The Upsilonian
Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
Phi Alpha Theta
Department of History and Political Science
University of the Cumberlands
Williamsburg, Kentucky
Vol. XIX
Summer 2008
The front cover contains a picture of the Bennett
Building, home of the Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
of Phi Alpha Theta and the History and Political
Science Department of University of the
Cumberlands. Built in 1906 as part of Highland
College, University of the Cumberlands assumed
ownership in 1907. The building underwent
extensive renovation in 1986-1987.
Journal of the Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
of Phi Alpha Theta
THE UPSILONIAN
Student Editor
Taylor Bowman
Board of Advisors
Chris Leskiw, Ph.D., Chairman of the Board of Advisors
and Assistant Professor of Political Science
Oline Carmical, Ph.D., Professor of History
Brent Foley, student member of Upsilon-Upsilon
Whitney Gooch, student member of Upsilon-Upsilon
Bruce Hicks, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
Al Pilant, Ph.D., Professor of History
M.C. Smith, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History
COPYRIGHT © 2008 by University of the Cumberlands
Department of History and Political Science
All Rights Reserved
Printed in the United States of America
ii
Table of Contents
iv
Comments from the President............................ Mary Osborne
iv
Comments from the Advisor..................................Eric L. Wake
v
Comments from the Student Editor................. Taylor Bowman
vi
The Authors
Articles
1
The Melting Pot Boils Over:
The American Legion’s Response to the
Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924.................... Mary Osborne
9
The Death of Harry Hotspur and Its Impact
Upon the Welsh Rebellion of Owen Glyndwr............ Chris Lay
2 2Passion and Piety: The Struggles of
Catherine of Aragon.........................................Sarah Whitaker
iii
Comments From The President
Greetings,
When I was inducted into Phi Alpha Theta as a sophomore, I never imagined
that I would be writing this commentary. Where did all of the time go? Nevertheless,
Upsilon-Upsilon has continued to uphold its tradition of excellence despite losing and
gaining members. We won the best chapter award for our division for the thirtieth
consecutive year, an accomplishment which testifies to all of the members’ hard work.
We hosted four lectures this year, at the first of which our Vice President-elect Sarah
Whitaker presented about her mission trip to Venezuela. One of our goals this year
was to raise enough money to attend the biennial convention in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. With that objective in mind, we tried a new fundraiser, a barbeque sale, in
addition to our regular book and bake sales. It was a great success, and in January,
Dr. Wake, Sarah and I attended the convention. We had a wonderful time meeting Phi
Alpha Theta members from across the country and “networking” with professors. In
the spring, four members presented papers at the regional conference in Louisville.
I want to salute all members for their dedication. We initiated six new members,
and all of us who are leaving know that Upsilon-Upsilon will be in capable hands.
I conclude by acknowledging our tireless advisor Dr. Wake, whose guidance has
been indispensable, and Fay Partin, who is the glue that holds the history department
together.
I hope the following articles both stimulate your enthusiasm for and broaden
your view of history.
Mary Osborne, President
Upsilon-Upsilon, 2007-2008
Comments From The Advisor
As the 2007-08 academic year comes to a close, upon reflection, it has been
a good one. Our membership has done well and has participated in a number of
projects. To the national convention, we sent two students in addition to me. One
student, Mary Osborne, presented a paper and I participated on a panel. Getting to
the conference was expensive. It was, as the students would say, awesome to see the
faculty and students come together to raise money for the trip and have a good deal of
fun doing it. Our primary fundraiser was a barbecue and almost every student member
and faculty as well worked on the project. Additionally, we went to the Kentucky
Regional Conference in Louisville where four presented papers. This year’s group
represented themselves and the University well.
And then there is this edition of The Upsilonian. Three students, our president,
vice president, and secretary wrote three excellent but extremely different papers. One
was on the American Legion and Immigration; another was on a Welsh situation; and
the third was on an English historical favorite, Catherine of Aragon. The authors are
to be congratulated. To our graduating seniors, we wish you the best of everything and
urge you to remember that you are always a part of Upsilon-Upsilon tradition.
Eric L. Wake, Ph.D
Advisor, Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter
iv
Comments From The Editor
It is hard to believe, but the end of yet another school year is upon us. For the
Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, this means that the time has come for
several new developments. Among these are the graduation of the group’s senior
members and the publication of this year’s edition of The Upsilonian.
To those who are graduating this semester, I would like to extend my sincerest
congratulations for their numerous achievements and express my deep appreciation
for their contributions both to Upsilon-Upsilon and to the Department of History and
Political Science here at the University of the Cumberlands. Good luck and God’s
blessings on all you do. Each of you will be sorely missed. I would also like to offer
special congratulations to graduating Phi Alpha Theta members Chris Lay and Mary
Osborne, this year’s winners of the Departmental Award for History and Political
Science.
Of this edition of The Upsilonian, I would like to say that I am honored to have
been selected this year’s editor and would like to thank Dr. Chris Leskiw, this year’s
Chairman of the Board of Advisors, along with Phi Alpha Theta members Whitney
Gooch and Brent Foley for helping me to serve in this capacity. I would also like to
thank Dr. Eric Wake for his dedication as Advisor of the Upsilon-Upsilon chapter, the
remaining faculty members of the History and Political Science Department for their
aid in selecting the papers published herein, and the Department’s Administrative
Assistant Mrs. Fay Partin for her invaluable assistance in putting this journal
together.
Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank the brilliant authors whose
works are featured in this publication. Chris Lay, Mary Osborne, and Sarah Whitaker,
thank you for submitting such well-written and well-researched papers. Each was
truly a privilege to read. I hope that all who read this journal will find your papers as
enjoyable as I did.
Taylor Bowman, Editor
Upsilon-Upsilon, 2007-2008
v
Authors
Mary Osborne was a May 2008 graduate
with a major in history and minors in English
and Spanish. This paper is a shortened version
of her presidential scholar research paper
written during the 2007-08 academic year.
Christopher Lay was a May 2008 graduate
with majors in history along with religion and
philosophy. The original draft of his paper
was written for the Departmental capstone
course.
Sarah Whitaker is a rising senior in the
2008-09 class. She is working on her Social
Studies certification while also minoring in
Spanish. The original draft of her paper was
written in a course entitled England.
vi
THE MELTING POT BOILS OVER: THE AMERICAN LEGION’S
RESPONSE TO THE IMMIGRATION ACTS OF 1921 AND 1924
By Mary Osborne
In this time of renewed concern over immigration reform, Americans tend
to presume that theirs is the first generation to tackle this complex issue. They
are mistaken. Nearly ninety years ago, the world was still reeling from the
devastation of World War I. Americans confronted many unsettling possibilities
after the United States (US) entered the war in 1917. The war triggered a
confluence of events that the public blamed on immigration. Many feared that
unchecked immigration would result in the destabilization of the government as
well as the loss of “American” culture. Citing these concerns, a group of legislators who favored social Darwinism
proposed bills creating a quota system to curb rising immigration. These
prejudicial quotas became an integral part of the Immigration Acts of 1921
and 1924, America’s first attempts at restricting immigration on a wide scale.
Meanwhile, a newly incorporated organization, the American Legion, pushed
for programs to Americanize the immigrant instead. Comprised of World War I
veterans, the Legion averred that anyone who was willing to make the ultimate
sacrifice for America was worthy of citizenship. Race did not enter into the
Legionnaires’ definition of a good American. The veterans, however, needed
the cooperation of Congress and the public to institute its programs. To further
its own Americanization programs, the Legion thus gave qualified support to the
passage of the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924.
The Legion had difficulty defining Americanism but had no trouble
evoking it and America as subjects of historical and mythical grandeur. Russell
Cook, the director of the National Americanism Commission remarked that it
was nearly impossible to define the phrase 100% Americanism. The concept
varied from individual to individual. Nevertheless, every individual could
be 100% loyal to America. Cook asserted, “It is that loyalty with which The
American Legion is concerned today, in order that the aggregate Americanism
of our people, as a whole, will be 100 per cent.”1 Nebraska Legion historian
Robert Simmons presented Americanism as something akin to a “spirit moving
through the centuries to realize an idea of freedom where nation and citizen
perfected each other.”2 Phrases such as “undivided allegiance, cooperation on
a grand scale, and worthy of sacrifice,” used to describe the individual’s proper
relationship to society, appear throughout Simmons’ work and the Americanism
Commission’s minutes.3 By the time the Americanism Commission was formed,
the Legion had devoted itself to Americanizing immigrants through education.
Aspects of the Legion’s Americanization program had been present since
the beginning of World War I. Education in political loyalty and patriotism,
adoption of English, and instruction in American history and government were
key elements. The Legion understood, however, that it could not accomplish
these goals in a short period of time. In 1923, the Legion formally demanded
total suspension of all immigration for five years. Russell Cook stated, The only
reasonable solution is The American Legion answer—a restricted immigration
1
2
until these aliens are assimilated and have become Americans in all sense
of the word.”4 Legion Commander Alvin Owsley called immigration “the
greatest problem facing the United States government.” John Taylor noted
at the National Executive Committee meeting, “As to Immigration, nothing
will be done in the House or in the Senate before March 4 on our fixed policy
of Immigration, to wit, the total restriction of immigration.”5 This statement
indicates that, as an official body, the Legion would have preferred complete
suspension of immigration to the quota system because immigrants still
continued to be admitted even under a rigid system. Commander John Quinn
noted that “the melting pot has been overstuffed, our absorption power has been
overtaxed.”6
Underlying his criticism was the fear that people who had little or no
understanding of American ideals or the American spirit were endangering
American institutions. The process of Americanization would take years, even
if immigration were to be completely suspended. The Legion’s Americanization
program could not be the same kind of “pressure-cooker assimilation” that was
touted during the war years.7 It would not be effective, especially with adults
whose traditions were ingrained. Critics of this method noted Germany’s failed
attempts to Prussianize peoples within its borders. Unlike the Americanization
programs of World War I, the Legion’s never stressed the complete “stripping”
of an immigrant’s native customs. Americans were learning that national
unity could not be artificially created. Forced assimilation would assuredly
backfire and create hostility toward the US. Assimilation and the acceptance of
American traditions should be of the immigrant’s own accord.
