Under Which Conditions does Environmental Migration Lead to Conflict in
Receiving Communities? The Role of the State and its Degree of Conflict
Involvement
Marlene Grundström
BSIS Journal of International Studies, Vol 7 (2010)
The BSIS Journal of International Studies is published by the Brussels School of
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1. Introduction
Today, there are quite a few conflict prevention strategies which specifically
address the challenges that environmental migration poses for receiving
communities. However, as environmental migration is likely to increase with
climate change, it is increasingly crucial to understand which factors affect the risk
of conflict and how conflict ultimately can be prevented.
This paper will analyze the role of environmental migration and its link to conflict in
receiving communities. It will evaluate which factors increase the likelihood of
environmental migration, leading to conflict in the receiving area, looking
particularly at the role of governance and state involvement in conflict patterns.
Some recent scholars have argued that the enhanced migration flows due to
environmental and climatic change will inevitably lead to a rise in conflicts, due to
conflicts with the receiving communities. Among these scholars, some seem to
imply that the propensity for conflict in areas receiving environmental migrants is
in fact higher than for other types of migration. This paper will argue that whilst
conflict as a result of environmental migration is a possibility, it is by no means
inevitable.
The paper will employ two case studies which have been frequently cited as
examples of conflicts caused by environmental migration – India / Bangladesh and
Senegal / Mauretania – to show that, as one of several factors, the level of state
involvement before conflict and in escalating conflict patterns in the receiving
community can be of great importance for determining whether conflicts will arise
and how they develop, and is a key intervening variable in the environmental
migration/conflict nexus.
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The paper will build on existing research on the complex link between
environmental change – migration – conflict, and attempt to fill certain gaps
regarding the role of governance and state involvement in conflict and pre-conflict
patterns in receiving states. The study is thus interesting from an academic
perspective, drawing upon theories of migration, conflict prevention and
environmental change, but also from a more practical conflict prevention
perspective, particularly as environmental degradation and migration are predicted
to increase along with climate change. The paper will be guided by the research
question:
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What is the role of state involvement in conflict and pre-conflict patterns in
receiving countries in explaining the link between environmental migration
and conflict?
2. Definitions & Limitations
Environmental migration
‘Environmental migration’ is a highly debated concept for which there is no
universal definition. This paper will build on Dun & Gemmene’s approach1,
recognizing that environmental change may interplay with economic, conflict and
other factors in causing migration. Thus, the analysis is not limited to cases where
environmental factors can be isolated as a sole cause of migration, but rather
Dun & Gemmene make a distinction between those who define environmental migration
narrowly, where environmental factors are viewed as exclusive causes of migration lows
(alarmists), and those who define it more broadly, viewing environmental factors as one of
many reasons why migrants move, and impossible to separate from other factors (sceptics).
See Dun, Olivia and Gemmene, François, ‘Defining Environmental Migration’ (2008) 31
Forced Migration Review 10.
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include cases where environment has been identified as one of several factors
resulting in migration. This definition is also more in line with the sceptical
approach and analytical framework employed later on in the study, emphasizing the
complexity of the causal mechanisms in the environment-migration-conflict nexus.
Conflict
‘Conflict’ in this paper will be defined in a rather broad way, without a requirement
of one of the parties to be the state, along with the Heidelberg Institute’s definition
of conflict as: “…the clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values
of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups,
states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests
and win their cases.”2
A potential weakness of this definition is that it is rather vague and not quantitative
through, for example, a minimum number of battle deaths or the like. However, for
the purposes of this study, which are partly explorative and concern a rather new
field of conflict prevention, it would not be suitable to have a very narrow definition
of conflict. A further narrowing down and distinction between different types of
conflict could be a suitable step for further research.
Link between environmental migration and conflict
The link between environmental migration and conflict has been divided into two
distinct categories: the indirect link, where environmental degradation leads to
conflict in the sending area, leading to migration, or the direct link, where
Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (ed.), “Conflict barometer 2005.
Crisis, wars, coups d’état, negotiations, mediations, peace settlements” (2005) Heidelberg.
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environmental degradation leads to migration, which in turn leads to conflict in the
receiving area.3 This paper will mainly focus on the latter, direct link between
environmental migration and conflict, i.e. conflict in receiving areas.
Broader relevance of the study in conflict prevention
One limitation of the scope of the paper which must also be mentioned is that it
focuses on the role of governance and the state level in the context of environmental
migration and conflict specifically. As there are relatively few studies which focus on
the state level in this specific context, there are not a great deal of theories on
exactly how governance and state interventions matter to prevent conflict in
receiving communities. As a result, the theoretical approach and analytical tool
must be kept quite broad and open in order to not exclude any functions of the state
which may be important in this context. As a result, this poses certain limitations on
the extent to which this paper can contribute to the much wider debate on how the
state and governance matter in conflict prevention in general, and to which extent it
can build upon some of the more detailed lessons which have already been learned
in this context.
3. Theoretical approaches: Environmentally-Induced Migration as a
Source of Conflict?
