving, not just on nuclear
engineering, but also chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, things like that. So you
know right away that there is the potential; a lot of students have been going there and when you
talk to people like our Russian friends, they say “oh yes, went to school with them, we know
they are there.” So there is very strong evidence that that information is true.
But what really changed things in my mind is a very well-placed defector who came out; you
heard about Zaw Win this morning. Zaw Win was an army major who came out with the help of
DVB, Democratic Voice of Burma, back in February of last year, and he brought images and
documents of what he was doing and he brought a description of what he had been doing, what
he had been told he was working on. That is Zaw there on the left, holding an impeller for a
liquid-fueled engine; on the right is a fluoride bed reactor which I believe is used for making
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You can take any one of these things, like the fluoride bed reactor, and say “oh, I see that, I don’t
see anything else, and so I am not sure that is really what that is.” But what we have from this
source is a whole series of photographs of a number of pieces of equipment, and then a
description from him on briefings he attended of what it was they were supposed to be doing. So
when you look at the program, you see there is a program; it is not just about a single piece of
equipment that someone doesn’t understand or doesn’t recognize. I will give you an example of
that (this isn’t about my Burma presentation): there is a bomb reactor that they were working on
and a former high official of IAEA said that is not a bomb reactor… do you really want me to
explain the bomb reactor?
Joel Wit:
I think you need to because it sounds like a bomb reactor. It isn’t.
Robert Kelley:
I am going to say what I was going to say first and then I will tell you
what a bomb reactor is. A senior official of IAEA looked at the pictures and said, “Oh, that is not
a bomb reactor, I wouldn’t make it that way.” But when we mailed him a drawing of a bomb
reactor from an open publication that someone else had made, you could see that it is very close
to a re-engineered job. A bomb reactor is simply a device for taking metal fluorides and reducing
it in a very high pressure, high temperature environment to get the metal out of the chemical
compound that is the thing that you want. I believe that compound is uranium because our source
says it was the uranium program; other people may say that it was for other materials for other
reasons.
As I said Sai is a 34 year old major. His bona fides are well-established. He has shown his face,
he has appeared in the documentary, his real name is out there. The Burmese government has in
fact castigated him for being a dirty rotten traitor by name, and said that he really never should
have left and they will kill him if he comes back. His family has in fact been interrogated. So, he
is a real person; he is not hiding who he is. We have a lot of information and hundreds of
photographs that we published for people to look at. Notice that he is a missile guy. He went to
school at Bowman in Moscow, he knew people that were involved in nuclear engineering, but
not him. He doesn’t know anything about nuclear engineering and when he shows us pictures
and says “here are the pictures of things that we are making in my factory,” he says “I don’t
know what they were; that is your job to figure it out.” And of course, that is what an intelligence
analyst does. He was deputy manager of some of those factories, so he knew who some of the
customers were. And he was briefed along with his general officers when he went as an aid on
what the program was about. They were told they were building a reactor, they were told they
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 85 were going to enrich uranium, and they were told that the goal was going to be weapons. You
heard this morning about the briefing that he got from inaudible before he went.
Now here is where I really wanted to go with this conference today rather than talk about the past
so much: this guy is a mechanical engineer. He doesn’t know nuclear engineering topics. He
gives us information, and it is our job to analyze and figure out what this stuff is. He tells us what
they were making and he tells us what he knows about the DPRK. Now, after the first
publication we made, I have gone back and interviewed him a couple of times. And because this
topic was so important to many people, I went into it in great detail. I said, “Well, do you know
any North Koreans?” “Yes.” “Did you ever work with them?” “Yes.” “When?” “Only before I
went to Moscow for training back in 2001.” “Did you ever work with them again?” “No.” “But
you know their language, you know what they look like, you have had associations with them?”
“Yes.” So, what he says is after he came back from Moscow for his training, again, in missiles in
nuclear engineering, he never saw a Korean again. He did correct that once and said that some
people gave some training at the DSTA, but he had nothing to do with that and it was on the fire
systems for small missiles.
So, what I am saying is that it is very reasonable to postulate that there is support from DPRK.
Sasha has made some good points about why maybe there aren’t some reasons to do it, the
Chinese might not approve. Well I can stand up here and tell you what we said in our original
report: we don’t have evidence of a relationship with the DPRK, and because that was the topic
of this particular seminar, that is really where I wanted to go.
So let me just repeat the last line: the news sources completely turned around what we said,
based on news articles for a number of days after the paper was published. Now here is what I
want to know. Here is Sai. He is a mechanical engineer; he is holding a component for a missile.
He is standing in front of one of the machines that we know was sold by the Germans to this
factory. We have seen other pictures of the machines in the factory, so we know it is the same
place in Burma where the Germans go and look at things. But nobody is talking to him; he hasn’t
been debriefed by any intelligence agency, no one has gone to him, no national government other
than the people who are helping him seek asylum. Now, we hear all the time, like before the Iraq
War, that U.S. males of northern European extraction make lousy spies, they don’t fit in, they
don’t speak Arabic, they don’t speak Burmese. We know that. And when people complain, we
don’t have an intelligence system that works because we can’t send our guys there. Well, that is
fine as far as that goes. But here is a guy that was there. Here is a guy that knows what was going
on, here is a guy that should be talked to. And 10 months have gone by and no one is talking to
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send him questions, Jeff talked to him, that is to say by question and answer, and wrote an
assessment of the component that he is handling there. But no one has come to see this guy.
A part of the problem, I think, is that any large country that deals with him, might own him. They
might have to support him for the rest of his life, he becomes their property, their problem, but I
think that is a concern.
There needs to be somebody who does this all the time, needs to be somebody who looks at
multiple disciplines. Coming from my background at IAEA, I know the IAEA would never ask
me questions about chemical weapons or missiles. They would be scared to, they wouldn’t know
what to ask, they wouldn’t know what to do with the information, and so they are not going to
talk to him about the other things he knows. In fact, I really didn’t talk to him much because I am
not competent in those areas. CWC, we have the same problem. What if you want to share
samples of what this brings out, will the IAEA share the samples that they take looking for radio
nuclides with CWC? The answer is no way. Their mandate will prohibit that, and they would be
very, very afraid to do it and it goes the other way. So I am suggesting there needs to be another
organization, probably within the UN, that deals with all of these things and isn’t hampered.
A good example of that, I think, is the Japanese magnetometer. If you are not familiar with this, it
is something that I think that iso-system has done an analysis of, and I think the Monterey
Institute has also done a good analysis. And in this case, you get something that we know what
the item is, but we don’t have the details. The Japanese don’t want to tell you the models and the
details and all the things you need to know that really do a good analysis. So we conclude that it
could be used for gyroscopes, it could be used for ring magnets for centrifuges; those are two
very different things. And we all know the answer: maybe it could be used for both, maybe it can
be used for one, maybe it can be used for neither. So I am suggesting this guy, this source from
Burma, is actually a very good reason for us to stop and think: do we have the right collection
systems in place, do we have the right analysis in place? I am proposing this as an international
thing as opposed to a national thing. And I think that is where I’ll stop.
Joel Wit:
Thank you, Bob. David?
David Albright:
Well, thank you very much. Bob mentioned a study we put out today that
is actually an older one; it was like a backlog. But I would say that there have been many
technical criticisms of Bob’s analysis. They haven’t always been made public but I will just
mention one by an IAEA expert group last summer, which also looked at the pictures of items
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 87 and there wasn’t an agreement on what any single one was actually for. And I think what we did
in our study today really is let’s look at this bomb reactor, but let’s go to somebody who has no
stake in this fight, who is a person with about 50 years experience, 40 or 50 years experience,
with this exact equipment making metals, uranium, rare earths, other metals, and been involved
or worked in a laboratory that actually developed the process during the Manhattan Projects, the
Ames Laboratory. He looked at it and said to us that you can’t tell from this picture what it is for,
there is enough uses for it that you just can’t make a decision. So, you are then left with finding
other information. And that is what I will come back to later: Burma and the analysis around
Burma suffers from a reoccurring problem of, I would just say, bias. I have some solutions for
that, but essentially in our work at ISIS where we looked at many countries over, for me, 30
years at ISIS, 20 years, we have rarely ever seen a country’s analysis that suffers from such bias
as we have seen in Burma. But again, I will come back to that.
At ISIS, we call Burma a nuclear wannabe. We think that, probably in their heart, they would
like to have nuclear weapons, or if not, put together the infrastructure that would allow them to
make that kind of decision later on. Maybe it will just be for power in the end, or research, or
medical isotopes, but at the same time, perhaps in the long run, it could be for weapons. But they
really don’t have any nuclear infrastructure. I think we have all agreed on this panel that it is a
very simple program, and on their own, they are not going to go anywhere. And that is really
why at ISIS, we start looking at North Korea, and I would say that the lack of evidence, and I
don’t want to sound hardline but I will give examples, shouldn’t guide your policy on dealing
with a country you worry about. Think of Libya and AQ Con. Our analysis until 2003 was that
Libya had no chance of getting nuclear weapons. Who would have thought that AQ Con would
sell them a gas centrifuge plant and be willing to help design weapons? Everyone missed Syria,
that started in 2001 or earlier, and it was simply missed. So I think that you have to worry a great
deal in thinking about a country like Burma, but how do you head off a future problem? I will
focus on that. What is the evidence that you do worry about? I mean, I have given a theoretical
possibility and Burma hangs with Syria, probably would have hung along with Libya if it could
have. They understand their weaknesses and they understand their needs, that they have to get it
from the outside.
But in the case of Burma, there has also been some evidence that again, and I agree with Bob,
that there is no direct evidence, but for us for example, when we learned about the Syrian reactor
back in the Fall of 2007, we also learned that a company called Nam Chong Gong, a North
Korean entity, had been a key in providing that reactor. And in that same conversation, it was
actually with a European intelligence organization, they said NCG is involved with Burma. So
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 88 you have to make the connection that NCG is providing a reactor to Syria; could they also be
providing something to Burma? And of course, no one is saying they did, or that they necessarily
would, but that you have to wonder. Bob raised the case of the magnetometer. That sale, and
involved other equipment related to either ring magnets, well ring magnets essentially, whether
used in centrifuges or elsewhere, that was organized by a North Korean trading entity
headquartered in Beijing and Pyongyang and Hong Kong. So, why were they doing this? And
what were the connections that would have led to this kind of sale? Was this equipment for
Burma? Was it for North Korea? North Korea uses very circuitous routes. Or was it for Iran? We
don’t know, but the Japanese prosecutors did come to the conclusion that, at least in their minds,
they thought the end use was Burma. This came out after a report we published back in January
of 2010, but we heard from the Japanese that we thought the end user was Burma. So again, it is
not proof of any kind of collaboration, but secondary to the worry of a nuclear transfer is the
worry that they are collaborating on procurement for whomever, whether it is Burma, North
Korea, Iran, that they are working together. One of the other common features of that is China.
China is a great gap in the export control system right now, in the UN Security Council system
right now, and it is very easy to go to China, unfortunately, right now, and buy European,
American. Then it looks like a Chinese domestic sale, but then the smuggling organization,
whether it is North Korea or Iran that gets the stuff illegally. So again, no direct evidence but
still a worry.
