C H A P T E R
-
4
K N O W L E D G E A N D J U S T IF IC A T IO N
4.1
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
a) Doxastic Theories
b) Non-Doxastic Theories
4.2
FOUNDATIONAL THEORY
a)
Forms of Foundational Theory
b)
Basic Beliefs
c)
Critical observation
4.3
4.4
COHERENCE THEORY
a)
Forms of Coherence Theory
b)
Lehrer and Bonjour’s Coherentism
CONCLUSION
84
KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION
The preceding chapter of Gettier Problem illustrates some of the
epistemological problems that have excited philosophical interest on the
problem of knowledge and justification. We have seen that the notion of
justification is related to our beliefs, it is related to our doubts and it is also
knowledge related to knowledge. We raise questions, ‘Is our belief
justified?’, ‘How do you know?’ We want to know what justifies him in
holding his belief. Thus, epistemology has traditionally focused on
epistemic justification. Justification plays an important role in traditional
epistemological thought Yet, the post Gettier epistemological analysis has
released some critical considerations about justifications. This chapter is an
attempt to discuss some issues related to knowledge and justification.
It has been acknowledged that epistemic justification is a necessary
condition for knowledge. Epistemic justification governs that we should or
should not believe and epistemic norms prescribe us how to form beliefs.
Thus, epistemology focused on epistemic justification more than on
knowledge and from this point of view epistemology might better be called
‘doxastology1.
4.1
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE :
In Contemporary Epistemology the word ‘justification’ is roughly as
what is required for knowledge. A justified belief is one that it is
epistemologically permissible to hold. Regarding the problem of knowledge
85
and justification, contemporary thinkers present some theories which can
be broadly divided into two categories - i) Doxastic and ii) Non-Doxastic.
a)
Doxastic Theories : It is assumed by epistemologists that the
justifiability of belief is a function exclusively of what belief one holds - of
one’s ‘doxastic state*. It is very natural because in deciding what to believe,
we cannot take account of anything except in so far as we have beliefs
about it. This theory has two subcategories - i) The foundational theories
and ii) The coherence theories.
According to the foundational theories, knowledge has ‘foundations’
of some epistemologically basic beliefs. They are in some sense ‘selfjustifying’. It means they are not supposed to stand in need of justification.
But the coherence theories deny that there is any such epistemologically
basic belief. They want to state that the justifiability of a belief is a function
of one’s total doxastic state, yet beliefs are justified by their relationships to
other beliefs. What makes a belief justified is the way it ‘coheres’ with the
rest of one’s belief.
b)
Non-Doxastic Theories
: These theories insist that some
considerations are also relevant in the determination of whether a belief
can be justified. Internalism and externaiism are the two kinds of
approaches of this category. Inernalism suggests that the justifiability of a
belief should be a function of our internal states. Beliefs are internal states,
so doxastic theories are internalist theories. But not all internalist theories
are doxastic theories.
86
According to direct realism, Justification is not just a function of our
beliefs about the perceptual states. On the other hand they suggest that
justification must be partly a function of the perceptual states themselves.
The justifiability of a belief is determined by a correct cognitive process and
the correctness of an epistemic move is an inherent feature of it. The
justifiability of a belief is a function of one’s internal states and is not
effected by contingent facts. It is also called ‘cognitive essentialism’.
On the other hand, externalism is the denial of intemalism.
According to externalism, besides the believer’s internal state, there are
some relevant necessary factors in the justification of belief. As an opposed
theory to cognitive essentialism, the extrenalistic theory of reliabilism holds
that epistemic justification turns on contingent matters of fact. Again,
probabilism assesses beliefs in terms of their probability of being true.
Externalist theories are non-doxastic theories, because they take
justifiability of a being to be a function of more than just one’s total doxastic
state. Thus the epistemological theories are related to each other in a
certain way. These relations are observed by Pollock in the following way-i
Internalist theories
f Foundational theories'!
■< Coherence theories f
.
Doxastic theories
Direct realism
r
Externalist theories
<
Reliabilism
Probabilism
*
r
★
^
*
Fig.4.1
87
j
Non-doxastic
theories
In order to enter into the topic of knowledge and justification, a brief
account of the different theories of justification has been discussed above.
In the previous chapter, it is observed how causal theories and defeasible
theories attempt to supplement the justification condition of the traditional
analysis with an additional condition but failed to explain clearly the concept
of epistemic justification.
Now foundational theory and coherence theory suggest solutions to
this problem from their different philosophical standpoints in contemporary
epistemology. In this chapter, it is not possible to observe all the aspects of
these theories. So, an endeavour is made to discuss only a few thinkers’
views which are relevant to the present problem.
4.2
FOUNDATIONAL THEORY
Foundationalism is a view concerning the structure of the system of
justified belief possessed by a given individual. It is the doctrine that
knowledge is ultimately based on beliefs that require no further justification.
a)
Forms of Foundational Theory : Traditionally, foundational beliefs
have been taken to be those which are certain or beyond doubt. Dancy
remarks that ‘classical foundationalism is the most influential position in
epistemology’.2 Classical foundationalism divides our beliefs into two
groups : those which need supports from others and those which can
support others and need no support themselves.
