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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Table of Contents
***How To Section*** .................................................................................................................................................. 3
What Is Policy Debate?................................................................................................................................................ 4
Speeches and Speech Order ...................................................................................................................................... 5
The Constructive Speeches ........................................................................................................................................ 6
The Rebuttal Speeches ................................................................................................................................................ 8
How to write a block and why?.............................................................................................................................. 11
What are blocks? Are they really, really, really important?................................................................................ 11
Judge Adaptation......................................................................................................................................................... 13
Cutting Cards ............................................................................................................................................................. 14
Using Articles .............................................................................................................................................................. 16
***TPP 1AC and 1NC*** ......................................................................................................................................... 17
How to Use This Section ......................................................................................................................................... 18
Intro to the topic ....................................................................................................................................................... 19
Glossary ....................................................................................................................................................................... 20
AFFIRMATIVE ............................................................................................................................................................. 21
1st Affirmative Constructive (1AC) ........................................................................................................................ 21
**Affirmative extensions- Containment** ............................................................................................................ 24
“They say: China doesn’t see TPP as containment” ............................................................................................ 24
Extension to Solvency contention ......................................................................................................................... 25
Answers to Appeasement DA ................................................................................................................................. 26
**NEGATIVE arguments** ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Negative Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 29
Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (1/3) ................................................................................................................ 30
Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (2/3) ................................................................................................................ 31
Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (3/3) ................................................................................................................ 32
Sample 1NC Answer to Containment advantage ............................................................................................... 33
Sample 1NC Answer to Solvency........................................................................................................................... 34
Extensions to 1NC Appeasement DA................................................................................................................... 35
“They say: Assurance is low now” .......................................................................................................................... 35
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
***How To Section***
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
What Is Policy Debate?
Policy debate is a type of debate competition in which teams of two advocate for and against a resolution
that typically calls for policy change by the United States federal government, this format tests a student’s
research, analytical, and delivery skills.
It involves the proposal of a plan by the affirmative team to enact a policy, while the negative team offers
reasons to reject that proposal. Throughout the debate, students have the opportunity to cross-examine one
another. A judge or panel of judges determines the winner based on the arguments presented.
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Speeches and Speech Order
There are eight total speeches in a debate round. Each debater gives two speeches: one “constructive” and
one “rebuttal.” The speech order looks like this:
1AC (1st Affirmative Constructive) – Read the
affirmative case and the plan
CX (Cross-Examination) – 2nd Negative Speaker asks
the questions
1NC (1st Negative Constructive) – Makes all the
major negative arguments (disadvantages, case
arguments, etc.)
CX – 1st Affirmative Speaker asks the questions
2AC (2nd Affirmative Constructive) – Answer ALL
negative arguments. Rebuild and strengthen the case.
Point out arguments that the negative has not
attacked.
CX – 1st Negative Speaker asks the questions
2NC (2nd Negative Constructive) – Present any
additional case arguments not covered by the 1NC.
Remember to take only part of the negative
arguments—leave some for the 1NR speech. Answer
affirmative arguments. Rebuild and strengthen the
negative side.
CX -- 2nd Affirmative Speaker asks the questions
1NR (1st Negative Rebuttal) – Present all other
negative arguments not covered in the 2NC. Answer
affirmative arguments. Rebuild and strengthen the
negative side. Do not present the same arguments as
your partner.
1AR (1st Affirmative Rebuttal) – Answer ALL of the
negative arguments from both the 2NC & 1NR.
2NR (2nd Negative Rebuttal) – Pick a few arguments
that you think the negative side is winning &
concentrate on those. Tell the judge exactly why to
vote for you. Tell the judge why the negative arguments
outweigh the aff arguments.
2AR (2nd Affirmative Rebuttal) – Respond to negative
arguments. Point out any arguments that have been
dropped by the neg team. Tell the judge why the
affirmative wins.
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The debater who gives the 1AC also gives the 1AR, and the debater who gives the 1NC gives the 1NR. So,
each debater can think of themselves as the 1A (the person who gives the 1AC and 1AR), the 1N, the 2A, or
the 2N, depending on their position in the debate.
Because the 2nd speaker (2A or 2N) gives the last speech, they're generally considered to be the “expert” for
their side. Most teams have one partner give the 2A and the other partner give the 2N, so that each debater
can focus on becoming an expert on one side of the debate.
For more information on speech order and responsibilities, visit www.atlantadebate.org
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
The Constructive Speeches
Why have constructives?
At the end of the debate, the judge makes a decision based on which of the final speeches are more
persuasive: the 2NR and the 2AR. So you might ask: if only the last two speeches matter, why have the other
six? There are at least three answers to this question.
First, for an argument to be made in the 2NR or 2AR, it must have been present in the previous speeches
(judges will discount 2NR or 2AR arguments that are “new.”)
Second, the constructives are an opportunity to read evidence that can then be referenced in later speeches.
While it isn't always necessary to cite evidence, doing so can often increase the credibility of your arguments.
Third, debaters can use the constructives to make a wide variety of arguments. To understand why this is
valuable, consider the different approaches of two hypothetical affirmative teams: Team Minnie Mouse and
Goofy.
Hypothetical Scenario #1: Team Minnie Mouse, in the 2AC, makes six arguments against the disadvantage. The
negative answers four of these arguments very well, but answers two of the arguments poorly. In the
rebuttals, Team Minnie Mouse takes advantage of this mistake by only talking about the arguments that were
answered poorly.
Hypothetical Scenario #2: In the 2AC, Team Goofy makes two arguments against the disadvantage. Because
the negative has less arguments to worry about, they answer both very well; since only two arguments were
made in the 2AC, Team Goofy is only able to talk about these two arguments in the rebuttals.
Team Minnie Mouse and Team Goofy may end up talking about the same two arguments in the 2AR, but
because Team Minnie Mouse made diverse arguments in the constructives, they've put the negative in a more
difficult position, and their 2AR arguments are likely to be much more persuasive to the judge.
Roles of debaters during constructive speeches
The 1AC
The primary job of the 1AC is to read the entire affirmative case. That means reading the plan, harms,
inherency, and solvency in your first speech. This also includes having the first speech highlighted so you know
what and where to read.
The 1NC
Read all off-case positions and make arguments directly against the case (what the affirmative read in the
1AC). All parts of every off-case position should be read. For example, if you are reading the Appeasement
DA you should read the uniqueness, link, (internal link if applicable) and impact. The 1NC should have
analytical arguments (arguments without cards) for the case debate and should have highlighted all off-case
positions. The 1NC sets the format for how arguments will be addressed on the case. For example, the 1NC
makes an argument that says Aladdin is not the best Disney movie ever. The 2AC will reference that argument
first before making their own arguments (off 1NC #1: etc., etc., etc.).
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The 2AC
The 2AC’s job begins before the debate. All 2AC’s should have some prepared speeches against commonly
heard arguments both on case and off case. This is called a block or writing blocks (see the section “how to
write a block”). The 2AC sets the structure for how arguments are for off case positions. For example, the
2NC will say, “off 2AC #1,” when responding to arguments. Offer point-by-point refutation of your
opponent’s arguments (line-by-line debating).
The 2NC
The 2NC extends your teams arguments made in the 1NC.You should be making 1 to 2 point answers to
your opponent’s arguments they made in the 2AC.You can use the 3-point style of referencing arguments
(they said, we say, why we win). For example, “off 2AC #1, they say Aladdin is the best Disney movie of all
time.,“ 1st- That movie was made a long time ago and there have been many better Disney movies made since
then, and 2nd- Aladdin teaches a lot of bad behavior—lying, stealing, and deception. He is no role model for
young people.
The 2NC should have prepared blocks to the most common types of affirmative arguments. 2NC’s should
also point out any and all dropped arguments, extend those arguments, and tell the judge why this means the
negative side wins this part of the debate.
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
The Rebuttal Speeches
Debating is Clashing
What's the difference between giving a speech and debating? Giving a speech is mostly about building a
relationship between you and your audience: being likable, clear, and persuasive to the person or people to
whom you're speaking. Debate is about that, too, but it also adds a third element: the other team. Good
debaters engage with, or “clash,” with what the other team says.
