INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND NATION
GALICIAN CASE
Ramón Máiz
Antón Losada
University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain.
BUILDING:
THE
Paper for Workshop 23: Regionalism revisited
Ecpr Joint Sessions of Workshops Mannheim 1999
1. Institutions matter: the politics of recognition and nation-building. The nation, not as
a given, but as the outcome of a process of political construction.
Recently various European regions or nationalities "without a state" have achieved
levels of self-government long sought after. The appearance of various recognition policies
due to the pressure of regionalist or nationalist mobilization have led some scholars to - all
too often - non-critically accept the positions of the nationalist leaders: assuming that the
nation is an objective fact historically consolidated around the presence of a series of
"objective" factors (linguistic, cultural, geographical, economic, etc.). Thus nationalist
movements and the institutions of self-government that they eventually achieve merely
constitute the external expression of that preexisting collective identity.
In contrast, the most recent research manifests the constructed and non-natural nature
of nations. They are not the starting point of a mobilization that aspires to self-government
but rather the result of a complex process of political, organizational, discursive and
institutional genesis. It is not the nation that generates the nationalisms, but rather the
regionalist or nationalist mobilization that, in certain social and institutional settings,
produces and extends a collective national identity. In other publications we have
systematically analyzed the principal factors that concur during the processes of nationbuilding. These include certain cultural preconditions ("ethnicity"), socioeconomic activators
of the defense of common interests, a political opportunity structure, and especially the
availability of a certain level of self-government and a politics of recognition, along with an
efficient discursive and organizational mobilization of all this potential.
In this paper we focus on the nationalizing effects of the institutional factor,
exemplified in the case of Galicia (Spain). Our point of departure are the neo-institutionalist
theses that institutions not only restrict the range of possible courses of action available to the
actors, but even generate and produce interests and identities (March, Olsen). Institutions do
not merely express, but also efficiently constitute interests and identities. In regards to selfgovernment, the institutions are not simply an external effect of a pre-existing nation, but
instead should be understood as an internal and decisive factor in nation-building. Thus the
equivocal nature of referring to nationalities or regions with a substantial level of selfgovernment as "nations without a state" due to the formal absence of its own state. Using this
terminology we miss the substantive efficiency and responsibility of the institutions in
creating the regional and national collective identities.
In contrast with the notion of preferences that are exogenous to the political process
and complete or transitive, neo-institutionalism has emphasized the study of endogenous
preferences, analyzing the process of preference formation so that not only the strategies but
also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context. Instead of a previous selfevident fact, the preferences become problematic, something to be explained (Steninmo,
Thelen and Longstreth 1992). And in this explanation institutions play a decisive role. In
sum, the institutions of politics provide a larger part of the explanation than do preferences
(Dowding and King 1995).
For our purposes the institutional constraints not only affect the policy making
capabilities of governments (Weaver and Rockman 1993), but also the capacities,
orientations and preferences of the individual and collective actors (Scharpf 1997), which are
structurally induced by the institutional context and thus become strategic. Image 1 below
graphically illustrates the model that we use as point of reference for this work.
In regards to nationalist or ethnic regulatory policies, the institutional context
provided by federalism, territorial autonomy or consociationalism supplies a democratic
manner of handling territorial pluralism while also reinforcing the collective identity and
encouraging increased demands for decentralization, since it opens up the political
opportunity structure that the actors face.
Image 1:The Institutional dimension of Nation Building: A model
(Source: own elabotation)
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Estado de las Autonomias
GOVERNMENT
ACTORS
PROBLEMS
Preferences
Identity Set
Partial regimes
Democratic decision
making
Clientelism
POLICIES
ECONOMIC
CULTURAL
PRECONDITIONS
In Galicia's case, thanks to the Constitution of 1978 it has the status of an
Autonomous Community within the Spanish State of the Autonomies. This will show itself
to be a decisive circumstance, not so much in generating development which remains rather
uneven, but in the production of a Galician collective identity, the empowerment of
nationalist political parties and the "galicianization" of programs. In sum, it acted to create a
"nationality" where formerly a region composed of four administrative provinces existed.
We will attempt to demonstrate that the Spanish autonomic political system causes in
Galicia a dual and contradictory effect. First, (i) it provides resources and policies which
undoubtedly will influence the development level of the region. This effect tends to be very
uneven and partial, given the frequent clientelist use of autonomic policies in order to
distribute divisible benefits as favors to local pockets of voters. Secondly, (ii) it implies a
progressive consolidation of an arena of competition for scarce resources and the
implementation of Galician national policies that will trace a new institutional, organizational
and symbolic setting.
This becomes translated into the perception that Galician collective and supralocal
interests are unique as such, constituting a specific national identity set and its corresponding
potential for political mobilization among the electorate and the party subsystem.
2. The endemic crisis of Galician nationalism and the historic institutional deficit
Although Galicia has a strong ethnocultural base - its own distinctive language is
spoken by 90% and understood by 95% of the population and there is a broad gamut of uses,
customs, family structures and productive strategies - it lacks however a historic institutional
base. In contrast with the Basque fueros or the Generalitat of Catalonia, Galicia presents a
peculiar historic political-institutional deficit. The early inclusion of Galicia within the
centralized territorial monarchy and the Spanish centralist State meant a lack of historical
precedents in self-government and consequently of historical memories that might serve as
the mythic/symbolic basis for establishing a discourse about a lost Golden Age, in order to
demand autonomy or even independence.
The disempowering of the Junta del Reino de Galicia as a point of reference
constitutes good proof of this specific difference which, along with other economic and
political factors weighs upon Galician regionalism and nationalism from its very beginning
(Máiz 1984, Artaza 1999). This state of affairs will change radically with the transition to
democracy and the Constitution of 1978, with its quasi-federal State of the Autonomies
model, which established Galicia along with Catalonia and the Basque Country as "historic
nationalities" in the midst of the "Spanish nation".
The Royal Decree-Law of March 18, 1979 granted Galicia a Pre-autonomic status,
which included transferring concrete powers along with the corresponding human and
material resources. The transfer process ended on April 6, 1981, with the publication of the
Autonomy Statute. The Constitutional Court's doctrine held that the powers immediately
corresponded to and should be assumed directly by the autonomic institutions through the
procedure of transferring the corresponding material and human resources for the purpose of
implementation. These powers provide the Autonomous Communities with notable levels of
quasi-federal self-government and imply a very significant process of decentralization,
distributed at three basic levels:
Powers exclusive to the Autonomous Communities: institutional organization,
territorial organization, urban policies, health, fishing in domestic waters, education, culture,
etc.
Shared powers: the State determines the bases for these powers and the Autonomous
Communities then legislatively assume and execute them. I.e. development and planning of
economic activity, industry, agriculture, corporate credit institutions and savings and loans
(cajas de ahorros), etc.
Powers expressly reserved for the central state: international relations, defense,
foreign commerce, the monetary system, etc.
The institutional model for this Autonomous Community1 (A.C.) follows the most
extended one among the Spanish A.C.'s. It is composed of a Legislative Assembly that
includes 75 representatives, a Governing Council (Xunta) that directs the Administration, and
a High Court of Justice integrated into the general organization of the State Justice
Administration. The Parliament selects from among its members the President of the
Community, who in turn names and presides over the Governing Council.
The Autonomic Administration of Galicia located its central facilities in the city of
Santiago de Compostela, the historic or sentimental capital of the Galician region. Yet this
city has traditionally been ignored by the national State Administration since it was not the
seat of provincial government and thus had no administrative tradition or infrastructure.
During these years the political history of the Galician Xunta has been characterized
by instability due to the successive coalitions of the various political parties on the scene.
This has marked the uncertain development of its institutions and has meant that
administrative organizational problems regularly occupy a secondary position in the Galician
political leader's agendas.
The preautonomic stage (1979-81) saw the centrist UCD as principal political force,
mainly dedicated to the constitution of a legal and institutional framework for the Galician
Autonomous Community. The first legislative period (1981-85) under Fernández Albor with
the Alianza Popular (AP) party governing in minority resulted in an administration with grave
difficulties in coordinating and leading its growth in an orderly fashion.
The second legislative period (1985-89) was marked by the intense political tremor
that occurred due to the mid-term crisis caused by the Vice President, and until then veritable
strong man of the Galician government, Xose Luis Barreiro. The departure of Barreiro and a
small group of representatives from the AP left Fernández Albor and the AP party in a
situation of "transition", parliamentary stalemate and loss of all political iniciative and
leadership capacity, which did not change until 1987.
A convulsive motion of censure forced the demise of the AP government. A three
party coalition took over the government: PSOE, and for the first time in Galician history,
two moderate nationalist parties - the Coalición Galega and the Partido Nationalista Galego.
The rise to power of this tripartite coalition put the presidency in the hands of socialist
González Laxe. This government would experience a critical point when Barreiro, once
again Vice President, faced the charge of abuse of power and was forced to resign.
The political weakness evident in the birth of the Galician Autonomous Community2
and a political arena dominated by the state parties along with the very limited presence of
strictly nationalist forces would generate throughout the 90's a negotiation process for
transferring resources that was subject to the priorities and necessities of the Spanish Central
Administration, in contrast with what took place in the two other historic communities,
Catalonia and Euskadi.
This process has been somewhat disfunctional due to the high volume of policy areas
to be covered by the new-born Galician administration in contrast with the limited material
and human resources available. The temporary character of a good part of the solutions
adopted during the transfer process severely hampered its development. In this sense, for
example, although the bulk of the services and human resources necessary for executing the
autonomic responsibilities had already been transferred, Galicia would not have its own legal
framework for administration until the Public Administration law of March 28, 1988. This
1
For a more detailed explanation of the institutional model of Galicia and its functioning, see "O Sistema
Politíco Galego. As Institucións" by Caamaño, Máiz, Rivera and Vilas, Xerais, Vigo. 1994.
2
The Statute of Autonomy is approved in a referendum that did not reach 40% electoral participation, and
subsequent autonomic elections hardly exceed 50% participation.
was subsequently modified in part by the law of March 8, 1991, during the Fraga
government's first term, initiating the administrative reform project for Galicia.
The reform and modernization of the administrative structure of the Galician Xunta
has gained relevance under the Fraga government that had not formerly been experienced. It
has progressively become one of the "star" policies of this government and its position on the
political leader's agenda has been clearly reinforced. This development occurs in conjunction
with a clientelist use of administration resources, thus consolidating the PP of Galicia as the
controller of the resources stemming from the autonomic budget and European funds.
The overwhelming electoral victory of Manuel Fraga and the Popular Party (PP) in
1989, subsequently confirmed in 1993 and 1997, along with the strong rise of the almost nonexistent Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) which abandoned its more radical strategies,
implied a radical change in the Galician political panorama. The BNG has grew to
proportions that threatened the PSOE's position as second Galician force and in fact
surpassed it in the autonomic elections of 1997. The Parliamentary configuration of the first
and second legislative terms (1981-85/1985-89) presented no political force with an absolute
majority of the seats. During this time the governing parties in relative majority experienced
processes of internal fragmentation and progressive loss of parliamentary support, with the
concomitant political crisis and governmental instability. In contrast, after the autonomic
elections of 1989 the party led by Manuel Fraga held an absolute majority in Parliament,
which should have sustained a solid government exhibiting clear leadership (Blanco 1991,
p.149).
