West Africa Seed Alliance
Case Study
!!!!!!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
16 June 2011
Steve Schmida of SSG Advisors LLC authored this report to the United States Agency for International Development
under IQC Number REE-I-00-07-00027-00.
DISCLAIMER
The author’s views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for
International Development or the United States Government.
!
PREFACE
!
The history of the West Africa Seed Alliance (WASA) dates back to 2005 when staff at the
USAID/WA Mission began to explore the idea of a partnership with seed companies to support
the emergence of a healthy private sector seed industry in the West Africa region, building on
some early successes in East Africa. As a partnership, WASA is an ambitious undertaking: it
brings together industry, donors (both public and private) and a regional institution in a
collaborative effort to focus resources on improving farmer access to quality seed in West Africa.
As such, WASA makes an excellent subject for a Case Study to provide alliance-builders with a
real life example of an alliance.
This Case Study is based upon background research, document review and more than 30
interviews with resource partners, implementing partners, beneficiaries and other key
stakeholders, both past and present. A small team comprised of USAID/WA, USAID/ODP/PSA
staff and the author conducted these interviews in December 2010 and January 2011. In addition,
a technical expert from the Bureau for Food Security (BFS) provided valuable insight and context.
While the author has sought to present material and input from all parties, the Case Study is
written with USAID staff as its primary intended audience. Therefore, there is a greater
emphasis on the particular role that USAID played in the Alliance. It is important to note that
this document is meant to serve as a learning tool regarding USAID public-private alliances, not
as a promotional publication or as an evaluation. As such, it is written to examine events in a
matter-of-fact manner and not promote any one organization over another. The Case Study is
also not meant to provide ‘easy answers’ or specific recommendations, rather it is meant to
engage prospective alliance builders in a real life situation and present how the different parties
in WASA addressed the challenges they faced. Alliances involving multiple resource partners,
implementing partners and beneficiaries are complex undertakings and there is no one ‘formula’
for success. Accordingly, this Case Study engages readers in the complexities that those involved
in WASA have faced and provides opportunities for readers to consider how they might proceed
when faced with similar circumstances, challenges and opportunities.
The WASA Case Study is divided into four modules that generally correspond to the different
phases of WASA as an alliance: Introduction and Scoping; Private Sector Identification and
Engagement; Definition/Formation (Procurement and MOU Preparation); and Alliance
Implementation and Measuring Renewing. The following graphic provides a rough timeline:
In addition to the four
primary modules, an
Instructor’s Guide has been
prepared so that the Case
Study can be integrated into
a variety of USAID training
programs. By breaking the
Case Study into modules,
users can focus on those
elements of the alliance
building and implementation
process that are of most
interest, or review the Case
Study as a whole.
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
!
While the evaluation team interviewed a wide range of stakeholders and has sought to present
the resulting material in a comprehensive manner, the WASA Case Study should not be
considered definitive. Although the author has sought to verify all information contained in this
Case Study, in a complex activity stretching over six years with numerous and changing actors
some errors in timeline or events are inevitable. Therefore, USAID/ODP/PSA and the author
welcome additional input from stakeholders to clarify actions or the sequences of events.
Lastly, the author would like to thank ODP/PSA, USAID/West Africa, the Bureau for Food
Security and all of those interviewed in the development of this Case Study. I very much
appreciate the time they invested in this process with me and admire the dedication of so many
individuals and organizations focused on the seed challenge across West Africa.
Steve Schmida
SSG Advisors, LLC
May 2011
!
3!
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
!
Table of Contents
!
PREFACE'
2!
WASA'KEY'ACTORS'
5!
GLOSSARY'OF'TERMS'AND'ACRONYMS'
6!
MODULE'1:'INTRODUCTION'AND'SCOPING'
7!
MODULE'2:'PRIVATE'SECTOR'IDENTIFICATION'AND'ENGAGEMENT'
11!
MODULE'3:'PROCUREMENT'AND'MOU'PREPARATION'PROCESS'
15!
MODULE'4:'ALLIANCE'IMPLEMENTATION'
20!
INSTRUCTOR’S'GUIDE'
25!
!
!
4!
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
!
WASA KEY ACTORS
!
African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA): Established in 2000 and based in Nairobi,
AFSTA is the regional seed industry association focused on developing private seed
enterprises across the continent. AFSTA serves as a resource partner in WASA and is
also the recipient of USAID/WA funding to support its West Africa office and the
WASA Coordinator.
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA): Established by the Gates and
Rockefeller Foundations, AGRA, an NGO based in Nairobi, is dedicated to a vision of a
food secure and prosperous Africa. AGRA is a resource partner in WASA and a
signatory to the WASA MOU.
Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA): An American NGO and USAID
implementing partner, based in Washington, DC. CNFA has a focus on agro-business
and was the major sub-recipient under the SEED Project.
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): The primary regional
governmental body in the West Africa region and a principal interlocutor for
USAID/WA. ECOWAS is a resource partner and signed the WASA MOU.
International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT): An
international agricultural research and development organization, focused on subSaharan Africa and South Asia. ICRISAT is the prime implementing partner of the
USAID/WA SEED Project under WASA.
Monsanto: A Fortune 500 company based in St Louis, Missouri focused on seed,
biotechnology and chemicals. Monsanto has been an active participant in WASA’s
steering committee.
Pioneer: A subsidiary of DuPont, Pioneer is one of the world’s largest developers of
hybrid seed. Pioneer provided support to WASA through AFSTA and played an active
role on the WASA steering committee.
Regional Alliance Builder (RAB): A member of the USAID/WA Mission Team tasked
with assisting Missions across the region to build public-private alliances.
USAID/West Africa (USAID/WA): USAID regional mission in West Africa.
!
5!
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
!
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
CAADP
DFID
GMO
IFPRI
MDG
NGO
OECD
PASS
USAID/WA
WASA
!
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
Department for International Development (UK)
Genetically Modified Organism
International Food Policy Research Institute
Millennium Development Goals
Non-governmental organization
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):
Program for Africa Seed Systems (AGRA)
USAID West Africa Regional Mission
West African Seed Alliance
6!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION AND SCOPING
The$purpose$of$this$module$is$to$provide$readers$with$a$brief$introduction$to$the$development$
and$business$challenges$regarding$seed$in$West$Africa.$$It$is$meant$to$lay$the$conceptual$and$
contextual$foundation$for$the$subsequent$modules.$$Upon$completion$of$this$section$readers$
will:$
1. Become$aware$of$the$importance$of$highBquality$seed$in$addressing$food$security$in$
Africa.$
2. Understand$challenges$and$opportunities$that$the$seed$sector$in$West$Africa$presents$
to$private$sector$companies.$
3. Begin$to$define$the$potential$interests$and$goals$that$USAID$and$the$private$sector$
may$share$that$could$serve$as$the$basis$for$an$alliance.$
Development Challenge
Between now and 2050 the human population is expected to increase by nearly 30%,
resulting in 2.3 billion more mouths to feed – a huge challenge to governments around
the world. The food security challenge is particularly vexing in West Africa, where low
incomes and high population growth rates mean that agricultural productivity needs to
grow at 6.8% annually to both maintain nutrition levels and
meet poverty reduction targets outlined in the Millennium
“The$president$and$I$
Development Goals (MDGs). Agricultural productivity not
intend$to$focus$new$
only improves food security, it increases economic growth.
attention$on$food$security$
According to a study conducted by the International Food
so$that$developing$nations$
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), doubling staples
can$invest$in$food$
production significantly increases food security, reduces
production,$affordability,$
consumer food prices by 25% and producer prices by 10%.
accessibility,$education$
The same study concluded that the elimination of tariff and
and$technology.”$–US$
non-tariff barriers to trade combined with modest increases
Secretary$of$State$Hillary$
Clinton$
in crop yields would lift 46 million people in West Africa
out of poverty.1
Increasing agricultural production can be achieved via two primary means. First,
countries can increase the amount of land under cultivation to boost output. While this
approach appears straightforward, it is fraught with political, economic, environmental
and social challenges. The second approach is to boost yields, i.e. tons/hectare
produced, through improved use of inputs (seed, fertilizer, etc) and techniques. Yields
across West Africa are substantially lower than those of other developing countries.