Warnecke, Andrea, Tänzler, Dennis and Vollmer, Ruth: ‘Climate Change, Migration and
Conflict: Receiving Communities under Pressure?’ (2010) GMFUS Study-Team on ClimateInduced Migration, Briefing Paper, 1
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Within recent political and academic debates, from an environment security
perspective, environmental and climate change-induced migration has been
portrayed as one of the emerging major future global security challenges. Some
scholars who argue that environmental migration has a high risk of leading to
conflict in receiving areas argue along neo-Melthusian lines, claiming that a scarcity
of natural resources has a very high likelihood of leading to conflict in general.4
Whilst environmental degradation in the environment-migration-conflict nexus is
assumed to exist mainly in the sending area, several scholars also argue that in
cases of environmental migration, environmental degradation and natural resource
shortages are likely to also affect the receiving area.5 It is against this background
that some of the environmental conflict arguments are also relevant when
migration is an intermediary factor, linking the environmental degradation and the
conflict. Based upon this assumption, Matthew argues that migration is the ‘key
linkage’ between environmental degradation and conflict as migrants end up in
‘marginal environments’ where hostilities are likely to emerge.6
Another reason why environmental and climate change-induced migration is
predicted to have a higher likelihood of inducing conflict than other types of
Thomas Homer-Dixon is one of the strongest proponents of such an argument, and has
been widely acclaimed in the environmental security discourse. He argues that
demographic change and population growth leads to increased pressure on natural
resources, which leads to degradation, competition and often violence. Sachs employs a
similar perspective, using the drought and subsequent violence in the Horn of Africa as an
example. See Homer-Dixon, Thomas ‘Environmental scarcities and violent conflict:
Evidence from cases,’ (1994) 19 (1) International Security 5; See also Sachs, j. (2008) ‘Land,
Water & Conflict’, Newsweek July 7-14
5 Reuveny, Rafael ‘Environmental Change, Migration and Conflict: Theoretical Analysis and
Empirical Explorations’ (2005) Human Security and Climate Change, An International
Workshop, Holmen Fjord Hotel, Asker, 6; Warnecke et al. 2
6 Matthew, Richard A. ‘Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge’ (2008)
International Peace Institute 4
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migration, according to some scholars, is the sheer magnitude of environmental
migration flows.7 Since environmental migrants are assumed to be particularly
dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods, and environmental changes
have the potential to ‘push’ large numbers of people into migration in short time
periods.8
This assumption has appeared to influence policy-makers during the past years,
who have identified environmental migration as one of the major security risks of
the future. The link between environmental migration and conflict has been made
by the Nobel Committee9, UN Security Council10 and the IPCC11, among others,
during the first decade of the 21st century.12
However, during recent years, the assumption that environmental and climate
change-induced migration has a direct augmenting effect on conflict has been
criticized for being exaggerated, simplistic and outright incorrect. Whilst the
magnitude of environmental migration in the future indeed may cause additional
challenges which are currently not evoked by other types of migration, there
Reuveny 6
This argument is also supported by Myers’ frequently cited predictions of the vast
magnitude of future environmental migration and his portrayal of these as a central
security challenge. See Myers, Norman ‘Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon
of the 21st Century’ (2001) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B358
9 The Nobel Committee’s explanation for the Nobel Prize awarded to Al Gore and the IPCC
in 2007 highlighted climate change-induced migration as a security risk; excerpt in
Kolmannskog, Vikram Odedra ‘Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change,
Conflict and Forced Migration’ (2008) Norwegian Refugee Council Report, Oslo, Norway
10 The UN Security Council discussed climate change as a security risk in April 2007. During
the debate, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon repeatedly made the causal link between
climate change-induced migration and conflict. Security Council 5663rd Meeting (AM & PM);
Security Council Holds First Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security
Hearing Over 50 Speakers
11 IPCC 2001; For critique of the previous IPCC narrow definition of vulnerability in the face
of climate change, see Raleigh, Clionadh; Jordan, Lisa and Salehyan, Idean ‘Assessing the
Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict’ (2008) World Bank Social Dimensions
of Climate Change Series, World Bank, Washington DC, 3, 4
12 Empirical examples often cited as evidence of the link between environmental migration
and conflict include the Sahel, Darfur and Somalia. See Matthew 1; Kolmannskog 18
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appears to be little reason to believe that environmental migration per se is
inherently more conflict-prone than other types of migration.
One common criticism has been directed against the current tendency of
‘securitization of climate change’, which has implications also in the way
environmentally and climate change-induced migration is portrayed. Brown,
Hammill and McLeman argue that there is little empirical evidence of the links
between climate change, security and conflict, and that ‘the present securitization of
climate change is supported for the most part by anecdotal research into developing
regions where conflict has been triggered by chronic scarcity caused by
environmental change.’13
Other critiques stem from migration scholars, arguing that environmental-security
specialists do not fully grasp the complexities of migration and tend to exaggerate
its negative impact.14 Whilst there is some anecdotal evidence that conflict has
erupted in communities receiving environmental refugees, the causal mechanisms
are still under fierce debate.
Built upon the criticisms raised above, broader critiques of the assumption that
environmental migration leads to conflict emphasize the importance of intervening
variables and contextual factors, which determine whether the relationship
Brown, Oli, Hammill, Anne & McLeman, Robert ‘Climate change as the ‘new’ security
threat: implications for Africa’ (2007) 83 (6) International Affairs 1147; see also Barnett, J.
and Adger, N ‘Climate change, human security and violent conflict’ (2007) 26 Political
Geography 63. Barnett and Adger argue that the linkages made in public discourse on
climate change and conflict are too simplistic, and that ‘climate change factors do not cause
violent conflict, but rather merely affect the parameters that are sometimes important in
generating violent conflict’, including governance capacity.