Indeed, some argued that the kind of Americanization which Grant and
other anti-immigrationists touted was endangering democracy. It promoted
isolation and confused the ideal concept of social order (as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence) with the concept of an ever changing ‘”dynamic
state.’”8 In The Passing of the Great Race, Grant claimed that the Nordics, the
bearers of modern civilization, are being slowly eliminated from the civilized
world.9 Grant, however, failed to account for the long existence of Egyptian,
Syrian, Indian, and Roman civilizations. The only way he could justify his
theory was to remain a modernist. Two of his contemporaries Professors Frantz
Boas and Jean Finot had already potentially shown that there was no such thing
as race superiority or inferiority. Artificial race distinctions were being broken
down even as ardent voices in Congress were trying to rebuild them through
physical and intellectual discrimination. Some claimed that assimilation was a
lost cause since it proceeded at varying rates among different peoples.
The American Legion countered that restriction should ideally be based
upon understanding of citizenship, ability to read, speak, and write the English
language, and upon employment. Instead of stripping an immigrant of his
heritage, so-called “racial characteristics” must be conserved.10 For example,
lawlessness perpetrated by immigrants was not due to inherent immorality
but the result of Americans’ failure to recognize old traditions. Immediately
substituting the old ways for American traditions was simulation rather than
assimilation. Insincerity of agreement was more dangerous than sincere
disagreement.
3
Not everyone concurred with the Legion’s ideology; most people were
suspicious of foreigners. Knowing that it could not quickly overcome
Congress and the public’s prejudice, the Legion supported the Johnson Bill,
which proposed a strict quota system. Albert Johnson, chairman of the House
Committee on Immigration, pressed for the passage of the 1921 quota bill and
drew up a bill which would become the 1924 Immigration Act. He sought the
counsel of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, and eugenicist Kenneth Roberts
in writing his bill. By switching from 3% of the resident alien population
according to the 1910 census to 2% of the resident alien population according to
the 1890 census, Johnson hoped to cut admissions by half.11 Legion testimony
at the hearings helped the bill become law. Even after the bill became law, the
Legion continued to support bills halting immigration for anywhere from 5-10
years, “giving this country time to assimilate the undesirable aliens.”12 The
Legion denied belief in racial superiority of Anglo-Saxons but believed that
the absorption of non-white races, such as the Japanese, would be futile and
possibly disastrous. Officially, the organization perpetuated the myth that the
more established ethnic groups had brought “peculiar and appropriate gifts with
the friendly purposes of making America greater.”13
Throughout the 1920s, the Legion circulated statistics that indicated
between 2 and 3.5 million illegal aliens resided in the US. More than 600,000—
many Communists and other radicals—were on relief.14 The Legion opposed the
sort of new immigrant who had been arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe
only because these groups contained many alien slackers and radicals. These
people seemed loath to accept American institutions and made no attempt to
assimilate. The newcomers appeared to reject the cultural community that to the
Legionnaires represented America. A statement made in 1929 by an American
Legion lobbyist before the Senate Hearings on the National Origins Act
succinctly sums up the Legion’s position: “The issue can be brought squarely
between patriotism and slackerism—shall slackerism be represented in selecting
our immigrants over patriotism?”15 The Legion judged immigrants as worthy
of admission based on their actions and attitudes, not genetic makeup. The
organization held hyphenism in contempt—either one was an American or one
was not. That determination was the simple definition of 100% Americanism.
Upon becoming an American, an immigrant transferred his loyalty to his new
country. He now identified himself with America. The Legion lobbied bills that
gave immigration officials no leeway by requiring them to automatically deport
Communists on the grounds that party membership signified a commitment to
violent insurrection. The California Legion, in particular, played a prominent
role in dealing with illegal aliens. It urged increasing the border patrol and
speeding up deportations.16
Legion-supported bills generally represented the grass-roots sentiments of
the Legion’s members. A post passed a resolution, and then a delegate from
that post ensured that it was adopted by the state organization at a department
convention. Next, delegates who sponsored the resolution proceeded to the
National Convention, where a committee usually endorsed the resolution and
passed on to the entire convention for approval. The approved resolution
became part of the Legion’s legislative program. The resolution was later
4
turned over to the Legion’s legislative committee in Washington. The director
of the Legion’s lobby or one of his assistants composed the bill after which it
was introduced in Congress. There was a Legionnaire or sympathizer present
either in the House or in the Senate to introduce the bill and to see it through the
designated committee to the floor of Congress.17
The Legion’s lobbying aroused suspicion that the organization had violated
its charter which stipulated that the Legion must remain nonpolitical. Congress
granted the charter without debate in the Senate and only mild questioning
in the House. Some representatives raised the possibility that the thirty-four
incorporators from the Paris and St. Louis Caucuses might dominate the
Legion to carry out ulterior (i.e. political) motives. Legionnaire Fiorello La
Guardia, who later opposed the Legion’s version of Americanism, assured the
Congressmen that the Legion was “an absolute democracy.”18 The Legion
often accomplished its objectives by working through other departments. In
August 1919, the War Department gave the Legion “official recognition and
assistance.”19 It issued guns to the Legion for ceremonial purposes. Whenever
Legion officials needed anything, they called on governors or attorney generals
and often immediately received what they requested. No one wanted to be
accused of being a Communist sympathizer, and consequently people acted out
of fear.
Most Legion departments and the national office refused gifts from
individuals to avoid accusations that it was anybody’s tool. Furthermore,
Legion founders who harbored political ambitions established a precedent
that prospective candidates for public office could not be Legion officers.
Legionnaire Noel Gaines, nevertheless, protested to the National Headquarters,
“’one of your committee [is] going from state to state trying to influence
legislation.’”20 In a letter to Massachusetts posts, State Commander James T.
Duane urged Legionnaires to concentrate on “beneficial veterans legislation
rather than politics.”21 Duane had pinpointed one of the Legion’s dilemmas
in his plea: where did “beneficial legislation” end and “politics” begin? What
constituted “beneficial legislation” and who decided?
To avoid violating their charter and to sidestep this political dilemma,
Legionnaires usually resorted to influencing politicians without endorsing
them. The Legion’s National Headquarters issued this statement in its defense:
“Whereas, it seems a proper function of The American Legion to voice its
attitude toward non-partisan questions of public interest and concern, to the end
that life and government in the United States may be improved.”22 The state
commander of Minnesota advised Legionnaires to persuade their congressmen
to commit themselves on issues of concern to the Legion. Legionnaires who
were personally acquainted with their congressmen should convince them to
speak at post meetings, where they would either commit themselves or face an
angry audience. Eligible politicians also joined the Legion. In 1924, twentyfour US senators and 145 congressmen belonged.23 Although not in their
capacity as Legionnaires, former National Commanders and other officers
organized veterans behind the Republican and Democratic standards.
The Legion was an effective lobby, and it encouraged rumors of its
omnipotence. John Taylor asserted, “The American Legion favors it. It is
5
inevitable legislation.”24 He once explained that legislation is made not by
Congress but by groups or persons interested in legislation. He worked closely
with Thomas W. Miller and Luke Lea to lobby Congress. Between 1921 and
1931, Taylor claimed to have written between 1,500 and 2,000 bills.25 Veterans’
benefits and national defense were his top priorities. He dealt with what he
called “key men” in Congress and drafted the bill himself. A “key man” was
a legionnaire or sympathizer who would introduce the bill and see it through
committees and then on to the floor. He and his men tried to place American
Legion members on various key committees.26 Taylor often appeared as a
witness before the committees and provided lists of witnesses who should be
called for testimony on particular questions. If a bill was not reported to the
floor, Taylor sent telegrams to the forty-eight state commanders who in turn
relayed his message to post commanders. The post commanders urged members
to send letters to obstructing members of the Congressional committee.
The secrets of Taylor’s success were thorough research and effective
presentation. By the mid 1930s, his files included twenty volumes recording
how every congressman had voted on every issue of interest to the Legion since
its inception and sixty volumes of committee hearings. The New York Sun
attributed to these files 50% of the Legion’s successes. Congressmen who had
forgotten how they voted previously on a measure often visited Taylor to recall
their positions. According to The New York Sun, “[Taylor’s] facts are invariably
accurate and reliable, the members of Congress have come to look upon them as
the most authoritative available.”27
When Taylor thought that the Legion would support him, he called for
an onslaught of telegrams and letters to let recalcitrant congressmen know
the Legionnaires considered their stand on a particular issue important in the
upcoming election. Often Legion officers wrote articles for publication in
magazines and newspapers. The National Commander acted as a spokesman,
advancing the Legion’s programs. The National Convention acted as a sounding
board for Legion policies. Other lobbies later picked up Taylor’s techniques.
He always sought maximum exposure for the Legion’s lobby. Any activity, such
as specific endorsements of political candidates, that threatened to split Legion
membership he defined as partisan and thus forbade it. Legionnaires also
spoke out on immigration through their official magazine The American Legion
Weekly.28
On May 26, 1924, Congress approved the Immigration Quota Act (also
known as the National Origins Act). It restricted immigration to 2% of the total
number of a nationality resident in the US according to the 1890 census. The
census favored Northwestern Europe. The maximum number of immigrants
admitted to the US was set at 164,000. Of this number, 150,000 immigrants
could come from Europe.