Many agricultural experts agree that increasing yields is the most effective way to
bolster production and, therefore, reduce poverty across West Africa.
Seed, particularly seed for staple crops, represents a critical input in improving crop
yields. While there have been many efforts over the last four decades to improve the
quality of seed and its availability in the region, most efforts have focused on the
development of new varieties through public sector institutions. Certified hybrid seed
and GMOs, generally produced by seed companies, results in far higher yields, but may
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Data!taken!from!the!USAID/WA!Feed!the!Future!FY10!Implementation!Plan!and!the!USAID/BFS!website.!
!
7!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
require the farmer to purchase seed each year. If farmers have access to higher quality
hybrid seed and make use of those seeds, they can contribute to increases in per hectare
yields resulting in increased production and a reduction in poverty for West African
farmers and consumers alike.
Private Sector Context
Seed is a big business. According to the International Seed Federation, the global market
for seed was over $42 billion in 2010. In OECD countries, the seed industry is the focal
point of several Fortune 100 companies, including ADM, DuPont (operating under the
Pioneer brand) and Monsanto and Syngenta. In addition to owning the intellectual
property on a wide range of high yield hybrid seed varieties, these large firms possess
enormous research and development capability. These companies also have proven
adept at developing distribution networks in emerging market economies around the
world. They possess high-quality training and capacity building extension programs for
farmers, agro-dealers and other links in the seed value chain.
Many of the large seed companies have struggled to break into the West African market
– one of the last untapped markets for seed. They have instead focused their regional
market development efforts in Eastern and Southern Africa, where agricultural practices
and market regulations are more favorable for their seed products. By contrast, West
Africa is a diverse region comprised of a large number of relatively small markets
(Nigeria being the notable exception), making it difficult for seed companies – local and
multinational – to achieve the critical mass needed to develop and distribute quality
hybrid seed on a profitable basis in West Africa. These issues made it difficult for seed
companies to grow in the sub-region. According to one industry representative, “we
need a structured seed industry in West Africa.”
While seed is seen by many observers as vital to any agricultural renaissance in West
Africa, it is not without significant
controversy. Despite substantial
“Social$and$economic$risks$from$GM$crops$are$
scientific evidence to the contrary, many
equally$weighty.$They$will$increase$dependence$on$
West African governments and
outside$technologies,$marginalize$farmers$from$R&D,$
environmental NGOs have been highly
and$consequently$exacerbate$the$social$and$
skeptical of genetically modified
economic$difficulties$already$affecting$Africa’s$small$
organisms (GMOs) and hybrid seed.
farmers."$–GRAIN$(Genetic$Resources$Action$
These organizations and governments
International)$
have strong reservations about the
impacts of these new varieties of seed on
biodiversity and the broader environment. In addition, some NGOs object to the
practice of selling hybrid seed to smallholder farmers, who traditionally have relied on
saved seed. Further, the business practices of some multinational seed companies have
raised questions regarding the ethics of hybrid seed and GMOs in developing countries.2
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!For!example,!in!2009!Monsanto!was!accused!of!dumping!poorOquality!hybrid!seed!on!smallholder!farmers!in!
South!Africa,!resulting!in!crop!failure!and!loss!of!livelihood.!!In!the!US,!“Food!Inc.,”!a!2009!documentary!film,!
highlights!controversial!business!practices!by!the!major!seed!companies.!
!
8!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
For its part, USAID takes an evidence-based approach to the issue of GMOs, focusing on
the available scientific data regarding the benefits and risks of GMOs. Using this
approach, USAID’s own analysis of the available data has generally supported greater
use of hybrid seed and GMOs as one of the most effective ways of boosting staple crop
yields. USAID has, therefore, generally supported expanded use of hybrid and GMO
seed in its programming, both at a policy level and on the ground with farmers, research
institutions and agro-dealers.
USAID/West Regional Mission Context
While USAID has worked on seed research and development for many years, the
Agency increased its focus on private sector seed systems starting in the early 2000s. As
a part of this new focus, USAID became interested in the notion of an alliance in seed for
several reasons. First, as the magnitude of the food security challenge became
increasingly apparent USAID began focusing greater and greater attention on food
security, particularly in Africa. Within USAID, there was a growing recognition that
seed comprised a critical component of the food security puzzle. In that regard, creating
a viable and dynamic market for private sector seed is critical for meeting the food
security challenge in West Africa as seed companies have the incentive, capabilities and
resources to get high-quality seed into the hands of farmers, large and small. The
international seed companies had the resources, experience and the business interest in
helping create that market.
Secondly, USAID as an agency began focusing greater attention on private sector
partnerships. In 2001, USAID launched its Global Development Alliance, a concerted
effort to promote partnerships with the private sector around the world. In 2007, thenAdministrator Henrietta Fore called on the Agency to triple the value of partnerships
with the private sector. This announcement greatly increased the interest in partnering
with the private sector at all levels of the Agency.
Thirdly, USAID was well-positioned to develop a partnership because of its strong
presence in West Africa and the depth of its technical expertise. USAID/West Africa
(USAID/WA) is a regional Mission, based in Accra, charged with working alongside the
country-level Missions and facilitating regional programming (as well as programming
in non-presence countries). As a regional Mission, USAID/WA works closely with the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on a range of program
objectives ranging from trade to agriculture to peace and security. USAID/WA had
been working in the seed sector through grants and contracts for many years. However,
with the increased focus on seed as a critical element to addressing food insecurity along
with the increased emphasis on partnerships with the private sector, USAID/WA’s
Regional Alliance Builder (RAB) and the Africa Bureau (AFR) began to consider whether
a partnership in seed in West Africa could be built. After all, seed looked to be an ideal
focal point for public-private collaboration: it is an essential piece of the food security
puzzle and there are companies with a clear business interest in seeing the market for
quality seed expanded.
It is in this context that what became known as the West Africa Seed Alliance (WASA)
was first conceived as an idea within USAID in 2005 following a conference on the
future of agriculture in Africa. USAID/WA began asking itself how it might collaborate
!
9!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
with the private sector to increase farm productivity through the use of high quality
seeds.
Learning Questions
1. From USAID’s perspective, what might be the benefits of partnering with the
private sector on seed in West Africa? What are the potential risks?
2. Why would seed companies be interested in working in partnership with
USAID? What types of value and resources might USAID bring to the table?
3. Are there other kinds of partners – either public sector or private – that you think
could add value to a partnership in seed?
!
10!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
WASA CASE STUDY
MODULE 2: PRIVATE SECTOR IDENTIFICATION AND ENGAGEMENT
The$purpose$of$this$section$is$to$describe$how$USAID$identified$and$engaged$potential$alliance$
partners.$$At$the$conclusion$of$this$section,$readers$will$be$able$to:$
• Understand$how$USAID/WA,$having$identified$a$possible$alliance$opportunity,$conducted$
outreach$with$the$private$sector;$and$
• Appreciate$some$of$the$potential$opportunities$and$risks$of$private$sector$collaboration.$
!
!
Having decided to pursue an alliance in seed in West Africa, USAID/WA began to reach
out to potential partners in the private sector and beyond. In 2005, the USAID/WA
Regional Alliance Builder (RAB), himself a specialist in the seed sector, conducted some
preliminary informal research with companies, research institutes and NGOs involved
in the seed sector. Initial inquiries seemed to indicate a real opportunity for
collaboration with the private sector. Based on that positive initial feedback, the RAB
circulated a three-page ‘concept note’ in late 2005 that described potential areas for
collaboration in developing a private sector seed industry in West Africa. The concept
note identified three key potential partners in a future seed alliance: seed companies,
foundations and other public sector organizations. Initial feedback within USAID/WA
and the private sector to the concept note was positive. The Mission began a concerted
effort to build an alliance in seed beginning in 2006.