14 See for example Guilmoto, C. ‘Institutions and migrations: Short-term versus long-term
moves in rural West Africa’ (1998) 52(1) Population Studies 85; Raleigh et al 35.
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between host communities and environmental migrants will be cooperative or
conflictual.15
Critiques have also risen from the fact that many overarching theories disregard
local and contextual factors. Many scholars within conflict prevention in general,16
and amongst critics of the macro-perspective of environmental security doctrines in
particular, emphasize the importance of the local level as key for understanding the
mechanisms of conflict. A focus on local actors has also gained ground in studies of
the environment-migration-conflict nexus specifically.17
Whilst local communities’ ability to adapt to the new circumstances of
environmental migration is an important factor, this ability to adapt may in fact
diminish as a result of global environmental change. As Tänzler argues, the local
level is not unimportant, but the ‘coping capacities of communities’ may recede with
intensified environmental degradation as a result of climate change, and traditional
Reuveny points out that the link is not automatic, but depends among other things upon
the receiving population’s dependency on natural resources for their livelihoods, poverty
levels and technological advancement, as well as local environmental factors. See Reuveny
20. Other scholars emphasize the type of environmental change, the type and duration of
migration and demographic features in receiving communities as key factors which must be
taken into account Raleigh et al, 4, 29; Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan highlight the
underlying vulnerability of communities, households and states. See also Suhrke, Astri
‘Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict’ (1993). Occasional
Paper of Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, Washington DC: American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 15. Suhrke points out that the outcome in the receiving
community to a large extent depends on whether the arriving people are ‘migrants’ or
‘refugees’ as well as their magnitude.
16 See for example Gunja Peter, Korir Selline (2005), “Working with the Local Wisdom. The
NCCK Peace Program in Kenya”, in Paul von Tongeren et al. (eds.), People Building Peace II,
Successful Stories of Civil Society, London & Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.441-447;
Schou, Arild/Haug, Marit (2005), “Decentralization in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations,”
Working paper 139, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Oslo; Bush,
Kenneth (2004), Building Capacity for Peace and Unity. The Role of Local Government in
Peacebuilding, Federation of Canadian Municipalities.
17 See for example Raleigh; Reuveny; Martin, Adrian ‘Environmental conflict between
refugee and host communities’ (2005) 42(3) Journal of Peace Research 329; Black, Richard
& Sessay, Mohamed F. ‘Refugees and Environmental Change in West Africa: The Role of
Institutions’ (1998) 10 J. Int. Dev. 699.
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knowledge may become less applicable.18 Thus, the importance of stable states with
the ability to support local communities becomes all the more significant. However,
in the wake of the polarization of global vs local perspectives on the environmentmigration-conflict nexus during recent years, there appears to be a certain gap in
existing research with regard to the role of state-level factors.19
There are some exceptions, as well as important lessons to be drawn from wider
fields of study. In the field of conflict prevention, as well as peacebuilding, there are
a wide range of studies focusing on state capacity and stability as a key factor.20
Similarly, development agencies including UNDP have highlighted the role of
governance in conflict prevention, focusing mainly on the role of democratic
institutions.21 The role of governance and the state level has also been highlighted
This builds on Tänzler et al’s argument, but applies it to a different problematique, i.e. the
environment-migration-conflict nexus, and not only the environment-conflict nexus which
is in focus in Tänzler’s study. Tänzler, Dennis, Carius, Alexander & Maas, Achim ‘Assessing
the susceptibility of societies to droughts: a political science perspective’ (2008) 8 Reg
Environ Change 161.
19 One reason why political and governance factors have been particularly disregarded in
environmental security literature, including migration-related – perhaps more here than in
other strands of conflict prevention studies and in other types of security challenges – is
that the often employed macro-perspective on global environmental change tends to
portray environmental and physical stressors as a given, as outlined in the above critique of
the ‘securitization of climate change’, often disregarding the role of local and national
political factors in determining the actual effects of global change for individual
communities. Another reason can of course be that governments themselves want to be ‘let
off the hook’ and find it easier to blame global environmental change than accepting certain
responsibility for how such change is managed nationally and locally. See for example
Salehyan, Idean ‘From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet’ (2008) 45 (3) Journal
of Peace Research 322.
20 For an overview of various academic initiatives and methodologies to assess state
capacity and governance in the context of conflict prevention, see Marshall, Monty:
‘Fragility, Instability and the Failure of States: Assessing Sources of Systemic Risk’ A CPA
Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2008; For an analysis which highlights
inter alia the role of state-level factors in peace-building, see also Wallensteen, Peter
‘Strategic Peacebuilding: Issues and Actors’ Krok Institute Occasional Paper #28:OP:1
September 2007.
