CHAPTER flV£
REGIONAL C()--0P£R~TION:
R£IL.__ATIONS B£TI\f££N
UZBEKISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN
161
We can see that in countries which are contiguous to each other geographically,
have common interests and also compatible economic structures, the tendency
to increase regional economic and commercial relations gains gradually more
importance. As this kind of regional cooperation and integration movements offer
the possibility of realizing the common interests of the countries in the matter of
expanding the production volume by providing more efficient use of production
factors increasing the commerce within the region and entering into wider·
markets, many countries have found themselves in one or more regional
movements.
It is interesting to study the prospect of regional cooperation, which came into
existence between the Central Asian Republics, especially between Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. Here, we would also like to analyse the factors, which hinder this
cooperation, and the necessary factors to form the cooperation platform that has
been developed between the republics.
The Central Asian republics have attempted to establish themselves as viable
nation, since their independence from the former Soviet Union in December
1991. This is essential for their legitimacy in the international political system,
and for their internal cohesion and development. Initially their relations with the
rest of the world were dominated not so much by what they wanted, but by what
the rest of the world desired to do with Central Asia. Moreover, rule of Soviet
regime has also had a significant impact on relations with different countries even
after the independence. So much so that relation among all Central Asian states
are still showing its reminiscences and its deeds, such as, determination of
national boundaries still shaping the nature of relationship, specially between
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
162
All these states of Central Asia face daunting problems of economic
development, though the degree varies from state to state, state building from
scratch, environmental problem etc. This became more problematic in the
countries where ethnic conflict and religious uprisings were more prominent. In
this context it is interesting to analyse the situation of two countries- Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan. In this chapter an attempt would be made to find out whether the
common problem, cultural heritage, physical proximity etc. are strong enough to
produce a well developed cooperative efforts - will forge them to form a strong
relationship or this remain more as a potential than real.
Foreign policy of almost all the Central Asian republics has concentrated on
strengthening national independence, attracting foreign investment and building
economic and political ties with an array of partners in both the east and west, to
further these goals, Uzbekistan has joined a number of regional and extra
regional cooperation structures. Tajikistan has certainly lagged behind to
establish such relations. But now, when things are getting normal in Tajikistan, it
is promptly bringing things in order.
5.1 Efforts Towards Cooperation
Since 1991 the Central Asian republics have met on several occasions to
promote cooperation and to create multinational institutions, both within and
outside the CIS structures. 1 But progress in this direction has been limited
because of nascent stage of their respective economies and unstable political
situation as well. Thus they couldn't work out a single uniform Central Asian
state, but they did recognize that they should try and work in agreement, since all
1
See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton, 1984; also see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,
Powerful Independence, Boston, 1977.
163
of them are poorly prepared to face the problem of transition. The collapse of
USSR's political center necessitated that members of the CIS reassess their
geopolitical situation as they look for new potential sources for technological and
financial assistance.
Even before that, since 1989 both in the regional and in the international
developments have an important effect on the efforts to establish regional
cooperation between the Central Asian Republics. In the phase of the
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the regional
identity of Central Asia played an important part; the leaders of the region have
started the establishment of regional cooperation mechanisms especially in
economic matters in the summits they realized even before the dispersion of the
Soviet Union.
In
a meeting
held in June 1990 in Alma-Ata, the leaders had articulated their
desire concerning the coordination of their political, economic and cultural
policies. However, all these works did not go further than an earnest desire. In
August 1991, in Tashkent, the leaders came again together and especially after
the initiative of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan decided to establish Regional
Council to promote the coordination in economic matters. But, because of the
strike in Moscow, the Council was not able to fully carry out its duties. However,
according to Martha B. Olcott, even the idea of establishing such a council was
important, at least from the point of view of legitimizing the borders of the
Republics situated in the region as well as being an important decision showing
that the leaders prefer cooperation instead of conflicts. 2
After the strike in Moscow, some republics proclaimed their independence and
the biggest problem for the Presidents of these Republics became to legalize
164
their existences by mobilising the support of the public opinion. In this confusion,
the next meeting between the Central Asian republics could only be realised in
December 1991 in Ashkabad and the leaders met this time to discuss the ways
to overcome the situation arising out of dispersion of the Soviet Union. At this
meeting, Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan, insisted on the establishment
of a Central Asian Community, which could be a balancing element against the
formation of a Slavic Community. However, because of the doubts in the
realization of this idea, the Central Asian Republics decided to participate in the
CIS.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Central Asian
Union(CAU) From its inception, the CIS has been crippled by disputes as to its
very nature. Some member states believed that the CIS would provide a forum
for continued cooperation, while others have viewed the organisation as little
more than civilized 'divorce court' set up for the purpose of managing the break
up of the USSR. 3 Although fear of Russian domination has been unifying factor,
member states nonetheless differ in the way they wish to contain Russia's
preponderance. Kazakhstan, for example, would like to see the CIS exert more
control on Russia's action by formulation of set of common rules, while
Uzbekistan uses virtually every possible opportunity to oppose Russian
'integrationist' proposals, appearing to view them as a smokescreen for a
Russian hegemonic agenda.
After the participation in the CIS, the Presidents (except Tajikistan) came again
together in April 1992 in Bishkek and renewed their efforts of forming a more
extensive regional cooperation system. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kozirev also participated in this meeting as if he wanted to prove the
2
Martha B. Olcott, "Central Asia's Post Empire Politics', Orbis, Spring-1992, p.28.