Seed Companies
USAID/WA reached out to US and international seed companies as potential partners,
including companies such as Monsanto, Pioneer, Kemseed and Syngenta. These
companies were a natural starting point for USAID/WA, which believed these
companies had the technology and
expertise that could help boost yields
“In$farm$communities$around$the$world,$
through the use of the companies’
advanced$hybrid$and$biotechnology$seeds$are$
helping$farm$families$produce$more,$earn$more$
seeds and input products. Indeed,
and$lead$improved$lives.$It’s$about$more$than$
based on the scientific data available,
just$improved$nutrition.$When$farmers$produce$
USAID staff believed strongly that the
more,$they$not$only$have$enough$for$their$
multinational seed companies hybrid
families,$but$they$can$sell$the$surplus$harvest$at$
seed and GMO products were essential
market.”$MMonsanto<Africa$website$
to improving staple crop yields in the
region. These companies have been
trying for many years to develop markets in West Africa without success. A
combination of small markets, low demand and regulatory constraints had limited the
ability of the companies to penetrate the West African market. Moreover, in West Africa
many were suspicious of GMOs offered by American and some European firms.
USAID’s outreach to the seed companies consisted primarily of one-on-one meetings
with company representatives based in the region and in Nairobi – a major hub for agrobusiness in Africa. The response to USAID’s idea of an alliance was quite positive.
Many of the companies contacted, including Monsanto, Pioneer (a DuPont subsidiary)
and KEMSeed, expressed strong interest in partnering with USAID on developing the
private sector seed industry in West Africa. According to one industry representative,
“We were eager to work with USAID from the start. USAID has a strong presence in the
!
11!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
West Africa where we hoped to expand the seed industry in the region.” The companies
were also eager to make their technology and market know-how available in support of
promoting a viable private sector market for seed in the region. In addition to the seed
companies themselves, USAID/WA also reached out to the African Seed Trade
Association (AFSTA), the regional seed industry body, comprised of both multinational
and African seed firms. USAID had worked with and supported AFSTA extensively in
East Africa over the last several years. AFSTA expressed strong interest in partnering,
but had only a small number of members in West Africa and no formal presence in the
sub-region at the time
Foundations
While USAID was beginning to look at building a partnership in seed in West Africa, an
exciting new initiative to strengthen agriculture in Africa was beginning to take shape.
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA),
based in Nairobi, was established as a $400 million
“AGRA$is$a$partnershipM
based$organization$that$
initiative of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
works$across$the$African$
Rockefeller Foundation and the UK Department for
continent$to$help$millions$
International Development (DFID). Inspired by the
of$smallMscale$farmers$and$
Green Revolution in agriculture in India in the 1960s and
their$families$lift$
70s, AGRA’s goal is to promote an African-led Green
themselves$out$of$poverty$
Revolution, which will reduce food insecurity by 50% in
and$hunger.”$M$Alliance$for$
20 countries across the continent. In terms of its program
a$Green$Revolution$in$
model, AGRA is primarily a grant-making institution,
Africa$website$
funding African companies, NGOs and research
institutions. AGRA focuses heavily on smallholder
farmers as its key target beneficiary – a position that was at odds with the multinational
seed companies. While AGRA’s overall level of funding was quite substantial, its core
donors and board had made it clear that the organization would need to diversify its
funding base in the future.
It is important to note that in 2006-07 AGRA had not yet defined its stance on genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). Although AGRA had not yet taken a position on GMOs,
the young organization was already facing significant scrutiny from international media
and environmental NGOs regarding its policies on GMOs. According to a senior
representative of AGRA, “We were getting a lot of negative press at that time accusing
us of all sorts of things related to GMOs and the large seed companies.”
USAID/WA believed that AGRA could be an ideal partner in West Africa: it had
substantial financial resources of its own, it had high visibility (the Chair of AGRA is
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) and its organizational mandate was highly
compatible with that of USAID’s. However, in previous dialog with USAID in West
Africa and elsewhere, AGRA had expressed some skepticism regarding possible
collaboration with USAID. To address that skepticism, USAID/WA reached out to
AGRA and held a series of exploratory meetings regarding a possible alliance to
promote a private sector seed industry in Africa. To USAID/WA’s surprise, AGRA’s
response to the idea of an alliance was highly positive.
!
12!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
Public Sector Partners
Outside of the private sector, USAID/WA has a strong relationship with the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – the main regional inter-governmental
body dealing with economic and
agricultural integration. ECOWAS has
“[ECOWAS$Agricultural$policy]$aims$at$ensuring$
cooperated with USAID/WA on many
that$agriculture$is$not$only$productive$and$
programs over the years, including
competitive$within$markets$in$the$community$and$
those in agriculture. USAID believed
internationally$but$also$guarantees$food$security$
and$serves$as$a$source$of$decent$income$for$its$
that ECOWAS could prove a vital
operators.”$MECOWAS$press$release$
partner in providing political support,
particularly around issues of trade and
regulatory harmonization. ECOWAS responded very favorably to the idea of a
partnership to promote private sector seed market development in West Africa. While
supportive of the idea, ECOWAS’s agriculture department was extremely short-staffed
and had only very limited budget resources at the time.
Moving Forward
By late 2006, the broad contours of the West Africa Seed Alliance (WASA) were taking
shape: USAID had identified and engaged several partners that both had resources and
the interest in collaborating on an alliance to promote the development of high-quality
private sector seed in West Africa. In addition, USAID/WA had built a relationship
with AGRA, which could provide substantial additional financial resources and
expertise to a collaborative effort. Lastly, ECOWAS had expressed a willingness to be
supportive of a partnership— potentially providing valuable political support.
To capitalize on this momentum, USAID/WA prepared a more detailed concept paper
on a potential alliance and organized a two-day workshop in December 2006 with the
key Alliance resource partners along with a small number of implementing partners
with expertise in seed, including ICRISAT (International Crop Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics) and CNFA (Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs). The workshop
resulted in a conceptual framework that would form the basis of an alliance among
USAID, the seed companies, AGRA and ECOWAS to promote the development and
distribution of quality seed across West Africa. USAID/WA, the seed companies,
AGRA and ECOWAS had all agreed in principle to work together on what was now
known officially as WASA. The parties agreed to establish a Steering Committee for the
Alliance and that an MOU codifying the partnership would need to be put in place.
Learning Questions
1. Describe how USAID identified potential partners. What do you think of this
approach?
2. What shared interests do you see among USAID, the seed companies, AGRA and
ECOWAS? Where do the interests of these companies and institutions diverge
from one another?
3. From USAID’s perspective, what value can the private sector seed firms provide?
What due diligence concerns might you have?
!
13!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
4. What might AGRA be able to provide to a partnership in seed? What due
diligence concerns might you have about AGRA at this stage?
5. What value can a public sector partner such as ECOWAS bring? What might be
some possible challenges of working with a regional body such as ECOWAS?
6. How does a partner reconcile philosophical differences when developing a
strategic partnership or alliance? What philosophical can you identify among the
WASA members?
!
14!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
WASA CASE STUDY
MODULE 3: DEFINITION AND FORMATION
(PROCUREMENT AND MOU PREPARATION PROCESS)
The$purpose$of$this$module$is$to$present$some$of$the$complexities$that$USAID$faced$in$procurement$and$the$
negotiation$of$the$WASA$MOU.$$The$goal$is$not$only$to$demonstrate$those$complexities,$but$also$describe$
how$they$were$overcome$to$make$WASA$a$reality.$$After$completing$this$module,$readers$will$be$able$to:$
• Appreciate$the$importance$of$careful$procurement$planning$when$forging$an$alliance;$$
• Become$aware$of$some$of$the$challenges$that$can$emerge$during$an$MOU$negotiation;$and$
• Explore$the$role$of$governance$and$decisionBmaking$structures$in$a$complex$alliance.$
!
!
!
By early 2007, the West African Seed Alliance (WASA) was beginning to take shape.
Multinational seed companies, AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) and
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) had all expressed an interest in
partnering with the USAID/West Africa Mission to address the seed challenge in the
sub-region. The likely partners had defined broad goals and commitments for WASA at
a workshop organized by USAID/WA. The companies and AGRA appeared prepared
to commit substantial resources towards an alliance, tentatively named the West Africa
Seed Alliance, or WASA. For its part, AGRA expressed a willingness to contribute up to
$40 million towards the development of viable seed systems in West Africa. For their
part, the seed companies were ready to contribute some $3 million towards a seed
alliance, primarily in the form of support to national seed trade associations, training
and demonstration sites. For USAID/WA and all the partners, WASA represented an
exciting and potentially dynamic partnership among governments, foundations and the
private sector.
