Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997
Influences of Adaptation to Communist Rule on
Value Priorities in Eastern Europe
Shalom H. Schwartz and Anat Bardi
Department of Psychology
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The basic value priorities prevalent in Eastern Europe are studied in a cross-national
comparison. Analyses of the implications of adaptation to life circumstances under
communist regimes lead to the hypotheses that East European samples are likely to attribute
especially high importance to conservatism and hierarchy values and low importance to
egalitarianism, intellectual and affective autonomy, and mastery values. The same
hypotheses apply to differences between countries within Eastern Europe in which there was
greater or lesser communist penetration. These hypotheses are largely supported with data
both from samples of school teachers and of university students from nine Eastern European
and 12 Western European countries. Various possible alternative explanations are
discussed: national economic level, religion, earlier shared history, effects of
totalitarianism, and distinctiveness of Western Europe.
KEY WORDS: values; communism; Eastern Europe; social change; cross-cultural psychology
Does the political system in a country influence the importance that its citizens
ascribe to the broad range of basic human values? Surprisingly, there is little direct
evidence that this is the case. Ideally, this question should be addressed with
longitudinal data on basic human values from countries that have undergone major
changes in political structure. Unfortunately, such longitudinal data are unavailable, partly because of the problems of reliable research on sensitive issues in
totalitarian countries. Another possibility is to address this issue through comparative, cross-national studies, as done in studies of the impacts of socioeconomic and
technological development on individual values (e.g., Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kahl,
1968). Previous cross-national research on countries with different political systems has offered interesting hints (e.g., Hofstede, 1980, 1991). It has not, however,
studied a broad range of basic values and it has not sought to relate such values
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Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.
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systematically to the different types of political systems (for a partial exception,
see Broek & Moor, 1994, discussed below).
Basic values may be seen as the very heart of culture (Hofstede, 1980, 1991;
Schwartz, in press). Culture is manifest in everyday practices, symbols and rituals
that can be seen by an outside observer. But the meaning of these manifestations
remains unclear until the observer comes to understand how the members of a group
evaluate them. These evaluations are expressed in basic values—what people
believe is good or bad, what they think should and should not be done, what they
hold to be desirable or undesirable. When we wish to characterize a culture in terms
of values, we describe the ideas about what is good, right, and desirable that the
members of a society or other cultural group share (Williams, 1970). These cultural
values (e.g., freedom, prosperity, security) are the bases for the specific norms that
tell people what behavior is appropriate in various situations.
The current article presents a cross-national study of the possible impact of
one type of political system on the basic values of citizens. We seek to identify if
and how the experience of living under communist regimes affected the basic
values of citizens in East European countries. There are two primary processes
through which basic values may have been affected—direct indoctrination of
people in communist ideology and adaptation of people to the life circumstances
created by communist rule. We first consider direct indoctrination.
For more than four decades, residents of Eastern Europe were subject to
life-long political education in communist ideology (Avis, 1987; Roskin, 1991).
But the inculcation of communist ideology was only partly successful. Often, it
produced reaction against the regime and its symbols (Barghoorn & Remington,
1986; Lovenduski & Woodall, 1987). Many have argued that, in Central
Europe, communism remained an alien ideology imposed upon citizens but not
accepted by them (e.g., Rupnik, 1988a,b; Vajda, 1988). Others have characterized the underlying political cultures in several of these countries—repressed
by the Soviet threat—as remaining more compatible with liberal than with
communist regimes (Almond, 1983; Huntington, 1984). We have recently
described how, in Eastern Europe, failed indoctrination even drained some of
the core values propounded in communist ideology of their usual meanings
(Bardi & Schwartz, in press).
If, as the authors cited have argued, communism did not have the intended
influences on value priorities in the domains to which communist education was
directly addressed, perhaps it had even less influence on human values in other
domains. The conclusion of the one study we have found that compared values of
citizens in Eastern and in Western Europe supports this inference. Broek & Moor
(1994, p. 226) reported that East Europeans did not differ as a group from their
Western counterparts in most values related to politics, religion, and primary
relations at the beginning of the 1990s. Only in the domain of work values were
consistent differences reported. East Europeans showed less appreciation for
initiative, achievement, and responsibility in work.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
387
Despite these findings and speculations regarding direct ideological indoctrination in Eastern Europe, there are grounds to postulate that life under
communist regimes did have substantial impacts on the values of citizens.
Research on the acquisition of basic values and on change in the value priorities
of individuals over the life-course has demonstrated that the second process
mentioned above, adaptation to life circumstances, is important for value
formation (e.g., Almagor, 1994; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kohn & Schooler,
1983; Rokeach, 1973). Adaptation does not require acceptance of an ideological
message. Rather, it refers to adjusting effectively to the opportunities and
constraints that structure one’s life chances. It might even entail finding effective ways to resist undesirable ideologies. Studies of Eastern Europe describe
communist regimes as structuring the living conditions of their citizens in
systematic ways in the worlds of work, family, education, leisure, and so on
(e.g., Kohak, 1992; Nowak, 1988). Hence, on theoretical grounds, adaptation
should have led to a characteristic set of value priorities.
Adaptation to life circumstances influences value priorities primarily through
two mechanisms—acclimation and compensation. For most types of values, people
form value priorities that are compatible with the reinforcement contingencies that
their life circumstances afford. That is, they acclimate their values to their circumstances. They upgrade the importance of values that are readily attained and
downgrade the importance of those whose pursuit is blocked. For example, people
in jobs that afford much freedom of choice increase the importance of self-direction
values at the expense of conformity values (Kohn & Schooler, 1983). A greater
degree of constraint on independence in the occupational experiences of Eastern as
compared to West Europeans may account for the observed differences in their
work values cited above from Broek and Moor (1994).
For a limited set of values, a compensation mechanism sometimes operates.
This is the case specifically for values concerned with material well-being and
security, when their attainment is largely beyond personal control. These values
are based on what Maslow (1959) called “deficit needs.” Deprivation increases
the strength of such needs and, correspondingly, of the valued goals to which
they point (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). For example, people who have endured
economic hardship and social upheaval attribute more importance to the attainment of wealth and the preservation of social order (e.g., Inglehart, 1991;
Schwartz, 1994a).1
The idea that value formation and change is an adaptive process forms the basis
for the hypotheses derived below regarding the impact of life under communism
on the basic human values of citizens in Eastern Europe. Confirmation of such
hypotheses depends upon finding a shared profile of value priorities that distin1 The
compensation mechanism does not apply to values related to Maslow’s “growth needs” (e.g.,
freedom). Deprivation in the attainment of such values usually leads to a decrease in their importance,
as shown in longitudinal research by Kohn and Schooler (1983).
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guishes the East European countries as a set from other countries. We will
compare these countries with countries from Western Europe, the region closest
to Eastern Europe in terms of historical and cultural developments (Schopflin,
1990). Both parts of Europe share the experiences of feudalism, medieval
Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and
the Enlightenment periods, although they obviously differ in some respects
noted below.
