Changes in Professionalism in U. S. State Legislatures
Author(s): James D. King
Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, (May, 2000), pp. 327-343
Published by: Comparative Legislative Research Center
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JAMES D. KING
University of Wyoming
in
Changes
in
U.S.
State
Professionalism
Legislatures
State legislatures in the United States have changed in many ways since the
drive for reform began in the 1960s. Using a modification of Squire's legislative
professionalindex, this analysis demonstratesthat a higherdegree of professionalism
is a general, but not a universal, trait of state legislatures. Disparities among state
legislatures have increased,with some being no more professional today than they
were 30 years ago. On the other hand, states that have removed legal restrictionson
legislative sessions, whose populationshave grown larger,andwhose neighborshave
more institutionally advanced assemblies have developed more professional
legislatures.
in governmenthasbeenthe subjectof frequent
Professionalism
andheateddebateintheUnitedStatesoverthelastdecade.Therecent
movementto limit the termsof legislatorsat boththe nationaland
havebecome
thatlegislatures
statelevelsstemsinpartfromperceptions
full-time assemblies inhabitedby careerpoliticians. The result,
accordingto term-limitadvocates,is thatlegislatorsspendtoo much
to higher
timesecuringtheirpositionsinofficeorseekingadvancement
andtoo littletimeattendingto thepublicinterest.
levelsof government
of statelegislaturescontrastssharplywiththatin
Thiscondemnation
the 1960s,whencriticsof legislaturesfocusedon thelackof modernin stateassemblies.Thespecificcharges
izationandprofessionalism
of inadequacy"range[d]from the qualityof the legislatureas an
institutionto the qualityof the menandwomenwho holdlegislative
office" (Keefe 1966, 52; see also Heard1966;Miller 1965). Such
oftenaccompanied
assessments,
bycallsforlegislativereform,ushered
a
of
in period change.
all statelegislatures
WilliamPound(1992,9) notesthat"Virtually
have experiencedsome measureof professionalizationin the last
(emphasisadded).Thequalifiersinthissentenceraise
quarter-century"
thedegreeandscopeof increased
professionalism
questionsconcerning
in statelegislatures.Inresponse,thispaperaddressesthreequestions:
Towhatextenthavestatelegislaturesbecomemoreprofessionalized?
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXV, 2, May 2000
327
328
James D. King
Have all state legislatures become more professionalized? If the
changesare not uniformacrossstates,whatfactorsaccountfor changes
in the level of professionalism in state legislatures?
Whethercontemporarystate legislatures are more professional
than those of the past is of interestfor reasons extending beyond the
curiosity of scholars and the distress of term-limits advocates. The
reform movement of the 1960s was aimed at improving legislative
outputs,butthe findingshavebeen mixed,the best evidence suggesting
thatprofessionalismaffectsparticularpolicies underspecific conditions
(Carmines 1974; LeLoup 1978; Roeder 1979; Uslaner and Weber
1975). Other effects of professionalism on legislative life are less
ambiguous. The frequency of legislator-citizen contacts, decisionmaking process of the legislature, propensityto alter the committee
structure, and legislative efficiency are functions of the level of
professionalization(Freemanand Hedlund 1993; Squire 1993, 1998;
Thompson 1986). Service in the assembly varies with legislative
professionalism, as member satisfaction, turnover,tenure in office,
and careerchoices relate to levels of compensationand the length of
sessions (Berkman1994; Francis 1985, 1993; Rosenthal 1974; Squire
1988). Even divided controlof the legislative and executive branches
may be a productof legislative professionalism,althoughopinions on
this point differ (Fiorina 1994, 1997; Squire 1997; Stonecash and
Agathangelou 1997). Thus, regardlessof its impact on public policy,
legislative professionalismwarrantsattentionbecause of its considerable impact on the qualities and makeup of American state legislatures. Citizens can expect differences in legislative operationsandthe
career patternsof public officials as their legislatures become more
professionalized.
Legislative Professionalism: Measurement and Change
V.O. Key, Jr. (1961, 8) wrote that "To speak with precision of
publicopinionis a tasknot unlikecomingto gripswiththe Holy Ghost."
