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LEARNING TO BE LOST: YOUTH CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA
DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE HSRC YOUTH POLICY INITIATIVE,
RESERVE BANK, PRETORIA
13TH MAY 2008
Eric Pelser
………………………………………………………………………..
1.
INTRODUCTION
I write this paper with some frustration. To be debating policy relevant to reducing youth crime in May
2008 seems, in the South African context, a real indictment of our politics and our policy priorities. We
are not, after all, evaluating dedicated and consistent action on the issue – we are debating what
should be done. This, in a country with a crippling crime rate and in which half the population is under
25. The issue and the arguments about it are not new – as indicated below, analysts have been
discussing this for the past 20 years. Yet, here we are. Nevertheless, in just more than a year, the
country will have a new administration and so perhaps there is an opportunity, a new space, for
concentrated attention on the issue. Therefore, if the argument presented in this paper provides a
sense of déjà vu – let’s put it aside and consider, instead, what should and can be done.
Briefly put, this paper argues that youth crime, indeed, crime in South Africa, is a function of the
development and replication, over the past 30 years of a “culture of violence“, a “normalisation of
crime and violence” amongst an “underclass” of negatively socialised and socially excluded youth who
constitute a significant proportion of South Africa’s population. The youth revolt of 1976 and the
rebellion of the 1980s critically wounded the key institutions of informal authority – South Africa’s
families and schools - and these have not been adequately healed. To put it bluntly, the children of
yesterday’s “lost generation” have not, as yet, been found and given relief– rather, they are now
learning to be lost. This, it is argued, can be attributed in part to a strategic misconception of the
nature of crime in the country and, related to this, poor strategy options post 1994.
The paper is presented as a discussion document and is intended to stimulate debate on the policy
choices that need to be made to address the issues. The paper therefore provides a brief overview of
the scope and nature of youth crime and victimisation, a look at the critical factors driving this, the
current policy environment and then, some suggestions on what is likely to be effective in the future
and the appropriate institutional arrangements for this.
1
2.
BLEEDING IN THE BELOVED COUNTRY- YOUTH CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA
2.1
The scale and nature of youth victimisation
While it is common cause that South Africa has high levels of crime and that what distinguishes the
country from other countries with similarly high crime rates is the violent nature of much of the crime, it
is less commonly known that South Africa’s youth, that is, young people aged 12-22, are generally
victimised at twice the adult rate, and at rates even higher for violent crimes.
This is indicated in Figure 1 below, which, comparing the results of the Institute for Security Studies’
2003 National Victims of Crime Survey, with those of the CJCP’s 2005 National Youth Victimisation
Survey (which surveyed 4,409 respondents aged 12-22), shows that young people experience assault
at roughly 8 times the adult rate; theft at five times and robbery at four times the adult rate.
Figure 1: Youth experience of crime1 (n=4,409)
45
41.4
40
35
Percentage
30
25
22.9
19.5
20
16.5
15
9.5
9.4
10
7.5
4.7
5
4.2
2.2
2
0.5
0.1
1.7
0
Any crime
Theft
Assault
Robbery
Adult rate: ISS 2003 NVCS
Sexual Assault
Housebreaking
Carjacking
Youth Rate:CJCP 2005 NYVS
Given South Africa’s demographics – half of the population of some 46-million is under 252 – the high
rate of youth victimisation is not that surprising. More surprising perhaps is that the research, which
assessed victimisation within the 12-month period ending September 2005, indicates that many of
these crimes were committed in places normally considered “safe” – the school and home. To take the
three most common crimes as examples:
•
•
52.4% of the victims of theft reported that their property had been stolen at school and roughly one
in three (31.2%) said it had been stolen at their homes. Almost one in two victims said they knew
who had stolen their property (46.2%), and, more than half of these indicated they knew the
perpetrator by name (55.7%).
Assault was typically reported to occur at school (26%), in public places (21.6%) and at home
(19.6%) and 92.9% of the victims said they were aware of the identity of the perpetrator.
1
Data for the graphic sourced from Leoschut. L. & Burton. P. 2005. “How rich the Rewards? Results of the 2005 National
Youth Victimisation Study, Cape Town: Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention. While there is some overlap in the data –
for instance, between respondents aged 18-22 who would be included in both surveys, and for the crime of housebreaking,
which affects all residents of the household - the graphic serves as a useful illustration.