For the first time of a solid leader was at the helm of the Galician government, based
on stable and overwhelming parliamentary and social support along with an indisputable
position as leader - both within the Autonomous Government and his own party - which the
citizens also clearly perceived (Lagares 1999)3. This gave rise to a notably stable political
period, especially in comparison with the recent past in autonomic politics, due to the
hegemony of the PP, which was translated into a broad legislative program and a normal
functioning of the Galician Xunta.
3. The socioeconomic impact of the Autonomous Community
3.1. Traditional economic and social evolution: a rural and migrant country
Historically Galicia has been a principally agrarian society. Not until the 70's will the
active population in the primary sector fall below 50% of the total population. This fact is of
particular relevance if we consider the sociological peculiarities of the Galician primary
sector:
A self-centered economy and a strongly minifundist system. This complicated any
possibility of acquiring surpluses and innovating. Since late feudal times the system of foral
ownership of the land had remained. In 1926 this changed due to a redemption decree by
Primo de Rivera, producing the first modernizing movement through privatization of fields
and mountains.
A high degree of dispersal of the population among small nuclei in order to minimize
the costs of cultivating small plots of land and isolation due to deficient means of
communication. This generated a social space dominated by family relationships and a heavy
3
In recent electoral surveys (Voz de Galicia, Decembre 1996, July 1997, Octobre 1997) Manuel Fraga
appeared as the most valued leader and the most recognized Galician politician. The rest of the Galician
government occupied much lower positions in the ranking and only one of them, José Cuiña, was recognized by
more than 50%.
weight of traditions under clientelist-type relations along with grave deficiencies in training
and education.4
The migratory currents had a strong impact on the population since they provided an
escape from a situation lacking in opportunities due to a subsistence economy and a rural
society dominated by certain groups (Church, local elites, administration), each of which
ferociously resisted any attempt at modernization5. In the period between 1860 and 1970 an
estimated 1,193,476 people migrated from Galicia (Villares 1984), which also implied a
process of aging and feminization of the population, since it is mainly the young people that
migrate.
It is also important to realize that this society had a minimal level of industrialization.
During the 19th century the weak industrialization process focussed on the canned foods
industry - which resided mostly in hands of outsiders such as the Catalans - and subsequently
the shipbuilding industry. Other attempts at progress such as the textile industry or the
mining companies did not succeed due to competitiveness problems or due to occupying a
secondary position in family production patterns that preferred agriculture as the central
economic activity. Thus Galicia entered the 20th century at a "disastrous starting point"
(Carmona, 1996, p.3)6, a society dependent on a strongly rural economy with weak industrial
and urban development, an aging and uneducated population, unlinked urban centers, no local
bourgeoisie and not even an acceptable communications system that might allow it to break
out of local isolation (Cabrera 1994).
The first third of the century is a slow awakening process for the Galician economy,
due to the increase in commercial livestock business thanks to associationism, the arrival of
the railroad, and strong growth in fishing and associated industries such as canning and naval
(Carmona 1996). Thus between 1920 and 1930 the population occupied in the primary sector
decreases from 82.78% to 65.32% while the industrial and service sectors grow
proportionally to 14.66% and 20.02% respectively.
The Depression and II Republic meant the beginning of serious problems in this
tentative process: a biological crisis in fishing resources, a fall in the price of beef and of the
demand for canned foods, and the bankruptcy of the weak regional banking system after the
Great War. The Civil War was ironically an era of splendor for the canning industry due to
the demand for military rations, but the years of Francoist autarky were a time of considerable
social (and economic and sociological) regress for Galicia in contrast with the initial levels of
modernization experienced between the end of the I Republic and the Spanish Civil War.
Galicia was left outside the national economic arena, and no longer could fall back on
migration, thus generating a process of ruralization lasting over twenty years, so that the
primary sector which occupied 73.06% of the population in 1940 would occupy 71.89% in
1950. Galicia experienced a veritable great step backwards, paralyzing the transformation of
the agricultural and cattle-raising sectors (Carmona 1996, p.8) and returning to an agrarian
subsistence economy with primacy of everything local, dependent and clientelist social
relations in an environment of social repression dominated by clearly reactionary elites and
4
The agrarian census of 1982 found that 7.4% of the agricultural business people were illiterate, 75.4% lacked
any level of education, only 15.4% had primary education, and 1.1% had reached a mid level of education
(Cabrera 1994).
5
For a complete panorama of Galician rural society and its evolution, see "La Propiedad de la Tierra en
Galicia: 1500-1936”, by Ramon Villares. Madrid. Siglo XXI. 1982.
6
For a detailed analysis of the industrialization process in Galicia during this period, see "El Atraso Industrial
de Galicia; 1750-1900" in J. Carmona, Barcelona, 1990.
groups. According to data from the Banco de Bilbao, during the decades of 1940-1960
Galicia decreased its portion of the national GNP by 1.21 points.
The sixties and seventies are the beginning of a growing and sustained economic and
social development process that reaches until now. The following graph 1 clearly illustrates
the evident progression of the Galician economy, which has tripled its size in barely twenty
years.
Graph 1
EVOLUTION IN THE SIZE OF THE GALICIAN ECONOMY
EVOLUT ION OF NAT IONAL ECONOMY IN GALICIA
So u rc e : B B V, IN E e IV IE
B illo nes d p eset as
de 1 9 9 0
3,50
3,20
3,00
2,50
2,32
2,00
1,73
1,50
1,00
0,50
0,93
0,65
1955
1964
1975
1985
1996
The Economic Stabilization Plan of the Francoist technocracy was the hallmark of the
60's and the Spanish era of development. In Galicia it meant the introduction of the first
networks of agricultural commercialization, beginning a process of modernization and a
complex and inconsistent process of concentrating agricultural property. The production
began to reach surplus levels, a timid process of industrial growth began, based once again on
the industries derived from the sea - especially frozen fish. New companies such as Citroen
located themselves in the region, public investment in industry increased and the great
novelty of electrical production became prominent - in which Galicia produces 12.2% of the
Spanish total. A new migratory process also began, this time centered on Madrid, Catalonia,
Euskadi and the center of Europe.
Table 1 provides an eloquent image of the evolving pattern of active population from
1960 on. With the exception of the Spanish economy's recession period at the end of the 80's,
growth has been sustained in the industrial sector and especially in services, although less
than the average growth in the rest of Spain. As an aside, we may highlight that the majority
of the new industry is centered on primary resources: natural resources, energy and the
workforce, so that its capacity to generate new inter-industrial relations and gross added value
to the economy as a whole may be limited (Carmona, 1996, p.14).
TABLE 1: Evolution of the Active Population by Sectors of Activity
(Source: Cabrera, Galician Institute of Statistics)
1960
1981
1989
1991
Primary Sector
Industrial Sector
Tertiary Sector
67.74%
16.1%
16.16%
48.60%
27.44%
33.96%
46.70%
23.74%
39.56%
40.20%
25.90%
43.90%
In spite of its weaknesses, this tandem tendency toward a decreasing primary sector
and growing industrial and service sectors implies greater urban concentration and
development, not only in the leading cities but also in the county seats. It has also meant the
construction of infrastructures, an improvement in communications and in the long run a
creation of opportunities to overcome the local predominance.
However, in Galicia this process demonstrates a peculiar characteristic of important
consequence: development and industrialization did not result in an exodus from the
countryside7. The introduction of capitalism took place in accord with and taking advantage
of the minifundist distribution, due to slow industrial development (Pérez Touriño 1983).
This process generated the following main effects:
Backwardness in the formation of a modern urban network.
An urban development marked by a unique symbiosis with the rural element,
where we find workers that maintain agricultural activity and property.
Backwardness in the consolidation of a clearly urban culture, resulting in a
slow process of modernization of rural social practices.
In sum, after the era of Spanish economic development, Galicia faced the phenomenal
changes that the transition to democracy would bring as a society with a weak and primitive
economy that could not compare with the Spanish national averages in economic value,
modernization and opportunities. It remained strongly influenced by migratory flows and
weak consolidation of the urbanization process, along with poor communications and serious
deficiencies in its infrastructures.
2.2. Changes in the socioeconomic panorama: an accelerated and precarious modernization.
The 80's constitute a substantial step forward in the peculiar process of modernization
of the Galician economy. The primary sector looses significance - although it still maintains
a much greater weight (over double) than the Spanish average. There is clear progress
towards terciarization of the economy, which becomes the most significant process in the
Galician economy during that decade (García González-Llanos 1996). The only sector where
a significant increase in demand occurs is the service sector, which becomes the engine
driving the concentration and urbanization process in Galicia. It becomes the most important
chapter in employment and thus in some degree absorbs the crises, recessions and decreasing
employment that other sectors experience:
The agricultural crisis caused by a lack of competitiveness and structural deficiencies,
along with changes in the competitive scene due to integration into the European Common
Market and the Common Agricultural Policy, with its regular ups and downs. These factors
joined to cause significant changes in the framework for certain activities, causing a
worsening of the productivity vis-à-vis the rest of the Spanish agricultural sector along with
7
For a detailed study of the evolution of Galician agriculture from the 60's on, see "Economía Campesiña e
Capital. A Evolución da agricultura galega 1960-1980" in Xosé Colino and Emilio Pérez Touriño. Galaxia,
Vigo, 1983.
weaker growth in income. All this has been aggravated by the meager access of the Galician
agricultural sector to public aid. (López Iglesias 1996).
The fishing crisis: caused both by the integration into the European Community and
by the expulsion from traditional fishing grounds due to these countries taking control of
them, which has led to a profound restructuring of both the fishing fleets and the size of this
sector (González Laxe 1996).
The industrial crisis: caused by the decreasing demand in the traditional areas of
Galician industrial activity (e.g. naval construction due to Asian competition and industrial
restructuring by the central government, timber industry, etc.). This has resulted in volatile
and uneven demand in the industrial sector due to its structural weakness, intensive use of
energy, low degree of transformation and weak internal structuring (Papeles de Economía
Española, 1996).
A persistence of problems in infrastructures and communications. This is one of the
main obstacles to economic development, modern production and territorial articulation of
the country (Pérez Touriño 1996). The slow improvement of access to Galicia by road, the
deterioration of railroad connections, the high cost of improving communications along with
the problems caused by Galicia's geographical and orographical location have resulted in
public investment strategies by the autonomic institutions that emphasize improvements in
infrastructure over solutions to industrial deficiencies (López Facal 1996).
Tables 2, 3 and 4 clearly present the striking evolution of the Galician economy and
allow us to gain a sense of its significant impact on the social conditions examined so far.
TABLE 2: Active population by sectors of activity
(Source: Galician Institute of Statistics, INE)
Sectors
Agriculture and fishery
Industrial
Construction
Services
Galicia 1995
28%
15%
10%
47%
Rest de Spain, 1995
8%
21%
9%
62%
TABLE 3: Evolution of the structure of the Galician economy
(Source: Papeles de Economía Española)
VAB (%)
Agriculture
Industry
Building
Services
1955
36.2
19.1
7.2
37.5
1975
17.8
25.8
8.5
47.9
1981
12.8
22.7
9.0
55.5
1985
11.4
23.8
7.4
57.4
1991
9.1
21.9
11.4
57.6
1995
7.8
20.3
11.7
60.2
TABLE 4: Distribution of GNP by sectors
(Source: FIES Foundation)
Agriculture and Fishery
Industry
Galicia 1993
8.5%
30%
Rest of Spain, 1993
4.5%
29.2%
Services
61.5%
66.3%
The Galician economy has experienced a process of adaptation and structural change.
