THE EU MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN POST-COMMUNIST CONDITIONS – INSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES
Krzysztof Szczerski PhD
Business High School – National Louis University
Nowy Sącz, Poland
Abstract:
The paper discusses an adequacy of the concept of multi-level governance for describing politics in the
conditions of post-communist state focusing on the case of Poland joining the European Union. Comparing with
the basics assumption of the concept, the political sciences analysis shows that one can observe serious
limitations of Poland to effectively connect itself to the EU system while in the same time – domestically - the
important distortion of multi-level governance can be observed named as “asymmetric rationality” and “innernetwork state”. In conclusions, the paper suggest that more efforts must be placed in public administration
reforms heading toward solidity of core government obligation and building steering capacities in other
constitutionally guaranteed functions.
Chapter 1: Multi-level governance as a Political Model
One of the leading models of politics in integrated Europe is the concept of multi-level governance
which is supposed to generate a functional division of competences between all actors involved in common
political system of the EU [ Marks et al.1996, Kohler-Koch, Eising 1999, Sandholtz, Stone Sweet 1998] . It is
also a model for a state system reforms which should address the main challenges that state as such is facing
now, namely an external pressure of globalisation and internal pressure of further decentralisation [Pierre, Peters,
2000, Pierre 2000].
1.1 Main features of multi-level governance
Multi-level governance as a model is well-described in the literature of politics and public
administration. Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of
governing. Taking into consideration a basic difference between a concept of government vs. an idea of
governance as a exclusive vs. inclusive nature of relation among hard-core of the state and different networks, it
can be summarised by the following descriptions.
Rhodes proposes seven definitions of the term “governance” as a notion for reforming public
administration, each of them emphasizes different priorities [Rhodes 2000: 56-64]. The first – governance as
corporate behaviour - “translates” the meaning used in business corporation into public sector and wants to see
more efficiency in this sector by recommending openness, integrity and completeness, as well as accountability
with the clear definition and allocation of roles and individual responsibilities [CIPFA, 1994: 6]. The second –
governance as the New Public Management – has two meanings: corporate management and makretization of
public administration, both with the key role of the word steering as a antonym of rowing (service delivery)
[Osborne, Gaebler 1992: 20, OECD 1995]. The third definition – governance as good governance – was born
among the experts of World Bank and tries to mix-up NPM with the idea of liberal democracy, identifying
standards of high-quality political action by advocating “efficient, open, accountable and audited public service”
[World Bank 1992: 611] to be achieved i.a. through reducing over-staffing, introducing budgetary discipline,
decentralization and greater usage of non-governmental organizations [Williams, Young 1994: 87]. The fourth
definition – governance as a Socio-Cybernetic System – highlights the limits to governing by a central actor,
claiming there is no longer a single sovereign authority, by introducing the terms of interactive politicaladministrative polycentric system in which government is no longer a supreme actor and the society is
“centreless” [Luhmann 1992: xv] . The fifth definition – governance as the New Political Economy – reexamines the government of the economy and its interrelations by underlining the state role as a gatekeeper and
coordinator of economic actors’ activities to secure its presence within economic exchange.
The sixth and seventh meaning of “governance” is of special relevance to the topic of this article. One
refers to governing “with and through networks or, to employ shorthand, it refers to steering networks” .
[Rhodes 2003:65]. Those policy networks, as described by Rhodes, are the sets of organizations clustered
around a major government function or department. Networks are a distinctive coordinating mechanism and,
therefore, separate from markets and hierarchies. Shared values and norms – to form a trust within networks - are
the glue which holds the complex set of relationships together. Trust is essential for cooperative behaviour and,
therefore, the existence of the network. Governance leads to fragmentation of public activities through new
networks but it also increases the membership of existing networks, incorporating both the private and voluntary
sectors. Therefore, the government swapped direct for indirect controls. In the same time, the government can
set the limits to network actions – through funds, legal and operational frameworks. The literature on governance
explores how the informal authority of networks supplements and supplants the formal authority of government.
It explores the limits to the state and seeks to develop a more diverse view of state authority and its exercise.
Governance through networks as self-organizing set of actors drawn both from public and private sectors is
characterised by interdependence between organizations, a continuity of interactions caused by the need to
exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes, game-like mode of interactions regulated by commonly
accepted rules and significant autonomy of networks form the state [Rhodes 1996:660].
