This paper is not an official paper from the French Armed Forces. It aims to summarize on-going challenges
within the French Army and has been drafted by the French Liaison Office in accordance with current open
publications.
This special update focuses on the intervention in Mali and the White paper.
THEATERS
NEWS:
ABOUT
“SERVAL”, THE FRENCH MILITARY
OPERATION IN MALI
and criticism abroad, culminating with the uprising of 14
January 2012.
Since January 11th, 2013, French forces have blocked, rolled
back and cornered Jihadi armed groups in Mali.
This article aims to give a summary of the background and an
update of the situation since March1.
- The mission objectives, essentially helping the Malian
forces halt the progress of terrorist groups, striking the terrorist
rear bases and securing Bamako as well as guarantying the
stability, have been fulfilled.
- The French President, the minister of defense and even the
media
praised
the
exceptional
reactivity,
the
professionalism and the determination of French troops
during this operation. The Afghan experience of French
troops in hard engagements, combined with their
knowledge of the African theatre produced good results
against a fleeing enemy on more than 95% of Malian
territory.
 Background/reminder
- Mali is a landlocked,
butterfly-shaped
country in NorthWestern Africa, on the
southern fringe of the
Sahara desert called
Sahel.
- It spreads roughly
1000 miles from North
to South and from
West to East, and
covers an area about
twice the size of
Texas.
- It is a former French colony, and has retained French as its
official language.- The population of Mali, as in many African
countries, does not belong to a single ethnic group. Ethnics
tensions have plagued today’s Mali long before its
independence in 1960.They flared up in 1963-1964 and in
June 1990 in the Adrar mountains, which triggered a violent
reaction of the government against the local population. A
vicious cycle of terrorism and repression started, fueling
ethnic hostility in the North, political dissent in the South
 Situation update
- The on-going operation led the enemy forces to adopt a
prudent and discrete posture, redeploying to their
historical areas: AQIM2 in the Ifoghas Mountains and
MUJAO3 around GAO. Permanently under pressure by allied
armed forces, most of them withdrew or even left Mali.
Those remaining are not strong enough to take the
initiative from the French and Chadian armed forces
deployed in northern Mali, they are using asymmetric
courses of action: IED, mines, harassment, etc. Many
insurgents dropped their weapons and fled on foot or on camel
back, avoiding the use of their pick-up trucks. The history of
smuggling of many AQMI members gives them a very
good knowledge of all possible escape routes between
Mauritania and Libya. Their capture will require the full
cooperation of all regional actors, which lies well beyond
the military part.
2
1
For a more comprehensive understanding of the background and
situation, see the March update
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Movement for Unity and jihad in West Africa, an opaque and
aggressive Al-Qaeda-linked group
3
Page 1/5
 - The way ahead
The weather has been favorable so far, with a single sand
storm complicating the seizing of Kidal. But with the coming
rainy season (June to October), air support and ground
movement will be partly hampered, complicating ISR,
logistics and maneuver.
However, even though the military operation was a success,
the situation will not be stabilized if a political settlement
cannot be reached.
For the near future, our forces will progressively decrease and
focus on CT operations, mainly in North Mali. French
personnel, in ad hoc liaison detachments, will also support
the AFISMA African units which do not have all the
necessary assets.The decrease started in April and will be
carried out over several months. It has to be conducted in a
very pragmatic manner, based on the situation on the ground,
on the African Forces at hand and on the political situation. In
any case, the political decision of President Hollande is that
French forces strength will be of 2,000 in July and down to
1,000 by the end of the year.
In parallel, the AFISMA forces will be rehatted as “blue
helmets” in July, to ensure the stabilization and security of
Mali.
 - Lessons identified:
- Value of the French bases in Africa, which provide not
only a security guarantee for French expatriates and many
others, but also superior training opportunities as well as an
expeditionary mentality for the troops deployed there. They
learn to leverage joint cooperation for small units over large
areas and get used to “go quickly and light”. The long standing
presence of French instructors across Western Africa provides
a fine knowledge of the human terrain and a certain amount of
interoperability with local forces.
- Validity of the “Guépard” alert system, with a whole
brigade in France on alert and ready to provide forces within
hours.
- Concerning Allied contributions: Serval proved that the
international
community
supported
the
French
intervention. The US, UK, Germany and other NATO
partners provided tactical and strategic airlift, air to air
refueling or intelligence assets. Belgium
provided two MEDEVAC helicopters. Other
contributions were promised for EUTM. These
contributions proved critical for the
operation. The logistics moved 12,000 metric
tons of equipment by train ship, air or flatbed
trucks in one month, roughly the equivalent of
what was repatriated from Afghanistan over one
year. The US support both for SERVAL but also
AFISMA proved and still proves to be critical.