21 Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note, UNDP 2009;
http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/Governance_Conflict_GuidanceNote.pdf
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in UN initiatives on natural resource management and conflict prevention.22
Tänzler, Carius and Maas emphasize the importance of state capacity and readiness
for conflict prevention in the face of environmental change, such as drought.23
In the direct context of environmental migration, Raleigh, Jordan and Salehyan are
critical to the macro/global perspective but emphasize the importance of contextual
factors and policy on both local and national levels.24 Similarly, Salehyan outlines
several key reasons why governance is important to prevent conflict,25 and points
out that ‘local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be
managed if there is the political will to do so.’26 Gleditsch, Nordås and Salehyan
point to citizenship policies and integration specifically.27 Similarly, Kolmannskog
concludes that ‘the role of the state…is crucial. In places where political and societal
institutions are weak, there is a higher probability of conflict occurring,’ in a
comment on the likelihood of environmental migration leading to conflict.28 Raleigh
points out that conflict is unlikely to take place without some type of state
involvement since distress migrants such as environmental migrants often are weak
and vulnerable, and thus unlikely to engage in conflict far from their original
Issues Paper for the Session on Natural Resource Governance and Conflict Prevention,
United Nations Department on Economic and Social Affairs, Expert Group Meeting on
Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Development, 15 November 2004
23 Tänzler et al 162; Whilst their hypothesis applies to the link between environmental
change and conflict, without looking at the role of migration, it is reasonable to assume that
it would apply at least to a certain extent to the environment-migration-conflict nexus as
well.
24 Raleigh et al.
25 Salehyan 318
26 Salehyan 319
27 Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Nordås, Ragnhild and Salehyan, Idea ‘The Migration Link’; (2007)
Coping with Crisis Series, International Peace Academy.
28 Kolmannskog 18
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resource base.29 Thus, the previous and current conflict involvement of both
sending and receiving states emerge as key factors.
However, as Salehyan points out, this is a field where more research is clearly
needed including ‘better measures of political institutions’ and their capacity to
manage environmental change, migration and conflict. This includes an analysis of
the role of the state beyond the measure of democratic institutions, which is the
most frequently used in the context of conflict prevention,30 and not fully sufficient
/ comprehensive in understanding the state role in the environmental-migrationconflict nexus.31
This paper will argue that a) the automaticity assumed in the link between
environmental migration and conflict is false and exaggerated, and b) the degree of
state involvement in different stages of conflict and pre-conflict patterns can play
the role of intervening variable, partly determining whether conflicts or
cooperation develops between environmental migrants and host communities.32
4. Analytical framework
Part of Tänzler et al’s operationalization of state capacity and readiness in the
context of environment-induced conflict is useful as inspiration for the analytical
Raleigh et al 35
See for example Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note, UNDP
2009; http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/Governance_Conflict_GuidanceNote.pdf
31 Salehyan 321
32 The focus on the state level and political/governance factors in this paper is not intended
to bypass the importance of other factors, including the type of migration (long-term, shortterm, temporary, permanent, etc) and economic vulnerability, etc. These remain valid
factors which ought to be taken into account in any comprehensive study. However, this
paper attempts to address a specific gap in current research with regard to the role of
policy and governance in conflict prevention in crises related to environmental stresses.
29
30
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framework of this study, despite the fact that it was not designed with migration in
mind.33 Tänzler identifies three specific dimensions of ‘state capacity’: the political,
the economic and the social.34 However, the focus in this study will be on political
and social factors. The economic dimension will not be addressed in this study as it
is given due attention in other studies of the environment-migration-conflict
nexus.35 The purpose of this study is rather to focus exclusively upon the political
and social dimensions of state capacity and readiness. In particular, two indicators
are particularly interesting for the purposes of this study: the state’s ‘degree of
conflict involvement’ (political) and the degree of ‘competitiveness of political
participation’ (social).36
The state’s degree of involvement in conflict is highly relevant in the environmentmigration-conflict nexus, as it can give a sense of whether the state can act as a
mediator between environmental migrants and receiving communities, or whether
It was designed to explain the link between environmental degradation and conflict,
without migration as an intervening factor. Potentially, the fact that migration enters the
environment-conflict nexus demands somewhat different state capacities than the ones
identified by Tänzler to be important to deal with environmental change in general.
However, arguably, certain key capacities of the state are vital in multiple different types of
challenges – be they direct environmental stress such as drought, or increased competition
over natural resources due to an inflow of environmental migrants. Whilst it is certain that
certain capacities are more important than others, in different types of situations, arguably
the state capacities identified as important by Tänzler in the face of drought are general
enough to be highly relevant in the face of environmental migration. Furthermore, it may be
argued that Tänzler’s analytical framework is of limited value, including for the reasons
mentioned above regarding the important of the local/community level in both conflict
prevention and climate change adaptation research. Other critiques may include that it
does not factor in alternative structures, including external assistance, in assessing state
capacities, and that the indicators of state capacity used are not very precise or accurate.
Despite these potential criticisms, the use of Tänzler’s analytical framework in the context
of environmental migration/conflict must be seen as a first step towards the analysis of the
role of the state in dealing with this type of challenge. Inarguably, the analytical framework
can be fine-tuned and adjusted through further research.
34 Tänzler et al 165
35 Tänzler’s operationalization of economic capacity includes analysis of factors such as the
population’s dependency on agriculture, an issue which is addressed in other studies of
environmental migration and conflict.
36 Tänzler et al 165
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the state itself is involved in conflict, preventing it from playing such a role. In the
case studies, ‘degree of involvement in conflict’ will be operationalized as both
involvement in preceding hostilities, and in conflict itself.
