Jpn J Clin Oncol 2014;44(Supplement 1)i78 – i83
doi:10.1093/jjco/hyt220
What Efforts Should Be Made in Asia in a Globalizing World?
Cross-boundary Cancer Studies at the University of Tokyo:
International Public Good in the Asia-Pacific Era
Shotaro Yachi
Special Advisor to the Cabinet, Former Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan
For correspondence, please contact Hideyuki Akaza, MD, Department of Strategic Investigation on Comprehensive
Cancer Network, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo, 4-6-1 Komaba,
Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8904, Japan. E-mail: [email protected]
Lecture date November 14, 2012
Received December 12, 2013; accepted December 13, 2013
Key words: cross-boundary cancer studies – the University of Tokyo – international public good –
strategic diplomacy – smart power
LECTURE PROFILE
FORMATION OF A NEW POWER BALANCE
Shotaro Yachi was born in Kanazawa City in 1944 and raised
in Toyama. After graduating from the Graduate School for
Law and Politics of the University of Tokyo, he entered the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969 and retired from the
Ministry in 2008. In Japan he worked in the Ministry’s Asian
Affairs Bureau, North American Affairs Bureau, Treaties
Bureau, as Director of the Personnel Division, DirectorGeneral of the Treaties Bureau, Director-General of the
Foreign Policy Bureau, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. Overseas he served twice at
the Embassy of Japan in the USA, and at the Embassy of
Japan in the Philippines, at the mission of Japan to the EC and
as Consul General in Los Angeles. Yachi undertook research
at the Fletcher School from 1970 to 1972 and at the Center
for International Affairs at Harvard University as a fellow,
from 1987 to 1988. He taught as a part-time lecturer at
Waseda University’s International Division (1986), at Sophia
University’s Faculty of Law (1993, 1994), at Seinan-gakuin
University’s Department of Law (1993), at Keio University’s
Faculty of Law (1996) and at Chuo University’s Faculty of
Law (2001 – 03). He currently serves as professor at the
Institute of Japan – US Studies, Waseda University, as guest
professor ( part-time) at the Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University, as part-time lecturer at the College of Arts
and Sciences, University of Tokyo and as visiting professor at
the Art Innovation Center, Tokyo University of the Arts. He
was appointed as Special Advisor to the Cabinet in 2012.
FROM A UNIPOLAR TO A MULTI-POLAR WORLD
Since the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s
there has been a pervasive feeling that Japan is sliding down a
slippery slope. The question remains whether Japanese
society will continue to tumble down such a slope, or whether
as a nation it can once again aim for the clouds and climb the
slope with dynamism, reemerging once again as a responsible
major power in the international community and one that provides international public good. Japan is currently teetering on
a precarious precipice. So in what kind of terms should we
consider what Japan needs to do in order to once again surmount the precipice?
Following the end of the Cold War, the bipolar structure of
USA – Soviet confrontation has been said to have been
replaced by a USA – dominated unipolar structure. However,
given the morass in which the USA has found itself in conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are those
who argue that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar, and still others who contend that we are now in a nonpolar era. Over the past 20 years, China has been rapidly
expanding its military capability, backed by double-digit
growth in defense spending, but in military terms the US-led
unipolar structure is likely to continue for the foreseeable
future. China has used the terminology, ‘One superpower and
many other strong nations’ and viewed in purely military
terms, this is an accurate summation.
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Jpn J Clin Oncol 2014;44(Supplement 1)
In economic terms, the USA, Europe, Japan, China, India
and follower countries are major players in the international
community. The situation is further compounded by the fact
that international politics or the international community is
experiencing the globalization of activities by non-state
actors, which are actively crossing the national borders of
nation states, those units that have been an integral part of the
modern international community since the mid-17th century.
Global corporations, or, more negatively, terrorists and
hackers, infectious diseases and climate change have all
become global phenomena.