John Taylor testified before the Senate Committee on Immigration that the
Legion endorsed and upheld the Immigration Act of 1924 because the Legion
believed in restrictive immigration and in the right of the American people to
judge who should enter their country although the quotas were “unjust, this
discrimination must inevitably exist.” Lastly, he maintained that the national
origins clause contained within Section II B of the act, which had yet to take
6
effect, was the fairest method upon which to restrict immigration. An official
statement later released by the Legion quoted from the clause: “’The annual
quota of any nationality…shall be a number which bears the same ratio to
150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920
having that national origin.”29 The national origins clause essentially took
into account the ethnic backgrounds of the entire US population, not only the
immigrants. Taylor affirmed that the clause would put the “new” and the “old”
immigrants on equal footing.30 No country would be given an unfair advantage.
Taylor recognized that Southern and Eastern Europeans saw “in the action of
Congress deliberate discrimination” and that the quotas were based upon an
“unfounded anthropological theory.”31
It must be understood that, while the Legion officially lent its cooperation
to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, individual posts sometimes
disagreed with the Legion’s position. For instance, the Corp. Sydney Rosenberg
Post (No. 670) in Brooklyn, New York, opposed the Johnson Bill. The post
denounced it as discrimination based upon racial and religious preferences. The
bill, it asserted, denied the ideals of freedom and equality of all men.32 The
Rosenberg Post’s stance corroborates Taylor’s statement that the quotas were
unjust. However, it appears that the Legion decided that it would be futile
at that time to combat this discrimination. The pressing issue was restricting
immigration whatever the means. In light of the gravity of the immigration
problem, the rationale behind the bill was less important. Moreover, the bill
satisfied the Legion’s official objectives with regard to immigration restriction.
The bill would reduce immigration drastically, free up jobs for veterans, and
allow the Legion time to intensively pursue its Americanization efforts.
The Legion issued other resolutions declaring its continued support for
the Immigration Act of 1924 and even opposing any modifications of the
exclusive provisions of the act. According to the Legion, various interest groups
were endeavoring to force Congress to modify or abandon the restrictive and
exclusive features of the law. Certain interests wanted Congress to nullify the
policy of control and limitation.33 If Congress relaxed these features, economic
prosperity and American citizenship would suffer. The Legion did, however,
recommend that preference should be made within the quotas for the parents,
wives, and children of aliens already in the US who have declared their intention
to become citizens one year prior to July 1924 and that those countries in the
Western Hemisphere should be included in the quotas.34 Furthermore, the
Legion obtained an amendment in 1925 which allowed alien veterans who lived
overseas to return to the US with their families as nonquota immigrants. This
amendment permitted 2,000 Italian-Americans, who became disgusted with
conditions in post-war Italy, to return to the US.
The quota system effectively reduced immigration in the US and all but
halted immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. The Legion’s twin
objectives of restricting immigration and protecting America from Communism
had been reached but at a cost. For its support of the Johnson Bill and of
immigration restriction in general, the Legion has incurred harsh criticism from
both historians and the public. Some opponents have accused it of siding with
the eugenicists and nationalists. These critics usually have neglected to examine
7
the Legion’s motives and have failed to comprehend its idea of Americanism.
The Legion gave only qualified support to the Immigration Acts of 1921 and
1924, for it officially rejected their racist intents. Anyone who expressed a
sincere love for the US and who would swear to protect its institutions could
become an American. This idea is what the Legion’s Americanism programs
are built upon. Their programs continue to operate to this day. In addition, the
American Legion still remains committed to its lobbying on behalf of veterans.
In this time of renewed concern over immigration, the American Legion has
wavered neither in its stance on immigration restriction nor in its definition of an
American.
Endnotes
1
Russell Cook, Address of the Director of the National Americanism Commission [ca. 1920s]
(Indianapolis, IN: American Legion Library Microfilms, 1920s. Microfilm), 1.
2
William Pencak, For God & Country: The American Legion, 1918-1941 (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1989), 5.
3
Ibid.
4
Cook, Address, 2.
5
The American Legion, National Executive Committee Minutes (Indianapolis, IN: American
Legion Library, Fall 1923), 62.
6
Pencak, For God & Country, 257-258.
7
Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National
Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 99.
8
Carol Aronovici, “Americanization: Its Meaning and Function,” The American Journal of
Sociology 25, no. 6 (May 1920): 696.
Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921),
48.
9
10
“Preferential Immigration” The American Legion Weekly (November 17, 1922), 4.
11
Edith Abbott, Immigration: Select Documents and Case Records (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1924), 65.
12
Pencak, For God & Country, 259.
13
Ibid., 256.
14
Ibid., 260.
15
Robert A. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1957), 43.
16
Pencak, For God & Country, 137.
8
17
Marcus Duffield, King Legion (New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, Inc., 1931),
48-49.
18
Pencak, For God & Country, 65
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid., 71.
21
Ibid., 107.
22
Verna B. Grimm to Mr. Holden (Indianapolis, IN: American Legion Library Microfilms,
1930), Microfilm.
23
Pencak, For God & Country, 112.
24
Ibid., 117.
25
Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1954), 22.
26
The American Legion, National Executive Committee Minutes (Indianapolis, IN: American
Legion Library, January 1924), 236.
27
Ibid.
28
The American Legion Weekly, 1921-1923, passim.
29
The Legion and Immigration (Indianapolis, IN: American Legion Library Microfilms, ca.
1929), 1. Microfilm.
30
John Thomas Taylor, Statement before the Senate Committee on Immigration (Indianapolis,
IN: American Legion Library Microfilms, 1929) Microfilm.
31
Legion and Immigration, 2.
32
Harry Horn to National Headquarters of the American Legion (Indianapolis, IN: American
Legion Library Microfilms, 1924) Microfilm.
33
Theodore Holcombe to the editor of the American Legion Weekly (Indianapolis, IN:
American Legion Library Microfilms, 1934) Microfilm.
34
Garland W. Powell to Watson B. Miller (Indianapolis, IN: American Legion Library
Microfilms, 1925) Microfilm.
THE DEATH OF HARRY HOTSPUR AND ITS IMPACT UPON
THE WELSH REBELLION OF OWEN GLYNDWR
By Chris Lay
Henry Bolingbroke, calling himself Henry IV, had secured the English
throne for the Lancastrians in 1399. In usurping Richard II, however, he had
not succeeded in dissipating the atmosphere of rebellion. When confronted
by a Welsh insurrection led by the formidable Owen Glyndwr, Henry balked.
Soon supported by the House of Percy under Henry “Harry Hotspur,” the Welsh
problem evolved into a genuine threat to the integrity of the crown. Yet, with
Percy’s death at the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403, the menace was abbreviated.
Though Glyndwr continued to antagonize Henry’s government, even broaching
aid from France, his revolution never again represented the overt hazard to
the English that it did when it counted Hotspur among its numbers. Percy’s
unfortunate demise made impotent the entire effort against Henry IV.
The Percys Assist Henry in Claiming the Throne
In order to fully demonstrate the impact of Hotspur’s death, it is necessary
to explore the role of the Percy family in England. This will make the Percys’
strength as an ally to Glyndwr evident by history and not only by claim. The
terms between the House of Percy and Henry IV were not always bellicose.
Both Hotspur and his father Henry Percy VI, 1st Earl of Northumberland,
were initial supporters of the king. Many later causes prompting defection
to Glyndwr’s camp stemmed from conditions agreed upon during this period
of mutual compliance. It would then be prudent to examine the relationships
between Henry Bolingbroke and the Percys, as well as the promised rewards for
the Percy family’s support in defiance of the crown.
Henry and the Percys
The 1399 revolution served to replace one dynasty with another. To avoid
the fate of the former monarch and to avoid imposing so heavily upon the
people, Henry was forced to rely strongly on the counsel of his advisors and
local magnates. He extended to them the right to exercise a degree of control
over the money they provided through recommendations.1 Likewise, many
remote and ungovernable areas outside the king’s reach demanded the rule of
the great estates to maintain order.2 The fact that the North “knew no prince
but a Percy” is distinctly reflective of that family’s standing there.3 It should be
little surprise that Henry would seek so stable an ally to consolidate his northern
holdings. Moreover, he would not be the first to do so.
Under Richard II, control of Northern England along the Scottish border
saw a constantly revolving custody of titles to curb the ambitions of the Percys
and their political rivals, the Nevilles. Richard understood the implications
of Percy favor and bought it with appointments. He made Hotspur warden of
9
10
the East March and keeper of Berwick in 1388 at a price of 12,000 pounds in
wartime and 3,000 in peace. Hotspur was “retained” in Richard’s service for
life in June 1390 at a sum of 100 pounds per annum and was given the West
March.4 These grants eventually evolved into singular Percy control of the
North in Richard’s later years.5 Such lucrative terms are again evident of the
necessity and influence the nobility held to monarchs of the time. Richard soon
recognized the potential danger in northern monopoly and again diffused land
holdings between the families. In so doing, he also cast aside Percy loyalty.6
Scorned by Richard, the Percys were the perfect ally to a Henry fresh
from his September 1398 exile and still fuming from the denial of his
inheritance. Upon hearing of his return, Hotspur, Hotspur’s father, the Duke
of Northumberland, and Ralph Neville, Duke of Westmoreland, in an alliance
of convenience, met the erstwhile Earl in Doncaster on July 16, 1399. There,
with the pledge of absolute northern rule and minimal Neville family gains, the
Percys sided with Lancaster. It is unknown whether the Percys believed Henry
sought only a return of his title and claims, as per his modest assurances, or that
he would stop at nothing short of the throne. The latter is more likely as they
would not risk beheading for treason to restore patrimony alone.7 Moreover,
they must have been aware of the potential rewards available beyond the
northern holdings recently denied them. Indeed, there were plentiful rewards to
be reaped.
The Price of Loyalty
For their immediate good faith, Hotspur was paid 666 pounds and
Northumberland was awarded an incredible 1333 pounds.8 Following the formal
ascension of King Henry IV, the benefits were even greater. Northumberland
was made constable of England for life and granted the Isle of Man at an
annuity of 6000 pounds in war and 1500 in peace. Hotspur received Northern
Wales, never before Percy territory, at 12,000 pounds in war and 3000 in peace.