Now on the Burmese analysis, we have had a lot of trouble with them, I will be honest. And Bob
is a close colleague, a friend, and we have had trouble with his analysis. Really what it comes
down to, although I must say we have a lot less trouble with Bob’s analysis than we have had
with some of the others, where we think if it was true, Burma would rank up there way beyond
North Korea in its nuclear capabilities, reactors, enrichment plans, plans to build nuclear
weapons, and on and on, is what we have seen in this literature. But what it is is that ultimately
too much of it depends on defectors, and I would say the lack of state, responsible state
participation in the debate. I will refer you to our publications to look at some of the criticisms of
Burmese studies. But the other part of this is very troubling, because we are an outside group, we
are small, Burma is certainly not a priority for us. For us, Iran and North Korea take a lot more of
our resources. We have worked on Burma since 2000, 2001. We were first asked to get involved
by the Thai government to assess some of these potential reactor sales to Burma. But still, it is
not a priority. What we are looking for is the governments to weigh in, and they won’t.
I think Senator Lugar in his own frustration on Friday introduced legislation to require the U.S.
government to give a report on North Korean-Burmese military cooperation, and there certainly
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 89 would be a component of that that is nuclear. And that really has been part of the problem. Some
of it can be understood, and we have had it explained to us by governments, that if the elephant
in the room or the tent is Syria, it was a horrible, horrible intelligence failure. People tend to
think of the bombing as a success in a way but in fact, it was a horrible intelligence failure. And
so if a government is going to come out and say there is nothing nuclear in Burma, they want to
be 100% certain, which you can’t ever be. So in a sense they are caught in a bind, that if they
come out and trash these studies, we’ll exclude Bob’s, but let’s say these outrageous ones, then
they risk being accused later that they just missed something because they may have, because we
have missed Syria, missed Libya. It may surprise people that the Libya deal with AQ Con went
back to about 1989 or 90. And for those of you who question sanctions, it was the draconian
sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN in the early 90’s that put a halt to that deal for five years.
Then sanctions were reduced and a deal came back alive, and became the deal that we all learned
about. So again, there is a real need for governments to weigh in to, in a sense, normalize this
debate, take it out of the hands of the defectors or the opposition, the activist groups, and put it
back on a more solid basis so we can actually see what is going on. And then I would also say we
need to think beyond this, because I think there is a reason to worry about Burma’s nuclear
ambitions, and there is a reason to worry about what North Korea may do there. Whatever the
conditions are, this is a long-term issue, and things can change. Some clever North Korean may
think, “Well, we can concoct a smuggling scheme, so that reactor will look like Burma did it on
its own.” And they will smuggle a lot of the stuff out of China to build the reactor, then if China
objects, North Korea can say, “Well, Burma did it. Deal with them.”
So I think there are a couple of things that really do need to be done, beyond this idea of getting
governments to start weighing in. One is that I hope the IAEA could do more, perhaps take this
issue to the Board of Governors, but I think in the end they are limited because they look at the
evidence and can’t come up with anything solid. In Iran, if you look back in history, they had
Natanz enrichment plant in 2002 to hang their hat on. There was an agreement that this is a
nuclear site, likely a gas centrifuge site, and they couldn’t move on it.
The other side of this is to be a little more proactive. We are very proactive now with North
Korea and Iran, very active efforts to disrupt their smuggling operations with various UN
Security Council resolutions. I would say that Burma isn’t going to raise to the level of Iran and
North Korea, but it should be there. Burma is expected to abide by these UN Security Council
resolutions. Burma should understand that there are going to be intelligence efforts to disrupt
their smuggling. Often they have been able to conduct it openly. The sales Bob talked about of
these German machines; they were done in the open. Burma is not on the list of countries like
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a starting point rather than an approval. So I think it is very important that Burma be added to
these lists, and that companies understand that Burma is a potential problem and shouldn’t
receive these kinds of equipment materials or technology.
The other part of it is, and this is more controversial, that people probably should think about
engagement with Burma. One of the unfortunate problems you get into, and I think you heard it
today in the panels, is that if you isolate Burma with no hope of changing them, then you drive
them into the arms of North Korea. So I think you have to think through how you actually
engage Burma to lure them away from North Korea. I know, I think rhetorically, Jack can talk
about that, it is probably U.S. policy, but how do you actually do that? And I think you can do it
without in any way legitimizing the dictatorship or stop working on human rights for the
Burmese; there are plenty of ways to do it. At ISIS we are not experts on that, but we would say
that is one of the things needed is we have to find a way, if you are really worried about missiles
and nuclear, is to find a way to work on those without having to deal with the whole set of issues
on Burma, and that has been done in other countries. This isn’t a perfect example, but I am sure
everyone is relieved in this room that this government made a decision to get rid of Libya’s
nuclear weapons program and its chemical weapons program and Qadafi doesn’t now have a
finished gas centrifuge plant, perhaps enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon.
That is an example of the kind of thing that you can do. And I would say that the key to that was
intelligence operation. So, I think the United States and its allies have to think more carefully
about how they can get more involved in penetrating the Burmese whatever program it is. Say
there is not much there, but still, penetrating at least the parts of it that could get involved in this
which is certainly there are smuggling operations, there are supply chains, and in looking for
ways to disrupt that and looking to get leverage out of that, as has been done in many cases.
So let me end there and thank you.
Joel Wit:
Thank you, David. Okay, so we have 45 minutes left and I hope everyone doesn’t
race for the doors. I’d like to open it up to the audience, since I think we have five excellent
people up here. So I am going to open it up for questions and if there aren’t any hands going up
then I am just going to start asking the questions. Okay, great, we do have hands; this gentleman
over here. Please identify yourself before you ask your question.
Mike Billington:
Thanks- Mike Billington from Executive Intelligence Review. Two
questions: one for Andrew Selth and Jack Pritchard, to add to your list of why they would be
concerned but also maybe to challenge what you said, that there is no possibility of an invasion. I
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 91 want to look back after Cyclone Nargis, when the British and the French were quite openly
arguing for humanitarian intervention, that they would not deliver the goods unless they allowed
their militaries in to do the delivering and that they had the argument for that, saying that they are
not helping their own people and all of that humanitarian argument. I think the U.S. at that time
scrapped that by the Patcom general going in and saying, “No, we are going to deliver these
goods to the military,” which I think basically pulled the rug out from under that threat but, I
think I would like to know what both of you think about whether or not that is a legitimate
concern, a legitimate threat that they were faced with.
Secondly, David Albright, I appreciate you debunking what you might call the “Burmese
curveball,” if you think back to the “Iraqi curveball.” But, nonetheless, you seem to be calling for
imposing a ban on, if I am hearing you right, dual-use technology. Is that not a direct attack on
their sovereign right to development and other means if you think that they should be denied that
kind of technology because of the so-called dual-use capacities, especially since you think they
have no significant nuclear program?
Joel Wit:
Thank you.
Andrew Selth:
On Cyclone Nargis and the discussion on the controversy about the
responsibility to protect, even if it meant humanitarian intervention into Burma, I would answer
in two ways. First of all, I don’t think it was a real threat. I don’t think anyone seriously
contemplated going in, despite some of the rather provocative statements that were made by the
French foreign minister, Australian prime minister, and a few other people at the time; I think
there was a lot of hot air being blown around at the time. But I don’t think anyone really
contemplated forcefully going in to Burma against the wishes of the government to deliver aid,
and, I might add, that after some of those statements were made, they were very quickly retracted
or contradicted. Secretary Gates, for example, made it very clear very quickly that the United
States was not planning to forcefully deliver aid to Burma. The French foreign minister retracted
his statement and later tried to deny that an assault vessel in the Bay of Bengal was indeed even a
warship. So, I am not sure the threat was real. There was a lot of emotion in the air, but I am not
sure the threat was real. The key point, though, is that it was perceived by the Burmese
government as real. I think that those sorts of statements by quite senior statesmen, some of the
discussion in the press at the time, the popular pundits and the commentary, they were talking
about the need to invade Burma for the good of the people, I think that had a real impact in Nay
Pyi Taw and added to all the other examples of threats in the past, including our threats of armed
intervention and some of the rather injudicious statements that have been made by politicians
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They contributed to the very sense of threat that has made the Burmese government so fearful
and potentially so ready to contemplate some kind of a deterrent program, whether it be just
simply increasing the strength of the armed forces in a conventional way, possibly including the
acquisition or the manufacture of ballistic missiles, and as we have heard, some believe even the
consideration of a nuclear deterrent. That perception I think is more real than the reality, because
that translates into policy.
Jack Pritchard:
Let me just follow-up on the North Korea side. I think the perception is
there, but I think in the North Koreans’ case they fully understand the reality of what the
capabilities are and what the consequences would be for an external power like the United States
to invade North Korea, and they use that in their own rhetoric both for domestic purposes and
also in their discussions with the United States and others. It is very similar, as Andrew points
out: the perception versus the intent and capability are very different.
Joel Wit:
I just wanted to intervene and ask a question at this point. I mean we are all
focused on the WMD, but I would like Andrew to talk a little bit about how this, the tunneling in
Burma, fits into this perception of an external threat and how serious they are about digging
these underground facilities because it seems to me that it is another part of their deterrent as
well, and it is something much more attainable than building a nuclear weapon.
Andrew Selth:
I don’t think there is any doubt that the Burmese government is engaged
and has been engaged for some time in a program that developed its armed forces including its
defense infrastructure. And that, I think, clearly includes the construction of various underground
facilities. The difficulty is we don’t really know what those underground facilities are for. There
is an argument among the activist community and some journalists that these are for nuclear
related purposes. I am not sure that is at all clear. I am not sure how they draw that conclusion. It
is quite possible that, therefore, various conventional defense facilities possibly, as some
journalists have claimed, defense arms industries, missile production facilities; I mean I guess
that is possible. They could simply be air raid shelters, they could simply be communication
nodes; some of the underground facilities would appear to have purely civil purposes, they may
not be related to defense matters at all. Again, we are faced with this dilemma that there is so
little hard verifiable evidence coming out of Burma about so many things including these tunnels
that it is easy for people to paint them in all sorts of different colors and claim they are for all
sorts of different purposes, but we really don’t know for sure. I wouldn’t be surprised if many of
them are for defense purposes but I have yet to be shown any evidence at all of what the specific
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Joel Wit:
Bob, you wanted to add something?
Robert Kelley:
If I may, that first visit that we paid to Democratic Voice of Burma was
about tunneling to some extent, Andrew, and what we found, I think, was a gross overstatement
in some cases. It is communications nodes but it tends to be bunkers more than tunnels. There
are some very specialized cases of shelters for large numbers of people, but mostly what we saw
was just small bunkers either cut and cover or back into a hill. There was a major
misunderstanding that they were laying fiber-optic cable over the whole country, and it was
nothing more than trenches back-filled with dirt. Some people were calling those tunnels. So I
think the tunneling thing is a bit overstated. The one thing that we did find was an underground
relocation for a lot of people, about a thousand people, that was obviously done with help, and
had CBW protection and things like that. And when I we found them, we found drawings,
detailed drawings…inaudible.