The final approach to governance is designed by the meaning of international interdependence putting
into the centre of debate the questions very much relevant to Poland on “hollowing-out” and “multi-level
governance”. The thesis of hollowing-out is made by several authors [Held 1991, Pierre, Peters 2000] who
argues that the authority of state erode through internationalisation of production and financial transactions,
internationally regulated trade, international organizations, international binding law, hegemonic powers and
power blocs. The multi-level challenge comes from transnational and self-government policy networks emerging
in the EU. There are three different types of displacement of state power and control: upward, towards
international actors and organizations; downward, towards regions, cities and communities; and outward, to
institutions operating under considerable discretion from the state (market, NGOs) [ Pieere, Peters 2000: 77].
1.2 Aims of multi-level governance
The model of multi-level governance is expected to guarantee five major supporting conditions for
stability in changing political environment in Europe.
They are as follows:
(1)
connection between growing number of semi-independent centres of power selforganisation to built stable meta-network regulated by common rule of law and basic
procedural agreement;
(2)
acting involvement of decentralised self-government and autonomous units while
respecting their identity;
(3)
inclusion of non-controlled economic networks into public sphere and new description of
relations between market and politics which should broaden the area of free choice;
(4)
revitalisation of the representative nature of political system through narrowing a
democratic gap between citizens and institutions while opening public administration to
civic society;
(5)
new form of international integration.
In this sense the state is left with two distinctive roles. The one is to set goals and make priorities, the
other – to achieve some degree of coordination of resources. So the state remains an active player but with
different expectations to fulfil. They can be named as: political leadership
(securing common good),
guaranteeing social peace, guaranteeing rule of law and objective conditions for all actors (monopoly of the force
usage) and establishing communication channels through the freedom of information and pluralism of ideas.
From the general point of view, one of the interesting ideas of what may come out from the multi-level
governance society is the model named “proceduralisation” of public sphere as a way to rethink modes of
collective regulation using a new model of collective rationality [De Schutter, Lebessis, Paterson 2001: 40-47].
The authors talk about a cognitive proceduralisation: a putting in place of mechanisms which enable learning
processes to be generated at a collective level which can cope with the uncertainty linked to contexts of bounded
rationality. In this model, rationalisation no longer consists of reading the laws of reality using the appropriate
methodology, guaranteed by deductive reasoning or by social science, but rather of reflexively constructing
situations by procedures. It is a genuine collective invention, which is now guaranteed only by itself, i.e. by its
own creative process. What is most important in this process are the two conditions which we have just
explained in conceptual terms: open dialogue between all the parties concerned by a problem; and the ongoing
reflexive loop between justification of the law and its application in practical contexts.
Chapter 2: Multi-level governance and the European Union
Characteristics of the European Union as a political system is a topic of large debate [Szczerski 2003a].
For this paper it is important that one of the prominent examples of the application of governance thinking to the
European Union is seen with the concept of multilevel governance [Nugent, Paterson 2003: 101-102] In that
sense it is described by the notion of “new governance” meaning “multi-level, non-hierarchical, deliberative and
apolitical governance, via a complex of public/private networks and quasi-autonomous executive agencies” [Hix
1998:54] It is worth mention that Sbargia argues that the EU exhibits also a good deal of ‘old governance’ of
steering and control which takes place via the institutionalised exercise of judicial authority operationalising and
enforcing a policy norm, the operation of an institution designed to make strategic use of information unavailable
to other actors (European Commission) and institutionalised lack of public money [Sbargia 2000: 221].
The idea of the EU as multi-level governance system starts with observing 'the existence of overlapping
competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels.
Member state executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity.
States are not an exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the European
Union'
[Marks
et
al.
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/politicalscience/0199250154/p142.htm
l - acprof-0199250154-bibItem-746 1996: 41]. This multilevel governance approach avoids the
assumption that the European Union is only a Brussels-level game and it avoids also a too reductionist state
centrism.
The EU has also been described as “a system of shared sovereignty, partial and uncertain policy
autonomy between levels of governance, and patterns of contention combining territorial with substantive
issues” [Tarrow, 1998:1].
Another important aspect of the EU as the multi-level governance system comes from the observation
of ambiguity of political space as the Union is a sui generis political system which makes binding decisions in
those policy areas in which powers of the traditional state arrived rather late and is much weaker in those areas in
which the traditional state first demonstrated its ability to use coercive power [Sbargia 2000: 220-221]. It is
although important that those binding decision are made on supranational with in many cases important
influence on member states’ economies.