Of course, Eastern Europe itself is not a monolithic entity (Glenny, 1990).
Lines of demarcation that may be significant for value priorities can also be drawn
within this geopolitical region. This too is relevant for assessing the effects of
adaptation to communist systems on values. One line of demarcation is religious.
The East European countries we studied encompass Roman Catholic (Czechia,
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia), Orthodox (Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia), and
Protestant (Estonia) countries. The partition between Roman Catholic and Orthodox countries overlaps two other lines of demarcation that have also been noted.
The Roman Catholic countries formed a Central European region whose socioeconomic development and agricultural adaptation to world markets placed it midway
between East and West (Gunst, 1989). Moreover, these Central European countries
were characterized by greater resistance to the penetration of communism and
stronger oppositional movements (Ascherson, 1992).
The variation within Eastern Europe along religious, economic, and political
lines may also relate to differences among these countries in value priorities.
Variation in resistance and opposition to communism suggests that communism
may have structured everyday life conditions less pervasively in the Central
European countries than in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Russia. If so, the impact of
communism on values may have been weaker in the former set of countries than
in the latter. A comparison of these two sets of countries is therefore an additional
way to assess the validity of our hypotheses regarding the effects of adaptation to
communism.2
Differences in level of socioeconomic development might also account for
value differences between the two sets of East European countries. Economic
development might account for value differences between Eastern and Western
Europe as well. In the discussion below, we consider national economic levels as
an alternative for explaining differences in values that our hypotheses attribute to
adaptation to communist regimes. Examination of the empirical data will reveal
that national differences in economic level do not provide an adequate alternative
explanation.
2 Within
Eastern Europe, religion is completely confounded with the political resistance lines that
scholars have drawn. It is possible, however, to assess whether religion explains any of the value
differences between Eastern and Western Europe that our hypotheses attribute to adaptation to
communism. For this purpose, we can compare the Roman Catholic countries of Eastern Europe with
those of Western Europe.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
389
BASIC VALUES APPROPRIATE FOR NATIONAL COMPARISONS
Hypotheses about differences in basic human values require a comprehensive
set of value types on which it is appropriate to compare countries. For this purpose,
we drew upon a theory of culture-level values, developed for cross-cultural studies,
that we have recently validated empirically (Schwartz, 1994a; Schwartz & Ros,
1995). This theory derived seven types of values by considering the basic issues or
problems that societies must confront in order to regulate human activity. It views
values (such as success, justice, freedom, social order) as the socially approved
goals used to motivate action to cope with these problems and to express and justify
the solutions that are chosen. Next, we briefly explain and define the various types
of values. (See Schwartz, 1994a; Schwartz & Ros, 1995, for more complete
explanations.)
The first basic issue is the nature of the relation between the individual and the
group. Different cultural responses to this issue form a value dimension whose
poles we label conservatism and autonomy. Cultures at the conservatism pole view
the person as an entity who is embedded in the collectivity and who finds meaning
in life largely through relationships with members of close groups. Conservatism
values emphasize the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations
that might disrupt the solidary group or the traditional order. Specific exemplary
values that are used as indexes of this value type include social order, respect for
tradition, family security, and honoring parents and elders. Pursuit of such values
overcomes uncertainty in life.
Cultures at the autonomy pole of this value dimension view the person as an
autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness, who
seeks to express his or her own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings)
freely, and who is encouraged to do so. It is possible to distinguish two types of
autonomy values, one referring to ideas and thought, the other to feelings and
emotions. Intellectual Autonomy values emphasize promoting and protecting the
independent ideas and rights of the individual to pursue his or her own intellectual
directions. Exemplary specific values are curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity.
Affective Autonomy values emphasize promoting and protecting the individual’s
independent pursuit of affectively positive experience. Exemplary specific values
are pleasure, exciting life, enjoying life.3
The second basic issue that confronts all societies is how to guarantee
responsible social behavior that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must
be induced to consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them and to
smoothly manage their unavoidable interdependencies. One polar resolution of
this issue builds upon power differences. It relies on hierarchical systems of
3 This value dimension bears considerable similarity to various widely used dimensions: individualism-
collectivism, interdependence-independence, individualization-traditionalism, and many others. For a
discussion of some of its differences, see Schwartz (1994, in press).
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ascribed roles. People are socialized and sanctioned to accept these roles and to
fulfill the obligations and follow the rules that are associated with them.Hierarchy
values emphasize the legitimacy of hierarchical allocation of fixed roles and of
resources. Exemplary specific values are social power, humility, authority, and
wealth.4
An alternative solution to the problem of responsible social behavior is built
upon egalitarianism values. It entails inducing individuals to recognize that they
have shared interests that can serve as bases for voluntary agreements to cooperate.
It portrays others as trustworthy individuals with whom contractual relations can
safely be negotiated. Others are equal to self in what each deserves, so that people
can be socialized to an internal commitment to the welfare of others. Egalitarianism
values emphasize transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promote the welfare of others. Exemplary specific values are equality,
social justice, freedom, and responsibility.
The third basic issue concerns the relation of humankind to the surrounding
natural and social environment. One response available to societies is to fit
harmoniously into the world, accepting it as it is and trying to preserve rather than
to change or exploit it. Harmony values emphasize fitting harmoniously into the
environment. Exemplary values are unity with nature, protecting the environment,
and world of beauty. A polar response is actively to exploit and change the world,
to bend it to our will and assert control. In societies adopting this solution, the world
is an object to master in order to further personal or group interests. Mastery values
emphasize getting ahead through active self-assertion, through changing and
mastering the natural and social environment. Exemplary values are ambition,
success, and daring.
HYPOTHESIS DERIVATION
We next describe life circumstances in Eastern Europe that are traceable to
the imposition of communism and we derive from them a set of hypotheses
regarding value priorities. During the 1950s and 1960s, there were unsuccessful
struggles against communist regimes in several East European countries. Thereafter, however, people began to adjust to their circumstances in a manner
described by Kohak (1992) as analogous to the adaptation of long-term prisoners to jail: They developed a set of skills and attitudes that enabled them to live
reasonably under the circumstances. We would add that they developed a set of
value priorities that acclimated to life under these circumstances or that compensated for its deprivations.
4 The
inclusion of humility among these values points to the fact that accepting the legitimacy of
hierarchy entails accepting that one is inferior to some as well as superior to others.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
391
In what follows, we explicate how aspects of the experience of life under
communism were likely to lead citizens in Eastern Europe to attribute greater
importance to conservatism and hierarchy values. In contrast, we explicate how
adaptation to these experiences was likely to lessen the importance citizens attributed to intellectual and affective autonomy, egalitarianism, and mastery values. We
derive no hypothesis for harmony values because adaptation required no particular
acclimation of these values.
The communist regimes of Eastern Europe, like other totalitarian regimes,
demanded that citizens conform to their superiors in all realms of life—political,
social, educational, and economic. Punishment for failure to conform was frequent.