2
See Stats SA, Statistics South Africa Mid-year Population Estimates, 2005. <http://www. statssa.gov.za
2
•
Robbery was typically reported to take place in the streets of the victim’s residential area (32%), at
school (13.7%) and at home (7.6%). The perpetrators were identified as “known community
members” (37.7%); learners at school (20.8%), other friends or acquaintances (10.7%).3
These findings have been supported by more recent CJCP research which points to the school as a
key site of crime and violence.
Figure 2
Violence in South African Schools (n=12,794)4
As is to be expected, data from this research indicates that the classmates of the victims were
identified as the primary perpetrators of school violence (94.4% for threats; 94.1% for assault; 55.4%
for robbery and 29.5% for theft). However, educators were themselves identified as the perpetrators in
5.8% of the thefts, 5% of the threats and 4.6% of the reported robberies. More worrying, however, is
that 50.9% of the primary school respondents reported that their teachers had assaulted them as did
14.9% of the secondary school respondents.5
Apart from describing the extent of violence in South Africa’s schools the research also paints a
worrying picture of a general criminality and disorder. This is indicated in Figure 3 below.
3
See Leoschut. L. & Burton. P. 2005. op.cit.
Graphic from Burton, P. 2008. Merchants, Skollies and Stones: Experiences of School Violence in South Africa. Cape
Town: CJCP. P.16
5
This is probably attributable to the high rates of corporal punishment, which, despite being illegal, continue to be reported in
South African schools – 70.1% of primary school respondents and 47.5% of secondary school respondents reported that
they were beaten or caned or smacked by an educator or principal when they had done something wrong.
4
3
Figure 3
Alcohol, drugs and weapons at schools (n=12,791)6
If South Africa’s schools are the site of much youth victimisation and crime, then, sadly, the home
environment and immediate social context of South Africa’s youth does little to help. Indeed, a strong
argument can be made that what is happening in the schools is, really, an extension of the crime and
violence that pervades South African homes and their immediate environments.
2.2
Exposure to crime and violence
As indicated in Figure 4 and Figure 5 below, South Africa’s youth also experience significant violence
in their own homes as victims on the one hand, and witnesses to this violence on the other.7
Figure 4
Personal experience of violence at home (n=12,793)
6
Graphic from Burton P. op cit. p. 47.
Both graphics from Burton, P. op cit. p.58 & p.61. While primary school learners appear to witness less violence outside of
their homes than older learners (48.5% as opposed to 67.9%), they report that they are exposed to violence in their homes to
the same extent (11.1%)
7
4
Figure 5
Exposure to violence in home and community (secondary school learners)
(n=6,787)
These findings corroborate the earlier National Youth Victimisation Study which indicated that roughly
one in 10 of the 4,409 respondents (11.9%) had witnessed violent interpersonal disputes amongst
family members, many of which involved the use of a weapon (39.8%) like a stick or a knife.8.
Further, as indicated in Figure 6 below, criminality within the home appears to be fairly widespread.
Figure 6
Crime in the family (n=12,784)9
8
See Leoschut. L. & Burton. P. 2005. “How rich the Rewards? Results of the 2005 National Youth Victimisation Study, Cape
Town: Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention. pp.30-31.
9
Graphic from Burton P. op cit. p. 56.
5
Again, these statistics appear to broadly corroborate those of the earlier research which indicated that
8.3% of the adult family members of the respondents had used drugs in the period of the research and
10.5% of the adult family members “had done something could get them into trouble with the law”.10
Such awareness of criminality is not limited to the home environment – there appears to be a much
wider awareness of crime in the community. For instance, the National Youth Victimisation Study
found that:
“… close to half (49.2%) of [the 4,409] respondents were personally acquainted with individuals in their
communities who had committed criminal acts, including stealing, selling stolen property and mugging or assaulting
others. More than a quarter (28.8%) of these participants were also familiar with community members who made a
11
living by being involved in criminal activities.”
Given their experience in the school grounds, in their homes and their immediate environments, it
should not be surprising that almost one in five (18.3%) of the respondents had considered committing
what they knew would be a criminal offence.12
Figure 7: Youth who had considered committing crime (n=4,408)
For half of these young people (50.2%), thinking about it was not enough – they admitted they had
already committed what they knew was a criminal offence.
3.
THE NORMALISATION OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE
The point of the descriptive statistics presented above is simply to demonstrate quantitatively, what
most South Africans know intuitively: for a significant number of South Africans, and particularly young
South Africans, victimisation, crime and violence is a very common experience. There are very few
safe spaces.