It is also important to notice that from the EU point of view (represented by the Commission), networks
are seen as assets rather than impediments to extent that “some networks are deliberately created by the
Commission in order to implement policy more effectively, to increase awareness of certain problems at the
national level, or give a ‘European’ dimension to a problem which is still in the policy competence of national
governments” [Sbargia 2000: 234]. In the shorts words – “policy networks help the Union steer” [Sbargia 2000:
235].
The latter is combined with the semi-administrative autonomy of the Commission. From one
perspective - it can be seen as a nucleus of an emerging ‘regulatory regime’ which constitutional logic is rooted
in the separation of ‘efficiency-oriented’ policy-making from the liabilities of political expediency and
partisanship. From the other hand – the Commission is increasingly embedded in plural networks of interest
intermediation and is dependent in its action on national administrations [Ludlow 2001:4].
2.1 Europeanisation of public administration
Thus one of the most important question arising form the concept of multi-level governance in the EU is
the notion of “Europeanisation” of public administration meaning the growing two-ways reliance between the
national and the EU bureaucracies. It is not about homogenisation but adjustment.
The process is seen through several functional channels [Page 2003:166].
The first one is a coercive mechanism resulting from the fact that the European Union can issue orders.
The European Union is the source of initiatives which have the force of law and this produces homogeneity.
The second is an imitation model resulting from the EU policy transfer. Such initiatives might be EUlevel initiatives, individual national practices, or syntheses of different national practices which are imitated by
other member states. The imitation may come from the inherent qualities of a particular model or as the result of
'the development of a mainstream consensus, of common paradigms' and the 'development of joint preferences
and even identities under the conditions of close political cooperation' which is 'an important element of
Europeanization' [Falkner et al. 1999: 512]. It is driven by exchanges between national authorities who share a
common concern to solve policy problems, as well as causal understandings and technical expertise. In essence
EU policy transfer is a pro-active approach.
The third proposed approach is an adjustment model based on the fact that member states react in
similar ways to conditions created by European Union. Hix and Goetz [2000: 20] sought to assess what they
termed the 'adaptive pressures resulting from the lack of fit between EU level institutional and policy
arrangements'.
The fourth channel is a polydiffusion model executed by variety of actors and institutions involved in
transfer of ideas and practices in different ways.
From the perspective of this article it is also worth to mention what features of nation states prevent
homogenisation, which, in our sense, is the question where to find the potential barriers for embedding Polish
public administration into the EU multi-level governance system. It seems that one can find three major
conditions averting the homogenisation [Wright 1994].
The one is immediate political interests and constellations. Party political ideologies and strength, and
the relationships with interest groups, are one form of immediate political pressure, and patterns of intragovernmental power, reflecting the balance between different ministers at the political level or different
ministries or sections of ministries, are another.
The second is path dependence, saying that a country's starting point when it comes to consideration of
types of reform limits the range of alternatives it can consider to those allowed by current institutional patterns.
The third is basic administrative philosophies, different conceptions of the role of the public sector in society,
the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and even wider conceptions of the nature of authority.
Chapter 3: Problems facing New Member States – the case of Poland
Analyses of the operational modes in multi-level governance, especially focusing on the one of the
European Union, pose certain problems concerning ability of New Member states to successfully “connect to
the EU system” by building functional bridges. To large extent, those problems are rooted in two processes - the
different paths of evolution in state and social systems between Central and Western Europe in the past and the
unique systemic conglomerate emerging nowadays in our part of Europe (I will speak for Poland) as a result of
chaotic modernization in 1990s. To sum-up: the problems are the characteristics of post-communist conditions.
In this respect, the challenges for Poland can be recapitulate in two main questions. What are the preconditions which must be fulfilled beforehand to secure stability of the system and to facilitate emerge of multilevel governance model ? What are the main challenges for the public administration and therefore what reforms
in public sphere are needed ?
In my view, the crucial point of concern for the post-communist political system in the view of multilevel governance is the lack of common standards and rationality among all actors and the weakness of
instruments of steering and control of multiple networks. Those challenges can be named as: “building bridges”,
“building gates” and “defining actors”. The operational quality of multi-level governance system depends on the
“bridges” it can establish between major “actors” as well the “gates” which control the relations with outer world
and within the system.