A similarproblemhauntsthose who probelegislative professionalism.
What "professionalism"means and what constitutes a "professional
legislature"are difficult questions to answer. As a result, studies of
professionalism in state legislatures have employed a variety of
measures of the concept. There is, however, at least some agreement
regardingthe natureof the beast:
While legislative professionalismcan mean differentthings to differentanalysts, the
concept generally refersto the enhancementof the legislature's capacity to perform
its role in the policy-making process with an expertise, seriousness, and effort com-
Changes in Professionalism
329
parable to other actors in that process. At root, this involves the extent to which a
legislature can command the full attention of its members, provide them with adequate resources to do theirjobs in a mannercomparableto that of other full-time
political actors, and set up organizationsand proceduresthat facilitate lawmaking
(Mooney 1995,48-49).
Operationally, most studies of legislative professionalism
interpret"commandingmembers'attention"and"adequateresources"
in terms of the compensation of legislators, the time available for
conducting legislative business, and the staff to support legislative
operations(ThompsonandMoncrief 1992, 199-202). Forthe purposes
of this inquiry,a measureof legislative professionalismmust be suitable for cross-time comparisonsas well.
Although a numberof measures of legislative professionalism
have been developed (Bowman and Kearney 1988; Citizens' Conference on State Legislatures [CCSL] 1971; Grumm 1970, 1971; Kurtz
1992), Squire's (1992) technique of gauging state legislative professionalism relative to characteristicsof the United States Congress is
most appropriatefor cross-time comparisons.This technique rests on
the notion that Congress represents America's most professional
legislature (Polsby 1975, 297). State legislative compensation, days
in session, and numberof staff membersper legislator for each state
are recalculated as proportionsof correspondingtraits of Congress
and averagedto producethe index. Squire's index is easily interpreted
(state legislative resourcesas a proportionof congressionalresources)
and replicated, and the use of a common standardfacilitates crosstime comparisons (Mooney 1994). These properties make Squire's
proceduresuperiorto othersfor assessing changes in professionalism
in state legislatures.1
For the current analysis, I calculated a modified version of
Squire's index for four sessions spanning three decades: 1963-64,
1973-74, 1983-84, and 1993-94. I selected the 1963-64 session as
the startingpoint because it approximatesthe onset of the reapportionment revolution initiated by the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Bakerv. Carr(1962) andReynoldsv. Sims (1964). Moreover, this session reflects conditionsas they existed when many of the
statelegislatures'harshestcriticswerewritingin the 1960s. The decade
intervals allow for estimating when the most significant changes in
legislative professionalismoccurred.
The index is constructedfromthreecharacteristicsof state legislaturesand Congress, averagedfor the biennium:
1. Compensation(salaryandliving expenses,in constantdollars);
2. Days in session;
330
James D. King
3. Expenditures for services and operations (minus legislator
compensation) per legislator (in constantdollars).
The modification of Squire's index occurs with the third
component, specifically the substitutionof expendituresfor staff and
supportservices in place of the numberof staff members.This substitution is necessary for the simple reason that accurate data on the
number of staff members are not available for the 1960s. Expenditures for services and operationsis a logical substitutebecause it taps
the same underlying concept, has been incorporatedin other professionalism indices (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995; Grumm 1970,
1971; Morehouse 1981; Uslaner and Weber 1975), and correlates
highly with the size of the legislative staff.2 Each component of the
index-compensation, days in session, and expendituresfor support
and operations-is calculated by dividing the value for a given state
by that for Congress in 1963-64. Averagingthese quotientsyields the
state's index score. The use of the 1963-64 characteristicsof Congress provides a static benchmarkfor assessing change in professionalism in subsequentdecades.3
Table 1 presentsthe legislative professionalism index scores for
individualstatesandthe summarystatisticsfor each of the foursessions
examined. Figure 1 plots the highest, lowest, and mean index scores
for each session. Both the summarystatistics and the index scores of
individual states point to the same conclusion: Overall, state legislatureshave become more professionalizedsince the 1960s. The highest
index score for the 1963-64 session was .444, meaning that the
resources of the Massachusetts legislature were roughly 44% of
congressional resources. Californiasubsequentlyreached high index
scores of .869 and .900 for 1983-84 and 1993-94, respectively. The
mean index scores demonstratea similarprogression,rising from .164
in 1963-64 to .251 in 1973-74, to .260 in 1993-94. Stated in relative
terms, the typical state legislaturein 1963-64 operatedwith one-sixth
of the resources of Congress but with one-quarterof congressional
resources in later years.