"The Galician scene has changed radically: in the mid-90's the activities included within the
service sector are the real protagonists. In 1995 the sum of its areas provided 60% of the
regional GNP and gave employment to almost 430,000 people, while industry -including
construction- and the primary sector are the occupations of 230,000 and 260,000 people
respectively" (García González-Llanos 1996). However, since these changes have also
occurred in the rest of Spain with similar intensity they have not meant any significant
variation in the relative position of the Galician economy, which raises questions about the
overall efficiency of the process and the adequacy of the policies implemented by the various
administrations.
In spite of all these problems, and the additional factors of the aging population and
the Galician economy's weak capacity to save, we may still identify important present and
future opportunities for the Galician economy: a high energy-production capacity, the
presence and consolidation of leading multinationals in the automotive/
textile/agriculture/food industries, the renewal of the managerial class, proximity to Portugal
(interconnectedness with its northern areas has intensified through the Community's
INTEREG II program providing interesting opportunities for economic complementation),
Galicia's role in the Atlantic development axis and strong institutional development in the
financial system thanks particularly to the Savings and Loans (Cajas de Ahorros) that have
been involved in regional development and collaboration with the autonomic administration
(Papeles de Economía Española 1996).
Thus the creation of the Administration and the high level of self-government have
constituted another of the determining factors in the evolution of the Galician economy. It
has had significant implications concerning decisions on distribution and allocation of public
resource expenditures formerly disbursed by the Central Government, especially the
capitalization of the productive and social infrastructures (Corbacho 1996). It has also had
political implications concerning the capacity to interconnect and manage the interests of the
various productive and social sectors of Galicia within national and European policy areas.
These changes have also implied an increasing internationalization of the Galician
economy, a notable increase in imports and exports, an improvement in regional coverage
rates in spite of persistent deficiencies thanks to a successful commercial implementation of
the automotive, agriculture, food and textile industries, mainly in Community markets such as
northern Portugal and France (Cristeto 1996).
A process of these characteristics has had significant impact on the social
preconditions of the Galician region. The most direct and immediate effect has been a
substantial increase in a majority of the population's standard of living: higher consumption
capacity, better access to culture/education/information, greater communication facilities, etc.
The 80's have also resulted in significant advances for Galicia in the areas of modernization
and urbanization.
As a summary, we may state that the 80's meant a combination of economic, social
and political factors that notably transformed the Galician sociological panorama, generating
a profound change in the population's social relations and perceptions. This in turn would
facilitate the adoption of a broad supralocal collective identity which, although not properly a
national identity, is clearly a Galician differential identity, a first step towards the
construction of a national social space (Cabrera 1994, p.16).
4. The impact of regional autonomy on public policy
4.1. Autonomic policies
The beginning of the Autonomous Community and the high level of self-government
that it provided became for several reasons one of the determinant factors in the evolution of
the Galician economy. It affected the decisions on distribution and allocation of public
resource expenditures, formerly controlled by the Central Government, and especially in
regards to the capitalization of the productive and social infrastructures (Corbacho 1996). It
also had a political impact due to the new capacity to articulate and manage the interests of
the various productive and social sectors of Galicia in the national and European policy
arenas. We must remember that the Community's sector policies (Common Agricultural
Policy, Common Fishing Policy, structural development policies, ERDF funds, etc.) have
become the principal frame of reference for development in the productive areas of the
Galician economy. These policies define the limits (degree of public support and
intervention, regulatory limits, level of protection from competition, etc.) and also the
resources available for its development - especially financial ones. Financial resources are of
significant relevance due to the weak Galician economy's dependence on public resources and
the fact that almost 50% of the Community funds are administered directly by the
Autonomous Community (see table 5a).
TABLE 5a: ERDF FUNDS FOR GALICIA
(Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, in millions of pesetas).
Main Developments
PROGRAMED
1994-1995
EXECUTION %
1994-1995
PROGRAMED
1994-1999
Territorial integration
98.487,86
89.914,66
91,3
254.453,98
Degree
of
EXEC.
35,3
Development of
economic basis
20.252,75
12.783,36
63,1
56.342,81
22,7
Tourism
1.452,42
971,03
66,9
3.954,83
24,6
Agriculture and Rural
Development
1.627,62
1.627,27
100
3.247,61
50,1
Fishery
546,85
678,43
124,1
1.814,48
37,4
Infrastructural support
for economic
Activity
Human Resources
26.761,65
23.082,59
86,3
55.620,41
41,5
5.9085,69
3.067,58
17,8
12.070,11
25.4
Technical assistance
and information
222,60
39,70
17,8
868,87
4,6
TOTAL
154.437,44
132,164,61
85,6
388.373,10
34,0
The Galician Xunta has broad regional powers, comparable to Catalonia and Euskadi,
that are at a par with the maximum available under the State of the Autonomies model. Table
5b clearly identifies the increasing management capacity and activity of the autonomic
institutions within the entire economic activity of the public sector, getting ever closer to the
expenditure levels of the central government, and thus impacting the entire economic activity
of the Galician region. All of this forms part of - and is a result of - the breadth and depth of
self-government powers available to Galicia.
TABLE 5b: EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN GALICIA
(In millions of pesetas. Source: Alvarez Corbacho 1996)
1985
State
CCAA
Local
Total
%
GNP
53.874
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
398.771 428.332 457.894 562.972 645.157
1991
10.509
1992
1993
1994
679.700 760.066 804.342
113.822 137.646 155.120 181.076 240.179 288.917 468.396 607.727 645.590 653.810
73.619
82.189
82.577
105.961 135.666 142.585 164.166 177.044 190.106 196.129
541.315 618.606 666.029 744.931 938.817
33.0
33.8
31.1
31.1
35.0
1.076.
659
36.1
1.243.
071
39.6
1.464.
471
44.1
1.595.
762
45.0
1.654.
281
44.0
The Autonomous government and its institutions have implemented a broad spectrum
of policies that have had diverse impact:
(i)
Innovation policies that supply increased net added value, such as fishing policies that
for the first time provide a global and coherent policy for the entire sector and a radical
transformation of the traditional legal framework. The leadership of the Autonomic
Administration was essential to carry out a process of deep reforms and modernization of the
whole sector (Losada 1988). This transformation resulted in the complete integration of the
Galician fishing industry into the Common Fishing Policy and access to IFOP funds (6.112
billion between 1994 and 1996).
(ii)
More conventional but equally necessary policies such as:
a) improvements in infrastructures, especially road networks and industrial siting
(over a hundred programs for industrial siting were begun). Community funds (ERDF,
EAGGF, ESF, and LEADER and INTEREG programs - see table) have played a central role
in financing significant parts (usually between 40% and 60% but at times the entire project)
of the costs of much of the public works necessary to bring about these improvements. (The
impact of the ERDF funds in improving the Galician roads has been of special significance,
since they have co-financed virtually all these projects).
b) growth in educational and university options due to the creation of two new
universities (A Coruña and Vigo), the construction and inauguration of new primary and
secondary education and technical formation centers along with a revision of the study
programs.
c) development of telecommunications thanks to public media which has had notable
impact and relevance (in 1995 the budget of the Autonomic Television channel was around
10 billion pesetas). Mobile telephone networks have been established in good measure
thanks to Community funds (ERDF) that have supplied a significant part of the financial
resources necessary to modernize the communication networks.
d) development of the health system due to the creation of the regional health service
(SERGAS), a network of first aid centers, and legal changes in the normative framework
(General Health Bill, Pharmacy Law) along with new management techniques (separation of
financing and provision of services, use of quasi-private management of hospitals,
introduction of competition in the system, etc.).
The following tables patently demonstrate the significant impact that the 90's had on
the basic progress indicators of this region, since this is the decade of greatest autonomic
development at every level.
A brief analysis of these indicators presents us with a scene of improvements in the
principal welfare indicators. Galicia has drawn progressively closer to the welfare average in
the Spanish State, although it still remains clearly behind in socioeconomic development, as
has traditionally been the case. Thus the regular reports on socioeconomic indicators
elaborated by the EU still place Galicia among the poorest regions of the Community with
income levels that range between 50% and 60% of the Community average.
TABLE 6a: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR GALICIA
(Source: Official data from the Xunta 1995)
1980
1994
Child Mortality rate
14.07
8.13
Birth rate
14.10
7.15
Urban concentration rate 16.01
18.70
Unemployment
4.8%
19.38%
TABLE 6b: EVOLUTION OF GALICIA'S GNP
(Source: Official data from the Xunta 1996)
1985
GNP/ Inhabitant
(Spain 100)
79.70
Real variation of GNP
1.90 % (España 3%)
1995
82.92
3.30% (España 2.5%)
The autonomic policies are undoubtedly affecting this process, although an economic
development model that might address the traditionally relevant sectorial problems of the
Galician economy is lacking. These problems include crisis in the agricultural sector due to
productivity problems and the EU policy of quotas, along with limitations on access to
traditional fishing grounds, crisis in the lumber industry and naval construction, industrial
deficiencies, etc. Other problems include the need for strategic innovation and definition of
industrial activity, technological development, employment policies capable of resolving
unemployment problems, a need for new areas of economic activity that are truly valuable in
services, and a selection of priorities in renovating and modernizing infrastructures and
transportation (for example the freeways from the national capital remain incomplete).
This general situation is aggravated by the aging population, the presence of broad
segments of low-skilled workers, an increasingly competitive environment, weaknesses in the
civil society and dependence on public resources, and a situation of comparative disadvantage
when negotiating with the Central Administration for increasingly scarce state resources.
The following tables present the main figures and resources employed in the
development of the most important policies implemented by the Galician Xunta.
TABLE 7a: MAIN POLICY AREAS' SHARE OF THE AUTONOMIC BUDGET
(Source: official data; in pesetas)
1982
1985
1989
1992
1994
1996
1997
Public
administration
Territorial
planning
181.341.557
5.044.358.312
9.039.474.000
25.521.117.000
26.082.419.000
24.275.308.000
14.593.616.000
9.789.892.119
13.684.733.231
35.932.631.000
52.071.826.000
60.124.618.000
48.424.859.000
50.354.300.000
Education
47.713.089
56.484.007.172
98.997.430.000
149.804.527.000
175.600.396.000
200.786.056.000
205.432.797.000
Agriculture
44.243.690
13.287.529.076
24.141.799.000
36.695.514.000
40.762.059.000
35.183.058.000
49.338.632.000
Fishery
317.781.766
4.321.490.000
8.177.030.000
9.012.863.000
16.485.090.000
17.558.605.000
Culture
Education
Agriculture
Education
6.122.329.400
8.876.854.000
11.799.867.000
9.225.229.000
21.602.462.000
Public Health
343.949.688
4.181.884.911
8.786.003.000
42.430.635.000
38.802.425.000
39.775.095.000
TOTAL
12.958.863.144
126.108.921.463
280.102.002.453
422.328.135.000
429.340.806.000
458.421.030.000
360.665.299.000
TABLE 7b: MAIN POLICY AREAS' SHARE OF THE AUTONOMIC BUDGET
(Source: official data; in percentage of the entire Xunta budget)
1982
1985
1989
1992
1994
1996
1997
Public
administration
Territorial
Planning
Education
1,4
4
3,23
7,08
6,18
5,65
3,18
6,6
10,85
12,83
14,44
14,24
11,28
10,98
0,37
44,79
35,34
41,54
41,58
46,77
44,81
Agriculture
0,34
10,54
8,61
10,17
9.65
8,19
10,76
Fishery
2,45
-
1.54
2,27
2,13
3,84
3,83
Culture
-
-
2,19
2,46
2,79
2,15
4,71
Public health
2,65
3,32
3,14
3,12
10,05
9,04
8,68
TABLE 8: MAIN AUTONOMIC ORGANISMS' BUDGETS
(Source: official data; in pesetas; not included in the Xunta budget)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
EGAP
(administration)
284.040.000
280.322.000
283.185.000
369.618.000
408.379.000
402.776.000
414.260.000
413.182.000
IGVS
Housing
13.020.000.00
0
14.796.082.000
19.070.137.000
16.231.121.000
17.499.890.000
16.757.369.000
17.337.968.000
17.178.223.000
SERGAS
Public
health
-
170.857.683.000
186.337.184.000
181.558.269.000
236.232.009.000
257.452.789.000
273.128.104.000
289.139.400.000
TOTAL
AUTÓ
NOMOS
14.045.550.00
0
186.913.181.000
207.127.780.000
199.685.314.000
255.928.076.000
277.262.498.000
304.462.398.000
337.006.274.000
TABLE 9: TOTAL AUTONOMIC BUDGET
(Source: Galician Xunta)
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
TOTAL
706.603.304.000
762.883.428.000
823.503.216.000
622.013.449.000 687.939.230.000
The data eloquently shows both the increasing quantitative volume of resources
administered by the autonomic institutions as well as the principal variables that have
influenced the allocation of expenditures. The A.C. manages almost the entire budget of
public expenditures in areas as significant as health, education, fishing, agriculture, and
territorial administration.