The direct relevance of the ‘degree of competitiveness of political participation’ is
less clear.37 However, it will be used as an additional control variable as democratic
institutions are often identified as one of the key state-level factors which can serve
to prevent conflict on a general level in the wider field of conflict prevention
literature.38
5. Case studies
In this study, the degree of conflict involvement and competitiveness of political
participation will be tested through the case studies of Bangladesh/India,39 and
Mauretania/Senegal,40 two of the most frequently cited cases of environmental
migration and subsequent conflict.41 The case studies are chosen because migration
flows in the two contexts manifest very different characteristics. Whilst migration
It can be questioned how relevant this indicator is in the context of environmental
migration. However, it must be noted that Tänzler et al’s subsequent argumentation builds
on the assumption that openness and competitiveness of a political system increases its
capacity to deal with crises in general, not only environmental challenges.
38 See for example Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note, UNDP
2009; http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/Governance_Conflict_GuidanceNote.pdf
39 From Bangladesh to Indian region Assam in the 1970s and 1980s
40 Internal migration within Mauretania, as well as between Senegal and Mauretania in both
directions, mainly around 1989 and 1990
41 Authors who have cited Bangladesh/India as a case of conflict induced by environmental
migration include Reuveny 663; Suhrke (1993) 29; Swain, Ashok ‘Displacing the Conflict:
Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India’ (1996) 33(2) Journal
of Peace Research 189; Warnecke et al 5; Homer-Dixon 1999; Kolmannskog 19; Gleditsch,
Nordås & Salehyan 5; Mauretania/Senegal: Reuveny 664; Suhrke (1993) 20; Black and
Sessay 1998; Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon, T.F. Environment, scarcity and violence
(1999). Princeton: Princeton University Press; Kolmannskog 20; Warnecke et al 5; Raleigh
et al 29.
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from Bangladesh to India was a result of water scarcity from the river flow land
degradation, in the Mauretania/Senegal case it was largely a result of
desertification. Migration from Bangladesh to India, and the ensuing conflict, took
place over an extended period of time, while migration and conflict within
Mauretania and between Mauretania and Senegal was largely limited to the years
1989-1990. The number of migrants was significantly larger in Bangladesh/India –
above 2 million – compared to Mauretania/Senegal – around 70 000.42
By testing the hypothesis on two very different case studies, and thus testing it
under very different circumstances, the hypothesis will undergo a more ‘difficult’
test. In other words, if it bears certain validity in both cases, it has been shown that
it can be relevant independently of other circumstantial variables. Whilst two case
studies are insufficient to reach any far-reaching or general conclusions regarding
the validity of the hypothesis, at least they can indicate whether it is relevant to
continue studying governance and state-level factors, or if the focus should be
oriented elsewhere.
A next step for further research could be to test the hypothesis in several case
studies where conflict has appeared subsequent to environmental migration, and
several cases where environmental migration has taken place but no conflict has
emerged.43 By studying governance and state-level factors in the non-conflict cases,
further insight could be gained into the factors which can help prevent conflict,
rather than just focusing on explaining conflict. However, since the field of
Reuveny 663-664
An alternative approach could be to list cases where environmental migration has taken
place but no conflict has been developed or where escalation has not taken place, in line
with Approach 1 in Wallensteen & Möller’s typology or methodologies for assessing the
success of conflict prevention. See Wallensteen, Peter & Möller, Frida ‘Conflict Prevention:
Methodology for Knowing the Unknown’ (2003) Uppsala Peace Research Papers No. 7,
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, 18
42
43
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environmental migration and the link with conflict is rather narrow, and has not
been studied to a great extent from a conflict prevention perspective, and with this
study being rather explorative in nature, there is a strong reason to focus on two
‘conflict’ scenarios initially, to detect potential intervening variables, before
pursuing further studies with a greater number of cases and greater variability in
the outcome/dependent variable (conflict vs. non-conflict cases).
6. Analysis
Mauretania/Senegal
Background
Migration within Mauretania and between Mauretania and Senegal took place
mainly between 1989 and 1990.44 Mauretania had long suffered from
desertification, partly as a result of the droughts that affected the Sahel in the
1970s. Both Senegal and Mauretania depended on the agricultural land and waters
of the Senegal River Valley for their livelihoods. The water was crucial for irrigation
of farmer’s lands. At the end of the 1980s, the environmental pressures and
desertification intensified, and the flow of Mauretanian Arab nomads/pastoralists
southwards into the Senegal River Valley increased significantly. The valley was
largely inhabited by the ‘Black African’ minority in Mauretania, and the push
southward by the Arabs increased ethnic tensions within the country. Migration
took place as a result of disputes over water use, both within their respective
countries, and across borders. The largest flow of migrants was in fact within
44
Suhrke 31
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Mauretania, with Arab pastoralists moving into lands farmers by African
Mauretanians. There were also a number of border clashes between Senegal and
Mauretania along the Senegal River Valley at the time, as parts of the land that the
pastoralists moved into were disputed territories, and conflicts erupted mainly
between Arab pastoralists on the move, and sedentary African farmers.
Arab minorities in Senegal and African minorities in Mauretania were subject to
violent attacks and killings. OAU attempts to mediate brought some relief, however,
only temporarily.
Degree of conflict involvement
First of all, there was a degree of conflict between the two states involved, where
they had vitally different interests, which predated the conflict arising from
migration.45
Second, the Mauretanian state supported the pastoralists’ controversial move
southward, mainly as part of its ‘Arabization’ policy pursued since the 1960s, and
the state simultaneously tried to expel a significant number of minority
Mauretanians ‘of Senegalese origin’ back to Senegal. Population exchanges of
minority groups were agreed, although Senegal received a net inflow of migrants,
partly also as a result of new Mauretanian land legislation as well as dam
construction plans, which stripped many black Mauretanians of their livelihoods
and forced them into Senegal.46 The Mauretanian state was thus clearly on ‘one side’
of the emerging conflict between Arab pastoralists and African farmers.