Life was made more difficult by the fact that the rules and expectations were often
obscure or unstable. Performing acts or expressing opinions that were not explicitly
known to be approved was therefore dangerous. In response, people learned to
adopt a “low profile.” As described in the research literature, they avoided taking
any initiatives or risks, refrained from offering suggestions or criticisms, and related
minimally to their superiors (Kohak, 1992, Marody, 1988; Musil, 1992; Nowak,
1988).
These adjustments to life under communism have clear value implications.
Close supervision, strict rules, and the suppression of initiative, risk, and
innovation all undermine autonomy values (Kohn & Schooler, 1983). This
applies most obviously to intellectual autonomy values like curiosity and
creativity whose expression was not only frustrated but often negatively sanctioned. It also applies to affective autonomy values like exciting life, pleasure,
and enjoying life. The independent pursuit of affectively positive experiences
was suppressed by the regime as a threat to reliable conformity and to conventional norms. Unable to pursue autonomy values successfully, people were
likely to adapt by downgrading their importance. Mastery values were likely to
suffer a similar fate. Such values as ambition and daring emphasize active
self-assertion and attempts to change the status quo. Their pursuit is inappropriate and even dangerous in settings where conformity to role obligations is
the paramount concern. In order to acclimate in such settings, mastery values
were downgraded if not abandoned.
In contrast, people were likely to attribute greater importance to the values that
could promote adjustment to this constraining and dangerous environment—conservatism and hierarchy values. By definition, conservatism values emphasize
propriety and restraint of actions and inclinations that might disrupt the prevailing
order. By pursuing such values (e.g., moderation, self-discipline, social order),
people could avoid conflict with their superiors and ensure more predictability in
their lives. By attributing high priority to these values, people could justify the
“low profile” that they adopted. In addition, compensation for the sense of
insecurity fostered by dangerous and unpredictable life circumstances might
increase the importance of the security aspect of conservatism values.
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To be reasonably comfortable in settings organized in an authoritarian manner,
people must also come to view the hierarchical distribution of roles and resources
as legitimate to some degree. Both those who exercised power over others and those
who were constrained to acquiesce in meeting the rigid but unpredictable demands
of the hierarchical system could more easily justify their actions and find meaning
in their lives by upgrading the importance of such hierarchy values as authority,
social power, and humility.
The demands for conformity under communist regimes were accompanied by
close surveillance over words and deeds (Kohak, 1992). Citizens often disapproved
of the methods and goals of the political regime or of the organizations in which
they worked or studied. Hence, they could not be relied upon to say or do what was
expected out of personal conviction. The need for surveillance led to the widespread
use of informants—fellow-workers, fellow-students, and other unofficial sources
of information who could report on failures to comply. Even ordinary, everyday
relations with peers might get one in trouble. This, in turn, produced suspicion
among people and a diminished level of interpersonal trust (Boski, 1994; Marody,
1988; Musil, 1992; Nowak, 1988).
One likely outcome of reduced interpersonal trust is an undermining of
egalitarianism values. These values call for voluntary commitment to the welfare
of others. But if others cannot be trusted, a commitment to their welfare is foolhardy
at best and self-destructive at worst. Guiding one’s life according to such egalitarianism values as equality, justice, and honesty makes little sense in settings where
there is little reason to expect others to reciprocate and there is a real risk of being
exploited. It is worth noting that the hypotheses of increased importance for
hierarchy values and reduced importance for egalitarianism values are opposite to
what one would expect were values influenced directly by the egalitarian teachings
of communist ideology.
In contrast, the concern about trusting others was likely to promote both
conservatism and hierarchy values. Lack of interpersonal trust makes it better to
avoid too much openness in relations with others and to rely upon established
norms, roles, and expectations. The assurance that people will fulfill the mutual
role obligations imposed by the hierarchical role structures in which they are
embedded can provide certainty and security. Hence norms, rules, role obligations,
and hierarchical relations are more crucial for successful adjustment to life circumstances. People may therefore have increased the importance they attributed to
conservatism and hierarchy values, the values that support and legitimize the social
structural arrangements that could provide some certainty. Within narrow solidary
groups of close friends and family, interpersonal trust generally persisted. It was
therefore especially critical not to disrupt these relationships. This too may have
enhanced the importance of conservatism values—values principally concerned
with smooth relations within the solidary group.
The paternalism of communist regimes in the social and economic realms was
also relevant to value formation (Feher, 1982). Paternalism fostered passivity, loss
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
393
of ambition, and loss of interest in the political process. People came to expect the
state to provide them with jobs, basic accommodation, and an adequate standard
of living (Marody, 1988). This increased people’s investment in the status quo and
was therefore likely to increase the importance of conservatism values that protect
the status quo. It also lent some legitimacy to the “beneficent” hierarchical order
and, thereby, to the hierarchy values that justify this order. In contrast, by fostering
passivity and lack of ambition, paternalism undermined mastery and intellectual
autonomy values.
Another consequence of paternalism was to reduce citizens’ sense of
responsibility for their own actions (Bar-Yosef & Vasher, 1989; Kohak, 1992;
Musil, 1992; Ziolkowski, 1988). Lane (1994) used the label “moral escapism”
to describe this mentality. Abdication of personal responsibility is the opposite
of the moral orientation expressed by egalitarianism values. Egalitarianism
values call upon people to engage in the arduous negotiation of shared interests
with others and to cooperate voluntarily in promoting the welfare of all segments of society. Hence egalitarianism values were likely to lose force under
paternalism. Lane argues that the mentality nurtured by paternalism underlies
the recent, successful reconstitution of reformed communist parties across
Eastern Europe. These are parties whose message appeals to conservatism and
hierarchy values at the expense of the egalitarianism values promulgated by
more democratic parties.
Finally, we note that the reinforcement system under communist regimes
tended to foster mediocrity as an ideal (Marody, 1988). Authorities typically failed
to reward effort and excellence with increased material benefits or promotions. The
criteria for rewards were often seen as capricious and incomprehensible. As a result,
people’s motivations to strive, to innovate, and to develop their unique ideas and
abilities were undermined. The likely consequence was a weakening of mastery
and intellectual autonomy values that express these motivations. Citizens adjusted
to this environment by developing a preference for equality of reward, regardless
of the quality of inputs (Marody, 1988). The principle of equality of reward enabled
workers to gain some control over their outcomes and it provided some predictability. At the same time, it was also likely to weaken the motivations for success,
achievement, and independence that are expressed in mastery and intellectual
autonomy values.
In sum, our analysis of the various life circumstances to which citizens adapted
under communist regimes in Eastern Europe leads us to hypothesize that the
stronger the communist influence, (a) the greater the importance attributed to
conservatism and hierarchy values, and (b) the less the importance attributed to
intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, egalitarianism, and mastery values.
This pattern should be revealed operationally in comparisons of East Europeans
with West Europeans and, within Eastern Europe, in comparisons of samples from
Russia, Bulgaria, and Georgia with samples from Czechia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia.