Joel Wit:
Why don’t we get back to the dual-use question?
David Albright:
Regardless of whether I think there is a significant nuclear program in
Burma, Burma has gone out to buy things that the German, Swiss, Japanese equipment was
bought under false end uses. It was detected by the Germans for example, the German
Government, after the sale that the end use was a lie, basically. It was clear that the declaration,
believe it or not, was to make diesel locomotive engines, a certain component, and it was clearly
not for that, even based on what was provided to the companies. The end use on the
magnetometer, and it was a cylindrical grinder that came out of Japan that appears to have false
end uses, they were illegal and people were prosecuted for that export. So you have a country
that is going out and breaking the laws of supplier nations, and that makes them eligible when
you combine that with the totalitarian or dictatorship with questionable motives.
So the first part of this really, I didn’t go through the details, you don’t necessarily want a ban,
you want to impose controls, specialized controls. Make it a nation that where you would look
upon it the same as you would look upon Syria, and then you would look upon a range of things,
missile, WMD, military technologies or equipment, and you would scrutinize any exports before
that could take place. The other part of it is is that Burma is violating UN Security Council
resolutions by buying military equipment from North Korea, and that should have some
consequences. I think an example was given of a ship that turned back that may have had
something banned on it, no one knows. But again, Burma is expected to abide by these
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UN Security Council. Certainly what should happen is the reports of what’s found, anything,
should go to the UN Security Council and the panel of experts that are associated with the
resolution, so they can more knowledgably report on the actual situation.
Joel Wit:
I’m sorry, just one more on tunneling.
Alexandre Mansourov:
It’s interesting if we go back to the November 2008 visit of the
Burmese Military Delegation to North Korea and look at the military facilities which they
requested to look at and were shown. At the air force base they were shown on-the-ground
hangars for the fighter jets, at the naval base they were shown an underground storage facility for
patrol boats and an underground tunnel for the submarines, where the submarines could go in
and out without notice, and they were shown a scud missile factory which is underground, it is in
a big tunnel. Part of the memorandum of understanding which was signed between the North
Korean general staff and the Burmese military was the sharing of the tunneling expertise. So
again, this may be an innocent interest for civilian purposes, but clearly a Than Shwe-led
delegation visited some pretty military tunnels. Actually if you read the report, the Burmese
officials who took notes provide the dimensions of each tunnel whether it is the tunnel for the air
force jets or for the naval patrol boats; they give exact dimensions with heights, clearly later to
be used in some engineering jobs.
Joel Wit:
Thank you, Sasha. Ambassador Hubbard?
Ambassador Hubbard:
Thank you, Joel. I am going to go back in history almost as far as
Dr. Mansourov did in talking about the feedback between North Korea and Burma. Joel, you
may remember that immediately after the conclusion, the signing of the Agreed Framework with
North Korea in Geneva, I was sent to Rangoon heading a Clinton Administration delegation to
try to open up some kind of productive contact with Burma. I think we deliberately were taking
this demonstration that one of the people who did this agreement with North Korea is now going
to Burma to try to pursue something similar, and our objectives were not weapons of mass
destruction in the Burma case but narcotics and human rights.
Interestingly, during the several days we spent in Burma with most of the top leadership at that
time, Kim Yook was the face of the leadership, no one ever mentioned North Korea nor my role,
but the fact is they signed on to a pretty good agreement. We got about 60% of a roadmap that
we wanted for moving towards freeing on Aung San Suu Kyi freeing on greater human rights
and all that. And I do think that was in part because the U.S. demonstrated it could do that kind
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 95 of thing with North Korea and the Burmese wanted to do the same thing, in fact the line that the
Burmese took with me is that we are lucky. We can feed and clothe our people; that might have
been true in 1994, I’m not sure it is entirely true now. But in order to advance, become part of the
world, we need access to technology, we need access to international finance and you are in our
way and would you please get out of the way and help us get there. I still believe some years
later that if we had been really prepared to pick up on it and recognize that we got 60% of what
we wanted, let’s go for the other 40. In fact, for political reasons we turned it around and we said
we didn’t get as much as we needed, we didn’t get all we wanted, and therefore eventually cut
off with Burma. I think there has been some feedback and forth and it doesn’t necessarily have to
be all negative feedback.
Joel Wit:
Thank you. Thank you, Tom. Any other questions? This gentleman over here.
Unidentified Male: If I may, I would like to probe the Chinese position on nuclear weapons in
Myanmar a bit. Is it conceivable that China would provide as much support, would get involved
with Myanmar as much as it is the oil gas pipeline and so forth if it believed that Myanmar had a
serious nuclear weapons program underway? And if Myanmar did have a serious weapons
program under way, is it conceivable that the Chinese would not know about it, would be
missing it completely?
Joel Wit:
I am not sure if anyone up here is a China expert who can answer that. Does
anyone want to try? Andrew, do you want to try? You are a regional expert.
Andrew Selth:
I’ll try. Let me try and take this one step at a time. I would be very
surprised if the Chinese would be at all comfortable with the notion of Burma developing a
nuclear weapon, if indeed it was doing so. I would imagine that they would try very hard to
prevent that happening, through whatever means available to them, whether it be persuasion or
blocking material going through China to Burma or whatever. I am not sure how persuasive that
would be; the Burmese government certainly values its relationship with China and recognizes
the importance of China, but if they set their mind on a core policy that they believe is essential
for their national survival then they may pursue it despite opposition from the Chinese.
Would China know about any such program? I don’t doubt that China has got very good sources
in Burma, probably better than most, and it would clearly be aware of everything that we have
been talking about today. Whether they have got any privileged access to the Burmese nuclear
program that provides all of the insights that we don’t have, I don’t know. Clearly there are some
things that the Chinese are not privy to. So some aspects of what is going on Nay Pyi Taw or
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imagine that China would be comfortable with the program, but if Burma did decide to go ahead
with it regardless, and if China felt that it was faced with a fait accompli, my hunch would be
that the Chinese would be able to live with it just as they have lived with the North Korean
nuclear program.
Joel Wit:
Sasha, do you want to answer?
Jack Pritchard:
Let me just reiterate that the last point of your question was that the
Chinese would know about it. It is my sense in dealing with the Chinese on the North Korean
issue that there are a number of things about the North Korean nuclear program that the Chinese
just had no clue about. So, I would tend to agree with Andrew, that they do know a lot, they are
involved, and they have got their fingers in a lot of things, but on this particular issue, it is not
clear at all that they would have any knowledge of it in advance.
Alexandre Mansourov:
Your question was is it conceivable. My answer would be it is
conceivable that China, at some point, might consider proliferating because, let’s not forget, this
is not a new idea. The United States shared its nuclear technology with its allies, the Soviet
Union shared its technology with allies and China was the beneficiary at some point. Today, they
say times have changed and strategic calculus is different, but there are still folks out there that
believe proliferation is good. We all believe in non-proliferation, but there are people in countries
that have the proliferation-is-good mentality. Whether today China has that mentality or not
depends on where you sit on this debate about the strategic rationale driving China’s foreign
policy and defense policy, but it is one of the reasons why China was part and parcel with the
North Korean nuclear program decades ago. One of the reasons why the Soviet Union stopped
providing technical assistance to Yongbyon back in the ‘60s was because of the serious worry
that the North Koreans might be leaking the Soviet nuclear technology to the Chinese after the
Soviet Union had interrupted all the nuclear and technical cooperation with China in the late ‘50s.
So again, is it conceivable that China might find the value in seeing the Burmese build their own
nuclear bomb as a deterrent against India or whatever? I think it is conceivable. Is it likely?
Maybe not likely today. In the future, the future will tell. Thank you.
Joel Wit:
Would you like to say something, David?
David Albright:
Just something brief. We don’t know very much about the Burmese
nuclear program, but what we do know is they want a research reactor, they have done some
uranium mining, some with Russian help. They may be building a uranium-processing facility.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 97 One interpretation by a European government of the same information that Bob went through is
that it sort of loaded toward the front end of the fuel cycle. They are looking at the things you
would normally look at if you were going into uranium mining and then extraction and
processing, but nothing to do with a bomb program. I would say that the bigger risk for us if we
really don’t want them to have nuclear inaudible is that they are going to move very slowly and
at some point they will say we have a legitimate, civil nuclear program. They will, in a sense,
look at Iran as a model more than North Korea, and I think China traditionally will always go
along with that, they don’t want the trouble. And it will be incumbent on countries like the
United States to say “that is a problem.”
Joel Wit:
Yes, this gentleman here.
Tin Maung Maung Than: I’m Tin from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. I was a staff
member at the Atomic Energy Committee of the Burmese Ministry of Finance in the 1970s. To
Andrew: can it be the biggest con job of the century? No, I am not saying it is conning the world;
it is conning its own people, because there is a lot of money to be made out of it, a lot of
promotions. Ko Ko Oo who is the Director-General of the Atomic Energy Department and has
become the Deputy Minister of Science and Technology on the 31st of March, he was a junior to
me at the university inaudible department, he is a good physicist. Basically, as you know, it is a
system where it is an apex structure. So a guy wakes up one day, as you see, and says, “why
don’t we have this? Yes, sir we can do that. Give me $10 million and another $10 million.”
Something like that is going on I suppose. Even Sai was saying that some of them are con jobs.
Inaudible You do centrifuge, everybody does centrifuge, right? And there is a kind of 200
megawatt inaudible hydroelectric dam which is partly underground. Well, what is it for? It is for
the safety of Nay Pyi Taw perhaps; you don’t know. The same goes for tunnels. There are
supposed to be 800 tunnels; I think that was an exaggeration. Again, a lot of money to be made
out of that as well. And then the Ministry of Science and Technology which is supposed to be
the legitimate mother unit of the Atomic Energy Department was involved but inaudible is a
confidant of the country and he used that as a kind of role.
Talking about research reactors, way back in the ‘50s the Burmese were talking about research
reactors when they were first formed. Back in the 60’s when America was dispensing inaudible
and other types of reactors all over the world, the Burmese didn’t want to get involved in the
Cold War. And in the ‘70s when I was there, we were looking for the so-called conceptual
inaudible, which was supposed to be selling for $300,000; it never got out of the drawing-board.
In those days under socialism, we didn’t have money, and that was during the Parliamentary Era,
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designs were still very primitive. The fact is that wanting a reactor was not new. I also was for it
when I was in the physics department. You want to play with the thing, right? But then the
problem comes because SBDC is seen as a despicable regime. If it is a democratic regime, it will
go out and have IAEA inaudible, and you can go and buy a reactor on the market or whatever it
is. Inaudible So the problem goes around and around and it will never end, I suppose.
So what can you do about it? That is the biggest question that comes back again and again. As
David has said, can you put them on the spot? That is one thing. Ask them to sign additional
protocol, or, if you want anything out of the box, give them a research reactor. Openly,
transparently give them a research reactor located in a suitable site and say, “look, we are giving
a gift to you guys inaudible.” That’s it.