This can only have a marked impact on how the country’s youth are socialised and develop their
identities.
10
ibid. p.32.
ibid. p..20.
12
ibid. p.33.
11
6
As Anthony Giddens puts it: “Self identity is not something that is just given … but something that has
to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” 13 Here, Pierre
Bourdieu writes of “habitus” which:
“… inherited from our individual and collective histories and traditions … guide[s] us in responding to cultural rules,
contexts and events. … It gives rise to and serves as the classifying basis for individual collective practices. It helps
shape our world view and locates our practices in certain social environments, producing and reproducing existing
cultural practices. In this context habitus produces a predisposed yet seemingly normalised way of seeing the world
and acting within it.” 14
In other words, local experience, what is felt and seen and understood of the way other people in the
immediate environment do things, shape one’s own view of what is “normal”, “routine” and “everyday”.
This then provides the framework for the development of self-identity and understanding of what is
required to “connect” or “fit” or “achieve” in the “normal” environment. It is in this way that a “culture”
develops and is replicated. In social development theory: “… when the processes of socialisation
integrate opportunities for interactions with others with the necessary involvement, participatory skills
and reinforcement, a social bond develops. … The creation of social bonds is set within a context
whereby structural influences and individual characteristics make available differing opportunities both
pro- and antisocial for young people”15
The relationship and interaction between the social context and individual criminality is taken up in
more directly criminological literature in Sutherland’s “differential association theory” 16 and Albert
Bandura’s “social learning theory” in which criminality is learned through exposure, modelling or
imitation and both internal and external reinforcement of behaviour; and France and Homel’s theory of
criminal “pathways” – a social development theory which specifically seeks to describe a set of
criminogenic risk factors in its analysis of “…the experiences of a human life – experiences that,
considered holistically over time and social situations, have a shape, a coherence: a story to tell about
17
a life being lived out in particular ways”.
In South Africa, this cultural theme has a long history. Initially taken up 22 years ago by the late Percy
Qoboza who wrote in City Press in April 1986 about “the dark, terrible beauty” of the courage of the
young township fighters, and acknowledged “ … a great shame … that this is our heritage to our
children: the knowledge of how to die, and how to kill.”18 This analysis was then developed in the
early 1990s by, amongst others, Colin Bundy, who wrote of the blurring of political and criminal activity
and the destruction of families and schools in the township violence of the 1980s and noted that:
“Social workers and psychologists speak of brutalization; an alternative term might be the
internalisation of violence”.19 A little later, Graeme Simpson wrote, with real insight on the “amagents”
and the emerging “culture of violence” in which criminal narratives were justified in terms of
mainstream “business”, “status”, “lifestyle” “and materialism”.20 More recently, Antony Altbeker argues
in a popular book that the pervasiveness of crime and violence is:
13
Giddens , A. 1991 “Modernity and Self-identity”. Cambridge: Polity Press
See France, A & Hommel R. “Societal routes and developmental pathways” in France, A. & Hommel, R. 2007. Pathways
and Crime Prevention. Theory, Policy and Practice. Devon: Willan Publishing. P.19.
15
Stephenson, M. 2007. Young people and offending: Education, Youth Justice and Social Inclusion. Devon: Willan
Publishing. pp. 7-8.
16
See, for an explanation Burke R. 2001. An introduction to criminological theory. Devon: Willan Publishing. pp. 90-94.
17
See Bandura, A. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, and Lawrence, J. Taking the
development pathways approach to understanding and preventing anti-social behaviour” in France A. & Homel, R. 2007.
Pathways and Crime Prevention. Theory, policy and practice. Willan Publishing: Devon. P.29.
18
Quoted in Bundy, C. At war with the future? Black South African youth in the 1990’s. South Africa Report (SAR) Vol 8,
No.1. July 1992.
19
See Southern Africa Report. Vol 8, No.1. July 1992
20
Simpson, G. 1998. Into the Heart of Darkness. Journeys of the amagents in crime, violence and death. Research paper for
the CSIR. Braamfontein: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
14
7
“… the result a chain reaction that has seen high levels of criminality lead to ever more people copycatting others
into crime. This has turned what would have been have been a serious crime problem into one that has turned
violence into something approach epidemic proportions, a problem far bigger than can be explained solely by the
21
factors – whether historical, social or economic – that are usually deemed to be ‘the root causes’”
However, when Altbeker argues that ‘Suggesting that violence in South Africa is a cultural
phenomenon, like any culture-based argument is controversial, even provocative’22, this, as indicated
above, is an issue that we have known about and lived with for some time now.