Hotspur’s uncle Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, was appointed an admiral
of England and given a 333 pound annual wage. The ignominious contrast of
what had become of Richard II merits mentioning. He died an inglorious death,
chained to the wall of Henry’s castle at Pontefract and starved.9
The Many Grievances of Owen Glyndwr
With the Percys abated and Henry secure on his throne, attention now
shifts to Wales and a man named Owen Glyndwr. Glyndwr was a profoundly
learned man with many statesmanlike qualities.10 These were supplemented
by a knowledge of the law owing to a Westminster apprenticeship and status as
an esquire of Henry IV.11 Further, he served as a squire to Richard II and may
have assisted Henry in the same capacity. He was forty years old in 1399, with
a long record of service to the marcher lords in Wales, nobles with large estates
along the borders. As a respected member of the Welsh gentry or uchelwyr,
he claimed extensive holdings: Glyndyfrdwy, in the valley of the river Dee,
Cynllaith, in the Berwyn Mountains, and Ceredigion, inherited in Southern
11
Wales. 12 Glyndwr was not some backwards rebel springing from a hole in the
ground to harass the English. He was a legitimate landowner with a thoughtful
series of complaints.
Glyndwr’s neighbor was an exceptionally cruel marcher lord named
Reginald Grey who detested Welshmen. Grey acquired many of Glyndwr’s
estates, claiming that they were actually within his domain and were his by
propriety. He soon withdrew, and Glyndwr coolly took the matter to the courts,
where the dispute was readily dismissed.13 Disgraced before the English judicial
system, Grey began plotting his vengeance. During a routine muster for war,
Grey allegedly lost Glyndwr’s summons and neglected to inform him of the
royal notification. As a result, the Welshman was marked absent on the roster
and branded a traitor. Grey claimed his lands without opposition. Glyndwr was
forced into the hills as a brigand.14
Now reduced to thuggish raids, Glyndwr saw himself as the heir to old
Welsh poems and prophesies of Uthr Bendragon and Owen ab Urien in their
victories over the Saxons.15 English indifference to Welsh exploitation by
landowners bred widespread disaffection. Preferring to service the desires
of the large estates, the English imposed severe taxes and restrictions on the
Welsh tenets.16 Meanwhile, Landholders were able to detain bards and other
such “vagabonds” at will.17 Henry himself was notably unconcerned for the
widespread social misconduct, musing, “What care we for the barefooted
rascals.”18 All of this stirred a pronounced anti-Henry sentiment from which the
rebel Glyndwr was able to draw support. His numbers soon grew, and his raids
became increasingly more menacing. Henry was forced to formally recognize
the rebellion as a threat in 1400.19 This meant that he must commit some means
to stopping it. Hotspur would be this means.
Hotspur in Service of the King
Admiringly called “Harry” by the Scots, Hotspur also owed them his
epithet.20 He was given the title “Hotspur” for his enthusiastic governorship of
Berwick in 1388, particularly in calming the characteristically restless Scottish
inhabitants of the area.21 Militarily, Hotspur had already proven his utility to
the crown. In September 1387, he had led a naval expedition to Brest with
inadequate support that forced the French to lift a siege they had maintained
for over a year.22 At Otterburn on August 5-6, 1388, he was captured in a
foolish charge at the Scottish camp center, resulting in 1,000 fatalities on both
sides. Yet, his daring display also killed the Scottish leader James Douglas
and put 30,000 Scotsmen to flight. In spite of his rashness, his valor was
widely recognized by a generous royal council who paid two thirds of his large
ransom.23 Henry considered Hotspur the most able swordsman in England and
entrusted his son, the future Henry V, into Hotspur’s tutelage. With this honor,
Henry named him Chief Justice of Chester, North Wales, and Flintshire and
the constable of its major castles. He was also made keeper of the lordship of
Denbigh.24 Hotspur was then held in no small regard. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
he was elected to bring Glyndwr and his marauders to heel.
12
Giving Chase Through Wales
Hotspur immediately made an offer of pardon to all rebels but Glyndwr
and a few others in March of 1401. Most of the Welsh dispersed and returned
to their homes contentedly, reducing Glyndwr to but seven followers. Guerilla
warfare continued, but it was hardly sustained as more than a nuisance.25 On
April 1, Hotspur and the young Prince Hal, as Henry’s son was often called,
initiated a siege of Conway castle. It had been overtaken by forty men while
its defenders attended a Good Friday service. The castle held for three months
against a relief force numbering 120 men-at-arms and 300 longbowmen. Its
nine most prominent defenders surrendered themselves to the terms that the
thirty-one rank and file be spared. They were summarily executed and the
soldiery released.26 Hotspur pursued other Welsh groups to Cadir Idris in May
and soundly defeated them. Glyndwr had no choice but to flee into Southern
Wales.27 During this time, Hotspur conducted a meeting with Glyndwr. The
Welsh commander agreeably noted that he would submit most willingly if
his life were spared and his property guaranteed.28 Hotspur was denied these
conditions by Henry for reasons addressed later.
This was the end of Hotspur’s involvement in subduing the Welsh
insurrectionists. Throughout the campaign, he had pleaded with Henry IV for
money to fund the operations. This was to no avail. The expense of both the
Conway and Cadir Idris efforts was incurred personally. Frustrated by a lack of
financial support in spite of successes, Hotspur retired to Northumberland.29
In his place, Henry mounted a number of jarringly unsuccessful attempts at
containing Glyndwr. These endeavors were distinguished by mismanagement
and unpreparedness. They relied too heavily on the amateur defenses of
undermanned baronial plots.30 The same could be said of future expeditions. A
sizeable attempt by Henry in September 1402 was beset by inclement weather.
Massive snow and hailstorms were reported to have come from Glyndwr’s
talented weather magicians. The Welsh were thought to command Minorite
friars, and the torrential storms were considered the product of their diabolical
arts.31 When not afflicted by fickle weather, Henry’s lumbering armies were
exhausted by a mobile Glyndwr. Acutely knowledgeable of guerilla tactics,
Glyndwr refused to engage Henry’s armies directly.
By 1403, control was given to Hal, the capable Prince of Wales. He too
soon discovered that wages and provisions for the soldiers were badly needed.
His requests were met with a 1,000 pound subsidy, wages for 500 men-atarms and 2,000 archers, and an additional three weeks of wages for 300 menat-arms and 2,000 archers.32 He would eventually burn Glyndwr’s estates at
Glyndyfrdwy and Sycarth in March of 1403 before impressing upon his father
the need for a more focused effort in Wales.33 Henry was distracted by other
matters, and no effort came.
Crushing Scottish Resolve
Meanwhile, Hotspur returned north to find only more fighting: an assembly
of Scots under Archibald, Earl of Douglas, was attempting to overcome the
northern borders. Infuriated by Northumberland’s recent successes against
13
his raiding parties, Douglas massed an army to crush Northumberland. In
mid September, Northumberland, Hotspur, and George Dunbar, Scottish Earl
of March, anticipated this attack and forced Douglas to fight at Homildon
Hill. The English peppered the Scots with a swarm of arrows, causing them to
break. Losing only five men, the English had annihilated a Scottish army and
claimed an impressive haul of prisoners. Among them were Douglas, who had
lost an eye in the battle (he looked up and caught a downward traveling arrow),
four other earls, four barons, and dozens of knights.34 Henry would be terribly
pleased with such a triumph.
Alienation from the King: Into the Arms of Glyndwr
This proved not to be true. Contrary to all custom and privilege of the day,
the Percys were denied their prisoners and their forthcoming ransom.35 The
encouraged structure of detainment in the North prescribed “border law,” a
notion of relaxed terms of imprisonment that allowed for visits to family on the
honor system. Northern ideas of civil imprisonment were lost on Henry, who
had little to no awareness of them.36 To deny this tradition was to brazenly insult
not only Hotspur the warrior but the entire House of Percy. Such was only the
beginning of the Percys’ problems with Henry IV.
Beyond the lack of monetary support in Wales, Henry had a number of
debts to settle with the family of Northumberland. Much was promised in
1399 for Percy support of Henry in the taking of the throne. Little had yet
been delivered. Nearly 20,000 pounds in payment remained outstanding
by 1403. Of the 60,000 originally pledged, only 49,390 pounds had been
authorized by Henry’s exchequer. Of that, 10,799 were in “bad tallies” or left
unpaid. The Percies received only 38,591 pounds; refusal to settle the figures
implied ingratitude on Henry’s part.37 Henry’s reluctance to accede to his lavish
promises was not evidence of stinginess, though, or even of dissatisfaction with
the Percys. As he claimed in his response to Percy anger, “I have no money,
so you shall have no money.”38 Still, it may have benefited Henry to be more
circumspect in his money promises.
Henry drew further criticism when he overturned a previously mandated
title. Hotspur had been named keeper of Roxburgh castle for life in 1399.
Henry withdrew this and gave the captaincy to Ralph Neville.39 Bewilderingly,
Henry then granted Northumberland the entire south of Scotland in
appeasement. Needless to say, the Scots were more than a little unwilling
to blithely accept Percy mastery. Furthermore, Henry refused to endorse or
even passively allow measures to subdue these lands by the Percys out of fear
of protracted war. They had been given the lands their family had sought for
generations, only without a means to claim them. The Percys also feared the
territorial ambitions of George Dunbar, who had assisted them at Homildon Hill.
Many of his lands had been distributed among the Percys. They feared that,
given his budding relationship in advising Henry IV, any success to him would
come at their detriment.40 Such gestures and the increased sponsorship of the
Nevilles in the North served only to alienate the Percys from a king they had
somewhat made.41
14
Additionally, Hotspur remained irritated by his disagreement with Henry
concerning treatment of the Welsh.42 Henry often chided him for leniency.
When he learned of Hotspur’s meeting with Glyndwr, Henry was furious.