165
effectiveness of Russia in the relations between the republics. However, in this
meeting also, the desired concrete steps could not be taken.
To counterbalance to Russian influence in the region, thereby reducing the role
played by the CIS still further, Uzbekistan has actively promoted structures
designed to facilitate economic cooperation among the Central Asian states. In
January 1994, at Tashkent's urging, the three governments of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan formed a "Common Economic Area" with the aim of
permitting the free circulation of capital goods and labour and establishing
common policies on credit, prices, taxes, customs and hard currency. The
Central Asian Union's structures include and interstate council comprised of three
countries presidents one of their prime ministers and another of their defense
ministers.
Since then, many meetings of the republics on the level of the presidents have
been held. In the process of cooperation, the first concrete step was the
establishment of the Common Central Bank a few years ago. This bank
continues at the moment to work on nearly twenty projects over 20 million
dollars. In this state of affairs, the process of cooperation has come to the phase
of working on establishing an economic union between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan in 1996. Turkmenistan stayed outside of this formation because
of its neutrality policy, which is also registered by the UN. In spite of willing to be
a part of such formations at the beginning Tajikistan stayed outside of these
movements because of its situation of political and economic indefiniteness.
3
See Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South, London, The Royal
Institute oflntemational Affairs, 1997.
166
5.1.2 Admission of Tajikistan
Later on, at a meeting of the presidents of the five Central Asian states convened
in January 1998 in Ashqabad, the participants discussed a possible enlargement
of CAU by bringing Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as members. Citing its
proclaimed neutrality, Turkmenistan declined the invitation to join but did not rule
out participating as an observer. Expressing the dissatisfaction with CIS,
Tajikistan president lmomali Rohmonov reiterated his country's wish to join the
CAU, in which it earlier had only observer status. It is interesting to note here that
Russia was not informed of the meeting in advance, which has held observer
states in CAU since July 1997.
A protocol of Tajikistan's admittance to the CAU was signed at a subsequent
summit meeting of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan in Tashkent on 29 March 1998. 4 In an interesting parallel development,
the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Belarus admitted
'Tajikistan to their quadripartite CIS Costumes Union less than a week later; on
April 1998, hereby signaling a possible move by Russia to contain Uzbekistan's
position in Tajikistan while maintain its own influence there.
In the· summit meeting organized by the president of the Republic of
Turkmenistan in Ashkabad in April 1999, the presidents of the Republics of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated and discussed
especially the topics regarding the use of water supplies in the region, regional
security, radical Islam, terrorism and narcotics.
1.67
Despite certain hopeful initiatives, the Central Asian Union is still far from fully
operational to establish strong intra-regional ties. The attempts to promote such
co-operations have inevitably suffered as members have sought wealthier
partners even outside the CAU to help reconstruct their own individual
economies. Although some headway has been made in establishing free trade,
the tariffs of the member state have still not been fully harmonized. Furthermore,
a lack of complementary among the economies of the member states limits the
prospect of substantial increase in intra-CAU trade. The ability of CAU to have
psychological edge over Russia got some jolt when three of its member states
acceded to another customs union within the CIS.
5.2 Factors Making Regional Cooperation Difficult
The Central Asian republics are young republics that gained their autonomy of
being real actors in international relationships only after 1990. After the
dispersion of the Soviet Union, they hold the control of their underground and up
ground sources for the first time and started the struggle to survive in the
international field. From this point of view, they did not have the wish to restrict
themselves concerning the definition of their foreign policies. They were not
willing enough to provide the common benefits through common initiatives.
Especially during the first years of independence, all the republics, even if they
had different ideas concerning the membership to the CIS, they behaved very
sensitively in the matter of their independence and they wanted to defend their
own interests without meeting any external pressure. Because they did not have
enough experience in international relations they behaved as pragmatically as
possible in the matters of foreign politics and they did not want to be tied up by a
4
"Tajikistan Joints Central Asia Economic Union", A Weekly Roundup ofMedia Reports Covered by BBC
168
cooperation movement, which might restrict their freedom of movement in these
matters. The wish of every country to define its own national interests and the
policies to provide these benefits by it, appeared as one of the factors which
might hinder the formation of cooperation between the republics. From this point
of view, as it was clear that the regional trade would be negatively affected if one
of these countries used its own monetary unit while in the inner regional trade the
Ruble was in use, the unilateral stand of Kyrgyzstan to mint and use Sam was an
example of putting national benefits above the regional.
5.2.1 Difference Originating due to Soviet Rule
The differences between the republics and the atmosphere of lack of confidence
created by the seventy years of Soviet administration were also causing
prol:>lems to the efforts towards cooperation. Furthermore, especially in the first
· years of independence, the contest for becoming a leading nation in the region
between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan had negatively affected the attempts for
cooperation. While Kazakhstan putting the argument for becoming a leader
nation to its characteristic of being a key nation between East and West and to its
close relations with Russia. Uzbekistan linked it to its having the greatest
population and to the characteristic of being the center of the region, a fact which
was also acknowledged by the Soviets. 5 In addition to this, leadership contest
between the two countries, Uzbekistan enjoys pre-eminence due to its population
and the existence of great numbers of Uzbek minorities in other countries.
