CHAPTER 1
PLANNING FOR THE INVASIO N
N 22nd July 1940, in a broadcast rejecting Hitler's offer of a peac
O based on recognition of German hegemony in Europe, Mr Ede ne
the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that "we shall not sto p
fighting until Freedom is secure" . Even at this nadir the basic British
strategy of re-entering France in force at an opportune time and the n
defeating Germany on the historic battlefields of France and the Lo w
Countries animated the stubborn self-defence which was immediately
required . As early as mid-June 1940 Churchill's fertile mind and aggressive determination had given impetus to the formation of the nucleu s
of a Combined Operations Command, and of parachute units, as wel l
as to the development of tank-landing vessels and other paraphernali a
suitable for amphibious raids . Above all, the spirit which was invoke d
in the British people, and which was amply manifest to Australian air men as they arrived in the United Kingdom late in 1940, was one o f
patience and enduring faith ; standing firm was the first requisite but i t
was not an end in itself but only the forerunner to an advance to complete victory .
Almost four years were to pass before this fervent resolve born i n
the shadow of defeat was to be put into full and direct practice ; but
most of the seemingly distant or independent military ventures of th e
intervening period were tributaries to this main stream of strategy . Onc e
the German attack had been held, first the Italian colonies and the n
Italy herself should be eliminated from the war before all availabl e
strength was turned against Germany . While Britain stood alone thi s
progression was inevitable . A force capable of assaulting and establishin g
itself firmly on the continent of Europe could not be trained, equippe d
and assembled, except by hard unrelenting effort over a long period durin g
which the territorial advantages of the Axis powers in Europe must b e
diminished and the enormous gap between their material power and tha t
of Britain drastically reduced .
By June 1941 Britain herself seemed free from invasion and there were a t
least temporarily encouraging indications that the U-boat menace in th e
Atlantic was abating . British commando raids had not progressed fa r
beyond the "butcher and bolt" principle, advocated by Mr Churchill o n
6th June 1940 to institute a reign of terror along enemy-occupied coast s
and thus disperse widely the forces available to meet a deliberate assault ;
British air attacks had merely scratched German industrial resources ,
which were not only expanding but had recently been significantly reinforced by facilities, especially oil installations, in the Balkans ; the British
expedition to Greece had ended disastrously and amply pointed the moral
that the time was not ripe for British forces alone to challenge th e
might of Germany under conditions favourable to the enemy .
2
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
194 1
Although the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 immediatel y
occupied nearly three-quarters of enemy ground forces, there were stil l
approximately 50 German divisions disposed to repulse any British attac k
against Norway or in north-western Europe . Marshal Stalin, who a yea r
earlier had seen France engulfed without himself taking action, no w
pressed Britain to make a large-scale diversion there to draw German
forces from the Eastern front . This was manifestly impracticable, for a t
best it would have engaged very few additional enemy forces . In th e
worst possible case, if the British diversionary force had been annihilate d
or badly crippled in France, and Russia herself overrun, the whole fruit s
of the training and re-equipment of British units in the 12 months sinc e
Dunkirk would have been cast prematurely away, leaving Britain weake r
than ever . Immediate aid to Russia would have to be principally throug h
the provision of equipment, a small token air contingent, and intensification of the air and amphibious raids already mounted in western Europe .
Should Russia successfully resist the first German onslaught, as Britai n
had done, then more ambitious projects would become feasible . The
British Chiefs of Staff, in accord with Churchill's own strong views, wer e
already planning to launch a British offensive in Libya, advance to Tripoli ,
and then immediately invade Sicily to threaten the Axis on its souther n
flank and thus divert enemy strength from the Eastern front . This plan
appeared to be the utmost which British forces alone could safely accomplish in 1942, and, even so, it was based on premises difficult to achieve .
The Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East themselves opposed th e
Sicily plan, which was shelved late in October 1941 when a new plan
(GYMNAST), for cooperative entry into French North Africa, becam e
the prime British objective—if and when General Auchinleck's comin g
offensive should drive the Italo-German forces from Tripolitania . Th e
strategic centre of operations was thus still to be the Mediterranean ,
and Britain held firm to her methodical plan .