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METHODS
Samples
Ideally, data for comparing countries would be based on representative national samples. Because there are no data on the broad range of human values of
interest here from representative national samples in the relevant countries, we
adopted another approach. For each country, we used data from samples that are
matched on critical characteristics. In addition, we replicated the study with two
different types of samples. One set of samples consisted of urban school teachers
who teach the full range of subjects in grades 3–12 in the most common type of
school system in each country. Teachers play an explicit role in value socialization
and they are probably close to the prevailing value consensus (Schwartz, 1992).
The second set of samples consisted of college students majoring in the popular
subjects in their own countries. We assumed that value differences between Eastern
and Western Europe that replicate across the two sets of samples probably point to
differences that would be found with representative samples as well.5
Table I lists characteristics of 17 samples from nine East European countries and 23 samples from 12 West European countries. For most countries there
were samples of both teachers (3rd to 12th grade) and of college students. All
samples were from the majority ethnic group in their country. With the exception of the Polish teacher sample, all the East European samples were surveyed
subsequent to the 1989 political revolutions. Thus communism was in decline.
However, our analysis of value formation as an adaptive process suggests that
value priorities do not change quickly. In any event, if the passage of time
weakened communist influences, it would have worked against confirmation of
the hypotheses.
Respondents in each sample completed the Schwartz (1922) value survey
anonymously in their native language. They rated the importance of 56 single
values “as a guiding principle in MY life.” Responses ranged from 7 (of supreme
importance) to 3 (important) to 0 (not important) to –1 (opposed to my values).
Sociodemographic questions followed the value survey.
5 Of
course, the value-importance scores of teachers and students are not the same as those of
representative national samples from their countries. We only assume that the differences in value
importance, based on student and teacher samples, order the countries in a manner similar to the order
that would be found based on the differences for representative samples. The latter assumption is
supported by an analysis of eight nations (Australia, China, Estonia, Finland, France, Israel, Japan, and
the Netherlands) from which values data were available for representative national samples or for
samples roughly representative of the adults in major cities. We correlated the value priorities of the
teacher and of the student samples from these nations (excepting France for students) with the value
priorities of the representative samples. For teachers, there was an average Pearson correlation of .89
across six value types and a correlation of .21 for affective autonomy. For students, the average Pearson
correlation was .91 across all seven value types.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
395
For each of the seven value types, we computed an importance score for each
respondent. The single values whose ratings were combined to generate the score
for each value type are listed in Table II, following a definition of the type in terms
of its core goals. These values fit the conceptual definition of the value type and
TABLE I. Characteristics of Samples
Country and Region
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria-Sofia
Bulgaria-Sofia
Czech Republic-Prague
Czech Republic-Prague
Estonia-Tallinn
Estonia-Tallinn
Georgia-Tbilisi
Georgia-Tbilisi
Hungary-Budapest
Hungary-Budapest
Poland-Warsaw
Poland-Warsaw
Russia-St. Petersburg
Slovakia-Bratislava
Slovakia-Bratislava
Slovenia-Ljubljana
Slovenia-Ljubljana
Western Europe
Belgium-Louvain
Denmark-Copenhagen
England-London
Finland-Helsinki
Finland-Helsinki
France-Paris
West Germany-Trier/Berlin
West Germany-Trier/Berlin
Greece-Athens
Greece-Athens
Italy-Rome
Italy-Rome
Netherlands-Amsterdam
Netherlands-Amsterdam
Portugal-Porto
Portugal-Porto
Spain-Madrid
Spain-Madrid
Sweden-Stockholm
Sweden-Stockholm
Switzerland-Lausanne
Switzerland-Lausanne
Sample Type
N
Year
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
196
179
200
160
189
94
200
206
141
165
195
195
216
189
208
199
214
1993
1993
1993
1993
1990
1990
1993
1993
1990
1990
1989
1990
1992
1991
1992
1992
1992
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
Teachers
Students
259
190
158
205
293
159
187
377
234
195
200
357
187
277
192
198
186
308
211
187
89
112
1991
1991
1990
1989
1989
1991
1990
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989–91
1988
1988
1989
1989
1988
1988
1993
1993
1988
1988
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Schwartz and Bardi
they also demonstrated empirical coherence in culture-level analyses.6 For each
country sample, we computed a country-level score for each value type by averaging the scores of all the respondents in the sample. Finally, the scores for each
sample were corrected by adding or subtracting a constant that reflected use of the
response scale. Specifically, if the average response to all values by members of a
sample was greater than 4.00 (the approximate international average), the difference between the sample average and 4.00 was subtracted from the sample’s scores
for each value type; if the average was less than 4.00, the difference was added to
the sample’s scores for each value type.
RESULTS
Eastern Europe vs. Western Europe
Table III presents the data for conservatism and hierarchy values, the types
that were hypothesized to be more important in Eastern Europe because of the
TABLE II. Definitions of the Value Types and the Single Items Used to Index Them
Conservatism
Intellectual Autonomy
Affective Autonomy
Hierarchy
Egalitarianism
Harmony
Mastery
6 The
Emphasis on the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations
that might disrupt the solidary group or the traditional order—clean, devout,
family security, forgiving, honoring parents and elders, moderate, national
security, obedient, politeness, protecting public image, reciprocation of favors, respect for tradition, self-discipline, social order, wisdom.
Emphasis on promoting and protecting the independent ideas and rights of
the individual to pursue his or her own intellectual directions—creativity,
curious, broad-minded.
Emphasis on promoting and protecting the individual’s independent pursuit
of affectively positive experience—enjoying life, exciting life, pleasure,
varied life.
Emphasis on the legitimacy of hierarchical allocation of fixed roles and of
resources—authority, humble, influential, social power, wealth.
Emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promote the welfare of others—equality, freedom, helpful, honest,
loyal, responsible, social justice, world of peace.
Emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment—protecting the
environment, unity with nature, world of beauty.
Emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion, through changing
and mastering the natural and social environment—ambitious, capable,
choosing own goals, daring, independent, successful.
44 values listed in Table II and used in these analyses had demonstrated reasonably similar
meanings across cultures in analyses of 97 samples from around the world (Schwartz, 1994b).
Moreover, in a multidimensional scaling analysis (SSA) of data from 49 nations (Schwartz, 1994a:
Schwartz & Ros, 1995), these values formed distinct spatial regions that represented each of the seven
value types.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
397
influence of life under communism. It also presents data for harmony values, for
which no differences were predicted. The mean importance of the value type in
each East European sample is listed in the first column under each value type. The
rank of each sample on the importance of this value type, among the whole set of
TABLE III. Value Ratings by Eastern Compared to Western European Samples:
Conservatism, Hierarchy, and Harmony Value Types
Teacher Samples
COUNTRY
CONSERVATISM
Mean Rank
HIERARCHY
Mean Rank
HARMONY
Mean Rank
3.99
4.39
4.57
3.77
4.43
4.03
3.95
4.34
4.65
17
8
3
20
6.5
16
18
10
2
4.24
(.31)
4.30
(.22)
11.2
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
4.18
3.95
4.19
4.33
3.90
4.24
4.17
4.22
4.20
6
8
5
1
9
2
7
3
4
2.31
2.07
1.92
2.42
2.34
2.45
2.47
2.04
1.69
Mean 9 Eastern European
St.Dev.