Having invested significant effort in pulling together WASA, USAID/WA was eager to
get the alliance off the ground. To make WASA a reality, USAID had to complete two
key tasks: 1) Ensuring the USAID/WA had an instrument in place to channel its
contributions in support of the Alliance; 2) Codifying the Alliance in a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU).
Procurement
From the outset, USAID/WA, as the initiator of the WASA concept, believed it needed
to play a leading and active role in WASA. Starting in 2007, the Mission began to
consider how it might organize its own contribution to the eventual alliance.
USAID/WA needed to have an implementing partner in place to implement activities
and programs that USAID would support as its contribution to WASA. However, the
Mission did not have an obvious contracting instrument in place and USAID
procurement policies and procedures made a competitive procurement appear to be a
daunting and time-consuming task. A competitive procurement can require months of
preparation and proposal review and the Mission believed it needed to move forward
quickly to capitalize on the momentum it had developed with the WASA partners.
!
15!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
USAID/WA was eager to move forward, but faced a conundrum: How to ensure that
USAID can get an implementing partner in place in a timely manner while meeting
USAID’s demanding procurement requirements?
While a competitive procurement presented seemingly insurmountable obstacles, there
are circumstances where USAID can issue an award on a non-competitive basis. One of
those circumstances is an award to international organizations, such as the UN bodies.
Under USAID rules, these awards can be made without
“I$am$challenging$USAID$to$
competition. USAID/WA identified the International
triple$the$value$of$resources$
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
our$agency$leverages$
(ICRISAT) as an international organization that had a
through$publicMprivate$
strong technical capability in seed and a good track record
partnerships,$and$to$do$so$
with USAID in Africa. Based on the framework
during$this$fiscal$year$and$
developed at the 2006 workshop, ICRISAT submitted an
the$next.$More$partnerships$
unsolicited proposal for the SEED Project as an
will$provide$developing$
international organization exempt from USAID
countries$more$
competition rules. In its SEED Project proposal to USAID,
opportunities,$more$jobs,$
ICRISAT envisioned leveraging nearly $50 million in
and$more$prosperity.”$–
resources, including $40 million from AGRA via WASA.
USAID$Administrator$
Henrietta$Fore$
While ICRISAT had a strong research background in seed,
it was not as strong in areas such as private sector
!
development and public-private partnerships. Therefore, in addition to ICRISAT, the
SEED project proposal involved several other partners, including CNFA (Citizen’s
Network for Foreign Affairs) – an American agro-business development NGO. The
importance of the CNFA role, as a sub-awardees, was such that a CNFA employee was
proposed to be Chief of Party (COP) on the SEED project – a highly unusual
arrangement in USAID awards.
In October 2007, nearly two years after the idea for an alliance to promote seed first
emerged, USAID awarded ICRISAT a four-year, $6 million cooperative agreement to
implement the SEED project as USAID/WA’s primary contribution to support activities
under WASA. The USAID/WA funding was envisioned as providing core support with
bi-lateral missions being able to ‘buy-in’ to support expanded activities in their
respective host countries. In addition, USAID/WA made a separate, smaller sub-award
to AFSTA, the regional industry association, to support the establishment of a new
AFSTA office in West Africa that would house a WASA Coordinator. Both the AFSTA
West Africa office and the SEED project were co-located in Bamako, Mali – a country
considered to be a leader in private sector seed market development in West Africa.
Coordination of activities and resource contributions to WASA could be made either
through the SEED Project or funded in a parallel manner to other organizations.
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Based on the common framework developed at the December 2006 workshop
USAID/WA began circulating draft MOUs for review by the other partners. The early
drafts included defined amounts for contributions to WASA activities by the resource
partners.
!
16!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
One of those resource partners was AGRA, an agricultural development NGO
established by the Bill and Melinda Gates and Rockefeller foundations. AGRA had
pledged $40 million towards WASA goals through its PASS program. However,
although AGRA staff supported the WASA concept, the organization was facing
significant scrutiny from NGOs and media regarding its links to US multinational agrobusiness firms. These observers often suspected AGRA of being a trojan horse for US
industrial agriculture firms.3 In part reflecting concern about these accusations, AGRA’s
Board responded by refusing to approve a draft MOU in which the multinational seed
companies were also signatories.
The decision of AGRA’s Board of Trustees left USAID/WA in a bind. On the one hand,
it had strong commitments to partner from the multinational companies, which were
eager to expand activities in West Africa. In addition, from a technical standpoint, many
at USAID also felt strongly that the hybrid seeds developed by these large firms were
critical to improving yields in West Africa. More importantly, these companies had the
market know-how and incentives to help drive the process of distributing high-quality
seed to farmers – large and small alike. Therefore, USAID/WA believed that the
participation of the major seed companies was critical to the success of WASA.
On the other hand, AGRA represented highly influential foundations and AGRA was
proposing to put the majority of resources into the alliance - $40 million. Given the
desire of USAID management to triple the value of partnerships, this made AGRA’s
participation, and the financial resources it represented, vital from USAID/WA’s
perspective. However, now AGRA was refusing to work directly with the
multinationals and, instead, wanted to focus exclusively on smallholder farmers and
local seed companies.
It was not clear that the two differing approaches on seed could be reconciled. This
schism between the major corporate players in the seed sector and the AGRA Board of
Trustees threatened to stymie WASA before it ever got off the ground. Rather than see
the Alliance fall apart, USAID/WA sought to find a way to restructure WASA so that all
parties could participate. After several months of discussion, a solution was found:
Monsanto and Pioneer would withdraw from the WASA MOU. In their place, AFSTA,
the regional seed industry association, would represent the interests of private sector
seed firms – multinational and African alike. Monsanto and Pioneer would channel
their support for WASA activities via AFSTA, while still participating in the WASA
Steering Committee. As an additional measure, language was inserted into the MOU
stating that activities under WASA would not work with GMOs in countries where they
are banned. This restructuring of the MOU increased AGRA’s comfort level with the
Alliance and the AGRA Board signaled its approval to proceed with the signing of the
MOU.
Finally, after two years of negotiations, the partners signed the WASA MOU in Bamako,
Mali in May 2009. The signatories included USAID/WA, ECOWAS, AFSTA and AGRA.
The MOU was far from perfect, but after nearly three years of discussion and
negotiation WASA was a reality.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!For!an!example,!see!http://agrawatch.wordpress.com/.!
!
17!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
The MOU as signed outlined the following goals for WASA:
• Ensuring that farmers have affordable, timely and reliable access to seed and
other planning material of improved, adapted crop varieties;
• Playing a lead role in the growth and development of viable agricultural inputs
systems;
• Supporting the development of national agro-industries; and
• Supporting the policy commitment and call by African Union Leaders… for the
restoration of Agriculture during the Abuja declaration at the African Fertilizer
Summit and in line with commitments to Common African Agricultural
Development Policy (CAADP).
WASA Governance Structure
In addition to defining goals, the WASA MOU also formalized the governance structure
for WASA in the form of the Steering Committee. The WASA Steering Committee was
formed in 2007 and had met periodically to try to coordinate the potential partners.
Comprised of the key resource partners – USAID/WA, AGRA, AFSTA and ECOWAS –
the Steering Committee will “serve as the advisory body of the Alliance.” In addition to
the MOU signatories, the multinational seed companies were also represented on the
WASA Steering Committee. The MOU stipulated that the Steering Committee was to
meet initially on a quarterly basis and later semi-annually to “discuss critical seed issues
and serve as a sounding board to the members in their programming decisions.”
The graphic shows how
the WASA governance
structure was intended to
function. The Steering
Committee would make
decisions that would be
implemented by
individual projects under
the WASA rubric. Those
projects would be
financed directly by the
Alliance resource
partners themselves. For
example, USAID/WA
funded the SEED project
(via a Cooperative
Agreement to ICRISAT)
in this manner.
Graphic$Courtesy$of$USAID/WA$
The WASA Coordinator was
charged with administering the
Steering Committee’s decisions. This Coordinator was employed by AFSTA with
funding from USAID/WA even though the primary USAID activity under WASA was
being implemented by ICRISAT. Further, as noted above, the WASA resource partners
had decided to fund activities under WASA activities independently, rather than
!