Russia continued to insist that Britain should plunge direct into the fourt h
(and final) stage of her strategic aim by invading north-western Europe ,
and, although the means were then lacking, Churchill instructed his Join t
Planning Staff in September 1941 to expedite their study of the resource s
which would be needed for this climactic enterprise . By the end of th e
year an outline plan, based on the assumption that France might b e
invaded in mid-1943, was ready for approval, but already the secon d
great shift in the course of the war had occurred with the Japanes e
attack on Pearl Harbour and Malaya . Britain and America became immediate and full Allies against Germany, Italy and Japan and strateg y
henceforth was decided on a world-wide basis except insofar as the unwillingness of Russia and Japan to declare war on each other prevente d
full cooperation between both Axis and Allied forces .
Although the new situation brought immediate dangers and, in th e
Pacific at least, entailed a reversion to first-stage strategy of warding off
defeat, the entry of America into the war gave promise at last of enoug h
men and equipment to make possible an armed re-entry to the continent
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1940-42
BEAT HITLER FIRST STRATEGY
3
of Europe . The direction of Allied strategy had in fact been long apparen t
because of a long-sighted decision of President Roosevelt in 1940 after
the utter defeat of France . The first military consultations between Britai n
and America began as air and naval staff conversations in that year an d
continued during January and March 1941 . The British viewpoint at thes e
discussions was consistently that, on the assumption that both Americ a
and Japan became belligerents, the Allies should concentrate on defeating
Germany and Italy first and then should turn their full weight agains t
Japan . These considerations were re-emphasised in August 1941 at th e
Atlantic conference between Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt ,
although the new factor of diverting large quantities of equipment t o
support Russia had then to be taken into account . In December 1941 ,
however, the way was clear for comprehensive and definite agreement
both in principle and method . Talks began in Washington on 22nd
December between the Prime Minister and the President, together wit h
their Chiefs of Staff, at which prompt and mutually satisfactory plans wer e
made . In January 1942 a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee wa s
set up to be responsible for the major strategy of the Allies and at th e
same time to control the broad program of war requirements and th e
allocation of all Allied resources . This united rather than collateral direction of the war promised an incisive quality and an efficiency of effor t
noticeably lacking in the earlier Anglo-French partnership and still unattained in action by the Axis powers despite their much vaunted solidarity . Both Britain and America were forced to give up a large measur e
of their freedom of independent action, and at times divergent views wer e
inevitable, but, in the main, agreed solutions and energetic commo n
action were always achieved on major issues after differing national o r
personal opinions had been fully aired . l
Of equal moment to the genesis of central strategical control arrangements was the decision at the December 1941 talks in Washington (th e
ARCADIA conference) to adopt officially the " Beat Hitler First" strategy .
Despite the great anger and loss caused by the Japanese offensives in th e
Pacific, President Roosevelt and General Marshall, the United State s
Chief of Staff, were prepared to take the courageous and locally-unpopula r
stand that Germany was the greater menace, and that unless German y
was opposed as quickly and effectively as possible she might, by eliminating Russia, create a world situation in which defeat of Japan would be
impracticable or merely a localised success . There was, however, in the
memorandum submitted by General Marshall and Admiral Harold R .
Stark, commanding the United States Naval Forces in Europe, a significan t
twist to previous British strategy . They stated : " . . . Our view remain s
that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory.
Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japa n
I The Combined Chiefs of Staff system had the fault from an Australian standpoint that onl y
the two major powers were represented . Australia felt that because all direction and allocation of materials now flowed from this more remote authority, she had in a sense been
disenfranchised because she had no direct access, while at the same time her position vis-a-vi s
the British Chiefs of Staff, which she had been at great pains to establish, no longer gav e
her the strength she desired.