Mean 11 Western European
St.Dev.
4.15
(.14)
3.51***
(.20)
5.0
2.19
(.27)
1.98*
(.18)
Graphic Ranks
15.0***
1
20
XXXXXXXXX
5
10
17
3
4
2
1
11
19
8.0
12.6*
1
20
XXXXX
XX
10.0
1
X X
20
XX
X X X
XXX X
Student Samples
COUNTRY
CONSERVATISM
Mean
Rank
HIERARCHY
Mean Rank
HARMONY
Mean Rank
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
3.85
3.65
3.87
4.16
3.68
3.90
3.75
3.76
4
8
3
1
7
2
6
5
2.56
2.42
1.99
2.55
2.09
2.33
1.89
2.01
1
4
11
2
8
5
15.5
10
4.10
3.87
4.31
3.99
4.18
3.86
4.84
3.99
9
14
5
11.5
7
15
1
11.5
Mean 8 Eastern European
St.Dev.
Mean 11 Western European
St.Dev.
3.83
(.16)
3.32***
(.18)
4.5
2.23
(.27)
2.01*
(.21)
7.1
4.11
(.24)
4.05
(.33)
9.3
Graphic Ranks
1
XXXXXXXX
14.0***
19
12.1*
1
XX XX X XX
19
X
10.5
1
X
19
X X X XX XX
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, 1-tail, comparisons between Eastern and Western Europe, t-tests for
means and Mann-Whitney U-tests for ranks.
398
Schwartz and Bardi
teacher or of student samples from the East and West European countries taken
together, is listed in the second column. For example, the Bulgarian teacher
sample rated conservatism values 4.18, ranking Bulgaria 6th of the 20 teacher
samples from Eastern and Western countries in the importance attributed to this
value type.
The mean importance rating and mean importance rank across the set of East
European countries are listed below the data for the separate countries. For
comparative purposes, Table III also presents the mean importance rating and mean
importance rank of each value type across the set of West European countries.
Finally, the ranks of the country means are displayed graphically beneath the data
for each value type. Xs denote the East European countries and blanks denote the
West European countries.
Conservatism. As shown in the left panel of Table III, conservatism values
were more important in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The strength of
the difference is striking. In both the teacher and student sample sets, there was no
overlap whatsoever between the countries of the East and of the West. This is
clearly seen in the graphic presentation. The mean for Eastern Europe was more
than three standard deviations higher than the mean for Western Europe for both
teachers and students. Thus the hypothesis was strongly supported.
Hierarchy. The middle panel of Table III reveals that hierarchy values were
also more important in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The same pattern
was observed for the teacher and for the student sample sets. Thus this hypothesis
was also supported.
Harmony. The right panel of Table III reveals no difference between Eastern
and Western Europe in the importance attributed to harmony values in either the
teacher or the student sample set. No difference was expected, as noted above.
Table IV presents the data for egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, affective
autonomy, and mastery values, the value types that were hypothesized to be less
important in Eastern Europe as a result of adaptation to life under communism.
Egalitarianism. As hypothesized, egalitarianism values were substantially less
important in Eastern than in Western Europe. For the teacher samples, there was
no overlap between East and West, and the difference in mean importance was over
three standard deviations. For the student samples, there was only one overlap, and
the difference between East and West in mean importance was almost three
standard deviations. Thus this hypothesis was strongly supported.
Intellectual Autonomy. Intellectual autonomy values were significantly less
important in Eastern than in Western Europe. This held for both the teacher and
student sample sets, providing support for the hypothesis.
Affective Autonomy. Affective autonomy values were also significantly less
important in Eastern than in Western Europe, as shown for both the teacher and the
student sample sets. Thus this hypothesis was supported as well.
Mastery. Mastery values were significantly less important in Eastern than in
Western Europe for the set of teacher samples, based on the test for the mean ranks.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
399
TABLE IV. Value Ratings by Eastern Compared to Western European Samples:
Egalitarianism, Affective Autonomy, Intellectual Autonomy, Mastery
Teacher Samples
COUNTRY
EGALITARIANISM
Mean Rank
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY
Mean Rank
INTELLECTUAL
AUTONOMY
Mean Rank
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Mean 9
Eastern European
St.Dev.
Mean 11
Western European
St.Dev.
5.35*** 6.0***
(.14)
3.76*** 7.0**
(.42)
4.60*
(.39)
7.7**
Graphic Ranks
1
1
1
20
MASTERY
Mean Rank
4.57
4.89
4.90
4.83
4.80
4.75
4.68
4.91
4.29
19
14
13
15
16
17
18
12
20
3.09
3.12
3.00
3.25
3.26
3.05
3.04
2.70
3.63
15
14
18
13
12
16
17
20
8
4.22
4.30
3.85
3.43
4.36
4.01
4.27
3.96
4.96
14
12
19
20
10.5
16.5
13
18
3
4.02
3.76
3.65
3.84
3.88
3.92
3.74
4.02
3.69
5.5
16
19
14
12
9
17
5.5
18
4.74
(.20)
16.0
3.13
(.25)
14.8
4.15
(.42)
14.0
3.84
(.14)
12.9
20
XXXXXXXXX
20
X XXXXXXX X
X
X XXX X XXX
3.98
(.23)
8.6*
1
20
XX X X X XXXX
Student Samples
COUNTRY
EGALITARIANISM
Mean Rank
AFFECTIVE
AUTONOMY
Mean Rank
INTELLECTUAL
AUTONOMY
Mean Rank
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Mean 8
Eastern European
St.Dev.
Mean 11
Western European
St.Dev.
5.21*** 6.0***
(.16)
4.23**
(.30)
7.0**
4.61*
(.39)
Graphic Ranks
1
1
19
1
MASTERY
Mean Rank
4.30
4.55
4.64
4.76
4.69
4.47
4.90
4.72
19
17
16
13
15
18
12
14
3.89
3.86
3.72
3.75
4.00
3.63
3.31
4.06
12.5
14
17
16
9
18
19
8
4.19
4.28
3.95
3.75
4.61
4.28
4.13
4.65
13
11.5
18
19
7
11.5
16
6
4.46
4.33
4.21
4.14
3.94
4.15
4.30
4.25
4
6
12
14
18
13
8
10
4.63
(.19)
15.5
3.78
(.24)
14.2
4.23
(.30)
12.8
4.22
(.15)
10.6
4.27
(.27)
9.6
19
XXXXXXXX
XX XX XXXX
8.0*
19
XX
XXX
X XX
1
19
X X X X XXX
X
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, 1-tail, comparisons between Eastern and Western Europe, t-tests for
means and Mann-Whitney U-tests for ranks.