18!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
pooling their resources together. Lacking either a substantial institutional role or an
ability to control funding, the WASA Coordinator’s authority to enact Steering
Committee decisions was unclear.
Learning Questions:
1. What do you think of how USAID/WA addressed the procurement challenges it
faced? What are the potential benefits and risks of issuing a Cooperative
Agreement to ICRISAT before the MOU was signed? Given how involved
USAID/WA wants to be in this alliance, what challenges might it face going
forward with the SEED Project Cooperative Agreement to ICRISAT?
2. AGRA and the multinational seed firms appear to be uneasy potential partners.
Given AGRA’s stance on multinational seed companies in general and GMOs in
particular, do you think the alliance should have moved forward?
3. What are the potential benefits and risks of having partners with competing
visions or philosophies in the same Alliance? Do you think the solution chosen having AFSTA (the industry association) represent the companies on the MOU addresses those underlying risks? Why or why not?
4. Review the draft and final versions of the WASA MOU. What concerns do you
have based on how the MOU changed from draft to final form?
5. What do you think of the proposed WASA Governance Structure? Are the
Steering Committee’s authorities and responsibilities clear from the MOU? If
not, how could these be addressed?
!
19!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
WASA CASE STUDY
MODULE 4: ALLIANCE IMPLEMENTATION
The$purpose$of$this$module$is$to$examine$how$WASA$as$an$Alliance$was$implemented$and$review$some$of$the$
challenges$that$the$partners$faced$both$in$terms$of$working$together$and$meeting$their$own$goals$within$the$
Alliance.$$After$completing$this$module,$readers$will:$
• Understand$the$challenges$in$alliance$governance$and$decisionMmaking;$
• Appreciate$the$importance$of$relationship$management;$
• Be$sensitized$to$the$importance$of$sound$program$design$as$an$integral$part$of$successful$alliances.$
!
!
In 2005, USAID/West Africa began exploring the idea of an alliance to strengthen the
private sector seed industry in West Africa. The resulting West African Seed Alliance
(WASA) was launched in 2007 and is focused on strengthening private sector seed
markets in the region. Comprised of USAID/WA, the Alliance for a Green Revolution
in Africa (AGRA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
African Seed Trade Association (AFSTA), WASA formally began in November 2007 and
continued through 2011. USAID/WA’s contribution to WASA was principally in the
form of the $6 million SEED Project, implemented by ICRISAT (International Crop
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics). In addition to its support for the SEED
project, USAID/WA provided a smaller amount of funding to AFSTA to support its
expansion into West Africa. At the launch of the alliance in 2007, the other resource
partners, namely AGRA and the seed companies (acting through AFSTA) were
projected to contribute a total of $50 million in resources over the life of WASA. WASA
activities supported by the various resource partners were defined by an MOU (signed
only in 2009), which also designated the WASA Steering Committee as the decisionmaking body for the alliance. A WASA Coordinator, employed by AFSTA and funded
by USAID/WA oversaw the implementation of WASA Steering Committee decisions.
Alliance Governance: WASA Steering Committee
Even before the WASA MOU was signed, the key partners formed the WASA Steering
Committee, comprised of USAID/WA, AGRA, AFSTA (including seed companies) and
ECOWAS. In addition, USAID implementing partners, namely ICRISAT and CNFA,
also typically attended meetings. Between November 2007- June 2010, the WASA
Steering committee met six times.
According to the WASA MOU, the Steering Committee was meant to be the key
decision-making body for all activities in WASA, but faced challenges from the start.
USAID and its implementing partner staff comprised the majority of attendance at
WASA Steering Committee meetings4. The meetings themselves were described by nonUSAID participants as ‘highly bureaucratic’ and ‘unwieldy. ’ Because many of the
Steering Committee participants were scattered across the continent, attendance at SC
meetings was a significant investment of time and travel funds for partners. Indeed,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!According!to!WASA!SC!meeting!notes,!USAID!and!its!implementing!partners!comprised!60%!of!attendance!
through!June!2010.!
!
20!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
ECOWAS did not attend a single Steering Committee meeting citing scheduling conflicts
and difficulties in travel. Over time ECOWAS came to believe that WASA was ‘too
American’ and its interest in being involved apparently waned. By 2010, ECOWAS had
come to the conclusion that it needed to work directly with the seed industry, through
an organization such as AFSTA, as the basis for a partnership. “We think it is time for a
new African-led partnership in seed to emerge.”
Other frictions in the Steering Committee quickly emerged. For example, the decision
by USAID to fund AFSTA’s office in West Africa placed the industry association in the
position of being both a resource partner, responsible for mobilizing the resource of the
seed industry, and, therefore entitled to a seat on the Steering Committee and a USAIDfunded implementing partner. Some resource partners on the Steering Committee
objected to AFSTA’s status as both a WASA resource partner and implementing partner.
In addition, ICRISAT petitioned to join the WASA Steering Committee, claiming equal
status with AFSTA, but was rebuffed by the resource partners.
For its part, AGRA participated in most Steering Committee meetings, but it did not
appear to run decisions regarding its programming in the seed sector through WASA.
AGRA’s lack of participation in WASA appears to stem from frustration with
USAID/WA’s handling of the WASA process. Representatives from AGRA felt that
USAID/WA did not understand or appreciate how AGRA operated. AGRA’s attempts
to coordinate the work of its PASS program (its main activity in seed) with the SEED
project were reportedly rebuffed. Further, some WASA participants believed that
USAID/WA was highly dismissive of AGRA’s approach to seed, which relied on the
development of local seed companies. For its part, AGRA was frustrated with
USAID/WA’s focus on the Monsanto, Pioneers and other large seed companies:
“USAID’s approach is too influenced by the multinational seed companies. Where has
that approach gotten you?” These disagreements made collaboration within WASA
highly problematic. According to one observer, “USAID/WA and AGRA are just
walking all over each other.” As a result of these difficulties, opportunities for synergy
among AGRA activities and with those of the other WASA members were lost. For
example, both USAID/WA and AGRA were funding CNFA simultaneously, but there
appears to have been little coordination between the two regarding the goals and
activities they were funding. Thus, although AGRA proposed to invest $40 million in
support of WASA activities, the reality is that the organization’s investments in seed
cannot be considered as leverage for the Alliance as there was little to no coordination
with other WASA partners and activities
Further complicating matters, AGRA inquired about submitting a large unsolicited
proposal to USAID/WA during this period, both making the organization’s role as a
true alliance resource partner ambiguous and potentially raising procurement issues. At
the time USAID staff suggested that the proposal not be submitted and AGRA backed
away from the idea. However, the issue of AGRA becoming a recipient of USAID
funding clouded the relationship regarding WASA for USAID/WA staff members, who
must abide by USAID procurement policies when engaging in dialogue with an
organization seeking funds.
!
21!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
While the seed companies – Pioneer and Monsanto – were active in the WASA Steering
Committee, their material support for WASA activities was limited. Of an anticipated
$3 million in anticipated resource contributions from the seed companies, only $150,000
(in the form of Pioneer funding AFSTA activities) and some modest donations of seed
materialized. “There was simply too much red tape and not enough activity on the
ground,” claims one company representative.
Another difficulty that emerged was the role of the WASA Coordinator. The WASA
Coordinator was an AFSTA employee – a position funded by USAID. While a job
description was developed, the role and authority of the WASA Coordinator was never
clearly defined. Was the Coordinator position meant to be a purely administrative
secretarial position, processing paperwork and organizing Steering Committee meetings
or was the position to coordinate the implementation of Steering Committee decisions
and, thus, ultimately responsible for coordinating the work of WASA implementing
partners? This lack of clarity led to friction with resource partners and implementing
partners alike. “WASA never had a Coordinator who could do things,” says one
member of the WASA Steering Committee.