4
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
1942
must follow ."2 Whereas the British had envisaged a gradual lopping of
important limbs of the Axis so that when in an enfeebled state it coul d
finally be mortally attacked, America wished to drive straight at th e
heart . America agreed to send air and ground forces as quickly a s
possible to the European theatre, stressing only that they should b e
actively engaged against the enemy .
The course of events in the Pacific early in 1942 as the Japanes e
drove south, drastically interfered with this simple offensive strategy ,
for considerable British and American forces had to be moved hastil y
to the Indian Ocean and South-West Pacific . Neither of the Allies wa s
able to spare the men, materials and above all the ships to encompas s
even the GYMNAST plan to gain the whole North African shore, whic h
had tentatively been accepted as a forerunner to invasion of Europ e
itself . The American Chiefs of Staff were still determined that only a
holding campaign would be fought in the Pacific once the dangers ha d
been halted there, and that the main blow would be launched agains t
Germany . The increased commitments in all areas and the drastic rise i n
shipping casualties, both of which cut into the forces which at ARCADI A
the Chiefs of Staff had thought would become quickly available, le d
them to narrow the European field to which they would commit forces ,
so that they advocated more and more strongly a direct attack agains t
Germany herself . The British strategy of envelopment was criticised as
too tardy and wasteful, and in March 1942 Roosevelt cabled that h e
was very eager to see a land front in Europe that year . Early in April
General Marshall arrived in London to press for a direct assault agains t
Germany as soon as possible.
The British Chiefs of Staff were at this time extremely consciou s
of the danger that German and Japanese offensives, if unchecked, migh t
lead to a linking of the two main Axis powers in the Persian Gulf area ,
and they were more mindful of the need for strategic defence in the
Middle East than anxious about what they feared might be a prematur e
frontal attack on Germany . Faced with American offensive zeal, an d
conscious that a disavowal of the "Beat Hitler First" plan might entail
American concentration in the Pacific, they willingly agreed to discus s
the merits of the outline plans for an early return to the European continent .
The two general precepts most discussed were of the SLEDGEHAMMER
and ROUND-UP type .3 SLEDGEHAMMER was to be a land and air operation by which a limited bridgehead would be established within rang e
of effective air cover from United Kingdom bases . The object was to pin
down German forces in the west and to engage the German Air Forc e
in such heavy battles of attrition that air, if not army, units would have
to be withdrawn from Russia . In this regard the bridgehead might thu s
be a more forceful and constant irritant than the "Circus" and "Ramrod "
2 R. E. Sherwood,
The White House Papers of Harry L . Hopkins (1948), p. 449.
"There were in fact several plans which at various times were given these names but in eac h
case the general outlines were similar.
1942
COMPROMISE REACHED
5
operations by fighters and fighter-bombers then being waged by the Roya l
Air Force alone . ROUND-UP was envisaged as a permanent lodgement o n
the Continent with the maximum forces that could be assembled or sup ported . General Marshall himself presented a plan on the ROUND-U P
model which involved an eventual force of up to 48 Allied divisions an d
5,800 aircraft for the invasion of northern France in the spring of 1943 .
This scheme closely resembled the first OVERLORD plan, and is thus one
of the most important landmarks in its history . In principle it was firml y
endorsed as the prime Allied objective, although even at the time som e
doubts were expressed whether the powerful invading force require d
could be equipped, trained and transported by the date suggested . The
expanding needs of other theatres, the increasing crisis in general ship ping and a serious shortage of suitable assault landing-craft were all
expected to create some difficulties . However, authority was given fo r
preparations to assemble the forces and equipment required for a cross Channel attack, and when General Eisenhower arrived in London i n
June 1942 he began discussions with Admiral Ramsay, 4 General Paget5
and Air Chief Marshal Douglas, the British planning team . Although
these conversations covered only the broader issues, the all-important
point of entry was closely studied and the advantages of attacking alon g
the central coast of Normandy rather than in the Pas de Calais wer e
appraised . This was perhaps the most important development at this stage .