- The rapid succession of air assaults and
ground moves under constant air cover,
including ISR MALE Harfang UAV and
maritime patrol aircraft, greatly disrupted
the enemy. The lessons learned in Libya on
targeting fleeting objectives were put to good
use.
- The rapid advance followed a three-tiered
pattern: SOF and airborne units seized key
airfields, and then were rejoined by French and
Malian or other African ground troops, in
particular, Chad and Niger.
The logistics had to follow quickly over
hundreds of kilometers, making secured airfields key
objectives for air resupply.
Communications and Information systems were strained to
their limits on these unusually large distances. SATCOM was
key, but in short supply.
In the fighting phase, French units capitalized on their
combat experience in Afghanistan. Many soldiers of
Operation Serval fought in the valleys of Kapisa province as
late as summer 2011. Combat support involved the whole
range of fires from mortars to laser guided bombs. Water
sources were constantly monitored from the air, starving the
jihadists.
New digital equipment facilitated the work of tactical air
control parties, helicopter pilots and VBCI crews, but was not
used by dismounted infantry units.
Page 2/5
EQUIPMENT
VBCI, ARMOURED VEHICLE FOR INFANTRY
COMBAT
The VBCI, Véhicule Blindé de Combat d'Infanterie, is
a French Infantry fighting vehicle designed to replace
the AMX-10P. It is built on an aluminum hull which carries a
modular THD steel and titanium armor that can be replaced in
the field. The 8x8 wheel combination is designed to make the
VBCI more comfortable and less costly than a tracked vehicle,
while giving it sufficient mobility to back the Leclerc tank.
Designed to be transportable by the Airbus A400M, the VBCI
is equipped with a one man design turret and has a 25 mm
stabilized gun. Fire control integrates a laser telemeter and a
thermal camera. The rate of fire is up to 400 rounds/min, and
the turret allows anti-air self-defense. It also includes a coaxial
7.62 mm machine gun for close defense and a Galix grenade
launching system. The carrying capacity is up to 11 persons.
The full digital integration to the network makes VBCI the
first combat vehicle adapted to the Scorpion Program. VBCI
was combat proven in Afghanistan and is currently in Mali
(see picture: 92 Infantery Regiment VBCI near Tumbuctu). Its
flexibility, high mobility, firepower, protection and
reliability are greatly appreciated by units. The 400th
VBCI was delivered to the French army on 12 June 2012. The
first unit to be equipped with the new infantry fighting
vehicle was the 35th Infantry Regiment in Belfort. In active
service since 2008, 630 vehicles have already been ordered.
THE DEFENSE
WHITE PAPER
AND
SECURITY
On Monday April 29th,
President
Hollande
published
the
2013
French defense and
security White Paper, a
160 Pages document on
Defense and National
Security. This strategic
review tries to reconcile
France’s
weak
economic growth and declining budgets with its ability to
take unilateral military action, preserve its nuclear
deterrence, and improve its intelligence and security. The
main facts are the following:
- The French Army will be able to provide an operational
capacity of about 66,000 men including 7 projectable
maneuver brigades: 2 will be able of first entry in order to
fight in coercion against an opponent with heavy means; 3 will
be multirole; 2 will be specifically light to be able to be
deployed for to quick overseas reinforcement and difficult
areas. These forces will have about 200 main battle tanks, 250
medium tanks, 2,700 multirole armored vehicles and 140
reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 utility and assault
combat helicopters and 30 tactical drones.
-The French Navy will keep its four nuclear ballistic
missile submarines, 6 attack submarines, 1 nuclear aircraft
carrier, 15 state-of-the-art frigates, 12 patrol of six
surveillance frigates, 3 projection and command, maritime
patrol aircraft,
- Relying on a permanent command center fully interoperable
with our allies, the French Air Force will include 225 combat
aircraft and 50 tactical transport aircraft and 7 aerial
surveillance, 12 multirole tanker, 12 surveillance drones
theater, some light aircraft surveillance and reconnaissance
and 8 ground-to-air medium-range systems.
- Special Ops and Intelligence will be reinforced. Cyber
defense is becoming a real priority.
In practice, from 2016 to 2019, French defense forces will
have to cut 24 000 posts. Despite this news, France will keep
its up-to-date independent nuclear deterrence and
reinforce her cooperation and involvement in NATO
forces.