Andrew Selth:
Thanks, Tin. Actually if I could just leverage of what Tin said to make a
couple of points. There is a story that has been going around for many years now in Burma that
one day Than Shwe woke up and had this brainwave that he wanted a nuclear bomb and called a
meeting and ordered it, and off went everybody to put it into action. And that accounts for the
large numbers of people going off to Russia for training, it accounts for some of the imports and
setting up these various vaguely defined defense facilities in the hills around Mandalay and so on.
But it all ran into sand because the Burmese simply couldn’t pull it off. And the story continues
that nobody was game to tell Than Shwe that in fact it simply wasn’t feasible, so they did what
sometimes happens in Burma and that’s everybody just kept doing things and telling Than Shwe
it was going fine.
Now, I don’t know, that would certainly account for some of the things that we have seent but I
am not sure if that is the case. But just raising the issue for consideration, it does make me want
to make another point and that is that I think part of the problem that has surrounded this issue
for many years, almost since 2000 when the idea of Burma buying a small research reactor from
Russia emerged and all the publicity began, is that we need to be very, very careful with
terminology, with the language we use, and to be very cautious about making assumptions. We
talk about a nuclear program without actually knowing what “program” means. There is the
assumption that “nuclear” means a weapon when it could in fact mean a civil program, as indeed
was contemplated when Burma was planning to acquire a small reactor from the Russians that
would be under IAEA safeguards. We talk about missiles, and yet often the missiles referred to
are everything from artillery rockets through to air-to-air missile to surface-to-air missiles to
scuds. The use of the word “scud,” for example; I have seen it referred to as a short-range missile,
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do we mean and which one do we think Burma is getting? There are an awful lot of loose
generalizations out there in the public media and the debate at the moment and I think we need to
be very much more precise about what it is we are talking about and what it is that we actually
mean when we discuss these issues because I think that is part of the way in which this whole
debate, to pick up David’s point, has blown out into these extraordinary proportions which,
without some hard evidence or some clear official statement, can lead to a lot of misconceptions.
Joel Wit:
Good point. On this point – why don’t you go ahead, Bob, and then Sasha.
Robert Kelley:
I would agree with you, I think it is a big con job. And we have a good
example of that back in 1989 or so when the Iraqi program was going nowhere, rattling off the
walls, very unsuccessful, and very inaudible, driven by their equivalent of the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST); the same kind of people with no goals and no milestones.
Sadam figured out he was being conned and brought his son-in-law in, Hussein Kamel, and
changed things around very much. So what I worry about it is that someone will come in and say
that laser isotope separation is really stupid, which both of us said the first time we heard it and
we know that isn’t going to work for them, but Sai has mentioned centrifuges and centrifuges
could be another program and it seems to be under the army instead of under the Ministry of
Science and Technology. I do think you are right, Andrew, as far as terminology goes. We have to
be very careful; I would say it is a program, and it certainly isn’t a power program, I said that,
but why would the research reactor program be secret? So that leaves me with kind of what is
left in between, the thing you don’t want to tell people about.
Andrew Selth:
Joel Wit:
Unfortunately in Burma almost everything becomes secret.
Sasha, go ahead.
Alexandre Mansourov:
I emphasize the role of China in North Korean calculations, but
now the important factor: the North Koreans would be very reluctant to intensify whatever
nuclear cooperation that may or may not be going on because of the lingering mistrust. Don’t
forget, for 25 years these countries refused to recognize each other, and it was very hostile
relationship. More importantly, the moment they did recognize each other, a year later, when
North Koreans opened up their doors and really showed to the Burmese the jewels of the
munitions industry which they didn’t show anybody other than the Chinese probably including
their scud missile factory, laser beam anti-tank radar, gun factories, and national air defense
command and control center, the Burmese put it all on the web for everybody to see. And so the
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 100 Chief of General Staff in North Korea lost his job over thi,s because he is in those pictures
signing those memorandums. The Secretary of the Munitions Department, the munitions czar, if
you wish, lost his job because he is seen in those pictures toasting Than Shwe. And so, for those
people in the intelligence community who basically told Kim Jong-Il, “don’t do it, they will stab
us in the back,” they went back to him and said, “We told you so. That is what is going to happen
and it happened.” So now if the North Koreans are going to share their nuclear technology, they
have to be aware, and I’m sure they are, that one day it could all be on the web for the rest of the
world to see, because, again, of their suspicion that the are still elements within the Burmese
military establishment who cannot forgive them for 1983. It is generational but it is still there.
And so, I believe that a fundamental lack of trust would prevent the North Koreans from going
the full way and sharing their nuclear secrets with the Burmese. As a state, as a government, that
is a big obstacle, in addition to the China factor.
Joel Wit:
David you want to add a point?
David Albright:
ISIS is principally technical, so let me make a policy recommendation that
we don’t have to defend later, particularly with what is going on with North Korea; it is a bit
controversial. You brought this up, there is a need, and again, we are a nuclear organization, to
find a deal. Again, this may be controversial for human rights activists or democracy proponents
but in the nuclear field, you want to find an arrangement. Now, what do we want, for example?
We don’t want North Korea involved with Burma; we want Burma obeying the UN Security
Council resolutions which forbid military sales and all kinds of other things, certainly anything
nuclear. And so we want to make Burma transparent under IAEA safeguards, additional protocol,
expanded safeguards, whatever. What does Burma want? Well we don’t actually know, but
certainly they seem to want a research reactor and that can be part of the price we pay. It is
certainly a much cheaper price than was paid in the ‘93 agreement, where it was a power reactor,
but I think that again, this would be scoped as separate from anything on human rights and I
think that would make it controversial in the Burma case. But certainly from a nuclear point of
view, the priority would be to get rid of any concern about WMDs and missiles, focus on that
first and then pick up the human rights later.
Joel Wit:
Okay, just very quickly and then we are going to take some more questions.
Alexandre Mansourov:
David, you keep pounding on the sanctions and the Burmese
compliance with the sanctions, but if you know what the Burmese government actually said
when they agreed to join the sanctions regime, and it was published in the New Life of Myanmar,
they said that they would reserve the duty to maintain and protect national sovereignty, which
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business in terms of the arms sales because they would be used to maintain and protect the
national sovereignty. And guess what? A month later, a military aircraft, a cargo aircraft, landed
in central Burma carrying the North Korean weapons. It wasn’t a ship, but it was a cargo plane in
violation of the UN Security Council resolution. The North Koreans understood that there was
this reservation expressed, but we don’t have to agree with it, and we have to press the Burmese
to retract it, but as far as North Korean-Burmese government to government communications,
that reservation took care of the Burmese joining the sanctions.
David Albright:
If could respond, that is an open invitation that there should be very active
efforts to disrupt Burmese trades with North Korea. It shouldn’t be military-oriented but certainly,
those planes have to overfly someplace.
Alexandre Mansourov:
China?
David Albright:
China, for example, but other places as well, and I think the UN panel of
experts associated with the Security Council resolution is wrestling with this kind of problem
with the member states, so I think Burma would be a very good example of a country that is in
violation of the Security Council resolution and that certain things should start to happen as a
result of that. At the same time, I think at the end of this, there should be some offer to Burma as
a way out, a legitimate way out of this violation.
Joel Wit:
More questions? There is a hand up in the back there.
Unidentified Female:
I am inaudible from Radio Free Asia. I believe Dr. Albright
mentioned that there is the need for the U.S. Government to lure Burma away from North Korea.
I am wondering if you can elaborate on that a little bit, how the United States can lure Burma
away from North Korea, and how serious at this point, the cooperation, especially nuclear
cooperation, is between the two countries.
Joel Wit:
I think we sort of answered that. There are a number of different things on the
table here: there is intensifying the sanctions, there is the possibility of some sort of peaceful
nuclear cooperation with a research reactor. That is not an entire policy, but at least those are two
elements. I don’t know if anyone up here wants to add another element to that, maybe Sasha has
some ideas, or we can piece all of this together.
Alexandre Mansourov:
David talked about the exit strategy for Burma and the way out for
Burma. We should also think about the way out for North Korea, because it is an empirical fact:
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 102 when North Koreans were engaged in dialogue with the United States they would take a waitand-see attitude towards their relationship with Burma. The moment that dialogue would be
interrupted or stopped, they would step up the interactions with the Burmese. So again, if North
Koreans have no expectation of any improvements in dialogue with the United States, then they
would definitely step up their engagement with the Burmese. The moment we re-engage, they
will slow down and they will again adopt this wait-and-see attitude as to how far they should
really go. This is just empirical fact.
Joel Wit:
So there is another element. You are not only attacking the problem from the
Burma side, but also from the supplier side as well. You can see all these elements can come
together in a fairly coherent approach, whether we are doing that now or not is a separate issue. I
think if we sat here for another hour, we could probably come up with more elements too.
Anyway, that is a start. Other questions, comments? Yes, Peter.
Peter Almquist:
Peter Almquist from the State Department. I will not lay out a new State
Department position, you will be glad to know, but I did want to ask something. It seems to me
that the ambiguity over much of what we have seen Burma about the photos, for example, is that
it is ambiguous. We don’t know the intentions; it could be this, it could be that, it could be benign,
it could be bad. And much of, I think, Bob’s argument is based on your conversations with Sai
Tin Win, you have insider information, in effect, about the intentions about the Burmese regime
from his experience in the Science and Technology Department. I would be interested in hearing
more about that; that seems to be the big gap that we all have. We know that Burma has a nuclear
capability; it is pursuing rudimentary nuclear technology. The intensions are the issue that we
don’t know much about, and I would be interested in hearing a little more about that, or from
anyone if anyone has insights into Burma’s intentions.
Unidentified Male: Inaudible
Robert Kelley:
Well, they say they are going to do it, Peter. It is kind of ordered top-down;
“You are going to do this.” That is why I say it is a bit of a con job: they are really doing it. I
don’t believe in selective enforcement of IAEA regulations, which is my concern. If you really
have a nuclear program you should be held accountable, and even if it is a crappy program, they
should be held accountable. I mean that is what it boils down to. So, why would anybody say,
“Oh, they are having a program but we aren’t going to do anything about it until it gets worse”?
That is my concern there. With respect to the organizational things, that is another thing that I
have gone over with Sai quite a bit now, and what I found there is that you have to open your
mind and realize that the organization, I tried to get him to draw organization charts, kept
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 103 changing over the three years he was associated with it, people came and went and MOST’s
influence has decreased some. He was part of the army group, and they have a very low opinion
of MOST. MOST is the organization that specified those machine tools, for example, that the
Germans and Swiss sold to them, and none of the people in the army can figure out why they
bought it, that it was a great big bag of things that somebody must have just wanted and they got
them.
By the way, the machine tools are not about any kind of an export violation issue or anything.