The Americans were also strongly in favour of a SLEDGEHAMMER
operation to be mounted during the autumn of 1942, either purely fo r
its own sake as a diversionary attack, or to maintain a small bridgehea d
through which the subsequent ROUND-UP could be staged . British commanders, who would have to provide most of the forces for this venture ,
opposed it with equal determination, because even minimum forces coul d
not be gathered before late September and it would then be too late t o
force air battles of attrition in favourable weather . The alternative proposal to gain a winter foothold was also of doubtful worth since onl y
nine divisions in all would be available of which five could be sustaine d
in the bridgehead . This force would have the unenviable task of holdin g
out for six or more months against carefully-prepared enemy air an d
ground counter-offensives, and if the divisions were lost or badly maule d
any future preparations for invasion would be severely hampered . American enthusiasm and British opposition finally resulted in a compromise :
a SLEDGEHAMMER operation would be mounted in 1942 only as a las t
resort if the Soviet Union appeared in danger of imminent collapse—or ,
as put more bluntly by the British planners who considered it basicall y
unsound, "if forced on us for political reasons ".
Political pressure was not long in forthcoming . While General Marshall
was still in London President Roosevelt cabled Stalin early in Apri l
* Adm Sir Bertram Ramsay, KCB, KBE, MVO. Vice Adm Dover, 1939-42 ; Flag Off r comd g
Combined Ops Mediterranean 1943 ; Allied Naval C-in-C, Expeditionary Force 1943.44 . B . 1883 .
Killed in aircraft accident, 2 Jan 1945 .
6 Gen Sir Bernard Paget, GCB, DSO, MC . (1914-18 : Ma' Oxford and Bucks Light Inf.) GO C
18 Div 1939-40 ; CGS Home Forces 1940 ; C-in-C SE Cd 1941, Home Forces 1941-43, Twentyfirst Army Gp 1943, Middle East Force 1944-46 . Regular soldier; b . 15 Sep 1887 .
6
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
1942
1942 suggesting that Soviet Foreign Office and military experts go to Washington to discuss common strategy. In May M . Molotov, the Soviet Foreign
Minister, visited both London and Washington . He urged a second front
in the west sufficiently large to engage 40 German divisions and their
associated air forces . In London it was not easy to convince Molotov
that a British suicide operation would give no real or lasting help eithe r
to Russia or the Western Allies ; irritated by what he thought was evasion ,
Molotov went to Washington demanding "a straight answer " . The American planners already favoured the scheme in principle and were unwillin g
to admit that they could not gather the material resources for it althoug h
they had not studied the precise difficulties involved . In this atmosphere
Molotov was able to extract what he later publicised as a categorica l
assurance of a second front in Europe during 1942 .
The British leaders, however, were turning ever more strongly agains t
the SLEDGEHAMMER gamble and towards the Mediterranean strategy o f
late 1941 . Mr Churchill himself visited Washington during June 194 2
and pleaded that the original GYMNAST concept to secure French possessions in North Africa provided a far safer and far more profitable substitute for a second front in western Europe . No decision had been reache d
on TORCH (the revised GYMNAST plan), in fact American opinion wa s
still advocating an early attack on France when Mr Churchill had t o
return to London because of the British defeats in the Western Desert .
There, early in July, he virtually cancelled SLEDGEHAMMER and urged
swift adoption of TORCH . Eisenhower, who feared that such a decisio n
would imperil not only the short-term assaults but also ROUND-UP, th e
acknowledged central theme of Allied strategy, was appalled and indignantly cabled to Marshall . There was consternation also in Washington ,
and for a brief space Allied cooperation stood at the crossroads, fo r
there were not wanting in America influential voices which called for a
major effort in the Pacific and only a holding campaign in Europe . Only
Roosevelt held firm to the original strategic decision during this very
strong American reaction . He sent Mr Harry L . Hopkins, General Mar shall and Admiral King (Chief of Staff, U .S . Navy) to London late i n
July to thrash the matter out, aiming still at SLEDGEHAMMER . British
leaders ' objections to SLEDGEHAMMER and their strong argument tha t
TORCH, by re-opening the Mediterranean would improve the world-wide
shipping position, could not be refuted in detail by the Americans, an d
their strong convictions were overcome only on 25th July when Roosevel t
himself authorised the landings in north-western Africa as the main effor t
for 1942, although a short-term attack on France was to remain mounte d
as an emergency threat, and preparations for the ROUND-UP operatio n
of 1943 were to continue .