What we need to look at when considering the power
balance of the international community is the relative reduction
in the international status of the USA. For example, in GDP
terms Japan was surpassed by China in 2010, and according to
projections by McKinsey & Company, China will overtake the
USA in 2027 to become the world’s largest nation in terms of
GDP. The relative decline in the USA’s position also implies
that position of other countries is on the rise, which we see in
the increase in fortunes of the so-called BRICs emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, China and India.
Looking back over history we see that once the most powerful nation in the world enters a period of relative decline, other
countries step up to challenge that nation. Just like in the late
19th century, when the preeminence of the maritime power of
Great Britain and its empire was challenged by the continental
power, that was Germany, there are now those who theorize
that a power transition would take place eventually between
the USA and China. Power transitions in the past have been
various in nature and format, with the one between Germany
and Great Britain being a clash whereby Germany sought to
oppose Britain militarily. In the case of the power transition
between Britain and the USA, at the end of the 19th century,
the USA sought to support Britain, and moved westward following the conclusion of the American Civil War, as it
acquired new territorial possessions such as Hawaii and the
Philippines. As such the power transition between Britain and
the USA was one of cooperation. So how will a power transition between the USA and China unfold? Among scholars
there are those who suggest it will be a melding of cooperation
and competition. In political and security aspects China will
vie to compete with the USA, but in economic aspects interactions between the two nations will be cooperative, given their
mutual dependence. This theory suggests that a transition
characterized by both cooperation and competition is a likely
outcome.
The third factor in any consideration of a new global power
balance is that the focus of the international community has
shifted to Asia and that we are now in what could be termed
an Asia-Pacific era. The fourth factor is related to the proliferation and increasingly complex nature of global issues. These
include nuclear-related matters, international terrorism, concerns over energy and resources, food supply and safety, and
infectious diseases, to name but a few, all of which are increasing in complexity or severity. Take, for example, infectious diseases as just one of these issues; how can we engage
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in international efforts to respond to the common threat posed
to humanity by such diseases? In terms of security and politics
there is a confrontational structure in place in the international
community, but on other global issues, the USA and China
must work together.
The fifth factor to bear in mind is the expansion and evergrowing use of social networking services (SNSs). As technology develops apace it would be hard to believe that human
cognition and understanding will be able to keep up. Although
SNS has positive aspects, namely convenience for all, its use
for political purposes has dark potential unless a good deal of
thought is given to proper use. Advances in technology will
continue to provide ever more varied ways of engaging with
SNS and this could also impact the international community
as a whole.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC ERA
CENTER FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
Above I have set out five elements that are relevant in the formation of a new power balance, including the era of the
Asia-Pacific, about which I would like to further elaborate.
The first point to make is that the center for global economic growth is gravitating toward Asia.
According to statistics of the International Monetary Fund
in 2011, the total trade of the l6 East Asia Summit (EAS)
members (the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Japan, China, Republic of
Korea, Australia and New Zealand, membership which has
since increased to 18 countries, with the accession of the USA
and Russia), amounted to US$9.3 trillion, close to surpassing
the total trade of the EU of US$10 trillion. Already almost
half the world’s population is accounted for in this grouping
and average economic growth rates over the past decade have
been twice the global average, and the nominal GDPs of
ASEAN countries, China and India have grown 4.2 times.
Furthermore, according to estimates by major UK banking
group HSBC, by 2050 the GDP of China will stand at
US$25.33 trillion, followed by the USA at US$22.27 trillion
and Japan at US$6.42 trillion.
Whether these forecasts will prove to be true is uncertain,
as they depend on various factors and preconditions. As the
structure of one-party rule by the Communist Party in China
employs both centripetal and centrifugal forces, which of
these will gain strength and traction depends on future economic growth and no definitive statement on the outcome can
yet be made. However, there is no doubting the fact that the
center of global economic growth is gravitating toward Asia.