In day-to-day life “clash” is often viewed as a bad thing: directly criticizing another person’s ideas can seem
rude or inconsiderate. In debate, though, where both sides usually have an okay point, clash is better viewed
as a sign of respect. Clashing with another team’s argument means that you’ve listened to it, understood it,
and made an attempt to respond to it. For example, the affirmative team is running a case that Students
should have more time in P.E. classes during the school day. Let’s consider two ways for a negative team to
make the argument that schools should not add more time spent in P.E.:
1. “If you vote for the affirmative, which advocates for more P.E. classes, then students will not have as much
time in academic classes. The school day is not going to be extended, so that means that students will learn
less information that will help them later on in life if they have less time taking academic courses because of
P.E.”
2. “The affirmative says that we need to improve the overall health of the nation and the only way to do that
is by teaching people early in life how to exercise and live healthier & active lifestyles. School is not the right
place for students to learn about how to live an active lifestyle—that is better taught in the home by
students’ families. Schools should primarily be focused on teaching students information and skills required to
build successful careers when they get older.
Clash is important in every speech, but especially in the rebuttal speeches, which are primarily about
extending your best arguments and comparing them to arguments the other team has made.
Extending Arguments
When you make a good argument early in the debate, chances are you'll want to bring it back up again later
in the debate. An “extended” argument is an argument made earlier in a debate that's made again in a team's
next speech. An argument can be extended from the 1AC to the 2AC, the 2AC to the 1AR, the 1AR to the
2AR, the 1NC to the 2NC/1NR, or the 2NC/1NR to the 2NR.
How is extending an argument different from repeating yourself? Good extensions contain three
elements: an explanation, an impact, and a rebuttal of the other team's arguments.
Explanations are a summary of a previous argument you've made. The best explanations include both a claim
(what is our argument?) and a warrant (how do we know that argument is true?)
“Impacting” an argument means explaining how that argument affects the debate as a whole. When impacting
an argument, ask yourself: if we're right about this argument, how does it tie back to our central point?
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Rebutting the other team's arguments can take several forms. If the other team reads a piece of evidence to
answer your piece of evidence, you should compare evidence, either by explaining why your evidence is good
or why the other team's evidence is flawed (or, ideally, both). At other points, you may want to argue that the
other team's argument or evidence doesn't apply to your original argument.
Impact analysis
“Impact analysis,” also known as “impact comparison,” is the process of comparing reasons why the plan is
good with reasons why the plan is bad. For instance, the affirmative might argue that the plan is that increased
P.E. is good for students and the country in the long-run. At the same time, the negative might argue that the
plan would be bad for country in the long-run because students don’t learn academics and are less prepared
to start a career. Which is more important: a healthy country or staying competitive in the global job market?
Since whoever wins this argument will have a big advantage in the debate, impact analysis is a vital part of
rebuttals.
There are four general reasons why one impact might be more important than other:
1. Magnitude – how big is an impact? This includes both how many people an impact affects and the way in
which it affects them.
2. Risk – how likely is the impact to occur? Do we know that the impact is going to happen (maybe because
it's already happening), or is a hypothetical future problem?
3.Timeframe – in how long will the impact occur? Impacts that happen farther into the future may be less
likely to occur, since it's often more difficult to make predictions over the long term.
4.Turns the impact/solves the impact – how does your impact interact with the other team's impact? For
instance: the affirmative might say: “without a healthy lifestyle, preparing for a long career is pointless since life
expectancy will continue decrease.”
The acronym Mr.T can help you to remember impact analysis: Magnitude, Risk, and Timeframe.
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Role of debaters during Rebuttal Speeches
The 1AR
The primary jobs of the 1AR are to extend the best arguments from the 2AC and to rebut the negative's
responses. As the most time pressured speech in the debate, the 1AR must quickly and efficiently make a
variety of arguments.
The best way to deal with time pressure in the 1AR is to narrow the debate wherever possible. On
disadvantages and other off-case arguments, it isn't necessary to extend more than 1-3 2AC arguments for
the 1AR. The 1AR should answer every negative argument on the advantages they plan to win, but the 1AR
can choose to “kick” an advantage if they want to save time.
The 2NR
The primary jobs of the 2NR are:
First – “write the ballot for the judge.” Writing the ballot for the judge means explaining, in a big-picture way,
why you win the debate. One way to force yourself to do this is to start every 2NR with the words “the
most important thing in the debate is...” and then explain which issues the judge should look to first in
deciding the debate. Impact analysis is often the best place to direct a judge's attention in the 2NR.
Second- to answer the 1AR's arguments. Make sure you not only answer the 1AR arguments but also think
about what arguments the 2AR could make and answer those arguments too. Below is a brief example of
what a 2NR would look like using our Affirmative case that Schools should have more time in P.E. classes
during the school day.
2NR EXAMPLE:
The future careers of America’s young people is the most important thing in this debate. It outweighs the
affirmative on magnitude…. if U.S. students do not have high-level skill sets to tackle the challenges we are
facing in the 21st century, then the good jobs will be taken by people from other countries who are focusing
more on academic classes than P.E. The affirmative claims that the biggest impact is an increase and health
and lifespan. It won’t matter how healthy and strong people are in the U.S. if they are unable to get jobs.
Now, the line by line debate – The 1AR says there is no link. First, extend the Roland evidence, U.S. schools
are being out-ranked by other nations because of too many extra-curriculars. The affirmative, by increasing
time in P.E., directly trades-off time with academics. Students will have less time learning things important to
career development. The aff definitely links to the academic trade-off disadvantage.
Lastly, they will say that affirming physical fitness in school matters. But, if physical fitness matters because it
makes people better, what’s worse…people maybe not being as healthy but having a good job or being very
physically fit but having no job and therefore no food, or house, or future?
The 2AR
As in the 2NR, the 2AR should attempt to “write the ballot for the judge.” The 2AR should start by explaining
the most important issues in the debate and then proceed to explaining other important arguments and
answering 2NR arguments.
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How to write a block and why?
What are blocks? Are they really, really, really important?
To answer the second question: yes, blocks are really, really really, important.
To answer the first question: blocks are pre-written and pre-organized responses to common arguments.
Since there are only a few big arguments in the packet, you'll be debating the same arguments again and
again: and since you'll be debating the same arguments again and again, it's important to think through how
you'll respond to them.
Good blocks include both evidence from articles and analytical arguments. For instance: a 1NC block against
the increase time in P.E. affirmative might include evidence from two news articles, along with several
analytical arguments that you come up with on your own. Similarly, a 2AC block against the Academic
Trade-Off disadvantage might include several articles and several analytics.
Once a block is written, you can use it in every debate where you face a given argument. Every time the
1NC reads an academic trade-off disadvantage, you can read your 2AC trade-off block in response. This
saves preparation time in the debate, ensures that you know your arguments well, and gives you time to
choose the best arguments against the disadvantage.
Blocks are most important for the 1NC and 2AC, but you can make blocks for any speech other than the
1AC. For instance, there are only so many possible affirmative answers to the academic trade-off
disadvantage, so it's reasonable to write out a 2NC/1NR block to each in advance to each argument.
Finally, blocks can make it easy to adapt and improve your arguments based on experience and judge
commentary. If a judge has a comment about a particular argument you made, it's easy to adjust that
argument in the block so that it can be made more effectively in future debates.
What would a block look like?
Let's say the 1AC argues that schools should devote more time and resources to P.E. class, because more
time in gym would improve students' health. The 1NC responds with a Math Disadvantage that says that
more gym class would trade off with time in math class, decreasing how much students learn.
On the next page, there's a sample 2AC block that could be used to respond to the disadvantage. Then, any
time the affirmative team hears the Math Disadvantage, they can pull out their block and immediately have
access to their best arguments. Later, if they think of new or better arguments, they can add them to the
block in the future.
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Sample 2AC block — Math Block
Here let’s assume that the negative has made an argument that Math class is more important
Health class. Below is a 2AC block to that argument:
Sample 2AC Block
1. Our advantage is more important than their disadvantage, because better health means that
students live longer and better lives.
2.You have to be healthy before you can learn – more gym class means that students will do
more with the limited time they have in math class.They'll have more of an opportunity to
clear their minds and more energy in general.