The autonomic institutions have become central actors of great relevance in the
various areas of policy. The Autonomous Government also controls legal capacity to
intervene and regulate, along with a level of economic and financial resources that have
become central to resolving the deficiencies and absences in the Galician economy. This has
impacted its evolution and the bulk of the private sector as it channels public grants,
especially those of the EU, administrative and fiscal regulation, granting of licenses, etc.
This capacity to influence is multiplied due to the development and consolidation of
an increasingly powerful technical and bureaucratic structure (see table 10) that serves the
autonomic institutions.
TABLE 10: PERSONNEL WORKING FOR THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY
(Source: official data; the first figure is number of civil servants, the second are contracted
workers)
1984
1994
1997
Public administration
97
508 + 163
477 +178
Agriculture
918
1663 + 499
1789 + 508
Public Health
2331
872 + 1033
1070 + 1295
Education
1385
1341 + 1268
1298 + 1152
Culture
-
240 + 499
263 + 125
Territorial planning
577
625 + 510
579 + 403
Fishery
-
408 + 133
500 + 124
Total Xunta
6939
7220 + 4494
7595 + 4679
In addition, we must consider the number of personnel working in autonomic
organisms of such relevance and weight as the SERGAS (health personnel), the IGVS
(housing policy management), the CRTVG (Autonomic Radio and Television Company);
along with the educational personnel (basic, middle and university education) which depends
in one way or another upon the Xunta both at a budget level as well as professionally. The
volume of these figures and the quality of their members (technicians, professionals of
various sorts, experts, civil servants, etc.) provide an idea of the weight that these
administrative corps' attain in a socioeconomic context such as Galicia's, whether due to its
control capacity, the mobilization of resources, or above all the technical and professional
support that it provides in order to create opportunities in the majority of the productive areas
of the region, which have clearly been affected by severe deficits in this realm.
Thus we may state that the 80's were marked by administrative growth, greater
instability and a low or intermediate degree of institutional development while the 90's have
meant - from the perspective of consolidation of autonomic institutions - a marked stability, a
high degree of institutional development, modernization of the administration and its
management techniques, and management of human resources and procedures (Bouzas,
1998).
For Galicia both decades have been times of significant advances in modernization
and urbanization, as mentioned already. A process of consolidation of urban nuclei took
place along with a visible process of improvement and growth in communication links. The
road network increased by 70%, the number of vehicles by 60%, and the Autonomous
Community created and established a public media. All of this completely ended the
traditional isolation of the rural world, especially in the coastal provinces. In addition, the
effects of the progressive return of a significant part of the immigrant population can be
perceived, as these people have a greater tendency to perceive the Galician social
environment as something global due to the distances formerly among them.
There is also some data from the realm of education that gives a fuller understanding
of the significant progress of the country in level of welfare and development. In 1995 the
educational expenditures in Galicia were of 24.01%, well above the 18.49% in the areas
dependant on the Central Government's Ministry of Education and Science. In 1993 the
number of students per teacher in the Galician schools was 20.56, compared with 27.38 in
1984. In 1996 a total of 44.2% of the Xunta's expenditures on personnel and 15.3% of the
total expenditures on goods and services were committed to education needs.
The other highly significant variable in autonomic expenditures was health, which in
1996 amounted to 69.2% of the total expenditures on goods and services, while 42.1% of the
total expenditures on personnel were committed to health costs.
An examination of the transfer of resources carried out by the autonomic institutions
to the private sector allows us to gain a rather exact idea of the growing importance that
autonomy has had from the perspective of the Galician business world. In 1996 the private
sector received 29.586 billion pesetas in transfers of capital and 19.475 billion pesetas in
current transfers (total: 49.061 billion). The most important chapters in these transfers were
those dedicated to education (17.159 billion), industry (6.675 billion) and agriculture (11.455
billion). In analyzing these expenditures by categories, the figures indicate that the bulk of
the transfers were used in programs to improve competitiveness (8.232 billion), encourage
production (9.581 billion) and support services (electrification: 3.259 billion)8. Due to the
generic nature of the objectives, these programs allow a broad margin of discretion for the
Autonomic Administration to decide selection and granting criteria.
Although this aspect of the modernization process is relevant, no less significant is the
impact produced by the very limits, precariousness and problems that characterize the process
(Máiz 1996). The restructuring of shipbuilding as a consequence of the industrial policies of
the Central Government, the crisis of the agricultural and fishing sectors - within the frame of
Community integration and the Common Agricultural and Fishing Policies that determine a
radical change in the traditional regulatory frame for these areas - along with the grave
problem of unemployment have all generated conflicts both in the urban nuclei as well as in
the traditionally non-mobilized farming sector. At the beginning of the 80's Galicia was the
A.C. with the lowest unemployment rate in Spain, while today the Galician level of
occupation has decreased by 13.5% and the number of unemployed has almost tripled
(Linares 1996).
8
Data from the Galician Xunta. Informe a economía Galega 1996/97. Caixa Galicia.
Due to these dynamics, a clear perception and feeling has arisen among broad social
strata that there is a Galician economic area with specific interests that are favored by the
A.C., and that a potential conflict exists between these "Galician" interests and the policies of
the Central Government or those of the European institutions. Paradigmatic examples of the
important effects caused by these institutional variables (Europe and the Autonomous
Government) are: the Common Agricultural Policy and the restrictions it imposed on the
production of milk, the Common Fishing Policy and the important restrictions it imposed on
the Galician fishing fleet (over 30%), as well as the incorporation into the fishing quotas
system.
This has resulted in a scenario of conflict where the trade unions of nationalist
tendency and the active members of the nationalist parties play an especially relevant role,
which has encouraged their involvement and consolidation. If economic modernization is at
the base of the process of overcoming localist identities, the successive crises in the
traditional sectors of economic activity in Galicia have contributed in good measure to the
establishment and social representation of the limits of a new collective identity (Cabrera
1994).
The policies and strategies applied by the autonomic institutions have also played a
prominent role in this sense, functioning:
(i)
as an economic or technical support in the conflict areas (such as in the
agricultural realm and the negotiations over paying the Community fines for excess
production of milk; or in the fishing problems where it has helped achieve the demanding
process of reducing and modernizing the fleet),
(ii)
as a spokesperson, articulating specific needs before the Central
Administration or the Community and international institutions (in the case of fishing). This
role has undoubtedly contributed to the consolidation of a perception of common space and
interests among Galicians, developing a nationalizing function in the political space and a
substantive defense of Galicia's global economic interests, thus overcoming territorial or
sectoral differences. This has structurally reinforced the historically given national
preconditions: a cultural and linguistic difference, economic peculiarities, etc.
Finally, in reference to the structural requirements for financing the public sector,
Galicia falls under the Common Regime for the Autonomous Communities, which was
developed in the Organic Law for Financing the Autonomous Communities, in addition to a
specific financing method for the area of health care. In 1996 80.4% of the Autonomous
Community's income was derived from transfers from the Central Administration, while
19.6% was income from own sources. Concerning expenditures we find that consumption
reaches a striking 80% while only 12% is committed to investment (see table 11).
TABLE 11: The budget of the A.C.
(In millions of pesetas. Source: Galician Xunta, Corbacho 1996)
Concept
1995
1996
Concept
ordinary
642.431
684.219
ordinary
revenues
expenditures
capital
74.644
80.804
capital
revenues
expenditures
financial
62.797
54.602
financial
revenues
expenditures
Total
779.872
819.625
Total
1995
606.345
1996
639.675
150.048
156.536
23.230
23.414
779.623
819.625
The European Structural Funds play a significant role in the Galician economy, both
quantitatively and qualitatively.9 In tandem there has been increasing reliance on debt as a
source of income. Among the A.C.'s that fall under article 151 of the Spanish Constitution,
Galicia's debt, at 9.3% of its GNP, is the highest, while the average is at 7%.
The financial perspectives appear clearly traced for the future. On the one hand, given
the increasing fiscal autonomy provided by the Central Government (a cession of the
management under legal constraints of up to 30% of personal income taxes, likely
concessions of the VAT and special taxes, etc.), the Galician A.C. finds itself poised to
assume both the opportunities and the risks of this new situation of greater fiscal autonomy.
New areas of competition and confrontation with the other communities in Spain, and thus
new opportunities for the development of nationalism discourse arise as the debate carries on
over Galicia's level of participation in sharing the Central Government's common resources
and its compensations for the disadvantages that this new system will produce. The questions
that will mark the financial, economic and political transformation of this region in the
coming years have to do with the development of a fiscal policy model for income and
expenditures along with restraint in Galicia's strong tendency towards indebtedness (Caramés
& Vázquez Taín 1996). The growing level of indebtedness must be revised in order to
discern the real needs, purposes and reasons for it - clientelism, expansive public
expenditures for electoral reasons, etc - in light of the data available on decreasing real
investment as a percentage of GNP (see table 12).
TABLE 12: Evolution of real investment in the Galician A.C.
(In millions of pesetas. Source: Galician Xunta, FIES Foundation, Alvarez Corbacho 1996)
Concept
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
real
98.533
101.679
105.091
93.074
94.431
investments
GNP
3.135.097
3.313.812
3.544.307
3.753.861
4.035.944
ri/GNP
3.14
3.06
2.96
2.48
2.29
4.2. Some thoughts on autonomic performance
Having overcome the initial stages of formation and the satisfaction in the public
opinion due to the level of self-government, from an institutional perspective Galicia and its
Autonomous Community increasingly face the problem of sufficiently justifying its
performance level, efficacy and efficiency in management. This has not yet been clearly
achieved and is a need in order to consolidate it before the citizens. This question has not
been resolved, so that it faces a series of dilemmas that might be classified as institutional.
There are not many sources providing information on the level of service and
institutional performance of the Spanish A.C.'s, or the degree of satisfaction of their citizens.
There are abundant opinion surveys in the press and recurring debates and public polemics,
but in general there is a dearth of information on the quality of output of the State of the
Autonomies model.
9
And specifically the prominent investments come from the IFOP, FEOGA, ERDF and ESF.
From the standpoint of Public Policy Analysis, the report carried out by the
Autonomic Performance Team (ERA) is to be highlighted. Its first findings were published
in 1997 within the 1996 Spain Report (Informe España) of the Encuentro Foundation.