At present, Uzbekistan has taken the lead in this contest from the point of view of
its uttering about political, security and cultural topics as well as about inner and
foreign politics and begun to provide important contributions to the works on
Monitoring, 23-29 March 1998, p.l.
5
Ronald Donnreuther, "Creating New States in Central Asia", Adelphi Paper, no. 288, Oxford, 1994, p.50.
169
regional cooperation.
5.2.2 Problem due to Delimitation
The artificially drawn borders of the republics with a characteristic that have
caused problems in political and ethnic matters are also elements, which make
the cooperation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan difficult. In this context,
Tajikistan's irredentist claim to take back Bukhara and Samarkand from
Uzbekistan, have caused many problems up to now and will continue to do.
The traditional hostility between the Tajiks and Uzbeks besides having origin in
conflicting claims over historical past is also rooted in the national delimitation of
boundaries in 1929. The demarcation of borders left a substantial Tajik
population in Uzbekistan and also the historical cities - Bukhara and Samarkand.
The Tajiks have still not been able to reconcile themselves' to the loss of two
historical cities. Tajik's enclaves in Uzbekistan are a potent source of ethnic
conflict and indeed nationalist talk has sometime widely been taken place about
recovering of Samarkand and Bukhara. This problem is so severe that even
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, once remarked "The one thing that could
possibly tear Central Asia apart is the issue of frontiers - those artificial
boundaries that was arbitrarily traced as early as 1924 ... If you want to pit one
republic against another you have to start talking about frontiers."
5.3 Uzbekistan's Role in Conflict in Tajikistan and Impact on Bilateral
Relations
Uzbekistan's role as a Central Asian regional power has been recognized since
the early days of Soviet rule. In 1925, politburo member Mikhail Kalinin exhorted
170
Uzbekistan's early communists to play hegemonic role in Central Asia and 'relate
to the neighboring republics as Moscow relates to you'. 6 Unlike other Central
Asian
countries,
Uzbekistan
alone
shares
boundaries
with
all
CARs
consequently, the then weight of Uzbek political and social culture, as well as the
country's size have certainly its impact on the day to day events of these
countries.
As far as situation goes in Tajikistan, it was possibly the least prepared of all the
Soviet republics for independence? Territorial, cultural and political cohesion
within the republic are weak. Communications between regions are poor, with
90% of republic covered with mountains. Clan networks have also influenced
political affiliation, reinforcing intra-Tajik divisions and inequalities.
The researcher has already discussed the various aspects of ethnic conflict in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in previous chapters. Hence the discussion brought to
the fore will only examine the involvement of Uzbekistan in Tajik civil war and
vice versa.
Although the conflict in Tajikistan was characterized by the Uzbekistan
leadership and the western media as a struggle between ex-Communist forces
and Islamic fundamentalist, the regional loyalties of various groups there
(northern Khojandis, southern Kulbis, Pamirs, Garmis etc.) and the uneven
6
D. Carlisle, "Geopolitics and Ethnic Problems: Uzbekistan and its Neighbours", in Yaacov Ro'i, ed.,
Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies, London, Frank Cass, 1995, p.77.
7
See M.B. Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security,
Washington, US Institute for Peace, 1996, pp.120-128, and also see Carlisle, n.6, p.83, for overviews of
Tajikistan's policies and regional division.
171
balance of central state power among them have played a more important role
than ideology. Since the out break of civil war in 1992, regional identities have
consolidated and any concept of unified national identity that may have existed
has been somewhat eroded.
The Khojand region in northern Tajikstan has large Uzbek population, is closely
connected - both culturally and economically - to Uzbekistan and enjoys the
patronage of Tashkent. In May 1992, Karimov played an active role in Tajikistani
politics to secure a Khojandi-Kulobi alliance and its dominant position in
Dushanbe's government; he also facilitated Moscow's decision to back the
alliance by means of military intervention. In November 1994, however, the
Kulobis staged parliamentary and presidential elections, after which they began
to drive the Khojandis from their positions in both central and local government.
Relations between the Tajikistan Uzbeks and Kulobi-dominated government in
Dushanbe worsened as the former increasingly came to perceive them as the
target of republic discrimination. 8
As early is November 1992, while discussions on the formation of CIS
peacekeeping force were being conducted, Uzbekistan was training and
equipping pro-Nabiev Ministry of interior force, under Safarali Kanjaeev, which
was crucial in removing the democratic-Islamic forces from Dushanbe, in
December 1992. The force was supplied from Termez (a military base in
Uzbekistan of strategic significance in Soviet occupation of Afghanistan) and
8
Return to Tajikistan: Continued and Regional Ethnic Tensions, Human Rights Watch I Helsinki Report,
vol.7, no.9, May 1995.