3. Quality over quantity – high-quality math instruction is far more impactful than just spending
a few more minutes in class. According to Elena Silver, a senior policy analyst at Education
Sector, “Research reveals a complicated relationship between time and learning and suggests
that improving the quality of instructional time is at least as important as increasing the
quantity of time in school.” They haven't proven that there's any relationship between spending
more time in class and students performing better in math.
4. Math's boring, anyway. Who uses that stuff in the real world?
5. [More arguments, or evidence]
6. [More arguments, or evidence]
Now let’s write a 2NC block to one of the arguments.
Sample 2NC block
AT: 2AC - Math is boring
AT (meaning answer to): 2AC – Math is boring (so at the top of the page write this so you know what you are
answering)
1. Math is not boring. It is the cornerstone of our economy if we cannot do math we can never properly
balance budgets and then we’d run out of money.
2. Math is fun.You can play games on your laptop, computer, or phone. Trivia games on Facebook about math
prove this is true.
See, it’s that easy!!
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Judge Adaptation
Some of your judges may have coached debate for many years, or debated themselves in high school or
college. Other judges may be at their first-ever debate tournament. Still other judges may have been judging
debates casually for several months, but never coached or participated in the activity themselves.
Whatever judge you have, it's up to you to make your case in a way that's persuasive to them.
Keep in mind that everyone has different ideas about what counts as a good or bad argument. As a debater,
your goal isn't to make the argument that's most persuasive to you (although believing that your arguments
are good ones is important). The real goal is to make the argument that's most persuasive to your audience: in
this case, your judge.
Here's a few ideas for adapting to your judge:
1.Talk to your judge. Before the debate, it's fine to ask the judge how much experience they have with
debate, and if they have any strong feelings about what you do or shouldn't or do in-round. Most judges will
be happy to answer you: you're demonstrating that you respect their time, and that you want to debate in a
way they'll enjoy.
2. Watch your judge. Some judges will smile, frown, nod or shake their head, look bored or engaged, or
give you other non-verbal signals that they like or don't like the argument you're making. If it seems like they
like your argument – remember to watch the judge and have your partner watch the judge to see what they
like and dislike. Focus on that argument in later speeches, and you'll have a good chance to win the debate. If
it seems like they don't like your argument, it's not a big deal – now you can be pretty sure that particular
argument won't win you the debate, and you can move onto another argument that might be more effective.
3. Work on your argument skills and your speaking skills. All judges appreciate a good, logical
argument, and all judges appreciate polished speaking skills. How much they care about each, though, might
depend on their approach to the activity. The easiest solution is to get good at both: otherwise, you'll find
yourself able to win debates only in front of certain kinds of judges to win debates only in front of certain
kinds of judges.
4. Be respectful to your opponents. Again, all judges want this, but some might care so much about it
that they'll decide the debate on that alone.
5. Ask how you can do better. After the debate, ask the judge what you could work on for next time.
Whether you won or lost, chances are that your judge will have some ideas on how you can improve. And, if
you end up debating in front of that judge again, you can keep their comments in mind to build a case that's
uniquely appealing to them.
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Cutting Cards
Why do we care about cards?
We’re not experts! When we have experts supporting our claims we look more credible.You can talk about
why they are credible and why your opponent’s cards are not credible. It gives us a way to have different
forms of clash and adds to the clash that already exists.
So what makes a card good???
3 things are needed to make a card a good card:
1st – It must have good warrants. It should explain why your claims are true. It can do this either with
empirical evidence (historical reasons) or logical reason (A is correct because of B, and B is correct because
of C, etc., etc.). If the reason is logical then the card should go into detail about why. It can give statistical
reasons for example – global warming is real because the top 100 scientist don’t have over 100 years of
analysis determine that the earth is warming at an accelerated rate.
2nd – The qualifications of the author must be good. If you find the greatest nuclear war impact card
ever and it’s written by James Smith, 3rd grade dropout and future alien test subject, this person is probably
not creditable enough to be talk about the effects of nuclear war. Make sure the person talking about the
truth claims are credible. Wikipedia is NOT a credible source it may not be peer reviewed instead use it to
find the work referenced on the page.
3rd – Date of publication should be taken into consideration. If your argument is time sensitive then
having the most up-to-date information is very important. If you are running a DA and you are using a
uniqueness card from the 90’s it may not be as good as a card from this month.
So what makes a bad card????
So there are a couple of things we can try to avoid
1st – try to avoid cards that say “sometimes,” “occasionally,” “can,” “might,” “it is conceivable that…,” and “has
the potential to…”
2nd – power tagging or over-tagging your cards. If your tag has more words that you read in the card… it is
not a good card.
3rd – it is out of context, meaning that’s not what the author intended to say. If you only use the part of the
card that supports what you want to say but ignore where she says, “however, I disagree with the above
argument,” that is taking the card out of context and it should not be done.
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There are 3 parts to an evidence card:
1) The Tag/Claim – a brief statement summarizing the point of the evidence. The tag must be a complete
idea (subject and verb).You write the tag after reading the evidence (see “Evidence Citations” below).
2) The source citation (see “Tags” below)
3) The exact passage, as copied from the article (cut and paste), and placed in a document to be copied
and shared (see “Handing in Your Evidence” below).
Sample Card
Offshore wind is too expensive and won't work – the Netherlands have already tried the plan
and failed (THIS IS THE TAG)
Nelson, 11 (D. Brady Nelson, an economist, writing for The Heartland Institute, a think tank advocating for
free markets. Published December 30, 2011. Available at http://news.heartland.org/newspaperarticle/2011/12/30/dutch-pull-plug-offshore-wind-subsidies) (THIS IS THE CITATION)
The nation known for its iconic windmills is throwing in the towel on offshore wind power, as Dutch officials
have determined the Netherlands can no longer afford large-scale subsidies for expensive wind turbines that
cannot produce electricity at economically competitive prices.
The decision is a powerful blow against renewable power advocates who have long asserted Holland proves
renewable power can be practical and economical. (THIS IS THE PASSAGE)
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Using Articles
Reading, understanding, and deploying the articles provided by the AUDL is probably the single most
important thing you can do to win debates. The articles are drawn from many different perspectives on U.S.China relations, and make a variety of arguments on both sides. If you ever think to yourself, “how do I
answer this argument?” There's a pretty good chance you'll be able to find the answer in one of the
affirmative or negative articles. The articles also allow you to use evidence to support your claims, which,
when used effectively, can make your arguments much more credible than the other team's arguments.Visit
www.atlantadebate.org for articles related to this topic that can be used in debate rounds.
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***TPP 1AC and 1NC***
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How to Use This Section
What's in this Section?
A pre-written 1AC (Trans-Pacific Partnership with a Containment Advantage)
A pre-written 1NC disadvantage (Appeasement DA)
Case Neg for both Solvency and the Containment Advantage
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Intro to the topic
Affirmative Intro
This affirmative says that the fact that the United States has not allowed China to enter the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, or TPP, that it is viewed as an act of containment. Containment is just as it sounds—it prevents
China from acting as they wish. China does not like this and this causes them to act aggressively in the South
China Sea. The affirmative will argue that failure to include China in TPP will continue Chinese aggressive
behavior which ultimately lead to war.
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Glossary
Deterrence – The ability to stop an attack by convincing an enemy that the sheer force of response makes
the attack ‘not worth it.’ Specifically, the use of military threats as a means to prevent international crises and
war.
EEZ – An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources,
including energy production from water and wind.
Escalation – In this context, when a conflict grows bigger by incorporating more countries and people.
When a fight is between 2 people and then 2 more join and then 4 more join, that fight ‘escalated.’
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — writes the rules for global trade between the Americas and Asia
that will help increase Made-in-America exports, grow the American economy, support well-paying American
jobs, and strengthen the American middle class. A list of Countries who are apart of TPP are below:
Australia
Canada
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Peru
United States
Vietnam
Chile
Brunei
Singapore
New Zealand.
Nine-Dash Line – literally: "nine-segment line of the South China Sea" and at various times also referred to
as the "10-dash line" and the "11-dash line", refers to the demarcation line for their claims of the major part
of the South China Sea. The contested area in the South China Sea includes the Paracel Islands, the Spratly
Islands, and various other areas including the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal.