Program Design Challenges
From the beginning, USAID/WA believed that it needed to take an active role in WASA
itself and the implementation of the SEED Project – USAID’s primary contribution to
WASA. After all, WASA was the brainchild of USAID/WA and the Mission invested
substantial staff resources into building the Alliance. While the Mission wanted to be
actively involved at all levels it created a significant impediment to doing so. In its haste
to get an award in place, USAID/WA issued a cooperative agreement – an assistance
instrument – to ICRISAT. As a result, USAID/WA’s substantial involvement in the
SEED Project was somewhat limited by the very nature of the award. Thus, even when
the WASA Steering Committee made decisions regarding SEED Project activities,
ICRISAT, as a recipient of a cooperative agreement, was not obligated to fulfill those
decisions. The disconnect between USAID/WA’s desire to be actively involved in all
aspect of WASA on the one hand, but on the other hand relying on an assistance
instrument to do so led to considerable frustration for all parties involved. USAID/WA
was frustrated that it could not direct the implementation of the SEED Project. NonUSAID Steering Committee members did not understand why USAID/WA could not
necessarily compel ICRISAT to implement WASA Steering Committee decisions.
Meanwhile, USAID/WA was described by SEED Project implementing partners as
being ‘heavy-handed’ and ‘micro-managing.’
In addition to challenges with the type of award made, the Chief of Party of the SEED
Project was initially an employee of one of ICRISAT’s sub-partners, CNFA. This
unusual arrangement led to considerable friction among the implementing partners and
causing considerable delays. In 2009, USAID/WA and ICRISAT agreed to replace the
Chief of Party with an ICRISAT employee, alleviating some of the strains among the
SEED Project implementing partners.
WASA Communications
Although WASA generated some publicity when the Alliance was formally announced
in 2009, many important outside stakeholders remained confused regarding the
!
22!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
composition, goals and activities of WASA. Though the WASA Steering Committee
discussed the importance of an external communications strategy, it does not appear
that substantive action was taken. Relatively little effort was given to explaining the
Alliance and its component parts to ministries of agriculture, seed dealers and other
important interlocutors of the alliance. “WASA was not well-launched. There was a
lack of communication about what it was. We thought they were forming a splinter
organization,” says the head of a national seed dealer organization. According to the
Ministry of Agriculture of Senegal, “There is an utter lack of transparency in WASA.
Even those working on the Alliance cannot articulate its goals.” The lack of
communication when combined with some of the operational challenges mentioned
above resulted in widespread skepticism. According to one of the largest seed firms in
West Africa, “WASA doesn’t exist in reality.”
Afterword: Measuring and Renewing an Alliance
Things came to a head at the WASA Steering Committee meeting in June 2010. At that
meeting, several participants expressed concern that the ‘principles and authority of
WASA were not adhered to by the alliance members’ and that there was a need to
reassess the goals and activities of the partnership. At the meeting, USAID/WA agreed
to commission an evaluation of WASA as an alliance. In December 2010, at the behest of
the WASA Steering Committee, USAID/WA conducted an evaluation of WASA. A
three-person team comprised of the SEED Project COTR, an agricultural alliances expert
from USAID/Washington and an independent alliance consultant, conducted
interviews with more than 30 key stakeholders, including all the resource partners,
implementing partners and beneficiaries and ministry of agriculture representatives in
Ghana, Mali, Benin and Senegal. Those interviews form the basis of much of this case
study.
In its original 2007 proposal to USAID, ICRISAT projected that USAID’s investment of
$6 million in WASA would leverage more than $50 million in resources from AGRA and
the seed companies. In reality, USAID will have invested more than $7 million in
WASA-related activities by the end of 2011 (when the SEED Project ends) and have
leveraged less than $200,000 in private sector resources. With so few resources
contributed by the private sector, it is difficult to see how WASA can be considered a
Global Development Alliance (GDA) as USAID defines the concept.
More disappointing than the lack of leverage is the lack of discernable results stemming
from the Alliance. Virtually all of the stakeholders interviewed during the evaluation
expressed some level of disappointment regarding the important purpose of the
Alliance and the apparent lack of real results. While WASA as an Alliance has not met
expectations, SEED Project activities yielded some positive results, such as the training
of agro-dealers, the creation of a seed library and some policy reforms, however, those
successes appear to be in spite of and not as a result of WASA.
While WASA as an alliance did not achieve the ambitious goals its creators had
originally hoped for, it can take credit for two more modest achievements as a publicprivate partnership. A number of WASA stakeholders believed that the most important
contribution of the alliance has been to raise awareness of the importance of private
!
23!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
sector seed development in addressing West Africa’s food security needs. “WASA did
make some noise about the importance of seed and that has helped.”
Another positive outcome of WASA may have been to illustrate the potential value in
public-private collaboration to promote a viable seed industry in West Africa. While
disappointment with the results of WASA itself was almost universal, many of the key
resource partners believed that there is still merit in collaborating together. Indeed,
many observers argued that a new African-led partnership in seed could be forged by
AFSTA and ECOWAS – institutions that first worked together through WASA.
At the time of the writing of this case study the WASA SC members were planning to
meet to discuss the USAID/WA evaluation report and explore the possibility of an
African-led successor partnership to WASA.
Learning Questions
1. How did the operation of the Steering Committee impact the effectiveness of
WASA? As a governance structure, do you think it was effective? Are there
other ways that WASA could have been governed that you think would be more
effective?
2. How do you think USAID managed the relationships in WASA?
3. How did the selection of a contracting instrument for the SEED Project impact
the Alliance? With the benefit of hindsight how could have USAID aligned its
contracting with its desired level of involvement?
4. Why would external communications in an alliance such as WASA be
important?
5. Going forward, what recommendations would you give to USAID/WA
regarding a successor partnership to WASA? What role can/should the Mission
play?
!
24!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE
Purpose of the Case Study
The WASA Case Study was developed in conjunction with an evaluation of the alliance
undertaken by USAID in late 2010-early 2011. The WASA evaluation resulted in a
report to the WASA Steering Committee and a management memorandum to
USAID/West Africa. In the process of developing these analyses, USAID/ODP/PSA
concluded that it had, in WASA, a significant opportunity to advance the state of
practice regarding alliances within the Agency.
USAID has more than a decade of experience designing and implementing alliances
around the world. While the agency has made substantial strides in creating the
processes and systems required to support alliances around the world, there is still
relatively little material available on the how, why and what happened of USAIDsupported alliances. The WASA evaluation presented USAID a unique opportunity to
take the information garnered from the WASA evaluation and turn it into a rich learning
tool for prospective alliance-builders within the Agency. The resulting WASA Case
Study is meant to support efforts within the agency to strengthen its ability to build and
implement successful, high-value alliances.
The WASA Case Study is designed to be sufficiently flexible to be used in several
different contexts. USAID/ODP/PSA may choose to integrate the different modules of
the WASA Case Study into its various training programs for Alliance Officers, Mission
staff and implementing partners. USAID Missions may want to use the Case Study to
promote cross-cutting and cross-department discussions regarding the planning
necessary for effective alliances, including procurement, program design etc. Lastly,
while the Case Study is not meant to be a technical document, the Bureau of Food
Security may use the Case Study to highlight the challenges and opportunities in
building alliances to support that office’s ambitious goals.
It is critical to emphasize that this Case Study is meant to be an internal learning tool
as opposed to an outreach document. USAID/ODP/PSA has a wealth of promotional
materials that it has developed for engaging both other USAID offices as well as
potential resource partners regarding the USAID alliance business model. In contrast,
the purpose of this Case Study is to capture in a relatively concise manner, critical best
practices and lessons learned from a highly complex alliance. It, therefore, includes both
WASA successes and many of the challenges that were faced. As such, the goal of this
document is to expose potential alliance-builders to a real life experience and examine
how WASA as an alliance was built and how it evolved over the course of its
implementation.
Case Study Structure
The WASA Case Study is broken down into four modules that broadly correspond to
the following partnership life cycle:
!
25!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
•
•
•
•
WASA Case Study Module 1: Scoping and Background
WASA Case Study Module 2: Partner Identification and Engagement
WASA Case Study Module 3: Alliance Definition and Formation (Procurement
and MOU)
WASA Case Study Module 4:Alliance Implementation, Measurement and
Renewal
By breaking up the Case Study into modules, the goal is to give instructors a high degree
of flexibility in incorporating all or parts of the WASA Case Study into training
programs. For example, the WASA Case Study can be used in full as part of the intense
training that ODP/PSA provides for Alliance Officer Backstops. In this instance, the
WASA Case Study can be embedded module by module into a multi-day training
program, where instructors use the Case Study as the ‘real life’ example to emphasize
each stage of the partnering life cycle.