172
supported by Uzbekistani aircraft. 9 Since this action, Uzbekistan's involvement
has been regularly reported, including air attacks on opposition camp in
Afghanistan. These raids have since been legitimized by an inter-republic air
defense agreement. 10 These peacekeeping forces also aided government
operation and Uzbekistan has been criticized by Kyrgyzstan, a fellow contributor
to the peacekeeping operation for escalating tensions in the republic. 11
Uzbekistan's assistance on behalf of the popular front, during 1992-93, has been
described as the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the civil war. 12
Both Uzbekistan and Russia continued to aid Dushanbe and criticized the radical
nature of opposition. Since 1993 they have publicly urged the Rohmonov
government to enter into dialogue with United Tajikistan Opposition (UT0). 13
From
~pril
democratic
1995, Karimov entered into direct discussions with both the
and
Islamic
movement,
much
to
the
annoy
once
of
Dushanbe. 14Tajikistan has criticized the Uzbek authorities for not officially inform
leaders of Uzbek president Islam Karimov's meeting. And it was said that the
then action was counter to the spirit of relations between the countries. This
relation also got strained due to a reported intention of Uzbekistan's leadership to
withdraw its military contingent. Kangas has argued that Uzbekistan has been to
seen an end to the conflict because of the fear of the export of violence from
9
See M. Orr, "The Russian Anny and the war in Tajikistan", Conflict Studies Research Paper, K21,
February 1996, p.3, as quoted in Stuart Horsman "Uzbekistan's Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 199297: Domestic Consideration", Centra/Asian Survey, vol.l8, no. I, 1999, pp.38-39.
10
K. Martin, "Tajikistan: Civil War Without End", RFEIRL, vol. 2, no.33, p.22.
11
SWB/SU/2225, 20 January 1995, p.G/5.
12
D. Straub, "Uzbekistan and Intervention in Tajikistan", Unpublished Paper; University of Minnesota,
1997, as quoted inK. Martin, n.lO, p.5.
13
SWB/SU/2279, 17 Apri11995, p.G/2.
14
SWB/SU/2269, 4 Apri11995, p.G/2; SWB/SU/2271, 6 April1995, p.G/2; SUB/SU/2272, 7 Apri11995,
p.G/2. Not only that, President Karimov also hold talks with US envoy to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on
regional security in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan. SWB/SU/2288, 27 Aprill995, p.G/5.
173
Tajikistan. 15 He argued that Karimov's concern (over the regional implications of
the war) have been validated by the January (1996) military uprisings in
Tajikistan and the breakdown of talks between the Tajik government and
opposition'. 16 Whilst not denying that Uzbekistan is concerned about the
situation, Kangas's comment, that Karimov's fear have been justified by January
uprisings seem difficult to reconcile with Uzbekistan's reported that Beimatov's
force were previously camped in Uzbekistan before their assault which suggests
that Tashkent at least did not prevent their return to Tajikistan. It is also reported
that Beimatov's forces received military aid from their host during the winter of
1995-96. 17
An attempted assassination on Rohmonov, in May 1997, led to further
accusations of Uzbekistani involvement, a charge Tashkent denied. 18 Relation
between two states were further tested by reports that Uzbekistani border guards
and elements of its military provided assistance and sanctuary for a second
rebellion by Khudaberdiyev and armed clashes between Tajik government troops
and unidentified troops, in October 1997, along the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan
border. 19
Similar accusations of interference in the affairs of Afghanistan also discredit
Uzbekistan's self publicized role as guarantor of stability. Practice has been
inconsistent with Uzbekistani policy statements on pursuing a policy of peaceful
15
R. Kangas, "Taking the Lead in Central Asian Security", Transitions, vol.2, no.9, 3 May1996, p.54.
ibid.
17
Labyrinth, vol.3, no.l, 1996, p.8.
18
SWB/SU/2908, 2 May 1997, p.G/2,.
19
RFE!RL, Newsline, vol.l, no.l47, 27 October 1997; FBIS-UMA-97-300. The unidentified groups may
have been refugees returning from Afghanistan, via Uzbekistan.
16
174
settlement to the conflict. The republic established close links with the antiTaliban commander, General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek?0
This led to another downstream in relation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Two prior uprisings in February 1996 and August 1997 has also been staged by
the rebel commander, whose main bases of support are in Kurgan Tyube and
Khojand regions. On all three occasions Khudoiberdiev was said to have invaded
from camps located inside Uzbekistan; a close associate of Khudoiberdiev,
Quosim Boboev, was reported to have testified upon voluntarily surrendering to
the Tajikistan authorities that the commander had been receiving support from
the Uzbekistani military, though not necessarily with the knowledge of
Uzbekistan's top leadership?1 But again in early 1999, it was suspected that
Khudoiberdiev's rebel forces are making preparation . in border areas of
Uzbekistan, bordering on Leninabad region. 22 Both 'the Uzbekistani foreign
ministry and Karimov himself denied that rebels had used their national territory,
implying that such accusations were attempts by both the Tajikistani government
and Russia to play 'Uzbek card'?3
Tashkent's concern regarding the conflict in Tajikistan has not been eased by
what it perceives as the threat to stability emanating from Afghan conflict. This
escalated dramatically following the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in the
Autumn of 1996, at which time Uzbekistan stationed elite military units along its
156-kilomter border with Afghanistan. Regarding the northern regions of
20
G. Bowzke, "Enemy Forces Unite for Final Attack on Afghan Leader", Guardian, 11 March 1994, p.15.
"Tashkent Devices Links to Armed Uprisings in Tajikistan", Inside Central Asia: A Weekly Round-up of
Media Reports covered by BBC Monitoring, 27 October- 2 November 1997, p.l.
22
SWB/SU/3404, 20 February 1999, p.G/2.
23
ibid.