88
Classical fbundationalism states that all our knowledge is derived
from our experience. So, our beliefs are about our own sensory states
(immediate experience). Our beliefs about our present sensory states are
infallible and basic. Again starting from his famous ‘cogito ergo sum',
Descartes argued that he could be certain that he existed as a thinking
being and this certainty was the rock on which he sought to establish
further knowledge of the world. For him not only the basic beliefs are
infallible guaranting truth of what they report but these are generated by
reason. This basic beliefs are intuitively certain or they are beyond doubt.3
Another eminent classical foundationalist Lewis holds that ‘unless
something is certain, nothing else is ever probable.* This view is explained
from the standpoint of knowledge and probability. So, probability is
assessed as relative to evidence. Probabilities must have something to rest
on or we need something certain unquestioned evidence by appeal to
which the probabilities of other things are to be assessed. Pollock suggests
that
not all
propositions
are
epistemologically
basic
and
only
epistemologically basic proposition can support other propositions.
Following Sosa fbundationalism can be explained as follows.“With
respect to a body of knowledge K (in someone’s possession),
foundationalism implies that K can be divided into parts ki, k2l............ ,
such that there is some non-symmetric relation R (analogous to the relation
of physical support) which orders those parts in such a way that there is
one-call it F - that bears R to every other part while none of them bears R
in turn to F”.5 Thus it wants to explain that foundation of knowledge are
89
some propositions which requires no justification. ^William P Alston
formulated foundationalism in the following manner - “Our justified beliefs
form a structure, in that sense beliefs are justified by something other than
their relation to other justified beliefs; beliefs that are justified by their
relation to other beliefs all depend for their justification as the foundation.”8
Alstorm
distinguishes
between
‘epistemic’
and
‘metaepistemic’
foundationalism, but these are not broadly disoussed in this study
Traditional
foundationalism
differs
modern
or
epistemic
foundationalism. For example, traditional foundationalism is dependent on
logical methods whereas modem foundationalism is dependent on
epistemic methods. It is clearly explained in this way“1.
The Radical Traditionalists believing in infallible basic beliefs
transmitting justification through the sure method of deduction.
2.
The Modest Traditionalists according to whom basic beliefs are
neither infallible nor incorrigible. For transmission of justification they aiso
chose a traditional inferential process, viz. induction. They can afford to
leave deduction because certainty is not the goal they are seeking for.
3.
The Modest Modernists for whom basic beliefs are nothing more
than self evident or directly evident beliefs. For communicating justification
neither deduction nor induction is considered competent. For this purpose,
some rules of evidence or epistemic rules are to be laid which are different
from the traditional methods of internal justification.’’?
90
Without a detailed analysis of the notion of basic beliefs, the study of
foundationalism is not possible. We have seen that this theory recognizes
the fact that someone's beliefs are in general justified by beliefs. This kind
of interpretation involves an infinite regress. For example to justify a
proposition P another proposition, q, the justifier q must itself be justified.
And if we cite for justifying q and something for justifying r, we fail in the
process of infinite regress. This will go on endlessly involving an infinite
vicious regress of epistemic justification. The justification condition of the
traditional analysis of knowledge is the direct source of this problem.
Different forms of foundationalist theories suggest the various ways
to solve this problem. Foundationalist argues tfnat our belief may be justified
by certain relation that they bear to what is directly evident and coherentists
suggest that they may be justified by certain relation that they bear to each
other.
b)
Basic belief: Foundationalism holds that the basic beliefs provide a
foundation for epistemic justification. Our senses provide us with the
epistemologically basic beliefs. We arrive at other beliefs by reasoning, so
reasoning cannot provide us ultimate source of justification. Thus we
acquire the picture of our beliefs forming a kind of pyramids
91
p
Basic Beliefs
Fig. 4.2
In some sense, basic beliefs are perceptual belief, but they need not
be beliefs about physical objects. Contemporary epistemology with an
artificial terminology suggests that basic beliefs are beliefs about ways of
being appeared to- 'appearance belief for short.
Again there are some non-basic beliefs which are justified by
reasoning from basic beliefs. A basic belief can be held on the basis of
another belief by a psychological relation. In epistemology, this is called the
‘basing relation’. To be justified in believing something, it is not sufficient
merely to have a good reason for believing i^ Sometimes we donot believe
the conclusion on the basis of those reasons. Therefore, if a reason entails
its conclusion, then it is a conclusive reason. It is discussed fn the previous
chapter that all non-conciusive reasons are defeasible in nature. A
92
defeasible reason is called a 'prima facie reason’. The importance of prima
facie reason, in the analysis of knowledge will be discussed again in this
chapter.