Alternatively, an instructor may choose to focus on a element, rather than using the full
case study. For example, a discussion involving Regional Legal Advisors and
Contracting Officers may focus on Module 3, which is focused on procurement and
MOU issues. In the case of a training event with Development Outreach Coordinators,
the instructors may choose to focus on Module 2, which covers the outreach-oriented
aspects of the WASA alliance-building process. In cases where instructors want to
focus on a single module, it is recommended that they include Module 1 as the
foundational module that provides critical background and context to each of the other
modules. In this way, the WASA Case Study can be used either as part of a
comprehensive alliance training program or as a discussion point on more narrowly
focused training opportunities.
Available Supporting Documents
!
26!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
While the WASA Case Study is designed so that it can be used on a stand-alone basis,
the Case Study packet includes supporting documents that an instructor can use to
deepen examination of particular topics or organize exercises around. Supporting
documents include:
• DRAFT Seed Alliance Concept Note from 2005
• DRAFT WASA Memorandum of Understanding from 2007
• SIGNED WASA MOU from 2009
• WASA Alliances in Action (ODP/PSA) from 2009
• WASA Case Study PowerPoint Presentation
WASA Module Instructor Guidance
The purpose of this section is to provide instructors with some concise guidance
regarding each module and how it can be used as a learning tool. This section
introduces the function of each module, offers suggestions regarding training exercises
and group discussions, and a summary of key learning points. The purpose of this
section is not to provide a step-by-step instructor’s guide, but rather to serve as a
reference that experienced instructors can cue off of in designing their specific training
program.
Module 1: Introduction and Scoping is largely designed to serve as the foundation for the
other three modules by introducing the underlying factors that led USAID and the
private sector towards forming what would become known as WASA. The idea is that
instructors can use Module 1 in sequence with the other 3 modules or by pairing it with
one of the other modules to highlight an issue, i.e. procurement, which may be of
interest to a particular audience.
The goal of this module is to expose users to the original motives and context for WASA.
By understanding these motives and the broader context, participants can come to
appreciate the complexity that alliances often entail.
Answers to Learning Questions5
1) For USAID/WA, the multinational seed companies were very valuable potential
partners. The seed companies possessed world-class scientific expertise,
intellectual property and technology for the development of high yielding seed.
They also possessed considerable experience developing viable seed markets in
developing countries, including marketing and distribution systems.
2) USAID/WA has a long history and extensive presence in West Africa – a region
that has been difficult for the seed companies to break into. In addition, some
companies believed that USAID would support policy reforms that will help the
seed companies break into the West African market. Lastly, USAID possessed
considerable funding for local research institutions, seed dealers and business
associations.
3) There are a variety of other actors that could add value to a partnership in seed.
NGOs, foundations, research institutions, multilateral agricultural organizations
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!It!is!important!to!note!that!the!answers!to!the!Learning!Questions!are!suggestions!based!on!the!WASA!case!
study.!!They!are!not!meant!to!be!definitive,!but!rather!provide!instructors!with!a!basis!for!engaging!participants!
in!discussion!about!these!topics.!!Instructors!can!and!should!add!insights!from!their!own!experience.!
!
27!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
and even banks and investment firms all could bring value to a partnership in
seed depending on the exact scope, scale and intended results of the partnership.
Suggested Group Discussion Topic: Why might USAID be interested in an alliance in seed?
What opportunities and risks might the alliance potentially entail?
Suggested Exercise: Have participants split into two groups to define the interests of
USAID and the interests of the private sector respectively. Participants can then come
back together as a whole group to jointly define what is the shared interest between
USAID and the private sector.
Module 2: Private Sector Identification and Engagement is meant to describe the process of
how USAID identified prospective partners and the steps USAID staff undertook to
work with those prospective partners on defining the alliance.
Answers to Learning Questions
1) Multinational seed companies had the potential to push for the creation of a
sustainable and private sector led market in seed in West Africa. They also
possessed technology, expertise and funding to support the development of
private sector seed systems in West Africa. In terms of due diligence, the
controversy surrounding GMOs would clearly play a role later on in the
partnership. In addition, many government and NGO stakeholders were (and
still are) skeptical of the intentions of these companies in West Africa.
2) In addition to funding, AGRA also brings a different model (grants to local
institutions) than USAID that could be extremely valuable as a compliment to
USAID’s approach. AGRA also possesses considerable in-house expertise as
well as high-visibility leadership in the seed sector. In terms of due diligence, the
AGRA Board has signaled that AGRA will need to diversify its funding base –
this would prove to be an issue later on in the partnership. In addition, the
intense scrutiny AGRA faced from civil society also later complicated WASA by
making it difficult for AGRA to openly collaborate with the multinational seed
companies.
3) Clearly, ECOWAS as the key inter-governmental body in the region can provide
legitimacy to WASA. In addition, ECOWAS can facilitate policy dialog at both
the country and regional level because trade harmonization is a key part of its
mandate in agriculture. As a sovereign governmental body, ECOWAS presents
certain challenges as well. Its focus is naturally on regional issues and, thus, its
interest in the development of private sector seed systems is limited to issues
such as trade and regulatory harmonization. In addition, the organization has
only a small staff working on these issues across a large and diverse region.
Thus, staff resources would be a significant constraint in WASA for ECOWAS.
4) This module highlights some of the key philosophical differences between the
partners in WASA. Differences in organizational philosophy and technical
approach can be critical constraints in partnerships even when partners share the
same general goal. In building successful alliances, it is important to work
!
28!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
closely with resource partners to uncover these differences early on before an
alliance is launched. In many cases, differences of technical approach can be
reconciled through negotiation or, alternatively, by having the partners explicitly
recognize the validity of the other organization’s approach.
5) In the case of WASA there were significant differences that would prove
problematic later on. USAID was inclined, based on its own analysis, to support
efforts to expand the use of seed developed by multinational seed companies
aimed at larger farms as the best way of bolstering yields. By contrast, AGRA
focuses on the development and strengthening of local seed systems and is
seeking to support smallholder farms. These were significant philosophical
differences in technical approach and they were not fully addressed in the
development of WASA.
Suggested Group Discussion Topic: Describe how USAID went about identifying and
engaging potential WASA partners. What do participants think of that approach? How
might they go about identifying and building relationships with partners differently?
Suggested Exercise: Divide participants into two groups. Have Group A focus on
defining what USAID might bring to a potential partnership in seed. Have Group B
focus on defining the resources that the private sector companies might bring.
Suggested Exercise: Have participants define potential due diligence concerns they might
have regarding each of the proposed partners: AGRA, AFSTA and the seed companies
and ECOWAS. How might they go about addressing those due diligence concerns?
Additional Key Learning Points
• USAID/WA defined a finite group of potential partners that had clear business
or institutional interests that were shared with USAID. In doing so, USAID/WA
was able to then target and tailor its outreach efforts in a deliberate manner as
opposed to wider outreach aimed at the private sector as a whole.
•
USAID/WA used a variety of engagement processes – one-on-one meetings,
workshops and concept papers to advance WASA from a notion to a fullyfledged alliance. Equally as important, the Mission engaged in a sustained effort
over many months to bring partners to the table. Doing so required a significant
investment of staff time and energy – a point that is often lost in the discussion
about alliances. USAID staff and management need to weigh these investments
carefully, balancing the potential benefit of an alliance with the costs associated
with staff time and attention invested in building that alliance.
•
The module also introduces some challenges that would emerge later on. In
particular, the political debate around the large seed companies and GMOs
would create significant headaches for USAID and all the partners later on.
Module 3: Procurement and MOU Process describes in detail the steps the Mission and its
partners undertook to codify the alliance in an agreement. In addition, the module also
describes the way USAID mobilized its own resource commitments – in the form of a
!
29!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
procurement action – in support of WASA activities. Lastly, this section also describes
how the governance structure for WASA was meant to function.
For internal USAID audiences, this module may be the most salient as it describes some
of the key process challenges USAID faces in building alliances. The decisions made
during this phase had a profound impact on how WASA was ultimately implemented.