EMERGENCE OF CHINA AND ADVANCE OF ITS MARITIME POWER
The second point is the emergence of China and its maritime
expansion.
China has always been a large country and according to the
research of some scholars, over the past 2000 years it has
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International public good in the Asia-Pacific era
always accounted for 30% of global GDP. However, following the Opium Wars from around 1840 the country endured a
history of humiliation for around 140 years, but has since
recovered to become the second-largest economic superpower
in the world today. When technological capability is factored
into considerations about China, according to estimates by
some scholars, China was the preeminent power in the world
in terms of technological capacity and economic power from
500BC through to 1500BC. According to projections by
McKinsey & Company, China’s GDP will overtake that of the
USA in 2027, and it is also said that China is utilizing a cybernetwork for the gathering of strategic intelligence. What is
more, according to USA intelligence sources, there is a possibility that China has begun the construction of its first homemanufactured aircraft carrier.
In this way China has made a peaceful rise in the global
community and has started efforts toward maritime expansion.
It is this maritime expansion that has the greatest significance
for the Asia-Pacific region.
THE USA RETURN TO ASIA
The third point is the USA return to an Asia-centric focus.
Under the Cold War structure following the Second World
War, the USA fought two major wars in the Asian theater—
the Korean War and the Vietnam War—and its focus was
clearly on Asia. However, following the series of terrorist
attacks on USA soil that occurred under the administration of
former President George W. Bush, new threat countermeasures were launched that resulted in tremendous energy and
budget being poured into strategy and action in the Middle
East. A strategy for Asia was left on the back burner. When
President Obama visited Japan in November 2009 he said
himself that he was the first USA President to be born and
raised at least in part in the Asia-Pacific region. In November
2011, during a visit to Australia, President Obama stated that
‘the USA has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation’, thus
indicating that USA policy and strategy had returned its focus
to the Asia-Pacific region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
has continued to make similar statements, from which it can
be understood that the USA has returned its focus to Asia, following its shift to the Middle East.
If a power transition between the USA and China occurs
against the backdrop of the above-mentioned developments, it
is likely that rivalry will develop in Asia between the two
countries. In journalistic terms it is averred that a ‘Great
Game’ may unfold in the Asia-Pacific region, similar to that
which developed in Central Asia and Afghanistan between
Great Britain and Russia prior to the First World War.
CHALLENGES FOR JAPANESE DIPLOMACY
STRATEGIC DIPLOMACY
If we were to enumerate the challenges facing Japanese diplomacy in the midst of these international developments, the
first things to point out are that Japan’s international position
has declined in relative terms and that all of Japan’s economic
indicators have similarly dropped. In the face of such a situation, Japan must give all its attention to engaging in strategic
diplomacy.
The mass media has been reporting recently that the
number of Japanese students studying overseas is decreasing.
While there are 190 000 Chinese students studying in the
USA, there are ,20 000 Japanese students, a figure that is less
than even Korean and Taiwanese students. This means that the
human resources that could be employed in Japanese diplomatic efforts are becoming more limited, indicating that
means of utilizing diplomacy will become more constrained.
During the years of strong economic growth, Japan’s share of
the world’s wealth increased, allowing for extravagance and
waste to a certain degree, but in today’s Japan this is no longer
possible. In economically stringent times, Japan must employ
its diplomacy in a strategic manner.
Strategic diplomacy entails looking long and hard at the
relationship between the ‘means and the end’ and nurturing a
posture that seeks to use all means available with a maximum
efficiency. What needs to be borne in mind when considering
strategic diplomacy is that a posture that seeks only to serve
narrow, short-sighted national interests on an ad hoc basis
serves no purpose and that rather it is essential to maintain
consistency with common international benefit and international public good. International public benefit could be
deemed to be peace, safety, security and prosperity in the
international community as a whole. When Japan seeks to
advance its own national interest, it is important to ensure
that in doing so, it does not go against or damage international public benefit. The nation state is basically one that acts on
the basis of self-serving interest, but there are ways in which
this need not be the case. Japan’s leaders will therefore be
likely required to seek out such ways, although they may be
difficult.