Lehrer specifically mentions some conditions for basic beliefs. They
are “(1) A belief to be basic must be self-justified. (2) A basic belief must
either be irrefutable or if refutable at all, it must only be refutable by other
basic beliefs. (3) Beliefs must be such that all other belief that are justified
or refuted are justified or refuted by basic beliefs. ”g These basic beliefs
constitute the foundation of all justification “In the absence of basic beliefs,
the whole edifice or justification would collapse for count of a foundation”.^
Also, “The fundamental doctrine of foundation theories is that justification,
whether it is the self justification of basic beliefs or the derivative
justification of non-basic beliefs guarantees truth".n
Another protagonist of foundationalism, R.M. Chisholm, presents his
view with the help of three concepts, viz, 1) self presenting states, 2) basic
propositions, 3) directly evident propositions. Chisholm's theory has several
versions. His main point is that human knowledge has a foundation
structure which consists of propositions about a knower’s own perceptual
states. His theory is based on the notion of epistemic preferability. He
states that .................if there is something that is directly evident to a man
then there is some state of affairs that present itself to him".12 Thus my
believing that 'Socrates is mortal’ is a state of affairs that is ‘self-presenting’
to
The state of affairs is ‘apprehend through itself. He also states that
desiring, hoping, hating may also be 'self presenting’. Thinking and
93
believing provide us with the cases of directly evident. Chisholm does not
accept the perceptual and observational propositions as directly evident.
He gives example of directly evident proposition as - “this appears redly to
me." Whereas the propositions “I see something before me”, is an example
of observational proposition.
He then offers the view that some known cases of truths, which are
not based on directly evident may be said to be indirectly evident. Our
knowledge of external objects, other people's mind and memory and the
indirectly evident is based on knowledge through what is directly evident.
Regarding the certainty, of l-propositions, Chisholm once stated the
view that “..........my l-propositions would imply a certain property that only I
have and yours would imply a certain property that only you have” i3
According to Chisholm, the concept of the certain is wider than that of the
directly evident. So, he defines “If there is an e such that (i) e is directly evident for s, and (ii) the
state of affairs, e implying h, is directly evident for s, then h is certain for
S ” -14
Afterwards he intends to shift the foundation from l-proposition to
something else and writes, “............. it is hardly plausible to suppose that
those directly evident proposition, which constitutes the basis of all our
knowledge are propositions which imply our individual essences.............
The basis of our knowledge cannot consist of l-proposition.” He himself
admitted that, “.....the account of the directly evident that I have given
94
requires correction”. Critics observes these state of Chisholm by following
words - “To save foundationalism from the embrace of solipcism (and for
that matter from skepticism) he has to give up l-proposition as constituting
the foundation of knowledge"^
For his foundational proposition, Chisholm wanted directness or
immediacy of justification. The terms 'directly evident’, ‘self-justification’ and
‘self-warranted’ all these are taken by Chisholm to mean the same.
- /
In his explanation, evident means ‘maximally reasonable’.
Thus the nature and importance of basic beliefs is the central issue
of different forms
of foundationalist theory.
Pollock states,
an
epistemologically basic proportion is one that a person can justifiably
believe without having reason for believing it. He forms certain points about
the conditions of basic beliefs. The class of basic beliefs must satisfy them.
(1) There must be enough basic beliefs to provide a foundation for all other
justified beliefs, and (2) the basic beliefs must have a secure state that
does not require them to be justified by appeal to further justified beliefs. <6
Russell suggests that immediacy is the main feature of basic
propositions. He also writes, “the basic propositions must be known
independently of inference from other propositions but not independently of
evidence .....".n According to him evidence is experimental and not
propositional. The basic beliefs must be apprehended intuitively or
immediately. In Swain’s version, a belief is self justified by virtue of being
95
the sort of belief it is, self-justification being only one form of immediate
justification.18
Alstorn has also coined some new terms in this context. For
example, by the term self-warrantedness of a belief, he means about one’s
cannot state of consciousness and he name the case where such beliefs
are foundations of knowledge as minimal foundation. The certainty of basic
belief or proposition’s is one analysed in various ways by different
foundationalist thinkers.
C)
Critical Observation:
It is observed that foundationalists believe that basic propositions
are there and they also believe that they form the foundation of all other
beliefs. So, the ultimate basis or the foundation of all inferentially justified
belief is non-inferentially justified belief or propositions. But, they differ on
✓
the point among themselves in respect to the question whether basic
beliefs are infallible, indubitable or incorrigible, and how basic beliefs are
justified.
Both strong and modest foundationalist views are very important in
this issue. Thinkers like Quinton assert that basic statements' are both
ostensive and intuitive. They are intuitively justified and ostensively
expressed. He says, “Intuitive statements must be ostensively learnt, for if
they were explained in terms of other statements, the later could serve as
premises in an interface to them. Ostensive statements must be intuitively
justifiable, for the occurrence of a situation of the kind of correlation with
96
which they were introduced would be a sufficient reason of a non-inferential
sort of their assertion”,™ He mentions five different senses of the word
‘certain’ to explain the certainly of the basic statements. They are
psychologically
indubitable,
logically
necessary,
self-authenticating,
infallible and incorrigible and in the sense of 'beyond reasonable doubt’.
Another radical foundationalist Lewis says that all credible empirical
propositions ultimately derive some of their credibility from absolutely
certain expressive judgment. This point is stated in the following words.
