THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND DEFENCE POLICY
Current Issues and Objectives
As presented by Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff, Visting Fellow, International Peace
Academy, for the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations Project
Roundtable on European Capacities for Peace Operations held on November 25,
2002.
1
The Idea of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy
• European Defense Community (CED) in 19521954 with a French Initiative
• Western European Union (WEU)
• Maastricht Treaty (February 1992) and the
Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997) created the
European Union with the aim of achieving a
common foreign policy (CFSP)
• The European Union is divided into a threepillar structure
Before the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union (which was then still called the
European Community) was little more than a wealthy economic area.
There had been earlier attempts to create a common defense policy through the
European Defense Community, but with no success. At the time, the Western
European Union (WEU) was more or less dormant. The WEU has taken sporadic
action during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav conflict (monitoring of economic
embargo), but nothing impressive. The Maastricht Treaty changed the whole
perspective.
2
The European Union’s Three Pillars
Common principles and objectives
European Council - GAC
PILLAR I
PILLAR II
PILLAR III
Community
policies
CFSP
ESDP
Cooperation in the
field of justice and
home affairs
European
Commission
Council of the
European Union
Intergovernmental
Procedures
The Secretariat of the EU Council (the intergovernemental body of the EU) and its
High Representative, Javier Solana, have the main responsibilities for ESDP. But
the European Commission (Chris Patten) and its External Direction (Relex) have
also a role in ESDP.
To summarize, Solana has the political, diplomatic and military role; Patten
controls the money and deals with all the components of conflict prevention and
development.
3
ESDP Progress
through European Summits
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
St Malo FR-UK summit (1998) : A New Dynamic
Cologne (June 1999) : Crisis Management Definition at 15
Helsinki (Dec 1999) : Capability Headline Goal
Feira (June 2000) : Police Headline Goals and Civilian
Aspects (rule of law, civil protection,
civil administration)
Nice (Dec 2000) : Capabilities Conferences –
Relations with Third countries
Göteborg (June 2001) : Political Structures in Place
Laeken (Dec 2001) : Declaration of Operationality
Seville (June 2002) : EU Operations in the Balkans
ESDP received a boost at the French-British Summit of Saint-Malo in 1998.
Since then (in a timeframe of 4 years) the progress has been tremendous.
The several steps between Saint-Malo and Seville are:
Cologne (June 1999) : Crisis Management Definition at 15
Helsinki (Dec. 1999) : Capability Headline Goal
Feira (June 2000) : Police Headline Goal and Civilian Aspects (Strengthening
the rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration)
Nice (Dec. 2000) : Capabilities Conferences - Relations with Third countries
Göteborg (June 2001) : Political Structures in place
Laeken (Dec. 2001) : Declaration of Operationality
Seville (June 2002) : EU Operations in the Balkans
4
ESDP Principles
• A political project, part of the European construction
• An autonomous decision and action capability
• An original crisis management concept relying on civilian &
military tools (global strategy)
• An interinter-governmental decision process
A clear-cut objective : Capability to act militarily in common
(no integrated armed forces)
A clear-cut mission : Petersberg Tasks
A clear-cut tool : The military capability Headline Goal
process
For a brief moment, I would like to go back to the core principles that are the heart of ESDP.
- ESDP is an important step towards strengthening the political integration between EU Member States. The
problem here is whether this integration is achieved by political or military means first.
- The main objective of the EU is to be a full actor on the international stage by having the means to act in
conflict prevention and crisis management in the European continent as well as outside it. The EU wants to
be an autonomous actor backed by credible military forces and the capacity to make independent decisions,
meaning independent from NATO.
- Building ESDP does not mean building a « European Army ». It is an intergovernmental process in which
the unanimity rule prevails.
- The specificity of the EU is to have at its disposal a global concept for crisis management comprising the
whole spectrum from conflict prevention to peace enforcement. This concept is adapted to the new
dimensions of conflict (intrastate low-intensity conflicts).