CREATING SMART POWER
The second challenge for Japan is the creation of smart power.
While smart power is related to strategic diplomacy, it represents more of a central national strategy, for which comprehensive consideration of diplomacy and security is required.
For example, the issue of whether to participate in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement negotiations is a
major one in Japan, and the reason why Japan has not entered
the negotiations to date is due to the agricultural sector. The
specific problem is rice. Currently, Japan-produced rice is protected by tariffs of .700% and joining the TPP and open up
the agricultural industry will require agricultural reforms. If
this issue is approached using conventional methods
employed to date, while various ministries will consult on the
matter and it will ultimately be discussed at the ministerial
level, as long as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MAFF) is opposed to the TPP, no further progress
will be made. As MAFF exists to protect agricultural interests
Jpn J Clin Oncol 2014;44(Supplement 1)
it is evident that no progress could be made from such a stance
toward joining the TPP.
To overcome this impasse, I believe that it will be necessary
to create a national strategy headquarters directly under the
control of the prime minister, which will engage in working
level efforts to accumulate knowledge and expertise from
around Japan, and also to create an organization similar in
nature to the National Security Council (NSC) of the USA.
Only such bodies would be capable of making a decision to
open up the agricultural sector. Under the current system of
inter-ministerial consultations MAFF would definitely remain
unbending in its attitudes, but if a decision was to be made by
national strategy headquarters under the control of the prime
minister, MAFF has no choice but to accept any decision,
making it perhaps just about possible to proceed with agricultural reform.
A similar example that could be given is the policy that was
announced by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions by 25% compared with 1990 levels.
If such a policy was to be truly implemented it would also
require not the conventional rounds of inter-ministerial consultations, but rather a national strategy headquarters that
would have the power over individual ministries to determine
a common strategy. The same can be said for energy policy.
Making a decision on whether to move away from nuclear
power or to maintain some or all of the 54 reactors currently in
place in Japan and then taking that decision forward as part of
energy policy as a whole, including how to boost the ratio of
renewable energy, is not something that can be achieved
through consultations among ministries concerned. A national
strategy headquarters is absolutely necessary to break through
the various policy deadlocks.
A third point is to move away from conventional wisdom
that clings to the success story of post-war Japan and to consider new ways to break the mold and move forward in different ways. In that sense the TPP has great significance. We
need an initiative that will open up sectors, like agriculture,
that are lagging behind and overcome obstructions to realize a
breakthrough.
LEADERSHIP IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD
Although it is said that Japan’s relative international position
has declined, it remains a fact that the country is the world’s
third-largest economic power. Even in military terms Japan
ranks fifth or sixth in the world and has a large population of
over 100 million. Although the total land area is small, when
the waters of the country’s exclusive economic zone are
included, Japan’s area is actually sixth in the world. It can
therefore be seen that Japan is a country that does possess
power in various senses, but it is doubtful that it can be said that
Japan has exerted leadership in the international community
commensurate with its stature as the world’s second-largest
economic power for most of the post-war period.
One of the reasons for this lack of leadership is Japan’s
defeat in the Second World War and a history of causing great
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trouble for its close neighbors, which have meant that Japan
has not been able to speak in assertive tones on various issues.
If Japan makes even a minor attempt to raise its voice, there is
a backlash from China. Likewise with Korea, when that
country asks what Japan did there during its 36 years of colonial rule and whether Japan considers that it can now raise its
voice with such righteousness, we are faced with a difficult
situation. It is for reasons such as these that have prevented
Japan from asserting greater leadership, even as it acquired
power and influence that would have made it a suitable leader
under different circumstances.
Furthermore, even in economic aspects Japan was unable to
raise its voice as there were products and services that it felt it
must protect. During the Kennedy and Uruguay rounds of the
negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the Doha round of negotiations at the World Trade
Organization, Japan never once fulfilled a leadership role.