Table 1 andFigure1 also indicatethatchangesin legislativeprofessionalismhave not beenconsistentacrossstates.Whilethe highestindex
scoresclimbedabove .700,the lowestindexscoresremainedbelow .070.
As a consequence, the range of scores increasedregularly,doubling
between 1963-64 and 1983-84. The standarddeviations also reveal
the greaterdisparitiesamong states, growing in tandemwith increases
in the mean index scores. The greatervariation in legislative professionalism in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s indicates that some states
were more responsive to the calls for reformthan were others.
Changesin Professionalism
331
TABLE 1
Professionalism
Scores of the States
Legislative
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
NorthCarolina
NorthDakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
RhodeIsland
SouthCarolina
SouthDakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Mean
Standarddeviation
Highest
Lowest
Range
1963-64
.110
.224
.183
.076
.410
.167
.124
.164
.101
.153
.199
.068
.233
.129
.160
.127
.135
.178
.110
.136
.444
.346
.151
.164
.228
.066
.199
.112
.079
.132
.115
.364
.155
.062
.210
.136
.193
.286
.135
.174
.097
.061
.190
.057
.213
.094
.098
.119
.275
.048
.164
.088
.444
.048
.396
1973-74
.066
.382
.292
.121
.752
.303
.230
.228
.307
.178
.300
.140
.451
.186
.297
.158
.128
.185
.208
.327
.467
.527
.243
.263
.364
.167
.221
.156
.093
.204
.090
.557
.244
.075
.381
.264
.256
.382
.137
.337
.113
.195
.256
.084
.146
.175
.210
.233
.364
.076
.251
.138
.752
.066
.686
1983-84
.225
.582
.351
.122
.869
.328
.261
.216
.276
.143
.250
.167
.380
.178
.218
.181
.112
.247
.205
.272
.469
.549
.231
.270
.304
.126
.229
.154
.039
.235
.104
.521
.233
.102
.379
.302
.251
.431
.140
.305
.107
.242
.196
.125
.178
.231
.259
.172
.315
.084
.257
.148
.869
.039
.830
1993-94
.142
.447
.279
.152
.900
.273
.315
.193
.346
.136
.315
.166
.382
.190
.238
.178
.165
.247
.158
.267
.333
.503
.245
.215
.295
.148
.246
.198
.061
.369
.086
.655
.281
.102
.432
.281
.247
.403
.194
.208
.108
.182
.226
.101
.276
.243
.296
.163
.331
.074
.260
.148
.900
.061
.839
James D. King
332
FIGURE 1
in
Change Legislative Professionalism
0.9
..
A
0.8 -
-A
,.
'
HighScore
0.7 -
0.6 Q
0.5 0.4 -
MeanScore
0.3 0.2 0.1 -
^ST^^or~~~~~~
~Low
-V --1963-64
--..... ....
1973-74
Score
.. . --. -.
1983-84
-..^C.
1993-94
Session
An examinationof scores for individualstatesreveals substantial
consistency.Seven states-Alaska, California,Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania-rank among the ten most
professional legislaturesin each decade. The Californialegislature,in
fact, rankedbehind only the Massachusettsassembly in 1963-64 and
hadthe most professionallegislaturein the threesubsequentmeasurement periods, a patternthat refutes suggestions that the California
legislature is in a state of decline.4 At the other end of the arrayare
Arkansas,New Hampshire,North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming, statesalways placingamongthe ten leastprofessional.Two
states-Montana and New Mexico-miss qualifying for regular
membershipin the top ten or bottom ten by only one session. These
consistencies are underscoredby the product-momentand rank-order
correlationsamongthe fourmeasurementsof professionalism.As Table
2 shows, all of the correlationsare positive and greaterthan .700. Not
surprisingly,the correlationsbetween adjoining measures are higher
than those between measuresmore distant in time.