- This spectrum is defined in the « Petersberg Tasks ». These tasks include humanitarian and evacuation
missions, peacekeeping missions and combat-force missions for crisis management, including missions to
restore peace. Unlike NATO, they are not dealing with collective defense. The work of the current
Convention on the future of the EU is actually dealing with this issue, whether that has to remain as such or
not. Until then the equivalent of NATO’s Article V is still enshrined in the WEU.
- The several steps for building ESDP are made according to a Headline Goal in military and civilian
aspects.
5
EU Operationality
was declared at the European Summit
of Laeken on December 2001
6
Headline Military Goal
By 2003,
2003, Member States must be able
to deploy within 60 days
and sustain for at least one year
military forces of 50 to 60.000 men
and the necessary support
to fulfill the full range of Petersberg tasks
Helsinki Headline Goal
ESDP aims at generating a Rapid Reaction Force of 50 to 60.000 men that can be
deployed in 60 days with the necessary support to fulfill the full range of Petersberg
tasks.
There have been some discussions on identifying elements which could be deployed
more rapidly (5 to 30 days). These discussions are still going on.
7
Headline Police Goal
By 2003, Member States must be able
to deploy within 60 days
and sustain for at least one year
military forces of 5.000 men
(with 1.400 of them being deployed
within 30 days)
8
EU operationality
is based on
• Permanent Political & Military Structures
(PSC, EUMC, EUMS, HR)
• Available Forces with a Capability Process
(ECAP)
• Crisis Management Procedures
• Associated Concepts (planning, CIS, log, CIMIC...)
• Crisis Management Exercises beginning 2003
• Framework Agreements on Financing Operations
(national contributions)
Permanent political structures:
-Political and Security Committee helped by a political-military working group (there is also a
Civilian Committee which is subordinated to the PSC)
-EU Military Committee
-EU Military Staff Committee
-High Representative at the head of the Secretariat of the European Council
- Police Unit / Situation Centre
Available Forces with a capability process: The Helsinki Headline Goal in military and civilian
aspects of crisis management
Crisis Management Procedures:
Decision-making by consensus
Associated Concepts: in order to complete whole the operational aspects of peace operations
Crisis Management Exercices: The first EU autonomous exercice is planned for 2003.
Framework agreement on operations financing:
Costs related to CFSP are put on the Commission’s budget, except for the expenses having
military implications. Those expenses are born by individual Member States, on individual
participating States (whether they provide troops on the ground or they only participate
financially to the operation).
9
EU military capacities
3 catalogues
Helsinki Headline goal Catalogue - (HHC) :
100,000 men ; 300 to 400 combat aircraft ; 80 Navy vessels
Operational requirements for Petersberg tasks
Helsinki Force Catalogue - (HFC) :
110,000 men ; 400 combat aircraft ; 100 Navy vessels
Member States contributions
Helsinki Progress Catalogue - (HPC)
54 strategic capacity shortfalls identified
Land, Sea,
Sea, Air, ISTAR, C3, Deployment,
Deployment,Logistics
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)
ESDP has reached its political and strategic headline goal.
The second step is to achieve the objectives concerning its capabilities.
In 2000, the French EU presidency has define 2 catalogues: the catalogue of
capabilities (needs of the EU in military matters) and the catalogue of forces (which
is what member states are ready to put at the disposal of the EU).
The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was created in December 2001 and
launched by the Spanish Presidency in 2002. It gathers all the projects to fill the
gaps in of ESDP capabilities. It is now divided in working groups aiming at
identifying the different projects.
For the moment, the ECAP process is quite slow, due mainly to financial restraints.
10
What Operations
Until Now?
11
Bosnia-Herzegovina
IPTF
EUPM
First police operation has been decided
• Calendar : Objective is 1st January 2003
• Mission : assistance, advice, control,
inspection for local police
(no armed component, liaison with NATO/SFOR)
Using 466 police personnel (IPTF = 1650)
The General Affairs Council declared in February 2002 the availability of the EU to
take over the UN Mission in Bosnia on January 2003 and for an initial period of one
year.
The EU will conduct its first operation in Bosnia in January 2003. Sven Frederiksen
will be the head of EUPM. Lord Ashdown is the High Representative of the
international community in Bosnia as well as the Special Representative of the EU.