3.1 Pre-conditions for multi-level governance and the case of asymmetric rationality of Polish public
sphere
The multi-level governance model, as discussed in the first chapter, is based on certain assumptions,
which are to guarantee its operational capacity. For Poland they still can be seen as a challenge rather than
resource.
The first major problem is the ‘teleological gap’. Some reforms undertaken in Poland, although being
rational in their own sphere, altogether have been orientated in achieving contradictory goals as there was no
common agreement on the question - what state is supposed to come out from the transformation. Reforms have
also been very much, as always, under pressure of changing political background of governments. This has
prevented Polish political elites from clearly defining the role of the state and its responsibilities in changing
political, social and economic environment and has been a major obstacle in building multi-level government
system in Poland. The problem come out forcefully during constitutional debate which has ended with many
social rights being put into the text of the Polish Constitution with no real guarantees [Sztompka 1999,
Antoszewski, Herbut 1999] .
This situation is not new for any political system, but it is different in the conditions of rapid and
fundamental change called “refolution” - the word made form reforms and revolution1. In this situation we can
not expect a “spontaneous order” to materialize but the politicians have to have a clear vision of common good
and raison d’etat.
From the point of view of multi-level governance the most important were the struggles for
decentralization and reconstruction of guaranteed social function of the state. In both cases we do not have a
clear answer whether we are consequently orientated towards network state or we keep traditional core welfare
state, which for time being is poor so it cannot deliver public services on expected level but is not retrieving from
its role. This leads to the situation when the state “is playing against itself”. In the same time, the state is still the
main architect of change, so the state apparatus is growing in importance [Gawryś 1999]. Contradictory to that,
the multi-level governance, as described before, needs a clear distinction of what should be done by ‘rowing’
(services delivered by public authorities) and what may be loosen for ‘steering’ (self-organising networks). This
question is still being wide open in Poland.
The second pre-condition for multi-level governance, which is still problematic in Poland, is a notion of
‘citizenship’ meaning active involvement in public sphere as a consequence of stable and independent private
milieu where the secured private property is a crucial dimension [Sunstein 1993: 914-915]. The active society
and ‘thick public layer’ is a condition sine qua non for multi-level governance model. In this field a certain
democratic deficit is observed. From one hand, Poles are dissatisfied with the politicians and politics and
political parties seem not to act as a intermediate bodies. From the other – civic networks are still very weak due
to improper law and social disinterest. Another important problem is the lack of political leadership which can
set goals and make priorities while in the same time we can observe growing influence of counter-organisations.
1
The world invented by Timothy Garton Ash
The third provision to form multi-level governance is the transparency of public sphere. This is still in
very much starting point as the bill of ‘freedom of information’ is not yet smoothly functioning. It is especially
important in the refolution countries where profound changes and especially state system reforms are not subject
to public monitoring or scrutiny.
Therefore a major problem, rooted in the first two, is the challenge of common rationality and the
governability in public sphere. The post-communist system can be described as a chaotic rationalisation in
both internal and external linkages. This is due five decisive circumstances .
We can observe a progression of state steering incapacity caused by the diminution of political
instruments of control [ Staniszkis 2003]. Understanding of the importance of “procedural bridges” based on
rule of law and meta-regulations is very weak in Polish political elites. Instead, nowadays, there is a certain
pressure to re-centralize a system as a way to stabilize it which is counter-productive. The case of Polish
healthcare system reform is the most appalling example. The system which has been decentralised through
introduction of regional Sickness Funds under the supervision of regional self-governments has been abolished
and central-run the National Healthcare Fund was established. This has produced collapse both from functional
and financial perspectives and finally was declared unconstitutional by the Constitution Court. In the same time
re-nationalisation of certain companies is proposed as a way of securing their existence.
The second problem is the virtual lack of the self-control instruments among different actors in public
sphere. Existing networks are very weak in execution of common standards and are mostly seen as ‘mafia-type’
organisations for which the first and major goal is to protect its own economical or legal positions. The public
sphere is seen as ‘zero-sum’ game where there can be only one winner. This is valid both for self-governing
bodies of doctors and lawyers as well as for different sectors of economy starting form media ending with
breweries. This non-existence of common interest in procedural bridges and standards of the game among
networks perfectly suits the similar lack of interest from the side government.