21
175
Afghanistan as buffer of stability between the country and the CIS, 24 President
Karimov called for open support for General Abdurrashid Dostun's forces there at
a summit of the presidents of the Central Asian states and Russian Prime
Minster Victor Chernomyrdin in October 1996. 25 Though denying that Tashkent
has ever provided Dostum with any military assistance, Karimov has openly
admitted supplying electric power, grain, medicine and other humanitarian aid to
the regions controlled by the ethnic Uzbek-war lord, 26 who has been leading a
counter offensive against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan and has presented
himself as a warrior against Islamic fundamentalism.
Rather than call for a Russian led military alliance to counter the Taliban,
Karimov's proposal for a multilateral initiative- that would include United States
and Russia - was in keeping with his general effort to curtail Russian influence in
this region. Karimov's government also hopes to replace Russia as the key in the
resolution of the Tajik conflict, particularly in the light of Moscow's continued
military presence in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Russia has cited that the conflict as
a reason why Tashkent should allow it to station its troops on Uzbekistan's
external border - a suggestion that Karimov has resolutely opposed.
The coming of power in Tajikistan of prominent pro-Islamic members of the Tajik
opposition has given Tashkent an added incentive to increase its leverage with
Tajikistani government by forging closer ties with president Rohmonov 27. To that
24
Lena Janson, "The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy", Discussion Paper, no.74, London, The
Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs, 1998, p.37.
25
See Zalamy Khalizad, "Afghanistan 1995: Civil War and Mini Great Game", Asian Survey, February
1996.
26
ibid.
27
Upon his return to Tajikistan in February 1998, following five years of exile in Iran, deputy UTO leader
Turajonzoda stated that the referendum should be held to replace the word 'secular government' with
popular government in the Tajikistani constitution in the country's political process, a declaration that
heightened Karimov's concerns regarding the official return of the UTO in Tajikistan Polity.
176
end, the Tajikistani President made a 'working visit' to Tashkent in January 1998,
at which he and Karimov were said to have reached 'full agreement' on such
matters as the status of Russian troops in Tajikistan, and conditions on the Tajik
Afghan border. 28
But later on in the year November 1998, an unsuccessful uprising was reported
in northern Tajikistan, which was said to have launched attack from the territory
of neighbouring Uzbekistan sixteen captured rebels were quoted as tilling that
they were moved to Afghanistan via the Uzbek border town and underwent
several months of military training there on the instructions of Khudoyberdiyev_29
But Karimov himself denied this accusation. 30 Here this is important to note that
Karimov went on saying that Russian intelligence services were stirring up
trouble between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russian Federal Security Services
(FSB) immediately denied that allegation. 31
Relations took a new turn with Uzbekistan announcement of republic's intention
to withdraw from the CIS collective security treaty. 32 Prior to this action,
Uzbekistan withdrew its battalion serving with CIS peacekeeping force in
Tajikistan. 33 . As a result, the relation became so strenuous that Uzbekistan
authorities reported to have said that Uzbekistan would not restrict itself to covert
support for the anti-Rohmonov or opposition but will come out in the open as its
main sponsor. 34
28
See Izvestiia, 6 January 1998.
SWB/SU/3397, November 1998, p.G/1.
30
SWB/SU/3399, 2 December 1998, p.G/1.
31
ibid, G/2; CDSP, vol.50, no.48, 1998, p.18.
32
SWB/SU/3452, February 1999, p.G/1.
33
SWB/SU/3388, 19 November 1998, p.G/2.
34
SWB/SU/3352, 6 February 1999, p.G/2.
29
177
5.4 Security Dialogue
This led Tashkent to review of the entire collective security system. Actually, it
was the result of Uzbekistan announcement of withdrawing from collective
security treaty that prompted Tajikistan and Russia to accelerate efforts to come
out with a new treaty. It gave the 201 st motorized infantry division the status of
military base. 35 Though no official comment was made on this agreement by
Uzbekistan, but according to various independents sources, it invited an
extremely negative and excessively emotional reaction of the Uzbek leader". This
negative reaction caused some annoyance among Tajik leaders. High-ranking
sources at the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs told /tar- Tass "Uzbekistan should
finally accept the idea that Tajikistan is a sovereign state, and not an
autonomous area within its influential neighbours". 36 Uzbekistan immediately
responded to this and President Karimov himself reiterated that Tajikistan has
any right to conclude agreement. This is just an attempt to set Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan against each other. 37
Uzbekistan-Tajikistan relation suffered another set back in August 1999, when
Tajikistan accused Uzbekistan of carrying out air raids. The bombing on
mountainous areas of Tajikistan caused a negative reaction among Tajik
society_38
35
36
37
38
CDSP, vol.51, no.14, 1999, p.20.
SWB/SU/3507, 13 April 1999, p.G/4.
ibid.
SWB/SU/3617, 19 August 1999, p.G/1.
178
After this event, particular attention was paid to the matter of repatriating the
Uzbek citizen, who went to Tajikistan following the February 16th bombings in
Tashkent and amongst them there were supposed to be leaders and supporters
of Uzbek Islamic opposition who were temporarily living in number of areas of
Qaroteigin zone of Tajikistan. 39
Though Uzbek Foreign Ministry denied this allegation but later on they went on
saying that they were really concerned about the military training of various
terrorist group in the different parts of Tajikistan. They also hinted about stringent
action against them. 40
5.6 Taiik Problem and Uzbekistan's Concern
For the CARs, which had llewly ·gained their independences, it was more difficult
to cooperate in the matters of security than to cooperate in economic affairs.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the acquiring of a distinctively
national-overtone complicated the efforts for meeting the menace of common
threat to their security. Instead, they started perceiving each other as their
enemy. Under these circumstances, it was not easy to develop cooperation.