Answers to Learning Questions
1.) The decision to issue a cooperative agreement – an assistance instrument – to
ICRISAT would prove very problematic during the implementation of WASA.
Under a CA, USAID is limited in the level of involvement it can have in
activities, whereas USAID/WA clearly wanted to be heavily involved in the
direction and implementation of WASA activities. This situation illustrates the
importance of proper procurement planning when designing an alliance.
Clearly, given USAID’s desire to direct activities an acquisition instrument
would have been more in line with the Mission’s vision. By involving the
procurement office as early as possible, alliance builders can better optimize the
procurement instrument (existing award or new procurement) to USAID’s needs
in the alliance.
2.) There are risks to proceeding in an alliance where the partners appear to have
significantly divergent agendas. It is, therefore, critical that these issues be
identified during partner engagement and, once identified, that all partners take
steps to either addresses those issues directly or design the alliance in a way that
supports multiple approaches that support a common goal. In the case of
WASA, it is possible that the divergent views on how to best bolster agricultural
productivity in West Africa among AGRA, USAID and the seed companies could
have been reconciled if all parties agreed to accept the legitimacy of other
approaches. In the case of WASA this does not appear to have taken place.
3.) Often development challenges do not lend themselves to a ‘one-size-fits-all’
solution and, therefore, having an alliance with partner organizations with
different visions and philosophies can be highly effective by allowing the alliance
to address a development challenge in a manner that leverages the comparative
strengths of the different partners. The risk is if one partners does not believe the
other partner’s vision or approach is sound it undermines the very purpose of
the alliance. In the case of WASA, differing visions were left largely
unaddressed. While the decision to put AFSTA forward as the signatory to the
MOU enabled the MOU to receive approval from AGRA, it did little to address
the underlying differences among USAID, the seed companies and AGRA.
4.) There are a couple of key differences: the dollar amounts to be committed were
removed. In addition, several specific, measureable, alliance goals were changed
to make them less specific. A key concern in this case is the level of commitment
of the partners to provide funding. If a partner is unable to state a minimum
amount of resources it is prepared to channel into supporting the alliance, it may
signal a lack of commitment to the alliance. Similarly, specific measureable
alliance goals can help focus partners on achieving those goals and add a sense of
!
30!
!
'
'
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
urgency when those targets are not being met. It is important to stress that there
may occasions when it is not possible to have specific goals or resource
commitments in the MOU. In such cases, extra care should be taken to ensure
the commitment of all resource partners in the alliance.
5.) On paper, the governance structure of WASA appears sound and appropriate in
terms of creating a decision-making body or process and having a capability to
facilitate coordination and collaboration among the different partners. In the
case of WASA, the role and responsibilities of the Steering Committee and the
Coordinator are not specifically defined in the MOU. For example, what
authority does the WASA Coordinator have to direct the implementing partners?
In creating a governance structure, it is important to carefully define roles and
responsibilities – either in the MOU itself or in separate documentation (often an
addendum) so that all partners understand how the governance structure is
intended to work.
Suggested Group Discussion Topic: The instructor can facilitate a discussion on what
participants think of how USAID/WA addressed procurement issues in WASA and
what the implications of those solutions might mean during implementation. For
example, USAID/WA had a strong desire to be heavily involved in WASA, but issued a
cooperative agreement as its principal activity under the alliance. How might that limit
USAID’s ability to remain heavily involved and direct the implementing partner?
Suggested Group Discussion Topic: The instructor can facilitate a discussion regarding the
WASA governance structure. While on paper, the governance structure seemed to be
appropriate, in practice it proved to be a major impediment to the successful
implementation of activities under WASA.
Suggested Group Exercise: Hand out copies of the draft (2007) and signed (2009) versions
of the MOU. Have participants compare the documents and summarize the key
differences between the draft and signed documents. For example, specific resource
commitments for the different parties were removed in the final version. In addition,
there are some changes in the level of detail of proposed actions. Instructors can use
these differences to highlight the challenges involved in negotiating an alliance.
Additional Key Learning Point
• The decision to allow a sub-awardee employee to serve as a Chief of Party
should raise red flags among participants as it significantly complicated the
implementation of the SEED Project by putting the prime awardee, ICRISAT, at
odds with the sub-awardee, CNFA.
Module 4: Alliance Implementation provides an overview of how the alliance operated in
practice and some of the challenges that emerged in terms of governance, program
design and communications. This module illustrates how some of the decisions taken in
previous modules had a substantial impact on the successful implementation of
activities under WASA. This section concludes with an Afterword describing WASA’s
present disposition, identified results and plans going forward.
!
31!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
Learning Questions
1.) The WASA Steering Committee proved problematic for several reasons. First,
neither the MOU nor any WASA meeting notes define what the criteria for
Steering Committee membership are. This lack of definition led to friction
between AFSTA and ICRISAT both of which are implementing partners, yet
AFSTA had a seat on the Steering Committee. In addition, because the Steering
Committee meetings were not seen to be as effective by participants, attendance
also began to wane.
2.) It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of relationship management in a
complex alliance. In the case of WASA, USAID struggled balancing the desire to
lead WASA forward while not being seen as dominating the Alliance. In
addition, USAID also seemed to be dismissive of AGRA’s technical approach,
which appeared to discourage greater participation of AGRA – the largest
contributor to the Alliance. For its part, AGRA muddied the waters by seeking
funding from USAID and, thus, changing its status in USAID’s eyes from funder
to possible implementing partner.
3.) By issuing a cooperative agreement to ICRISAT USAID/WA was limited in its
ability to direct ICRISAT activities, leading to friction among all parties. With
the benefit of hindsight USAID had a choice: if USAID/WA believed it needed to
be heavily involved, it could have taken the time to issue a contract, perhaps
using an IQC or a set aside to expedite the process. Alternatively, if there was no
choice but to issue a Cooperative Agreement, USAID/WA would need to be less
involved in leading the alliance and instead put the implementing partner in a
leading role.
4.) Clearly, the issue of GMOs and the multinational seed companies is a
contentious one among some governments as well as the media and civil society.
A partnership that includes a USG agency, large American multinationals and
foundations representing some of the wealthiest Americans on such a topic could
arouse suspicion among stakeholders. Therefore, having a robust external
communications strategy regarding the goals of the alliance, its operation and
decision-making could have alleviated some of the many misconceptions that
emerged regarding WASA.
5.) Going forward, it does appear possible that a new Africa-led partnership
between AFSTA and ECOWAS in seed may yet emerge. Here, USAID/WA can
play a supporting role in providing resources to support those objectives that
align with USAID/WA strategy and also leverage the regional mission’s
mandate to work on regional-level issues, particularly with regard to promoting
policy harmonization and facilitating intra-regional trade in seed.
Suggested Group Discussion Topic: The instructor can facilitate a discussion on what
recommendations participants might make to USAID/WA going forward. Should
USAID/WA renew WASA or should it consider a new alliance? What role is there for a
regional alliance in seed? What potential partners, beyond the existing WASA partners,
may exist?
!
32!
!
'
WEST AFRICA SEED ALLIANCE (WASA) CASE STUDY
'
'
Additional Key Learning Points
• Successful alliances require sound program design. Many of the difficulties
WASA faced during implementation can be traced back to key programmatic
and procurement decisions made be USAID/WA, including the use of a
cooperative agreement, the decision to allow a COP from a subawardee
organization and uncertain role of the WASA Coordinator.
!
•
As an Alliance WASA did not live up to expectations. On paper, WASA as an
alliance makes perfect sense as each of the resource partners brings unique
resources and skills to the table. In practice, WASA failed to live up to its
creators’ high expectations due to the difficulties in program design, governance
and relationship management.
•
WASA can take credit for setting the stage for a new African-led partnership in
seed. Going forward, it appears possible that a new partnership between AFSTA
and ECOWAS on seed provides the best opportunity for public-private
collaboration to develop a robust, self-sustaining private sector seed industry in
Africa. For its part, USAID/WA may want to play a supporting role in that new
partnership, but because of the challenges of WASA, the Mission may want to
exercise restraint to ensure that it allows the African institutions to take the lead.
33!