The third negative process is a ‘commercialisation of the state’ which is a improper post-communist
modification of the notion of “managerialism” in public administration. It leads to the situation when new form
of quangos is arising mostly in the form of agencies operating with public money without strict parliamentary
control (so-called “off-the-budget funds”). To illustrate this phenomenon Staniszkis proposes concepts of
‘political capitalism’ and ‘capitalism of public sector’ [Staniszkis 2001]. The first one corresponds with the early
stage of redeployment of wealth from state-owned sector to private actors through the networks of communistparty executive members, personal loyalties, access to information and resources. It has form Polish first
business elite based on a ‘rent of position’. The latter one is characteristic for current stage of politics and can be
describe as ‘colonisation’ of public funds by political and business interest groups.
Fourthly unsettled relations between political authorities and economic actors are leading to corruption
which becomes an only way of this ‘inter-connection’ while lobbing is still a ‘grey zone’.
And finally, the key importance of inter-network connection through the rule of law and procedural
agreement is questioned by the lack of good practising and the weak law systems as well as instability of the law.
All those problems impair a possibility to build a multi-level governance model seen from all seven
definition proposed in the chapter 1.
Adding to that, a question of hollowing out the state is emerging. Polish experience so far is mostly of
passive involvement into the process of European integration which is steered by the notion of “harmonization”.
In this case the only engine used in the process is a ‘coercive’ one which is the last efficient.
The above mentioned problems lead to formulation of main description of current situation of Poland as
a model of “asymmetric rationality” and “inner-network state”.
Asymmetric rationality may be seen as a deformed multi-level approach as it shows that in the same
political system we can observe double standards of rationality with a vacuum in the sphere of meta-regulations
and non-existence of functional bridges. The first set of standards comes form global and European level and is
heading towards modernisation and harmonisation of economy according to the corporate governance.
Commercialised public bodies and the process of privatisation are perfectly suitable tools for finding common
interest between public administration and business elite to form a joint-venture in this logic. The completely
opposite is the logic of traditional sphere of state responsibilities and social functions which is left to the ‘local
circumstances’ i.e. over-staffed, badly managed, traditional bureaucracy. Consequently, we can observe,
irrational clash between two logical orders in one system.
Inner-network state is a distorted governance model connected with the previous one. Here one can
look at reversed pattern of this model. Instead of networking social sphere and profit from self-organising
pluralism among economic and social actors while keeping the state capabilities in steering through control,
effective judiciary and police system, strong and stable law - the politics is doing just opposite. Networks has
been introduced into the very core of the state to commercialise public funds so they are not longer part of an
external environment. This leads to the situation in which there is no place for the traditional function of the state
in its core government. Instead ‘rowing’ logic is still present in many spheres of economy and public life.
3.2 Administration non-accountability and multi-level governance
The institutional capacity of public administration to establish functioning linkages with the European
multi-level governance system can be measured in two dimensions: one is general and the latter specific.
The general institutional challenge is coming from the internal structure of public administration, the
role of regulative agencies, the organisation of decision-making process, the ineffective co-operation with civic
society and the need “Europeanisation” of Polish administration.
The specific problems are due to wrong allocation of basic resources in Polish public administration.
From the first point of view, there is a certain gap in the institutionalised “meeting-points” of
different networks which leads to vulnerability for shocks and crises. This includes three problems: the lack of
clear division of competences within governmental structures responsible for the EU matters, the urgent need to
establish functional links between different levels of public authorities – central government and selfgovernments, the urgent need to establish functional bridges in the social dialogue.
The wrongly organized and over improperly designed role of non-majoritarian and quasi-market
institutions can form a problem of over-bureaucracy. This is especially valid for the Common Agricultural
Policy and structural funds administrations. In the same time there is a question of guarantee of solid institutional
“front gates” in border control, veterinary inspections, sanitary inspections, medical and chemical products
registration etc.