Main Operational contracts of French Forces will be:
1. A national emergency group of 5,000 men in alert
allowing us to build up an immediate joint response task
force of 2,300 posts projectable at 3,000 km from France in
7 days. This task force will be made up of one 1,500 men
combined air-ground integrated battalion equipped with tanks,
combat helicopters. They will be projected by a Navy group
with one LHD (BPC) with 10 fighters and intra theater tactical
transportation aircraft, navy patrol aircraft, in flight refueling
aircraft and C4ISR means.
2. Sustain simultaneously on two or three theaters, 6,000
up to 7,000 men or in one major coercion operation (with 6
months notice), 2 combined brigades made up of 15, 000
men able to be reinforced by 2 other allied brigades to build a
NATO division.
3. A domestic intervention force of 10,000 men will be kept
anytime for national protection.
In financial details, the military planning budget law for the
next 4 years will now be discussed. Its publication may be
scheduled during autumn 2013.
Page 3/5
HISTORIC CORNER: THE BATTLE OF
KOLWEZI
The Battle of
Kolwezi was
an airborne
operation b
y
the French
Army that
took place
in May 1978
during
the invasion
of Zaire by
the Front for
the National Liberation of the Congo. It aimed at rescuing
European and Zairian hostages held by Katangese rebels
after they conquered the city of Kolwezi. The operation
succeeded with the liberation of the hostages and light
military casualties.
In May 1978, an uprising took place in Katanga against
President Mobutu and a 3,000 to 4,000 man strong Katangan
rebel group arrived, accompanied by the 2nd Cuban Division
which departed from Angola and had crossed neutral Zambia.
Upon arriving, they took about 3,000 Europeans as hostages
and carried out various executions, killing between 90 to
280 Europeans. President Mobutu requested foreign
assistance from Belgium, France and the USA. The day after
the airport was retaken, Mobutu arrived in person to boost
troop morale and reassure the population; he seized the
opportunity to parade several European corpses which struck
western public opinions and led to a widespread acceptance
of the decision by the Elysée to launch a parachute
operation.
On 16 May at 0:45, the 2nd REP was put on alert. Elements of
the planned operation started to leak into the press, causing
fears that surprise would be lost if a swift action were not
taken.
Legionaries of Opération Léopard took off on 17 May
from Solenzara in Corsica, and arrived in Kinshasa after a 10hour flight. On 19 May, they were flown to Kolwezi,
1,500 km away. At 14:30, a 450-man first wave jumped from
a 250-metre altitude into the old hippodrome of the city. The
drop was performed under fire from light infantry weapons,
and six men were wounded as they landed, while another was
isolated from his unit, killed and mutilated in the street before
even removing his parachute.
A violent firefight ensued in the streets, while French snipers
started picking out threatening rebels, killing 10 of them at
300 meters with the newly introduced FR F1 rifle. European
hostages and those who had been able to hide started to come
under the control and protection of the French. A rebel
column, led by an AML vehicle, attempted a counter-attack
that was stopped around 15:00 near the railway station by
rocket fire. Using infantry tactics, the REP quickly neutralized
all rebel groups in the city.
At 18:00, the city was under French control and mostly
secured. During the night, rebels attempted to infiltrate but
were stopped by an ambush prepared by the French Foreign
Legion.
In the night of the 19th to the 20th of May, further fighting
occurred. On
the 20th, at
6:30, another
wave of 250
paratroopers
was dropped
east of the
city, taking
rebel
positions
from behind
and
occupying
this part of the city before noon. This group entered the P2
quarter and discovered the massacres that had occurred there.
On 20 may, the Belgian Paracommando Regiment landed on
the airport and headed towards the city on foot, then entered
Kolwezi and started evacuating Europeans towards the
Airport, leaving the securing of the city to the French. The
first hostages were evacuated to Europe at noon. In the
afternoon of 20 May, Metalkat was taken by the 2 REP,
forcing 200 rebels away. This swift operation provided the
paratroops with a surprise element that they exploited,
capturing the centre of the city. Within two days, the entire
city was under control, and 2,800 Europeans were secured and
evacuated on 21 May. The entire region soon came under
control of French and Belgian paratroops, until they were
relieved by an African force led by Morocco and comprising
Senegal, Togo and Gabon. The operation was an illustration
of the efficiency and effectiveness of light infantry when
used with the element of surprise and with good
intelligence and logistics.
Page 4/5
DEPLOYMENT OF THE FRENCH ARMED FORCES4 AS OF 05/01/2013
Operational context key words: “Increased diversity, duration, dispersion & violence, legality”
4
Army, Air Force, Navy and Gendarmerie.
Page 5/5