45
46
Suhrke 32
Black and Sessay (1998) 703; Homer-Dixon (1994)
17
Although it can be argued that the refugees coming into Senegal were not
exclusively environmental migrants, but in fact political refugees, this merely
demonstrates that environmental factors as ‘push’ factors in migration seldom work
alone, but often interplay with other factors. Homer-Dixon classified the
Mauretania-Senegal case as ‘human-induced environmental scarcity’.47 The
Mauretanian state thus had a role in creating the flows of internal migrants as well
as migrants to Senegal in the first place.
In response to the wider inter-state conflict dynamics, including Senegal’s advanced
plans to build a dam in the Senegal River, which would have major consequences for
Mauretania’s continued ability to use the river for irrigation purposes, the
Mauritanian government restricted African farmers’ land rights within Mauretania
and supported the Arab pastoralists’ push to take over their lands. As a
consequence, pre-existing tensions between the two states had a significant
exacerbating impact on the emerging conflict patterns between migrants and
receiving communities on a local level and within Mauretania. The migrants and
receiving communities were used as a ‘tool’ in the wider international political
conflict by the Mauritanian state.
Suhrke notes that without such supportive/interventionist state policies, Arab
pastoralists moving for largely environmental reasons would have been too weak
and vulnerable to instigate conflict in the receiving areas.48 If displaced groups land
ability to make demands, the potential for subsequent conflict in receiving areas is
rather limited.
47
48
Homer-Dixon (1994)
Suhrke (1997) 270
18
The Senegal/Mauretania case also raises the issue of land policies and land rights in
particular. Black and Sessay point to the importance of sound environmental
management in receiving areas to reduce the risk of conflict over scarce resources.
The study focuses mainly on institutions in Senegal to manage the flow of African
Mauritanian refugees and their relations in environmental and land management.
Whilst the study does not cover policies or institutions in Mauretania, which is the
main focus of this study, it is nevertheless interesting to note that Black and Sessay
identify policies that distribute benefits equally between environmental migrants
and receiving communities as the most successful in the Senegalese context.49
However, it is unclear how successful such policies would have been in a mixed
ethnic context (as in the internal migration in Mauretania), considering that many of
the Mauritanian refugees in Senegal were in fact of African/black origin and thus
did not add to any ethnic tensions in the first place.
Concludingly, the state played a role in several key ways. Firstly, Mauretania and
Senegal were already engaged in conflict before the main migration flows began in
the late 1980s, which affected the subsequent dynamics in significant ways. Second,
the state actually played a role in creating the environmental scarcity, instigating
the increased migration flows. Third, the state took an active role through specific
policies favouring migrants, significantly increasing the risks of conflictual
competition between migrants and receiving communities over scarce resources.
Competitiveness of political participation
In 1989, Mauretania was governed by a military authoritarian regime run by
Colonel Taya. After reforms in 1991, the country gained certain formal democratic
49
Black and Sessay (1998) 707
19
institutions; however, before then, it had few democratic characteristics.50 In fact, in
1989 Freedom House ranked it as one of the least free countries in the world, both
with regard to civil liberties and political representation.51 The regime thus had no
incentive to take into account the views of African minorities, and could pursue its
Arabization policy without any electoral consequences. It is however difficult to
determine the consequences of this lack of competitiveness of political participation
for the conflicts between migrants and receiving communities.52 Senegal, on the
other hand, had been a parliamentary democracy since its independence in 1960,
albeit with very strong presidential powers.53 It is interesting to note the examples
mentioned above of successful Senegalese programs of distributing land and
resource benefits equally between migrants and receiving communities. However, it
is unclear if these programs had any direct or indirect link with the degree of
competitiveness of political participation.
Bangladesh/India
Background
Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads Report, Mauretania 2007
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7228-8.pdf, [Accessed on May 1,
2011]
51 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report, 1989
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, [Accessed on May 1, 2011]
52 Tänzler’s indicators are intended for an overarching analysis of state capacity and
readiness in general, which is intended to be relevant only indirectly to the environmentconflict (and in this study applied to the environment-migration-conflict) nexus. It is,
however, interesting to note how these indicators interplay also in a more direct fashion in
the specific case at study.