EUPM will be much smaller than the current IPTF. EUPM is a pure civilian
mission. It does not have any military component. Its relations with SFOR concern
information sharing and support in case of public disorder situations.
12
FYROM : post TFF ?
European Council in Seville
expressed the will of EU to succeed NATO TFF
The UN may take over NATO in February 2003
Logical extension of EU political & economical role
in the Balkans
•Pending issues
Within EU : define CIS needs ; write concepts ; financing
agreements interpillar coordination
With NATO : chain of command ; capabilities & assets
required ; security agreements ; extraction arrangements
BERLIN+ agreements must be settled
The European Summit of Seville has taken its first decision to establish an EU crisis management
operation. The EU operationality is about to become a reality in its closest geographical area of
interest: the Balkans. Balkan States are clearly attracted by the perspective of becoming a member of
the EU one day. Negotiations will begin for Slovenia. Tomorrow, it might be Croatia and Serbia.
At the Prague Summit, NAC decided to renew a reduced TFF (of 400 men compared to the current
700-800 men) for another 6 months, but will reassess the situation in February. If, at that time,
NATO wants to withdraw, the EU will succeed it.
In the meantime, quite a few prerequites will have to be met:
- Political context of Macedonia: it is improving. Now, there is only a need for a small operation. In a
few months time, there might be a need only in police matters. When it is the turn to the EU to take
the lead, it might then have to conduct another police mission.
This situation has its drawbacks and its advantages:
- it won't credibilize the military dimension of ESDP, its military operationality, and it might lead to
a division of labor between the EU and NATO.
- But it would be a way for the EU to deal with the transnational criminality occurring in the region.
The EU taking over Amber Fox is conditioned by an agreement on Berlin+, unless it is a really small
mission or if it becomes a police mission. Actually, the UK and Germany oppose any EU operation
in Macedonia without a prior agreement on Berlin+. But France considers that the EU could deploy
an operation on an ad hoc basis.
13
EU Operations in the Future ?
• Africa?
• Caucasus?
• Central Asia?
• Middle East?
If, for any reasons, the EU cannot test its operationality in the Balkans, then where?
The EU has no geographical limits for deploying an operation.
- The closest area of interest after the Balkans is most probably Africa for many historical
reasons. Recently, maybe the Ivory Coast was a missed opportunity for the EU.
- The Caucasus region where there are numerous so-called "frozen conflicts" (Transnistria,
Karabagh, Ossetia, Abkhasia). Most of these conflicts are currently dealt with by the OSCE.
- Central Asia: quite far to the European interest for the moment. But, in Afghanistan, ISAF
is more or less a European operations, even more when the Germans and the Dutch will take
the lead next January.
- The Middle East? Why not, as a result of the EU efforts at the diplomatic level within the
"Quartet". The EU has already given a lot of money to economic projects of the Palestinian
Authority.
14
EU - UN & NATO Relationships
EU acknowledges the primary role of the UN in
maintaining peace and security
EU does not question
but fosters transatlantic relations
Mutual reinforcement, not competition
between EU/ESDP and NATO/ESDI
2 military options for an EU-led operation :
- use of autonomous capacities
- call for NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin+)
What are the relationships of the EU with other organizations?
• With the UN, it is, for the moment, rather simple: The EU acknowledges the primary role of the UN
in maintaining international peace and security. Any EU operation would require the UN Security
Council’s authorization. The EU is willing to retain the political and strategic control over any of its
forces.
• With NATO, it is a bit more complicated. In theory, ESDP does not question but fosters the
transatlantic link. It should strengthen the European pillar of NATO.
• The EU has two options to intervene in a crisis management:
1/ The use of autonomous capabilities
2/ To use, under EU political control and strategic conduct, NATO military assets and
capabilities (better known as « Berlin+ », the EU/NATO permanent arrangements).
Currently, Javier Solana is trying very hard (through a shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara)
to achieve an agreement before the European Summit of Copenhagen.