This was because there were things that needed protecting that
prevented Japan from becoming a rule maker. In the field of
international law too, Japan has never acted as a rule maker in
the compilation of international economic rules. However,
these past failures should not become engrained, and it is now
important for Japan to continue to accrete power, restore its
fortunes and devise initiatives that will allow it to act as a rule
maker in the international community.
‘A FREE AND OPEN INTERNATIONAL ORDER’
Now that China is expanding into the maritime sphere it is of
utmost importance to ensure that it understands that the principle of free navigation must absolutely be respected and that
a free and open maritime order is an international imperative.
China considers that historically the South China Sea was
its own possession and it has followed a course in recent years
of sending disguised fishermen to the island and coral reefs
claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, before gradually
bringing these islets under its military protection. China needs
to be made to understand that such actions are not acceptable.
However, when such issues are raised and China is called on
to comply with the laws of the sea as a maritime nation, it
usually opts to engage in bilateral negotiations. Countries like
Vietnam and the Philippines are unable to win any concessions in bilateral talks, which is the reason why China chooses
this option. This too is something that cannot be allowed to
happen. What Japan needs to do is to engage with China in the
context of a free and open maritime order, or a free and open
international trading order. This is something that Japan
cannot do alone, however, and it is likely that approaches to
China will have to be made in cooperation with the USA or
other like-minded nations.
EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY
There is a feeling that the concept of an East Asian
Community (EAC) has been strangely sullied since the administration of former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.
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International public good in the Asia-Pacific era
The Hatoyama Administration announced that the EAC
vision would be advanced in a spirit of fraternity and in a trilateral summit with China and the Republic of Korea, the
then-Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that ‘Japan relies too
strongly on the USA and will now focus on Asia’, indicating
that the axis for Japanese diplomacy would shift from the
Japan – USA alliance to the EAC, or, more specifically China
and the ROK. The then-Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada also
stated at the time that Japan would exclude the USA. Under
normal circumstances in diplomacy it would be necessary to
appropriately pay one’s respects to a country such as the USA,
with which Japan had enjoyed an alliance relationship for
many years, but as the government dispensed with any such
niceties it created a sense of displeasure and distrust in the
USA This situation was brought about by the Hatoyama
Administration’s lean toward the EAC.
The concept of the EAC is ultimately to create an integrated
body in East Asia similar to that in Europe. However, to
hasten toward the creation of such a body would mean making
many concessions that would detract from the ultimate
purpose. It is an issue that demands not to be rushed, but
rather advance carefully, with all parties working together to
iron out any inconsistences or points of conflict relating to individual countries’ interests.
However, diversity in Europe and Asia is tremendously different in nature. In the case of Europe there is a shared religion
in Christianity, a shared experience of the European
Enlightenment, and shared historical culture passed down
from ancient Greece and Rome. Such commonalities are
lacking in the case of Asia. However, I believe that it is fair to
dream that 50 or 100 years hence, the people of Asia may
share a common consciousness as being part of a community
and that this will help to create the basis for a concept such as
the EAC in a natural way. Rushing ahead and forcing through
such a concept now will not work. Furthermore, given that the
USA itself is asserting its position as a Pacific nation, it would
be particularly difficult for Japan to take an approach that
sought to exclude the USA.
East China Sea, stating that its sovereignty and influence
extend over the seas in the same way as land-based territories.
Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea permits limited national rights to natural resources within
a country’s exclusive economic zone, these are sovereign
rights and not sovereignty. China is treating sovereign rights
as sovereignty itself. The basis for this view lies in the difference with how China views the international order.