400
Schwartz and Bardi
The difference was of borderline significance (p < .07) based on the test for mean
ratings. For the set of student samples, however, there was no difference between
Eastern and Western Europe. Thus this hypothesis received only partial support.
Bulgaria, Georgia, and Russia vs. Central (Eastern) Europe
As noted in the introduction, there were differences among East European
countries in the extent to which communism succeeded in penetrating the social
system or met with resistance from opposition groups. Among the countries we
studied, penetration was presumably greater in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Russia than
in Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. If so, the impact of the
communist system on values should have been stronger in the first set of countries
than in the second. We therefore compared the mean importance attributed to each
of the types of values in these two sets of countries to shed further light on possible
impacts of adaptation to communism.
Formal statistical tests were not computed, given the small number of cases (3
versus 5 for teachers, 2 [no Russians] versus 5 for student samples). We simply
compared the mean importance ranks of the two sets of countries for each value
type. To compute these mean ranks we used the data in Tables III and IV. These
comparisons are adequate to suggest whether the directions of difference conform
to those we hypothesized.
Both conservatism and hierarchy values were more important on average in
Bulgaria, Georgia, and Russia than in Central Europe. This was the case in both
the teacher and the student sample sets. This provides further support for the
hypotheses that adaptation to communism promotes these two types of values.
Egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, and mastery values were more important on
average in Central Europe than in Bulgaria, Georgia, and Russia, in both sample
sets. This provides further support for the hypotheses that adaptation to communism
undermines these three types of values. The evidence was mixed with regard to
affective autonomy values. The data from the teacher samples supported the
hypothesis that these values are weakened under communist regimes, but the data
from the student samples contradicted it. In sum, the comparisons within Eastern
Europe were compatible with five of the six hypotheses and had conflicting
outcomes for one.
DISCUSSION
Influences of Adaptation to Communism
The literature we reviewed on the organization of life under the communist
regimes of Eastern Europe pointed to a set of value-relevant life circumstances to
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
401
which citizens were constrained to adapt. The major features to which we drew
attention included pervasive demands for conformity, close surveillance of word
and deed, unpredictable application of rules and sanctioning of disobedience,
widespread use of informants creating an atmosphere of mistrust, suppression of
initiative and of freedom of choice and action, rewards generally unrelated to effort
and performance, and paternalism that encouraged passivity and the abdication of
personal moral responsibility.
We postulated that people would acclimate their value priorities to the reinforcement contingencies that these conditions created. We therefore expected East
Europeans to upgrade the importance of values that were readily attained or
expressed (conservatism and hierarchy); and we expected them to downgrade the
importance of values that were unattainable and of values whose expression or
pursuit was likely to be self-defeating (intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy,
mastery, and egalitarianism). Because people were largely deprived of certainty
and security, we also postulated that a compensation mechanism would lead them
to attribute higher priority to conservatism values. A core goal of conservatism
values is the attainment and maintenance of a state of certainty and security.
The findings of this research revealed a shared profile of value priorities that
distinguished the East European countries as a set from West European countries.
The explanation offered thus far for this profile is that it reflects people’s adaptation
to life in a communist social system. For five value types (conservatism, hierarchy,
egalitarianism, intellectual and affective autonomy), the findings were consistently
supportive of this explanation. The hypothesized differences replicated in both the
teacher and student samples. The findings for mastery values were in the direction
compatible with this explanation, but the difference was significant only in the
teacher samples.
The comparisons within Eastern Europe added further support to the interpretation that value priorities were influenced by adaptation to the communist social
system. We compared the countries in which communism presumably penetrated
the social system more deeply and pervasively with those in which there was less
penetration. Comparisons of the teacher samples revealed that, for all six value
types, countries in which communist penetration was greater exhibited value
priorities that more strongly reflected adaptation to the life circumstances we
associated with communism. This was also the case in the comparisons of the
student samples for all but affective autonomy values.
The two independent evaluations of the hypotheses—East/West comparisons
and within Eastern Europe comparisons—reveal that those hypotheses that received less than full support in one evaluation were fully supported in the other.
The hypothesis for mastery values was only partly supported by the comparisons
between Eastern and Western Europe but fully supported in the comparisons within
Eastern Europe. The hypothesis for affective autonomy values was only partly
supported in the comparison within Eastern Europe but fully supported in the
402
Schwartz and Bardi
East/West comparison. This increases our confidence in interpreting the whole set
of value priorities as reflecting adaptation to the communist social system.
In the introduction, we cited one earlier study that compared values in
Eastern and in Western Europe which concluded, overall, that there were few
consistent differences (Broek & Moor, 1994). Data for that study were gathered
in 1990–1991, and included five of the East European countries studied here
(Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). How can we account for the
apparent divergence in results? Most of the questions in their survey asked
about specific political, religious, family, and work attitudes and behaviors
rather than about basic, underlying values. This makes comparison difficult.
Moreover, closer examination of their tables reveals differences, consistent
with our findings, in a number of items that are relatively clearly related to the
types of values we measured.
For example, East Europeans were substantially less tolerant of various
out-groups than West Europeans. This is consistent with the relatively low importance of egalitarianism values in Eastern Europe. Postmaterialist attitudes, attitudes
that express an emphasis on individual freedom and social responsibility in contrast
to order and material security, were also less important in Eastern Europe. This is
consistent with the attribution of lower importance to autonomy and egalitarianism
values in Eastern Europe and of higher importance to conservatism and hierarchy
values. Finally, the lesser appreciation for initiative, achievement, and responsibility in work that Broek and Moor (1994) reported for Eastern Europe is consistent
with the lesser importance of autonomy and mastery values we observed. In sum,
at least some of their findings can be seen as supportive of the influence of
adaptation to communism on values in Eastern Europe.
Alternative Explanations
Economic Level. Most countries in Eastern Europe have had a lower economic
level than most countries in Western Europe for more than a hundred years. Hence,
effects of economic level might offer an alternative to effects of adaptation to
communism as an explanation for the current findings.
Inglehart (1991), Triandis (1990), and Schwartz (1993) have theorized about
effects on values of increased income levels. Briefly, their arguments suggest that
greater income brings more security and more opportunities to choose lifestyles
independently. Security and opportunities for independence, in turn, are likely to
promote increased endorsement of values of the types we label intellectual and
affective autonomy and egalitarianism and decreased endorsement of values of the
conservatism and hierarchy types. Regarding mastery, no obvious hypothesis is
implied by theorizing about socioeconomic level. Thus, for five types of values,
predictions based on socioeconomic level parallel those based on communism. It
is therefore important to assess whether adaptation to national level of economic
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
403
development is a better explanation for the current findings than adaptation to
communism.