So, consistently exposed to crime and violence in the key institutions of their socialisation – their
homes, schools and immediate social environments - a significant proportion of South Africa’s youth
has learned and internalised this behaviour and so replicates it. Indeed, there is research that
indicates that crime, and often violent crime, is a primary means for many young South Africans to
connect and bond with society, to acquire “respect”, “status”, sexual partners and to demonstrate
“achievement” amongst their peers and in their communities.23
These are essential human desires but, as we are all too aware, the positive pathways or avenues for
meeting them – mainly sound education leading to career-oriented employment – are, for too many
young South African’s, constantly out of reach. In sociological terms this resonates with Robert
Merton’s strain theory – the structural divide between the cultural goals of society as expressed in the
“material possessions, symbols of status, accomplishments and esteem that established norms and
values encourage us to aspire to…” and “… the distribution of opportunities to achieve these goals in
socially acceptable ways”.24 So, for Merton:
“It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain common symbols of success for
the population at large while its social structure rigorously restricts or completely eliminates access to approved
modes of acquiring these symbols for a considerable part of the same population, that antisocial behavior ensues
on a considerable scale” 25.
Excluded by the debilitating effects of poverty, dysfunctional home environments, poor education, lack
of appropriate skills and unemployment, this “underclass” cannot access the dominant or mainstream
culture and yet is incorporated into it and is constantly aware of and seeks to achieve its primary
symbols – wealth and conspicuous, acquisitive consumption.26 Lacking access to legitimate
pathways of achieving society’s normative goals, a significant proportion of South Africa’s youth has
“normalised” illegitimate means – crime and violence – of acquiring the prevailing symbols of
“success”, to demonstrate cultural compliance, individual status and “control” over their environments.
Thus, for a significant proportion of young South Africans, crime and violence has been normalised,
become “culturally acceptable”, mainly through consistent experience and exposure in the key
institutions of their socialisation – their homes, their schools and their immediate environments.
21
Altbeker, A. 2007 A Country at War with Itself. South Africa’s crisis of crime. Johannesburg : Jonathan Ball Publishers.
p.130.
22
Ibid. p.119.
23
See, for example, Simpson, G. “Shock troops and bandits. Youth crime and politics” in Steinberg, J. (ed) 2001. Crime
Wave – the South African Underworld and its Foes. Witwatersrand University Press; Bruce, D. “To be someone: Status
insecurity and violence in South Africa” in Burton. P (ed) 2007. Someone stole my smile. An exploration of the causes of
youth violence in South Africa. Cape Town: Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention; and, Ward, C 2007. ‘It feels like the end
of the world’. Cape Town’s youth talk about gangs and community violence. ISS monograph series No. 136, July. Pretoria:
ISS.
24
Explanation by Burke R. 2001. An introduction to criminological theory. Devon: Willan Publishing. pp.106-107.
25
Merton, R. 1938 ‘Social structure and anomie’ American Sociological Review, 3(5): 672 – 682. p.680.
26
See Young, J. 1999. The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity. London: Sage
8
Recent research by the CJCP indicates some empirical validation of this argument. For instance, the
research which was conducted amongst 395 young offenders (of mainly violent crimes), their parents
or other caregivers (n=233), their siblings (n=297) and their peers, show that:27
•
•
•
•
•
4.
More than three quarters of the young offenders (76.2%) had themselves been a victim of crime –
they had been victims of mainly assault (44.1%); robbery (43.5%); theft (22.3%) and home
burglary (15.8%).
The households of the young offenders were violent - 43.3% offenders reported having witnessed
a violent interpersonal dispute in their homes, while the same was reported by one in four of their
siblings (26.9%) and roughly one in five of their care-givers (22.3%). The victims of this violence
were mainly other members of the family.
Also, criminal activity was prevalent in many of these households - one in three reported knowing
family members who were engaged in illicit activities that could get them into trouble with the law
(35.9%) and when asked if they knew family members who had, in the year preceding the
interview, dealt or sold any drugs, 21% of the young offenders reported that they did
More than trouble with the law, it is clear that for many of the young offenders, the imprisonment of
members of their families is a relatively common experience. A total of 165 of the 395 young
offenders (41.8%) reported that a member of their family had been imprisoned, before their own
incarceration.