The only thing the machine tools are important for is they were sold legally but there were enduser inspections. So from an intelligence point of view, it is fantastic, it is 100% verification that
these items or these locations, I got a GPS in my hand, I can see these people, the Germans take
pictures when they go there, the Burmese take pictures of the Germans while they’re there, so we
see the same people doing the same things. Then when the Germans are gone, we see the same
machines making other stuff. The allegation has never been that it is illegal; it is only an
allegation that says, “Hey, we know exactly what is going on for once and we can keep going
back.”
David Albright:
I have a couple of things. One is that I don’t believe the defector ever said
that the bomb reactor was to make uranium inaudible. So, they never said what the equipment
was for, so the intentions are unknown and that is the problem: we are arguing over what these
pictures say about intentions and so that is the key issue. There is real disagreement, and I’m not
sure we will ever get to the bottom of it.
There was a strong feeling among the German government, I don’t know if I saw this in the
Swiss government, that they were mislead on the inaudible of this equipment. You don’t use that
kind of equipment for training.
Robert Kelley:
Of course not, that is why it was a lie.
David Albright:
No, actually they said it was to make a part of a locomotive engine and
that the verification would be to show that that was the case. The German government got its
inaudible when it was accused about outfitting a nuclear weapons program. So I think there is
great deal of defensiveness in the German government now, but I would say that we were
actually first group to release information about that equipment back in January of 2010 and I
would say that without the help of German government officials raising concerns about the enduse missile, centrifuge, whatever it was, we wouldn’t have been able to do that study. There was
a feeling in a sense that they had been taken, and they weren’t going to let it happen again. So
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 104 again, when you get into the legality, you have to get into how Burma was treated as a nation
back when that export happened, and it wasn’t on, as far as I understand, any list. So probably
the export was legal, but the German government, I know, and probably the Swiss government
have revised their procedures so that those kind of exports are less likely to happen again.
Robert Kelley:
Yes, I think you will find that what David just said is true. It was Ko Ko
Oo who was on the list of people that were not supposed to receive things. He was formerly head
of the Department of Atomic Energy; the computer program was supposed to pick it up and
didn’t recognize “Oo” as being a name. So, that is part of the reason that that went through. We
do have pictures of the Germans doing the annual inspections, and there is Ko Ko Oo standing
there showing them these huge diesel locomotives, saying this is what we are doing. They are
trying to say, “we are doing what we said in the end-use certificate,” when the sources from there,
Sai Win, shows pictures of them making bomb reactors, for which he has a drawing labeled
“bomb reactor,” and a letter saying “bomb reactor.” He doesn’t know what a bomb reactor is; in
fact, his exact words were, “I don’t know what a bomb reactor is, but it sure sounds interesting.
Here, I’ve got these pictures. What is wrong with that?”
Joel Wit:
Any other questions? I think our time is almost up. No other questions? Well, I
don’t know if we have cleared anything up, but I think certainly it has been my experience too
that when you are dealing with a country like Burma, you are never going to know for certain
what their intentions are, what technology they have, but I think there is certainly a lot of smoke
here and it seems to me that we should be thinking now about how to head this off, because 10
years from now, if we aren’t trying to head it off we might end up in the wrong spot. I want to
thank everyone up here for providing us with some illumination on this problem.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 105 Panel 5: What it all Means – Implications of North and South Korean
Relations with Myanmar
William M. Wise: Traditionally, when moderators begin a final panel at a conference, in fact,
more often than not, they say everything has been said but not everyone has said it. In this case,
it’s not true. We are now going to go to the crux of our issue for today, which is U.S. policy -what all of what we have been discussing for the last several hours means for the United States.
To lead us in that discussion, we, frankly, could not have two better qualified persons. First, at
the far end of the table, Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia
and Pacific Affairs, who handles Southeast Asia and ASEAN issues -- a career member of the
Senior Foreign Service with 25 years as a diplomat and a man thoroughly acquainted with the
issues of Burma and American policy relating to it. And to my immediate right, Mike Green,
associate professor of International Relations at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown,
senior advisor and Japan chair at CSIS, who served on the National Security Council staff from
2001 to 2005 in the last portion, which he was senior director of ASEAN Affairs responsible for
the entire region. I might add that we take enormous pride in saying this -- he is also an NA and
Ph.D. graduate of SAIS.
I’m going to see if I can summarize, very briefly, a couple of issues that arose during our
conference and see if we can focus this discussion on some of these issues and additional issues
that our two panelists will bring up. We began with a look at domestic issues of governance,
political reform, and economic change in Burma -- in particular, the implications of domestic
issues for U.S. relations. And in this respect, it seems reasonable to ask, “Is U.S. policy working?”
“Are our goals clear to us and to others?” “Are the means for achieving these goals appropriate?”
“Are they available?” and, “Are they likely to achieve some measure of success?” “Are we
perceptive and flexible enough to detect and understand change should it occur in Burma?” But
for that matter, exactly what is the measure of success in a U.S. policy toward Burma? Do we
have in place the instruments we need to understand and influence the regime’s thinking and its
actions in the domestic sphere, or would it be more productive to have a roadmap of some sort
for more normal relations. On the external side, looking at Burma’s bilateral relations with its
immediate neighbors and beyond, from the U.S. perspective, what are our policies and are they
indeed working? What are the consequences of Chinese economic penetration of Burma? Is
Burma at some sort of risk of overreliance on China in other ways? And if so, if that is the case,
does the Sino-Burmese relationship pose some sort of danger or problem for the United States?
What about the roles of two of our oldest treaty allies in Asia -- Thailand and South Korea -- in
trade and investment activities with Burma? From a U.S. policy perspective, what’s the nature of
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 106 the Burmese security relationship with North Korea? Are these suspicions of nuclear weapons
development and missile development that we talked about in the last two hours, are they real?
Are they overblown? Are they sufficiently worrisome to generate a U.S. response? And if so,
what sort of U.S. response is called for? David Albright asked, “How do we head off a future
problem? How do we disrupt illegal activities in their present form or ensure that they don’t
happen in some future form?” In sum, what are we doing and what should we do to shake the
security and economic environment in which we find Burma and its neighbors?
And we might also ask, “Does any of this really matter?” With all the critical military, foreign
policy, and humanitarian crises that we face around the world, does Burma really matter to the
United States? Is this important? Is there something we can do? With that, let me turn to
Professor Green and ask him to begin.
Michael J. Green: Thank you, Bill. It’s good to be back at SAIS. I see you’ve got new carpet,
or maybe not. I spent many happy years in this place and don’t come back often enough. So
thank you for inviting me. As Bill said, I spent five years on the NSC staff, which is sort of
gravity defying and inhuman. But I came away with some lesions about things. So I thought the
topic today is what it all means -- the implications of North/South Korea relations with Myanmar.
And I thought one way to tackle this problem for this last session was to pretend that I’m still in
the NSC. And if the principals or the deputies called a meeting and I had to staff it and prepare
the introductory memo for the National Security advisor to open up the discussions, how would I
do it? So as I was listening to the discussion, I was jotting down how I would structure an NSC
memo for a principals’ committee meeting. And typically, as Karl and others who have been on
the NSC, and Bill know, who’ve been on the NSC staff and in the situation room, typically the
National Security advisor takes that memo, frames up the problem, turns first to the Secretary of
State or the representative of the State Department, who then reframes the entire issue so that it’s
easier for State Department to be in charge. So Joe knows this game well, so I thought I would
do that. I thought I’d frame up the questions and some ideas and then Joe can go first as the State
Department representative.
The first thing we do in these memos, we try to identify our objectives because you can easily
become drawn into a debate about sanctions -- do they work, do they not work. And there are
larger objectives we have. Those are means. The sanctions are a means, a tool -- not an end. Then
we usually, at least, and I think this is still the case, start identifying our assumptions. And finally,
what are our options for action?
The objectives, briefly, we have broader objectives in Asia. Burma and North Korea are
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 107 problems in a larger geographic, geostrategic setting. We have an interest in maintaining a
favorable strategic equilibrium and engaging our friends and allies in moving the region to a
more stable place. And Burma needs to be considered and North Korea needs to be considered in
that context.
Second, we have an obvious interest -- and this is global -- in combatting proliferation. And
Burma and North Korea, obviously, come up there.
Third, we have an interest in advancing democratic norms and protecting human rights. Not just
within Burma or within North Korea; but within Asia as a whole, we have an interest in
encouraging the region to continue embracing neoliberal normals as regional norms. And if
you’ve seen some of the surveys we’ve done at CSIS in recent years among elites, there’s quite
strong evidence that within Asia, there’s broad identification with democracy, human rights, rule
of law, and lots of debate, lots of contestation. But in terms of the ideas and the norms that
motivate Asia and that define Asia, it’s a good story and we want to continue that. So it’s not just
a situation within Burma or North Korea, but the region’s approach in thinking about these issues.
And then we have a whole basket of other issues -- economic issues, combatting drugs and illicit
activities -- which are there, but frankly, in the Burma/North Korea case, are a secondary level
compared to the geostrategic, the proliferation, and the normative.
Assumptions that should guide our discussion -- well, this is usually where the Secretary of State
starts to redefine things. First, I would argue, having heard some of the discussion today, that the
election and the change of government that took place recently in Nay Pyi Taw could mean the
change is coming to Burma. But the evidence is not there yet. And, in fact, there’s quite a bit of
contrary evidence over 2,000 political prisoners still in jail. The activities of the Parliament have
been constrained beyond, I think, what even the greatest cynics expected. The ethnic conflicts
have expanded. The Shan ceasefire has been broken and the army is moving hard with a
thousand cuts against the Shan. The one element that is perhaps most promising, in terms of
change, is that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is out and is able to meet people. And that’s something
that is reversible, but also gives us more purchase, more leverage than anything else we’ve seen
in terms of developments internally since the change of government and since the election.
And then, finally, if there is change, if there is political change, it’s going to be long term. If we
want to support political change, it’s going to end up being a long term investment. But that’s
important to keep in mind because many of the problems we face -- whether it’s human rights or
proliferation -- are more immediate. So that makes it difficult for us. If we invest in engagement
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 108 and lifting sanctions to encourage change, it undercuts our efforts to deter and dissuade
proliferation and bring change to political prisoners. So that’s a difficult thing.
Second, we have to be, we’re in a strategic pause right now, as I think the administration assesses
what’s coming out of the changes in Nay Pyi Taw. But I think we have to be aware that the world
doesn’t take a strategic pause -- that non-action can be interpreted by our friends and adversaries
as intent and as policy and as strategy and as acceptance of the status quo. So the second
assumption would be that we’re in a strategic pause. I would argue it can’t last forever. The
world’s moving on.
Third, on the nuclear question -- not to replay the previous panel -- but if I were doing the
intelligence assessment, I would say, from what we heard, that we have low confidence that
Burma has an active nuclear program. It’s not to say they don’t, but we have low confidence that
they have an active nuclear program. Low to moderate confidence that they have a nuclear
relationship with North Korea, based on the evidence. But moderate to high confidence -probably high confidence -- that there is a network that relates to proliferation, that relates to
North Korean trading companies that is dangerous, as David Albright pointed out. And I would
say moderate to high confidence that North Korea has the intent to transfer capability. And I say
that because, first of all, because the North Koreans told us this in 2003. I was there with Jim
Kelly when they said they would transfer their capability if we didn’t end our hostile policy.