This was a prospect Hotspur failed to grasp as such conferences between
adversaries were common in the North. Henry further chastised Hotspur for not
seizing Glyndwr when his quarry was there before him. Hotspur found such
a suggestion treacherous and repulsive.43 By refusing any mediation, Henry
confused and angered the young Percy. Accustomed to gentlemanly conduct
even between enemies, Hotspur was pushed further from a king whose actions
were decidedly ungentlemanly.
Most hurtful to the relationship between the Percys and Henry involved
Glyndwr’s capture of some choice royal prizes. On January 31, 1402, Glyndwr
captured his nemesis Reginald Grey at Denbigh. Shortly thereafter, he snared
Sir Edmund Mortimer, Earl of Wigmore, at Bryn Glas when Mortimer’s Welsh
archers turned on him, killing 1,100 Englishmen.44 Mortimer was Hotspur’s
brother-in-law. He was also the uncle to Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March and
true heir to the English throne.45 Henry quickly paid the ransom for Grey, who
was a personal friend of the king’s. Fearing Mortimer as a threat to his position,
Henry was reluctant to free him. In a rage, Hotspur personally demanded in
no gentle terms that Henry negotiate Mortimer’s release or allow the Percys
to pay the ransom themselves. Henry flatly responded, “I will not strengthen
my enemies by paying them money.” The resulting dialogue between the two
culminated in Henry allegedly reaching for his blade, only to be stayed by
Hotspur, who said, “Not here but on the field of battle.”46
Despairing over fear of not being ransomed, Mortimer joined Glyndwr
through marriage to his entrancing daughter. This was a disastrous blow to
the English; the sizeable land inheritance of the Earl of March was now lost.47
Hotspur and the Percys would then also join Glyndwr, assembling at Chester
on July 13, 1403, with the aim of usurping “Henry of Lancaster.”48 This claim
represented the great fear of Henry IV: his dynastic right would be refused by
the weakness of his title. In fact, Henry had dispirited much of the population
with some unpopular policies. For instance, his initial declaration that he would
be financially “of his own” contrasted sharply with heavy taxation. Many
perceived this as a breach of faith.49
There are other rationales available for the motivations behind the Percys’
abandonment of Henry that are certainly legitimate: he was accused of
undermining the church with unwarranted clerical subsidies and of interfering
with the sheriff’s independence by “packing” Parliament.50 The chronicler
Adam of Usk cites feudal ambition as the key. He reports, “That house became
much too puffed up,” and fell in its pride.51 The Percys witnessed the erosion
of their power and became frightened at a sudden loss of influence. No matter;
they could simply try kingmaking again by deposing the current monarch.52
Nevertheless, general dissatisfaction with Henry underscored by social
discontent drove the Percys to Glyndwr.53 In doing so, they initiated the worst
crisis of the reign.54
15
Tensions Boil at Shrewsbury
“You crowned yourself king,” the Percys told Henry.55 Though they likely
did not believe this, it was the claim they brought against him to justify the
uprising. They accused Henry of misleading them at Doncaster in 1399 in that
he only sought his inheritance and lands returned. Further, they championed
themselves as “Protectors of the Kingdom” in a damning manifesto.56 The goal
of the Percys and Mortimer was now to vindicate the right to rule of Richard II
if he was still alive or to assert the claim of the Earl of March if he was not. To
this end, Hotspur rallied citizens to Shrewsbury, claiming Richard was alive and
would lead them.57 Hotspur was a political realist, though. Upon the arrival
of many bearing the standards of Richard, he revealed to them the truth and
confessed the fundamental reasoning behind this new rebellion: he had ejected
Richard because he was a poor king. Now, discovering Henry to be worse, he
wished to correct his mistake.58
Hotspur had gone to Shrewsbury to marshal more men and to meet
Mortimer and Glyndwr on July 23. From there, they would strike decisively at
the king. Unfortunately, Glyndwr was delayed campaigning between Dryslwyn
and Carmarthen.59 The wily George Dunbar’s counsel to Henry IV also
complicated matters. Though Henry sought to regroup his forces immediately
upon hearing of the revolt, Dunbar advised that he emasculate the rebellion
piece meal before it could gain strength. Thus, riding with renewed vigor,
Henry descended upon Shrewsbury.60 Startled by the sudden appearance of the
banners of the king, Hotspur understood the inevitability of what was to follow.
He had no choice but to fight and instructed his men accordingly.
Henry opened with genuine overtures of peace, and Hotspur was inclined
to listen. His uncle Thomas Percy acted as envoy; it was his strong influence
that forced the fight. At midday on July 21, 1403, the battle was joined.61 In
the ensuing chaos of longbow against longbow, Hotspur and Archibald Earl of
Douglas—the prisoner of Homildon Hill now fighting for his liberty—valiantly
charged into the English center. They killed three of the king’s clever decoys
(another idea of Dunbar’s) and his standard bearer. Just as the battle appeared
to be going in Hotspur’s favor, he lifted his visor to gauge his surroundings. An
arrow pierced his eye-socket and killed him instantly.62 Demoralized without
their leader, Hotspur’s forces scattered.
Thomas, Earl of Worcester, and Douglas were captured. Worcester was
executed and Douglas eventually released, only to return to treachery soon
after.63 Initially buried by a family member, Hotspur’s body was exhumed by
example and displayed between two millstones at Shrewsbury. To further prove
him dead, it was removed a few days later, salted, quartered, beheaded, and
spread between Chester, London, Bristol, and Newcastle. At York, his head was
jammed onto a pike to stare vacantly across his own northern territory.64
A Flaccid Threat From Glyndwr
With Hotspur dead, Glyndwr lacked a capable ally to expand his rebellion
beyond Wales and threaten England proper. Mortimer was able, but he could
not command the sheer strength of the Percys. Northumberland was concerned
16
with distancing himself from the revolt of his son, which he likely supported.
Glyndwr could only focus internally for now, and there he made some gains.
Glyndwr’s Initial Success
Glyndwr was unknowingly assisted by the English in conquering Wales.
Their neglect of its numerous fortresses provided many advantages to the
Welshman. Poorly equipped English garrisons were inadequately manned and
offered paltry resistance. Moreover, demoralized by hostile surroundings and
gossip of treason prevalent in the region, individual soldiers gave no prolonged
defense. Limited knowledge of the terrain also made the English especially
prone to ambush.65 The English were trapped in an environment both natural
and artificial that was antagonistic to them. Of course, word of Glyndwr
offering nine pence daily wage to join him did little to bolster their confidence.66
Henry launched a typically unfocused expedition in September 1403
that marched unopposed. As Glyndwr refused to meet the English armies
in conventional combat, the English considered the territory quickly won,
withdrew, and saw the land again revert to rebel control. He captured the
castles of Llansteffan, Drwslwyn, Newcastle Emlyn, and Carreg Cennen, then
in June 1404 the castles of Criccieth, Harlech, and Aberystwyth. By this time,
Glyndwr controlled all of Wales from Caernarfon to Cardigan.67 He had grown
so powerful that he summoned a Welsh Parliament at Machynlleth.68 He then
recognized the anti-pope at Avignon Benedict XIII in order to gain justification
for a church in Wales, universities to function without English recourse, and the
lifting of ecclesiastical censures and oaths to the Roman pontiff.69 Even with
notable victories in Wales, however, Glyndwr had no means of making gains in
England. He could only impel Henry to meet his demands for reform or even
independence by demonstrating an ability to terrorize the English from within
England. He still had no powerful ally with whom to intimidate Henry.
Abortive French Assistance
Glyndwr looked to the French to provide the aid he so desperately needed.
On July 14, 1404, he signed a treaty of mutual support with Charles VI. No
serious French invasion was to come from it, however, beyond a few scant ships
easily repulsed at sea.70 Owing to Northumberland’s diplomacy with France,
Glyndwr set out with 10,000 men-at-arms on August 1, 1405, to meet a French
force of 800 men-at-arms, 600 crossbowmen, and 1200 foot at Milford Haven.
They pushed as far into England as Woodbury Hill, eight miles from Worcester.
Henry was unimpressed by this show of force and refused to meet him, forcing
Glyndwr to return to Wales.71 Having no taste for the Welsh winter, the
troops departed in November of 1405 after weather again deterred an English
expedition.72 An internal dispute between the Burgundians and the Armagnacs
over right to rule in 1407 completely nullified future French support.73 As for
the English, they judged that the French threat to trade in the channel and in
Calais superseded whatever meager risk a Welsh-French alliance could project.74
Ultimately, French assistance did little more than dampen Glyndwr’s spirits.
17
The Failures of Northumberland
The story of what became of Northumberland is even more pitiful. He,
Mortimer, and Glyndwr signed the Tripartite Indenture in February 1405. This
document formally divided England between the three rulers relative to their
victory over Henry.75 Glyndwr, though, was in no position to help anyone
outside of Wales. A second rebellion of Northumberland under Archbishop
of York Richard Scrope was trounced at Skipton Moor in May 1405, though
the execution of the archbishop under secular law engendered much disquiet
in the people.76 Northumberland escaped to raise another army in 1408. He
was deceived into its creation by sheriff of Yorkshire Thomas Rokeby. His sad
collection of smithies, tailors, artisans, and countrymen was crushed by Rokeby
at Bramham Moor on February 19, 1408. Northumberland was beheaded.
Worse for Glyndwr, the Welshman was severed completely from external aid;
his envoy Lewis, bishop of Bangor, was captured during the battle.77
Glyndwr Fades Away
Two critical defeats in 1405 signaled the decline of Glyndwr, which he
fought viciously. Firstly, at Grosmont on March 11, Prince Hal defeated his
lieutenant Rhys Gethin, killing 800 Welshmen. Then, at Pwell Melyn on May 5,
Glyndwr’s son Tudor was killed and his son, Gruffudd was captured. Another
defeat in 1406 robbed Glyndwr of Gower, the Tywi valley, and large parts of
Cardiganshire. He had no hold over the south of Wales.78 Further, there was
no sense of nationalism to unite Wales in his favor. He was not universally
supported, and news of his recent setbacks only diminished his followers.