“Proximate ground of the probable or credible need not be certain : it will be
sufficient if these are themselves genuinely credible. If ‘P’ is credible on the
ground ‘Q ’, then the credibility of 'Q' assures a credibility of lesser degree
than if ‘Q ’ were certain. But if the credibility of 'P' rests on the credibility of
‘Q ’, and that of ‘Q ’ on that of ‘R ’, and so on ; and if in this regress we
nowhere come to rest with anything which is certain ; then how can, the
credibilities spoken of be assured at all or be genuine; since each in turn is
relative to a ground, and no ultimate ground is given ....... There are
grounds of empirical knowledge which are thus certain,
in given
presentations of direct experience”.2o
Lehrer defines incorrigibility in terms of the concept of logical
impossibility. His definition is “S has an incorrigible belief P if and only if it is
logically
impossible
that
S
believes
that
P
and
P
is
false" .21
But if the notion of incorrigibility is applied with logical necessity then it will
restrict its application to matters of fact. Hence Lehrer again defines the
incorrigible in the following words.
97
“S has an incorrigible belief that P if and only if (i) it is contingent that
p and (ii) it is logically impossible that s believes that p and it is false that
P -22
Hence, the existence of the incorrigible belief guarantees the truth of
what is believed. But, the truth of the belief is not guaranteed by logic
alone. Lehrer claims that, though incorrigibility is not a sufficient condition
for justification, it may possibly be a necessary condition for self
justification. He writes “.....even though not all incorrigible beliefs are self
justified, it remains possible that all self-justified beliefs are incorrigible"^
We have already discussed the view of Chisholm regarding certainty
and directly evident. By referring to Kant, Chisholm again explains the
following principle and he wants to call it ‘the principle of the unity of
consciousness’.
“For every x, if it is empirically certain for x that something is F and if
it is empirically certain for x that something is G, then (i) is F and x is G,
and (ii) it is empirically certain for x that something is both F & G”.24
J
Lehrer has shown that if basic beliefs are logically incorrigible then
there would be almost no basic beliefs at all. Again, if our basic beliefs are
subject to error, they cannot guarantee their own truth consequently cannot
provide a foundation for our empirical beliefs. This situation is explained by
Lehrer in the following way “If we try to find some guarantee of truth for basic beliefs outside the
basic beliefs themselves, we fall into the coal-pit of skepticism. Again, if
98
we allow basic beBefs themselves to be the source of the guarantee of truth
basic beliefs are to have, we open the way to the ravishment of unrestricted
speculation. Eitherway, we court epistemic disaster."^
So the problem of how basic beliefs are possible and how they will
justify other fads about the world does not have a simple solution. Thus, it
leads some philosophers to doubt their existence. It is argued that the
beliefs that we actually proposed as foundations are infact doubtful and not
self-justifying. This kind of weaker version of foundationalism keeps the
possibility that there be reasons against a basic belief. It accepts F1 and
F2. Again, another more wreak version of foundationalism holds that the
basic beliefs are partially justified and so their justification is insufficient.
Here, we ran accept only F1 but not F2. In these versions of
foundationalism we find the absence of fallibilism.
„ Lehrer by criticising foundationalism in its strictest form writes “if we
were to restrict our basic beliefs to those that are logically incorrigible, we
would find ourselves confined to an exceedingly small number of beliefs
indeed almost nonej\2s Already we have discussed, that Chisholm himself
is not satisfied about the competence and also about the existence of Inow* proposition was forming the basic belief of knowledge.
^Again, the foundationalists' method of actual transmission of
justification from the basic to non-basic belief is not free from criticism.
Even, if some propositions are epistemologically basic and also they are
initially certain and thereby if they ran confer inferential certainty to others
99
yet the whole idea may be meaningless if there is no actual passage from
the basic to the non-basic beliefs^
Comman rightly observes “one of the crucial problems that faces a
foundational theory of justification has been the difficulty of finding some
plausible way to warrant inferences from what is foundational to other nonfoundational statements. Without some such warrants, only the very limited
foundational statement are justified and some form of epistemological
skepticism seem s reasonable”^
It is true that Chisholm formulates certain rules of evidence to
ensure the passage from the directly evident. But, we can only say that the
formulation of those rules can help us attain a certain degree of probability
but not truth.
v ^gain,
Pollock
observes that prima-facie
reasons
plays
an
indispensable role in our knowledge of the world. But the problem of
explaining how prima-facie reasons are possible and how they will justify
other facts about the world does not have a simple solution. Thus it leads
some philosophers to doubt their existence. Harman observes that
“reasoning can lead not only to the adoption of new beliefs but also to the
rejection of old beliefs. If all reasons proceed exclusively in terms of
conclusive reasons that would be in explicable.”28
x>rtence, the foundational theories cannot successfully claim that we
have epistemologically basic belief. Because the beliefs that are actually
proposed a s foundations are infact doubtful and not self justifying. As a
100
response to this situation, we find the fallibilistic account of foundationalism
which maintain that beliefs need-not be certain in order to be self justifying.