This switch in application of force had some deep-lying effects o n
future events . In America where popular impatient demand for a true
second front was gravely disappointed, the advocates of a Pacific strateg y
received increased support and in practice this meant some curtailmen t
of supplies and of naval assistance to subsequent operations in Europe .
1942-43
DECISION AT CASABLANCA
7
In Britain the absence of direct assault gave great impetus to a large scale bomber offensive against Germany . It mattered little that the disastrous reconnaissance in force to Dieppe in August 1942 amply emphasised
the very sound objections which Britain had raised to the SLEDGEHAMME R
proposal . The Americans, who had previously been anxious to make a
frontal assault on France regardless of losses, now raised many objection s
to the British proposal that the main impact of TORCH should be as nea r
the central Mediterranean as possible so that Tunisia could be seize d
by swift resolute action . Instead the Americans advocated an attack o n
the Atlantic flank and an advance eastward only when Morocco was
firmly held.
The next step in the development of Allied strategy was taken at th e
Casablanca conference in January 1943, held at a time when the invasio n
of north-western Africa had begun auspiciously but had been halted b y
resolute enemy counter-measures because of the initial Allied failure t o
secure Tunis . The Eighth British Army had defeated the enemy at E l
Alamein and now controlled all Libya ; the Russians had begun an offensive from the Volga . Time had shown that a suicidal SLEDGEHAMME R
would not in any event have been warranted and the Russians no longe r
were in danger of total defeat . Time, however, now argued against th e
original concept of ROUND-UP . A large part of the American forces fo r
TORCH had come from those sent to Britain in preparation for ROUND-UP ,
and between this diversion, a cooling of American enthusiasm, and th e
indreasingly difficult shipping situation in the Atlantic, it was not possibl e
to build up sufficient forces for a full-scale invasion of France in th e
spring of 1943 . Unfortunately, because of initial hesitancy, it was no w
clear that the Tunisian campaign would not be finished before May, s o
that forces and naval transports then available could not be transferre d
and re-trained for ROUND-UP before September at the earliest, after th e
favourable campaigning period in France had almost passed . The decisio n
of the Casablanca conference, therefore, was to defer the projected assaul t
on Europe until early 1944 by which time really effective forces wer e
expected to be ready for action . It was also decided to appoint a Britis h
officer as "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) "
to coordinate all planning for the invasion . Lieut-General Morgan° was
chosen and began his task in April 1943 taking the initials of his titl e
COSSAC as the name of his planning staff .
Strategic action for 1943 was decided after some long discussion .
Two of the decisions—an all-out offensive against U-boats and a co ordinated Anglo-American air assault against German industry—wer e
tied directly to the invasion plan . Both were intended to bridge the ga p
between Allied and enemy resources ; one by clearing the convoy routes
so that men and materials might flood into Britain and the naval an d
merchant shipping required for amphibious assault be made available a t
e Lt-Gen Sir Frederick Morgan, KCB . Comd 1st Support Gp 1 Armd Div France 1939-40 ; BGS
II Corps 1940-41 ; GOC Devon and Cornwall Div 1941, 55 Div 1941-42, I Corps 1942-43 ;
COSSAC 1943-44 ; Dep CS Allied Expeditionary Force 1944-45 . Regular soldier ; b . 5 Feb 1894 .
8
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
Ian-Aug 194 3
the proper time, the other by depressing the general German econom y
and above all the key armament industries . Action by ground forces could
not be so quickly resolved and the British pressed for the conquest o f
Sicily and heavy attacks on Italy once Tunisia was won, while the Americans, who feared that China would that year bear the brunt of Japanes e
attack, strongly urged campaigns in South-East Asia to recapture Burma ,
and in the South-West Pacific to prevent any enemy consolidation o f
their gains in that region . Finally the Sicily plan was authorised but th e
Americans had some mental reservations as to the exact allocation o f
resources between the two main theatres .