There seems to be a progressive increase in acceptance by Galicians of the level of
autonomy that they perceive to have. In 1984 only 19% of the Galicians stated that they were
satisfied with the degree of autonomy achieved, while in 1992 this percentage had increased
to 31%. In regards to identification and a sense of belonging, 55% of Galicians declare
themselves to be as Spanish as Galician in 1992 while 23% felt more Galician. However, we
observe a slight but sustained decreasing tendency in the public perception of a need for a
greater degree of autonomy, which in the data has gone from 42% in 1984 to 40% in 1992
(Informe ERA 1997).
Galicians are among the Spaniards that most relevance accord to the decisions
adopted by their Autonomous Government. According to CIS data, in 1992 62% of Galicians
considered that the decisions taken by the Xunta affected them much or quite a bit (very
similar percentages to those of Catalonia, Navarre and Euskadi). 63% had the same opinion
concerning the decisions by the Central Government and 64% concerning their city hall.
Galicia is located among those A.C.'s that attain an intermediate level of satisfaction
from the functioning of its Autonomous Government (Informe ERA 1997, p.517).
Concerning the report card for its government in 1992, according to the results elaborated by
the ERA team from CIS data, 14% of Galicians considered that it had done a good or very
good job, 51% said average and 20% said poor. These are similar to the grades given the
Central Government (13%, 49% and 24% respectively) and the city halls (21%, 43%, 15%
respectively).
Leaving behind the realm of perceptions, we now move on to a description of the
juridical development of the Autonomous Community. The legislative activity of this A.C.
has been intense. Between 1981 and 1995 a total of 146 laws have come into effect,
constituting an annual average of 9.7 laws, which places Galicia in fifth place in legislative
activity after the A.C.'s of Navarre, Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque Country (ERA Data
1997). Of these, 74 can be considered entirely innovative laws in content and extent of reach,
while four of them regulate new areas for the first time (ERA Report 1997).
The Autonomic Performance Team in its Report to the Encuentro Foundation on
Spain in 1996 classified this legal activity as interventionist (out of 146, 50 may be
categorized in this manner) more than regulatory, which seems to be a common characteristic
among those communities with a lower level of socioeconomic development and availability
of resources (ERA Report 1997).
These laws have several characteristics: (i) a significant presence of "institutional
design" content, that is, the creation of semiautonomous institutional spheres for managing
and providing public services that are considered strategically relevant for the community;
and (ii) a significant degree of institutional socialization in that they incorporate the creation
of certain concrete participation channels for the official sectors or affected groups.
This situation illustrates clearly one of the problems that sooner or later Galicia must
deal with: defining the terms of the relationship between the public powers and civil society.
The Xunta has grown rapidly and intensely, gaining increasing resources and occupying an
ever broader range of activities and areas. Along with the process of consolidation of the P.P.
party in the government through solid networks of clientelist exchange relations between the
Xunta and its citizens, this has allowed it to occupy an increasingly significant space in a civil
society that has not typically been known for its robustness. The growing levels of subsidies
and public intervention of the autonomic institutions in every area - economic, social,
cultural, educational, etc. - have generated a dynamic of increasing dependence of civil
society on public action. This dynamic would seem to raise serious questions concerning the
future and the need to reevaluate the role of the public powers in light of scarce resources,
which requires overcoming clientelism as a form of political relations.
Clientelist practices involve an exchange of favors (public works, subsidies, facilities
in obtaining licenses, paralysis of the urban planning…) for votes and political support for the
P.P. This generates a subsystem of political networks, a peculiar "social capital" that implies
not only the squandering of a good amount of resources due to lack of rationalization of the
public intervention, but also erosion of the normal functioning of the democratic institutions
and the party system (Máiz 1993, 1996). A recent study found convincing empirical evidence
- through use of official data analyzed by means of statistical regression - on the
predominance of political/electoral variables in the distribution of the discretional autonomic
investments - which add up to some 30 billion/year in the 90's. The weak weight of the
normative criteria that legitimate the public discourse and territorial solidarity contrasts with
the official rhetoric claiming that the principal criteria for distribution of investments is the
level of population scattering and of per capita income. Instead, the decisive issue in the
territorial allotment of funds is a series of political variables (same political tendency as the
Autonomous Government and Local Government, volume of votes obtained in the electoral
district by the party ruling the A.C.). This dynamic has substantial effects on equality,
institutional collaboration and interterritorial solidarity (Corbacho, Veiga, 1999).
The Autonomic Institutions constitute one of the key variables that have altered and
continue altering the social preconditions by helping to create a political opportunity structure
that is favorable to nationalist development (clearly visible in the electoral results and the
evolution of the main parties) and contributing to the process of political, organizational and
discursive construction or "production" of the "Galician nation". We assume that the nation
is not something natural or given, but rather the outcome of a process of social and political
construction. This occurs by:
1.
The consolidation and institutionalization of a differential ethnic base
(language, culture, history, institutions) upon a preexisting "raw material" which is
conveniently elaborated and redefined, mostly through institutional action by the A.C.:
linguistic normalization, creation of its own services and media, etc.
2.
The mobilization of resources and its impact on the social and economic
preconditions: greater social mobility and supralocal communication, a significant volume of
financial/legal/technical/informative resources, formation of a matrix of common interests,
etc.
3.
The recreation of a new political opportunity structure: greater access to
institutions - creation of new institutional space: social councils, foundations, coordination
mechanisms between administrations, etc. - and regularity in political participation, greater
political participation.
4.
The creation of new nationalist "interpretation frames" and institutionalization
of them through specific policies (education, communication, culture, etc.)
In view of this, it seems relatively possible to identify certain policies, their results
and outcomes (see table 13) as examples that operate in this fashion, directly and exclusively
resulting from the autonomic activity and deriving in significant impact upon the construction
process of a broadly assumed national identity. This contributes to develop a certain political
self-image as a broadly assumed collective identity that becomes sufficient to reach the mass
level.
A detailed analysis of this preliminary information allows us to formulate the
hypothesis which can even be initially confirmed that the policies carried out by the
Galician Xunta and their relative success are contributing to the institutional
consolidation of the Autonomous Community and this in turn brings about certain
relevant effects on, what we might label the "political, institutional and identity
production" (Máiz, 1997,p.14) of the Galician nation. This process of construction may be
understood as the combination of the following elements:
(i)
political: the idea of nation and of national identity as the determinant factors
in the legitimacy and representativeness of the political actors, the parties; expansion of the
political competition sphere centered around the national space, an increase in the stability of
the electoral alignments, open doors and access for the nationalist forces to the institutions,
incorporation of these elites into the process of institution building;
(ii)
institutional: growth of the nationalist or regionalist groups' organizational and
material resources, expansion of the institutional spaces that nationalist forces can have
access to, capacity of these institutions to compete in the national and supranational arenas
for allocation of resources;
(iii)
identity: discursive and mythic/symbolic processes perceiving a collective
national identity with its own interests and objectives based on "national" solidarity vis-à-vis
other forms of collective solidarity (class, etc.); legitimacy of national public policies and
cultural homogeneization, development of a center/periphery discourse and competition with
other nationalities for resources during a process of State construction.
TABLE 13: THE IMPACT OF AUTONOMIC INSTITUTIONS ON NATIONAL
IDENTITY
(source: author)
Arena
Health policy
Output
 SERGAS
 Health regulation
 Assistance network
Outcome
 Regional health

network
Increasing financial
resources
“nation production”
 Institutional prod
1. Administrative and

2.
3.
Education policy
 Academic programs
 Language regulation
 increasing use of


Galician language
Nationalist revision
of History, Culture,
etc.
New universities and
investigation units
 Institutional prod.
1. Administrative and

2.

3.
4.
5.
Public administration
 Regional, visible
 Regional
geographic identification
of a common service
political prod.
Visible inter-regional
competition for resources
and services
Integration of
professional elite.
geographic identification
of a common service
Política prod.
Integration of
professional elite.
Identity prod
Increasing use of a
common language
Increasing culture
identification
Institutionalisation of
political and cultural
nationalist myths
 Identity prod
administration
 SGPA
 Information system
bureaucracy
 Financial, legal and
technical resources
1. Institutionalisation of
Galician language
 Political Prod
2. Integration of
professional elite.
3. Creation of a professional
elite
 Institutional prod.
4. Common administrative
identification
5. Materialisation of a
common identity
6. Creation of procedures
Communication
 TVG
 RAG
- creation of regional
media space
 Identity prod
1. Increasing use of Galician
2.

3.

4.
5.
Fishery policy
 General regulation
- economic organisation
of a key sector
 Political prod.
1. Common identity:

2.

3.
Transport policy
- Official Plan for
highways and roads
- better communications
language
mass diffusion
Institutional prod.
Creation of an
audiovisual network
based on lenguage
political prod.
new arena for political
competition
integration of
professional and business
elite

1.
2.

1.
regional interest
competing with foreign
interests
Identity Prod.
Supranational conflcits
for resources
Institutional prod.
Administrative and
geographic identification
of a common service
Political prod.
Breaking local isolation
optimising common space
Institutional prod.
Administrative and
geographic identification
of a common service
These effects are directly caused by the influence of the policies implemented by the
A.C., and are almost entirely the outcome of them or at least have not arisen in this fashion
from other administrations. In turn, they:
Obtain concrete results in substantial aspects of articulating a solid collective identity
and improving the degree of organization of collective interests. This contributes to the
political, institutional and identity production of the nation through greater use and
institutionalization of the language, improvement in communications and a break with
localism, educational and cultural changes that introduce nationalist discursive elements,
institutionalization of the nationalist values and collective identity features: history, language,
culture, folklore, etc. In addition, economic/political/informative resources are mobilized in
support of the defense of "Galician interests" when competing with other interests (regional,
national, or European Community), etc.
Achieve in many areas of public sector action (health, education, fishing, agriculture,
etc.) that the autonomic policies become the normative framework that provides the rules of
the game for the various actors, thus becoming the main frame of reference. Within its
confines the actors interact, handle conflict and reach agreements or become organized in
terms of a new common matrix of "Galician" interests built in good measure as a direct result
of autonomic institutional activity.
Cause the main political, social and economic actors on the Galician political scenario
to deal directly and mainly at the autonomic realm, with the Autonomic Administration, in
order to handle and settle their problems, either by negotiation or conflict and confrontation.
Beyond this role of mediation, control and regulation, actors also turn to the autonomic
institution in order to seek representation of their interests in conflicts that go beyond the
strictly autonomic areas of competence, that require interrelations and competition with other
national and supranational interests, especially in the context of the European institutions, and
the formulation of the various Community policies (fishing, agriculture, structural, etc.). This
last aspect operates in turn as principal motor for joint action by the most prominent actors in
the various sectors, reaching the point of becoming almost an interest group or organized
actor. The active presence both at the national and European levels of the Autonomic
Administration through the Consellerías [ministries or departments] of Fishing, Agriculture,
Health, who often function as spokespersons or representatives of a certain activity in Galicia,
has contributed to reinforce the collective identity by giving support and linking a set of
particular and common interests, acting as an organized actor in defense of these interests.
Contribute to the establishment of the Autonomic Administration as firmly grounded
among a set of actors who make use of its support, point of reference and even opposition.
Increasingly the various actors have given up questioning the legitimacy of autonomic
intervention and its authority, opting rather to frame their problems, needs and demands
before the Autonomic Administration, seeking its support in the case of conflicts with other
administrations, especially in the national, international and Community arenas.