A foundational theory can only be defended by adopting a different
view of what beliefs are epistemologically basic. This situation leads us to
move towards a new theory of justification that is coherence theory which is
the
true
alternative
of
foundational
theory.
Pollock
admits
“If
foundationalism fails, what should we erect in its place? W e have two
options. W e can retain the doxastic assumption and adopt a coherence
theory, or we can reject the doxastic assumption and adopt a non-doxastic
theory. My ultimate proposal will be that we follow the latter course, but
because the doxastic assumption has so much intuitive appeal I will first
explore the possibility of adopting a coherence theory” 29
^Now before we move onto the coherence theory of justification, it is
very necessary to discuss certain points of foundational theory and
coherence theory from a comparative point of view. C o herence theory
asserts that foundationalism is false, because there cannot be basic beliefs
but foundationalism does not assert that coherence theory is false as
coherence
is
not a
source
of justification.
On
the
other
hand
foundationalism fully acknowledge that a belief system's coherence
contributes to the justification of its members. Foundationalism holds that a
belief is justified only if it coheres with - in the sense that it is not defeated
by the subject’s relevant background beliefs. W e have seen that
foundationalism does not deny that the concept if coherence has an
101
important role to play in the account of the structure of epistemic
justification.
The recent advocates of foundationalism like Chisholm has explicitly
regarded coherence a s a source of justification. “He allows a relation of
coherence to be important epistemically only on those case s where the
propositions comprising the coherent set have warrant so no one can be an
out and out foundattonalist in the sense that each of our beliefs accepted is
not so on the basis of a foundational statement".3o
To avoid regression, coherentism falls in a vicious circularity.
However coherentist holds that epistemic circularity or the idea of beliefs
justifying each other is not such a bad idea. Bonjour states that
coherentists are committed to circularity. Circular reasoning collapses into
self justification.
In this issue of the debate over foundationalism and coherentism,
Davidson's paper, ‘the Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’,
formulates an important objection to foundationalism. According to
Davidson, coherentist'maintains that “nothing can count a s reason for
holding a belief except another belief. It's partision rejects as unintelligible
the request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk".3i Davidson
by following coherentist wants to assert that the source of a beliefs
justification must always be one or more other beliefs and rejects the
foundationalisf s account that justification has its ground in something other
102
than beliefs. Hence, “there can be no such thing as a belief that is justified
through a circular chain of reasons”.32
Thus we see that foundationalism cannot provide an adequate
account of self justified belief in the analysis of knowledge.
4.3
COHERENCE THEORY:
We have observed that foundationalists believe that if there are
justified beliefs at all, there must be basic beliefs. Coherentist holds that it
is possible for a belief to be basic on the ground that what justifies a belief
must always be one or more other beliefs. Mathias Steup mentions that
Otto Neuroth, one of the first philosophers to advocate coherenticism,
advocate the view that : “we are like sailors who must rebuild their ship
upon the open sea. With this metaphor Neuroth explains that when we
evaluate our beliefs and attempt to make appropriate changes, there is no
exist from the circle of our beliefs. We can inspect our belief system from
within - remaining afloat on the open sea and with no choice but to
evaluate particular beliefs that strike us as questionable in terms of what
else we belief. If we are like sailors, we could simply remove our ship from
the open sea, but we can’t leave the open sea. Thus we cannot go outside
the system of our belief. If we are like sailors on the open sea of our belief,
then a beliefs justification can be derived from nothing but other beliefs”.33
Coherence theory of justification holds that a belief is justified if it fits
in with a set of beliefs, appropriately specified. A particular belief is justified
103
if it is integrated into a coherent system of beliefs. It denies any immediate
justification. In order to deal the regress argument, it rejects the chains of
justification and takes the total system of belief to be epistemologically
primary.
The coherence theory of justification has connection with the belief
statements of the subject. Here, justification consists in coherence between
statements articulating one’s beliefs. Lehrer explicitly advocates the view
that “There is nothing other than one’s belief to which we can appeal in the
justification of belief. There is no exist from the circle of one’s beliefs".^ We
form our epistemic justification through inferential means and so ultimately
every statement that has some degree of warrant has its validity due to it's
relation with valid principles of inference to certain other statements. Again,
coherence obviously is a matter of degree. So, there is always the
possibility of alternative proposition which may be more coherent than our
currently available justified belief of a particular issue.
As a theory of justification coherence is an approach of 20th century
epistemology by a number of thinkers. It was first proposed by pragmatists
like Pierce and Dewety Some other thinkers like Harman, Goldman, Lycan
think of coherence as inference to the best explanation based on a
background system of beliefs. But such kind of coherence cannot imply that
all justifying inferences are explanatory. Hence, a more general account of
coherence as a successful competitor to foundationalism is presented by
Lehrer and Bonjour. An elaborate discussion on these two important
accounts of coherentism is made later in this chapter.
104
a)
Forms of Coherence Theory
By following Lehrer, we can show three prominent forms of
coherence theory of justification.
1. The entailment theory of coherence
2. The explanatory theory of coherence
3. The probabilistic theory of coherence
1.