Despite this consistency, professionalism scores for individual
states exhibit a variety of patternsof change. Two-thirdsof the states
reachedtheir zeniths of legislative professionalismin the 1973-74 or
333
Changes in Professionalism
TABLE 2
Correlationsbetween ProfessionalismScores across Time
1963-64
1963-64
-
1973-74
1983-84
1993-94
.865
.823
.788
1973-74
.801
-
.930
.908
1983-84
.741
.913
-
.929
1993-94
.755
.850
.893
Note: Pearson's product moment correlationsare in the upper right portion of the
table. Spearman'srankordercorrelationsare in the lower left.
1983-84 session, a patterncorrespondingto Alan Rosenthal's (1996,
173) observation that legislative reform was "well underway or
substantially achieved in the 1980s." Seven states experienced
continuousgrowthin the level of professionalismacross the fourtime
periods, achieving their highest levels of professional in 1993-94. In
sharp contrast is New Mexico, which was at its "most professional"
level in 1963-64. Irregularpatterns,with rising and falling professionalismscores intermixed,areevident in most states.By the measure
employedhere,the legislaturesof fourstates-Georgia, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire,and New Mexico-were less professional in 199394 than in 1963-64.
The fact that most states reached or had passed their peak of
legislative professionalism in 1983-84 does not mean that absolute
resources for state legislatures declined in the decade that followed.
In fact, "moreof everything"was the normfor state legislaturesin the
1990s. Expendituresfor supportand operationsper legislator in constant dollars increased between 1983-84 and 1993-94 in 43 states;
expendituresin currentdollars increased in all states except Alaska.
Twenty-six states met as frequently or more frequently in 1993-94
relative to 1983-84. Compensationin constant dollars increased in
only 14 states,but legislatorsin 39 statesreceived largerpaychecks in
1993-94 (reflecting increases in currentdollars). An examinationof
the mean scores for index components shows fairly steady increases
in legislator compensationand expendituresfor staff and support.
JamesD. King
334
FIGURE2
in
Change Index Components
0.5
Days
0.4 -
0
0.3-
...
A
--A
A
Compensation
0.2-
0.1
0
..
.
Expenditures
1-4
1-4
1-4
1-
1963-64
1973-74
1983-84
1993-94
Session
Legislative Professionalism: Explaining Change
The varyingdegreesof changein legislative professionalismlead
to ourthirdresearchquestion:Whatfactorsaccountfor changesin levels
of professionalismin statelegislatures?A set of regressionanalyseswith
our repeatedmeasuresof legislative professionalismforming a series
of two-wave panels provides an answer to that question. The index
scores for 1973-74, 1983-84, and 1993-94 serve as dependentvariables. Following recommendedproceduresfor panel designs, initial
values of the dependentvariableare controlledby includingthe index
score for 1963-64 in the model as an independentvariable. This procedure is preferableto defining the dependent variable in terms of
change (Yt-Yt,), in which case the change scores are not independent
of the scores at t-1 (Bohrnstedt1969; Markus 1979, 45-48).
Legislative professionalism can be viewed as a policy output,
the result of willful choices made by a state's elected officials and
citizens (Mooney 1995). As such, the vast literatureon state politics
points to the social andeconomic characteristicsof the state's population (e.g., Dye 1966;MorganandWilson 1990), the institutionalstructureof the politicalandgovernmentalsystems (e.g., Sharkansky1967),
and the policies of neighboring states (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990;
Changes in Professionalism
335
Gray 1973) as influences on state policy outputs.Most analyses using
governmentalstructureas a dependentvariable seek to explain interstate differences on a characteristicvariable,but there are exceptions.
Keith J. Mueller (1985) examinedchanges in gubernatorialpowers in
1960 and 1982, identifying the state's tendency toward policy
innovativeness and change in state wealth (as measuredby per capita
income) as the key variables associated with change. Bearing more
directly on the current study, ChristopherZ. Mooney (1995) used
Grumm's index based on 1963-65 data and Morehouse's (1981)
similarly constructedindex for 1970-71 as a two-wave panel study.