At the Washington conference in May 1943 (TRIDENT) which sat
at the very time when the last enemy resistance in Tunisia was bein g
broken, the codeword OVERLORD was chosen for the assault on norther n
France . There was a considerable amount of basic planning and preparation already complete and the recent favourable turn in the Battle o f
the Atlantic gave hope that the required build-up would be achieve d
in Britain by the spring of 1944 . Here again there was some divergence
of opinion, the British Chiefs of Staff advocating an Italian campaig n
after the conquest of Sicily, the Americans insisting that there must b e
no further drain on forces required directly for OVERLORD, and remaining sceptical that the preoccupation and exhaustion of enemy troops i n
an Italian campaign was a true contribution to the main scheme . Thus
when, towards the end of the Sicilian campaign, the fall from power o f
Mussolini gave promise of great political as well as military dividend s
from an immediate Allied entry into Italy, it had to be effected on a n
ad hoc basis .
The COSSAC outline plan for the 1944 master stroke had mean while been completed and was presented to the Quebec conferenc e
(QUADRANT) in August 1943 . Basically it proposed an assault on th e
Normandy coast west of Caen with an initial strength of three divisions ,
backed by two more in an immediate follow-up wave, and built up
within a fortnight to a strength of 18 divisions, after which further force s
could be fed in as required through Cherbourg which was one of th e
principal early objectives . Two brigades of airborne troops were to assist
in the first assault phase . This general plan, with its very small spearhead, was unavoidable because a limited number of assault-craft was a t
that time allocated to OVERLORD, so that, although men and arms wer e
not lacking, they could only be fed in at a comparatively slow rate whic h
might endanger the whole enterprise if the Germans could quickly concentrate their forces against the beach-heads . This weakness was seen a t
the time, and Churchill proposed that the initial assault should be in creased by at least one more division ; if shipping were available for thi s
it would naturally also accelerate the subsequent build-up of Allied forces .
The Americans, who in such a case would have to provide the additional
assault-craft, demurred, and in contrast to their previous insistence tha t
all force must be applied in one single drive, proposed that landing-craf t
temporarily in the Mediterranean but destined for the Indian Ocean should
Aug-Dec
TALKS WITH STALIN
9
be used for a simultaneous assault in the Toulon-Marseilles area o f
southern France . This plan (ANvIL) was accepted as the best diversio n
then practicable and the COSSAC plan was approved by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, who reaffirmed 1st May 1944 as the date for its execution . ?
At the Quebec conference Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, former
head of Fighter Command and the chief air planner with COSSAC ,
was designated Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Ai r
Force (A .E .A .F .) which was to protect and help clear the way for th e
liberating army . Headquarters A .E .A .F . was set up on 25th November
1943 and became established soon afterwards at Stanmore in Middlesex .
In retrospect it may have avoided much argument and misgiving had a
supreme commander for OVERLORD been appointed at the same time .
Mr Churchill, conscious that no choice other than an American wa s
acceptable, himself proposed General Marshall, but President Roosevel t
was disinclined to make an immediate announcement, especially as th e
presence of Marshall in Washington for as long as possible was though t
to be imperative .