Moreover, their continued dependence on Russia further aggravated the situation
because of its own game plan.
Uzbekistan has understandable concerns about the situation in neighbouring
Tajikistan. The instability in the state has implications for regional security,
including smuggling of arms, drug trafficking and training of insurgent by hostile
forces.
39
ibid.
179
Uzbekistan's political elite regards the strengthening and maintenance or regional
stability as the paramount objective of the republics security policy. 41 The
possibility of fragmentation of Uzbekistan similar to what occurred in Tajikistan is
a realistic concern for Tashkent. Limited identification with the state due to
regional clan and ethnic divisions and the establishment of Islamic local
government in Ferghana Valley, 1991-92, endorse these fears. 42
Tashkent also criticizes Dushanbe's discrimination towards minorities. Whether it
is a genuine concern or it is Uzbekistan's attempt to use the issue of Uzbek
Diaspora for exerting pressure on the Rohmonov administration. Its modest
interventions on behalf of the minority may also suggest that Tashkent is fearful
of transforming the Tajik situation into a Tajik-Uzbek struggle, consolidating
~
Tajik national identity with an 'external' enemy such a policy would also have
implications for ethnic relations in Uzbekistan.
The situation in Tajikistan is without doubt a security concern for Uzbekistan, but
there is a credibility gap between rhetoric and practice. Numerous domestic and
international analysts have criticized Tashkent for exaggerating the regional
threat of Islamic fundamentalism and Tajik nationalism, emanating from the Tajik
conflict. 43 Akayev argues that even if there were calls from within Tajikistan for
the integration of Tajik populated territory in Uzbekistan, the former does not
have 'the human or material resources to maintain a successful challenge to its
40
ibid, p.G/2.
P. Petersen, "Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia", European Security, vol., no.l, p.l34.
42
See Carlisle, n.6, for regional divisions of Uzbekistan and their political implications.
43
A. Polat, "Political Prisoners in Uzbekistan: Five Pardoned, Eight on Trial", Central Asian Monitor,
no.6, 1996, p.36.
41
.
180
larger neighbours and dismisses Karimov's fears of overspill from the Tajik
conflict. 44
These accusations are strengthened by the discrepancies between the republics,
official declaration and its physical involvement in the conflict and also the close
co-relation between government's attitudes towards Tajikistan and domestic
opponents. In the case of former, Alimov claims that Uzbekistan, and Karimov in
particular, have been consistent and key actor in seeking a peaceful negotiated
solution to the conflict. Amongst the peace proposals are embargoes on arms
supplies to the combatants, and intolerance of any pressure or intervention from
external parties. 45 These have been circumvented by Uzbekistan. One example
of this was Uzbekistan's two-month long refusal to sign Tewzan Protocol in April
1997, as a guarantor of Tajikistan's post war peace. Karimov argued that
Uzbekistan was not prepared to take on this role, suggesting that this was
responsibility of Russia, the USA or EU. 46
5.7 Environment Based Problem Between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the effect of the distribution and quality
of water on the political and economic development of the newly independent
Central Asian states has become more pronounced. These countries now have
total control over their own water resources. In addition, because most rivers and
streams in Central Asia flow across boundaries separating these states from one
another and from neighbouring countries, water management involves new ties
and coordination among the newly independent Central Asian states as well as
with their neighbours. Finite land resources, an arid climate contributing to limited
44
Shirin Akiner, "Conflict, Stability and Development in Central Asia", in C.J. Dicks, ed., Instabilities In
Post Communist Europe, Portsmouth, Carmichael & Sweet, 1996, p.l3.
45
K. Alimov, "Uzbekistan & Foreign Policy: In Search of Strategy" in R Sagdeev and S. Eisenhower, eds.,
Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change, CPSS, Chevy Chase, 1995, pp.191-192.
181
annual and seasonal water availability, and poorly defined and demarcated
borders may increase the potential for natural resource-related problems.
5.7.1 Physical Geography and Water
The Aral Sea basin of Central Asia extends across areas that are included within
the newly independent republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, two southern provinces (Oblasts) of Kazakhstan (Qyzlorda and
Ongtustik), and parts of northern Afghanistan and northeastern Iran. The basin's
population of over 32 million occupies approximately 1.5 million square
kilometers (km 2) of territory; population density varies from less than 10 persons
per km 2 in the desert plains in the west to over 300 in the valleys and foothills of
the mountains in the east and the south. 47
Only through diversion of water from the Syr Oarya, Amu Oarya, and Zeravshan
rivers and their tributaries enough water is available for agricultural, industrial,
and personal uses of most of the Central Asian region. The Syr Oarya, Amu
Darya and Zeravshan rivers are fed by seasonal snow and ice melt from high
mountain areas in their respective drainage basins to the south and the east. The
Syr Oarya and Amu Oarya flow out of the Tyan Shan and Pamir mountains,
respectively, northward through their alluvial valleys onto the flat expanse of the
Qoraqum (Kara Kum) and Qyzlqum (Kyzl Kum) deserts before forming deltas
where their energy dissipates upon emptying into the Aral Sea. Mean annual
natural volume of flow of the Amu Oarya, at 69.5 cubic kilometers (km 3 ), is
roughly twice that of Syr Oarya. 48
5.7.2 Water Use
46
See RFEIRL Newsline, vol.1, no.81, 25 July 1997.