Coherence as entailment
Some coherent thinkers conceived the relation of coherence as a
relation of necessary condition. This view may be formulated as - a belief
that p coheres with other belief of a system c if and only if P either
necessarily implies or is necessarily implied by every, other belief in C. But
this kind of logical relation will not consistently entail any factual judgment.
Every contingent statement can be negated. Lehrer says, “If we were to
assume that such coherence was sufficient for complete justification, we
should have to admit that any contingent statement, a person is completely
justified in accepting is such that he is also completely justified in accepting
the denial of that statement.“35 Hence, on the basis of necessary relation,
we cannot explain the coherence theory of justification.
2.
Coherence as explanation
This view asserts that coherence required for justification is a kind of
explanatory coherence. The justification of a belief cannot be decided in
105
isolation from a system of beliefs. A system having a maximum of
explanatory coherence confers justification on beliefs within it.
This view was propounded by W. Sellars and Harman .36 Leherer
says, “All beliefs are justified by their explanatory rule.... Some are justified
because of what they explain, others are justified because they are
explained.”37 The belief concerned must fit in with a system as a whole.
This view suggests that explanatory coherence of a system could be
increased by decreasing what needs explanation.
Lehrer expresses his dissatisfaction over this explanatory coherence
through the following arguments.
1)
There are some examples of statements of our beliefs that
were completely justified by general statements within a
system, quite independently of any explanatory role or function
of such statements. For example, statements derived from the
Pythagorean theorem.
2)
A statement completely justified in one system may not be
justified with respect to another system of explanation.
3)
Again no relation between statements suffices to guarantee
complete justification. Thus explanation cannot be the sole
ingredients of justification. A principle can serve the purpose of
truth, however, while lacking explanatory merit.
106
3.
The Probabilistic Theory of coherence
It is an approach of Lehrer where he is going to state a subjective
theory of coherence abandoning the charge for some objective features to
justify our beliefs. A theory of probability is a theory of chance. Unlike
foundationalism coherence theory does not suppose that they have any
guarantee of truth. In this theory, “justification has truth as an objective, but
it demands some external guarantees of success. They construct the
theory on the subjective integrity of a veracious enquiry and the internal
relations among the beliefs. The belief that one statement has a better
chance of being true than another need only belong to the corrected
doxastic system of a man to provide justification in the quest for truth.
Lehrer claims that “we donot assume there to be any guarantee of the truth
of these beliefs or those they serve to justify.”^
b)
Lehrer and Bonjour’s Coherentism
In his version of coherence theory, Lehrer emphasizes on the notion
of acceptance. Coherence with this central notion of acceptance system is
determined by what it is reasonable to accept based on this system.
According to him not all beliefs are acceptances but all acceptances are
beliefs. Acceptance is a subclass of beliefs. The difference between them
is - acceptance is always formed in the interest of obtaining a truth and
avoiding an error in what one accepts but belief is not always formed in the
interest of obtaining a truth and avoiding an error.
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Acceptance has a functional role in thought, inference and action.
Because according to Lehrer what we accept is a notion related to our
subjective or personal justification. Our acceptance system tells us that it is
more reasonable to accept one thing than another. Thus, an acceptance
system generates justification. Acceptance system acts as judge to obtain
truth and avoid error. “S is justified in accepting that P at T if and only if P
coheres with system X of S at T.”39 From this definition Lehrer derives
another important definition of personal justification.
“S is personally justified in accepting that P at T if only if P coheres
with the acceptance system of S at T."40
Lehrer conceives of coherence as a relation between a particular
proposition and a relevant acceptance system. He says that my
acceptance of P coheres with my acceptance system only if P wins out
over all the propositions that compete with i|. Thus, which of two competing
propositions coheres with one’s acceptance system is determined by which
of the two propositions, it is more reasonable for one to accept vis-a-vis
one's acceptance. In this context, Lehrer brings the terminology ‘beating
the competitors’ as an essential ingredients of coherence. A proposition P
to cohere with one’s acceptance system, it must beat every proposition one
accepts that competes with it. Thus Lehrer points out that assumptions
about one’s own trust worthiness are an essential ingredient of coherence
M. Steup summarises Lehrer’s version in the following words. “To
begin with, Lehrer would say you are justified in accepting that P if and only
108
if P coheres with your acceptance system. And in order for your
acceptance of P to cohere with your acceptance system, P must beat all of
its competitors. Finally, your acceptance system must include one or
several propositions to the effect that, under the present circumstances, the
source from which your acceptance arises is trustworthy".^
Lehrer suggests that if we combine this kind of personal justification
with an objective constraint then only it will serve us as an account of
complete justification. But he himself admits that T h e belief of a man about
the world described within his corrected doxastic system would be entirely
erroneous”.42 That is why he suggests to use 'subjective justification’ for
coherence of beliefs and reserves ‘complete justification’ for truth of
knowledge.