In order to evaluate the relative strength of the economic-level and adaptationto-communism explanations, we compared the sizes of two sets of correlations:
correlations of national ratings of value importance with (1) gross national product
per capita (GNP/c) in 1986 across the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and
with (2) the dichotomous variable of Western versus Eastern Europe—equivalent
to noncommunist versus communist regime. This comparison may be somewhat
biased against the adaptation-to-communism explanation because it contrasts correlations of a dichotomous variable (West-East) with correlations of a continuous
variable (GNP/c). Of course, GNP/c and West/East correlated substantially with
each other (.74 for teacher samples, .72 for student samples). Hence their correlations with values were unlikely to differ greatly.
Table V presents the sets of correlations. Overall, the detailed comparisons of
correlations indicate that whether a country had been subject to communist rule
was a somewhat stronger and more consistent predictor of value importance than
the country’s economic level. For the teacher samples, five of the six predicted
correlations with values were more strongly in the expected direction for West/East
than for GNP/c (all but intellectual autonomy) and the correlation for mastery was
unexpectedly negative for GNP/c. For the student samples, three of six correlations
favored each of the predictors and the correlation for mastery was again negative
for GNP/c.
The two predictors shared considerable variance because communist countries
were generally less developed economically. It is therefore probably most reasonable to interpret the data as suggesting that adaptation both to the communist system
and to socioeconomic conditions contributed to value formation. However, in light
of these data, economic level does not provide an adequate alternative explanation
for the findings we have attributed to adaptation to communist regimes.
Different economic levels of countries might also provide an alternative
explanation for the value importance differences within Eastern Europe. In order
TABLE V. Correlations of National Value Ratings with West vs. East
and with Gross National Product Per Capita
Value Type
Harmony
Conservatism
Hierarchy
Mastery
Affective Autonomy
Intellectual Autonomy
Egalitarianism
Direction
Predicted
none
–
–
+
+
+
+
TEACHERS
(N = 20)
West
GNP per
/East
Capita
STUDENTS
(N = 19)
West
GNP per
/East
Capita
.12
–.75
–.22
.36
.60
.39
.81
–.10
–.84
–.43
.12
.66
.48
.87
.11
–.62
–.09
–.06
.58
.59
.40
.22
–.79
–.48
–.40
.80
.75
.69
404
Schwartz and Bardi
to assess this possibility, we correlated GNP per capita with the importance ratings
of values across the East European countries. Despite the small numbers of
cases (nine countries for teacher samples, eight for student samples), six of the
14 correlations were significant at the .10 level. In the teacher and student
samples, both affective and intellectual autonomy values were less important
in countries with lower GNP/c. This is the same direction predicted for greater
penetration of communism.7 In the student samples, mastery values were less
important in countries with lower GNP/c, parallel to the prediction from
communist penetration; but this was not the case in the teacher samples.
Moreover, egalitarianism values were more important in countries with lower
GNP/c in the teacher samples, opposite to the prediction and findings for
communist penetration; and the correlation of GNP/c was in the same direction,
though not significant, in the student samples. Consequently, differences among
Eastern European countries in their economic level do not provide a good
alternative for explaining the differences in value profiles that were attributed
to adaptation to communist rule.
Religion. Might the prevailing national religions explain the value differences
between Eastern and Western Europe that we have attributed to adaptation to
communism? There were three Orthodox countries in the Eastern European set of
samples and only one in the West European set. Moreover, there was only one
majority Protestant sample in the Eastern set but six in the Western set. It is
necessary to compare East and West European countries with the same prevailing
religion in order to disentangle effects of adaptation to communist rule from effects
of religion. For this purpose, we compared only the Roman Catholic countries, five
from Eastern Europe (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and six from
Western Europe (Belgium [students only], France [teachers only], Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland [Catholic region]). If this comparison yields findings compatible with the hypotheses based on the effects of adaptation to communism, it would
discredit differences in the religions of Eastern and Western Europe as an alternative explanation.
The differences in value importance between the Roman Catholic countries
of Eastern and Western Europe were in the directions hypothesized on the basis
of adaptation to communist social systems for all six value types. This pattern
was observed both in the comparisons of teacher samples and in the comparisons of student samples. Moreover, the magnitudes of the mean differences for
each value type were similar to those observed for the full sets of samples that
included Protestant and Orthodox countries as well. Thus, holding religion
constant, the East/West differences were unchanged. Consequently, it is possible to dismiss prevailing national religions as an alternative explanation for
7 Note,
however, that in the student samples, affective autonomy values were no lower in Bulgaria,
Georgia, and Russia than in Central Europe, the one finding that contradicted expectations based on
the depth of communist penetration. So the GNP findings do not parallel these findings.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
405
differences between Eastern and Western Europe in their value priorities. It is not
possible, however, to assess the viability of religion as an alternative explanation for the value differences observed within Eastern Europe. The countries
most penetrated by communism were also those in which Orthodoxy is the
prevailing religion.
Earlier History. Long before the advent of communist regimes, Eastern Europe
was governed by more centralized and autocratic regimes than Western Europe; it
was more agrarian and less developed economically and socially (Moore, 1966;
Rupnik, 1988a). Could the pattern of value differences observed here also have
pre-dated communism? While earlier history may account for some of the
East/West differences, we doubt that it provides an adequate explanation. The
agrarianism and traditions of autocratic governance in Eastern Europe probably
contributed to its vulnerability to the imposition of communism. But the degree of
centralized authoritarian rule and the suppression of pluralism increased dramatically with the communist takeovers (Schopflin, 1990). Moreover, while the value
profile observed across the various East European countries studied here was
relatively homogeneous, history reveals a region that was cross-cut with differences
among countries. Culturally, the region was populated by substantial numbers of
people of different religions (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam,
Protestantism, Judaism) and ethnic groups (Slavic, Latin, Germanic, Magyar,
Gypsy, and others). And East European countries engaged in repeated mutual
conflicts (Kittrie, 1988).
Consideration of the value profiles of particular countries also sheds doubt
on this explanation. Among East European countries, Czechoslovakia differed
in its earlier and persistent move away from authoritarian to democratic rule
and in its social and economic advancement that included the development of
an educated middle class during the 19th century (Stokes, 1989). Yet, the value
profiles of Czechia and Slovakia did not stand out as more “Western” than the
average of their Eastern European neighbors. Estonia was not only the lone
Protestant country in our East European set, it was also the earliest to be exposed
to the influences of Western markets and modernization because of its position
on the Baltic Sea (Stokes, 1989). Yet, the overall value profile observed in
Estonia was also no more “Western” than the profiles in other East European
countries.
In sum, despite sharing some aspects of their earlier history, Eastern European
countries were far from homogeneous historically. Moreover, despite important
historical differences among them, they exhibit a shared value profile that is
compatible with their shared experience of communism and incompatible with
these historical differences.
West Not East. Although the hypotheses of this study were based on analyses
of life circumstances in Eastern Europe, they were tested in comparisons between
Eastern and Western Europe. Thus, the observed differences were also influenced
by circumstances in Western Europe. Indeed, the comparisons may reflect the
406
Schwartz and Bardi
adaptations of Western Europeans to democratic, advanced industrial social systems. Can we be confident that they also tell us about Eastern Europeans’ adaptations to communist regimes?