Five factorswere associatedwith increasedlegislativeprofessionalism:
change in populationlevel, change in populationheterogeneity,change
in restrictions on the length of legislative sessions, the difference
between the professionalismof other states in the region and that of a
particularstate at the initial time period, and the priorlevel of professionalism in the state.
Mueller's and Mooney's studies suggest a model combining
social and economic factors, institutionalcharacteristics,and policy
diffusion. Social changes-more specifically, shifts in the size and
compositionof a state's population-alter the complexity of problems
facing the legislature;a logical response is to increase the amount of
time and resources devoted to legislative business. Since longer
sessions and greater support cost more money, a growing financial
base means that a state can afford a more professional legislature.
Often the number of days the legislature is in session is tied to
restrictionsplaceduponit by the stateconstitutionor statutes;removing
these restrictionsmay well be necessary to initiate change in professionalism. Finally, states often look to other states, typically those
close by, for direction in policy development. In deciding to provide
increased resources for the legislature, a state is most prone to using
professionalism in neighboringstates as the standard.Thus, a state is
more likely to increase its legislature's resources if the level of
professionalism is lower than that of other states in the region.
The model for assessingchangein professionalismis specifiedas:
Y = b, + blP + b2H +b3W + b4R + bD +b6Y6 + b7S + e
where Ytrepresentsthe legislative professionalismof the state at time
t(1973-74, 1983-84, or 1993-94); P representschange in population
level between 1963-64 and time t; Hrepresents change in population
heterogeneitybetween 1960 and time t; Wrepresentschange in state
wealth between 1963-64 andtime t; R representschange in restrictions
336
JamesD. King
on session length between 1963-64 and time t; D representsthe differentialbetween professionalismin otherstates of the region andthe
state in 1963-64; Y63representslegislative professionalismin the state
in 1963-64; S representsa dummy variable for states of the South;
and et representsthe errorterm. Details of the operationalizationof
the independentvariablesare providedin the appendix.)The dummy
variable indicatingthe southernstates accountsfor the unique characteristics (e.g., political cultureand growthpatterns)of that region and
theirinfluenceon policy outputs,includinglegislative professionalism
(Mooney 1995; Morganand Wilson 1990; Tuckerand Herzik 1986).
Failureto accountfor these factorsis a form of specification errorthat
produces biased and inconsistentestimates of the regression parameters (HanushekandJackson1977;PindyckandRubinfeld 1976). The
model is estimatedusing ordinaryleast-squaresregression.All regression coefficients are hypothesizedto be positive except those for the
variable designatingthe states of the South.
Table 3 displays the regression estimates. Overall, the model
performs well: All regression coefficients are in the hypothesized
direction,the resultsparallelMooney's (1995) analysis,and,as is typical for this type of analysis, a high proportionof the variation in the
dependentvariableis explained.The patternsregardingthe statistical
significance of the independentvariables are fairly uniform in the
estimations for 1983-84 and 1993-94.
Four variables demonstratethe most substantialand consistent
impacts on legislative professionalism.5First, as expected in a panel
design, the initial level of professionalismaffects subsequentlevels.
The pattern of growth in legislative professionalism noted in the
previous section is reflected in the positive and increasingly larger
coefficients. Second, states experiencinggreaterincreases in population level respondto the pressureby devoting more resources to the
legislature.Third,removing legal restrictionson the length of the legislative session permits increases in professionalismby allowing the
assembly to meet more days and, in most states, increase legislator
compensationthroughthe per diem for living expenses. Finally, there
is a diffusion of legislative professionalism,as the difference between
a state's professionalism and that of other states in the region in the
1960s affects subsequentlevels of professionalism.As with a variety
of policies, statesadapttheirlegislativestructuresto become more like
theirneighbors.Thethreeremainingvariables-geographicregion,change
in populationheterogeneity,and change in statewealth-affect professionalismin the mannerexpectedbuthave coefficientsreachingacceptable levels of statisticalsignificancein only one estimationof the model.