International laws exist in the modern international community that date back to the time of the Westphalian sovereignty
of the mid-17th century, and the accepted view of the international order based on modern international law is that under
the sovereign state structure all states are, in form, equal
before the law. However, China was not a participant in the
formation of such an order and believes that modern international law is a construct of European design. The Chinese,
however, are a pragmatic people and tend to cherry pick the
laws that suit their national interest. For example, China has
accepted the legal theory concerning continental shelves, but
other legal precedents that do not fit in with national prerogatives are dismissed. China’s view of the international order is
sino-centric, a China-centered pyramidal structure, with
China standing at the apex.
Given such views it is unlikely that China could aspire to
become a global leader under current thinking. This is
because a leader should be expected to uphold the concepts
and philosophies that underpin and are shared by the international community as a whole. In the USA there are universal
values that appeal to the hearts and minds of the people and
are said to be the very concepts of a republic, namely
freedom, respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of
law. These concepts are lacking in China. China espouses the
concept of a ‘Socialist Harmonious World’ and a ‘Socialist
Harmonious Society’, but in philosophical terms it is difficult
to say that this concept is one that represents a universal value.
Is it not unlikely that a ‘harmonious society’ would be able to
lead the world or have a spirit that would win over the people
of the world?
EMERGENCE OF CHINA THE GREATEST
DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY
DISCUSSION
The emergence of China is the greatest diplomatic challenge
for the 21st century. China is a continental power, but it is currently expanding also as a maritime power. As a continental
power China has aimed to ensure its own security by brining
peripheral ethnic groups under its rule and has continue to
expand its territories. China is maintaining this concept as it
moves to expand into the maritime sphere, asserting that the
South China Sea is its own ‘maritime territory’. Moreover, it
is also using the term ‘core interest’ with reference to the
South China Sea, in the same way that it used the term with
regard to territories such as Tibet. China is also using the
same arguments in debate over the Senkaku Islands and the
Q: You have expounded on diplomatic concepts relating to universal values,
describing value-based diplomacy and arc of freedom and prosperity, in
which the role played by strategic diplomatic thought is significant. This
seminar aims to set out a core direction for cooperation in Asia relating to
cancer. However, moving a little away from the issue of cancer itself, I
wonder if you could cast your eye over the position of Japan in Asia and the
role of the U.S. – Japan relations in Asia, and give us your thoughts, based on
your experience in diplomacy, on what international public good Japan could
bring to this region and how this could be oriented towards the perspective of
considering cancer in Asia.If Japan goes on to take a leadership role in Asia,
in what ways do you think it should differentiate this role from that played by
the U.S. to date? Are there any values that Japan could espouse that are different to the international universal values demonstrated by the U.S.?
Yachi: With regard to your first point, I believe that Japan should seek to
value its own history, traditions and culture and identify within those some
things that Japan can teach the world and use to reach out to and appeal to the
Jpn J Clin Oncol 2014;44(Supplement 1)
people of the world concerning the Japanese spirit and national character.
Furthermore, Japan upholds all of the universal values of respect for human
rights, humanitarian actions, democracy and the rule of law, so I therefore
believe that Japan should join the U.S. and Europe in fully advancing these
values. Japan should also cooperate with the countries that could be expected
to have similar respect for universal values and share them in the name of
common interest.However, an extremely difficult question is to identify what
it is that is universal in the Japanese spirit. At the very least, what we can say
from the point of view of countries that are seeking to attain common universal values is that Japan could act as a reliable and trustworthy partner. An
example of the virtues of the Japanese people can be seen in the attitudes that
were displayed in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, where
people put themselves second to the needs of family members, neighbors,
company colleagues and the community as a whole, displaying a spirit of selfsacrifice, discipline and caring. When viewed from other countries, from the
U.S. for example, these acts would indicate that a people who display such
virtues would be reliable partners in efforts to strive towards common
goals.Q: From the perspective of further deepening the Japan – U.S. alliance,
what specific challenges need to be overcome in order to address the issues relating to the right to collective self-defense?