Briefly, the "Berlin+" package is the following:
- EU access to NATO planning capabilities
- Availability to the EU of NATO's assets and collective means
- Options for a European command
- Adaptation of the planning system of NATO to better take into account the availability of European
forces for EU operations.
15
Compatibility Between
ESDP and NATO/NRF?
• Risks of duplication and
competition
• Ways for containing those risks
• NATO is currently finding ways to exist. That was already the case in the Washington Summit,
but it is even more obvious since Sept 11. NATO is trying to find new missions (fight against
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, civil aspects of crisis management). It is also trying to
expand its geographical scope to the whole world (Afghanistan, Iraq).
• It is in this context that the Americans proposed its Allies the creation of a NATO Response
Force. The Nato Response Force is a project that is still being discussed. Principles have been
agreed upon, but not yet how to organize and structure such a force.
• Risks exist that NRF overshadows the efforts made in building ESDP. NRF might divert some
European States from ESDP. It might lead to the sharing of military roles, to NATO’s advantage. It
might lead to duplication and competition btw the two structures.
• Way to contain those risks: political control of NAC over NRF; to make both forces available for
NRF and ESDP; compatibility of both forces.
16
True Tests for ESDP
• To put the EU operationality into a
concrete form
• To achieve an agreement on Berlin+
• To make progress on capabilities
17
Future of ESDP
• ESDP has to overcome its weaknesses: operational
planning, decisiondecision-making process
• How to achieve a common foreign policy?
• EU/NATO: Same troops or division of labor?
• The EU lags behind NATO in building common military
assets
• Decreasing national military budgets of European States
Risk of « WEUization » of ESDP
• ESDP has to overcome its weaknesses:
-- The question of operational planning is not resolved yet. The EU does not have its own planning headquarters. For planning any
operations, either it will have to rely on SHAPE or individual member states. That is why the agreement on Berlin + is important.
This reliance also implies a slower process, so the EU should perhaps have a nucleus operational planning cell.
-- The current decision-making process is quite slow, and it will have to adapt its decision-making to the requirements of rapid
reaction. Actually, this problem is also faced by several other organizations: the UN, the OSCE, and to some extent NATO (in the
case of Kosovo). The real problem is not the rapid reaction force, but the rapid reaction decision.
• But the development of ESDP is also hampered by several other factors:
-- The lack of a common foreign policy is a serious drawback for the ESDP. There is within the EU a political division between the
Anglo-Saxons always looking towards the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean countries, with France being in the middle and trying to
be the leading country of ESDP.
-- The existence within Europe of two regional organizations with the same kind of capabilities. That lead inevitably to competition,
especially when European States themselves cannot agree among themselves on which organization to favor, and for what tasks.
And it is clear that for the time being a majority of European States are favoring NATO.
-- Indeed, the current project of NATO Rapid Response is not only a way to give the organization some new missions, but also a
way to compete with the EU. The problem is that the EU still has to build its own assets.
-- The EU lags behind NATO in building common military assets (especially concerning planning, strategic transportation, and
intelligence). Its member states are individually way behind the US because of the existence of neutral states, that is an historical
factor. Recently, Lord Robertson said that "NATO's credibility comes from its capability". It is also true for ESDP. And in this
matter, NATO has definitely a step forward.
-One has to understand that NATO is for a lot of European States a way not to spend to much on the defense. The United States
spends about 3.5% of GDP on defense, as most European States spend less than 2%.
•The result of all this might be a "WEUization" of ESDP, the EU having all the structures necessary to conduct an operation, but
never the political will (because of its Member States divisions) to decide any. That would not be a sound situation.
18
The EU is the second
superpower in the world !
• Economically, this is already the case
• Politically, it is not yet, but the
potential exists
• It will take a few more years
• Economically, this is already the case.
• Politically, it is not yet, but the potential exists. I think the world is better off with
groups of states that can oppose, in a constructive way, the United States (as we
have seen in the negotiation on Iraq in the UN Security Council).
• The EU, as with any regional organization in its early stages, needs a few more
years.
19
THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY
AND DEFENCE POLICY
Current Issues and Objectives
?
QUESTIONS
?
20