He had no help from the geography of Wales, which impaired internal
communications. To make matters worse, the English began to develop a sense
of cohesion and improve their defenses. They could garrison castles with fewer
numbers and resupply them by sea. 79
The surrender of Aberystwyth in September 1408 and Harlech in March
1409 forced Glyndwr back into low-level raiding with little consequence.
Mortimer was killed in the siege of Harlech, and Glyndwr’s wife, two daughters,
and three granddaughters were captured. He continued to harass the English
with his son Maredudd, a struggle that finally culminated in an uneventful
raid on the Shropshire border in 1410 that was easily put down. Three of his
most loyal and experienced captains were captured and executed. Glyndwr
disappeared into Wales. He emerged briefly again in 1412 to capture the loyalist
Daydd Gam to no effect and then in 1413 to refuse the pardon offered by Henry
V. As of 1415, he vanished utterly. A Welsh chronicle insists, “Very many say
he died; the seers maintain he did not.”80 At age forty-six, either theory is viable.
Regardless, his legacy certainly outlived him.
Only An Encouragement
But what was that legacy? Measured by his later years, it would be one
of determined failure. For all of his effort and ability, Glyndwr simply could
not threaten England in a meaningful way without powerful allies. Among
18
those allies, Hotspur was the only one who offered any true chance for
success. The French had little concern for the Welsh; their true interests were
focused elsewhere even when aiding Glyndwr. Moreover, the English never
considered such an alliance reasonably harmful and were never proven incorrect.
Northumberland was just as damaged by the death of his son as Glyndwr was.
His subsequent efforts lacked both a unity of objectives and able soldiery to
see them through. Hotspur, though, possessed the resources through his family
and personal ability to truly subvert the crown—were it not for a stray arrow
delivered at just the right time. In the end, Glyndwr’s rebellion was but an
inspirational nuisance whose only real purpose was to encourage the other
enemies of the king. If not for Shrewsbury, it was a nuisance that would have
likely toppled the throne because of those enemies.
ENDNOTES
1
F.R.H. Du Boulay, An Age of Ambition: English Society in the Late Middle Ages (New York:
Viking Press 1970), 129.
183.
2
J.R. Lander, Conflict and Stability in Fifteenth-Century England (London: Hutchinson 1969),
3
Michael Weiss, “A Power in the North? The Percies in the Fifteenth Century,” The Historical
Journal (June, 1976): 502.
4
Alexander Rose, Kings in the North: the House of Percy in British History (London: Weidenfield
& Nicolson 2002), 407.
5
R.L. Storey, “The Wardens of the Marches of England towards Scotland, 1377-1489,” The
English Historical Review (Oct., 1957): 596-602.
6
Ibid., 603.
7
Rose, Kings in the North, 415-416.
8
Ibid., 416.
9
Ibid., 420.
10
Vivian Hubert Howard Green, The Later Plantagenets: a Survey of English History between
1307 and 1485 (London: E. Arnold 1955), 249.
11
Thomas Walsingham, The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, 1376-1422, trans. David
Preest (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press 2005), 318.
12
Jon Latimer, “The Last Welsh Prince of Wales,” Military History (Dec., 2002): 42-43.
13
A.G. Bradley, Owen Glyndwr and the Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, with a Brief Sketch
of Welsh History (New York: Putnam 1901), 112.
14
Rose, Kings in the North, 427.
15
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 42.
19
16
George Holmes, The Later Middle Ages, 1272-1485 (Edinburgh: T. Nelson 1962), 192.
17
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 43-44.
18
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 113.
19
Frederick Solly Flood, “Prince Henry of Monmouth: His Letters and Despatches during the War
in Wales, 1402-1405,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Vol. 4 (1889): 126.
20
Rebecca Fraser, The Story of Britain: from the Romans to the Present: a Narrative History
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2005), 212.
21
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 239.
22
Anthony Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 1272-1461: Political Conflict in Late Medieval England
(Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble 1986), 191.
23
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 264.
24
Rose, Kings in the North, 427.
25
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 44.
26
Rose, Kings in the North, 427-428.
27
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 44-45.
28
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 153.
29
Ibid., 140.
30
Green, The Later Plantagenets, 247.
31
Paul Strohm, England’s Empty Throne: Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation, 13991422 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press 1998), 131.
32
Flood, “Prince Henry of Monmouth,” 131-136.
33
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 45.
34
Rose, Kings in the North, 424.
35
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 182.
36
Rose, Kings in the North, 425.
37
Ibid., 425.
38
Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 228.
39
Ibid., 228.
40
Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 228.
41
Rose, Kings in the North, 426.
42
Much of this is rooted in the English misconception of the Welsh. The people of Wales were
widely thought to be savages who lived in caves. Their victories in war were often accompanied by
20
uncorroborated stories of castration of their enemies by Welsh women, among other lewd practices.
Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 131.
43
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 154.
44
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 45.
45
Green, The Later Plantagenets, 250.
46
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 173.
47
Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 227.
48
Rose, Kings in the North, 429.
Simon Walker, “Rumour, Sedition, and Popular Protest in the Reign of Henry IV,” Past and
Present (Feb., 2000): 50.
49
50
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 326.
51
Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 229.
52
Weiss, “A Power in the North,” 502.
53
Lander, Conflict and Stability, 52.
54
A.R. Myers, England in the Late Middle Ages (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books 1952), 101.
55
William Huse Dunham, Jr. and Charles T. Wood, “The Right to Rule in England: Depositions
and the Kingdom’s Authority, 1327-1485,” The American Historical Review (Oct., 1976): 748.
56
Rose, Kings in the North, 429.
57
Walker, “Rumour, Sedition,” 38.
58
Strohm, England’s Empty Throne, 109.
59
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 327.
60
Rose, Kings in the North, 430.
61
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 205.
62
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 328.
63
Rose, Kings in the North, 430, 438.
64
Ibid., 432.
65
Green, The Later Plantagenets, 251-252.
66
Walker, “Rumour, Sedition,” 31.
67
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 46.
68
Fraser, Story of Britain, 211.
69
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 270-271.
21
70
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 46-47.
71
Tuck, Crown and Nobility, 232.
72
Rose, Kings in the North, 236.
73
Myers, England in the Late Middle Ages, 101-102.
74
Holmes, The Later Middle Ages, 194.
75
Bradley, Last Struggle for Welsh Independence, 266.
76
Fraser, Story of Britain, 212.
77
Green, The Later Plantagenets, 252.
78
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 47.
79
Rose, Kings in the North, 440.
80
Latimer, “Last Welsh Prince,” 48.
PASSION AND PIETY:
THE STRUGGLES OF CATHERINE OF ARAGON
By Sarah Whitaker
Catherine was of no use. Queens were to produce heirs, entrusted to
preserve dynasties and continue legacies crucial to the monarchy. The Queen
of England, however, had not fulfilled her role. She had borne King Henry
VIII but one child, and even at that, the child was female. Catherine was now
plagued with “certain diseases” that prevented her from becoming pregnant
again, and thus Henry’s vexation occurred.1 He would need another Queen to
bear him an heir. Thus he began his Great Divorce from Catherine of Aragon,
seeking out a loophole in which he could lawfully be rid of her. She would
not endure the shame of divorce nor the guilt of false accusations aroused to
aid Henry. She had done nothing wrong, and so this quiet, reserved Queen
would oppose the King defiantly. It was this bold stance that shook English
tradition, for it would be Catherine’s actions that would bring about the King’s
break from the Roman Catholic Church, a leading cause of the Great Protestant
Reformation. Though Catherine’s great influence can be credited to events
out of her control, her intentional pressure upon the King most surely is just as
important to the Reformation as anything else.
It was in October 1501 that the Spanish Princess first arrived in England.2
She had been betrothed to Prince Arthur, the eldest son of King Henry VII and
Queen Elizabeth and the next in line for the crown. King Ferdinand and Queen
Isabella watched as England prospered, still recovering from the devastating War
of the Roses. The Tudor Dynasty was bringing the country back into importance
and would prove to be a worthy ally against the neighboring French. Henry VII
eagerly arranged for the marriage alliance as well. An alliance with Spain could
provide much needed stability to the unsteady dynasty, and better yet, a hefty
dowry was to be expected.3 They agreed upon the large sum of 200,000 crowns,
a sum so large in fact that it was paid over time in broken increments of jewels
and gold.4
The two were married at St. Paul’s on November 14, 1501, by the
Archbishop Warham. It was quite the occasion, with lavish banquets and
festivities lasting for ten consecutive days. They were then to retire to the
Marches of Wales, but questions arose about the appropriateness of such an
arrangement. Arthur was but fifteen years old and Catherine only sixteen. Both
were still at such tender ages that some thought it unwise to fully consummate
the marriage. After some deliberation, Henry felt the two should not be
separated, and Catherine accompanied her young husband to the Marches along
with her Spanish attendants.5
It would not be a long marriage, however, for within months, Arthur fell ill.
His delicate condition would not improve, and on April 2, he died.6 Catherine, a
young widow, was bewildered with grief because she was now alone in a foreign
land. All of England was in mourning as well, especially the King and Queen.
Not only had they lost a dear son, but they had also lost an heir to the Tudor
throne. They had one other son Prince Henry, but he was their last. Neither
the Tudors nor England could go through another civil war so soon. Further
22
23
still, what was to be done with the newly acquired Spanish alliance? Catherine
would surely be sent back to Spain along with the rest of her handsome dowry.
Ferdinand was troubled as well. He was on the brink of war against King Louis
XII of France and needed the commitment of England’s alliance. News of
Arthur’s death could not have been more untimely; they were awaiting troops
in Toledo to engage the French.7 Ferdinand needed England, and Henry needed
Catherine.