The claim encompasses the area of Chinese land reclamation known as the "great wall of sand".
Sino – generally refers to China. As in, Sino-American, or Sino-Japanese.
South China Sea – Part of the Pacific Ocean, encompassing an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits
to the Strait of Taiwan. It is:
• south of mainland China, including the island of Taiwan, in the east;
• east of Vietnam and Cambodia;
• west of the Philippines;
• east of the Malay peninsula and Sumatra, up to the Strait of Malacca in the west and north of the
Bangka–Belitung Islands and Borneo
Sovereignty – The full right and power to govern. In this context, it means the right to govern a particular
space or area. One country challenges another’s sovereignty when they try to take over their land or area.
Appeasement- Appeasement in a political context is a diplomatic policy of making political or material
concessions to an enemy power in order to avoid conflict.
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AFFIRMATIVE
1st Affirmative Constructive (1AC)
(Note to debaters:You must read a plan during the 1AC—it’s the most important thing the affirmative reads! Don’t skip it!)
Plan – The United States federal government should increase diplomatic and economic
engagement with The People’s Republic of China that invites them to join the Trans-Pacific
Partnership making clear to the Chinese government that they are not excluded, can meet
standards, and are encouraged to apply for membership.
Contention 1 is Inherency:
China is not in the Trans-Pacific Partnership now
Wang 2/10/2016 (Fei-Ling, 2016, Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “China and
the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Significant Challenges and Profound Opportunities”,
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/01/2016127134617824774.html)
Several countries around the Pacific like Russia and North Korea are not in the TPP. South Korea insisted that it was already in via its free trade treaty with the U.S. and later asked to join
the TPP formally. (4) A few others in or near the region such as Bangladesh, Colombia, India, Laos, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand have also expressed interest in joining the TPP. Most
conspicuous and intriguing, however, is that the TPP
does not include China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is a genuine Pacific nation
and also world’s largest exporter. Other than some wishful murmurs, there is no sign that the PRC will be a part of the TPP anytime
soon.
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Contention 2 is our Advantage – Containment:
First, China explicitly sees TPP as an element of containment
Aneja 2/6 (Atul, staff @ The Hindu, Indian newspaper, “Don’t politicise TPP: China to U.S.”,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/dont-politicise-tpp-china-to-us/article8203670.ece)
China has warned the United States not to politicise international trade following comments by President Barack Obama as the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), a U.S.-led free trade deal in the Asia-Pacific that excludes Beijing, was signed. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang on Friday urged
relevant countries and governments “not to politicise economic and trade issues”, and avoid leading people to the conclusion that the U.S. has
been promoting the TPP “out of certain political consideration”. Mr. Lu was responding to remarks by President Obama on Thursday as
the TPP was signed by 12 countries in Auckland that “TPP allows America — and not countries like China — to write the rules of the road in the
21st century”. Mr. Lu said such comments were “interesting”. After several years of negotiations, the TPP has emerged as a controversial document, both
within the U.S. and beyond. “Trade is a good thing. But trade has got to be fair. And the TPP is anything but fair,” said Bernie Sanders, the Senator from Vermont, who
is challenging Hillary Clinton for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination. U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said the deal could add $100 billion a
year to U.S. growth. However, critics say that the pact would export U.S. jobs to other member states. The TPP is also being strongly criticised for threatening to
extend restrictive U.S. intellectual property (IP) laws globally. The BBC is reporting that, “The U.S.-led initiative is a key part of Mr. Obama’s so-called pivot to
Asia” — widely
seen by Beijing as President Obama’s double-edged doctrine of China’s military and economic containment.
Second, Containment risks war—Including China in the TPP is key to prevent war
Kroeber 2015 (Arthur, managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics and editor of China Economic Quarterly, “What Will the TPP Mean for China?”,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership-obama-us-trade-xi/)
The TPP illustrates a dilemma for U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific. On one side, Washington seeks to counterbalance China’s rising power by
strengthening its military relationships with its regional allies, tilting in favor of southeast Asian countries in their maritime disputes with China, discouraging its
friends from participating in Chinese initiatives such as the AIIB, and pursuing a massive trade agreement that leaves out the region’s and the world’s biggest trading
nation. On the other side, American leaders reiterate that they have no desire to contain China (rightly seeing such a strategy would fail), and
argue that deeper engagement, rather than confrontation, is the right way forward in U.S.-China relations. This stance is borderline incoherent, and it’s
Chinese see it as duplicitous. Washington’s words are all about constructive engagement, but its deeds mostly
smack of containment. At the root is a deep ambivalence about whether or not the United States should accept China as an equal. If it
understandable why many
does, then it must also accept that China will build a sphere of influence and regional arrangements that exclude the United States. If it does not, then it must accept
that in fact if not in name it is pursuing a strategy of containment. Such a strategy heightens the risk of armed conflict. For the moment, China
and the United States still mostly conduct their relations on a basis of economic pragmatism rather than strategic rivalry. But the ground is
rapidly shifting. The completion of the TPP sharpens the question of how the United States and China will share power in the Asia-Pacific, but
provides no answer.
A China war would go nuclear
Straits Times, 2000 (“No one gains in war over Taiwan” Pg. 40 June 25, 2000. L/n)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that
splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other
countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any
country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and,
China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere
may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the
Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal,
could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army
to a lesser extent, Singapore. If
may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia
which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean
War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in
Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter
is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates
that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A
acquired a similar capability, there
Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the
military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that
principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a
While the
seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above
result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war.
prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might
everything else.
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Contention 3 is Solvency
Including China is key to trade—The plan boosts cooperation between the 2 countries
Greenville 2016 (Stephen, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney and a consultant on East Asian financial issues, 12/10, “Include China in the
TPP to augment its benefits”, http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20151210-ARE-THINGS-GOING-SOUTH-for-KOREA/Viewpoints/Stephen-Grenville-Include-China-in-the-TPP-to-augmentits-benefits)
is better to have larger trade groupings rather than smaller: There is less likelihood of trade diversion, whereby
trade is, of course,
optimal, but the World Trade Organization shows no signs of being able to make progress. Plurilateral agreements such as the TPP will still have
distortional effects, but with 12 members and one-third of world trade, the TPP will cause less diversion than the bilateral preferential trade
agreements that have become so common. What are the benefits of a larger grouping? Econometric modeling by Peter Petri, Michael Plummer and Fan
As a general principle, it
imports from fellow members of the group displace imports from outside, even though nonmembers may offer cheaper prices. Multilateral
Zhai, published by the Honolulu-based East-West Center with the support of the prestigious Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, indicates
that the TPP by itself will have modest benefits, but a similar framework for a group covering the entire Asia-Pacific region would
generate much greater benefits. They estimate the TPP would raise annual world income by $295 billion in its existing form, but by $1.9 trillion if
an all-inclusive Asia-Pacific grouping could be achieved. To put this in perspective, the world will gain about 0.3% of gross domestic product by
implementing the TPP, but an Asia-Pacific agreement would raise incomes by nearly 2%. One can argue about the methodology of these model-based
results, but the message is powerful. Stop at the current membership and there is only a modest benefit; widen the membership and the benefits are
dramatically multiplied. There are some prospects that other Asian countries will join. This would be easiest for South Korea, which concluded a bilateral trade
pact with Canada relatively recently. Indonesian President Joko Widodo expressed some interest when he visited America earlier this year, although there would be
obvious omission is China. While the U.S. worked assiduously to encourage countries such as Indonesia to join, U.S.
rhetoric in relation to China has been ambivalent, even unwelcoming. President Barack Obama "sold" the TPP to Congress by styling it as an
strong domestic resistance. The
opportunity for the U.S. to make Asia's trade rules rather than allowing China to do so. "China wants to write the rules for the world's fastest-growing region," he
said. "That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should level the playing
field." While denying that the TPP is part of a process of containing China, Obama offered Beijing something much less than an open invitation to
membership: "And by the way, there's been some suggestion that by doing TPP we're trying to contain or disadvantage China. We're actually not. What we are trying
to do is make sure that rather than a race to the bottom in the region there's a reasonable bar within which we can operate. And we hope that then China actually
joins us in not necessarily formally being a member of TPP but in adopting some of the best practices that ensure fairness in operations." At the same time, U.S.