Secondly, because of Syria and third, because of some of the dialogue North Koreans have had
with recent visitors that, when you think about how North Korea maintains its leverage and
deters us, horizontal escalation, not transferring fissile material, but the threat of horizontal
escalation, is a way to deter us to put provocations against us and increase their own momentum.
So I think the intent on the North Korean side is arguably, the possibility of that is quite high.
Fourth, Chinese influence is clearly increasing but, again, it’s an assumption. We should not
assume that Burma is going to willingly be Finlandized by China. These are, I mean, the
Burmese ethnically are basically Mongols. They are fiercely independent, tough people and
there’s no love lost with China. So we shouldn’t just assume that China’s going to gobble up
Burma.
Fifth, the other big neighbors who are either allies or close strategic partners of ours, principally
India and Thailand, are going to be very hard to move. Very hard to move on this issue for a
variety of reasons, some of them legitimate. On the other hand, Burma is no longer an obstacle to
us engaging ASEAN or India. When I was on the job six, seven years ago, one of the arguments
was we’ve got to have a different Burma policy because this is an obstacle to our engagement of
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 109 ASEAN. It’s not. ASEAN, clearly, as Joe knows and can elaborate. ASEAN wants more of us
and Burma’s not an obstacle to that. In a way, that gives us some freedom.
Sixth, in terms of engagement versus sanctions, pick your poison. Neither has gotten us what we
want. Secretary Campbell’s engagement of the regime has gotten us nothing except perhaps the
Aung San Suu Kyi release, which is not nothing -- it is important, but reversible. So we don’t
have the conditions, the political or diplomatic conditions that would warrant lifting sanctions.
And also, we should look at sanctions but we should also keep sanctions in the larger context.
This is a country, Burma, with 3.7 billion dollars in reserves. So our sanctions are not either the
tool we want in totality. How can I put it -- they are not a big stick. They’re a stick, but they’re
not a big stick. But also, they’re not the source of the Burmese people’s suffering. You can’t
blame it on sanctions with a regime that has 3.7 billion dollars in reserves.
And finally, we have tools -- the Jade Act and the Security Counsel resolutions against North
Korea, 1874, that Burma, in both cases, Burma is clearly violating. OFAC, the treasury
department, can impose targeted financial sanctions. So we do have tools we’ve not used. Okay,
so actions and with this, first, as I suggested, we are getting to the point -- I’ll be interested in the
Secretary of State’s view -- we are getting to the point where we need to move beyond strategic
patience.
Second, it is critical, as David Albright -- I think -- articulately suggested, it is critical that we
interdict North Korea proliferation networks including Burma and that we dissuade North Korea
and other actors from thinking that this is permissible. It’s a little bit like Guiliani’s zero
tolerance in New York for squeegees -- you know all that story? So Guiliani went out and he
arrested all the people who were squeegeeing windshields and asking for money. And lo and
behold, the crime rate went down because he had a zero tolerance for any illicit behavior. And I
think the North Korea/Burma nexus merits the same approach.
Related to that, I would argue that the new envoy, the new coordinator for Burma, should be
given responsibilities for coordinating, among other responsibilities -- diplomatic, for example -should be given responsibilities for coordinating the internal US government application of
sanctions. Which is tricky. And it takes time and it takes intelligence and it takes coordination.
Third, we should engage. But we should do so mindful that the leverage that we really have for
change inside Burma is Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the degree to what she’s able to build space
and create dialogue and that’s the pivot, that’s the center of gravity we should be focused on. So
if we talk about sanctions, it should be clear that she has a role in this -- that we’re trying to build
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 110 internal reconciliation around her release and encourage her continued release.
Fourth, there’s room for humanitarian space. There’s room and there’s space for doing more in
the humanitarian terms and I would argue for exploring that, but being careful not to displace or
discredit ethnic or religious or NLD related civil society groups that are doing humanitarian work.
We shouldn’t lump everything to the USDA to the Junta side and then, you know, sort of change
the balance of influence away from the ethnic. So we need to be careful about it, but I think
there’s room for doing more.
And finally, we need to step up -- and this would be the new envoy’s job and Joe’s job and Kurt’s
job -- a regional engagement. One area that I have previously overlooked, which has now been
called to my attention thanks to this conference, is the degree of South Korea’s relationship with
the Juntas. So this is an area we should be talking to our friends in the Blue House about because
of the proliferation concerns and other things that touch on South Korea’s security interests.
Mr. Secretary?
Joseph Y. Yun:
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mike. I think it was about a month ago
that David Steinberg asked me to come and speak here. You know, he’s been, when I was in
Korea, he was very, very helpful to me. Everything I know about Korea is him. Same with
Burma. When I took the new account to Burma, he’s just been terrifically helpful. So I couldn’t
say no, you know? Even though the topic and he’s on direct code and you’re going to get me into
a lot of trouble, you know? So yesterday -- no, it was actually Friday -- I went to see our analyst.
So I asked him, “Should I talk about, you know, weapons trade?” “No, absolutely not.” You
know? “Should I talk about refugee issues?” “Absolutely not.” You know? And so there are a
very limited amount of topics I can talk in a very open setting like this, but I will give it a go,
okay?
A few days ago, I met a good friend from Korea. His name is Ra Jung-il. Many of you might
know him. He was number two in Korean CIA during Kim Dae-Jung era and then he became
National Security Advisor under Noh Moo-hyun. And he recounted to me one particular incident
in 1983 where Burma, South Korea, North Korea all came together. That was, of course, the
attempted assassination of President Chun Doo-hwan in Rangoon around Aung San Mausoleum.
And this is an interesting incident that brought the three together. In fact, what had happened was
North Korean Special Forces sent three people, three people, each of them kind of officer level
and they prepared for days. They went there about two weeks beforehand through using North
Korean cargo boat. They landed there and they were housed by North Korean embassy officials
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 111 in Rangoon and they prepared the bombing incident. All this comes from, by the way, from the
lone survivor whose name is Kang Min-chul, who Ra Jung-il talked to as the number two in CIA.
And Kang Min-chul was a young guy who was 27 years old at the time. He had been in North
Korea. He was born in Kangwon-do, same town as where the big chief of Hyundai Motors came
from, you know? And so he had received special training at Special Forces and its incredibly
strict training, if you can imagine. They have to carry 30 kilograms on their back and do 60
kilometers in 12 hours. So they are tested on that on a regular basis. He’s got to be able to swim,
he’s got to be able to run and all that. So anyhow, he went through this incredible training and, of
course, probably most of you know what happened. Practically everyone in South Korean
delegation, including number of ministers, were killed. I think the Kang Min-chul at that time
confused President Chun Doo-hwan with Korean ambassador -- maybe they’re both a little bald,
I don’t know. And so he detonated the bomb at the wrong time. And one guy died, two were
pursued and two were eventually caught. And Kang Min-chul and his accomplice, Kang Minchul decided to cooperate. But his accomplice did not cooperate and he was executed
immediately and Kang Min-chul served 25 years and then I think it’s about two years ago he
died in prison. I think he had cancer. So essentially, this incident brought not only two Koreas,
I’m recounting this incident to go through a little bit of history behind Myanmar and two Koreas.
And you have a very mixed history. And as a result of that, of course, Myanmar cut off
diplomatic relations with North Korea and relations with South Korea kind of went on. And it
was not until, I believe, 2008 that North Korea again resumed diplomatic relations with Burma, I
would say, resumed diplomatic relations with North Korea and then it’s now there are two
embassies there -- they’re fully normalized. And there are many reasons we can ask, “Why was
there diplomatic relations at the time?” And I think probably the root cause of resuming that
diplomatic relations was similarities in their world views. In their world views, number one,
they’re both becoming increasingly isolated. They had, in fact, a few friends in their
neighborhood and they had become very much repressed societies with the government being
increasingly alienated. And in that world view, I think they also share defense. They are both
under threat. And so they began, I believe at that time, a closer relationship and even to the
relationship where we would say doesn’t fully adhere to norms of international rules, including
the number of the UN Security Counsel resolutions that have been passed.
And of course, you know, I’m sure, I’m sorry I missed most of the day. You have discussed what
are the similarities and what are the differences. And in that sense, as Mike said, U.S. policy can
not be same for both countries. And of course, it is not the same. For North Korea, we have
relied a lot on much more multilateral approach -- the prime example being the six party talks.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 112 And in Myanmar, it is much more bilateral approach. But behind that, I would say there is a
tremendous sense that international community is together. And that’s a point that I want to
emphasize. Within that bilateral approach, I believe U.S. has made a lot of inroads, especially
with ASEAN. The one big payoff, having engaged ASEAN in over the last two years has been
we see much closer together. I mean, there is really no real discussion on, you know, what is
domestic interference, what is not domestic interference. I mean, you see bodies like in Indonesia,
bodily democracy for, which have invited Myanmar. And you see much louder voices coming
out of Manila, Bangkok and elsewhere that Myanmar should be part of the family. And so I think
that’s a very positive move. At the same time, I think the international community -- you can take
a look in terms of UN General Assembly resolutions, human rights counsel - they’ve passed a
number of resolutions, again, that calls for very unified position on where Myanmar should be in
terms of respecting human rights, in terms of opening political space for the opposition.
I just want to recount for you what we have done over the last two years -- you know, essentially
after Mike left. You know, Mike was going to be the special envoy for Myanmar and I’m sorry it
didn’t happen, but I think it’s probably a good thing it didn’t happen for you, you know?
Essentially, there was, I would say the policies that we followed in this administration are not
really different from what happened in the Bush administration and before that in Clinton
administration. We’ve had a dual track policy for a long time. We’ve had the policy in which we
have done sanctions, we have gone to international organizations, we’ve tried ASEAN and at the
same time, we’ve also tried engaging. There has been heightened engagement over the last, I
would say, 18 months. Kurt Campbell, my direct boss, has been there twice. I was there in
December and that track is still very much open. Of significance, I would say, is the freeing of
Aung San Suu Kyi. It is very significant that she was freed -- even though we expected her to
free, of course -- one never really knows until she is actually freed. The reason why she was
freed is it was her term. But term of sentence was up. And there was an election last year in
November.
So those two events have led to a third event, which is forming of a new government. You can
say whatever you want about the new government. I believe it is much the same people. It is
much the same people, but we do have a situation in which, I believe now, there will be an
interlocutor for us. So we’re very much looking forward to engaging him -- you know, it’s
usually “him,” by the way, you know -- in Myanmar.
So what is it that we’re looking for? I think the answer is obvious to everyone. We’re looking
foremost to see that there will be political prisoners, and Mike has mentioned about over 2,000
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 113 and among them are many old people, many people who’ve been in prison for decades. We’re
looking to see release of political prisoners. I think that would be the single most concrete item
that Nay Pyi Taw could do to international community.
Secondly, we would be very much worried if security of democratic opposition, including NLD
and Aung San Suu Kyi, if their security was in any doubt. So we would be looking for,
essentially, these political forces to remain or to stay secure under no threat.