Changes in Professionalism
337
TABLE 3
Panel Analysis of Legislative Professionalism
(standarderrorsin parentheses)
Variable
1973-74
1983-84
1993-94
.166
(.108)
.118*
(.059)
.085'
(.044)
1.427
(1.109)
1.874"
(.722)
1.020
(.696)
Change in state wealth
.005
(.033)
.029"
(.010)
.008
(.020)
Change in restrictionson session length
.039
(.025)
.038*
(.023)
.046*
(.025)
Regional professionalismdifferential
.258
(.202)
.476'
(.227)
.878'"
(.249)
Legislative professionalism(1963-64)
1.579'*
(.213)
1.897***
(.241)
2.117***
(.263)
South
-.023
(.032)
-.077
(.043)
-.030
(.043)
Constant
-.089
-.138
-.169
Change in populationlevel
Change in populationheterogeneity
R2
SEE
F
.784
.069
21.78**
.783
.074
21.64***
.738
.082
16.89***
Note: Main entries areunstandardizedregressioncoefficients. Significance levels are
based on one-tailedtests.
p < .05; p < .01; **p < .001.
The anomaly in the panel analysis concerns the 1973-74
legislative session. This estimationof the model yields a slightlyhigher
R2 and lower standarderrorof the estimate, yet only one variablethe level of legislative professionalismin 1963-64-has a statistically
significant regression coefficient. This may reflect a more general,
across-the-boardincrease in legislative professionalism in the first
decade of the reform movement. In subsequentyears, the change in
professionalism comes in response to specific factors in the socioeconomic, institutional,and political environments.
338
James D. King
Conclusion
Alan Rosenthal(1993, 125) observes that"State legislaturesare
becoming like the U.S. House of Representatives." The analysis
reportedhere substantiatesthat conclusion. In the 1960s, the average
state legislatureoperatedwith 17%of the resourcesof Congress. That
figure has subsequentlyrisen to 25%. Whereasthe most professional
state legislature of the 1960s functioned with less than half of the
congressional resources, today's has nearly three-fourths of the
resources of the national legislature. But a higher degree of professionalism is a general, not a universal, trait of American state
legislatures.Disparitiesamong state legislatureshave increased,with
some legislaturesbeing no more professionaltoday thanthey were 30
years ago. Meanwhile, states that have removed legal restrictionson
legislative sessions, whose populationshave grown larger,andwhose
neighbors have more institutionally advanced assemblies have
developed more professional legislatures.
Whether the heightened professionalism of American state
legislatures is considered a disturbingor desirable trend rests upon
one's perspectiveof the political process. Those who distrustgovernment andcareerpoliticianswill find little comfortin the pattern.Those
who turnto state legislaturesfor solutions to society's problemsmay
be encouragedby the advancementsof the past three decades. In any
event, it is doubtfulthat state legislatureswill returnto the conditions
of the 1960s. Even if a particularlegislature's resources do not grow
substantially, the compensation of legislators, time in session, and
supportfor legislative operationsare unlikely to be diminished.
James D. King is Professor of Political Science, Universityof
Wyoming,Laramie, Wyoming82071-3197.
APPENDIX
VariableMeasurementand Data Sources
I. Componentsof the ProfessionalismIndex
Compensationfor state legislators is the mean annualcompensationin salary
and allowance for living expenses (per diem or flat rate) during the session. Living
expenses are includedbased on Sollars's (1994) finding that legislatorshave used this
as a means of augmentingtheir compensationdespite limits on salaries. Figures are
adjustedfor inflationusing the ConsumerPrice Index (1963=100). Compensationfor
membersof Congress is the annualsalary, as reportedin Congressional Quarterly's
Guide to Congress (1991, 642).
Changes in Professionalism
339
Days in session is the numberof legislative days in session, averaged for the
biennium.Both regularand special sessions are included.Reportsof session length in
calendardays are convertedon a ratio of five legislative days to seven calendardays.
When differences exist between the upper and lower chambers,the mean numberof
days is used. In the few instancesin which statesreportedmeeting in session for most
or all of the year (Colorado 1973-74; Michigan 1983-84, 1993-94; Wisconsin 199394), estimatesof session lengthwere made based on the most recentreportsof legislative days. Congressional data are drawn from Orstein, Mann, and Malbin (1996,
Tables 6-1 and 6-2).