Empirical data is beginning to support this argument that the management of the
autonomic policies has had an impact on the perceptions of the Galicians concerning the
A.C., especially if we compare data from the end of the 90's with the beginning of the decade.
The public opinion surveys published by the media during the autonomic campaign of
1997 show that about 50% of the respondents approve of the government's activity, 36%
disapprove; 48% of the respondents believe that Galicia has improved during the Fraga
governments while 31% believe it has stayed the same, and only 21% find it has gotten
worse.
In another survey carried out by the Xunta among 7000 users (and thus of relative
validity), published in the press (Voz de Galicia, 20-V-1997), 59.3% manifested that their
evaluation of the Administration had improved in the last two years, and 64.4% stated that
they had a favorable impression of the Autonomic Administration. This percentage increased
significantly among the rural population, reaching 71.4% contrasted with 62.5% among the
urban population. The main criticism, from 32% of the respondents, was how slowly it
moved, especially in processing records.
In more recent and possibly more trustworthy data due to its origin, the first barometer
carried out by the School of Political Science of the University of Santiago (March 1998;
published in all the Galician newspapers), provided revealing information on the attitudes
that Galicians have towards their A.C. One out of every three Galicians grade the
Autonomous Government's performance as very good or good in recent years, most of all in
managing communications and roads (82.8% consider that they have improved under the
Autonomous regime), housing (51.4%), health (44%) and education (43%), while the
employment policies are esteemed particularly faulty (52.2% feel that the problem has
worsened), as are agriculture (49.5%) and fishing (41.8%).
Other especially significant results of this barometer are that (i) Galicians are satisfied
with the performance of the Autonomous regime (45.5%) but the majority demands higher
levels of self-government (59.6%); (ii) the President of the Galician government, Manuel
Fraga, and the leader of the main nationalist party (BNG) are the best known political leaders
(100% and 97% respectively), the most valued (6.26 and 5.32) and who inspire most
confidence (55.8% and 41.2%); and (iii) their respective parties receive the highest scores
when respondents were asked about their activity in defense of the Galician interests (PP,
37.8%; BNG 35%), but only the P.P. reaches a satisfactory level of confidence as a governing
party (PP: 53.65%; BNG: 19.4%).
5. The political impact of the Autonomous regime: party system and elections
The last part of this article focuses on considering the extent to which evolving
socioeconomic conditions and especially the creation and consolidation of the autonomic
institutions and spaces have had effect upon the political evolution of Galicia, its party system
and its electoral competition patterns. The data provides rather solid evidence in this sense,
highlighting that changes have in fact occurred in the electoral behavior, in the evolution of
the parties, and especially in the growing strength of the nationalist forces and the clear
tendency toward a regionalist/autonomist position in the main party, the PP, which has
dominated the Galician political scene for the last twenty years.
5.1. Immediate precursors: the recent political evolution of Galicia
The causes of the historical failure of Galician nationalism in its attempt to build a
mass supported nation may be found not only in the historical institutional deficit already
mentioned, but above all in the social preconditions analyzed in the last section. Significant
factors have been the mainly rural character and extended persistence of the foral regime of
land ownership, the minifundism and subsistence economy, the scattered population, the
strong migration currents, the preeminence of everything local, the chronic deficiencies in
communications and infrastructures, the lack of urban concentration, the territorial
disjointedness, and the opportunities that all of this provides for the success of control
mechanisms of the Church and local elites, along with caciquism as a peculiar form of
political clientelism (Máiz 1996).
In light of this, it seems reasonable to state that during the historic period (1870-1936)
in which the collective differential identities within the Spanish State (Euskadi and Catalonia)
were built and consolidated, Galicia was sociologically incapacitated from assuming a
collective identity in the sense of a strategic mechanism for the defense of the interests of one
collective group against another or others. This identity should most properly be understood
as the outcome of perceiving a difference, while the national identity would be a social
representation of this reality as assumed by a majority of the population.
Thus Galician nationalism during all of the 19th century and much of the 20th will face
an unfavorable political opportunity structure (Máiz 1996, p.39). A necessarily brief review
of its recent history allows us to confirm that it has been dominated by three fundamental
characteristics:
a permanent
tension, that has adopted various forms, between
conservative/traditionalist nationalism and liberal/progressive nationalism.
a marked imbalance between the cultural development of nationalism (Xeración Nós,
Irmandades da Fala, etc.) and its organizational and political development (weak institutional
presence and poor electoral results, except when it joins up electorally with national parties:
Liga Gallega or Solidaridad gallega in 1906).
the existence of an almost permanent "communicational breakdown" between the
nationalist groups/elites and the majority of the population. The former were composed of
small urban bourgeoisie, scholars and intellectuals, often Castillian speaking with little
concern for the peasant's problems, while the latter were rural, Galician speaking, under the
dominance of the control mechanisms of social strata such as the bourgeoisie that controlled
the power, the Church, the owners, etc. This dysfunctional communication was aggravated
by a lack of "master symbols" that the entire country could identify with, in contrast with
other communities (Cabrera 1994).
The proclamation of the II Republic in 1931 reactivated the intensity of political life
and also of Galician nationalism, which still contained a level of tension between
conservatives and progressives.
Socioeconomic conditions remained the same:
underdevelopment, localism, territorial disjointedness and lack of mobilization of
communicative processes. Still, nationalism at this point will encounter two factors that
favor it: an aggravation of the crisis among the traditional elites and new opportunities for
alliances among the political forces.
Thus the group in A Coruña creates the Organización Republicana Gallega Autónoma
(ORGA) that joins a national party, Izquierda Republicana. In Ourense the traditionalist
Partido Nacionalista Republicano ends its electoral non-participation and campaigns in the
elections. In Pontevedra the Grupo Autonomista de Vigo is organized under the leadership of
a key figure, Castelao. As a result, the 1931 elections provide Galician nationalism for the
first time with parliamentary representation in the Spanish Cortes: two from Coruña, one
from Ourense and one from Pontevedra.
Dissatisfaction with the lukewarm republican reaction to a demand for selfgovernment, along with the good electoral results, led to the birth of the Partido Galeguista in
December of 1931, under the leadership of the Vigo group. It included various nationalist
groups and become the first nationalist party, strictly speaking. A stable organization of over
5000 members and a hundred local chapters, a concrete program, and -another novelty- a
much broader interclass support were its features (Máiz 1996).
Once again the tension between conservatives and progressives will dictate its
electoral progression. After running alone in the 1933 elections and failing to achieve
representation, the progressive wing will take charge and dictate an alliance with the national
left, the Frente Popular. This resulted in a recovery of electoral positions and its greatest
success, achieving an affirmative vote on the Statute of Autonomy with 74% of the electoral
census backing it, while the minority conservative branch that had broken off paid the price
for the division.
The Civil War and the sad Franco dictatorship will cut off at the roots this political
progression of Galician nationalism, which will find itself in the need to begin anew (Máiz
1996, p.53). This phase, "the long night of stone" as poet Celso Emilio Ferreiro called it in
his verses, meant a radical break with the past. The regime's repression was clearly selective,
respecting the conservative wing of nationalism and even gaining its support, while targeting
the progressive leaders. Many of them opted for the exile route, or left politics and dedicated
themselves to cultural activity, developing a certain "resistance culture" that took the place of
any political reorganization of nationalism (Máiz 1996, p.55). As a result, "the following
generations found they must "constitute afresh" political nationalism in Galicia" (Cabrera
1994, p.15). Breaking with the political tradition of republican nationalism, some of the
nationalist groups now evolved towards radical anti-colonialism (Máiz 1996).
The modernization of the 70's brings with it the transformation of social relations in
Galicia: new more highly-educated and better prepared generations become active, the
immigrants return, and these groups become the basis of a process of transformation of
conceptual patterns and attitudes which allows the creation of a supralocal space (Cabrera
1994). In 1963 the old dynamic began to be altered in a somewhat ambiguous manner as
political action is initiated anew with the founding of the Consello da Mocedade, a
heterogeneous political force spanning all the way from Christian-democrats to communists,
which almost immediately enters into crisis.
During this period three tendencies are visible within nationalism: the socialists, the
Christian-democrats and the extreme left. In 1964 the Unión do Pobo Galego (UPG) is born
from this last group. It clearly opted for clandestine political activity inspired by MarxistLeninist principles, Third World anti-colonialism, and proletarian nationalism. The Partido
Socialista Galego is also born in 1963, committed to federalism and socialism. Due to
increasing pressure from the UPG it will become gradually more radical.
The slow but radical socioeconomic transformations in the 70's in Spain and Galicia development and commercialization of agriculture, incipient industrialization, rapid
urbanization - imply changes in the setting and traditional conditions under which Galician
nationalism had developed. Thus it will face these transformations and the political
opportunities created by the decomposition of the Franco regime in a tardy manner and with
analyses of the socioeconomic reality that were inflexible and outdated. After 1975 the UPG
will attempt to broaden its limited support by creating the Asamblea Nacional Popular
Galega, which other left-wing groups and trade unions will eventually join. In 1976 it will hit
a crisis point, breaking into two movements, one more moderate and smaller, the other
faithful to Marxism-Leninism and the colonial analysis of the Galician situation within the
Spanish State (Beramendi, Seixas 1998).
It is especially significant to point out the absence of a Galician nationalist party on
the right of the spectrum, or to the center-right, as is the case in Euskadi and Catalonia. This
may be explained due to the difficulties that certain Galician bourgeois strata had in joining
it, either due to the fact that the national parties looked after these social strata by way of the
main conservative and centrist politicians. This was also the case with the increasingly broad
urban middle classes that were politically not in tune with Galicianism and remained closer to
the Spanish national options with its political programs centered more closely on their
material interests (Máiz 1996).
5.2. The institutional factor and changes in the political map: new spaces, new dynamics
The development and consolidation of the autonomic institutions and the policies they
implemented have resulted in clear impact on the evolution of the political realm in Galicia.
In the following pages we will analyze how the development of this process of institutional
consolidation and the progressive importance of the policies and resources available to the
A.C. have decisively marked the rhythm of Galician politics. It is a key element in explaining
the three principal tendencies that have taken place: (i) the progressive galicianization of the
dominant party, the Popular Party, (ii) the loss of importance and political space by the
Socialist Party due to its weak capacity to generate an adequate identity for the new
autonomic institutional scenario, and (iii) the rise and consolidation of an emerging
nationalist force, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego.
Three principal characteristics can be discerned in the political dynamic of the
Galician electoral scene since the ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 until 1982
when the left won its overwhelming victory in Spain (Máiz 1996):
1.
Precarious political participation (see graph 2 on non-voting), with the
provinces of Lugo and Ourense at the bottom of the electoral participation figures in Spain.
High indices of fragmentation (.71 in 1982) and volatility (22.5) demonstrate the instability,
crisis and permanent reshaping of the political forces (see graph 3 on electoral results).
2.
The existence of a moderate degree of pluralism and scarce ideological
distance between the main parties, along with the especially conservative character of the
electorate, shown in the constant and stable dominance by the center-right political options:
UCD, AP-CP-PP.
3.
Weak electoral presence of nationalism in an electoral space clearly dominated
by the parties of national span.
In the 1982 elections these singularities become even more relevant, so that in Galicia
(i) the socialist party, PSOE, does not become the main political force nor does the centrist
UCD face disaster as in the rest of the country, (ii) the nationalist parties do not rise
significantly and (iii) the conservative party (AP, later CP, and subsequently PP) occupies the
first place.