But under ordinary circumstances empirical beliefs are simply not
accompanied by beliefs such as suggested by Lehrer. Hence, Lehrer’s
theory amounts to a version of skepticism because it demands too much of
justification in case of our ordinary beliefs. For example, the proposition - I
see a cat before me’ will not be ordinarily justifiable if we follow Lehrer’s
principle and impose it on justification. In order to defend his position,
Lehrer would have to say these acceptances need not be belief.
Thus from Lehrer’s remarks on the nature of acceptance, it is not
clear how he conceives of the relation between acceptance and belief^. On
the one hand, he claims that acceptances are a subclass of beliefs on the
other hand he says, ‘Most of what we accept from experience, that 57 is an
109
odd number, w e accept without ever having considered it. It is an
acceptance but not a b e lie f .43 Greko by taking Lehrer, claims “Acceptance
need not be explicit”.
Like Lehrer, Bonjour conceives of justification in terms of coherence
but he insists that coherence must be understood in terms of relations
between actual beliefs. According to Bonjour "empirical belief - B coheres
with my background beliefs if and only if I have a reason or a justificatory
argument, for the truth of B ”.44 He also gives example of such a belief in the
following way -
1) B has feature F
i
2) Beliefs having feature F are very likely to be true.
Therefore, 3) B is very likely to be true.
Bonjour then defines justification in the following words - “In order
for B to be justified for a particular person A, it is necessary, not merely
that, justification along the above line exists in the abstract, but also that A
himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he
believes the appropriate premises of (1) and ( 2 ) .............”45
Bonjour deals the regress problem with a holistic conception of
justification. H e defines justification as essentially systematic or holistic in
character, beliefs are justified by being inferentially related to other beliefs,
in the overall context of a coherent system.
no
However, the most important point that Steup observes here is that
both Lehrer and Bonjour agree that coherence is at least in part a function
of level ascent. But Bonjour states that level ascent must take the form of
actual beliefs that is why Bonjour’s theory of justification is known as the
theory of metajustification. This theory is designed as ‘an idealised
reconstruction of a relatively pure coherence theory’ one which avoids all
versions of foundatinalism.
BOnjour introduces another new term to this theory i.e. ‘epistemic
responsibility’. Our requirement for a particular belief is imposed by
consideration of epistemic responsibility. ‘S is epistemologically responsible
in holding belief B’. Bonjour’s view on justification is internalist, because a
belief must be cognitively accessible to the subject but other internalists
hold that justification is also accessible if it comes in the form of evidencev
Again, Bonjour’s notion of empirical responsibility is related to the notion of
'cognitive possession of a justification*. So, Bonjour offers a kind of strict
interpretation of justification which someone’s cognitive possession, must
take the form of beliefs. ,
He distinguishes between the generating sense of inferential or noninferential belief and the justificatory sense of these beliefs. In the
generating sense, observational beliefs are non-inferential but in the
justifying sense beliefs are inferential. In this crucial point, Bonjour’s version
of coherence goes against all foundation of any strong or weak type. In
Bonjour’s terminology, non-inferential means it simply occurs to me and
such beliefs are ‘cognitively spontaneous’. So, certain sorts of cognitively
111
spontaneous belief are reliable on matters of empirical discovery. But a
particular justified belief is an outcome of coherence among these empirical
beliefs.
Thus, Bonjour likes to construct a coherence theory of empirical
knowledge. Empirical belief must have real connection with the world.
Therefore, in order to establish that kind of belief, Bonjour brings the notion
of ‘observation requirement’. Bonjour observes that a cognitive system
which is coherent and satisfies the observation requirement but fails to
accord with reality is unlikely to remain coherent unless it is revised in the
direction of greater accord with reality. Here the system is no longer a
system of subjective belief without any real connection with the world.
In this point, we can refer to Pollock ; “.....because according to
such a theory, injustification is not a matter of coherence with set of all
propositions, but only with the set of propositions which are believes. What
one believes is causally influenced by the way the world is, so the world is
not being unjustly ignored” ^
A standard objection to coheretism is that it isolates belief system
from the world because it asserts that beliefs are justified by virtue of
relations between not beliefs and the world, but beliefs only. Lehrer and
Bonjour’s accounts show that coherentism does not disconnect our belief
system from the world. By his notion of ‘observation requirement’, Bonjour
refutes the objection of the critics. Lehrer too is able to reply to the critics
that since we are connected with the world through perception, charges in
112
the world are reflected in our perceptual belief. Hence, their views seem
satisfactory in the problem of knowledge and justification from different
approaches in our study.
4.4
CONCLUSION:
Inspite of all these safeguards, between coherence of the system
and truth, one can never say that a complete accord between the system of
belief and reality has been reached and also there is the possibility of
failure in the attainment of truth. Justification is a matter of degree. So we
can never be sure that the optimum has been reached. This is the so called
fallibilistic tendency of knowledge. Hence we may claim that our factual
truth is ever corrigible in principle. Thus, ‘foundationalism with all its
different variants and coherentism inspite of all reformulations fail in
achieving truth a s we commonly understood to be’.47 From the above
discussion, we can assert that either truth is ineffable or is probable. It
means either truth is reduced to probability, truth is a matter of degree or it
remains ineffable to our empirical cognitive effort. Skepticism arises from
this risk of error.