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said that "passing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier." This
view, made in the context of America's Asian
"rebalancing," presents the TPP in a combative rather than cooperative mode. This adversarial view is widespread. The New York Times
saw the pact as "a win for the United States in its contest with China for clout in Asia." Of course, the U.S. is not going to kowtow to China, or put in place a set of
trading rules that reflect an authoritarian command economy rather than its own market-based approach. But there is an alternative -- a consistent policy that
pushes back where China is challenging, as in the South China Sea, while at the same time offering China the opportunity to become a full "responsible stakeholder"
in a rules-based international economic order. There might have been a case for excluding China during the negotiation phase in order to simplify negotiations and
develop a set of rules that suited America's market-based orientation. With the rules now in place, China would have to accept them if it joined, just as it accepted
narrow exclusionary mindset needs to be addressed. The Petri study notes that: "Given China's scale and
strategic role in the region, it is difficult to envision the future of the Asia-Pacific trading system without a central role for China." The
argument that China's economy is not ready for the "platinum standard" rules of the TPP is simply fatuous. Of course China is an authoritarian
command economy with many state-owned enterprises. Vietnam, already accepted as a member, has the same issues. These are being
accommodated within the TPP rules, just as Malaysia and Brunei are being accommodated through less demanding foreign-exchange reporting
WTO rules when it joined in 2001. This
requirements. For its part, China has shown no great offense at being excluded. Perhaps Beijing has felt that it is better not to seem too anxious to join a club that
would reject its overtures. There would, however, be advantages for China in joining. Not only would membership open up trading opportunities, but the "platinum
standard" rules would push China in a direction in which many of its reformers want to travel anyway. China might make good use of the Petri
study to remind the world, and U.S. commentators, that preferential trade agreements are distortional -- the TPP is estimated to cost the Chinese economy 0.3% in
annual GDP through trade diversion, according to the study. The way forward is to offer a less ambivalent welcome to China, encouraging it to
begin a dialogue with the TPP partners that would lead toward the greatly augmented benefits that come from wider membership. The problem is
that there is very little enthusiasm among key players for enlarging the membership. Neither the U.S. nor Japan seems likely to initiate this more
welcoming attitude.
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**Affirmative extensions- Containment**
“They say: China doesn’t see TPP as containment”
TPP promotes Chinese containment
Hearn & Myers 2015 (Adrian & Margaret, fellows @ Inter-American Dialogue, “CHINA AND THE TPP: Asia-Pacific Integration or Disintegration?”,
http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/CLA-TPP-Report-final-web.pdf)
China watchers, national and foreign, have painted a somber picture of the TPP, noting that trade is already relatively
open between its members and that it is therefore likely to harbor ulterior motives. According to the Director of the
APEC Research Center at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Cai Penghong, “It seems that the U.S. is using the TPP as a tool
as a part of its Asia Pacific Strategy to contain China” (Cai 2011). The agreement is also described as a U.S.-led plan to
undermine ASEAN+3, an institution that has leveraged China’s growth to consolidate East Asian economic integration (Li
.
2012) A prominent foreign contributor to Chinese official media, John Ross (2011), argues that the TPP aims “to
reorient trade discussion in the Pacific away from the most dynamic market, China, to the less dynamic one of the U.S.
by setting terms which exclude China.” Similarly, according to K.V. Kesavan and Kartikeya Khanna (2012), “the partnership
serves to compete with China’s economic interests rather than be complementary.”
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Extension to Solvency contention
Clearly inviting China in solves both relations & the economy
Gross 2013 (Donald, senior associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 7/9, “Welcoming
China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/trans-pacific-partnership-china_b_3562801.html)
By inviting China to join the negotiations for the TPP at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the United States would
strengthen the likelihood of the U.S. benefiting both from China’s long-term economic growth and its support for
international institutions on which the U.S. relies. As Professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University puts it: The
“United States cannot thwart China’s rise, but it can help ensure that China’s power is exercised within the rules and
institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted ... that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded
world of the future.” Most importantly, including China in the TPP would advance crucial objectives of American economic
policy — obtaining greater access to the Chinese market for U.S. goods and services, significantly reducing the Chinese
government’s role in the private sector, protecting intellectual property, and fostering greater foreign investment in both China and
the United States. This week’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue is an opportune time to make it manifestly clear the United States
,
welcomes Beijing’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and, in so doing resolve an issue that has hurt U.S.
relations with China for far too long.
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Answers to Appeasement DA
Assurance is failing now – funding, distractions, China
Green et al. 2016 (Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at Georgetown,
served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks, PhD in
Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian
official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International Security Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach
Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships” January 2016, CSIS,
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf)
Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional relationships, posture, operational concepts, and
capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance. The
past 14 years of war have left the military services with
significant challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed, reestablishing fullspectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of challenges from state and non-state actors
globally. It is doing so while drawing down forces and structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending
projections than planned even a few years ago. China’s rapidly expanding military investments and increasingly coercive
actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and near-term challenges facing the United States and its allies and
partners in protecting vital regional and global interests. Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing where it can, the United
States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests.
The threat of invasion by North Korea continues to decrease, but the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for instability within
North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years, the Asia-Pacific
region has witnessed significant
developments that require a reappraisal of U.S. strategy and force posture, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies and
partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some new challenges are emerging, and some existing risks are
worsening. These trends span issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most states in the
Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the same time, however, states across the region have become more
sensitive to China’s growing political, economic, and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijing’s increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian countries
indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce
critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the
U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea. In preparing this study, the
authors
heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies and partners that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many
regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance. The administration has taken
important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security
Strategy prepared for Congress.6 The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various lines of effort,
including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and
with allies and partners. Nevertheless, the
implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests.
Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, and U.S.
capability development is not keeping pace with challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of
military power in the region shifting against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not
articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when it comes to managing
China’s rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in administration speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7
The 2012 CSIS independent assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it remains a problem in terms of reassuring allies and partners
and sustaining congressional support. Second, cuts to the defense budget from 2009–2015 have limited the
Defense Department’s ability to pursue the rebalance. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, long-term budget
uncertainty and the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the environment that existed when
CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen
the rebalance, the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge
is increasing and concerns are growing about the ability of
potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forward-operating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a
premium on investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced integrated air and missile defense
(IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber;
electronic warfare (EW); a blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful reminders of China’s plans
to push the United States out of the region in a conflict. These capabilities give China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the Western Pacific,
U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the U.S. economy depends. Absent major operational or technology
breakthroughs by the United States and its allies and partners, substantial risk remains that China’s strategy could undermine the U.S. military’s ability to defend U.S.
interests in the Asia-Pacific. Fourth, China’s tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectations—as demonstrated by Beijing’s increased operational tempo and
construction of military airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands. This risk tolerance requires the United States to reassess its China policy, and
may lead allies and partners to do the same.
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Turn: Plan helps the alliance & increases perception of U.S. involvement in the region—
constructive engagement is key
Tanaka 2015 (Hitoshi, senior fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange and chairman of the Institute for
International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd., previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs
Hitoshi, “The next step for the US-Japan alliance,” Aug 4, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/04/the-next-step-for-the-us-japanalliance/)
This evolution in US-Japan alliance relations has taken place as the regional balance of power shifts. Emerging economies such as
China, India, and ASEAN countries are rising; Asia’s middle class is growing; and US defence spending shifting toward a more sustainable, ‘lean-but-mean’ posture.