Until 1984 the narrow nationalist space will be marked by a deep division and
scattered options, in spite of an intense organizational effort and much activism. The antiautonomic extreme left will become hegemonic, specifically the UPG, thus assuring its lack
of alignment with an electorate that is principally conservative, leaving it as a minority and
marginal movement.
The initial electoral results of left-wing nationalism were a clear defeat, both of the
national front model controlled by the UPG and of the Partido Socialista de Galicia. From
then on successive crises will result in the fragmentation of the UPG, so that the majority of
its members move on to leadership positions in the frontist formation Bloque Nacionalist
Popular Galego, later on the BNG, or to become integrated with the Galician socialists in the
PSOE, or evolve towards a more moderate nationalism through the Unidade Galega coalition
first, and later the Esquerda Galega party which will end up disappearing due to its
incorporation into the BNG.
Graph 2
ELECTORAL NONVOTING IN GALICIA
Source: Official data
ELECTORAL NON-PARTICIPATION IN GALICIA
Source:official ATA
80%
70.98%
70%
60%
57.23%
53.78%
50.80%
50%
47.34%
43.68%
39.27%
40.49%
37.52%
36.30%
39.87%
37.09%
35.90%
30%
A--97
M-95
E-94
A-93
G-93
M-91
G-89
A-89
E-89
E-87
M-87
G-86
A-85
G-82
A-81
REA-80
G-79
26.15%
G-77
20%
33.70%
32.31%
30.36%
G-96
40%
43.06%
42.11%
On the other side of the spectrum, the chronic weakness of support for an explicitly
center-right sort of nationalism becomes accentuated due to its late organization, the
confrontations between its most representative leaders and the dismemberment of the
galicianist and culturalist elite, some of whom join the socialist party's context. Thus the
Partido Galeguista runs in the 1979 elections as part of a coalition (Unidade Galega), which
results in narrow electoral profits that disappear when it runs alone in the 1981 elections. PG
disappears from the scene due to an internal crisis, while Coalición Galega (CG) appears as a
moderately nationalist force on the center-right composed in part of PG members and also
members of the extinct UCD. It will play a prominent role in the 1985-89 legislature, first by
keeping the conservatives in power and later by displacing them and allowing a nationalist
force to access the government for the first time as part of a coalition with the PSOE.
The ratification of the Statute of Autonomy, providing a level of self-government
comparable with that of Catalonia and Euskadi in spite of differences in national
consciousness, along with the initial stages of institutionalization of the Autonomous
Community and social/economic changes will imply a radical transformation of the Galician
electoral context. Two differentiated political arenas will arise: the Spanish Cortes and the
Galician Parliament, and in this last one a dual voting pattern will promptly become manifest.
In autonomic elections the nationalist vote will rise, while in the general elections it decreases
while national political forces receive more votes (Máiz 1996).
Graph 3
COMPOSITION OF THE GALICIAN PARLIAMENT IN THE FIVE LEGISLATURES
Source: Official data
45
43
42
40
38
35
AP-CP-PP
34
PSOE
30
BNG
28
25
UCD
26
EG
22
20
15
19
16
PSG-EG
CG
13
13
11
10
5
5
3
0
PCG
18
0
1981
3
1
1985
2
1989
0
1993
0
1997
The nationalist electoral disaster of 1982 (where the national parties receive over 80%
of the votes) meant a massive rejection of maximalist proposals and extreme offers while
consolidating the dominance of the national parties. At this time a process of redefining the
political space occurs, which tends to reduce the number of parties and candidates, thus
forming a tripartite system marked by the following characteristics:
1.
Internal crisis of the UPG and of left-wing nationalism, which will fragment into two
forces: Esquerda Galega and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). After moderate success
in the 1985 elections and limited success subsequently, the first of these options will end up
disappearing. BNG will initiate a clear process of moderation after 1989, which along with its
great capacity for organization and high levels of activism will bring it to occupy an
increasingly broad electoral range, receiving and concentrating both the votes and the
organization of a good part of the Galician nationalist political spectrum. It will reach the
point of becoming the only clearly nationalist force, under the powerful leadership of Xosé
Manuel Beiras (the antagonist of conservative leader Manuel Fraga). In 1997 it displaces the
PSOE as second political force. Its moderation has meant progressively but drastically
abandoning any intensive nationalism opposed to the State of the Autonomies, leaving behind
elitism and exclusivist positions in favor of a "common project" that leaves aside the extreme
leftist initial discourse and anti-autonomic radicalism in favor of a broad populist front and a
generic nationalist discourse of inter-class sort (Cabrera 1994). This present position is
calculated to be much more ambiguous, with tacit acceptance of the Constitution and the
Statute of Autonomy, built upon the "defense of interests which at times are populist and at
times are Galician" (Máiz 1996).
2.
The brief appearance in the 1985 elections of a moderate nationalist force, Coalición
Galega (CG), which will achieve a significant level of organization, and municipal and
parliamentary presence (24% of the votes in the 1985 elections). The conservatives will
temporarily lose control of the Autonomous Government when CG leaves the coalition and a
certain splinter of it forms instead a tripartite coalition with the PSOE and a new party, the
Partido Nacionalista Galego, that came from a previous fragmentation of the left-wing of the
CG itself.
3.
In the 1989 elections Manuel Fraga appears on the scene. Until then he had led the
national right-wing party, and in Galicia he became lead candidate on the list of the
conservative party for the regional elections and presidency of the Galician PP. Fraga won
overwhelmingly in the following elections of 1989, 1993, 1997. He also initiated with the PP
a process of galicianization, consolidating solid local and provincial clientelist networks
through exchange networks between the Xunta and citizens, appropriating Galician cultural
elements including symbolic and ideological capital from the Galicianist tradition of
regionalism. This has allowed him to clearly connect with the diffuse differential sentiment
among the Galician electorate, making use of the regionalist argument before the central
government which was in the hands of the PSOE until 1996 (Máiz 1996).
4.
Center-right nationalism has practically disappeared, while its space has been
occupied by the PP in good measure. The moderate left and social-democratic nationalism
have also disappeared after the 1993 and 1997 general elections.
5.
The lack of mobility of the PSOE has been evident, locked between an obsolete
organization and antiquated messages that progressively isolate it from the most dynamic
segments of society, a crisis in direction and leadership, a dependent strategy vis-à-vis the
national organization and the weight of the socialist decade in power in the Central
Government and the electoral defeat in the 1996 general elections.
6.
A correction in the strong non-voting tendency has taken place, so that the autonomic
elections achieved similar levels of participation to those of other A.C.'s. Differences in
participation have been observed between the autonomic and general legislative elections.
In sum, the modernization of the Galician political context has clearly been marked by
a process of nationalist moderation on the left, and a regionalist position on the right (Cabrera
1994). The indices of non-voting have decreased considerably bringing Galicia closer to the
Spanish average. The political realm has increasingly been galicianized, so that all the
political forces, even the non-Galicianist ones, assume a discourse of differentiation and use
of the Galician language. This has contributed to create a common matter or "master frame"
shared both by nationalists and non-nationalists (Máiz 1996) of defense of the Galician
culture and language and of "Galician interests". The scenario has also expanded due to the
"Galician media space", where (see graph 4) the regionalist right has a clear predominance,
the national left-wing party is worsening its position and remains in almost permanent crisis,
and the interclass nationalist option is on the rise electorally. The reasons for this can be
found in the economic and social changes brought on by the rapid and unequal modernization
and urbanization of Galicia, crisis in the industrial/agricultural/fishing sectors that create the
basis for a series of differentiated Galician collective interests vis-à-vis the EU and the central
State, the institutional impact of the Autonomous regime and a successful mobilization of
organizational and interpretational resources.
Graph 4
EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR THE MAIN PARTIES IN ALL THE
ELECTIONS
Source: Official data
Evolution of voting in all elections
source: official data
800,000
763,839
795,922
793,427
755,925
734,203
700,000
583.579
600,000
570,417
515,551
488,375
459,941
426,623
548,831
453,607
437,919
456,698
400,000
420,654
433,256
364,747
392,922
396,416
362,148
358,591
302,475
300,000
539,885
517,795
309,019
297,981
269,233
313,124
183,958
194,682
148,139
148,130
G: GENERAl
A: Autonom ics
M:local
E: European
PP de Galicia
PSOE
BNG
G-96
G-93
G-89
A-89
E-87
M-91
47,749
38,968
27,076
G-86
G-82
A-81
G-77
0
G-79
23,086
109,144
45,525
52,781
38,418
E-89
62,076
M-87
63,446
215,349
126,254
105,703
59,421
A-85
100,000
A-93
178,172
208,079
M-95
200,000
A--97
500,000
513,744
504,623
The Galician political scene is full of uncertainties and open ended questions for all
the political forces, especially in a national political context where the Catalan and Basque
nationalist forces have demonstrated great capacity to obtain resources and areas of power
from the Central government in exchange for their support. The national left-wing parties
(PSOE and IU) face the challenge of overcoming the clear electoral defeat in the autonomic
elections of 1997, a loss of votes to the moderate nationalist left, organizational problems,
internal divisions, and difficulties in generating a solid political space before the electorate
and the national political organizations that they are a part of. The rapid growth of the BNG
as a nationalist force on the left and its process of program moderation imply challenges in
discovering the limits of these processes. To what point can this organization, composed of
broad segments with strong ideologies, assimilate and resolve the situation without
experiencing traumatic crises, and to what extent will a program change of this size elude
future problems of credibility among its electorate.
Not even the PP, the leading force and overwhelming player, has a definite and
tranquil future. The solid personality of its present leader, Manuel Fraga, is both a strength
and a weakness, due to his age of 70, which makes decisions concerning continuity or change
of leadership imminent. This has potential electoral impact and raises questions about the
model of party organization for the future.
One of the most relevant and distinguishing facts about the Galician autonomic
panorama is the great weight that the autonomic President has had since 1989. Manuel Fraga
Iribarne is, according to all the surveys, the most well-known leader with 99% recognition,
followed only by the leader of BNG, Xosé Manuel Beiras (89.6%). The only member of the
government to appear on this index is the Conselleiro de Ordenación del Territorio, and
director of the party structure in Galicia, Xosé Cuiña (89.6%). The relationship of Manuel
Fraga with his government members is even more overwhelming: virtually none are
recognized by over 10% of the respondents.
According to 1992 data by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS), he was
the most highly valued president, along with those of Extremadura, Catalonia, and the Basque
Country. In 1992 28% of Galicians evaluated his performance as positive, 44% as average
and 21% as negative. The qualities most valued in the President were: 42% highlighted his
capacity for dialogue, 43% his honesty, and 32% his efficiency. . The comparison between
the evaluation of the President and the Government is even more eloquent in 1992. The
government received much more modest percentages: 29% in capacity for dialogue, 31% in
honesty, and 21% in efficient performance (Informe ERA 1997).
The structure of the dominant party in Galicia, the PP, is strongly clientelist and
territorialized due to the fact that several internal local groups hold areas of influence within
the organization. This generates a growing dynamic of internal tension between various
territorial barons, and externally towards the national organization which is suspicious of the
galicianization of the party and seeks to impose upon it a similar control to that of the other
regional chapters. So far all of this has been mitigated by the presence of the autonomic
President, but this must be resolved in one way or another in the future.