Thirdly, we would be looking for some kind of dialogue. Not just with democratic opposition,
but also with ethnic parties. And I think this is a crucial difference between North Korean
situation and Burmese situation. There are no ethnic minorities in Korea, you know? There are
plenty in Burma. And that’s really an added complication that the regime is very, very sensitive
about. And so we’ll be looking to see some dialogue on that.
And number four, there must be a process in the end, ultimately. There must be a process that
would bring in the ethnic opposition, ethnic leaders, as well as democratic opposition, into the
mainstream body politic. I mean, this is a difficult thing for me to tell them, you know? But in
the end, they must understand that without this process that gets the main opposition and ethnic
leaders into mainstream politics, I just can not see how Myanmar’s relation; not only with
ASEAN, but with international community, can be normalized. I think really gone are the days,
you know, when these countries can be part of normal system without at least taking into account
their main body of politics. So this is a conversation that we need to have and this is not only the
conversation for us with Nay Pyi Taw, but it’s also conversation with ASEAN for its neighbors
and with the international community in total. I mean, I would agree with Mike that at the
moment, we are in an engagement mode. But you know, again, you’ve got to have enough tools
in your toolbox to accomplish. Do we have enough tools? I don’t know. I mean, ultimately, it
really is a process for the Burmese population themselves. In the end, they’re going to
accomplish it and we can only help them, you know, in some meaningful way. But I’m not sure
we can be decisive. It’s got to be Burmese voice in the end that’s going to be decisive. Thank you,
Bill.
William M. Wise:
Mm hmm.
Jae Ku:
You mentioned, Mr. Yun, the appointment of special envoy for Myanmar. Some
folks may not realize this is a statutory requirement, not an initiative by the State Department.
But could you briefly outline what the statue requires the special envoy to do and then how you
think State might actually employ the envoy?
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 114 Joseph Y. Yun:
Yeah, I would hope it would pay them, you know? [laughter] No, seriously,
it is a requirement by law. It’s in Jade Act and you know, starting from Mike, we have looked at a
number of candidates and Mike himself chose not to continue with it. And we are looking at one
particular candidate at the moment. And the job of that person is really, I would say, threefold.
Number one is to work with Burmese -- both Burmese government and Burmese civil society,
Burmese political leaders and number two -- to work interagency, to forge a good position, to
forge policies that we will forward when he works with the Burmese government. And number
three, he needs to work with the international other governments, especially EU, UN, ASEAN,
Northeast Asian including the Chinese. I think those are the main tasks that our envoy will have.
Michael J. Green: Can I just add briefly? I was nominated for this and it was at the end of the
Bush administration and then in the transition, there was no hearing and decided someone with
closer ties to the Obama administration should do it. The candidate they’re talking about would
be excellent, if it’s who I think it is. Just two things: it does say in the legislation that the envoy is
to coordinate internal policies, but it specifically mentions sanctions, which is an important part
of it. And the other is that the envoy is to look at areas to expand humanitarian assistance. Which
I think is important because I think it’s a very well-crafted piece of legislation because it
basically arms the envoy with sticks and carrots to explore and test what’s possible. So I just
wanted to supplement what Joe said.
William M. Wise: Let’s now turn to you, the audience, for your questions or comments. As
always, please identify yourself and any institutional affiliation you’d like to plug, as well as
making sure that you are brief and to the point. Yes, sir.
Kim Aung Tae:
My name is Kim Aung Tae. I’m the former chief of the Burmese Voice of
America, currently with FSI. I would like to ask, I would like to check with you as to the
authenticity and the veracity of the information I received this morning from RFA. I looked up
the RFA Burmese website and there was a big story saying that Aung San Suu Kyi recognizes the
new government of Burma. But when I read it and when I read the coat, it says that Aung San
Suu Kyi said, to a question posed to her in a Q&A session, a Q&A program of RFA -- and she
said, “I recognize the government as it is in place in Burma.” So is it true? If it is true, what
triggered her to say that and any connotations and implications you can elaborate?
Joseph Y. Yun:
Me or Mike? [laughter].
Michael J. Green:
You know and I can say it.
Joseph Y. Yun:
Yeah, Mike. Yeah. [laughter].
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 115 Michael J. Green: I do think your question points to a different answer I’d like to give, which,
because I haven’t seen that report. But Aung San Suu Kyi is an icon internally and to many in the
Junta inaudible [36:24] and so like any icon or any person with that kind of personality, people
often project on to her what they want to hear or don’t want to hear. And so her alleged positions
on issues have frequently been misrepresented in the press or by governments. And my sense is
that she is very delicately and subtilely trying to manage a difficult position. On the one hand,
she wants to encourage the Junta to engage and to start expanding what Joe describes -- not only
the NLD, but the ethnics’ abilities to engage in dialogue with the regime and start building a
more inclusive process -- which, by the way, even from Beijing to New Delhi, every government
says that; that we need more reconciliation and engagement with all the parties within Burma. So
on the one hand, she’s trying to do that. On the other, this was an election and a constitution that
were, I mean, the charitable version is to say they were deeply flawed and therefore, there is a
clear legitimacy problem. So she’s constantly trying to strike this balance and I think that she’s
doing it quite well but because it’s so subtle, she’s often misrepresented. So I would be very
surprised if she, this morning, announced that she recognizes the government, thank you very
much, you can all go about your business.
Unidentified Male: But we had a direct quote on what she said this morning.
Unidentified Female:
Was it in English or Burmese?
Unidentified Male: It was in Burmese.
Unidentified Female:
Okay, so how does it… [multiple people discussing].
Unidentified Male: No, but it would be interesting to hear what her actual words were, or at
least what they’re reported to be.
Unidentified Male: If you would allow me to translate the, freelance translation, so to speak.
She said, “The fact that there’s a new government that I recognize as it is…
Unidentified Male: Inaudible
Unidentified Male: … I heard it. She can.
Unidentified Male: That’s what she’s been saying all the time.
Unidentified Male: Yeah.
Unidentified Male: Nobody’s inaudible [38:26]. When you say, “Recognize this note or I
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 116 would.”
Unidentified Male: It’s not just diplomatic recognition, though, it’s just to acknowledge.
Unidentified Male: She regards.
Unidentified Male: Yeah.
Unidentified Male: She regards the Burmese new government as it is. Inaudible [38:38] -- it’s
a Burmese word. She had been saying, and inaudible [38:45]…
Joseph Y. Yun:
Okay. The heading of the story really baffles everybody, which is
inaudible [38:56 - Burmese language].
Unidentified Male: Well, that’s the inaudible [38:57] to the right.
William M. Wise: Yes, it would be indeed be news if a headline writer actually distorted the
underlying story, wouldn’t it? [laughter] Yes, Andrew?
Andrew Selth:
Andrew Selth from Griffith University in Australia. You both mentioned
the Jade Act -- I think it was 2008, is that right?
William M. Wise:
Yeah, mm hmm.
Andrew Selth:
Is that right?
William M. Wise:
Yeah.
Andrew Selth:
Another provision of the Jade Act was that the government would make
annual statements on Burma’s relations with countries with regard to intelligence contacts,
purchase of inaudible equipment, WMD exchanges. I’m not sure that any of those statements
have been issued yet, but they were required annually. Can you throw any light on when we
might see one of those statements?
Joseph Y. Yun:
I think we make classified reports on that part to Congress on weapons
trade and that aspect. There are also other reporting requirements that we have not done one in
two years, I would say, and that’s the review of the general provisions of Jade Act. And I would
expect as soon as our special envoy is named, he will get to work on that one, which is two years
delayed.
William M. Wise:
Yes, Priscilla?
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities Page 117 Priscilla Clapp:
I’m Priscilla Clapp, for those of you who don’t know me. Question for
you: When the new envoy is appointed, will that person then be sort of the principal one who
carries the engagement process or will Kurt Campbell and folks in the State Department still be
in charge of that?
Joseph Y. Yun:
My understanding is, you know, is very much like our six party talks
envoy for North Korea in which we have actually two, actually we now have three special
envoys for North Korea. We have Bosworth who does overall North Korean policy coordination,
Sung Kim who does six party talks, and have Bob King who does North Korean human rights.
But we’re only going to have one for Burma and this person will actually work with us within
our bureau, East Asian and Pacific Bureau. And so he will be there to day-to-day engagement on
Burma issues. But just like the setup for Korea, we will still have, as we have Korea desk, we’ll
have Burma desk, as well. So for example, say supposing there are visa issues, important VIPs
like you know, Billows or Steinberg going there, then that’ll be with the desk job, you know?
And so there will be similar division. I think, you know, and our embassy will be backed up by
our desk while, in fact, policy issues will be primary concern of the special envoy. Is that clear?
Priscilla Clapp:
Will Mike be assistant secretary?
Joseph Y. Yun:
Well I mean, he will work similarly as Kurt does work on North Korean
issues, as well as Steinberg and the secretary. They will all have an input, you know? We have no
shortage of labor, you know?
William M. Wise:
Yes.
Unidentified Male: In the current budget of inaudible [42:49], probably not a good thing to
say on the record. Off the record…
Kelly Curry: Kelly Curry from the Project 2049 Institute. There’s been a lot of talk recently
about a policy review in Europe with our European allies looking at their Burma policy and
potentially pulling back sanctions and I’ve seen a report today that they have decided to remove
some visa restrictions on certain officials of the regime. I was wondering, within the range of
what you can talk about, if you could address how we’re working with our European allies and
how this is complementing or complicating our attempts to have a common policy or some kind
of consensus with them, as well as our own internal discussions.
Joseph Y. Yun:
Mm hmm. Our European allies have been key, key, crucial part of
common policy towards Burma and there’s no question in my mind, without our strong support
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Australians, as well as Japanese, South Koreans, I mean I would say, European allies have been
key movers. This is particularly true of Britain island, some Scandinavian countries; they’ve
been very important allies. I had not heard they had moved visa restrictions. Maybe that has to
do with, I’m just guessing at this point, new government being in place. So people who are no
longer in the government, maybe their restrictions were removed. But again, we do talk, you
know, very often, very frequently, on having a common stance on these issues and they’ve been
very important.
William M. Wise:
David Steinberg?
David Steinberg:
Dr. Dave Steinberg. Joe, you mentioned the security of the domestic
opposition as one of the calls of the U.S.. You mentioned specifically Aung San Suu Kyi and the
NLD. Did you mean the NLD as an institution or did you mean the individuals who have been
associated with the NLD, since the NLD doesn’t exist as an institution, legally at least, in the
country?
Joseph Y. Yun:
I think that’s, I think both. I would say, obviously, security of individual
members of NLD is very important and we would very much like to see NLD legitimized as a
political party so that they are able to play a role in the political activities. So we would very
much ask Nay Pyi Taw that they be allowed to participate in domestic political process.
David Steinberg:
Including the ones in prison?
Joseph Y. Yun:
Yeah. Mm hmm.