Expendituresfor staff and support is the mean annual expenditures for the
legislative branch,excluding expendituresfor legislatorcompensation,divided by the
numberof legislators. State data are from the United States Census Bureau's State
GovernmentFinances (various years). Figures are adjusted for inflation using the
ConsumerPrice Index (1963=100). Congressionaldataarefrom Orstein, Mann, and
Malbin (1996, Table 5-9).
II. IndependentVariables
Threevariablesreflectthe state'ssocial andeconomiccharacteristics.Population
level is the naturallog of statepopulationin thousandsfor 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990
(U.S. Census Bureau).Population heterogeneityis the Sullivan index of population
diversity. State scores for 1960 and 1980 are taken from Morganand Wilson (1990).
I calculatedthe scores for 1970 and 1990. State wealth is the gross state productper
capitain billions of dollarsfor 1963, 1973, 1983, and 1993 (FriedenbergandBeemiller
1997; Renshaw, Trott, and Friedenberg 1988), adjusted for inflation (CPI for
1963=100).
Restrictionson session length indicates statutoryor constitutionalrestrictions
on the length of the legislative session eitherby limits on the numberof days permitted
or by the structureof salaryor reimbursementfor expenses, as reportedin the Book of
the States (Council of State Governments,various years). The variable for change
equals 1 if the stateremovedrestrictionsbetween 1963-64 andthe session in question,
0 if therewas no change in restrictions,and-1 if restrictionswere addedafter 1963-64.
The diffusion of policy innovationsis representedin the model by the variable
regionprofessionalismdifferential.This is the meanindex score for 1963-64 for states
of the region (using the Census Bureau'snine regional divisions), excluding the state
in question, minus the state's index score for 1963-64 (see Mooney 1995).
NOTES
An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the 1997 annualmeeting of the
SouthernPoliticalScience Associationin Norfolk,Virginia.I wish to extendmy thanks
to WayneFrancis,PatriciaFreeland,BurkeGrandjean,andthe editorand reviewersof
LSQ for theirmany helpful comments.
1. The reliance upon factor analysis in computing the Grummand Bowman/
Keamey indices makesthemunsuitablefor cross-timecomparisons.The value for any
James D. King
340
given state is relativeto those of otherstates in the time periodratherthanto an objective standardof professionalism.Consequently,assessmentsof change would rely on
the unrealisticassumptionsof nearconstantvarianceandlegislativeperformanceacross
time. See Mooney 1994 for a thoroughdiscussion of the strengthsand weaknesses of
the differentmeasuresof legislative professionalism.
2. Although the time frames do not match perfectly, the correlationsbetween
staff data for 1977, 1988, and 1996 (provided by the National Conference of State
Legislaturesin privatecommunicationwith the author)and expendituresfor services
and operationsper legislatorfor 1973-74, 1983-84, and 1993-94 (currentdollars)are
as follows: 1970s: r = .868; 1980s: r = .921; and 1990s: r= .922.3.
The legislative professionalismindex scores computedfor this analysis correlate quite highly with those presentedin otheranalyses, with the one exception of the
CCSL 1971 rankings,which tap a somewhat differentcharacteristicof state legislatures (Mooney 1994):
1963-64
Grumm
CCSL
Morehouse
Bowman and Keamey
Squire
Kurtz
.838
-.279
.770
.715
.894
.766
1973-74
1983-84
.808
-.426
.894
.799
.905
.782
.790
-.371
.896
.808
.909
.754
1993-94
.784
-.469
.931
.821
.879
.767
All correlationsare Pearson's r except for those with the CCSL index (which
are Spearman'srank-ordercoefficients) and Kurtz's categorizations(which are eta
coefficients). The correlationswith the CCSL rankingsare negative because lower
scores signify the most professionallegislatureson the CCSL rankings.
4. The factors associatedwith such assessmentsare not simplistic and concern
issues other than professionalism.For a discussion of the changes in the California
legislature,see Rosenthal 1996.
5. The coefficient for change in restrictionson session length in 1983-84 falls
slightly outside the customarylevel of statisticalsignificance with a probabilitylevel
greaterthan .05 but less than .06 (one-tailedtest). This difference is too small to have
a bearingon the substantivesignificance of these variables(Gold 1969).
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