David R. Smith, "Environmental Security and Shared Water Resources in Post Soviet Central Asia", Post
Soviet Geography, vol.36, no.6, 1995, p.354.
48
ibid.
47
182
Although some attention has been paid to conflict caused by the scarcity of
water. Water is limited in its availability in three major ways:
•
Growing population consume water through personal, agricultural, and
industrial use;
•
Regional water supplies are used more rapidly than they are renewed;
and
•
Access to water supplies becomes more concentrated in the hands of few.
Much less water is used and consumed by the upstream republics of Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan than their downstream counterparts. With a population of twice
that of its neighbours, Uzbekistan alone uses three-fifths of regional water
supplies.
5. 7.3 Water Based Conflicts
As 'noted by Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, "We already have dozens of
water based conflicts over land and water", there already have been numerous
small scales, and water based conflict in Central Asia. One of the focal point was
on Ferghana basin; in which parts of three republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan) straddle the middle course of the Syr Darya, and along the lower
course of the Amu Darya delta near the southern source of Aral Sea.
The problem with the new CARs was that their inability to change the water
balance arranged during the Soviet days. An alteration in that balance could
promote hostility among the users of Amu and Syr Darya and of Aral Sea. The
most important challenge of ecological problem was the drying of Aral Sea. The
construction of massive irrigation projects have led to a decrease in the flow of
water from the feeder rivers, Amu and Syr Darya to the Aral Sea, the later not
reaching the sea.
183
As reported in the Economist (London), "Tajikistan as an upstream state believes
itself as a rightful owner of all water flowing from its territory and is doggedly
seeking payment of water used by Uzbekistan. After all, argues Tajik, Uzbekistan
charges for its gas it supplies to them and it cuts of the supply for long periods if
payments are not made. Conversely, Uzbek accuses Tajik of contaminating the
water with industrial and agricultural pollutants, as well as sewage, thus
spreading disease in Uzbekistan". 49
Hydrologists acquainted with the problem assert that water level of the Aral Sea
has fallen by 13.5 meters between 1957 and 1984. 50 The desiccation of Aral Sea
according to meteorologists is adversely affecting the environment and inducing
climatic changes. Professor Habibulaev, the then chairman of Uzbek Academy of
Science estimated that between 15-17 million tons of sand and silt are being
deposited over the cotton field and cities of Central Asia. Secondly, water
resources being heavily committed to irrigation, the population started to face
acute shortage of drinking water. A committee to save the Aral had been formally
formed and this committee mobilized the public opinion to force the government
to establishment of special commission to examine the Aral Sea problem. 51
Thus the economic and ecological concern has been transformed into issues of
national. importance. Because of mobilisation of Uzbek people took place on
ethno-nationalist lines on matters, which are considered to be crucial for all round
development and well being of Uzbek people as a whole. More so, the Uzbek
intelligentsia took this opportunity to call for a review of economic relationship
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and sought to bring changes in the structure
of economic relations.
49
50
"Tajikistan's Water Politics", The Economist (London), 14 July 1996, p.29.
ibid.
184
Breakthrough was achieved only in 1997 in this regard when, the presidents of
the Central Asian states issued a declaration setting out measures to deal with
the environmental problems of the Aral Sea. In the document, which was issued
at the end of their summit in Alma-Ata on 28th February52 , the presidents
declared 1998 a year of environmental protection in the Central Asian region.
They also envisaged preparation of a comprehensive programme for dealing with
environmental problems and combating nuclear pollution, and appealed to the
UN for aid to the people of the Aral Sea basin, who they said were in "a crisis
situation". They also called on international organizations to help in the
preparation of a draft convention on the development of the Aral Sea basin. 53.
5.7.4 The Alma-Ata Declaration
Confirming
our adherence to the
regulations
of the
UN
International
Environmental Programme -"The agenda for the 21st Century'' -and thoroughly
supporting the aspiration of the people to prepare and implement a single
strategy for resolute development of the Central Asian countries. They also
agreed to earlier adopted obligations regarding large - scale cooperation on the
international and interstate levels.
They also called on the UN and its sp.ecializes agencies to turn their attention to
the crisis situation in the Aria! Sea basin and undertake active measures in
environmental protection in that region, especially focusing on measures to
provide aid to the needy in the Arial Sea zone.
51
A detailed examination of the Aral Sea problem can be found in CDSP, voLXXXIX, no. 50, p.ll.
SWB/SU/2864, 11 May 1997, p.G/1.
53
ibid.
52
185
5.8 Pragmatic Approach Between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
The relations between the republics, which had to face many economic problems
together with the collapse of the economic system, had been controlled from the
center during the Soviet era. In obtaining the necessary foreign investments and
aids to be able to get rid of these problems, is also a situation, which hinders
cooperation among Central Asian republics. As the economies of the countries of
the region are not complementary, they have chosen the direction of providing
development by establishing relations directly with foreign countries and
multinational companies, instead of the frame of cooperation between them. 54 As
economic factors instead of cultural and religious ones are gaining importance as
determining elements in international relationships, it is not difficult to understand
this situation developing among the Central Asian Republics.