53 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report, 1989
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439, [Accessed on May 1, 2011]
50
20
The flows of Bangladeshi migrants into India in the Assam region, from the late
1970s to the 1990s, totalled up to 2 million.54 Migration took place mainly as a
result of flooding and a lack of sustainable water resources and environmental
change which was partly human-induced and partly ‘natural’.55 The lack of water
resources and ensuing environmental degradation had devastating effects for the
poor rural population of large parts of Bangladesh. Whilst many were internally
displaced and significant numbers moved to urban centers in Bangladesh, these
were not able to absorb all the migrants and many of them were forced to relocate
into India.56 Studies show that environmental reasons were the main reasons for
migration into India, although of course it is difficult to completely isolate
environmental factors from underlying economic factors.57
According to Swain, there was a clear link between the increase in migration, and
the increased degree of conflict.58 The conflict that ensued in Assam – and later
other regions – became manifest in the 1979 elections in the Mangaldoi
constituency, when 70 000 Bangladeshi immigrants suddenly appeared on the
electoral rolls for the first time.59 Several local Indian groups felt threatened, and
rivalry emerged. The ruling Congress Party, however, made attracting Bangladeshi
The migrants from Bangladesh were mainly of Muslim origin, moving into largely Hindu
areas of India. They suffered from the diversion of the Ganges by India at Farakka. 35
million people in Bangladesh were dependent on the Ganges for their livelihoods. The
reduced water flow led to land destruction, river erosion, forest degradation and
Bangladesh only being able to detract less than 20% of what it would need to sustain its
people and key industries including fishing and farming: Swain 193
55 Swain 189
56 Suhrke (1993) 29
57 Swain 198
58 Swain 199
59 Swain 198
54
21
voters part of their strategy, and won the elections, which resulted in the longstanding conflict.60
State involvement
The state played an important role in exacerbating conflict between migrants and
receiving communities in several ways. First of all, as in the Mauretania case, there
was an element of conflict present already before environmental degradation and
subsequent migration took place. The Indian Government’s policies of diverting
water from Bangladesh indeed directly caused the environmental degradation and
ensuing migration.61 The long-standing conflict between the two countries,
exacerbated by the water diversion dispute, clearly had an impact on subsequent
local conflicts between migrants and receiving communities in Assam.
At the second stage, the Indian Government’s involvement in the conflict extends to
both local and national levels. On a local level, the ruling Congress Party became
involved, with certain interruptions, by expressly siding with the migrants and
thereby creating friction with local groups who felt betrayed by their own local
government. On a national level, the Indian Government got involved in the local
Assam conflict in 1984, when the Prime Minister signed an Accord with the Assam
Suhrke (1993) 29; Violence ensued between Bangladeshi immigrants and Assamese
locals, resulting in more than 3000 deaths, before and after the elections. Rivalry between
the newly formed Bangladeshi political party and Assamese political groups, including AGP,
continued during the 1980s. The Indian Prime Minister intervened in 1984, by giving
certain concessions to the AGP, with no lasting positive results. The ruling Congress Party
went back to attracting Bangladeshi immigrants ahead of the 1990 elections. See also Swain
198
61 Although state involvement at this stage was not envisioned in Tänzler et al’s analytical
framework, it is clear that it must be taken into account. It also raises several interesting
issues regarding what is man-made and what is natural environmental change – although
this discussion goes beyond the scope of this study. Thus, an interplay of environmental and
political factors were at the root of the ensuing conflict in the first place. This also
demonstrates that it sometimes may be difficult to isolate environmental and political
factors, and that these may interplay at different stages of an emerging conflict.
60
22
local political groups to dispel the Bangladeshi migrants, who were viewed as
competitors for jobs and instigators of violence. At the time the Congress Party
supported the Accord. However, this Accord was rendered meaningless when the
Congress Party locally realized that it had been a mistake, losing the mid-1980s
elections due to the loss of immigrants’ votes, and fighting to win back the migrants’
votes in the late 1980s.
One of the interesting aspects of the Indian Government’s involvement is that the
ruling party’s siding with the immigrants appeared to have been a key factor in the
emergence of conflict,62 exacerbating rivalry and the local population’s fear of the
migrants as competitors for jobs and scarce resources. This partly contradicts
Tänzler’s claim that a government policy that is favorable to migrant integration
automatically reduces the risk of conflict. However, it reveals that nonetheless, the
government has a key role in exacerbating or diluting underlying tensions. It is also
evident that the Congress Party did not design its electoral roll policies with the
ultimate goal of integration, but rather with narrow self-interest – i.e. winning the
next elections – in mind.
The state level in fact did try to assuage local concerns of the receiving communities
through the Prime Minister’s intervention. However, at the level of conflict already
reached at the time, this only served to escalate migrant groups’ violent activism. It
appeared as a last-minute intervention rather than a long-term program to support
actual integration.63
Suhrke points out that ‘a supportive state…was a main cause of the rising strife and
eventual violence’, Suhrke (1997) 265
63 It is of course difficult to hypothesize about how the conflict had developed if the
government had played more of a passive role, i.e. not included migrants on its electoral
roles., or if the Prime Minister had not intervened in local politics. It is likely that given the
size and political activism of the migrant communities, they would not have accepted such a
degree of marginalization.
62
23
An interesting comparison point at this stage is the corresponding unfolding events
in West Bengal, where the ruling party similarly included immigrants on the
electoral roll, but at a slower pace and in a way that was more aligned with other
integration measures, and where the Prime Minister did not intervene. Although the
events and the two different states are not entirely comparable, it is noteworthy
that West Bengal did not witness the same degree of conflict or hostility as Assam64,
where the Government’s siding with migrants out of pure self-interest was more
evident.
Concludingly, the state played an important role in providing the overarching
conflict dynamics between India and Bangladesh, which may have fuelled hostilities
between migrants and receiving communities. However, considering the different
outcome of Bangladeshi migrants arriving in West Bengal in India (no conflict),
there is reason to believe that this factor was not decisive. The state was also more
directly involved in the conflict by favouring migrants in a way that local
communities interpreted as a threat, and then abruptly withdrawing their support
to migrants. Lack of coordination between Indian state and local government
policies appeared to fuel the conflict further.