Awareness of criminality in their neighbourhoods was very high – 84.6% of the young offenders
reported they knew people in their neighbourhoods who were involved in activities that could get
them into trouble with the law, and 79.2% of these respondents said they knew people in their
neighbourhoods who made a living from crime. This wide-ranging awareness of crime in the
immediate community was corroborated by 70.4% of the offender’s siblings and more than half of
their caregivers (51.1%).
IN THE HALL OF MIRRORS: THE POLICY RESPONSE TO YOUTH CRIME
As indicated above, the normalisation of crime and violence or South Africa’s “culture of violence” has
been a topic of academic and public discourse for some time. Yet, I would argue that this is precisely
the issue that South African crime reduction policy, or, at least the implementation of that policy, has
missed.
For instance, analysis of the development and implementation of South Africa’s National Crime
Prevention Strategy, which specifically articulated a developmental approach to crime reduction
involving the range of functions associated with the “social cluster” in support of the activities of the
law enforcement agencies, indicates that it was “… compromised at its inception in 1996 by the
differing political needs of the new politicians and bureaucratic competition in the newly created
Department of Safety and Security” and rapidly became more “a statement of vision than a strategy”28
Indeed, it may be argued that the only parts of the strategy that were implemented were those
concerned with improvements to the criminal justice system (CJS) - specifically, the Business
Against Crime supported Integrated Justice System programme that aimed at improving the
management of offenders and victims and the flow of information through the CJS and which put in
projects intended to enhance systems of reporting, recording and investigation at police stations and
detective units, improve the administration of the courts and strengthen the sentencing regime, reduce
escapes from prison and parole violations.29
It is also clear that the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security, which set the policy framework for
an “inter-locking” approach to law enforcement and “social crime prevention” was, from the date of its
27
This research, together with research analyzing the key factors that build resilience to crime, will be published later in
2008.
28
See Rauch, J. “Changing step: crime prevention policy in South Africa” in Pelser, E (ed) 2000. Crime Prevention
Partnerships: Lessons from Practice. 2000. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies
29
See Rauch.J. ibid.
9
Cabinet approval, almost wholly ignored – in favour of a high-density and tough policing and
sentencing approach. This has meant that the key social and situational crime prevention policy
provisions contained in these policy documents – intended specifically to address the developmental
issues related to the “culture of violence” have either not been implemented, or, where there has been
an attempt at implementation, at anywhere near the scope and scale envisaged by those who drafted
and approved the policy.
The main reason for this, I would argue, is the continuous rhetoric associated with the supposedly
tough approach adopted by the police following the 1999 elections – a public and political rhetoric that
consistently puts the police at the centre of “a war against crime”. Publicly articulated through the
ritualised release of police crime statistics which attempt to show that crime has “stabilised” and
therefore the police are “winning the war” and, more sensationally, by the vacuous statements of
public figures, from the late Steve Tshwete’s “ons gaan hulle moer” to the more recent “shoot the
bastards!” from Susan Shabangu, the Deputy Minister for Safety and Security, this rhetoric positions
the police as the primary crime reduction agency. This has allowed the Departments of Social
Development, Education, Health, Housing and Transport to either ignore or abdicate their crimeprevention responsibilities - crime is the responsibility of the police. Today, the function of Social
Crime Prevention (as it was clumsily called in the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security) is the
responsibility of a small unit in the SAPS.
Importantly too, this approach posits crime in South Africa as the function of “others”, “them”, “the
criminals” who can somehow be readily identified and dealt with (by the police, courts and prisons).
And that is the strategic misconception – “they” are actually “us”, “the criminals” are our children. As
this paper has tried to show, for far too many young South Africans, crime and violence is an intrinsic
feature of socialisation, an inherent feature of personal development. Yet, policy implementation has
continuously focussed outwards, when it should have looked inwards.
Now, none of this should be read to imply that South Africa should not improve the efficiency of the
agencies of its criminal justice system – the police (especially the detective service), the courts and
functioning of the prisons. Such improvements are necessary (if only to enhance public confidence in
the state) but they will surely not be sufficient - particularly if the point of it all is to change a value
system, a “culture” held by a significant proportion of South Africa’s youth.
Simply put, if the real issue is that if South Africa is required to turn the cultural tables, make “normal”
crime and violence “abnormal”, make it exceptional rather than “routine” and “everyday” then there are
much better places to start than the criminal justice system. South Africa’s recidivism rate – variously
“guesstimated” at upwards of 66% 30- bears this out, as does the CJCP research on young offenders
which shows that imprisonment was a fairly constant feature in their lives: half of them (49.4%)
reported that they had been incarcerated prior to the offence for which they were currently
incarcerated – for one in five of these offenders (21.3%), twice before.