It was in both parties’ best interest to continue an Anglo-Spanish alliance,
and so proposals were initiated to maintain such connections. Marriage
arrangements were drawn up for Prince Henry and Catherine, but doing so
would be no simple task. Because of Catherine’s previous marriage to Arthur,
Henry’s brother, a papal dispensation was needed from the Roman Curia. The
Holy Bible was quite specific on such a matter, stating that “thou shalt not
uncover the nakedness of thy brother’s wife… if a man shall take his brother’s
wife, it is an unclean thing.”8 Furthermore, such marriages were prohibited due
to the fact that “the two were regarded by the Church as brother and sister.”9
Had Catherine, however, really been the wife of Arthur? She swore that, though
the King had not separated them after the wedding, her marriage had not been
consummated. Testimony from her duenna Dona Elvira further supported the
Princess’ promise of virginity. Ferdinand and Isabella wrote soon after that
Catherine “remains as she was here [that is, virgo intacta], for so Dona Elvira
has written to us.”10 The English had their doubts—many had heard Arthur’s
boast after the wedding night. Nevertheless, Henry VII, Ferdinand, and Isabella
petitioned Rome, sending a treaty that asked for dispensation even if Catherine
had had intercourse with Arthur. Much to the monarch’s delight, the Pope issued
the dispensation, but the rumors and questions would not be silenced long.11
Henry VIII and Catherine were married on June 11, 1509. Financial
disputes concerning the new dowry and its amount prevented an earlier
wedding, and they were unable to marry until after King Henry VII’s death in
April.12 Though Catherine grieved for Arthur, she grew to love Henry. She had
spent much time at Durham House in the Strand surrounded by the bickering
and quarrels of her household as she waited for Henry to come of age. Her
health had begun to fail, so she welcomed her marriage to Henry as an escape
from her loneliness and neglect.13 Their marriage was quite a happy one to begin
with. They had much in common, both being quite educated and pious, and
Catherine, like her mother Isabella, was a capable adviser to her husband. Their
affection for each other was obvious to those who surrounded them. 14It seemed
that Catherine could be happy yet again.
The sorrow Catherine felt when her first pregnancy failed must have been
immense. She had a premature delivery seven months after the royal wedding.
It was written that she “had desired to gladden the King and the people with a
prince,”15 but through Henry’s consolation, her love for him grew even more,
and four months later, she was pregnant again. The kingdom rejoiced at the
child’s birth in 1511, for the King now had an heir: Henry, the Prince of Wales.
The excitement ceased, however, when the infant died seven weeks later.16
Catherine was comforted once again by Henry. They were young, after all.
They would have time.
24
In 1515, Catherine was pregnant yet again. This time would be different,
though, much to the surprise of everyone. On February 18, 1516, Catherine
gave birth to her daughter Mary at Greenwich Palace. Though the child was a
female and unable to take the throne, it was a comfort to know that Catherine
could give birth to a healthy child, and the royal couple hoped that boys would
follow. They would not, however, and thus began the initial stages of the Great
Divorce.17
Henry had become tired of waiting. He had been patient through the
miscarriages and premature births, each one slowly erasing the hope of an
heir. Henry could no longer avoid the issue—Catherine could very well fail
to produce a living male heir for the Tudor crown. It was Cardinal Thomas
Wolsey who first made mention of the King’s realization. Wolsey pointed out
Catherine’s apparent inability to produce an heir, but in that statement, he began
to foster the idea that perhaps Henry’s marriage had not been valid.18 He pointed
out the Levitical Law upon which the dispensation had been based, that a man
should not marry his brother’s wife. Such sin was punishable with childlessness.
Though he had a daughter, a king was as good as childless without an heir.
Was that not what Henry was experiencing? Wolsey also pointed out that
dispensations were traditionally only granted for urgent cases, and Pope Julius II
had issued the one that united Henry and Catherine with great hesitation.19 Had
the marriage of Henry and Catherine been valid? If it had not, it would only be
fitting for them to quickly divorce, putting to an end the life of sin they had been
living.
Still, Henry loved his wife and respected her. The doubt was still in his
mind, but he felt he must not be hasty in reaching such a conclusion. It was
not until Henry met Anne Boleyn that hastiness was not such a bad thing. Anne
was fifteen years younger than Henry and twenty years younger than his aged
wife Catherine.20 It had not been out of the ordinary for Henry to be fixated on
other women, but Anne was different in that she would not yield to the King’s
advances. She knew that by gracefully withholding herself from him, she would
have something that the other mistresses did not. Henry was intrigued by this,
and soon became infatuated.21 It was not long before the idea of a divorce was a
welcome one.
Soon Henry had made up his mind. He had no son. He was convinced God
had been punishing him for the sinful marriage he had entered into, and so he
was determined to flee from his immorality by divorcing Catherine. He felt that
Pope Julius II had been wrong to issue the dispensation, and because of this, he
had never been married to Catherine at all in the eyes of God. The kingdom was
suffering as well. Without a male heir to the throne, they would be thrown into
yet another War of Roses. This was for the good of the people, for the good of
England, and for the good of Catherine. He became so sure of this “that Henry
even entertained hopes that Catherine herself would help him obtain what he
wanted.”22 Wolsey too thought, “Catherine, a lady so gentle, resigned, and pious,
would make no great opposition to the divorce.”23 However, the two were both
terribly mistaken.
When Catherine learned of the King’s intentions, she was shocked. She had
no doubt that her marriage had been legitimate. True, she had been unable to
produce the male heir Henry needed, but that was in no way a punishment from
25
God. Catherine was convinced that she had not been married to Arthur in the
eye of the Lord. She had never consummated the marriage and was a virgin, as
she had said, when she married Henry.24 She loved Henry, but she could not go
along with his arrangement. Her love for him, as well as her deep faith, refused
to let such an action take place. To allow such a divorce would require her to
admit she had lived in sin as a concubine for twenty years. Her daughter would
be illegitimate, and they both would be tainted with impurity forever. 25 It was
here that Catherine began to take a stand on such matters. She would fight
for her two greatest passions; her faith and her husband. Catherine had done
nothing wrong, and she would not be judged otherwise.
The first step Catherine needed to take was to cut Henry off from the
papacy. Though the matter of divorce was decided in the mind of Henry, it was
not so easily done. Divorcing Catherine would require a second dispensation
because doing so would break one of the holy sacraments of the Roman Catholic
faith. It was no easy thing to obtain this second dispensation. The present Pope
Clement VII would essentially bring into question the authority of the papacy if
he ruled Julius II’s dispensation void. Realizing this dilemma, Wolsey explained
to the Pope that, “by pronouncing Henry’s marriage null he would confirm
forever the power of Rome in England.”26 Wolsey’s proposition weighed heavily
on the Pope.
Working with Don Inigo Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador to England,
Catherine sent her first message to the Emperor Charles V. The Emperor was
Catherine’s nephew, the son of her sister Juana and Juana’s husband Philip of
the Hapsburgs.27 News had reached England that “Rome was in the hands of
an imperialist army,” and the Pope was “the prisoner of the Queen’s favorite
nephew.”28 Charles was able to put extreme pressure on the Pope. Catherine
wrote her nephew and asked that he inform the papacy to take immediate steps
to abolish Wolsey’s case against her and prevent any trial from even reaching
England. Meanwhile, she would oppose Henry’s claims of their illegitimacy,
remaining his wife and Queen. She would live where he would have her, and go
anywhere he would send her, but she gallantly declared that she would remain
his wife until the end and would have no shame in doing so. Legal matters had
become involved, and she would gladly accept counsel during this dispute.29
After Catherine’s display of action, Wolsey and Henry were stunned. This
could not be the same reserved Catholic Queen they had previously known.
They had expected the matter to be a simple political dealing that would be
brief and concise, but it soon became apparent that Catherine would not comply
with the King’s wishes, so Wolsey set out to counter the Queen’s advances. He
began by making sure no legal council would be available to Catherine. With
the King, he sought out to isolate Catherine and prevent her from further contact
with her nephew, churchmen, or any other person who could be considered an
enemy to Henry’s plot.30 Wolsey was sure that Catherine’s isolation would be
enough to dampen her spirits and cause her to abandon the stance she had taken.
Catherine, instead, only worked harder. She knew that she needed Spanish
counsel because the Spanish did not fear the English King, and she could fully
trust them. In Spain there might also be useful documents, such as letters or
information concerning the dispensation, but she was unable to gain these
advantages from Spain without the help of Charles. He needed to know what
26
was happening and be informed of all the facts. Wolsey’s tight restrictions,
however, hindered Catherine from communicating with Charles. How could she
smuggle a message all the way to Rome?31
Though most of her Spanish servants had been forced to leave by Wolsey,
there was one man in particular who had been left with the Queen, her sewer
Francisco Felipez who had served for twenty-seven years. He appealed to the
King for permission to go to Spain because his mother had bid him return for
her dying blessing. Catherine feigned anger at the request, accusing Felipez of
inventing a story to give him an excuse to leave her behind just as all the other
Spaniards had. Henry granted Felipez’s passage, showing compassion to the
Spaniard when the Queen would not. Catherine’s plan worked all too well, and
with the safe passage Felipez was granted, Catherine was able to gain audience
with Charles via her loyal servant. There Felipez relayed to the Emperor the
situation of the Queen and the three requests she had for him. First, she asked
Charles to admonish Henry personally. Perhaps his intimidating power would
be enough to make Henry back down. Second, she implored him to awaken the
Pope to the gravity of her circumstances and convince him to move Catherine’s
case to Rome. Wolsey had hurriedly begun the case, due partly to Catherine
and partly to Henry’s impatience with the situation. The King was declared an
innocent offender, and the purpose of the case was to inform Henry and all of
England that the theological studies of the council revealed Henry to be living
in sin unbeknownst. He would, of course, cry out for a divorce, for if “the King
remained in his error and idolatry and minded still to continue his unlawful
marriage … then he was a madman.”32 If the papacy could but see the evidence
brought before the Queen firsthand in Rome, it would surely support her cause.