Hwin Min: Hwin Min from VOA, Voice of America. My question is do you see an
opportunity to work with Chinese? To approach their regime, you know, to make a gradual
change? Because according to WikiLeaks, you know, there was China’s frustration about the
Burmese, the way the Burmese generals run the economy. They’re trying to improve it. So is that
the place, you know, where you can work with the Chinese government to put more pressure on
Burma, even though China may not want democracy? Thanks.
Joseph Y. Yun:
You know, we discuss wide range of issues with the Chinese and we
discuss, obviously, North Korean issues. We’ve had very, very, close cooperation on six party
talks on North Korean issues and I would say discussing these issues have been the highlight of
our engagement with China. On Burma, we’ve had a couple of discussions but they have not
been as in-depth nor have they produced the results that we would have hoped for and they have
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Michael J. Green:
Can I wait and answer him?
Joseph Y. Yun:
Yes.
William M. Wise:
No please, go ahead.
Michael J. Green: I think there’s a fundamental world view developing in Beijing that,
regimes like Burma or North Korea, while distasteful -- and I’ve done dialogues with Chinese
think tanks and government the past few years on both North Korea and Burma -- while
distasteful, it’s better to have them there for a variety of reasons -- ideological and raw balance,
balance and power of politics vis-à-vis India, the U.S., Japan. So it’s going to be extremely
difficult. My impression is that on North Korea, China is a much harder partner than it was when
I was in government. And in Burma, we never did much and we still don’t do much. There are
two areas, though, where I think we can do more with China. One is that Beijing was extremely
unhappy with the Junta for attacking the Kohkang minorities and driving them across the border.
The PLA people I talked to in Beijing said it was 50,000 oppressed -- the press said 30,000 or
35,000 refugees -- they said 50,000. They had a complex operation to disarm them and send
them back. They were really unhappy about that. So in terms of the effects across the border, I
think there might be some room for dialogue.
The other is, for those of you who were here earlier, you had some discussion about the fact that
North Korean trading companies are openly operating in China and some of those trading
companies are operating with Burma. And I think we’ve talked about the role of the special
envoy in North Korea. I think that Bob Einhorn -- who’s terrifically talented, in charge of
enforcing the Security Counsel sanctions on North Korea -- should be given support to press the
Burma connection, including with the Chinese. So there are some areas where the Chinese will
have reasons to work with us and we’ll have reason to press the Chinese. But overall, I think it’s
going to be extremely difficult to have a meeting of minds with Beijing on the future of both
those countries.
William M. Wise: Joe, if I can extend that question a little bit to Thailand and South Korea,
Mike mentioned South Korea and I’d be happy to add Thailand to the list. It is a legitimate
subject for dialogue with close friends, but what kind of outcomes might be expected?
Joseph Y. Yun:
South Korea and Thailand.
U.S.‐Korea Institute at SAIS | 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 6th Floor | Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5830 | www.uskoreainstitute.org Myanmar and the Two Koreas: Dangers and Opportunities William M. Wise:
Page 120 Yes. In economic relations.
Joseph Y. Yun:
Yeah. On South Korea, South Korean government has been very active on
pursuing, I would say even agreeing to, you know, you can see by their voting record they have
been consistently supportive of democracy and human rights agenda in Myanmar. This was
particularly true during Kim Dae-Jung era, when he was president when, you know, he’s a Nobel
laureate and he recognized Aung San Suu Kyi as being one. So they formed a very close
relationship and ever since then, they have been very supportive.
In terms of economic agenda, I mean, I don’t see the degree of South Korean investment in
Myanmar that, for example, I see in Cambodia, Vietnam, and in other parts of Southeast Asia. So
I don’t think it’s as widespread and we’ve never really had a conversation about that with South
Korea.
Similarly, Thailand is, of course, neighbor. They face a multitude of problems, challenges, and
opportunities by sharing a long border with them. They have refugee issues to contend with.
They also have, you know, issues concerning investment, their roads going in. And so on the
political agenda, again, we do discuss it quite a bit with the Thai and like the ASEANs, I would
say they’re foremost among the ASEANs, they want to see a situation improve there and they are
looking forward to having much more of ASEAN/Myanmar dialogue and I think Indonesia and
Thailand have especially taken that up.
Unidentified Male: Thank you.
William M. Wise:
Thank you. Lex Rieffel?
Lex Rieffel: Lex Rieffel with Brookings Institution. A reference was made to
Myanmar/Burma’s substantial foreign exchange reserves and I would be interested in hearing
your assessment about the Burmese economy. Is it doing okay? Is it getting stronger? Are jobs
being created? Or is it sort of spiraling, is your assessment that it’s spiraling down, it’s getting
worse, that there’s going to be a crisis in the agriculture that’s going to be a famine and sort of
going down the tubes? And what, either way, what are the implications for our relationship in the
inaudible [52:48]?
Michael J. Green: Well, Burma ranks at the bottom or near the bottom for spending on
education, health, and many other indexes. But in terms of foreign reserves, it’s pretty well off.
So when we look for ways to engage on humanitarian areas, I would think that part of our
purpose should be to convince the government to spend some more of its resources on its own
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wrong for the leadership in that country. I mean, the Jade Act describes the envoy’s position in a
way that seems contradictory at first. How can you be tightening targeted financial sanctions,
engaging the regime, talking on a humanitarianism base? I think the strategy is about using and
testing and trying to use the tools in your toolkit. So I hope that there is an opportunity to try to,
for the international community, to try to push the regime to think a little bit harder about how its
wealth is spent, particularly at a time when this transition to a new government, the evidence, at
least circumstantially, appears to suggest that the generals are, you know, in this supposed
privatization process are lining their pockets. I mean, so I think it’s a legitimate area, not only for
the U.S. but for the international community to try to engage on.
William M. Wise: We have time for, believe it or not, one last question if there is one among
us. Yes, Professor Thitinan?
Thitinan Pongsudhirak:
Hi, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, visiting professor here at CSIS,
Southeast Asian studies program. If this conference were held in Bangkok or Singapore or
Jakarta and so on, the participants might say that this is a bit overblown -- that the U.S. has
limited leverage vis-à-vis Burma and Myanmar without working through ASEAN, through the
UN, through the Europeans and so on. And I think that the last decade of sanctions, I think, has
come to be accounted for because, you know, using a lot of stick over the past decade, I think
now you’ve seen that China and even some of the Europeans not as much, but ASEAN and
China, they made a lot of inroads. And then the U.S. is in there in kind of a catch-up mode,
period. Now if you look to a question and a comment -- if you look at the areas where the U.S.
might regain or create new space leverage, one is certainly the South China Sea. If you look at
the recent tension with China vis-à-vis Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and so on, you know,
if you work with ASEAN in the South China Sea, these hedging countries, states, would want the
U.S. engagement and that would give some leverage and then Burma/Myanmar after elections
would then be taken in stride within the ASEAN context. That gives you some space to work
with. That’s comment.
Question: To what extent is U.S. policy, the policy review and so on, is autonomous and free
from capture by various, you know, lobby groups and Washington and New York and so on and
so on? To what extent can you really have some latitude in policy making and review vis-à-vis
Burma and Myanmar, bilaterally and within the regional context? Thank you.
Joseph Y. Yun:
I think if you’re successful, you have a lot of freedom to move. If you’re
not successful, you don’t have much freedom to move. And in my experience, you know, limited
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think that that policy room is being squeezed as a result. So I think it tends to go in cycles. And
so on the one hand, there is a success element. And there’s also external factors -- what is going
on in Myanmar itself? And ultimately, it is that that’s going to make you successful, you know?
And so if those external factors are going in your favor, you’re going to have a lot more room.
And so right now, I think we did a big review about 18 months ago. We decided that we will do
enhanced engagement. And so that’s the track we’re on. But again, that track is not forever
sustainable unless you get something for it.
Before I just leave, let me just also answer Lex’s point on the economy. You know, travelling
around Southeast Asia quite a bit, I mean, it is obvious to any casual observer that the economy
in Myanmar is degraded. It has suffered. I mean, I think there is no question, you know? And
clearly, a lot of it has to do with mismanagement. You just have to look at their foreign currency
and foreign exchange policy to know that the basic price mechanism is simply not correct there.
So they’re going to need a lot of help. I think one highlight of our policy has been on
humanitarian assistance. This is inaudible [59:05]. And I believe our groups there, our NGOs, as
well as other donor government, have found a space that they can work, you know, with the
people, with local groups that have provided a lot of valuable assistance in health care, in
education, in micro-financing. So I think that’s been, to me, a big positive of our policy, you
know, of what we’re doing over the last few years.
Michael J. Green: I’d like to make a background point. First, is there lobbying by groups that
support the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi and so forth? Yes, of course. It’s the United States.
There are also lobbying groups with economic interests. I mean, there’s a collision of ideas. This
is not a policy, in my view, that’s determined by one lobby in Washington or New York. Just as
the Mearsheimer and Walt’s argument that Middle East policy is determined by one lobby is
wrong, I think it would be wrong to assume that US policy towards Burma is determined by just
one point of view.
Second, I teach my students this at Georgetown. I hope it starts here SAIS. American foreign
policy strategy grows organically from our values. It is extremely difficult to sustain a foreign
policy strategy that’s inconsistent with our values. We can do it for a little while, but you can’t
sustain a policy that’s inconsistent with our values. And frankly, I think that American leadership
in the world has got a lot to do with our values. It’s not just based on real politique. And one of
the things we need to consider in all of this is that there is, I would argue I’m sounding a bit
theoretical here, but there’s an ideational balance of power in Asia. Asia is an area where there’s
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this issue from a U.S. perspective, I think we need to be very conscious of that. And if we think
that somehow we can, you know, manage the balance of power with China by turning towards a
real politique approach that, you know, that moves away from our values, we’ll lose. Because
that’s not our game; that’s China’s game. On the other hand, Joe briefly alluded to something
earlier which is important, which is within ASEAN, there’s, for example, in Indonesia there’s the
Bali Democracy Forum. There is more of their intra-Parliamentarian leagues. There’s more of a
recognition of the importance of these things. So we also need to align our policy as much as
possible so that we’re encouraging regional approaches and there’s a sweet spot in there, but it
would be a very dangerous -- I know you’re not suggesting this -- but a very dangerous choice
for us to falsely think it’s between idealism and realism on this one. It’s going to take a much
subtler approach, I think.
William M. Wise: Well, thank you, and thank you both very much. This has been a really
interesting and [applause], an interesting and especially candid conversation that we really
appreciate and at the risk at being a little, perhaps, over the top, I want to point out these two
gentlemen absolutely represent, at least in my view, the great strength and depth of our policy
making ability in Asia. We have some awfully good people who engage in this business, and so
thank you. And though I know occasionally at the end of a 16-hour day you may aspire to the
status that Mike and I have achieved of former government official, but I hope it doesn’t happen
to you for a long time. And Mike, you may think that this former government official status is so
much fun, but I hope you lose it pretty soon, too. So please join me in thanking them again.
To my colleagues, David Steinberg and Jae Ku, thank you so much for your great work in
making this conference possible to all the panelists. Thank you for your wonderful efforts. Thank
you all for coming today. We are adjourned.
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