Thus as the Abe administration struggles over the next couple of months to pass legislation to expand Japan’s security role, structural shifts in East Asia are
making it clear that the next step for Japan and the US must be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted partnership. Japan
must strengthen regional trust. The 70th anniversary of World War II offers an opportunity to affirm Japan’s peaceful postwar identity and to mend ties with South
Korea and China. In his anticipated August statement, Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of the key
elements of the Murayama Statement. At the same time, Abe should set out Japan’s defence policy in a forward-looking way — clearly stating that it is aimed solely
at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional security environment — to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea
that the revised US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s new security legislation to allow limited forms of collective self-defence represent a return to
a more aggressive regional posture. A change in the US mindset is needed so it may truly act as a resident power in East Asia. Current
projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds of the global middle class by 2030 and will account for more than half of global
GDP by 2050. As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the US become more intimately and directly involved in
the order-building process. This requires the US to move away from its tendency to act as an external balancer and toward a more
engaged day-to-day involvement and leadership role in the region across political, security and economic dimensions. One channel for the US to
project such political leadership would be to spearhead the establishment of a four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. Such a mechanism
would be well positioned to foster reassurance diplomacy regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the US-Japan alliance, and to promote agreements on militaryto-military hotlines and crisis management procedures to reduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate damage in the event of a crisis. The US and Japan
should strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea, Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK
trilateral cooperation, including contingency planning, is urgent given the uncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trilateral cooperation directed toward North
Korea should take into account the need to engage China and Russia, make preparations to steer the situation toward a soft-landing unification, and utilise Track 2
diplomacy to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula. The forward deployment of US troops throughout East Asia
needs to be re-examined regularly — through intensive consultation with alliance partners — to ensure it is politically sustainable and able to meet contemporary
challenges. While the US forward deployment is a critical regional public good, it must be re-considered whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration
in one area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa in the face of strident local opposition, is the best strategy over the long term to fulfil US-Japan alliance
goals. Advances in new military technologies and the changing nature of regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more
dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more evenly distributed and rotated across the region — a trend that is already underway with
increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. At the same time, as the SDF continues to expand its roles and
functions to engage in limited collective self-defence, there will be greater potential for joint US-Japan basing arrangements, which should be utilised as an
opportunity to deepen US-Japan security cooperation. Finally, Japan and the US would be wise to complement their security cooperation with
more vigorous efforts to constructively engage with China in key areas, including on multilateral financial institutions, mega-regional trade agreements, and
energy and the environment.
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Japan is in military spending deficit – can’t make nuclear weapons
Bremmer 2015 — Ian Bremmer, foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME, 2015, (“Why the World doesn’t have to
fear Japan,” TIME, 9/24, Available online at http://time.com/4047863/the-world-doesnt-have-to-fear-japan/, Accessed 6/24/16, RR)
Trouble in the East China Sea between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, has been an uncomfortable undercurrent in global affairs.
Now, 70 years after the end of World War II, ostensibly pacifist Japan has passed legislation that expands the role and reach of its military. The angry reaction from
the Chinese and South Korean governments that followed owe as much to domestic politics as to memories of WW II–era Japanese militarism. Some fear that
Japan’s move signals that East Asia will become the world’s next danger zone. But breathe easier–East Asia is one region we don’t have to worry about.
First, it’s much easier to pass a new law than to build a new military. That’s especially true in Japan, which doesn’t have much more money to spend on
defense. The country’s debt is already approaching 250% of GDP, and the International Monetary Fund warned this summer that it
will rise to as much as three times the size of Japan’s economy within 15 years unless the government reins in spending. The country’s rapidly
aging population demands progressively higher spending on pensions and health care. That’s why Japan’s Ministry of Defense is asking for a bump in military spending
of just 2.2% for next year, a rise that owes more to increased costs imposed by a weaker yen than a desire to beat China, which is recording double-digit increases
in military spending. Nor is there public support in Japan for a more hawkish foreign policy. The new law has eroded Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s popularity and provoked intense protests inside and outside Japan’s parliament. According to a recent Pew survey, 68%
of Japanese want to limit Japan’s military activity, while only 23% want the country to be more active. If Japan becomes militarily aggressive, costs will
become unsustainable and opposition to Abe will become entrenched. So if it’s expensive and unpopular, why did the Prime Minister push for this change? Abe
wants to demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the military alliance with the U.S. by showing a willingness to become a more active
partner. The U.S.-Japan alliance, not a stronger Japanese military on its own, is crucial for countering China’s expansion. In addition, many members of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are more hawkish than the average Japanese. Appeasing them helps Abe build and maintain support within the LDP for his more
important drive for economic reform. And the economy is one more reason Japan is not about to stoke conflict. China is Japan’s largest trade partner. We may see
more Japanese patrol boats in the East China Sea, but we’re no more likely to see open conflict than we were before this law passed.
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
**NEGATIVE arguments**
Negative Introduction
Appeasement is the theory that when a leader gives in to the demands of the people, the people will respond
by thinking, “hey, that leader sure is weak, look how she gave us all this stuff.” As a result, they will ask for
even more stuff from her. The dictionary defines it as – “satisfaction of an aggressor by granting of
concessions”. In other words, there are a lot of countries in the world that really hate the United States, for a
whole bunch of different and random reasons. They all want the US to decrease the number of troops we
have deployed abroad and quit messing with them. The plan does exactly what our enemies want, it decreases
the number of troops we have out there. The disad is based around this concept.
The Appeasement disad is likely to be, in some form, one of the most popular disads on this topic.
Here are the basic ideas of each part of the disadvantage:
UNIQUENESS – right now Obama has assured Japan that the U.S. will remain strong in the Asia Pacific. He is
seen internationally as credible.
LINK – Appeasing China sends the signal that the U.S. is weak on China. That makes Japan anxious.
IMPACT – Japan starts increasing their military by the way of an arms race and nuclear proliferation (building
nuclear weapons).
The affirmative answers to appeasement should focus on the following:
A. The U.S. is already not appeasing our allies in places like Afghanistan and Iraq
B. This actually helps our allies.
C. Japan cannot afford to build nuclear weapons
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Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (1/3)
U.S-Japan Alliance is strong, but fragile
Glosserman et al 15 — Panel of Experts: Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu,
James Miller is
Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D. in
public policy from Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy for National Security Council policy-making and crisis management, Catherine
Kelleher is a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, Kori Schake is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution,
2015, ("Reassurance: What Should Allies Expect?”, Carnegie Endowment, March 23rd, Available Online at carnegieendowment.org/files/07Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP)
On the operational level we’re
seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South
Koreans. We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like Ambassador Ho-young this morning, the news today that there’s a
deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out, so we’re seeing a stepping up of the
presence. It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that that’s what the allies are looking
for. We get the fact that there’s a demand for more. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need
to be expecting, is a demand for the United States for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, the
alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides, a receptiveness to the needs. Finally, I think, we’re
seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the
leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic
connection between the three countries.
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Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (2/3)
Plan is appeasement – giving China things unilaterally encourages aggression and scares Japan
which creates an Asian arms race.
Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2/19/2009 (Emma, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Mary Beth, Analyst in
Nonproliferation, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests” Accessed 6/22/16
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf JJH)
U.S. Security Commitment
Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S.
guarantee to protect Japan’s security. Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella,” although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack
on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, “ ... the
Most
policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is
more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27 During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured
United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.”26
destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front
of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the United States has reiterated its
commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge.
Some in Japan are nervous that if the United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between Tokyo’s and
Washington’s security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what
they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea’s denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further
evidence that the United States does not share Japan’s strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may
strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence. Despite these
concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and
strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China’s rising stature
likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major
readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a
fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S.
commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance
drift. Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the
issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on
the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts, the most alarming possible
consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33
The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program;
encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear
weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect—or
even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary
tension could be deeply destabilizing. The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence
was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers
maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors. US China Relations The course of the relationship
between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization
debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from
some in the United States to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan
to be “unleashed” in order to counter China’s strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from
China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan’s non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations
likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations
become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly
true if the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations.35 Despite improved
relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong, and many in Japan’s defense community view China’s
rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat.
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Sample 1NC Appeasement Disad (3/3)
Asian prolif causes nuclear war
Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder:
Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, pp. 59-63
Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, the
possibility of inadvertent nuclear
war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the postCold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other
technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling
both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war.¶ The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political
intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in
crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent.
Unfortunately, inside
dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent
pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its
command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience.¶ For example: during Able Archer
83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet
intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first
strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the
alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18¶ Another example of the
difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more
demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile
faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there
was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders
could act on them.¶ A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of
studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory.
Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian
general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for
launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket
launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was
scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid
confusion.¶ The Future: Issues of Concern¶ If
the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War,
between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more
concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then
Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including
those that might influence the decision for or against war.¶ Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared
with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future
threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be
presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West
nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis.¶ The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with
geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force
structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and
cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear
weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious
reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because
the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or
global respect.20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because
plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War
Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice
for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North
Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.¶ The
short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of
that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed
missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as
conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also
have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken,
retaliation.¶ This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of
policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could
profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity
(in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account
contiguous states means
of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war
between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic
missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
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Sample 1NC Answer to Containment advantage
China doesn’t see TPP as containment
Bradsher 15 (Keith, 4/28, staff @ New York Times, “Once Concerned, China Is Quiet About Trans-Pacific Trade Deal”,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/business/international/once-concerned-china-is-quiet-about-trans-pacific-trade-deal.html?_r=0)
As the deal has come to the forefront again, the Chinese government has changed its view. Some of China’s leading trade policy intellectuals
now say that they have few concerns about the agreement. They also say that the pact could even help China, by making it easier for
Beijing to pursue its own regional agreements without facing criticism that it should instead pursue ambitious global free trade pacts that would
require significantly opening its markets to Western competition. “We don’t think T.P.P. is a challenge to China — we will watch and study,” said He
Weiwen, a former Commerce Ministry official who is now the co-director of the China-United States-European Union Study Center in Beijing. “We are
more or less neutral because we have our own agenda, pushing forward Asean plus six and the Silk Road,” he said, referring to two of China’s own
regional initiatives. He added that China would make sure its regional pacts complied with global free trade rules on such deals.
China war won’t go nuclear
Fravel 15 (M. Taylor, Associate Professor Department of Political Science Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Future of U.S.-China Strategic
Stability”, 4/30/15, https://nuclearconference2015.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/cunningham_fravel_nsri_2015.pdf)
Chinese assessments of crisis stability in the U.S.-China relationship are optimistic. Chinese strategists see a low risk of nuclear
escalation, both intentional and unintentional, at present and into the future. These assessments contradict the theoretical expectations of Western scholars about
the current risks of intentional escalation. They also contradict the concerns of the U.S. policy community about the future risks of unintentional nuclear escalation
posed by the AirSea Battle Concept. At present, Chinese optimism about crisis stability is premised on a belief that the stakes in any U.S.-China conflict
would be low.126 As a result, neither state would risk the possibility of nuclear escalation from a more intense conflict. If a more intense
conflict did occur, Chinese strategists expect that U.S. conventional superiority and China’s no first-use policy would prevent either side
from escalating to nuclear threats. As a hedge, China is allowing limited ambiguity over its no first-use policy to deter the United
States from any temptation to use its conventional superiority to attack China’s nuclear arsenal. In the future, China’s strategic community
does not expect recent developments in U.S. strategic capabilities to change the risks of intentional nuclear escalation. With some
exceptions, most Chinese strategists see a low risk of unintentional escalation at present. They do not share U.S. concerns about the novel unintentional escalation
risks posed by the AirSea Battle Concept in the future. But even if Chinese analysts accurately assess the nuclear risks present in a U.S.-China contingency, their
optimism about crisis stability may be unwarranted if it is not shared by the United States.
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Sample 1NC Answer to Solvency
China says no to TPP
Wang 2/10/2016 (Fei-Ling, Professor of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “China
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Significant Challenges and Profound Opportunities”,
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/01/2016127134617824774.html)
China seems to like what it has now in international trade and thus is unmotivated to join the America-led TPP. Deep concerns also
exist in Beijing about the TPP’s higher labor, IPR, and environmental standards that link free trade to synchronized sociopolitical policies and values. This
is easily viewed fundamentally threatening by the one-party regime of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) as the TPP would require
significant changes of China’s domestic legal system and even its overall political system. Thus China has kept its distance from the TPP.
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Extensions to 1NC Appeasement DA
“They say: Assurance is low now”
Alliance strong now and strengthening it is key to overcome limitations – evidence otherwise
assumes that the US adopts an isolationist policy – mutual cooperation, Abe visit, burdensharing, and trilateral naval exercises
Manggala 16 (Pandu Utama, part of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, published on the East Asia Forum, a
policy forum directed by Emeritus Professor Peter Drysdale of the Australian National University, “Could Domestic Politics Shake
the US–Japan Alliance” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/22/could-domestic-politics-shake-the-us-japan-alliance/)
Not only is the US–Japan alliance looking solid, but it appears that both countries are looking to further
strengthen it. This sentiment gained momentum after the official visit of Abe to the United States in April 2015. Both leaders have
also reaffirmed their commitment to the alliance by announcing the revised Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation. The revised
document acknowledges the regional shifts in the balance of power, Japan’s altered defence posture, and the emerging transnational threats to
Japan and the United States. The outlook for the US–Japan alliance has also improved with the passage of Japan’s security-related bills in
September 2015, which allows the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to play a greater role in maintaining international peace and
stability under the banner of a ‘proactive contributions to peace’. The alliance is now explicitly global in scope and aims to be more
balanced and effective. But, as the alliance expands, the limitations faced by both Washington and Tokyo must be managed carefully. With
the relative decline in US power, the future of global leadership is uncertain. As such, there is a risk that the United States could pursue the same ‘isolationist policy’
that US presidential hopeful Donald Trump has been advocating so strongly. Alternatively, there is a risk that the United States might try to drag Japan into
unnecessary conflicts. And, while Japan’s new security laws expand the role of the SDF, its ability to exercise collective self-defence is still limited under strict
these limitations in mind, both Washington and Tokyo must elevate the alliance to the next step by
developing a more multifaceted partnership. The United States and Japan are already taking this next step through
conditions. With
strengthening trilateral cooperation with like-minded partners such as Australia and India. For instance, Japan and India upgraded their relationship to a
‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan in 2014. The relationship has gone from strength to strength
ever since, and has included a successful US–India–Japan Malabar naval exercise in 2015.
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Increased US-China engagement accelerates Japanese fears of decoupling which damage the
alliance and cause remilitarization
Glosserman 13 — Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, 2013 (“The China challenge and the USJapan alliance”, CSIS, 11/21, Available Online at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/Pac1383.pdf, Accessed 6-23-16, JJH)
The biggest issue for the US-Japan alliance is China. Washington and Tokyo must address the direct challenges that Beijing poses to
regional security as well as manage the impact of China’s rise on their bilateral relationship. The latter is the more difficult of the
two assignments: while there is considerable common ground in the two countries’ assessment of China, there is a growing gap
between Americans and Japanese on how to respond to Chinese behavior. On paper, the two countries are in lockstep when it
comes to China. The language of the last Security Consultative Committee meeting (the SCC, usually called the “2+2”) is explicit:
The US and Japan “continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to
adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its
rapid expanding military investments.” It sounds like boilerplate, but it hits the right notes, identifying concerns and telling Beijing
what they expect it to do. But beneath this concord, there is discord. When it comes to China, Japan is channeling the spirit of
Margaret Thatcher, who once warned President George HW Bush to “not go wobbly” when dealing with the Soviets. Japanese
experts and officials voice two concerns. The first is a fear of “decoupling” the US and Japan, a worry since President Bill Clinton
overflew Tokyo twice on his way to and from Beijing. Japanese worry that they have been eclipsed by China as the US’s preferred
partner in Asia. There is teeth gnashing in Tokyo every time the US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue convenes, and Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo is still waiting for his shirt-sleeves Sunnylands summit with President Obama. Fears of decoupling have receded
– but haven’t vanished – and Tokyo now frets over “mutual vulnerability” (sometimes called “strategic stability”), a world in which
China’s nuclear arsenal makes Washington hesitant to respond to Chinese aggression. This leads to a “stability-instability paradox”: a
situation in which the prospect of mutual pain creates stability at the strategic level (MAD provided this during the Cold War) but
invites small-scale provocations or aggression locally. The geographic focus of this particular fear is the Senkaku Islands, uninhabited
islets in the East China Sea that are held by Japan and claimed by China (and called the Daioyu in Chinese), that have become the
locus of tensions in the Japan China relationship. Even though the US has insisted for years that the islands are covered under the
US-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese are not mollified. The standard US response is that the “US takes no stand on the claims to
disputed territory, but the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the treaty as ‘territory administered by Japan.’ ” Japanese
experts and officials urge the US to be more forward leaning, actually backing Japan’s claim to the islands as well as chastising China
for threatening instability in the region. They prefer language from the Trilateral Security Dialogue (which includes the US, Japan and
Australia), released a day after the SCC statement, which decries “coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in
the East China Sea,” wording more explicit than that in the 2+2 declaration. What accounts for the gap in perspectives? One
difference is obvious: Japan feels threatened now by Chinese actions. As a Japanese scholar explained, “this is the first occasion in
which the Japanese people really sense the possibility that Japanese territory under control of their government may be menaced
by an external enemy.” The US is also worried by Chinese behavior, but the threat is more distant, both in terms of geography and
time, and more abstract (typically framed in regard to a shifting balance of power). This reflects a second difference: how each
country ranks security threats. China tops Japan’s list, while the US identifies North Korea as its immediate regional concern. The
US may be dragged into conflict in both cases, but Pyongyang is considered a more belligerent and unpredictable force than Beijing.