Competitiveness of political participation
India, as the world’s largest democracy, must be viewed as having a very high
degree of competitiveness of political participation at the time.65 It is however not
Swain 199
See for example Freedom House Freedom in the World Report for 1980, where India was
considered ‘Free’ and scored 2 on a scale of 1-7 (1 being the highest) with regard to both
political representation and civil liberties. Although Freedom House can be criticized from
several perspectives, it nevertheless gives a rough indication of the degree of
64
65
24
obvious what effect this had on the dynamics of the conflict in the case of
Bangladeshi migrants in Assam. On the surface, it appears that the conflict partly
emerged through patterns of political party competition; both Bangladeshi migrants
and local Assam groups formed political parties to strengthen their rival demands at
the height of the violent conflict. However, it is conceivable that the channels of
political party participation and competition aided to defuel conflictual patterns
which would have been even more violent had there not been any avenue for
peaceful competition.
7. Conclusion
Both the case studies indicate that policies and particularly state-level interventions
have played a key role as an intervening variable, linking environmental migration
and conflict. This supports the critique of the Malthusian and early environmentsecurity scholars, who have claimed that there is a direct link between
environmental migration and conflict.
The findings support the claim that state policies are important to increase or
decrease the risk of conflict. Whilst reducing environmental degradation and
managing/decreasing migrant flows are important measures, it appears that state
interventions at different stages are also crucial.
The results also show that the state and governance is important at several different
stages of an emerging conflict. Both India and Mauretania serve to raise the issue of
competitiveness of political participation, as relevant to this study and as defined through
Tänzler’s indicators. Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report, 1980
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page+439, [Accessed on May 1, 2011]
25
the state’s role in creating environmental scarcity or degradation in the first place,
as well as fostering a long-term inter-state conflict dynamic which had spillover
effects on the local emerging conflict between migrants and receiving communities.
In both cases, the state also actively favoured migrants over receiving communities,
based on ethnic or populist motives, which appeared to have had negative effects on
emerging conflict dynamics.
These findings are also interesting as they almost counter-intuitively demonstrate
that state polices favoring migrants and their ability to re-settle in receiving
communities in fact can increase the risk of conflict. This runs counter to several
theories that focus exclusively on the empowerment of migrant groups as a key to
integration and reduction of conflict risk. It appears that if state policies are viewed
as excessively favorable to migrants, in the eyes of receiving communities, this can
in fact lead to a greater risk of conflict than if the state had stayed neutral or done
nothing to empower migrants.
This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all state intervention to
empower environmental migrants is negative. However, it sheds light on the fact
that states may use environmental migrants as tools to achieve other goals, and that
policies which seem to be empowering and pro-integration in fact can have the
opposite effect. The success of integration policies in conflict prevention necessarily
depends upon the receiving communities’ perceptions of migrants. Policies that
appear to increase the position of migrants in receiving communities, such as the
rapidly enhanced political rights of Bangladeshis in Assam, and the withdrawal of
African farmers’ land rights in Mauretania, tend to foster a view of the migrants as
26
competitors and rivals, thus increasing the risk of conflict.66 This risk appears all the
greater if there are underlying and historical political tensions between ethnic
groups or nationalities, which existed in the cases of both India and Mauretania,
partly as a result of state level previous patterns of conflict.
Another interesting area for future study could also be the linkages between global,
national and local-level factors. Of course, none of these act in isolation. One way of
enhancing the understanding of the role of the national/state level would be to see
how national institutions and policies can support and/or undermine local conflict
prevention efforts in the face of environmental migration.
The results of the study also point to the relevance of Tänzler et al’s analytical
framework and its operationalization of political capacity and readiness in the
context of the environment-migration-conflict nexus. However, it also appears that
focusing exclusively upon state capacity as a fixed variable – including the
competitiveness of political participation – rather than on specific policies, is a
limited way of assessing the potential role of the state.67 Whilst certain elements of
democracy may still be important to prevent conflict, the Indian case shows that
democracy alone is no magic wand. Changes in political strategies, on the other
hand, had very direct implications for conflict patterns. This indeed had little to do
with state capacity – or degree of democracy – in itself, but was rather the result of
conscious policy choices. Similarly, in Mauretania, whilst it can be argued that the
state had little inherent capacity to provide for and resolve conflict between its two
Warnecke et al claim that government politics favoring migrants are the exception and
not the rule, but do not provide any significant evidence to substantiate this claim. An
interesting topic for further study would thus be to increase the number of cases to see how
widespread state policies favoring migrants are, and which effects they have had on
migrant-receiving community relations. Warnecke et al 5
67 This is in line with Salehyan’s critique on the focus on democratic institutions as the sole
measure of state capacity, as outlined in the beginning of this paper, Salehyan 321
66
27
ethnic groups, it appears that active policy choices played perhaps an even more
important role than the ‘limiting’ low inherent capacity of the state. An approach
highlighting national-level political agency and strategy would thus be useful to
complement Tänzler’s focus on state inherent capacity.
However, due to the limited scope of this study, it is not possible to draw any
general conclusions about state policies and their ability to prevent conflict. In
order to increase knowledge of the role of state policies, not only in instigating or
exacerbating conflict but also in preventing conflict, further studies would have to
be undertaken of cases of environmental migration where conflict in fact has not
taken place, due to successful prevention measures. However, one conclusion which
can be drawn is that preventing conflict in areas receiving environmental migration
ought to include the state level and not only focus on reducing environmental
change on a macro level, or focus on exclusively dealing with local actors.
28
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