Also, a stream of empirical evaluative research indicates that “parenting variables” mediate some
80% of the factors like “family dissolution, unemployment, geographic mobility and household
crowding on juvenile participation in crime” 31 and demonstrates that an “aggregate level variable
measuring parenting quality … mediates the effects of structural variables on crime”.32
Fortunately, there appears to be a developing legal and policy framework that acknowledges, if
sometimes tacitly, a more developmental approach to the issue. For instance, the provisions of the
Children’s Act (No.30 of 2005 and its Amendment Act of 2006 [B19F-2006], the Education Laws
Amendment Act (No.31 of 2007) and the provisions of the Child Justice Bill are good examples, as is
30
There is no reliable figure for this as yet, but anecdotally, most analysts settle on upwards of two-thirds.
See Laub J.H & Sampson R.J 1988. “Unraveling families and delinquency: a reanalysis of the Gluek’s data,” Criminology,
26.
32
See Weatherburn, D & Lind, B. “What mediates the macro-level effects of economic and social stress on crime” in France,
A & Homel R. 2007. Pathways and Crime Prevention. Theory, policy and practice. Willan Publishing: Devon
31
10
the recently announced R10-billion Department of Education’s Early Childhood Development
Programme. Also, the inclusion of explicit crime prevention provisions in some of the Urban Renewal
Programme sites and within the Integrated Development Programmes of some of the metro and other
local authorities are positive developments.
This framework may provide the space for a more coherent, developmental and preventative
approach in the future – a dedicated risk-based strategy for reducing youth crime and violence.
5.
A NEW DEAL FOR SOUTH AFRICAN YOUTH? TOWARDS A RISK-BASED STRATEGY
Given South African demographics, the scale of youth crime and violence, its constant replication and
the debilitating effect on South Africa, I would argue that a re-think is required – it is not enough to
simply hope that the potentially crime preventive provisions of the new social policy would, if
implemented effectively, have the desired effect. Rather, I think that what is required is a dedicated
crime reduction policy and a costed strategy for its implementation, a strategy that provides for
evidence-based amelioration of specific risks faced by South Africa’s youth.
There is a stream of international literature on risk which details specific individual, family, school, and
environmental factors33 and this has been taken up locally by a range of authors.34 However, for
South Africa one problem with the literature and the approach it outlines is that of scale - this is mainly
because the risk factors that are analysed and addressed in the developed world (particularly Europe
and North America) refer to conditions in specific, contained localities (usually a few inner-city blocks)
which can be identified and targeted for multiple interventions. In South Africa, these factors describe
the conditions of the majority of the population. So, all the risk factors for crime and violence in South
Africa have not, as yet, been weighted or prioritised and therefore, analyses tend to be fairly broad.
Nevertheless, the research does indicate five key principles that may be useful for guiding the content
of a dedicated youth crime reduction strategy.
•
Crime and particularly violent crime is typically a youthful male enterprise – this is a universal
phenomenon, and the age of first offence is typically early teens and, for those who are caught,
the age of first incarceration is typically late twenties35. This refers to the age-crime curve in which
most offenders, even career criminals, “age-out” of crime as they get older and their criminal
activity gets less violent. This is also why most of the literature refers to youth between the ages of
15-25 being particularly at-risk of offending. However the CJCP research indicates that the age of
first offence in South Africa may well be younger than what is “typical” - the young offenders
reported that they had committed their first criminal act at a very young age – 10-15 years (43.5%);
16-18 (35.9%) and 19-25 (18.7%).
•
Generalised community level interventions are not effective – a review of evaluative literature
indicates that there is “ … very little direct observational evidence that community or
neighbourhood-level surveillance and intervention play a critical role in limiting the amount of crime
that actually occurs.”36 This cautions against too quick a resort to national “moral regeneration
campaigns”, programmes intended to enhance “community ties” through volunteer associations
33
See, for example, Farrington, D & Welsh, B. 2007. Saving Children from a Life of Crime. Oxford: University Press; France
A. & Homel, R. 2007. Pathways and Crime Prevention. Theory, policy and practice. Devon: Willan Publishing, Stenson, K. &
Sullivan, R. 2001. Crime, Risk and Justice. The Politics of Crime in Liberal Democracies. Devon: Willan Publsihing
34
See, for example, Ward, C. “Young people’s violent behaviour: social learning in context” in Burton. P (ed) 2007.