But the important point is that the risk of error is however compatible
with a high probability of truth which may suffice for knowledge. So, we
cannot stop our endeavour at the point that we may fall into error.
Though we are fallible, it does not imply the suggestion that
epistemology is dead. Skeptics provide an useful device for understanding
113
the problem of knowledge and justification. Hence, before we enter into
next chapter on scepticism, it is noteworthy to mention the view of Lehrer
and Clay - "The philosophical importance of skepticism is not merely
heuristic. Of course a s the history of philosophy has taught us, however,
many central features of an epistemological theory become apparent when
one asks how one would reply to the challenges of the skeptic in terms of
the theory”.48 Thus, “let us embrace the skeptic, not so much a s an
opponent to be vanquished but a s a source of enlightenment”.
114
Notes & References:
1.
Pollock, J.L., ‘Contemporary Theories of Knowledge’, Hutchinson,
London, 1988, p.24.
2.
Dancy, J., ‘An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology’, Oxford,
1985, p.53.
3.
Vide Stout, A.K., ‘The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes’ in
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by W. Dony.
4.
Vide Lewis, C.I., ‘An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation’, La Salle
: Open Court, 1946.
5.
Sosa, E., ‘The Raft and the Pyramid in Knowledge in Perspective,
Cambridge University Press, p.167.
6.
Alstorf;, W.P., ‘Two Types of Foundationalism’ in the Journal of
Philosophy, Vol.LXXIII, N o.7 ,1976, p.165.
7.
Choudhury, Sujata, ‘Nature of Knowledge’, Allied Publisher, p.97,
8.
Pollock, J.L., Op.cit, p.26.
9.
Lehrer, K., ‘Knowledge’, Oxford, 1974.
10.
Ibid, p.15
11.
Ibid, pp.78-79
12.
Chisholm, R.M., ‘Theory of Knowledge', Prentice Hall, 1966, pp.2125.
13.
Chisholm R.M.,
‘The Directly Evident' on ‘Justification and
Knowledge’ edited by Pappas, p.116.
14.
ibid, p.124.
15.
Choudhury, S., Op.cit, p.94
16.
Pollock, J.L., Op.cit, p.28
115
17.
Vide Russel, B. Chapter on ‘Basic Proposition’ in ‘An Inquiry into
Meaning and Truth’.
18.
Swain, M., ‘Justification and the Basis of Belief in Justification and
Knowledge, Op.cit, pp.27-28.
19.
Quinton, A., ‘The Nature of Things’, Routledge and Kegal Paul Ltd.,
1973, p.134.
20.
Lewis, C.I., Op.cit, p.333
21.
Lehrer, K„ Op.cit, pp.81-83.
22.
Ibid, p.85
23.
Ibid, p.85
24.
Chisholm, R.M., ‘The Directly Evident’, Op. cit, p.124.
25.
Lehrer, K., Op.cit, pp. 152-153
26.
ibid, 152
27.
Comman, J.W., ‘On Justifying Non-Basic Statements by Basic
Reports’ on Justification and Knowledge, Op.cit. pp.121-129.
28.
Harman, G., ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’ in the
Philosophical Review, 74,1965, p.89.
29.
Pollock, J.L., Op.cit, p.66.
30.
Foley, R., ‘In Chisholm on Coherence’, Philosophical Studies, 1980,
p.551.
31.
Devidson, D., ‘Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ in D
Henrich ed., Kant arder Hegal ? Klitt-Cotton, 1983, pp.423-38.
32.
Piatinga, W arrant: The Current Debate, Oxford, 1993a, p.74.
33.
Steup, M., ‘An Intoduction to Contemporary Epistemology’, p.115.
34.
Lehrer, K., ‘Knowledge’, Op.cit, p.188.
35.
ibid, p.158.
116
36.
Sellar Wilfrid’s articles, ‘Some Reflections and Language Gam es' in
Science, Perception and Reality (Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1963),
pp.321-58
and
Vide
Acceptance and Rational
Harman’s
article
‘Introduction,
Belief, edited Swain, Holland, 1970,
pp.83-99.
37.
Lehrer, K., Op.eit, p.161.
38.
Ibid, p.192
39.
Lehrer, K ,' Theory o f Knowledge’, p. 115.
40.
Ibid, p.115.
41.
Steup, M., Op.eit, p.125
42.
Lehrer, K., ‘Knowledge’, Op.eit, p,213.
43.
Lehrer, K., ‘Coherence and the Truth Connection’ : A Reply to My
Critics, p.270.
44.
Bonjour, L., ‘The Structure o f Empirical Knowledge’, Harvard
University Press, 1985, App-A.
45.
Ibid, p.31.
46.
Pollock, J., ‘A Plethora o f Epistemological Theories’ in Pappas
Edited, Essays on Knowledge and Justification, p.102.
47.
Choudhury, S., Op.eit, p.124.
48.
Lehrer and Clay edited, ‘Knowledge and Skepticism’, West View
Press, London, 1989, in ‘Introduction’, p.xvii.
117