Yachi: The issue of the right to collective self-defense has a long history,
and in order to fully utilize this right it will be necessary to either amend the
Self-Defense Forces Act or achieve the passage the draft bill for the Basic Act
on Security, which has been approved by the General Council of the LDP. If
such legislation is passed it will eliminate the need for politicians to seek to
change interpretations of the Constitution of Japan by simply changing their
responses to parliamentary questions. A measured and careful response is
required.
Q: Do you envisage that the national strategy headquarters you have mentioned would be similar to the bureaucracy-led headquarters structure that is
currently in place?
Yachi: My image is along the lines of the National Security Council (NSC)
of the U.S. In the U.S. the NSC is headed by the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, who has extensive decision-making powers granted
by the President. The NSC in the U.S. is comprised not of politicians, but of
top-level experts from around the country, who assist in policy planning. Such
a structure is also necessary in Japan, and one that does not seek to bring together senior figures from just national government ministries and agencies.
Q: If there were such a national strategy headquarters to make decisions on
diplomatic challenges, what would be the important points in ensuring that the
decisions are taken through to implementation at the working level?
Yachi: Take for example the cases of the TPP and also environmental issues,
if a national strategy headquarters were there to take the big decisions, I think
that the administrative organizations of the Japanese government already have
a high degree of capability in international terms and there are many extremely capable people working for government, who could carry through a decision once it has been made. In that sense there is no great need to change the
current implementation structure. What may be necessary is to increase
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flexibility and mobility within the system, whereby an official from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be easily transferred to the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry, for example.
Q: Why does Japan insist on emphasizing its claims to territories such as
Takeshima, the Senkaku Islands and the Northern Territories? Would it not be
preferable for islands such as these to be administered jointly by Japan and the
ROK, or Japan and China, and for the countries concerned to engage in joint
development?
Yachi: The sea, air and space are all global commons and we must work to
ensure that they are free and open and available for all to utilize. However,
there is a premise that territories and islands come under the sovereignty of
specific nations. Around territories and islands there are territorial waters, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, beyond which are international waters, where vessels of other countries have the right of passage.
However, in response to cases like that of China, which is claiming that the
South China Sea has always been its own maritime territory, there is a necessity to have a free and open maritime order in place. There is currently no
concept that would permit sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, for example, to
be shared.At the same time, we must also take into consideration distrust that
exists between people and also between nations. If a nation does not trust
itself well it is unlikely to trust another nation. If Japan were to propose shared
administration of the Senkaku Islands to China it is unclear how China would
respond. It may dispatch naval forces to occupy the Senkaku Islands and
before you know it China could be claiming that the islands of Okinawa were
also part of its territory. This is not the way to ensure the peaceful administration of disputed islands.People hearing such arguments for the first time might
be inclined to think that China would never seek to lay a claim on Okinawa.
However, it must be remembered that Okinawa was once the Kingdom of the
Ryukyus and paid tribute to both the Satsuma Domain and also to Imperial
China. Indeed the ten families said to be the oldest on Okinawa are also said
to have names of Chinese origin. At the time of the arrival of Commodore
Matthew Perry in Japan in 1853 the Japanese on the main islands spent a
sleepless night due to the presence of Perry’s four steam-powered ships, in
contrast to which the Americans received a rapturous welcome on their arrival
in the Ryukyus. The reason for this difference was that the Ryukyuans practiced an extreme form of diplomacy based on the premise that if a threatening
thing or presence was given a welcome, it would leave without doing anything
bad. The reaction of the mainland Japanese, in contrast, was to seek to repel
the foreigners with all their might. If China were to really press a claim on
Okinawa it might be the case that history would repeat itself and this would be
something Japan would not accept. Putting it in extreme terms the issue is a
very difficult one, as it deals with questions of whether to accept what would
be enforced peace, or whether to seek self-determination and decide what to
do by ourselves. The basic problem is a lack of trust between people and
between nations.
Conflict of interest statement
None declared.