Someone stole my smile. An exploration of the causes of youth violence in South Africa. Cape Town: Centre for Justice and
Crime Prevention; Smythe D & Artz, L 2006. “Youth Crime Prevention Indicators”. Presentation for the Alliance for Crime
Prevention, Cape Town, 22 February 2006.
35
See Clear, T. 2007. Imprisoning Communities. How Mass Incarceration makes disadvantaged communities worse. Oxford:
University Press pp 39-41
36
See Weatherburn, D & Lind, B. “What mediates the macro-level effects of economic and social stress on crime” in France
A. & Homel, R. 2007. Pathways and Crime Prevention. Theory, policy and practice. Devon: Willan Publishing,p.132.
11
and recreational facilities and empowering community-based organisations, like the Community
Police Forums (although these may be good ideas for a variety of other reasons).
•
Generalised deterrence is not effective – programme evaluation indicates that programmes
designed to make youth “aware” of crime or “scared” of its consequences through “exposure” or
stern messaging from authority figures at best do nothing (they cause no harm), or, at worst,
encourage criminal behaviour.37
•
Targeted early preventative intervention is key – there is much evaluation literature that provides
“guidance on the risk factors to target and demonstrates that impressive results can be achieved
by using a number of early prevention programmes that target these risk factors”38 Mostly, these
programmes focus on building functional families
•
Systemic support to sustain early intervention is as important - this refers simply to the means by
which the impact of early intervention programmes are built on and sustained over the early lifecourse of at-risk individuals , in other words: “… the mechanisms that sustain the effects should
be given as much attention as the prevention initiatives or interventions that result in these
effects”39. Programmes here focus primarily on the management of safe schools and immediate
post-school activities, especially the transition from school to (often temporary or sporadic)
employment.
Given this, and the analysis of the normalisation of crime and violence above, how would these
principles be incorporated into the content of a risk-based strategy for reducing youth crime and
violence in South Africa?
Clearly, the focus of the strategy would need to be on the home, school and immediate post school
environments of at-risk youth. However, the first and perhaps most difficult issue would be to identify
who qualifies as being “at-risk”. As already indicated, there is much work to be done on weighing and
prioritising risk factors in South Africa, but from what research indicates and for purposes of debate, I
would propose the following six criteria:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Residence in a locality with high rates of violent crime
Residence in a household with reported domestic violence
Personal victimisation – particularly a history of violent victimisation
The conviction of a parent or sibling on a criminal charge
Presence of poor cognitive ability and attainment, as expressed in seriously disruptive behaviour in
learning environments
Prior offending behaviour
In effect, these criteria would limit the implementation of the interventions to the most violence prone
areas of the country – the 70-odd priority police station areas that record more than 60% of all violent
crime in the country 40 and that is one of the purposes of these criteria.
Given these criteria, the key elements of a comprehensive strategy would be the following:
•
A coherent and sustained family behavioural support programme that focuses on dysfunctional
and violent households, particularly those headed by young single mothers
37
See, for example Lynman, D.R, Milich, R, Zimmerman, R et al “Project DARE: No effects at 10-year follow up” in Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology . 1999 Vol. 67 No. 4. pp 590-593 and Petrosino, A, Petrosino C.T. & Beuhler J. “Scared
Straight and other Juvenile Awareness Programmes” in Welsh,B & Farrington , D. 2007 Preventing Crime: What works for
children, offender, victims and places. Springer Press
38
Farrington, D & Welsh B. op cit. p. 168
39
See Hayes, A. “Why early in life is not enough: timing and sustainability in prevention and early intervention” in France &
Hommel, op cit. pp. 214-216.
40
See Annual Report of the South African Police Service for 2006/2007. Pretoria: SAPS.
12
For instance, in the CJCP research on young offenders, just one in five said they lived with both
parents (23%) and just 29 respondents (7.4%) indicated that they had had a positive and
consistent relationship with their father - more than half of the respondents (53%) indicated that
they had not received emotional support from their fathers (who were either not around, or, if they
were, did not seem to care much). This was affirmed by just about half of their siblings (48.1%).
•
A dedicated and comprehensive early childhood development programme that provides
developmental support to the children coming from dysfunctional households
Allied to the family support programme, this would aim at improving cognitive abilities, learning
ability, self-esteem and empathy for others.