Third, there is the context in which each country frames relations with China. China is among both countries’ top trading partners
and the destination of considerable investment from both. But Washington sees relations with Beijing more broadly, engaging it as a
partner across a range of endeavors, while Japan’s perspective is narrower – it sees China primarily as a threat. US references to a
strategic partnership, or sometimes even cooperation, with China raise temperatures in Tokyo. Other factors tug on the alliance.
The bitter, bloody history of Japan-China relations during the 20th century distinguishes regional analysis in Tokyo and Washington,
creating expectations and obstacles for Japan that the US doesn’t face. (Ironically, in the 1980s, this history pushed Tokyo closer to
Beijing than the US liked.) Beijing is quick to widen perceived gaps in thinking between Washington and Tokyo, playing up the image
of an irresponsible US or an irresolute Japan. Some Japanese hawk a China threat because it supports their political agenda,
whether increasing military spending or loosening constitutional restrictions on the Self-Defense Forces. Highlighting a China threat
also reinforces the message that Tokyo is a serious ally, ready to pull its weight on regional security concerns. Unfortunately, while
many in the US back these moves, Japanese messaging has been ham fisted, arguing that Tokyo must change the interpretation of the
right of collective self-defense because in some cases Japan might not be able to defend its own territory, an argument that
inadvertently plays up the image of an irresponsible ally. Some insist that problems in the US-Japan relationship spring from Japanese
insecurities. That is true – up to a point. But those insecurities, real or imagined, are a problem for the alliance and need to be
deflated. As a start, while pursuing cooperation with China, and urging Tokyo to do the same, Americans must push back against the
notion that there is an equilateral triangle among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing. Our alliance fundamentally distinguishes the USJapan relationship from that of the US and China.
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2016-2017 Atlanta Urban Debate League
Novice Starter Resource Packet (TPP Affirmative/Negative and Appeasement Disadvantage)
Japanese rearmament leads to arms race and war
Mizokami 15 — Kyle Mizokami, writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The
Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, 2015 (“China’s Ultimate Nightmare: Japan Armed With
Nuclear Weapons”, The National Interest, October 31st, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-ultimatenightmare-japan-armed-nuclear-weapons-14214, Accessed 06-24-2016, SP)
It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear
weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both
its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal. To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact,
it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would
have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them.
China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime. Japan
has no nukes, therefore, if China holds to its word, Japan should be reassured. “If” and “should” being the operative words here. Still, it’s an interesting proposition.
Nuclear phobias and the lack of a pressing need aside, there’s certainly no reason why Japan, the third largest economy in the world,
couldn’t build nukes. What would a Japanese nuclear deterrent look like? Let’s examine the traditional nuclear triad of land-based
ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines and each leg of the triad’s suitability for Japan’s circumstance. For
the sake of argument, let’s say Japan can choose just one leg to invest in. We’ll also set the number of nukes at roughly 300. Japan’s
high population density would mean that the destruction of just a handful of cities could kill or injure the majority of the country’s
civilian population. Against an adversary such as Russia or China, Japan must be able to inflict similar losses. Land-based missiles
Japan could invest in a small arsenal of land-based missiles, each carrying one or more nuclear warheads. The missiles could be
stationed in hardened silos, like the American Minuteman III, or on mobile launchers like the Russian RS-24 Yars. A Japanese ICBM
would be smaller, not needing the range and fuel to reach North America. The ability to reach all of China, European Russia and the
Middle East would be sufficient. Eventually, Japan might settle on a force of 100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, each equipped
with three 100 kiloton warheads. The missiles could be based in hardened silos in eastern Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, or
moved around on mobile launchers. This is the least survivable of the three ideas. Japan’s close proximity to China means that in the
event of a nuclear attack from the latter it would need to have a “launch on warning” doctrine to ensure the missiles survived. That
would considerably increase the possibility of accidental nuclear war, as a hardware or software malfunction in Japan’s early warning
system could be incorrectly interpreted as an attack. Geography makes land basing even less attractive. Japan’s high population
density makes it impossible to find a location for 100 missile silos that would not would invite terrible collateral damage in the
event of attack. Even basing them in remote places like the northern Island of Hokkaido would incur needless risk. Mobile launchers
would be far too large and heavy to travel Japan’s road network, unless a separate track were built somewhere. Even that would
make their positioning more predictable. Another option might be to exploit Japan’s extensive rail network. Strategic bombers
Japan could build a wing of stealthy bombers to deliver cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs. Such an aircraft could fly nuclear
penetration missions against adversaries, knocking out enemy nuclear weapons, command and control and other counterforce
targets. Nuclear bombers would give Japanese strategic warfare planners the flexibility to go after multiple targets or change the
targets in mid-flight. Nuclear bombers can be recalled at any point in the mission. A bomber scheme could involve three squadrons
of twenty-four bombers each, for a total of seventy-two jets, each the size of an FB-111 strike aircraft. Each bomber would carry
four short-range attack missiles, each with a 100 kiloton yield, for a total of 288 nuclear weapons. Geography also makes strategic
bombers unlikely. A lightning attack against Japan’s bomber bases could wipe out the entire force on the ground before they are
given the order to scramble. If tankers are necessary for the bombers to reach their targets, the destruction of the Japanese tanker
force would make the bombers irrelevant. Furthermore, advances in air defense technology could make the bombers dangerously
vulnerable. Japan could, like the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command of old, maintain a force of bombers permanently in the air,
but that would be expensive and require enough bombers in the air (and aerial tankers) at any one time inflict a punishing blow. The
cost and complexity of standing up and maintaining such a force would be prohibitive. Ballistic Missile Submarines This is the most
attractive option. Ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable platform—as long as at least one were out on patrol at all
times. Each Japanese “boomer” could just sail east to the Mid-Pacific to relative safety; any anti-submarine warfare ships and planes
sent by Russia or China to hunt it would have to get past Japan itself. Japan could persuade the United States to share submarine,
missile and warhead technology with it the way it does with the United Kingdom. Of the three basing schemes, the defensive
nature of sea-based deterrent is probably the most likely the United States would agree to help with. Depending on the timeline,
Japan could even end up funding certain parts of the Ohio Replacement Program—particularly the missile. In a sea-basing scheme
Japan could emulate China, France or the United Kingdom, maintaining a force of five ballistic missile submarines, each equipped
with sixteen nuclear-tipped missiles. Each missile would be equipped with four 100 kiloton warheads. The one submarine on patrol
at all times would be equipped with sixty-four warheads. There are some drawbacks. Ballistic missile submarines would be more
difficult to keep in contact with during a crisis. Finally, if only two out of five submarines are on patrol at any time only 128
warheads would be available. Obviously, under current circumstances, it’s not in anyone’s interests for Japan to have nuclear
weapons. Still, it must be recognized that if pushed, it could certainly do so. Although a long ways off, all sides should remember that
increasingly strained relations between Japan, China, and Russia could make a bad situation much, much worse.
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