Alongside there are organisational failures in public administration which lead to ineffectiveness and
open-up a floor for misbehaviours. Just to name the few:
1. concentration of power in the hands of individual officials with large room to uncontrolled
manoeuvres due to the bad quality of legislation;
2. responsibilities attributed to single person can be quite large with the lack of participation of others in
his/her decision-making (custom officers, bureaucracy in the privatisation processes, police officers);
3. the arbitrariness of decision-making especially in the market regulation agencies and tax
administration;
4. lack of procedural scrutiny and insufficient attention paid to documentation and reporting even during
the law-making process in the central government;
5. the weakness of external control and internal monitoring due to absence of valuable supervision by
special bodies;
6. the less attention paid to personal responsibilities of individual official. [NIK 2000]
The Europeanisation of public administration is the Hamletic problem of “to be or not to be” for Polish
bureaucracy as far as the EU multi-level governance is concerned. It is the question whether we will be able to
join the European Administrative Space or not. In this respect certain problems seem to be the most important
[Rabska 2004:58]. Firstly is the matter of adequate structures to form a basis for linkages with the EU
counterparts. Second dilemma concerns abilities of those structures to fulfil duties accordingly to the Treaties
and the body of acquis communautire. Third is the question of relations between public administration and
citizens so to be able to come-up with the European standard of “good administration” access to which is a right
of the EU citizen.
As far as the structures are concerned there is a certain need to create new bodies and modernize
currently existing. In this respect the problem of clear division of competences arises again including relations
between central government and local and regional self-governments. From the EU point of view – two main
goals must be achieved: safekeeping of the process of integration of the acquis to the daily working of public
administration and mutual trust based on joint procedures. From the Polish perspective the most important seems
to be achieving functional capacity to integrate into different dimension of European politics on each level of
public authorities. Successful performance of the new duties of public administration depends both on proper
allocation of responsibilities according to the principle of subsidiarity as well as ability to build effective
partnerships with social and economic partners. The citizens right to “good administration” includes some
conditions which are still to be guaranteed in Poland, among them: “the right to have his or her affairs handled
impartially, fairly and within reasonable time (…), the right to be heard before any individual measure which
would affect him or her is adversely taken and the right to have access to his or her files”2. In broaden sense - it
combines the right to effective administration with the ethical standards for public servants.
From the perspective of daily-basis work of public administration we can also observe certain
limitations of capacities. These we can see in the following spheres of administration activities:
(1) organisational scarcity – with the main problems including information resources and information
circulation, bad coordination between different offices, little experience;
(2) human resources with the problems of inadequate level of knowledge (including foreign languages)
among senior officials, insofar experience of passive manner of work, bad of procedural culture;
(3) technical shortages. [Chodor, 2002: 104-105].
Having the problems in most of the administration spheres concerning multi-level governance in the EU
context brings us to the challenge of ‘administrative non-accountability’ [Hausner, Marody 2000] which can
be observed in worsening the quality of administrative decisions3 and the low-quality of human resources.
3.3. Functional conditions for multi-level governance and the case of Poland
Apart from the structural conditions, effective multi-level governance system, needs several functional
provisions. These include: common knowledge, active involvement, proper legislation, training and information.
First of all, all partners should acquire a much deeper knowledge and understanding of the operational
models of all actors on all levels.
Secondly, it is important that networks should have opportunity to be involved in planning services and
policy making with public authorities at all levels. Relationships between different actors and public authorities
should be clear and involve contractual arrangements which will properly involve their own constraints. But
whatever relationship they may have with governments, networks must remain independent of government.
Public authorities should review public policy and make proposals about what would need to be done for policy
to help networks to increase its capacity and where relevant to improve its skills in order that it can best fulfil the
new roles it is being called on to address.
It is strong need for clarifying and adjusting legal frameworks so that they are conducive to the
networks fulfilling its full potential at national, regional and local levels. [Szczerski 2003b].
Conclusions
The above mentioned problems are not questioning the basic opportunities for the post-communist state
to reform its political system along the idea of multi-level governance. They simply point out that it cannot be
done without certain caution.
In this respect one can argue that Poland needs the second generation of state system reforms heading
towards reconstruction of public sphere by revitalisation of the core functions of the state, from one side, and
embedding social and economic networks in discursive self-learning governance system, from the other.
2
Charter of Fundamental Rights of The European Union; chapter V, article 41
In every 3 out of 5 cases brought to the Supreme Court of Administration in Poland is decided in the plaintiff’s
favour [Hausner, Marody 2000]
3
The first one is to secure the bridges and gates by guaranteeing just and fair conditions for each partner
and the rule of law. These reforms should be aimed at effectiveness of police, judicial and control systems
accompanied by accountability of inspections responsible for security of market products and agencies
regulating economic activities.
The latter is to open-up the system to the innovative actions and international resources by active
involvement of Polish public administration into internal steering and European governance.
.
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