But even then, physical proximity of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has forced both
the countries to carve their relationship more delicately and continuously. More
so, the historical past of the countries also gave them extra cultural affinity. And
last but not the least, the Soviet domination and their national delimitation policy
left them in such a situation that they are bound to go beyond the limit of CAU to
serve their interest.
Tajikistan formed the part of Uzbekistan till 1924 when it was made on
autonomous republic. This division, part of Stalin's 'nationality' plan, was aimed to
solve the issue of straddling ethnic minorities in each other's territories. 55
Traditionally, Uzbeks have a nomadic ancestry and are known for their fighting
54
55
Shafiqul Islam, "Capitalism on the Silk Route", Current History, vol.93, no. 582, April1994, p.158.
Dr. M. Hasan Nuri, "Tajikistan in the 1990s", Regional Studies, vol. XIV, no.4, Autumn-1996, p.36.
186
powers. Over a long period of time, they have maintained their supremacy over
predominantly sedentary city-dwelling Tajiks. 56
Due to their historical past and physical proximity it is essential for Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan to cultivate good relationship with each other. Not only that ethnic
composition of both the states also compel them to have a good access to each
other's country. Sectoral development of Soviet regime has made all the CARs to
look upon each other. And last but not the least only economic development of
both the countries are the only way to give them prosperity. Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan stress their firm intention to ensure the steady development and
strengthening of all round friendly relations, bilateral cooperation and goodneighbourly relations, which are beneficial to both peoples.
After initial failure of CIS, both countries have started to try to develop and extend
relations and comprehensive cooperation, the principles of which are set out in
the agreement on friendship, good-neighbourly relations and technological and
cooperation between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan of
4th January 1993. 57
Acknowledging that there is an urgent need for implementing practical measures
for consolidating economic relations and technological and scientific and cultural
cooperation, they took the initiatives to joint endeavours aimed at establishing
and consolidating peace and stability in the region
56
On this see Maria Eva Subtelny, "The Symbiosis of Turks Tajiks" in Beatrice F. Menz, ed., Central Asia
In Historical Perspective, Karachi, Vanguard Books, 1996, pp.45-61.
57
SWB/SU/2141, 1 November 1994, p.G/1.
187
Emphasizing the strengthening of cooperation within the framework of the
Commonweal
the
Independent
States they
agreed
to
have
economic
cooperation. Areas of industry, energy, transport, communications, agriculture,
production of raw minerals and technology as well as in tourism and ecology
were identified to be covered.
In order to ensure the implementation of these decisions, the leaders of the two
countries have instructed their governments to draw up an agreement on further
development of cooperation in the fields of science, culture, technology,
education, health, information and sport.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are of opinion that development of corporation in. the
field of technology must promotes unhindered relations between ·scientific
research, enterprises and project and construction workshops on both sides, in
particular in carrying out programmes and joint investigations in the preferred
fields of science and advanced technology. They are also trying to extend long
term relations between the academies o sciences and scientific enterprises and
the wide exchange of technological information as well as educating and
exchanging scientists.
Both the countries have agreed to establish economic cooperation at the
government and administration level in banking, finance and in the fields of the
economy, factories and in all kinds of ownership. With this intention they will
develop measures in preparing the necessary economic and legal conditions.
5.9 Possible Areas Of Cooperation
188
However, in view of unresolved political and ethnic reasons it does not seem
possible that relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will make a long stride
in near future. In spite of these problems there are several areas for the solution
of common problems present between both the republics.
In the post Soviet era, some problems in the energy sector of the region existed
due to the collapse of the communist system At one side, the petroleum
production decreased, at the other side the scarcity of the foreign exchange
reserves brought several problems together with it. Consequently, a regional
cooperation in this field could help the Central Asian Republics especially
Tajikistan. The supply of gas and coal of Uzbekistan on easy terms can provide
the Tajikistan sufficient energy.
Another field of cooperation between the Republics exists in the matter of the
solution of problems concerning the environment. The Republics can cooperate
especially in the matter of the protection of the Aral Sea situated between
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The countries of the region have established a fund
and devised a five years environmental strategy for the protection of the Aral
Sea. However, progress in this venture has been slow
On the other side, water is the scarcest source in Central Asia and structurally
not distributed equally between the Republics. Substantial portion of water is in
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with little agricultural areas. Consequently, the
Republics have to cooperate in the matters of providing a systematic need-based
distribution of the water and establishing more efficient irrigation systems.
The efforts in regional economic cooperation can be effective in the form of wider
regional
co-operations
among
Central
Asian
republics.
The
Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO) represents an example of this kind of
189
formations. However, there are different arguments stated concerning the role
ECO plays in the region. In this context, while there is a group who evaluates
ECO as an important economic force of the 21st century because of its strong
market of 300 million and its untouched sources, there is another group which
finds ECO insufficient and unsuccessful because of its lack of success in the past
and the ideological and political differences between the member countries. 58
However, for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who do not have sea-coasts, can look for
other countries for way outs.
To develop cooperation between the countries, especially Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, they have to end the ethnic and political problems and give up using
the minorities living in their territories as leverage.
58
Mehrdad Haghayaghi, "Economic Cooperation Organisation: A Preliminary Assessment", Central Asia
Monitor, no.l, 1995, p.l4.
·