Elsewhere, we have presented a detailed analysis of value priorities in Western
Europe compared to 35 countries from the rest of the world (Schwartz & Ros, 1995).
A distinctive Western European value profile was identified. A comparison of
values in Eastern and Western Europe with those in other countries around the
world make clear that the differences reported here reflect characteristics of Eastern
Europe and not only of Western Europe. A full comparison is beyond the scope of
the current article, but a few results of this comparison can be mentioned to illustrate
the point:
(1) Compared with all the other countries, Western European samples
attributed unusually low importance to mastery values. But mastery
values were even less important to Eastern European samples. Whatever
the explanation for the low priority of mastery values in Western Europe,
an additional explanation is needed for their even lower priority in Eastern
Europe. Adaptation to communism provides such an explanation.
(2) Eastern European samples attributed the most importance to conservatism values, samples from other regions of the world next most, and
Western European samples least. Characteristics of Western Europe cannot explain the high importance of conservatism values in Eastern Europe
as compared to the other regions. Adaptation to communism provides an
explanation.
(3) Western European samples attributed the most importance to affective
autonomy values, samples from other regions of the world next most, and
Eastern European samples least. Characteristics of Western Europe cannot explain the low importance of affective autonomy values in Eastern
Europe as compared to the other regions. Again, adaptation to communism provides an explanation.
The above examples support the view that the differences between value
priorities in Eastern and Western Europe are due to more than the distinctive
features of Western Europe. Characteristics of East European countries apparently
played a separate role. Adaptation to communist regimes provides a consistent and
coherent account for the whole set of differences. It is therefore an especially
plausible explanation. This explanation is further strengthened by the fact that it
also accounts for the value differences observed within Eastern Europe, between
countries in which communism penetrated more or less deeply.
Totalitarianism. The current study focused on communist regimes in Eastern
Europe. Might the hypotheses derived and tested here apply equally well in all
totalitarian regimes? This is a question worth studying. We would not assume that
all totalitarian regimes are similar with regard to the features critical for value
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
407
formation that we identified in Eastern Europe. In China, for example, the economic
system has provided substantial rewards for individual initiative and entrepreneurship for many years. As expected, based on value acclimation to such conditions,
Chinese samples attribute unusually high importance to mastery values (Schwartz,
1994a). This contrasts with the low importance attributed to mastery values in
Eastern Europe. This example illustrates how totalitarian regimes may differ in the
value-relevant life conditions they impose.
CONCLUSION
The current study supports the view that adaptation to the life circumstances
imposed by communist regimes had profound effects on the value priorities of
Eastern Europeans. This in no way contradicts the widely held opinion that
communist ideology and indoctrination failed to convince most Eastern Europeans.
Efforts to teach communist values directly may have had little influence. But,
despite themselves, Eastern Europeans were constrained to adapt to the communist
social system in which they lived. The data examined here suggest that this
adaptation deeply influenced their values.
The recent revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe may lead to substantial
value change. Our theoretical analysis of value formation as an adaptive process
implies, however, that value change is likely to be gradual. It requires more than
modifications of the political atmosphere and of prevailing ideological messages.
It depends upon transformations of the actual life conditions to which people are
exposed. Only as the opportunities and reward contingencies that people confront
in daily life are changed do we expect value priorities to shift. People will gradually
acclimate their values to changed circumstances, upgrading the importance of
values that become attainable and downgrading the importance of those whose
pursuit is no longer adaptive. If life becomes more secure and controllable,
conservatism values will also lose some of their importance, because people will
no longer emphasize them in compensation for their insecurity.
The rate of personal value change is probably somewhat dependent upon age
and life stage. Vulnerability to change may be greatest during adolescence (Brim,
1966). At that stage, value priorities are less crystallized and less anchored in a
large number of past experiences to which people have adapted over time (Carpini,
1989; Inglehart, 1991). Younger people may therefore adapt more quickly to the
transformation of life circumstances in Eastern Europe. Adults who discover that
the goals they have come to cherish—their important value priorities—are no
longer adaptive are more likely to resist or to oppose social changes rather than
to acclimate their values. Assuming that a sense of insecurity in youth is not
readily overcome by changed circumstances, persons who compensated for
such a sense of insecurity by emphasizing conservatism values may also fail to
modify these values.
408
Schwartz and Bardi
The value profile common to Eastern European countries that was identified here is ill-suited for the development of democracy. A commitment to
egalitarianism and autonomy values is required to provide the moral basis of
social responsibility that is needed to maintain a democratic system (Diamond,
Linz, & Lipset, 1990). But these values have relatively low importance in the
Eastern European samples. Nor are the value bases for a free enterprise system
well-established: Autonomy and mastery values are not widely endorsed, suggesting reluctance to assume responsibility, to take risks, and to work hard to apply
one’s talents assertively. Instead, the emphasis on conservatism and hierarchy
values implies a continuing desire for the government to take responsibility and to
provide for basic needs.
Social developments in Eastern Europe are taking different paths in different
countries. Hence, future studies of values in these countries can test our theorizing
about the relations of specific aspects of life circumstances to the formation and
modification of particular types of values. In order to clarify the mutual causal
influences of value priorities and social developments on one another, longitudinal
studies of basic values should be undertaken. This study can provide a baseline.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by grant No. 187/92 from the Basic Research
Foundation (Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities) and grant No. 94-00063
from the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF) to the first
author, and facilitated by the Leon and Clara Sznajderman Chair Professorship in
Psychology. We thank the following persons for gathering the data on which this
article is based: Krassimira Baytchinska (Bulgaria), Gabriel Bianchi and Viera
Rozova (Slovakia), Bartolo Campos and Isabel Menezes (Portugal), Ake Daun
(Sweden), J.-P. Dupont and F. Gendre (Switzerland), Johnny Fontaine (Belgium),
Adrian Furnham (England), James Georgas (Greece), Suzanne Grunert (Denmark),
Sipke Huismans (Netherlands), Maria Jarymowicz (Poland), Michael McCarrey
and Vladimir Zahkarov (Russia), Leo Montada (West Germany), Toomas Niit
(Estonia), George Nidharadze (Georgia), Henri Paicheler and Genevieve Vinsonneau (France), Darja Piciga (Slovenia), Maria Ros and Hector Grad (Spain),
Giancarlo Tanucci and Sonia Roccas (Italy), Jan Srnec (Czech Republic), Antti
Uutela and Markku Verkasalo (Finland), Zsuzsa Vajda (Hungary). We are grateful
to Marina Barnea, Ariel Knafo, Gila Melech, Galit Sagie, Lilach Sagiv, and Naomi
Struch for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Direct correspondence to Shalom H. Schwartz, Department of Psychology,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel.
Values and Adaptation to Communist Rule
409
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