•
A sustained effort to improve the management and quality of South Africa’s schools, so that they
function more positively as places of positive learning and socialisation,
Here there is already some activity and the rigorous implementation of the provisions of the
Education Laws Amendment Act (No.31 of 2007) will no doubt help as will enhanced
implementation of the safer school strategies already in place in some provinces – the better of
which aim at developing a community-wide sense of the school as a “node of care” or “sacred
space”41
•
A 12-month mandatory and comprehensive national youth civic service programme that focuses
on developmental support to those young people aged between 15-25 who are not in the
education system or working or who have been released from incarceration.
Building on the aims of the current National Youth Service, namely offering “… excluded groups
the opportunity to reach their full potential for mainstream participation by gaining experience of
service at community level, gaining hard and soft skills, increasing their self-esteem …”42 through
the provision of opportunities they could not get through the formal education system and,
importantly, a structured exit to employment opportunities (including self-employment). This could
entail review of the Expanded Public Works Programme (EWP) and a more connected tie-in
between the youth service programme and the EWP.
•
For young offenders, upgraded and sustained diversion programmes and a monitoring system for
young offenders
Based on the principals of restorative justice and community service, many diversion programmes
are already in place and to upgrade these, the development of minimum standards by the HSRC is
clearly helpful.43 However, an obvious gap remains – how to judge whether diversion programmes
are effective or, in other words, a monitoring system that keeps track of young offenders to enable
assessment of repeat offending. Allied to this, a closer connection between diversion programmes
and family support programmes should be established.
•
For young offenders who have been incarcerated, a systematic exit and re-integration programme
The specific aim of this programme would be to limit repeat offending and recidivism. So, linked to
current education programmes for young offenders inside prison and the probation system, this
should aim at developing a sense of personal responsibility for one’s actions and empathy for the
impact of one’s actions on others, as well as a step-by-step programme for positive reintegration
into society, including links to the family support programme and the youth civic service
programme.
41
Speech by Ms Gugu Ndebele, Deputy-Director General, Department of Education at the Launch of the CJCP National
rd
Schools Violence Study at the Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg, 23 April 2008.
42
See Perold, H, Patel, L, Carapinha, R & Mohamed, S. “Civic Service Policy in South Africa” in Research Partnerships Build
the Service Field in Africa. Special Issue on Civic Service in the Southern African Development Community, March 2007.
Braamfontein: The Social Work Practitioner-Researcher, University of Johannesburg.
43
See Dawes, A & van der Merwe, A. The Development of Minimum Standards for Diversion Programmes in the Child
Justice System: Final Report for NICRO, October 2004, HSRC.
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6.
CONCLUSION
To conclude this paper, I wish to highlight two obvious and immediate criticisms of the proposals
outlined above – likely cost; and instituting perverse incentives.
The cost issue is a real one – the types of programmes outlined above do not come cheap, especially
at the scale required in South Africa. However, I think the real question is not whether South Africa
can afford to implement these interventions, but rather, whether we can afford not to. The only
alternative is a continuation of the current largely punitive approach which emphasises the functions of
the criminal justice system and this can only result in a massive expansion of the prison system. Not
only do we know that this will not be effective in mitigating the normalisation of crime and violence
(actually it may well exacerbate it), we also know that this is also very expensive. One analyst has
recently proposed a prison expansion programme costing R60-billion over 10 years44 (and this is just
building costs – it excludes the R125 per day costs of keeping an offender in prison). However, upfront expenditure on effective preventative programmes lessens the costs incurred by the criminal
justice system by thinning the numbers going through that system in the first place. In other words, it
makes financial sense to invest in prevention, rather than “a cure” of very doubtful efficacy. It also
makes political and social sense to invest in the development of the country’s youth, rather than its
likely imprisonment.
The second issue – that of providing perverse incentives is more tricky and refers to the acquisition of
required social services through deliberately illegitimate means. It is actually an issue of state capacity.
In this case, some of the interventions outlined above may incentivise criminality if that is the only
means of acquiring some of the services. Here the proposed family support and early childhood
development programmes come readily to mind. So, the proposals are predicated on the assumption
of generally improving public services – especially those associated with the functions of the
Departments of Social Development and Education. However, this assumption is implicit in all social
policy proposals and improving service delivery is a constant theme for the management of these
departments. Therefore, the point here is not to elaborate on the institutional mechanisms and
accountability structures required to improve service delivery – rather it is simply to highlight that
declining or deteriorating service delivery in the youth crime sector may well have consequences
greater than may be anticipated.
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44
See Altbeker, A. The Great South African Crime Debate, in Business Day, September 28, 2007
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