Lastly, Catherine asked that Charles seek out a way to revoke Wolsey’s authority
over the case. She still believed her husband was not to blame but was led
astray by the deceitful words of the Cardinal. These requests were lengthy, she
admitted, but she implored her nephew to help her in her great time of need.
To help Catherine would trouble him more than it was worth, but Charles felt a
deep sense of family obligation. Catherine was pleased to hear that the Emperor
pledged his full support.33
Wolsey was beginning to lose. His existence in the court relied on the
pleasure of the King because his humble beginnings gave him no leverage.
He had been successful thus far in satisfying the King’s wants, but Henry was
growing impatient very quickly. Wolsey promised the King he would have his
bachelorism quickly, but weeks went by and Henry grew weary. Wolsey needed
a victory soon, so he decided to go straight to the Pope. The Cardinal needed
to liberate the Pope from Charles V, but militarily, doing so would be quite
complicated. Wolsey proposed that French troops, allied with England already,
would sweep the Spanish from Naples and free Rome. The old ambition of the
French had been to gain lands in Italy, and though Henry had previously spent
much to prevent such an occurrence, he agreed to allow it in exchange for a
divorce.34
Clement was in a predicament. He recognized the seriousness of Henry’s
request because Henry was asking to disregard the Holy Sacraments, but
Wolsey’s words were not ignored, and liberation and restoration were imperative
27
to the papacy. It is true that siding with Wolsey would be unfair to the
Queen, but sometimes sacrifices are needed for the good of the people. What
irrevocable damage might result? His mind still clouded with uncertainty,
Clement chose to delay making a commitment. He compromised, allowing a
trial in England, as long as it was full and open. The outcome of the trial would
be the final verdict, and Clement swore he would in no way revoke the decisions
made. However, specific instructions were given to the Roman Cardinal Lorenzo
Campeggio to delay a trial as long as he could and to try to reconcile the parties
involved.35 It was hardly what Catherine or Henry had hoped for.
Campeggio sought out the compromises of Clement, but he did so in vain.
Hoping negotiations could be reached, the Roman Cardinal first went to the
King. Campeggio knew the Queen would never agree to live with the shame
of divorce, so he instead suggested she enter a nunnery. The papacy could
grant her release from her earthly marriage in exchange for a heavenly one, and
there was no shame in that. Henry was pleased with such an arrangement, but
Catherine would not bend so easily.
She explained to the Cardinal that she had committed no wrong and
preferred to stay in the matrimonial state to which God had called her already.
Catherine was unwavering. She was the legal wife of the King, and “if she were
to be torn limb from limb for saying so, and then rise from the dead, she would
die a second time in defense of that truth.”36 The trial was set for Christmas.
Catherine could not hope to receive a fair trial so long as it was in England,
yet she still held fast to her convictions and was summoned to the courts at
Blackfriars on June 18, 1529. She came in person, though Henry would respond
through proxy, and began her case. She had no council to advise her, but for
the helpless woman she claimed to be, she curtly addressed the prejudice of
the courts and appealed the case as it was pending in Rome. She appeared
again three days later, at the first full session of the courts. Catherine surely
shocked those present. She was unexpected, and two monarchs had never before
appeared before the courts as if to settle a common public issue. She waited
quietly to be called upon and politely made her way to Henry. Kneeling at her
husband’s feet, Catherine took a deep breath and began her plea. This was
what the Queen had been preparing for. Instead of chastising her husband’s
scandalous acts or brandishing her piety, Catherine spoke of her love for Henry
still yet. She asked him to sympathize with her, a stranger in his country, and
testified to her true obedience to him and him alone. She spoke of their children
God had chosen to take home, and after steadying her voice, she declared,
“When ye had me at the first, I take God to be my judge, I was a true maid,
without the touch of man. And whether this be true or not, I put it to your
conscience.”37 She paused to hear her husband’s reply, but King Henry VIII
gave her nothing. He would grant her not one word. The rest of her speech was
without fervor or energy, for Catherine realized what was to become of the trial.
With a deep courtesy, she left the court.38
Though Catherine would not return to the court, she was not forgotten.
On July 22, the Pope brought the case to Rome after coming to terms with the
Emperor in the Treaty of Barcelona.39 Much to the liking of Clement, a delay
was required due to the Roman holidays, and court would recess until October
1. Henry was enraged. He was far too tired of waiting. Wolsey had outlived
28
his usefulness, and the King took matters into his own hands. Though Catherine
had fought intensely, she would not win. Henry had Parliament pass The Act
in Restraint of Appeals to Rome in 1533, cutting judicial ties between England
and Rome. This Act said that “all spiritual cases, whether they concern the
King …or any other subjects of resiants, shall [be]…determined within the
King’s jurisdiction and authority and not elsewhere.”40 Henry made sure that
the papacy could not interfere in his divorce again. Furthermore, Henry acted
through Parliament to pass the Succession Act of 1534, declaring Catherine’s
marriage to be void and Anne’s to be valid.41
Henry at last had the divorce he so desired, but the costs of his decisions
were irrevocable. The Pope was outraged at Henry’s total disregard for the
Roman Catholic Church and excommunicated him. Henry replied in 1534 with
the Act of Supremacy, breaking from the Church altogether. The Church of
England was thus created, which would trigger a great religious battle known
as the Protestant Reformation.42 A new religion was forced on an unwilling
England due to the Tudor State. Catherine, in turn, would spend her days in
prayer until her death in 1536.43
Catherine had fought bravely, but at what expense? The moral matter of
truth for which she had so ardently fought had been lost. Her love for Henry had
not brought him back into her arms. Catherine’s religious crusade for her Roman
Catholic faith had not restored peace but resulted in a Protestant uprising. Even
after her death, the effects would continue as her daughter Bloody Mary caused
Catholicism to leave a bitter taste in English mouths.44 Perhaps if Catherine had
stepped aside for Anne, England’s separation from the Catholic Church would
not have come as it did. If she had retired to a nunnery instead of fighting,
would Protestant theology have such a footing in England?45 One cannot help
but wonder if Catherine of Aragon, a fierce woman of passion and piety, would
have approached her predicament in the same fashion if she knew what would
be the result. She brought about several significant changes in England, but
would she have done so if she knew in advance the nature of these changes?
ENDNOTES
1
J.A. Froude, The Divorce of Catherine of Aragon (London: n.p., 1891; Reprint, New York:
AMS Press, Inc., 1970), 21. Catherine was eight years Henry’s senior and was past the age of
childbearing.
2
John E. Paul, Catherine of Aragon and Her Friends (New York: Fordham University Press,
1966), 3.
3
Mary M. Luke, Catherine, The Queen (New York: Coward-McCann,Inc., 1967), 23.
4
Ibid., 25.
5
Ibid., 10.
6
Garrett Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1941), 48.
7
Luke, Catherine, The Queen, 49. Emperor Maximilian and Philip, Catherine’s brother-in-law,
were giving Ferdinand no reason to believe the Hapsburg alliance could be counted on. Maximilian
29
would instead wait to see who had the most to offer him, France or Spain, and then decide who he
would ally with.
8
Marvin H. Albert, The Divorce: A Re-Examination by an American Writer of the Great Tudor
Controversy (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1966),30-31.
David C. Steinmetz, Reformers in the Wings (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 54.
9
10
Paul, Catherine and Her Friends, 18-19.
11
Albert, The Divorce, 31-32.
12
Brian Frable, “Catherine of Aragon, Queen of England,” (November 1998), revised June
2006, [on-line article]; available from http://departments.kings.edu/womens_history/ cathyaragon.
html; Internet; (accessed 31 March 2007).
13
Paul, Catherine and Friends, 21.
14
Albert, The Divorce, 53. Fray Diego, Catherine’s confessor, wrote to Spain that, “Her
Highness is very healthy… with the greatest gaiety and contentment that ever was. The King adores
her, and Her Highness him.”
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid., 53-54
17
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 174-5.
18
Albert Du Boys, Catherine of Aragon and the Sources of the English Reformation (London:
Burt Franklin, 1881; Reprint, New York: Bert Franklin, 1968) 196. Catherine had a great dislike
for Wolsey, probably because of his position as the King’s close advisor, a position she held before.
However, she suggested that Wolsey only questioned the validity of the King’s marriage because of
his pro-French policies and his plan to substitute Catherine with a French Princess.
19
Froude, The Divorce of Catherine of Aragon, 24.
20
Albert, The Divorce, 81.
21
Ibid., 87.
22
Ibid., 94.
23
Du Boys, Catherine of Aragon, 198.
24
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 241.
25
Albert, The Divorce, 94.
26
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 243.
27
Luke, Catherine, The Queen, 24.
28
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 249.
29
Ibid., 252.
30
Du Boys, Catherine of Aragon, 214-15.
30
31
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 253.
32
Nicholas Harpsfield, A Treatise On The Pretended Divorce Between Henry VIII. and
Catharine of Aragon (n.p. ;Reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1965), 232.
33
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 254.
34
Ibid., 256.
35
Ibid., 265.
36
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 269.
37
Ibid., 286.
38
Ibid., 289.
39
Henry Ansgar Kelly, The Matrimonial Trials of Henry VIII (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1976), 136.
40
Mortimer Levine, “Henry VIII’s Use of His Spiritual and Temporal Jurisdictions in His Great
Causes of Matrimony, Legitimacy, and Succession,” The Historical Journal 10, no. 1 (1967): 3.
41
Ibid., 6.
42
Carter Lindberg, The European Reformations (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.,
1996), 317.
43
Bettty S Travitsky, Reprinting Tudor History: The Case of Catherine of Aragon.” Renaissance
Quarterly 50, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 166.
44
Hilaire Belloc, Characters of the Reformation (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1960), 152-155.
45
Mattingly, Catherine of Aragon, 270.