A supreme commander faced with personal responsibility for carryin g
out the COSSAC plan would certainly (as Eisenhower did later) have
felt the basic weakness of the initial assault far more sharply than di d
a committee, and Marshall would have been in an ideal position to obtai n
early the means of repairing the major defect . As it was, although
OVERLORD was fully accepted in principle and detailed planning continued ,
the American Chiefs of Staff experienced some uneasiness concernin g
the British attitude throughout the period between the Quebec and Cair o
conferences . At the Cairo conference (SEXTANT) in November 194 3
Mr Churchill offered reassurances that, while advocating supplementar y
campaigns in southern Europe, he was by no means trying to avoi d
OVERLORD . The British made it clear, however, that they would engag e
in northern France only if military resources sufficient to make th e
venture a feasible operation were forthcoming ; and in this regard they
criticised the presence at Cairo of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who
had obviously been promised or was expecting to receive military ai d
which America had declared herself unable to provide in order to bolste r
the main weakness of the COSSAC plan . These issues were still bein g
debated when the principal members of the conference travelled t o
Tehran for special talks with Marshal Stalin and his advisers . Russi a
was uncompromising in her attitude ; she wished no intervention (which
even at this stage she was almost inclined to hint at as interference )
in south-eastern Europe, but instead demanded that OVERLORD and
ANVIL should proceed in strength as soon as possible . Russia undertoo k
to stage a simultaneous large-scale offensive on the Eastern front. Back
in Cairo the Anglo-American planners again reviewed their points o f
agreement and divergence and on 6th December reached an irrevocabl e
'+ This date was first issued in a supplementary directive from the CCS to COSSAC on 2 5
May 1943 .
10
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
Dec1943-Ian194 4
mutually-agreed decision in principle that OVERLORD and ANVIL were
to have absolute priority over all other operations anywhere in the worl d
during 1944 and that both should be mounted during May of that year .
On the same day General Eisenhower was chosen as the Supreme Allie d
Commander, a decision publicly announced on Christmas Eve 1943 .
Eisenhower was to take with him to Britain key members of hi s
winning Mediterranean team : Air Chief Marshal Tedder as deputy commander, General Montgomery to command the Twenty-first Army Group ,
and General Bedell Smith as Chief of Staff . Officially they saw the
COSSAC plan only late in December, barely four months before the y
were required to carry it out, but Eisenhower was already aware of it s
main outline and even before he was called upon to take responsibilit y
he had formed certain mental reservations which paralleled the previousl y
expressed British doubts . He himself was to be in America until mid January 1944, but he asked the others to prepare criticism of the pla n
during his absence because he "felt that the initial assaulting forces wer e
being planned in insufficient strength and committed on too narrow a
front" . He reached London again on 15th January and, although hi s
directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was not issued until 14t h
February (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was no t
officially recognised until the following day), very searching scrutiny was
given to the basic plan during this transitional period . At the first meetin g
with his Commanders-in-Chief (General Montgomery, Admiral Ramsa y
and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory) on 21st January, agreement wa s
readily reached on the principal changes which were sought for the pla n
of assault .
Eisenhower and Montgomery, after their experience of Sicily, wer e
adamant that, against the vastly superior coastal defences and defender s
of France, a minimum of five divisions instead of three should attack i n
the initial wave . Again a considerable widening of the prime assault are a
seemed necessary to give tactical freedom both in exploiting chances o f
quick success and in meeting especially threatening enemy counter-attacks .
Thus while COSSAC had restricted entry to the beaches lying betwee n
Courseulles in the east and Grandcamp in the west, Eisenhower no w
proposed landings on the Ouistreham beaches on the east flank and aroun d
Varreville in the west, in the one instance aiming at a quick seizure o f
Caen and in the other at a firm foothold on the Cotentin peninsula wit h
the prospect that the vital port of Cherbourg would first be cut off an d
then captured . The size and employment of airborne forces was als o
reviewed, two divisions being suggested for the Cotentin venture and on e
to gain important bridges over the Orne and Dives Rivers north-east o f
Caen . These major modifications were put before the Combined Chief s
of Staff on 23rd January together with the assumption that they woul d
entail a delay in preparations of approximately one month . The Combined
Chiefs of Staff agreed on 1st February that OVERLORD should be mounted
not later than 31st May, but when the varying ground, air and nava l
considerations for the exact timing of the landings had been fully gauged,
1941-44
CONTROL OF AIR FORCES
11
it was finally decided on 17th May that tide and light conditions accept able to all three Services would occur only between 5th and 7th June .