The institutionalization of Galicia as an Autonomous Community has in any case
meant a quantitative and qualitative change. The economic scene provides challenges due to
needed structural reform in order to provide self-sustaining development due to foreseeable
cuts in the flow of external resources. In the political realm there is a need for adaptation of
the nationalist parties to this new strategic environment through moderation of their
nationalist demands due to the substantial autonomic self-government and galicianization of
the other forces - PP and PSOE - that are increasingly identified with the Galician territorial
community. In all these processes the institutions and public policies carry out a decisive
political role in constituting preferences, actors and identities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AJA, E. Valoración general; Informe Pi i Sunyer sobre Comunidades Autónomas 1990, p. 27-34; Fundación
Carles Pi i Sunyer D´Estudis Autonómics i Locals; Civitas, Barcelona, 1991.
AJA, E. Valoración General; Informe Comunidades Autónomas 1996, Instituto de Derecho Público; Vol.1
p.21-43; Barcelona, 1997.
ALVAREZ CORBACHO, X. El sector público: rasgos generales. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de
las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 33-42. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social.
Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
ALVAREZ CORBACHO, X; REGO VEIGA, G. Clientelismo Político y Gastos de Capital en los Municipios
Gallegos. 1998. Forthcoming
ARTAZA MONTERO, MANUEL MARIA DE. Rey, Reino y Representacíon. La Junta General del Reino de
Galicia (1599-1834). CSIC. Madrid. 1998.
BERAMENDI, J. NUÑEZ SEIXAS, X, M. O Nacionalismo Galego. Edicións A Nosa Terra. Vigo. 1995.
BERAMENDI, X. O Nacionalismo Galego. A Nosa Terra. Vigo, 1995.
BERAMENDI, X. De provincia a Nación. O galeguismo político 1840-193. Vigo. 1998.
BLANCO VALDÉS, R, L. Galicia. Informe Pi i Sunyer sobre Comunidades Autónomas 1990, p. 144-116;
Fundación Carles Pi i Sunyer D´Estudis Autonómics i Locals; Civitas, Barcelona, 1991.
BLANCO VALDÉS, R, L; Galicia. Informe Comunidades Autónomas 1996, Instituto de Derecho Público; Vol.1
p.291-313. Barcelona, 1997.
CAAMAÑO F, MÁIZ R, RIVERA X M, VILAS X. O Sistema Político galego: as Institucións. Editorial
Xerais. Vigo. 1994.
CABRERA VARELA, J. Las Precondiciones Sociales de la Identidad Colectiva de Galicia. Historia y Crítica,
número 4, 1994, p.209-239.
CARAMÉS, L, VÁZQUEZ TAÍN M. La Hacienda de Galicia: autonomía y corporaciones locales. Papeles de
Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 42-71. Fundación Fondo para la
Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
CARDESIN, J M. Paysannerie, marché et État. La structure sociale de la Galice rurale au 19 siècle. Annales,
Histoire, Sciences Sociales, número 6, p.1325-1346, Noviembre-Diciembre, 1996.
CARMONA BADÍA, J. El Atraso Industrial de Galicia; 1750-1900 , Barcelona, 1990.
CARMONA BADÍA, J. La Economía del siglo XX: una panorámica. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía
de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 3-17. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social.
Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
COLINO X, PÉREZ TOURIÑO E. Economía Campesiña e Capital. A Evolución da agricultura galega 19601980. Galaxia, Vigo, 1983.
CRISTETO BLASCO, B. El Comercio Exterior. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA.
Galicia. Número 16. p. 230-239. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación
CaixaGalicia. 1996
DA ROCHA, JM; MEIXIDE, A; POUSA, M. Ciclos, crecimiento y convergencia de la economía gallega.
Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 17-33. Fundación Fondo para
la Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
DE BLAS GUERRERO, A, Los Nacionalismos Españoles y el Estado Autonómico, Documentación
Administrativa, El Estado Autonómico, Hoy (varios autores), 232-233, Octubre 1992-Marzo 1993. INAP.
Madrid.
DOCUMENTACION ADMINISTRATIVA, El Estado Autonómico, Hoy (varios autores), 232-233, Octubre
1992-Marzo 1993. INAP. Madrid.
DOMINGUEZ CASTRO L; QUINTANA GARRIDO, X R. Contribución a una Sociología de los Actores
Políticos en la Galicia de los Inicios de la Transición Democrática. En J.M. Santacreu (coord.), II Jornadas
internacionales sobre Historia Contemporánea y Nuevas Fuentes, Editorial Club Universitario, Alicante, 1997.
EGAP, Memorias 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, Escola Galega de Administración Públicas. Santiago de
Compostela.
EXPORTAR desde Galicia. Estudios de Política Exterior S A. Caja de Madrid. Madrid. 1995.
FERRÁS SEXTO, C. Cambio Rural na Galicia Atlántica: os casos de Irlanda e Galicia (1970-1990).
Universidade De Santiago. Santiago. 1996.
FUNDACION ENCUENTRO. Informe España 1996, Una Interpretación de su Realidad Social. Fundación
Encuentro, Madrid, 1997.
GARCIA CONZÁLEZ-LLANOS, A; El Proceso de Terciarización de la economía Gallega. Papeles de
Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 249-262. Fundación Fondo para la
Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
GIMÉNEZ MONTERO, A. Autonomía y dependencia financieras en el Nuevo Modelo de Financiación de las
CCAA de régimen común. Cuadernos de Información Económica, 116, p.100-110. 1996.
GONZÁLEZ LAXE, F. El Sector pesquero: análisis y comortamiento. Papeles de Economía Española.
Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 141-153. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y
Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996
INFORME A Economía Galega 1995-1997. Instituto de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia. Universidade
de Santiago de Compostela. Fundación Caixagalicia. 1997.
INFORME “Capitalización y Crecimiento de la economía Gallega. 1955-1996. Fundación BBV. Madrid. 1998.
INFORME ERA. Informe España 1996, Una Interpretación de su Realidad Social. Fundación Encuentro,
Madrid, 1997.
JONES, C. O: An Introduction To The Study of Public Policy, Brooks-Cole, Monterey, 1984
KINGDOM, J: Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies, Little Brown, Boston, 1984.
LAGARES, N. El Vuelo de la Gaviota. Madrid. Tecnos. 1998.
LÓPEZ FACAL, X; Industria e Industrialización. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA.
Galicia. Número 16. p. 169-184. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación
CaixaGalicia. 1996.
LÓPEZ IGLESIAS, E; La dinámica Reciente del Sector Agrario. Balance de una década de integración
Comunitaria. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 117-130.
Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
LOSADA TRABADA A, La Administración Autonómica Gallega, Primeros Pasos de una Reforma,
Autonomies, número 18, p 59-64, Barcelona, 1994.
LOSADA TRABADA A. El Impacto de una política sobre la Consolidación Institucional de la Autonomía.
Analisis de la Política de Pesca en Galicia. 1998. Forthcoming.
LINARES CUERPO, MD. Actividad, Ocupación y Paro, evolución y características. Papeles de Economía
Española. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 82-98. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación
Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996
PAPELES DE ECONOMÍA ESPAÑOLA. Economía de las CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. Fundación Fondo para
la Investigación Económica y Social. Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
PÉREZ TOURIÑO, E. Agricultura y capitalismo. Análisis de la pequeña producción campesina, Madrid,
Ministerio de Agricultura, 1983.
PÉREZ TOURIÑO, E. Infraestructuras de transportes. Papeles de Economía Española. Economía de las
CCAA. Galicia. Número 16. p. 299-311. Fundación Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social.
Fundación CaixaGalicia. 1996.
PÉREZ TOURIÑO, E. Infraestructuras y Desarrollo Regional: Los efectos Económicos de la A-9. Civitas.
Madrid. 1997.
MÁIZ SUÁREZ, RAMÓN. O Rexionalismo Galego: organización e Ideoloxía. Publicacións do Seminario de
Estudios Galegos. Edicións do Castro. 1984.
MAÍZ SUÁREZ, R. Estructura y Acción: elementos para un modelo de Análisis Micropolítico del Clientelismo.
Revista Internacional de Sociología. Tercera ëpoca, Número 8-9. Mayo-Diciembre. P. 189-215. 1994.
MÄIZ SUÁREZ, R. The Open-ended Construction of a nation: The Galician Case in Spain. Actas Congreso
Internacional Os Nacionalismos en Europa, Pasado e Presente, Beramendi, Maíz, Nuñez (ed.), Vol II, p.173208. Universidade de Santiago, 1994.
MÁIZ SUÁREZ, R. Nación de Breogán: Oportunidades Políticas y estrategias Enmarcadoras en el Movimiento
Nacionalista Gallego (1886-1996). Revista de Estudios Políticos, Nueva ëpoca, número 92. P.33-78. Abriljunio 1996.
MÁIZ SUAREZ R. Estrategias e Instituciones: El Análisis de las Dimensiones Macro del Clientelismo Político.
En: Política en Penumbra. Antonio Robles (comp.). Siglo XXI editores. Masdrid. 1996.
MÁIZ SUÁREZ, R. A Idea de Nación. Xerais. Vigo 1997.
MONASTERIO, C; PÉREZ, F; SEVILLA, J, V; SOL, J. Informe sobre el Actual Sistema de Financiación
Autonómica y sus problemas; Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 1995.
MONTERO, J, R; TORCAL, M; La Opinión Pública ante el Estado de las Autonomías: Una visión
panorámica. Informe Pi i Sunyer sobre Comunidades Autónomas 1990, p. 344-364; Fundación Carles Pi i
Sunyer D´Estudis Autonómics i Locals; Civitas, Barcelona, 1991.
MORATA, F: Institucionalización y rendimiento político del Estado autonómico, Revista de Estudios Políticos,
n 76, pp 225-297.
RIVERA OTERO, X M. Os Partidos políticos en Galicia. Xerais. Vigo. 1998.
RODRIGUEZ ARANA, J, A Escola Galega de Administración Pública (1990-1992), EGAP, 1993.
- O Sector Público Económico Galego, Coordinador, varios autores, EGAP, 1993.
RODRIGUEZ, D,:
-Reforma e Modernización da Administración Pública Galega, 11-41, Revista Galega de Administración
Pública, 5, EGAP, 1993.
-Textos para unha Reforma Administrativa, Conferencias e Documentos, 1, EGAP, 1992.
SUBIRATS J: Análisis de Políticas Públicas y Eficacia de la Administración. INAP, Madrid, 1989.
- La Administración Pública como problema: el Análisis de Políticas Públicas, Documentación Administrativa
224-225, INAP, octubre 1990-marzo 1991.
- Diez Años de Comunidades Autónomas. Notas para un primer balance, Ideas 90, n 2, pp 19-26.
-Un Problema de Estilo: La Formación de Políticas Públicas en España, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales,
Madrid, 1992.
-Democracia: participación y eficiencia, Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, Número 5-6, p.35-45, INAP,
Madrid, 1996.
SUBIRATS, J; GOMÁ R. Políticas Públicas en España. Contenidos, redes de actores y niveles de Gobierno.
Ariel. Barcelona. 1998.
TORNOS, J. La Actividad del Estado respecto a las CCAA, Leyes y Normas con rango de ley; Informe
Comunidades Autónomas 1996, Instituto de Derecho Público; Vol.1 p.45-58, Barcelona, 1997.
VILLARES, R. La Propiedad de la Tierra en Galicia 1500-1936, Madrid, 1982.
VILLARES, R. A Historia, Vigo, Galaxia, 1984.
VILLARES, R. La Situació política de la Galícia Actual: “Fraguisme” i Nacionalisme. L´Avenç. Numero 183.
Juliol-agost 1994. P.14-22. Barcelona. 1994.