If no opportunity offered to attack between those dates a suitable tid e
would not be available for a fortnight and suitable tide and light conditions not until early in July. The target date, subject only to last minute alteration, was therefore set at 5th June 1944.
OVERLORD was the keystone of planning in the whole strategic conception of the Anglo-American "Beat Hitler First" policy . As a joint pla n
it was first conceived at a time when it appeared likely to be vital t o
assist the military recovery of the U.S .S .R . if not to prevent her total
annihilation . More indirect support to the U.S .S .R . and peripheral campaigns which bled Germany had in fact during 1942 and 1943 aide d
such a resurgence of Russian strength that before OVERLORD could be
staged German armies had retreated from Russian territory . In th e
event, therefore, the OVERLORD invasion was to be a tremendous blo w
from the north-west coordinated with the existing Allied advances fro m
the east and south to wage a final campaign for the utter defeat o f
Germany.
Both in purpose and scope OVERLORD was an unalterable commitment
binding the United Kingdom and the U .S .A . In creating the land, se a
and air forces necessary to carry out the plan the far-reaching patter n
of allocation of manpower, materials and industrial potential had bee n
already decided for a long time . Successive joint and tripartite (includin g
Russia) conferences had unanimously confirmed the aims of OVERLORD
long after the simple "Second Front" aim had lost its original urgen t
validity . It would have availed little to recast the plan drastically becaus e
of the changed circumstances of early 1944, even though American an d
British proponents of (differing) philosophies of achieving victory mainly
by strategic bombing were strongly opposed to any interference with th e
existing combined bombing offensive against German industry which woul d
have to be halted in favour of OVERLORD air requirements .
Before, during and after the assault phases of OVERLORD, the decisio n
to place all Anglo-American air forces under the direction of Genera l
Eisenhower as Supreme Commander provoked active debate and some
tacit evasion . Since 1941 the R .A .F . had been developed primarily fo r
the task of strategic bombardment . Short-range fighter, tactical attack an d
Coastal Command units were really ancillary forces designed to hel p
create a situation in which Bomber Command could have the greates t
freedom of action . 8 With the restricted proportion of national effort which
could be allocated to building up the bomber force because of the agree d
decision to raise and equip ground forces for OVERLORD, expansion appeared painfully slow to men like Air Chief Marshal Harris who believe d
that bombing, if on a sufficiently large and sustained scale, could o f
itself sow the seeds of final victory . Despite this restriction during 194 3
the tonnage of bombs dropped on German targets was greater by abou t
70 per cent than the combined total for the preceding three years an d
The main lines of RAF planning in these years are discussed in the preceding volume of this series .
12
PLANNING FOR THE INVASION
1944
a quarter . The R .A .F . had at last proven types of heavy-load-carrying
bombers, greater availability of well-trained aircrews, improved maintenance facilities, ground organisation and navigation aids which permitte d
night strikes against large targets of ever-increasing scale and frequency .
The crews of Bomber Command squadrons, trained as they were i n
specific techniques, their minds schooled to a philosophy of area bombardment and convinced of their own experience that they were now in
a position Ito strike ever harder blows, were in tacit agreement with their
leaders who opposed any change in the pattern of operations .
The U .S .A .A .F . was also wedded to a policy of strategic bombing—
the attrition of specific " point" industrial targets by precision dayligh t
bombing . This bombing force was confident early in 1944 that it coul d
operate freely over the greater part of Germany because long-rang e
fighters were now available in sufficient numbers to enable the bomber s
to crash through enemy airborne defences . The American Eighth Ai r
Force was as eager as Bomber Command to prove its own theories in
action so that the OVERLORD campaign appeared as an unwelcome, if
necessary, diversion .
The desire of the Anglo-American strategic air forces for freedo m
to conduct autonomous policies could not be granted in the light of the
vast needs of OVERLORD . A satisfactory compromise was reached that
Tedder, as Eisenhower's deputy, and not Leigh-Mallory as air commander-in-chief for OVERLORD, would coordinate the operations of th e
tactical and strategic air commands during the phase of total commitment
of all forces to OVERLORD .